Dissertation committee:
Θεοχαράκης Νικόλαος, Αναπληρωτής Καθηγητής ΕΚΠΑ - επιβλέπων,
Δαλαμάγκας Βασίλειος, Ομότιμος Καθηγητής ΕΚΠΑ,
Βάμβουκας Γεώργιος, Αναπληρωτής Καθηγητής ΟΠΑ,
Κωστελέτου Νικολίνα, Αναπληρώτρια Καθηγήτρια ΕΚΠΑ,
Λεβεντίδης Ιωάννης, Αναπληρωτής Καθηγητής ΕΚΠΑ,
Παπανδρέου Ανδρέας, Καθηγητής ΕΚΠΑ,
Παπαπέτρου Ευαγγελία, Καθηγήτρια ΕΚΠΑ
Summary:
The aim of the present dissertation is to further explore the field of fiscal governance, especially the field of political models of fiscal balance. The main interest focuses on the examination of the relation between fiscal balance, corruption and the political-institutional framework in Greece, during the period 1980-2012. In addition, we examine the probability of detection of corruption in the short and long term, the potential fiscal benefits from the detection of corruption, the total and partial rate of return of spending on constraining corruption, their impact on GDP as long as the crowding effects. We further examine the impact of both corruption and political -institutional framework on the financing and the efficiency of the auditing mechanisms, by using a neoclassical model of government decision making. The dissertation consists of 8 chapters:
• In chapter 1, we present a literature review on the political and institutional
determinants of fiscal balance.
• In chapter 2, we present a literature review on corruption.
• In chapter 3, we introduce a model for investigating the interaction between factors, such as corruption, political-institutional determinants (bureaucracy, political stability, socioeconomic condition, shadow economy) and fiscal balance.
• In chapter 4, we present an econometric analysis of the impact of corruption on fiscal balance, in the short and long run. Furthermore we estimate the potential fiscal benefits from detecting corruption.
• In chapter 5, we deal with the impact of the political and institutional framework on the auditing mechanism as well as with the causality relationships between political and institutional variables.
• In chapter 6, we examine how spending on detecting corruption affects crucial aspects of the economy. To be precise we examine the extent to which spending on anti-corruption policies affects the choice between private and public investments (crowding effects), GDP and (total and partial) rates of return.
• In chapter 7, we focus both on the government-decision making process concerning the detection of corruption and the determinants of corruption.
• Finally, in chapter 8, we summarize the main findings of the dissertation and proceed with suggesting appropriate economic-policy measures to cope with the problem of corruption.
Keywords:
Budget, Fiscal Balance, Corruption, Political system
