Supervisors info:
Απόστολος Μπουρνέτας Καθηγητής ΕΚΠΑ (επιβλέπων), Οικονόμου Αντώνιος Αναπλ. Καθηγητής ΕΚΠΑ, Μηλολιδάκης Κωνσταντίνος Καθηγητής ΕΚΠΑ
Summary:
The essay is structured as follows: At the beginning of chapter 3, we are
analyzing the basic model of one single queue where customers decide whether
they will join the queue or not, or whether they will leave without being
served. The goal is to maximize profit under two different points of view: The
system administrator allows the customers to act considering their own profit
or he tries to maximize social welfare. Following this, these two values are
compared and the result emerges that the percentage of the customers being
served under the social welfare parameter is smaller or equal to the respective
percentage under strategy conditions, whereas the system’s profit is always
larger or equal. This leads us to conclude that if the customers are allowed to
join the system having their personal profit as the sole parameter, then the
total welfare is reduced, since there is congestion and the queuing times in
the system are increased. Following this simple model, in chapter 3, we expand
this to a two-queue customer model, where the customers come and, apart from
deciding whether they shall join the system or not, they decide as well which
of these two queues they will join. The results emerging from this model are
equivalent to these of the basic single queue model, concerning the relation of
the total percentage of the customers being served.
Keywords:
Game theory, Queueing models, Equilibrium Nash, Social benefit
