Recent developments in the interface between intellectual property law and competition law in view of the Lundbeck decision

Postgraduate Thesis uoadl:2863864 350 Read counter

Unit:
Κατεύθυνση Άυλα Αγαθά και Ανταγωνισμός
Library of the School of Law
Deposit date:
2019-02-21
Year:
2019
Author:
Gavala Ioanna
Supervisors info:
Εμμανουήλ Μαστρομανώλης (Επίκουρος Καθηγητής Νομικής Σχολής ΕΚΠΑ)
Ευθυμία Κινινή (Επίκουρη Καθηγήτρια Νομικής Σχολής ΕΚΠΑ)
Δημήτριος Τζουγανάτος (Καθηγητής Νομικής Σχολής ΕΚΠΑ)
Original Title:
Σύγχρονες εξελίξεις στο ζήτημα της χάραξης ορίων μεταξύ του δικαίου της βιομηχανικής ιδιοκτησίας και των κανόνων ανταγωνισμού με αφορμή την υπόθεση Lundbeck
Languages:
English
Greek
Translated title:
Recent developments in the interface between intellectual property law and competition law in view of the Lundbeck decision
Summary:
This thesis discusses one of the most controversial practices in the pharmaceutical sector and a highly topical issue in the interface between intellectual property law and competition law: “pay for delay” agreements. Such agreements constitute settlements of patent disputes that arise between originator companies and generic manufacturers, when the latter attempt to entry the market. Under “pay for delay” agreements, the generic manufacturer commit to delaying their market entry in exchange for a payment by the originator company. From the perspective of pharmaceutical companies, patent settlements are pro-competitive and the rational choice when companies want to avoid the costs and the uncertainty of patent litigation. From the perspective of competition authorities, such agreements are anti-competitive, particularly when the motive of the agreement is the sharing of monopoly profits to the detriment of consumers. In the Lundbeck decision, the first European court decision on “pay for delay” agreements, the General Court upheld the Commission’s view that such agreements constitute a restriction of competition by object within the meaning of article 101 TFEU. Previously, the Supreme Court of the USA, in the Actavis case, had found that “pay for delay” agreements can raise anticompetitive concerns, but suggested that they should be evaluated under the Rule of Reason, hence by examining their effects on competition. While the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Lundbeck case is still pending and the “pay for delay” debate still open, this thesis analyses the critical parameters for the legal assessment of these agreements and presents the alternative approaches that can be found in theory and case law.
Main subject category:
Law and Legislation
Keywords:
patent settlements, “pay for delay”, reverse payments, pharmaceutical patent, generics, pharmaceutical sector, restriction of competition, Lundbeck, Actavis
Index:
No
Number of index pages:
0
Contains images:
Yes
Number of references:
40
Number of pages:
68
File:
File access is restricted only to the intranet of UoA.

thesis final.pdf
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