@article{uoadl:2977866,
    volume = "42",
    number = "3",
    pages = "531-538",
    journal = "Managerial and Decision Economics",
    issn = "0143-6570, 1099-1468",
    BIBTEX_ENTRY = "article",
    year = "2021",
    author = "Constantatos, C. and Pinopoulos, I.N.",
    abstract = "We endogenize the contract-type choice in a vertically related market. We relate that choice to the distribution of bargaining power between the upstream and downstream partner in contract-terms negotiation. For two wide classes of demand functions, the upstream (downstream) firm prefers a two-part tariff (linear) contract, and thus, we model the contract-type choice as a noncooperative game. When a firm has strong bargaining power over the contract terms, risk dominance selects its least-preferred contract type: the strong firm has more to lose in case of disagreement over the contract type. Under relative symmetry in bargaining power, risk dominance selects the efficient two-part tariff. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.",
    title = "On the choice of contract types in vertical relations",
    doi = "10.1002/MDE.3261"
}