Τομέας Άλγεβρας Γεωμετρίας
Library of the School of Science

2013-06-13

2013

Κότσιαλου Γραμματεία

Ελευθέριος Κυρούσης Καθηγητής

Generalized second price ad auction under budget constraints

English

Δημοπρασίες δεύτερης τιμής για διαφημίσεις με περιορισμό στον προυπολογισμό

In this Master thesis, we analyze known, either incentive-compatible or not,
mechanisms which can be used in the online auctions for selling advertisement
space in a web page. The most of the work focus on the Generalized Second Price
mechanism under budgets constraints.
Firstly, we show with counterexamples that specific properties of envy-free
assignments (presented in ``Position Auctions” of Hal. R. Varian) are not
satisfied by pure Nash equilibria sets. Secondly, we present counterexamples
for the main theorem in ``Repeated Budgeted Second Price Ad Auction’’ of A.
Arnon and Y. Mansour, which concerns the existence of pure Nash equilibrium. We
present a new version of the previous theorem and moreover, a new condition
under which balance exists for two agents with non-identical, conservative bids.
Finally, we analyze the auction model that will be presented in ``On the
Stability of Generalized Second Price Auctions with Budgets’’ of J. Diaz, I.
Giotis, L. Kirousis, E. Markakis and M. Serna. More precisely, we examine the
relation between Nash and envy-free equilibria when each agent has a budget
constraint, and demonstrate the main results of this paper.

Auctions, Generalized Second-Price, Budgets, Envy-free assignments, Nash equilibrium

Yes

77

Yes

15

77

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https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/object/1321091