TY - JOUR
TI - Strategic customers in a transportation station when is it optimal to wait?
AU - Manou, A.
AU - Economou, A.
AU - Karaesmen, F.
JO - Computers and Operations Research
PY - 2014
VL - 62
TODO - 4
SP - 910-925
PB - 
SN - null
TODO - 10.1287/opre.2014.1280
TODO - Game theory, Clearing system;  Nash equilibrium strategies;  Partial information;  Queueing strategic customers;  Unobservable, Sales
TODO - We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.
ER -