Unit:
Κατεύθυνση Λογική και Θεωρία Αλγορίθμων και ΥπολογισμούLibrary of the School of Science
Supervisors info:
Δημήτρης Φωτάκης, Επίκουρος Καθηγητής, ΣΗΜΜΥ, ΕΜΠ
Original Title:
Change-Averse Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games
Translated title:
Change-Averse Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games
Summary:
We introduce a new model in Congestion Games, where the players choose their strategy
according to the new cost they incur, as well as the difference between their current state
and the new state they are considering. The latter part of the decision-making process is
based on the assumption that players who are considering a signi cant change are less prone to take it, than they do on a similar choice. This model has analogies with ϵ approximate equilibria. We can easily see that this new model provides a richer set of equilibria than approximate equilibria. Christodoulou et al. prove that as far as Linear Congestion Games are concerned, we have good bounds on the Price of Anarchy. We prove that similar results are true in our case. We also prove that players do actually converge on such an equilibrium and relatively quickly.
Main subject category:
Science
Other subject categories:
Mathematics
Keywords:
Congestion Games, Nash equilibrium, Price of Anarchy, Convergence
