Abstract:
In the current study, the challenges, the priorities and the systemic opportunities
regarding Greece’s strategic behavior and its overall policy initiatives in the Aegean in the post-Cold War era are described and analyzed. In accordance with the Dardanelles Strait, the Aegean Sea represents an integral part of a trade passage of great significance for the regional balance of power, as well as for the planet-level effects on the balance of power among the Great Powers.
Hence, the strategic behavior of the littoral states - Greece and Turkey - owns distinctive value for the geopolitics of the Greater Middle East, especially in the aftermath of the end of the bipolar order of the international system. This is examined in the light of the questions above: What are the static geopolitical aspects determining the balance of power in the Aegean Sea and what are the new challenges of the post-Cold War system?
What are the political-strategic initiatives taken by Greece and what is the level of effectiveness within the framework of national interest implementation?
The crux of the matter relates to the great geopolitical significance of the trade sea passage of Dardanelles-Aegean and the position of the intervening actors on the climax of power not permitting them to act as the sole geopolitical factors. This is implemented by the super-systemic actors and of course, the dominating naval powers, as it was the case of the U.S. in the post-war era. Nevertheless, the strategy of small and middle powers may give answers to such challenges when leadership capacity and strategic plans will exist in an active way vis-à-vis the inter-state dilemmas, especially when referring to Greece owning - according to the International Law of Seas - the dominant role in the Aegean Sea.
For instance, the plan and implementation of patron-client relations could contribute productively towards this aim via the interconnection of interests and the cultivation of a situation of mutual commitment between the dominating naval power and Athens. On the contrary, the failure of Greece to move towards this choice deals with the overall failure of Greece’s strategy in the Aegean Sea in the post-Cold era, referring to deterrence credibility, managing security dilemmas and last but not least, balancing the Turkish threat.
