Unit:
Κατεύθυνση Στατιστική και Επιχειρησιακή ΈρευναLibrary of the School of Science
Author:
Μπενιουδάκης Μύρων
Supervisors info:
Μπουρνέτας Απόστολος Καθηγητής (Επιβλέπων), Μηλολιδάκης Κωνσταντίνος Αναπλ. Καθηγητής, Οικονόμου Αντώνης Αναπλ. Καθηγητής
Original Title:
Στρατηγικές ισορροπίας σε ουρές με αποζημίωση και πελάτες με αποστροφή κινδύνου
Translated title:
Customer equilibrium policies in queues with delay compensation and risk aversion
Summary:
We consider a single server Markovian queueing system with strategic customer
behavior. Arriving customers decide whether to join the queue or balk. The
queue length is not observable at the time of the join/balk decision. A
customer who joins earns a reward upon service completion and incurs an
entrance fee plus a waiting cost per unit time of remaining in the system.
Customers are not generally risk neutral, but rather maximize the expected
value of an appropriately defined utility function of the net profit. In this
context an important question is the identification of symmetric Nash
equilibrium strategies in the game played by the customers.In this work the
service provider considers introducing a policy of complete or partial
compensation for the delay each joining customer faces, and wants to identify
the optimal entrance price/compensation policy that maximizes his expected
profit. In the case of linear customer utility function, i.e. when the
customers are risk neutral, we show that introducing compensation does not
increase the service provider’s profits. On the other hand, when customers are
risk averse, then it is optimal for the service provider to compensate fully
for the delay and charge an appropriately entrance fee. Furthermore, the
optimal price is equal to the one maximizing the expected social welfare in the
risk neutral case. Finally we perform some computational experiments, to
explore the impact of several system parameters such as the service rate, delay
cost etc, on the equilibrium arrival rate and the service provider’s profits.
Keywords:
Unobservable queues, Risk aversion, Profit maximazation, Risk neutral customers, Compensation
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