Supervisors info:
Ρεβέκκα-Εμμανουέλα Παπαδοπούλου, Επικ. Καθηγήτρια Δικαίου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, Nομική Σχολή, Τομέας Διεθνών Σπουδών, Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών
Μεταξία I. Κουσκουνά, Επικ. Καθηγήτρια Δικαίου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, Nομική Σχολή, Τομέας Διεθνών Σπουδών, Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών
Αναστάσιος Γουργουρίνης, Λέκτορας Διεθνούς Δικαίου, Nομική Σχολή, Τομέας Διεθνών Σπουδών, Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών
Summary:
This paper focuses on the contrast between ex ante objective justifications, and ex post dynamic efficiency defences as arguments for the justification of prima facie abuse of dominance. The first category of arguments can function as a negative precondition of abuse and co-define the scope of application of article 102 TFEU, while the second category isn't accepted by the ECJ due to their ex post (a) and non objective nature (b). They function per definition as exceptions (as the dominant company doesn't deny the abuse and only invokes reasons for the ex post allowance of the abusive conduct) and don't, thus, fit into the logic of article 102 TFEU, which doesn't encompass a disposition similar to the one of 101 (3) TFEU. Together with the avoidance of the conversion of the "as efficient competitor test" into an indirect efficiency argument, the paper highlights the inherent reasons for the -in substance- inadmissibility of efficiency arguments. The main reasons are, among others, their vague and non-objective nature, the inability to meet the burden of proof and the improbability of the passing on of efficiency gains to consumers. On the other hand, as far as objective justifications are concerned, ex ante static economic arguments justify volume rebates and price differentiations, while loyalty rebates seem unjustifiable. Furthermore, in the same context, certain cases of legitimate business conduct, objective necessity and state imposed behaviour prevent the application of article 102 TFEU. Public interest justifications aren't, though, generally accepted as objective justifications of prima facie abuse. Last but not least, the paper also examines the scope of objectively justifiable conduct in case of refusal to deal or to give access in "essential facilities", whether or not combined with industrial property exclusive rights.
Keywords:
objective justification, efficiency, exception by nature, scope of application, competition on the merits, beating competition, meeting competition, formalistic approach, more economic approach, effects based approach, total welfare, consumer welfare, aggregate consumer welfare, predatory pricing, refusal to deal, average variable costs, average total costs, legitimate business conduct, objective necessity, state imposed behaviour, public interest, essential facilities, quantity/volume rebates, fidelity/loyalty inducing rebates, performance rebates, retrospective rebates, target rebates, differentiated pricing, cost structure, formalistic approach, more economic approach, effects based approach, ordoliberalism, consumer, dominant undertaking, prima facie abuse, negative precondition of abuse, dynamic efficiencies, static economic justifications, burden of proof, vague nature, reversed causative link, petitio principii, probatio diabolica, authoritarian conditionality, transfer of efficiency gains to the consumer, presumption, hypothetical weighting, exclusionary intention, as efficient competitor
