On the problem of realism and the concept of truth in quantum mechanics

Doctoral Dissertation uoadl:1308884 671 Read counter

Unit:
Τομέας Φιλοσοφίας και Θεωρίας της Επιστήμης και της Τεχνολογίας
Library of the School of Science
Deposit date:
2016-07-11
Year:
2016
Author:
Νικολάου Μιχάλης
Dissertation committee:
Βασίλειος Καρακώστας Καθηγητής ΕΚΠΑ
Original Title:
Επί του προβλήματος του ρεαλισμού και της έννοιας της αλήθειας στην κβαντική μηχανική
Languages:
Greek
Translated title:
On the problem of realism and the concept of truth in quantum mechanics
Summary:
Scientific realism purports to discover the determinate and independent from
the mind structure of the world, while supporting a correspondence theory of
truth. However, the inherent probabilistic character of quantum mechanics is
not compatible with the standard metaphysical view of reality. Any expectation
for the replacement of quantum mechanics by a realistic kind of scientific
theory, impinges on the dictates of Bell's theorem. This does not necessarily
mean that the intended realistic aspect of «discovery» should be abandoned and
replaced by «invention», as many anti-realists like Michael Dummett allege, on
the ground that efforts such as those of Hillary Putnam, to reconcile realism
with the theory of quantum mechanics have failed. Axiomatic dysfunctions in the
foundations of classical scientific theories, as well as the possibility of
re-appraisal of the interpretation of the state vector in Hilbert space quantum
mechanics due to Bub-Clifton 'uniqueness theorem', prompt our research towards
the local natural frames of reference as fields of constitution of realism. In
this way, we attempt to shape a contextual realistic interpretation and develop
an account of truth of contextual correspondence appropriate to the quantum
domain of discourse.
Keywords:
Quantum Mechanics, Realism/Antirealism Conflict, Objectivity, Truth, Contextualism
Index:
No
Number of index pages:
0
Contains images:
Yes
Number of references:
243
Number of pages:
vii, 241
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