



National and Kapodistrian  
UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF SCIENCE

Division of History of Science and Technology

Postgraduate Programme in History and Philosophy of Science and Technology

PhD Thesis

## **Between politics and technopolitics:**

critical episodes in energy and transportation infrastructures in  
colonial Cyprus

**Ανάμεσα στην πολιτική και τεχνοπολιτική:**

κρίσιμα επεισόδια στις υποδομές ενέργειας και μεταφορών στην αποικιακή  
Κύπρο

**Serkan Karas**

ΔΤ 008/02

Advisory Committee:

Professor Kostas Gavroglu (supervisor)

Lecturer Dr Stathis Arapostathis

Associate Professor Aristotle Tympas

Examining Committee:

Professor Jean Christianidis, Assistant Professor Faidra Papanelopoulou, Professor Costas Dimitracopoulos, Professor Theodore Arabatzis, Members of Advisory Committee

July 2014, Athens

# Contents-Περιεχόμενα

---

List of Abbreviations- Λίστα Ακρωνυμίων

List of Tables – Λίστα Πινάκων

List of Maps- Λίστα Χαρτών

List of Photographs- Λίστα Εικόνων

Acknowledgments- Ευχαριστίες

Prologue- Πρόλογος **1**

Chapter 1. Integrating techno-politics into politics: Theoretical frameworks

Κεφάλαιο 1. Ενσωματώνοντας την τεχνοπολιτική στην πολιτική: θεωρητικά πλαίσια **5**

Chapter 2. The Colonial period in the history of Cyprus

Κεφάλαιο 2. Η Αποικιακή περίοδος στην ιστορία της Κύπρου **34**

Chapter 3. The (non)-making of railway in Cyprus: railway lines towards the sea

Κεφάλαιο 3. Η (μη) κατασκευή σιδηρόδρομου στην Κύπρο: σιδηροδρομικές γραμμές προς τη θάλασσα **76**

Chapter 4. Negotiating/translating imperial policy, nationalism and vested interests into harbours: the making of Famagusta Harbour and Larnaca Harbour improvements

Κεφάλαιο 4. Διαπραγματεύοντας/μεταφράζοντας την αυτοκρατορική πολιτική, τον εθνικισμό και τα συμφέροντα στα λιμάνια: η κατασκευή του λιμανιού της Αμμοχώστου και τα έργα στο λιμάνι της Λάρνακας **156**

Chapter 5: 'Electrifying' Cyprus

Κεφάλαιο 5. «Ηλεκτρίζοντας» την Κύπρο **218**

Chapter 6. Post-war colonial port development: Colonial Development and Welfare Act  
1945

Κεφάλαιο 6. Μεταπολεμική αποικιακή ανάπτυξη των λιμανιών: Νομός περί Αποικιακής Ανάπτυξης και Πρόνοιας του 1945	<b>297</b>
Epilogue- Επίλογος	<b>337</b>
Bibliography-Βιβλιογραφία	<b>351</b>

# Abstract-Περίληψη

---

The current thesis explores the relation of co-production between infrastructure building and governance practices in Cyprus, while demonstrating the relevance of such a relation to the colonial order and its effective reproduction. The study is based upon four case studies of major electrification, harbour and railway construction projects. More specifically, the construction of Famagusta Harbour and Cyprus Government Railway as well as the Larnaca Harbour improvements dated between the late 1890s and the early 1900s comprise the subject of Chapters 3 and 4. The post-Second World War electrification scheme and Famagusta Harbour development projects are examined in Chapters 5 and 6. These case studies are unfolded with the aid of insights, theoretical and analytical tools derived from the history of infrastructures, postcolonial theory and technopolitics.

Η παρούσα διατριβή διερευνά τη σχέση συν-παραγωγής μεταξύ της κατασκευής υποδομών και των πρακτικών διακυβέρνησης στην Κύπρο και καταδεικνύει επίσης τη σημασία της σχέσης αυτής για την αποικιακή τάξη και την επιτυχή αναπαραγωγή της. Η έρευνα αυτή βασίζεται σε τέσσερις περιπτωσιολογικές μελέτες έργων ηλεκτρισμού, κατασκευής λιμανιού και σιδηρόδρομου. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η κατασκευή του λιμανιού της Αμμοχώστου και του Κυπριακού Κυβερνητικού Σιδηρόδρομου καθώς και τα βελτιωτικά έργα στο λιμάνι της Λάρνακας που χρονολογούνται μεταξύ του τέλους της δεκαετίας του 1890 και των αρχών της δεκαετίας του 1900 αποτελούν το θέμα των κεφαλαίων 3 και 4. Το σχέδιο ηλεκτρισμού και τα έργα ανάπτυξης του λιμανιού της Αμμοχώστου που ακολούθησαν το Δεύτερο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο εξετάζονται στα κεφάλαια 5 και 6. Αυτές οι περιπτωσιολογικές μελέτες ξετυλίγονται με τη βοήθεια διαπιστώσεων, αναλυτικών και θεωρητικών εργαλείων που αντλούνται από την ιστορία των υποδομών, τη μετααποικιακή θεωρία και την τεχνοπολιτική.

# List of Abbreviations

---

AKEL (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού/ Progressive Party of Working People)

CA (Crown Agents)

CE (Consulting Engineers)

CGR (Cyprus Government Railway)

CO (Colonial Office)

CS (Chief Secretary or Colonial Secretary)

EAC (Electricity Authority of Cyprus)

EOKA (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών/ National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters))

HC (High Commissioner)

LDF (Locust Destruction Fund)

LTS (Large Technical Systems)

PEO (Παγκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσπονδία / Pancyprian Federation of Labour)

SoS (Secretary of State for the Colonies)

STS (Science, Technology and Society)

TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı/ Turkish Resistance Organisation)

# List of Tables

---

Table 1. The colonies and amount of colonial loans allocate from the Colonial Loans Act 1899. See that Cyprus is the only non-tropic colony in the list	<b>93</b>
Table 1. Extract from the Hall report. Data gathered by Hall about the existing power plants and generators in Cyprus. CO 67/325/2	<b>296</b>
Table 1. Extract from review of Ten-Year Development programme. The list of schemes in the programme. CO 926/116	<b>298</b>

# List of Maps

---

Map 1. Extract of map from the Brown report. The dotted lines stretching southwards from Larnaca represent the provisional route of Larnaca-Limassol. See that Famagusta-Nicosia route passes from the south-eastern Messaoria, closer to the bigger villages of the region. (Famagusta-eastern terminus; Karavostassi-western terminus; Nicosia-centre; Larnaca-southern terminus). CO 67/7, Samuel Brown to George Elliot, 31st March 1879 **81**

Map 2. Extract from the Shelford Report. The proposed route is the line passing in the middle of the Island. Red-dotted lines represent the region from which traffic was expected according to Shelford's estimations. See that Famagusta-Nicosia part follows a path towards the north-east Messaoria (Pritchard's route) while Nicosia-Karavostassi part lies on the route drawn by Samuel Brown. CO 883/6/4, Shelford to Crown Agents, 15th July 1903 **119**

Map 3. Extract from the map in a 1931 railway report. The map shows the competitive roads (blue lines) to the railway (red line). It is indicative to see the traffic and population around the railway route. CO 67/246/1 **119**

# List of Plans

---

- Plan 1. Proposed Famagusta Harbour design of Coode, Son & Matthews. Dark red spot shows the quay area that was acclaimed. See that there are no provisions for the outer harbour. CO 67/121 **173**
- Plan 2. The final design for the Larnaca harbour improvements. There is no breakwater but a sheltering arm for the protection of lighters. CO 67/152 **209**
- Plan 3. Extract from the map of Coode, Son & Matthews. Famagusta Harbour extension works. The green areas are extensions of the quay and area to be dredged for ironclads. The brown area extends the quay by a pier and creates a pocket for sailing vessels outside the area of deep harbour for ironclads. **212**
- Plan 1. Extract from Preece, Cardew & Rider report. This is the proposed Stage 1. See that Grid's first direction of expansion is the load. Besides connecting every big town and city (except mountainous rural areas of Paphos and Karpasia), the transmission line passing over the Troodos Mountain links the Grid with heavy consumers like various mines and hotel resorts. CO 67/325/3 **246**
- Plan 2. Extract from the same report. We see that at Stage 2 the Grid extends to the nearest and most populous villages to the transmission lines. Again Paphos and Karpasia are not connected to the network. CO 67/325/3 **247**
- Plan 3. The proposed Transmission and Distribution System for Cyprus after the completion of Stage 3 We see from the maps that Stage 3 was actually the connection of Paphos and Karpasia-North-East Messaoria region of Cyprus. . CO 67/325/3 **250**
- Plan 1. Extract from Millbourn report. See that extensions are designed on the shore stretching beyond the ancient walls. CO 926/223 **316**
- Plan 2. Extract of Plans of free port zone on the harbour extensions. CO 926/223 **317**
- Plan 3. Extract of plans for new roads feeding the port. See extensions from the shore to the planned Famagusta-Nicosia road (i.e. the old railway route). CO 926/223 **318**

Plan 4. Extract from the map that shows designs of shore and reef schemes. CO 926/224	<b>328</b>
Plan 5. Extract from the plans showing the Shore scheme.CO 926/224	<b>329</b>
Plan 6. Extract from the plans of Reef Scheme. See that this design foresaw reclamation works upon the breakwater to create quay space. CO 926/224	<b>330</b>

# List of Photographs

---

Photograph 1. Picture of Famagusta Harbour extension works. View of harbour entrance from the Southeast Bastion, taken 2nd May 1906. CO 1069/696

**213**

# Acknowledgements

---

I would like to thank all members of my advisory committee. Kostas Gavroglu has been a valuable mentor in every step of my research. The multifaceted support and influence of Stathis Arapostathis has been critical to my work on this dissertation. His experience with British engineering and expertise enriched the story of my dissertation in multiple ways. I also owe a lot to Aristotle Tympas, especially for his deep knowledge and insight in regards to the politics and history of infrastructures.

Having relied extensively on archival material, I had to make long-term research visits in Britain and Cyprus. I could not conduct such an extensive archival research without the funding from the Centenary Bursary awarded by the British School in Athens and the Karen Freeze Fellowship awarded by the Foundation for the History of Technology and the Society for the History of Technology (SHOT).

My parents deserve to be acknowledged for supporting me in the writing of this dissertation. All these years, I have been very lucky to have their honest and constant support. Lastly, I would like to thank Eylem and Ismail for their hospitality during my stay in Cyprus.

# Prologue

---

This study focuses on the history of major infrastructures in colonial Cyprus (1878-1960). More specifically, it introduces four representative stories from railway, electrification and harbour development. These four stories cover the phases of planning and decision-making regarding Cypriot infrastructures. While telling these stories, it aims to combine several threads of relevance to the historiography of technology, STS, and the historiography of Cyprus. First of all, this study may very well be the first academic work that seeks to integrate the history of technology into the historiography of Cyprus. This integration follows naturally from the main academic motive behind this work, which was to explore relations between colonialism, politics and technological infrastructure-building. Each chapter starts in pursuit of the politics behind the decision to construct a particular Cypriot infrastructure. It then follows the arguments and debates leading to the prevalence of specific designs, and, finally, to the (non-)construction of this particular infrastructure. In almost every chapter, this course of events and actions covers processes of localization ('situatedness', 'appropriation'), thereby trying to shed light on processes (e.g. contestation, negotiation, collaboration etc.) that shaped decisions to plan but never build/construct a particular infrastructure.

The dissertation consists of six chapters. The first two offer an introduction to (and synthesis of) theoretical and historiographical considerations. They serve as theoretical, historiographical and historical guides to the rest of the dissertation. Chapter 1 offers a review of suggestive theoretical and historiographical arguments from the fields of history of technology and STS. Through reviewing influential works of the sub-fields like Large Technical Systems (LTS), Postcolonial Studies and Technopolitics, it summarises their insights, analytical tools and methodology. The last part of this chapter presents the scope and objects of the dissertation.

Chapter 2 is tailored to the needs of a reader unfamiliar with the history and historiography of colonial Cyprus. Its purpose is to help the reader obtain the historical

background of the periods under consideration so that she can follow comfortably the discussions, facts and events presented in the following chapters. This chapter does not set a strict historical framework for the rest of the study but serves as the minimum guide necessary. This is necessary when it comes to comparing the historical findings of this study with the available political, economic and social history of colonial Cyprus (1878-1960). The chapter introduces the reader to the basic characteristics of the British rule and regime, major political, economic and social episodes, influential figures of power and wealth of the island, and important issues concerning daily life. Specialised and more focused episodes from the history of Cyprus – such as Chamberlain’s policy, post-war colonial development etc. – are inserted in the rest of the chapter, as the need arises.

Chapter 3 is concerned with the construction of the first and only railway of the island in the framework of the Colonial and Development Welfare Act 1899. The history of the making of this railway has two parts. First, it is concerned with the making of the Famagusta-Nicosia line. The reader may find an informative, we hope, part that traces back old discussions on constructing a railway in Cyprus. Subsequently the reader is informed about Joseph Chamberlain’s legacy in the colonial policy and the choice of Cyprus as a subject of it. The railway comes into the picture as a part of a certain perception regarding agricultural development. The second part of the chapter is about the construction of the railway. The issue of the Larnaca Branch becomes the main theme. By focusing on the debates regarding the inclusion or exclusion of Larnaca in the railway, the locality comes to the fore in the history of railway construction in Cyprus. The chapter also follows the debates and negotiations that led to the making of improvements at the Larnaca harbour.

Chapter 4 is integrated into the previous one because of the close relations between the Famagusta Harbour and Larnaca Harbour improvements, and the prospective construction of the railway. The chapter starts with the first proposals, projects and thoughts on the Famagusta Harbour, which date back to the beginning of British colonialism on the island. It then presents the decision-making process leading to the construction of Famagusta Harbour as a joint project with the Famagusta-Nicosia-Karavostassi railway. A substantial part of this chapter tells the story of the Larnaca Harbour improvements, which was introduced at the end of Chapter 3. This part discusses a series of negotiations involving local Larnacan stakeholders, the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office.

The electrification of Cyprus is the main theme of Chapter 5. The period covered in this chapter differs from the preceding two chapters. It dates back to the post-war and decolonisation period of the island (1945-late 1950s). However, like Chapters 3 and 4, the first part of this chapter traces past ideas about electrification projects, which led to the island-wide Grid Scheme of the post-war period. The reader is exposed to the particularities of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 and an associated Cyprus ten-year development programme. The second part of this chapter tells the story of the shaping of the Grid and the course of events leading to its materialisation. The last part brings the locality into centre stage by retrieving and interpreting reactions to the proposed design.

Chapter 6 gives an introduction to the non-making of the Famagusta Harbour development during the post-war period. It follows strategic political changes around the island as they were connected to the proposals and debates regarding the Famagusta Harbour development. The reader will find here aspects of the history of the gradual transformation of the Famagusta Harbour into a naval and military base, alongside proposals designed to integrate Cyprus colonial policy into the Harbour's design and vice versa.

A first synthesis of the conclusions of the study is to be found in the epilogue. These conclusions may be summed up in four clusters of issues. The first has to do with relations between colonial governance, ideology and infrastructure-building. The case of Cyprus confirms that infrastructures were material expressions of certain ideologies and policies; they were imagined and promoted as tools for answering crises concerning governance, state management and ruling of the colonised. Ideology and colonial policy also shaped technological policy, the character and the structure of these infrastructures. Further, they were deliberately embedded in the design of infrastructures.

Secondly, the dissertation suggests that locality acted and intervened in the construction and decision-making in different ways, through contestation, negotiation and/or collaboration. Locality did not only act on but also gave different meanings to the infrastructures and their designs. Consequently, different meanings could lead to the creation of spaces for anti-colonial positioning and action. While studying politics and techno-politics in the decision making, in connection to the materiality of infrastructures,

engineers came forward as key influential figures. Experts and engineers influenced and shaped the design of infrastructures by framing their preferred social solutions in technical ways; they were called upon to translate the solution of a certain economic or political problem into an infrastructure plan. Here again, local engineers differed in their views and actions from the engineers of the metropolis. Lastly, as far as the Cyprus historiography is concerned, the study suggests that colonial development policy and practice regarding infrastructure building were considered essential for the perpetuation of British rule. By recognising this relationship, this dissertation demonstrates how attention to technology can answer central questions regarding the crisis of legitimacy of British colonialism in Cyprus.

# Chapter 1. Integrating techno-politics into politics: Theoretical frameworks

---

## Introduction

The scope of this chapter is twofold. It begins with a literature review of several fields under the general title of history of technology and, to some extent, Science, Technology and Society Studies (STS). More precisely these works are from Large Technical Systems (LTS), postcolonial studies and technopolitics. The overviews are drawn from research conducted by leading authors in these fields and the intention in referring to them is to frame the theoretical and methodological space of these fields, without aspiring to strict and concrete schemes for the present thesis. In doing so, these three latter fields are therefore used as templates for writing the histories and arguments that follow in this study.

In the second part of the chapter, the theoretical platform of the research is introduced, including primary research questions, concepts to be utilised, and methods to extract stories. The reasons behind the questions, concepts and methods chosen, are justified in relation to the existing archives, historiography and the arguments of the research. The reader will find that there are two levels of inquiry which are directly linked to the arguments. First of all, the thesis demands a descriptive method of writing, as this is the first serious work of history of technology in the historiography of Cyprus. At the first level of inquiry, the study seeks to answer why British colonialism chose to engage in these infrastructure projects; and how this decision was thought to consolidate further British rule on the Island. At this level, 'technology' and its design are considered as means for the materialisation of the British colonial policy for Cyprus. At the second level of inquiry, things are more complicated. It is argued that materialisation of these projects was not

straightforward in colonial contexts but a process open to negotiation and discussion; local politics and power relations not only had a role in their localisation but these infrastructures and their design were becoming a part of their local politics and power relations. Thus, at the second level, the study asks how local power relations and politics appeared, utilised, and opposed not only these infrastructures but their design characteristics as well.

## **Part 1. A Look at the History of Large Technical Systems (LTS)**

Large Technical Systems (LTS) studies emerged during the 1980s and since then it has been institutionalised as a separate field in the general scholarship of history of technology. LTS scholarship, as a separate branch of the history of technology, stands for a different understanding of technical change and its study in the existing historiography. The focus of inquiry in LTS is not on artefacts but on the larger systems or networks which they are part of. Network development is not examined as a straightforward process but as a contested and negotiated one. Large Technical Systems are not just a system of technological artefacts, but they also cover private or governmental institutions, natural resources, legislation and powerful financial and political actors. They can vary from electric grids to road and railway networks, etc.

LTS literature is diverse in its overall research purposes and academic position. LTS scholarship does not serve a coherent theory of technological and societal change but it is represented as a “platform for discussion” constructed by several perspectives, concepts and research strategies. Thus, an overview of the field must cover many studies and works of different theoretical and methodological origins. The work of Erik van der Vleuten, which is a chapter from the book of *Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000*, delivers the basic introductory information and a coherent categorisation of the existing perspectives, narratives and concepts in LTS scholarship.<sup>1</sup> I will make extensive use of it further below.

---

<sup>1</sup> Vleuten, Erik van der, and Kaijser, Arnie, 2006. *Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000*. Science History Publications/USA, p.280.

Any overview of LTS literature, typically and justly, starts with the works of Thomas Hughes whose classic study on the electrification of Germany, Britain and USA (*Networks of Power*) is considered the origin of this new field. Appreciation of Hughes's scholarship on technological systems goes further, and is even considered foundational for contemporary history of technology as a field.<sup>2</sup> There are three primary reasons' for Hughes's persistent influence. Firstly, Hughes's criticism of the focus of historiography of technology on the invention of artefacts, and his proposal of studying 'systems' in which the artefacts are an integrated part of the latter. He argued that the analysis of sociotechnical systems should include technical as well as institutional and organisational components, and also natural resources and legislation.<sup>3</sup> Secondly, he emphasised the need to study the phase of diffusion and territorial expansion in society-wide structures while pointing out the importance of their development in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries in the framework of technological change. Hughes also elaborated on the role of these systems in societal change. From his perspective, these systems are "new, human-made deep structures in society"; the place and the way people act in many social circumstances (like work and war) are being influenced by them. Lastly, Hughes inspired scholars in methodology when he forwarded "sociotechnical systems research methodology". He advocated locating the "perpetual interaction between technological and societal change" at the epicentre of academic inquiry. The challenge he set himself, and historians to follow, was to write a history of technology and society that was neither a history of external factors shaping the technology, nor the internalist approach of studying internal dynamics of technology.<sup>4</sup> According to Hughes, separate categories such as 'political', 'societal' or 'technological' are too crude and may drive the researcher to overlook "how the sociotechnical fabric is woven". This argument led him to propose the study of "system builders" who are defined as privileged actors – such as big investors, state and civil institutions – in the weaving process.<sup>5</sup> He pointed out that a thorough understanding of the technological and economic aspects of a

---

<sup>2</sup> Hughes, Agatha C., Michael Thad Allen, and Gabrielle Hecht. 2001. *Technologies of Power: Essays in Honour of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes*. MIT Press, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Lagendijk, Vincent. 2014. *Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks*. 1st edition. Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers, p. 21.

<sup>4</sup> Hughes, Thomas Parke, 1983. *Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Veluten & Kaiser, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-282.

system requires also the study of ideological and even the aesthetic concerns of these crucial agents.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to the above, the introduction of phases in technological development is also a major contribution of Hughes; he forwarded four phases for Large Technical System development. In the first phase, invention and the development of the system come forward. This is followed by the phase in which the technology is transferred into new social and geographical spaces. The growth of the system is the next phase which then opens the way to a new concept that again Hughes introduced; “technological momentum”. He suggests that as a system grows it starts to acquire “momentum” which implies that the system has a “mass” consisting of machines, devices and other physical artefacts; and a “direction” arising from the involvement of persons, institutions and organizations.<sup>7</sup>

What is meant by ‘Large Technical Systems’ is rarely strictly defined. Here I will try to clarify how LTS is defined and perceived, and furthermore which approaches are being exercised in order to study them. As will be made clear below, there are several research themes of interest, each one of which covers different approaches and narratives. Vleuten’s chapter, referenced above, provides a helpful overview and categorization of the wide range of relevant studies. In line with this analysis, the current chapters does not intend to adopt strict definitions and certain perspectives, but instead an adaptative framework of concepts, analytical tools, categories, and insights.

---

<sup>6</sup> Hughes et al., 2001, *op. cit.*, p. xiv.

<sup>7</sup> Hughes, 1983, *op. cit.*, p.15.

## Research Themes in the Existing LTS literature

### 1.1 History of Large Technical Systems

#### System building history

In the considerably diverse literature of historiography of LTS, the first and probably the best-known tradition originates with Thomas Hughes', *Networks of Power*. Yet it is in a subsequent book, the ground-breaking *American Genesis*, that he takes a step further by linking the making of LTS with the social history of the USA. Hughes argues that the history of system builders and modes of system building can be seen as a mixture of history of management and history of technology, while in the same time participating in the cultural and ideological construction of societies. For Hughes, "system building is in the core of the creation of a nation" – in his case the American nation. The socio-technical activity of system building and invention are projections – into materiality – of the character of an American who is committed to democracy and free enterprise. In this patriotic narrative the nation created itself, a technological one, which later became an example for the rest of the world. System builders' ingenuity, its importance and its forms are emphasised, which all agree with the American glorification of individuality and pioneerism. This process of quasi-determinist logical growth of systems is constituted by several phases: the invention of systems, the spread of the large systems and in the last phase the emergence of reactions to the systems. Thus the reader ends up with a history of USA from the perspective of system building.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> Lagendijk, 2014, *op. cit.*, p.23; Veluten & Kaiser, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-285.

## Institutional History

The exemplary study in this category is Arnie Kaijser's<sup>9</sup> work on Sweden. In his approach Kaijser includes, next to 'traditional' networks, the 'grid-based' networks such as railroads, and 'loosely coupled systems' like postal services and air-traffic systems as well. In this way, he attempts to write a history of an entirety of systems which he considers to constitute, as a whole, a material and institutional structure shaping today's societies. His narrative focuses particularly on "patterns in the development of institutions governing the construction and operation of infrastructures". Comparative studies, in the framework of this approach, also help to expose the existence of different institutional frameworks and governance models of large technical systems. In his later works, Kaijser expanded his approach to study the role of institutions in transnational networking processes.<sup>10</sup>

## Material Networks History

While Hughes focuses on system building and Kaijser on institutions, Joachim Radkau focuses on the material dimension of large systems. In his version, LTS are not considered exclusively as products of modernity but instead he traces them back to Antiquity. In his perception of LTS history there are three phases – with different types of systems – in which one does not necessarily find prerequisites of central planning and coordination for system development. In the first phase, he locates the water-based systems – inland navigation, irrigation and drainage – which can be traced from the early civilisations to the Industrial Revolution. The second phase involves materially 'tight-coupled' systems of the 19<sup>th</sup> century like railways, paved-road networks and telegraphy. The systems of the 20<sup>th</sup> century make up the third phase, in which he recognizes three features: the increasing importance of information and communication technologies, diversity of consumer choices, and 'second-order' systems that combine first-order systems to create a new function (e.g. organ transplant networks).<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> See Arne Kaijser, "Controlling the Grid: The Development of High Tension Power Lines in the Nordic Countries", in: A. Kaijser and M. Hedin eds., *Nordic Energy Systems: Historical Perspectives and Current Issues* (Canton, Mass., Science History Publications, 1995), pp. 31-54.

<sup>10</sup> Veluten & Kaiser, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-286.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 286-288.

## 1.2 Studying Societal Change and Large Technical Systems

A variety of studies in LTS literature focuses on societal change rather than technical change. Scholars in this category try to give a historical understanding on the shaping of today's societies. The exemplary works show that the word 'societal' is being used with the broadest possible meaning. In this category, LTS are considered as tools of leverage for economic, political, cultural, social and even environmental change or, in short, 'deep structures' embedded in society shaping social and individual life. Despite its promises, the social implications and influences of technological change have been an uneasy topic in the field because of its connotations with *technological determinism*. Recently, it has been widely recognised that societal change can be studied – and must be studied – without getting involved in determinist perceptions. Below, I will refer to two main approaches in this particular literature with an emphasis on David Nye's work for its outstanding novelty.

### Sociotechnical System Building – Canonical LTS approach

In this canonical approach, LTS development and construction are taken in to account as both a social and a technical process. Thus, while writing the history of a technical system, the historian reveals also the social interactions and changes that originate, and are part and parcel of, this process of system building/development. Two kinds of societal change are brought to light by this analysis. The first one is the non-technical constructions that are developed during the whole system building process. These non-technical constructs may prove to be of historical importance in their own right. A typical example is Hughes' work on electricity supply systems where he also presents the foundation of utility companies and franchises. He points out that this type of social institutions and relations (based on private ownership and market) constituted a privately-owned electricity supply in the USA, in contrast with European examples of state-owned systems. Besides non-technical constructs, societal change may originate from the system builders' activities. In this consideration, system builders are motivated by different purposes and goals which the material body of

the system is built to satisfy. Fingerprints of their motivations appear in the functions of the systems. In the same manner, a large technical system can be designed to “alter power relations” or to create “social divides” where a party is being excluded or disadvantaged by others from the access or use of a network. Briefly, the canonical approach studies the development or building of large technical systems (i.e. a certain phase in the lifetime of a system), and the twofold investigation of “technological shaping of society” and “social shaping of technology”.<sup>12</sup>

## Users Approach

The users approach is amongst the most recent and productive for studying the social implications of network technologies. Its innovativeness comes from its object of study which is the “other end of the system”, the users. The users approach has showed us that users have a key role in the social shaping of LTS. Users can make many choices in use, and give different meanings to things, which in turn may shape the system rather differently. System building and intrinsic properties of network technologies indeed give certain constraints and possibilities but the users approach proves that they do not determine the use strictly.<sup>13</sup> *Electrifying America* by David Nye is one of the best examples of the users approach in systems studies, which deserves a closer look at its insights.

In Nye’s theorisation, for the majority of people a technology finds its meaning when people integrate/incorporate it into their everyday life. Only then is it real. He argues that the electrification of America is not just the story of inventions and corporations but that it also involves “a popular absorption in the potentialities for personal and social transformation”.<sup>14</sup> As a result, Nye concludes with a different periodization of the history of electrification of the USA from Hughes`. As an aside, it might be thought that in Nye’s approach all parties involved in the shaping of the systems – managers, politicians, engineers, labourers, housewives etc. – have the same scale of power or influence or have an authority of involvement on the same level. In other words, it may create an image of a

---

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 290-292.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 294-295.

<sup>14</sup> Nye, David E. 1992. *Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, pp.381-382.

‘democracy’ where all processes are materialised by the contribution of equals having symmetrical power, influence or potentials. However, throughout the book, Nye was clear that this was not the case.

## Institutional Users

While the users’ narrative focuses its attention on the use of artefacts in local settings (i.e. home, industry and city), the institutional users’ approach takes into account institutions that use “geographically extended features of LTS to change society-wide societal institutions – say food supply, finance or industrial production”. Consequently, such users create “second-order large technical systems” which may affect people’s lives and habits in an indirect way. Examples about this approach can be found especially in the case of Netherlands where, for instance, the food industry took advantage of integrated national transport and communication networks and created integrated food chains across the country.<sup>15</sup>

### 1.3 Transnational History of Technology: The Example of Tensions of Europe

Transnational history of technology, as framed in the programme of Tensions of Europe, should be integrated with the historiography of large technical systems. While Tensions of Europe differs in several ways from the existing study, it can still serve to provide concepts and insights. Erik van der Vleuten’s article is a comprehensive guide to the content and context of TOE.<sup>16</sup> Vleuten, one of the ‘founders’ of the TOE programme, argues that TOE is:

---

<sup>15</sup> Veluten & Kaiser, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp.295-296.

<sup>16</sup> Vleuten, Erik van der, 2008. “Toward a Transnational History of Technology: Meanings, Promises, Pitfalls.” *Technology and Culture* 49 (4): 974–94.

...a transnational enterprise' exploring and defining ways to study transnational European history with a focus on the role of technology.<sup>17</sup>

It also demonstrates how a transnational history research agenda can inspire innovative history of technology research.

Three terms are of primary importance for the formation of the TOE research agenda: 'transnational', 'technology', 'Europe'. TOE uses a wider and flexible meaning of the term 'transnational', for which Vleuten finds three definitions in the literature. Firstly it is used to define, roughly speaking, a study of movements, people, ideas, things, experiences that cross national borders. Circulation, fluidity, flow, connection and relationship are concepts that are emphasised in this framework. Secondly, transnational is used also in the study of non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations which play a role in shaping the history of the world. Transnational history has also taken the meaning of "decentring the nation-state from its position of the principal organizing category of scholarly inquiry". Transnational history questions the nation-centred narratives which put in the epicentre of historical inquiry the experiences, traditions, achievements etc. of the nation.<sup>18</sup> One of the most ambitious 'objectives' of TOE is to approach the history of European 'integration' not from an exclusively political viewpoint, as it is mainly covered by the existing literature, but through a technological viewpoint (e.g. networks and infrastructures). The TOE agenda comes to consider this process, whether it be integration or fragmentation, also as a material one, with the latter presenting itself in "material networks, technical systems, and the circulation of knowledge and artefacts".<sup>19</sup> The idea of writing a European history of technology considers technology a 'crucial agent of change' which, authors believe, can contribute to discussions about Europe.

In TOE, as a research strategy, Europe is handled as an 'actor category' but not a geographical entity. Thus, it becomes the study of 'techno-politics' where researchers focus on "how actors *design* and *use* technologies to constitute and enact European integration (or fragmentation)". A second strategy approaches Europe as an "emergent outcome of a set of practices that involve linking, and delinking of infrastructures, circulation and

---

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 974-975.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 978-982.

<sup>19</sup> Misa, Thomas J., and Johan Schot, 2005. "Introduction." *History and Technology* 21 (1): 1-19, p. 2.

appropriation of artefacts and knowledge. Last, they consider that Europe can only be understood when the techno-politics, the process of linking, circulation and appropriation are placed in a global perspective.<sup>20</sup>

The area of TOE that relates closely to the research agenda of this thesis is the sub-theme 'Networking Europe'. In this sub-theme transnational linkages and circulation are explored in the development of transnational infrastructures and the building of transnational networks.<sup>21</sup> This agenda recognises that throughout the centuries transnational linkages and network building have been used by political power which can range from emperors, to dictators, to governments etc. The importance and benefits of connecting people and societies across/inside national borders have been expressed by a range of scholarly backgrounds including philosophy, engineering politics.<sup>22</sup> All have pointed out the importance of building technological networks in order to achieve this goal. 'Networking Europe' comes to study the development and construction of such networks and points out the tensions involved in such sociotechnical processes. However, it also tells us that a sociotechnical process is not a straightforward one, it bears a risk of creating tensions between involved parties. Many times it is negotiated and contested, which can drive the process to failure<sup>23</sup> because it is a complex process that is materialised in different social, political, economic and cultural contexts.<sup>24</sup> As a conclusion, 'Networking Europe'<sup>25</sup> constructs its research agenda around the assumption that:

---

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p.8.

<sup>21</sup> Transnational network technologies: "geographically expanded, materially integrated structures that cross national boundaries. They include transport, energy and communication systems." The authors find it 'profitable' to study these structures as Large Technical Systems (LTS), as "systems of interrelated components of technical and non-technical nature including elements that are often labelled as organizational, institutional managerial, legal etc., manipulated and juxtaposed by privileged actors called system (or network) builders." Vleuten & Kaijser, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>22</sup> Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, 'Prologue & Introduction: Transnational infrastructures and the shaping of contemporary Europe', in: van der Vleuten and Kaijser (eds.), *Networking Europe* (SHP, 2006), 1-22, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> In another source, the authors argue that tensions and ambiguities are not surprising since it has been acknowledged by many historians. Technical change is not a straightforward, rational process that makes an impact on society resulting in societal change. On the contrary, such processes are "messy, negotiated, often contested, and intertwined with hopes and agendas of many historical actors, negotiations, and conflict-ridden economic or political contexts." These processes involve contradictions, human action, 'occasional benign deeds' and unexpected consequences. Taking these factors into consideration allows us to avoid linear and simplistic historical accounts. So any such research talks about transnational linking as well as de-linking and re-linking, hope as well as conflict. Vleuten & Kaijser, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp.3-4.

<sup>24</sup> Vleuten & Kaijser, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>25</sup> For exemplary recent case studies, see from "Special Issue: Infrastructural Europeanism, or the Project of Building Europe on Infrastructures": Schipper, Frank, and Johan Schot. 2011. "Infrastructural Europeanism, or

“...the complex shaping of European societies was recorded in material infrastructures which because of their obduracy and life span, continued to structure European society building with all its contradictions. Thus Networking Europe refers to a simultaneous transnational network and society building in Europe.” (p.25)

Aside from ‘Europe’, governmental and business leaders (designers and decision-takers) but also workers, consumers, professionals, and citizens, who experience or confront these networks in their daily life, are defined as actors. ‘Networking Europe’ also gives special attention to the privileged actors who are named as system or network builders of Europe. Although these actors are conceived as having an advantaged position in design and decision-taking processes, they are not considered as the exclusive authorities in the top-down construction of networks. On the contrary they are chosen to emphasise the human character of network building.<sup>26</sup> The last group of actor category involves international governmental and non-governmental institutions/organisations which are mentioned above.

The terms ‘inking’ and ‘delinking’ (alongside circulation and appropriation), are the main concepts used in TOE projects and their understanding is indispensable. Linking and de-linking are defined as key processes “in the transnational shaping of polities, societies and economies, and also for negotiating relationships between the international, national and subnational”.<sup>27</sup> Particularly, linking refers to the “regional or national linking of infrastructures, railroads highways, energy systems, and telecommunication networks”. The linking of infrastructures involves physical couplings, regulatory and institutional structures, and standardization practices needed to make the couplings work and to facilitate the flow of information, goods, people and energy. A linking process brings ‘de-linking’ into discussion as some parties are always excluded from the former process. In this way, transnational infrastructure building presents itself as a process that involves tensions and

---

the Project of Building Europe on Infrastructures: An Introduction.” *History and Technology* 27 (3): 245–64; Legendijk, Vincent. 2011. “‘An Experience Forgotten Today’: Examining Two Rounds of European Electricity Liberalization.” *History and Technology* 27 (3): 291–310; Laborie, Léonard. 2011. “Fragile Links, Frozen Identities: The Governance of Telecommunication Networks and Europe (1944–53).” *History and Technology* 27 (3): 311–30.

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>27</sup> Vleuten & Kaijser, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

struggles about inclusion and exclusion.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, concepts of appropriation and circulation are forwarded where the latter means movement of people, knowledge, and artefacts between cities, companies and institutions. However, in order to avoid misunderstanding circulation as free-floating the concept of appropriation must be employed.

Appropriation<sup>29</sup> is “the process in which users – governments, companies, organisations and citizens – variously explore, signify, reproduce, communicate and integrate knowledge and artefacts into their daily life and business”.<sup>30</sup> This concept of ‘appropriation’ has been developed by the research network of Science and Technology in the European Periphery (STEP). Gavroglu, speaking on the localisation of scientific discourses, tells us that:

Appropriation refers to the totality of processes that characterize the active engagement of the local scholars in understanding, disseminating, using, criticizing, remoulding new concepts, bringing to the fore the demands of the scientific theories for new ontological commitments, struggling to create new legitimizing spaces for the new practices associated with the introduction of the sciences, weaving coalitions, etc.<sup>31</sup> Here, it is important to note that ‘appropriation’ is the study of a process through the local actors whose actions have mostly remained or still remain unrevealed.

---

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>29</sup> The hypothesis behind circulation – which is movement – is that by circulating, goods, services, people and information get into contact with different people who in turn with a process of appropriation create new ties and relationships among the consumers, citizens etc. Thus new living communities are created (not just imagined ones) and a contribution is made to constructing new identities, experiences and relationships. As a result, it is suggested that our attention must be directed towards international junctions or sites where circulation and appropriation are being materialised. *ibid.* p. 9.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.* p. 10.

<sup>31</sup> Gavroglu, Kostas. 2012. “The STEP (Science and Technology in the European Periphery) Initiative: Attempting to Historicize the Notion of European Science.” *Centaurus* 54 (4): 311–27, p. 316.

## Part 2. History of Technology and Colonial/Post-colonial discussions

The literature on colonial/post-colonial studies of technology is substantial, though composed largely of case studies rather than broad interrogations of the concepts and methodologies adopted. Thus an overview of this literature will refer to several papers which either try to present main approaches in the field or offer insights into the issue. Here I will focus on arguable the three most significant contributions. First, *Europe Technology, and Colonialism in 20<sup>th</sup> Century* (2005) by David Arnold represents an integral part of the Tensions of Europe project which was published in the special issue of *History and Technology*. Like Arnold, Warwick Anderson in *Postcolonial Technoscience* (2002), which was published in the special issue of *Social Studies of Science*, surveys the background of history and related literatures on technology in the colony and post-colony. In another special issue of *History and Technology*, Suzanne Moon in her *Introduction: Place, voice, Interdisciplinarity: understanding technology in the colony and postcolony* (2010), offers an exploration and elaboration on the main concerns about technology issues in the colonial and post-colonial context.

Arnold with his paper contributes to any scholar who wants to deal with issues of colonial and post-colonial technology in two ways. First of all, he provides a critical overview of the related literature about technology, colonialism, decolonisation and development in the extra-European world of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Secondly, he outlines changing perspectives and emerging research issues in the history of technology in the European colonies and ex-colonies of Asia and Africa. The latter presents critics of 'diffusionist' arguments and discussions on the conflicting 'Western'-'Indigenous' technology dichotomy in order to create a more developed debate which will be discussed below. Additionally, even though the paper refers to history of technology, it draws its sources mainly from other sub-disciplines – mainly economic history, agrarian history, environmental history, and the history of medicine. As Arnold claims, the existing literature on history of technology and colonial and post-colonial issues is lacking in both number of studies and analytical complexity.

According to Arnold, if one traces back the development of the history of technology as it relates to Asia and Africa after the second half of 20<sup>th</sup> century, three dominant approaches can be found. The first approach equates technology with industrial technology which had evolved in Europe and North America and transferred to Asia and Africa as a legacy of the colonial era. According to this logic, these technologies were transferred to so-called 'backward' or even 'primitive' colonial societies by the 'advanced' civilisations. From invention to development, such technologies are considered products of Europe which acted as the unique agent in their *diffusion* to colonial regions without any local input. Perceived as progressive and modern, thus as something positive, these technologies were considered to serve for an "objective rationale" and as an intervention by a superior civilisation. Any failure about these technologies is blamed on the "backward locals" who are unable to recognise its benefits, or on the physical conditions that opposed their use.<sup>32</sup>

A new approach was born during a period of emerging Third World nationalism and growing technological scepticism which came to alter the understanding of Western technology. This approach recognizes that many countries had their own noteworthy and long histories of technology – pre-dating European intervention – which were overwhelmed by colonialism and international capitalism. This 'indigenist approach' characterizes European technological intervention as violence or, in other words:

*...a physical and epistemological violence directed against past practices and outmoded technics; but also a current violence expressed through technologies of warfare and policing, of rapacious land appropriation and mineral extraction, of intrusive medicine and coercive public health.*<sup>33</sup>

Characterisation of European technology as progress and boon is substituted with aggression, arrogance and greed. Lastly, this perception uncovered how indigenous technologies and practices provided space for resistance against colonizing technologies, and to wider systems of colonial and post-colonial hegemony.<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup> Arnold, David (2005). 'Europe, Technology, and Colonialism in the 20th Century.' *History and Technology*, 21 (1):. 85-106, pp.86-87.

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*, p. 87.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*, p. 87.

The third approach in studies of history of technology in colonial and post-colonial contexts can be named 'post-colonial' or 'post-colonial technoscience'. 'Post-colonial' directs the attention of the researcher to contemporary phenomena, and seeks new modes of analysis and critique. In the words of Warwick Anderson:

*A postcolonial perspective suggests fresh ways to study the changing political economies of capitalism and science, the mutual reorganization of the global and the local, the increasing transnational traffic of people, practices, technologies, and contemporary contests over 'intellectual property'. The term 'postcolonial' thus refers both to new configurations of technoscience and to the critical modes of analysis that identify them.*<sup>35</sup>

The postcolonial perspective discards products of old colonial regimes which reinforce their practices and hegemonic claims: dichotomies and rigidities, such as metropole/colony, western/Indigenous, modern/traditional etc., are discarded and replaced by fluidity, circularity and plurality, and a focus on a 'complex border zone of hybridity and impurity' in order to understand the ideas about class, race and temporal differences that are enacted and disturbed in techno-scientific practices. It suggests an analytical symmetry and inclusion, but further than this, it forwards the study of post-colonial provincialisation of 'universal' reason, the description of 'alternative modernities'. On the other hand, it is a response to simplistic typologies and sweeping generalities of space and time, respectively, but also partly to concerns about transnational processes like corporate globalisation, increasing commodification of science, and intellectual property matters.<sup>36</sup> Although the 'post-colonial' enterprise appears widely heterogeneous, Anderson argues that we can point out a few other features. Firstly, post-colonial places an emphasis on the 'situatedness', which implies that technoscience networks are materialised in local contexts. The global is produced in a locality; transnational processes of displacement and reconfiguration, fragmentation and hybridity are multi-sited, where the 'centre' is just another node in the network. Furthermore, post-colonial tends to see technology as 'an instrument of power relations' as opposed to a cultural space of historical materialisation of

---

<sup>35</sup> Anderson, W (2002), "Postcolonial technoscience", *Social Studies of Science*, 32: 643-58, p. 643.

<sup>36</sup> Anderson, 2002, *op. cit.*, pp. 643-644 ; Arnold, 2005, *op. cit.*, p .87.

various forms of interaction and exchange (see the paragraph below). Consequently, post-colonial history of technology becomes an enquiry into means, uses and effects.<sup>37</sup>

Further elaboration on some of the points referred to above will help to emphasise some useful insights into the post-colonial enterprise. Technology and power relations are a major concern of post-colonial studies. Civilising missions and post-colonial liberation projects had a technological orientation which attracted the attention of scholars to investigate, on the one side, directly the ways in which colonial power was created and exercised and, on the other, the deeper implications of the material legacies of the colonial experience. However, recent studies have moved on towards more complicated accounts of analysis on power-technology relationships and abandoned the emphasis on the straightforward consideration of technology as tools of power. Now scholars are interested not only in the ways the technology was appropriated and sabotaged in order to favour various colonial groups, but also, more fundamentally, “how technology and power were co-produced, each shaping the other in important ways”. While several scholars are focusing on power relations, others direct their attention to technological controversies or discourses around new technologies. “Debates and disagreements over new technologies can make visible the ways that contests over (for example) religion, gender, ethnicity, privilege, or other cultural beliefs are noticed, resolved, or exacerbated within this matrix of unequal power.”<sup>38</sup>

David Arnold has emphasised that there are available interpretations which may situate the history of technology relative both to the history of Europe and the inner stories of colonial and post-colonial societies, without privileging one over another. One way is to reverse the paradigm and argue that understanding the history of Europe and technology is not possible without having reference to the world outside of Europe. Conceptualisation and self-identification of Europe and Europeans have been shaped in relation to the non-European world. A second is the influence of the extra-European world on things that are considered authentically ‘European’. One can only argue about the degree of influence of external factors on developments such as the Industrial Revolution. Third, it should be recognized that extra-European regions were and still are, to some extent, sources of

---

<sup>37</sup> Anderson, 2002, *op. cit.*, pp.651-652 ; Arnold, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>38</sup> Moon, Suzanne, 2010. “Place, Voice, Interdisciplinarity: Understanding Technology in the Colony and Postcolony.” *History and Technology* 26 (3): 189–201, pp. 189-190.

alternative or new technologies. Europe is still in need of what other societies produce or products originating from different technological and cultural traditions. As post-colonial studies show that 'alternative modernities' coexist around the world, thus, Arnold argues, it is possible to imagine that alternative technologies exist to sustain modernity's plural forms and fashions. A fourth response is the long history in Europe of looking for new opportunities outside of the Continent for technological experimentation and development which are or were not feasible on the Continent itself. Colonies in America, Asia and Africa remained sites of careers for professionals, engineers and scientists, men and women, who were otherwise restricted in Europe. In addition to this, colonies and ex-colonies might also be sites for the development of advanced technologies and not just dumping grounds for downgraded and obsolete technologies. Until recently, colonies and ex-colonies were favoured for laboratories and testing-grounds for tests and experiments that were not allowed or possible in Europe for reasons of security, health or politics. Lastly, Arnold claims that European technology became a contested one after the challenge that came especially from the USA and Japan from the 1930s onwards. The 20<sup>th</sup> century was the century of the USA but not Europe, thus it excluded the Europeanness of technology.<sup>39</sup>

The 19<sup>th</sup> century marked a crucial moment for most of the extra-European regions. The arrival of European colonial powers and their technologies was accompanied by a physical clout and ideological force. Technologies like railways, steamships or telegraphs were considered measures<sup>40</sup> of civilisation, the superiority of Europe and a differentiating criterion between the 'backward' and the 'civilised'. However, Arnold argues, historians of technology might ask different questions about this narrative. One might inquire as to what extent these technologies, which were so epic in the eyes of colonisers for dominance and prestige, were important in the eyes of the local people. Did they replace the technologies which people used to work and live? Or we can ask how far the history of technology in colonial regions can be understood as an essential aspect of history of technology in Europe, which in turn made Europe a dynamic centre and the rest of the world a periphery. If one looks at the 20<sup>th</sup> century and focuses on decolonisation, more questions for research can be found. First, Arnold notes, is the question whether decolonisation brought also a

---

<sup>39</sup> Arnold, 2005, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-90.

<sup>40</sup> See Adas, Michael. 1990. *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

technological liberation or marked a new era of exploitation and extraction. In some cases the change in political status quo allowed ex-colonised peoples to take control of technologies that were exclusively white enterprises, and occupy positions of power and professional authority. However, the Cold War brought pressures on politics, economy and technology which in turn induced technologies of poverty and public unrest. Similarly, we may ask whether or to what extent the ideology of development in the first two decades after World War II helped to strengthen the power relations inherited from the colonial period and increased the technological gap between Europe and ex-colonies.<sup>41</sup>

As time matters to history of technology, space does too. Technology is sited in space and first of all in 'nature'. Arnold reminds us that in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries European technology was claiming to be universal, but colonial regions such as Asia and Africa proved to have a different nature to Europe. As the ambitions of Europe increased, so the visibility of its limits became clearer. The specialisation of the branch of tropical medicine was particularly important for illustrating the difference between Europe and its colonies, but also in colonies different engineering problems with different solutions emerged, for example in railway construction or bridge building. Thus tensions within the colonial medical, scientific and technical services proved that what was standard in Europe could neither be feasible nor desirable elsewhere.<sup>42</sup> However, the environment does not justify by itself the difference between European technology and technology in the colonial or post-colonial world:

*...the role of the environment, real or perceived, was influenced and supported by a range of cultural, economic and political considerations.*<sup>43</sup>

Consequently, as in Europe, technology was located, functioned and shaped in the colonial or post-colonial world in a politically 'configured' and culturally 'differentiated' context. Thus, we can argue that the dichotomy between indigenous and western knowledge is artificial and constitutes an exaggeration which falsely implies a deep gap between two poles. Arnold sums it up as follows:

---

<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 91-93.

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*, p. 95.

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, p. 95.

*However, it was precisely one of the self-legitimizing mechanisms of colonial regimes and many of their postcolonial successors to make a distinction between indigenous technologies (as for instance, shifting cultivation) that were condemned as being primitive, wasteful or environmentally destructive and those (like 'scientific forestry') that were validated by modern science and sanctioned by the imperatives of productivity and profitability. Even if popular knowledge was eclectic, states (colonial or postcolonial) tended to see things differently. Equally, one of the effects of colonialism, especially in Africa, was to partition the land spatially and functionally between technologically differentiated sectors—the plantation, the factory, the forest, the labour or game reserve—and to seek to order society accordingly.<sup>44</sup>*

In relation to the use of big European technologies in the everyday life of the colonised, we can also argue that the culture of the people did not change fundamentally. It is interesting to study what the colonised people did with the new technologies, which technologies they resented and resisted and which were welcomed and adapted easier than others.<sup>45</sup>

A few final words about the spatial dimension of colonial technology are important in the light of critiques against the diffusionist model. Historically, technologies travelled in a number of directions from different regions or continents but not just from Europe out to colonies. Colonies, as mentioned before, were also sites of innovation invoked by direct borrowing and adaptation from indigenous practices and local knowledge: sites of experiment for curious Europeans, thus creating a new and hybrid knowledge that integrated into the western knowledge arsenal. These technologies were products of the local environment, social conditions, and political and economic circumstances. Also, it must be noted that exchanges were not just between the colony and metropole but also between different colonies and regions.<sup>46</sup>

The overview above, as mentioned in the introduction, is drawn from certain sources. Moon's and Anderson's papers are part of two special issues, in two different journals, dedicated to the theme of post-colonial technoscience. These are two of three

---

<sup>44</sup> *ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>45</sup> *ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>46</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 98-101.

special issues that were also referred in *The Postcolonial Science and Technology Studies Reader* by Sandra Harding.<sup>47</sup> Harding, though not a Science, Technology and Society (STS) scholar (her primary field is postcolonial studies), but she has been the author of works which included gender, culture, science and the postcolonial as objects and tools of study. Besides the two issues referred to here, there are two more special issues in relation to post-colonial studies and STS. One of these issues again was introduced by Warwick Anderson in 2009, who, besides the references above, engaged a critique of STS for its dedication to globalisation theory.<sup>48</sup> Anderson's main concern, as in the first paper of 2002, is post-colonial studies of science. For this reason and his frequent references to his previous paper, I excluded it from the overview here. The special issue was published in *Science as Culture* journal in 2005, which was introduced by Maureen McNeil.<sup>49</sup> Her focus again is on the sphere of science and many of her references are similar to the points and authors noted above. For this reason it has not featured in the preceding overview.

Libbie Freed writes on road network building in French Equatorial Africa and French Cameroon during the 1920s<sup>50</sup>. Freed studies the local French administration's goal of local improvement via connecting commercial centres with the administration by road networks. Roads were considered necessary to consolidate and make efficient the administration's power over the vast land it occupied. Lack of funds from the metropole drove the local colonial administration away from the 'modern' concepts of road building and designs to technically simpler, maintenance-oriented and labour-extensive methods. The mere use of forced labour in maintenance and construction, and the reshaping of the landscape by colonial authorities, opened spaces of contestation over colonial rule and order through the

---

<sup>47</sup> See Harding, Sandra, 2011. *The Postcolonial Science and Technology Studies Reader*. Duke University Press.

<sup>48</sup> See Anderson, Warwick. 2009. "From Subjugated Knowledge to Conjugated Subjects: Science and Globalisation, or Postcolonial Studies of Science?" *Postcolonial Studies* 12 (4): 389–400. Anderson's critique of STS theories can also be followed in Chapter 8: "Pramoedya's Chickens: Postcolonial Studies of Technoscience" in Hackett, Edward J, and Society for Social Studies of Science, 2007. *The New Handbook of Science and Technology Studies*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press : Published in cooperation with the Society for the Social Studies of Science.

<sup>49</sup> See McNeil, Maureen. 2005. "Introduction: Postcolonial Technoscience." *Science as Culture* 14 (2): 105–12.

<sup>50</sup> In the five special issues on the subject, Freed's article is the most suitable for the scope of this study. The majority of the articles in these issues are concerned with themes of science. However Freed's article relates in several ways to this study. Firstly, it is about history of technology and, most importantly, an infrastructure. Secondly, it elaborates mostly on the construction and conception phase of this infrastructure. For more examples see also: Hecht, Gabrielle. 2002. "Rupture-Talk in the Nuclear Age: Conjugating Colonial Power in Africa." *Social Studies of Science* 32 (5-6): 691–727; Smith, Laurel C. 2010. "Locating Post-colonial Technoscience: Through the Lens of Indigenous Video." *History and Technology* 26 (3): 251–80; Kusiak, Pauline. 2010. "'Tubab' Technologies and 'African' Ways of Knowing: Nationalist Techno-politics in Senegal." *History and Technology* 26 (3): 225–49.

roads and road works.<sup>51</sup> The roads were built not according to western standards or conceptions but in line with colonial interests. The roads and road building shaped the socio-geography of the regions they passed through, creating tensions and contestations both inside the local communities and the colonial rulers. The colonialists' objectives had unintended results; in the long run there were political, ethnic and economic consequences.

### **Part 3. Technopolitics**

The first conceptualisation of the term, 'technopolitics', can be attributed to Gabriel Hecht and Timothy Mitchell. A substantial literature on the history of technology shows and is interested in the question of how politically, socially and culturally biased human choices have given shape and pace to technological design and development. Several examples, such as Hughes' Large Technical Systems concept, have been referred to in the above. Historians' insights into the construction of technology, whether by political, social or cultural biases, have been highly refined. However, a missing element, which in contrast is the starting point for Hecht, is the role of technology in the construction of politics or other dimensions. From this point of view the history of technology can thus talk more easily to mainstream history. Accepting the role of technological designs and choices, which are shaped by human decisions, in the performance and construction of politics or other human activities, creates a more sound equilibrium between the human and material duality in research.

Technopolitics refers to power, politics and technology that create a hybridity. For example, expert knowledge cannot be analysed in clear-cut categories cultural, economic or technical. It is constituted in a heterogeneous way; it deserves to be understood in hybrid terms. Gabrielle Hecht explains this hybridity with the term 'technopolitics' which, as performance of power through technology, is defined as the "strategic practice of designing

---

<sup>51</sup> See Freed, Libbie, 2010. "Networks of (colonial) Power: Roads in French Central Africa after World War I." *History and Technology* 26 (3): 203–23.

or using technology to enact political goals”.<sup>52</sup> The way Hecht uses this term does not imply that such practices are politics by another name. She notes that their material, artifactual forms matter fundamentally to their success and shaped the ways these hybrid systems “acted upon the world”.<sup>53</sup> On the other hand Timothy Mitchell defined and coined the term, in a compatible way with Hecht’s, while researching the rule of experts in modern Egypt. His ‘techno-politics’ puts emphasis on the unpredictable power effects of technological designs and assemblages - “the unintentional effects of the (re)distribution of agency that they enacted”.<sup>54</sup> Mitchell resembles techno-politics to an alloy whose ingredients are “both human and nonhuman, both intentional and not, and in which the intentional or the human is always somewhat overrun by the unintended”. He claims that the particularity of the way this amalgamation<sup>55</sup> between things and ideas is done creates the perception of the ‘realm of intentions’ to prevail.<sup>56</sup>

Gabrielle Hecht’s *Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II* and Timothy Mitchell’s *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* are the two basic exemplary studies for technopolitics.<sup>57</sup> Hecht focusses on the history of French nuclear power during the 1950s and 1960s. She avoids answering questions like what was French about the French nuclear programme and rather chooses to tell us the relation between definitions of Frenchness and engineering choices. Engineering choices were part of a struggle to define Frenchness in times of diminishing French global influence and a humbled national pride. Technical prowess was a solution for regaining national pride in a peaceful way. Hecht narrates a story in which engineers tied nuclear technology and national identity into the fabric of reactor design and management; workers strengthened these links in labour unionism and workplace culture; neighbours perceived these as

---

<sup>52</sup> Hughes *et al.*, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*, p. 14; Hecht, Gabrielle, ed. 2011. *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War*. 1st ed. The MIT Press, p. 3.

<sup>54</sup> Hecht, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>55</sup> “The world out of which techno-politics emerged was an unresolved and prior combination of reason, force, imagination, and resources. Ideas and technology did not precede this mixture as pure forms of thought brought to bear upon the messy world of reality. They emerged from the mixture and were manufactured in the processes themselves.” Mitchell, Timothy. 2002. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. 1st ed. University of California Press, p. 52.

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>57</sup> This rich book explores the transition of Egypt which was experienced by construction projects affecting the Nile, irrigation schemes, agriculture technologies and warfare. Mitchell’s work is of political theory which involves themes like social calculation, agency, abstraction, violence, law, capitalism and expertise. See Mitchell, Timothy, 2002. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. 1st ed. University of California Press.

symbols of changes occurring in their local social-economy. The foundational question answered in the book is what kind of a picture emerges if all aspects of the life of a technology are studied. She ends with the insight that political, social and cultural choices shape the design and growth of technical systems. Hecht is interested in “how technologists define their niches in national policy making and enact policy choices in technical practices and artefacts, how workers establish their place and assert agency in hierarchical structures, and how local communities situate themselves within a nation”.<sup>58</sup>

There are many valuable works that instrumentalise technopolitics in their historiography. Toby Jones, in *Crude Ecology: Technology and Politics of Dissent in Saudi Arabia*, explores underlying factors of the November 1979 Shi'i revolt in Saudi Arabia.<sup>59</sup> To the list of conditions and frustrations leading to Shiite revolt, Jones adds Cold War relations and six decades of discrimination and oppression experienced by the Shi'a minority at the hands of the Saudi state. The story tells us how in the construction of a large irrigation network, the technical and socio-economic involvement of Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company) in it and the Saudi state's desire to divert the resources of the region of East Arabia and to consolidate its power, the project created conditions for the outburst. In this story not just the devastation of the region's irrigation system but also the Cold War alliances and the American role in the shaping of Saudi state policy, helped cultivate dissent. In *Nuclear Colonization?: Soviet Technopolitics in the Second World*, Sonja Schmid analyses Soviet technopolitics as expressed in the nuclear technology transfer in Eastern Europe during the Cold War.<sup>60</sup> Schmid tries to create a history where the Soviet nuclear technology, in the exemplary cases of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, was used to create a relation of dependence on the Soviet Union through technical designs and the management of nuclear reactors. She shows that different technical and organizational choices led to the creation of a variety of 'technopolitical regimes' which were, in cases like Czechoslovakia, contradictory to the intended Soviet politics.

Technopolitics, as a notion, remains more fluid rather than coined and rigid. Even Gabrielle Hecht, in “The Power of Nuclear Things”, uses it more flexibly from its initial

---

<sup>58</sup> See Introduction and Conclusion at Hecht, Gabrielle, 2009. *The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II*. New edition. The MIT Press.

<sup>59</sup> See Hecht, Gabrielle, ed. 2011. *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War*. 1st ed. The MIT Press.

<sup>60</sup> See Hecht, Gabrielle, ed., 2011. *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War*. 1st ed. The MIT Press.

coinage as politically strategic design. While trying to understand patterns in the shaping of nuclear networks, nuclearity and markets in relation to Africa, Hecht employs the notion more expansively, as “distribution of power in material things and symbolic circulations”.<sup>61</sup> Hecht analyses three historical genealogies of George Bush’s claim in 2003 that Saddam Hussein sought uranium from Africa. The article tries to answer how technopolitics makes some things nuclear, commodities, African, or all three. Her recent book *Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade*, develops this article in a more comprehensive work that focuses on the interrelationship between African uranium and the global nuclear regime of the post-war world.<sup>62</sup>

#### **Part 4. Theoretical and Methodological Framework of the Research**

This study has several aims to satisfy. First of all, this study can attribute itself as the first serious work in the general field of STS (history of technology in particular), concerning Cyprus. The existing literature of both the history of technology and the history of Cyprus seems to lack any similar work. Thus, this study opens or aims to open a new academic space in the historiography of Cyprus, and it serves both to its author and to others interested in Cyprus as a guide and, it is hoped, a model. The themes touched upon can be enriched, criticised and used to develop further study. With this in mind, it can be argued that this study wishes to speak to historians of Cyprus and those interested in history of Cyprus besides historians of technology.

Besides this broad ambition, this study aims to talk about politics with the agency of technology. Politics is everywhere and as long as political power penetrates to every single fabric of society it becomes unavoidable to talk about it. In the case of Cyprus, politics may be overemphasized by its historians but this does not change the fact that, in certain periods, the politics in colonial Cyprus dominated the everyday life and practices of people, at least the majority.

---

<sup>61</sup> See Hecht, Gabrielle, 2010. “The Power of Nuclear Things.” *Technology and Culture* 51 (1): 1–30.

<sup>62</sup> See Hecht, Gabrielle, 2012. *Being Nuclear Africans and the Global Uranium Trade*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

There are two levels of inquiry in studying these infrastructure projects – their conception, design and construction – in the colonial period of British Cyprus, 1878-1960. At the first level the question is more straightforward and is derived largely from the perception of technology as a political tool. Why did the British Empire and her administration decide to engage in such infrastructure projects at these certain periods? What was the political aim? Or, it can also be articulated as, how was this infrastructure building envisaged as a political tool for further consolidation of the colonial regime? At the second level the inquiry zooms into the design characteristics and localisation of the project itself and discussions around them. In other words, the question here is how and why certain characteristics were given to the infrastructures under discussion and how these became or were utilised as matters of politics. The zoom-in is not just into details of the body of the relevant technology but into Cyprus and her local politics. At this level the scope is to analyse, as far as possible, how technical issues translated into politics and political agendas and vice versa.

In order to fulfil the inquiries above to a reasonable extent, I draw concepts, insights and analytical tools from the three theoretical frameworks; transnational history, postcolonial studies, and techno-politics. As a matter of fact, aside from techno-politics, these theoretical frameworks do not present strict theoretical tools and methodology. Additionally, techno-politics is framed and defined pretty widely so that even it does not constitute a concrete theory. The period under study is the colonial period of Cyprus under the British Empire. One would say that it is inevitable to utilize tools and methodology from colonial and post-colonial studies, but both the history of Cyprus and the history of technology literatures prove the opposite. While the former have nearly ignored them, the field of history of technology showed a limited interest. Despite the emphasis on the aftermath of the colonial period, post-colonial studies are also relevant for studying the colonial period.

First of all, the emphasis of postcolonial studies on ‘situatedness’ is enlightening. Infrastructures are not packed in the metropole and mailed to the colonies to be set up like furniture from big retail companies. Here, the centre or the metropole is just another factor or actor, and the technology – as a technical assemblage and management – acquires a hybrid form both of local and metropolitan influences. In addition to insights of techno-politics, the second level of my inquiry refers to localisation. Post-colonial studies have an interest in the question of how technology and power were co-produced and not just on

technology's utilisation as tools of power. I try utilizing this with another interest in post-colonial studies: debates and disagreements over new technologies which can be used to make visible ways of contests over issues like ethnicity and religion in a matrix of unequal power. Thus I will analyse the discussions around the infrastructure projects in order to see the political stance and intentions of the actors who, one way or the other, are considering their power in relation to the project. The outcome refers both to history of technology and history of Cyprus literature.

The insight that technology, politics and power create a hybridity is fundamental to this study. This relates directly to the above considerations. I prefer drawing from the definition of Gabriele Hecht since Timothy Mitchell's definition requires the study of infrastructures history in post-construction. Technopolitics enable me to embed the politics in the above insights of post-colonial studies. Thus, the study will focus on debates and discussions around these infrastructures and their designs to trace the political strategy or intention of the contestants. The design matters since the technology acts upon or wishes to act upon the world in the way those who have shaped it intended. Cyprus' history had witnessed periods of high politicization of daily life so that, I assume, infrastructural projects were welcomed as issues of central politics.

The next question here is: who are the 'system builders'? Both Hughes' approach and the scholarship from Networking Europe prefer to follow the words and actions of the 'privileged actors' who are in an advantageous position in the design and decision-taking process; they are the ones who possess more power than the rest in the power network of politicians, officials, colonialists, engineers, merchants etc. In a hierarchical society and especially in a colonised one, there are also hierarchies of the power to influence decision-taking. However, this does not mean a top-down imposition of the decision by the 'privileged' whose perceptions about the world, many times, are confronted with reality and forced to be negotiated. This is the first criterion in choosing the members of the actor category of the study. The second is the availability and the state of the archives. A large chunk of this study uses British colonial sources and archives. These include dispatches, letters, reports, surveys, memoranda, newspaper clips, photos, drawings etc. from the Colonial Office, Cyprus Government, Crown Agents, Consulting Engineers and other British ministries like the Treasury and Admiralty. In these sources one can follow the discussions between Cyprus Governors, their officials in Cyprus, Secretaries of State in the Colonial

Office and other ministries and their officials, engineers working for Crown Agents, Consulting Engineers or other Colonies. Most of the time related news from Britain and Cyprus media can be found since they were used as a means to get informed about mainstream public opinion. No doubt these actors are mainly British and, generally, they express the British official opinion or British stereotypes and beliefs.

However, in these sources one can also find petitions, letters, representations and communications from and to local political, social and economic 'factors' of Cyprus. These include mayors; community leaders from villages; people of wealth such as merchants, industrialists, tradesmen; religious leaders including bishops, archbishops and muftis; trade and labour unions; Turkishcyriot and Greekcyriot politicians. Especially for the period 1881-1931, the researcher can find minutes of the Legislative Council which was the unique institution of political expression of mainstream Cypriot politics. In cases where the local political reactions cannot be traced in these archives satisfactorily, newspaper archives are relied upon. The choice of newspapers is restricted to only the Greekcyriot press for mainly practical but also historic reasons. A large number of the most popular right- and left-wing Greek-speaking newspapers can be accessed digitally. Additionally, the Turkish-speaking press had been in the Arabic alphabet since the late 1920s but not in the modern Turkish Latin alphabet. Turkish-speaking newspaper archives have been kept in paper form, and their method of archiving could be described as archaic, and thus time-consuming for the user. Despite this fact, there is no bias towards one community over the other because the actors themselves tell us the political agenda of each period which, most often, was the issue of union with Greece.

In the selection of the periods two points have to be clarified. There are jumps in the time from one project to the other. Moreover, the stories do not cover the whole history of each infrastructure understudy. Firstly, each period in my research, roughly 1898-1907 and 1945-1960, were characterised by the instantiation of large projects, which means that, for one or the other, the colonial administration engaged in materialisation of infrastructure projects that were significant in size and cost. This works in multiple ways in favour of the researcher, especially when she wants to study the decision-making process, and the design and construction phases. In a small island, such relatively large projects favour the researcher to write more comprehensive stories when they have no essential secondary

literature to turn to.<sup>63</sup> The stories, then, jump from one period to the other, to study only these phases of decision-making, design and construction. The selection of the infrastructures to be studied depends on the period and the interest of the author.

The electrification of Cyprus stands as a theme untouched and has the prospect of producing very interesting stories and insight if it is studied further than the beginnings achieved here. This network was also an obvious choice due to my being an electrical engineering graduate, and therefore being familiar with this network technology. Harbours and railway projects are less straightforward. During the first period that I touched upon, three projects came forward: railway, harbour and irrigation. Railway is a long-forgotten technology in Cyprus and is still referred to as an old ghost. Besides the public interest in railway, its construction had been considered a joint project with the construction of Famagusta Harbour. Through this subject, I therefore engaged in writing on harbour projects as well. This is a particularly attractive choice when one considers Cyprus' primary contact with the rest of the world, as an island, was through ships and harbours until 1940-1950 with the establishment of military and civil aviation links. In addition, all three infrastructures were institutionalised to an elementary level, meaning that it is relatively easy to find relevant archival resources. These choices become all the more compelling in light of Cyprus' history across the colonial and post-colonial period.

---

<sup>63</sup> There are two monographs on the Cyprus Government Railway and another one on Cyprus ports. The first two are nearly identical: see Turner, B. S., 1979. *The Story of the Cyprus Government Railway*. London: Mechanical Engineering Publications; Radford, Michael, 2003. *The Railways of Cyprus*. Nicosia: Laiki Group Cultural Centre. Turner's book is a rarity and antique which has become nearly impossible to find. Radford, as he notes in his book, draws so much from Turner's book that it could easily have been a re-edited version of the former. Both engage in archaeology of technology with a focus on the technical parts in a great detail. Radford adds other rails found in the island next to the Cyprus Government Railway. Radford's book contains especially rich photographic material. Then there is Hugh Ballantyne's collection of Cyprus Government Railway photos, mainly of its last years and demolition. See Ballantyne, Hugh, 2007. *Cyprus Narrow Gauge*. Midhurst: Middleton Press. The monograph on Cyprus port can be considered as touristic visual material with many photographs and maps together with some superficial historic data. See Marankou, Anna. 2002. *The Harbours and Ports of Cyprus*. Laiki Group Cultural Centre.

# Chapter 2. The Colonial period in the history of Cyprus

---

## Introduction

This chapter aims to help the reader as a historical guide. It unfolds the history of Cyprus in the 20<sup>th</sup> century in a largely descriptive manner, so that the reader can get a picture of the social, economic and political reality in Cyprus during the period covered in the thesis. The aim is to inform the reader about important events that stigmatised the everyday and political life of the Island and acted as points of reference and moments of change for the rest of its history. In addition it describes the social, economic and political framework of the island so that the reader can get a more complete sense of understanding in regard to the order of the things.

As the whole study aims to see the history of technological infrastructure as intertwined with the political history of the island, this chapter is written to provide a wide historical background for those who are not familiar with the rich and complex Cypriot history. It must be noted that every chapter will also provide the necessary historical information about key points of the historical period under scrutiny (e.g. Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1945, Joseph Chamberlain's constructive imperialism etc.)

As the reader will observe, the content is about the political, economic and other types of histories which are mainly labour, social and cultural. From the political history, there are references to international politics, key political events and agents such as political institutions and personalities, wars, colonial matters, administrative issues etc. In relation to the economics of the island, the chapter provides information on major taxation issues, the

financial situation of the state and the society, influential foreign and local economic factors, trade, industry and agriculture. As far as the secondary sources permit, there are also references to histories of labour issues and struggles, particular social phenomena, nationalism etc., so as to give an elementary understanding or a rough framework of the daily life of the majority of the people. However, the social history of Cyprus is still a category of research waiting to be touched upon. This makes social and historical references very restricted.

Besides being a historical guide, this chapter is also necessary as a point of reference. One of the scopes of this study is also to provide new insights into the existing historiography of Cyprus, by telling stories of infrastructure building, revising existing interpretations where necessary. The structure of the chapter is based upon a periodization of the political history of the island as reconstructed by existing secondary bibliography, having as its main criteria the radical political changes or shifts and their repercussion in the making of colonial Cyprus.

## **Part 1. From the first years of British rule to the 20<sup>th</sup> century**

### **1.1 Political and Administrative Structure of British Rule**

With the coming of British colonialism in Cyprus the way the state mechanism was organised changed significantly, as had many other aspects of politics, economy and society<sup>1</sup>. The changes beyond the juridical system which were transferring the Cypriots from the *millet* system to the modern bourgeoisie common law were equally radical. Historiographically, these early years of the British rule period have not been studied to any great extent. However, one can say that there is a common understanding that, in many aspects, these years were stigmatised by the 'transition to modernity'. It is appropriate to

---

<sup>11</sup> The Cyprus Convention which passed the island under British control foresaw a payment of a certain amount to the Ottoman Sultan. This was the infamous 'Tribute'. The terms stated that Britain would pay an amount from the excess of Cyprus revenue over expenditure. The amount was approximately £92,000. In fact, the Sultan never saw this money because it was being canalised to the British and French bondholders of the Turkish Loan of 1855. In 1878 it was calculated to cost 10s. for every man, woman and child in Cyprus. Hill, George, 2010. *A History of Cyprus*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 299, 464-467.

start with the description of the organisation of the British authority and administration in this part of the chapter. This emanates from the fact, I believe, that the British state mechanism was exposed to few and minor changes throughout the 82 years of colonial rule on the island.

The British were intending to rule Cyprus not so much by force but with the consent of its people. Even though it was not the rule, this was generally a dogma in the British colonial policy for those regions that they could apply it to.<sup>2</sup> In this line, Cyprus was given a constitution in 1882 that was in the framework of the liberal policies of Gladstonian Britain.<sup>3</sup> However, in reality the constitution did not offer a relatively more democratic and liberal administration of the island's matters. The constitution established two institutions, which were the Executive Council and the Legislative Council. The Legislative Council gave the Government the character of a representative parliamentary system. In the Legislative Council there were Greekcypriot and Turkishcypriot elected members (9 Christians/non-Muslims and 3 Muslims) and six Official members who were British civil servants appointed by the Governor himself. This setting created an arithmetic equality in the Council between Greekcypriot and British-Turkishcypriot votes which was only unbalanced by the vote of the Governor who had the right of the decisive vote. As can be understood easily, even though the Cypriots were voting against or in favour of a law, the number of the British votes could easily overrule their will. Even in the case of a law passing by Cypriot votes (when for instance a British officer was absent), the Governor could seek refuge at the Colonial Office<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> This dogma considered ruling a colony with violent oppression as inefficient and not useful. What was important for them was to assimilate local leaders into the logic and morals of their colonialists, to accept their leadership for the sake of "progress", collect taxes from their compatriots for this matter and so on. Gradually the representatives/leaders of the colonized people were given more power and rights to administer the country's inner politics and issues. Darwin, John. 2006. *The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate*. 1<sup>st</sup> edition. Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Wiley-Blackwell. p. 91.

<sup>3</sup> The acquisition of Cyprus was a policy of the Conservative Government of Benjamin Disraeli. This had been opposed by the Liberals of William Ewart Gladstone, whose Government in 1881 would be influential in giving Cyprus a legislative body.

<sup>4</sup> Direct rule of the colonies was not something practical and possible because of the enormous distances and long communications time. The governance of the colonies was the job of governors. The Colonial Office's role was to supervise the colonies but especially their finances. The staff of the Office was from the members of the Home Civil Service. A new official was being appointed as Assistant Principal, posted to one of the geographic divisions. Their work was to make the first comment on the incoming despatches from the colonies and forward them to their seniors. These new appointees were passing enough time at a certain division and acquiring experience and knowledge about a certain group of colonies. Colonial Office officials acted in the name of the Secretary of State and not in their own. The post of Secretary of State for the Colonies was usually not a heavy one within the Cabinet in comparison to Treasury or Foreign Affairs. However, there had been names that pushed their own ideas and projects. He was answerable to the Prime Minister and Houses of Parliament. A Governor's appointment was difficult if the Secretary of State did not approve his name

which could pass any decision by issuing an Order-in-Council. This also indicates much about the relation of the London Government with the Governor who only answered to the Colonial Office. The Executive Council was made up of appointed British and Cypriot members and functioned as an advisory organ to the Governor.<sup>5</sup>

The Government consisted of several departments for its basic administrative functions. The Secretariat was the central administrative department which co-ordinated and controlled all the other departments. Under the Secretariat there were Receiver-General, Customs and Excise, Public Works, Survey and Land Registration, Forests, Police and Prisons, Postal and Medical departments, and the office of the King's Advocate, who was the legal adviser to the Government. For governing the six districts in the island there was one British District Commissioner for each district (with local helpers), who was responsible for the implementation of the official policies and reporting problems to the Chief Secretary and to relevant departments.<sup>6</sup>

In short, such an administrative structure did not give the Cypriots any substantial political authority in the island's matters, but did integrate them into the framework which the British wanted to use in order to rule the island. The British, as a method, were allocating some posts of secondary importance in power to Cypriots. This was already a method that had been tried in other colonies. It was thanks to these arrangements that people from higher social strata, unrelated to ethnicity, began to take political and bureaucratic posts. Only in policing was there a bias towards the Turkish Cypriots who were the majority in the service despite of being only 20% of the whole population<sup>7</sup>. One last point that must be noted about the Cyprus government is the stance of the British colonial officers. Holland and Markides define their general behaviour as follows:

---

politically. Ure, Gavin. 2012. *Governors, Politics and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918-58*. Hong Kong University Press. pp. 22-24.

<sup>5</sup> Katsiaounis, R. (2008). 'Η Διασκεπτική 1946-1948 με Ανασκόπηση της Περιόδου 1878-1945', Λευκωσία, Κέντρο Επιστημονικών Ερευνών Κύπρου, pp.18-19.

<sup>6</sup> Georghallides, G. S. (1979). *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926 with a Survey of the foundations of British Rule*. Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, p. 37.

<sup>7</sup> Katsiaounis, 2008, op. cit., p. 18.

*British officials sought to keep their heads down, concentrate on administration, and identify by trial and error a working equilibrium between 'British', 'Greek', and 'Turkish' identities and loyalties.*<sup>8</sup>

## 1.2 Political factors: the Greekcyprriot and Turkishcyprriot political elite

For many decades the political leadership of the Greekcyprriot community remained occupied by a class of bourgeoisie made up of merchants, money-lenders, professionals and the clergy. The latter, which meant the Cyprus Autocephalous Orthodox Church, would, later on in the history of the island, develop into a political institution that dominated and led the political life of the whole Greekcyprriot community. These two classes exercised a terrific influence on the community which were surviving through their economic, social and spiritual monopoly over the farming folk. The Church which had become the representative of the Greekcyprriot/Orthodox Christian community during Ottoman times, controlled the education system and every aspect of spirituality of the traditionally conservative Orthodox rural people. The capitalists who were also representing the Greekcyprriots at the Council were also generally money-lenders. Due to their economic power over farmers these money-lenders had an effective control over them that was giving birth to a corporatist and paternalistic relationship between the voter and the candidate.<sup>9</sup>

The Turkishcyprriot ruling class was, in general, made up of big land-owners and bureaucrats, who were conservatives and collaborators of British rule.<sup>10</sup> Even the Constitution of 1882 was set up on the collaboration of this class with the British.<sup>11</sup> One can consider the politics of this class as a way to compensate for their loss of power after the

---

<sup>8</sup> Holland, R. & Markides, D. (2006). *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960*, New York, Oxford University Press Inc, p. 172.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, p. 20

<sup>10</sup> Turkishcyprriot historiography suffers heavily from lack of serious historians and historical work. For many years, a few so-called nationalist historians had dominated the public opinion and historiography. These people were more like ideologues and story-tellers than historians since one could hardly find any reference to primary or even secondary sources. There are only a handful of serious historians like Niyazi Kızılyürek, Mete Hatay and Nevzat Altay. Kızılyürek and Altay have been mainly interested in Turkishcyprriot nationalism and Hatay has works related to the Ottoman Cyprus. Another problem of the Turkishcyprriot historiography is its uninterestedness in the colonial period. That's why the reader will find mainly Greekcyprriot historians who are again certain number of persons.

<sup>11</sup> Kızılyürek, N. (1988), 'Paşalar Papazlar', Kıbrıs Defterleri Kitap Dizisi I, Londra, p. 40.

Ottoman regime against the Christian counterparts who were now economically and socially more developed and dynamic.

These classes of power in both communities and British officialdom were the decisive factors in giving shape to the island's political, economic and social life. If we sum up, it can be said that in the first 40 years of the occupation the British could not manage to build relations with the farmers, who were thus left to elect whoever they were told to do so. Only during and after the Second World War could farmers and workers manage to create a different politics of their own.<sup>12</sup>

### 1.3 Major Political Events in the Period 1900-1931

The island of Cyprus entered the 20<sup>th</sup> century in transition. The British reforms in the administration, taxation and justice were the main factors transforming the society from a typical Ottoman one into a more modern and capitalist one. Of course the pace of change was slow for many, but the whole structure of the economy, politics and society was being restructured. In other words, Cyprus was entering in to modernity and the Greekcypriot community would be the first to experience it *en masse*. There is a general tendency, about this period, to attribute to, mainly, Greek and Turkish nationalisms and their developing an ever growing role and influence, especially in matters of politics. Historians such as Georghallides give importance to Greek nationalist politics and others, including Holland and Markides, are inclined to read history as moved by British officialdom and its relations with the Greekcypriot nationalists and the 'enosis' movement.

High Commissioner Haynes-Smith (1898-1904) during his last years in the service had sent a series of warnings to his superiors that action might have to be taken against "Greek opponents of British rule". He was referring to the rising Greek nationalism, the sentiments for *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) and its agitators<sup>13</sup>. In his 1903 report he informed his superiors at the Colonial Office about "an 'aggressive extension' of the enosis movement" and in 1904 he was repeating that the movement is 'more emboldened'. His

---

<sup>12</sup> Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>13</sup> It was during his service in 1903 that for the first time demand for enosis had been announced officially by the Greekcypriot Elected Members of the Legislative Council.

demands for overcoming the 'danger' were an increased number of troops, alterations or cancellation of the 1882 Constitution, thus the abolition of the Legislative Council.<sup>14</sup> This was the period of colonial development which constructed the railway, Famagusta Harbour and Larnaca harbour improvements. The reader will see that colonial development had the scope of answering at a crisis which was not defined to be originating solely from the works of local nationalisms', especially of the so-called enosis 'movement'. Greek nationalism was not necessarily defining local political agendas, but it was even being utilised for private interests (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4).

The successor High Commissioner, the mildly philhellene Sir Charles Harman-King<sup>15</sup> (1904-1911), was sent to Cyprus to co-operate and woo with the local politicians in order to avoid an embarrassing international breakdown. He concluded that the main problem in Cyprus was financial.<sup>16</sup> Coincidentally, it was during his service that the Grant-in-Aid to Cyprus was increased to £50,000. We will see that 'finance' or Cyprus colonial development policy was more than the idea of one High Commissioner. There were other more important factors including Joseph Chamberlain's constructive imperialism, social and economic crisis in Cyprus, and criticism within British politics on the legitimacy and reasons for Britain's presence in Cyprus (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4).

In 1907 the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, made a visit to the island in order to prepare a report. His visit created expectations especially in the Christian population not towards the enosis but the financial questions of the island. Churchill, after his visit, came out of his official line and criticised the British economic policy in Cyprus.<sup>17</sup> Again in 1909 there was a hot debate over the Tribute which later on transformed into the demand for more Greek elected members in the Legislative Council.<sup>18</sup>

However, the most significant years of the early twentieth century were those of 1911 and 1912. The news of the dispatch of a deputy from Crete to Athens to enter the

---

<sup>14</sup> Holland, R. & Markides, D., 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

<sup>15</sup> He was constantly reprehended by the Colonial Office for not defending against the attacks towards the British presence but for trying to achieve a co-operation between Christians and Muslims. *ibid.*, p. 173.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, p. 172.

<sup>17</sup> He claimed that Britain has no right to collect taxes from Cyprus to pay the 'Tribute'.

<sup>18</sup> Sir Charles Harman-King was later sent to Guiana and replaced by Sir Hamilton Goold-Adams. He was considering Cyprus theoretically an Ottoman possession and he governed the island as a typical colony. Like many of his predecessors, he was demanding constitutional restrictions. He was imbued with "a strong bias against Greek politicians, increasingly stereotyped by British officialdom as the sole cause of instability". *ibid.*, p. 174.

parliament created after-effects in Cyprus. In spite of this development the Christian politicians avoided a head-on clash with the British authorities and again restricted their activities around the issues of legislation and Tribute. Though after the resolution of the Archbishopal question by the election of the radical Bishop of Kitium, the ranks of the enosis politics were tightened and resulted, in 1912, in the en masse resignation of the Elected Members and large demonstrations.<sup>19</sup> As the High Commissioner reported in 1912, Christian-Muslim co-operation was getting increasingly worse. The resignations and the Turco-Italian War in the Mediterranean were building up a bi-communal tension, because the Greekcypriots were starting to see the Turkishcypriot community as an obstacle to enosis.<sup>20</sup>

Cyprus in the First World War was left in the periphery of the major strategic and political developments.<sup>21</sup> However, it contributed the British war machine by non-military means.<sup>22</sup> These developments inevitably had some impact on the life of the islanders, but the major political development during the war years<sup>23</sup> was the British offer of Cyprus to Greece.

On 15 October 1915 the British Empire decided to make an official offer to Greece to take Cyprus under its sovereignty on the condition that Greece would enter the war on the side of Entente Powers.<sup>24</sup> The offer was negatively answered by Greece due to internal matters (disagreements between Venizelos and the King Constantine). The news of the offer and the rejection of it arrived on the island on October 29. Despite of the news there were

---

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*, p.174

<sup>20</sup> In May 1912 this political tension created the most extended disturbances, troubles broke out in 26 villages outside of Nicosia and most serious at Limassol. However the bi-communal clash was avoided quickly and the tension ended with the help of the leaders of both communities. *ibid.*, p. 175.

<sup>21</sup> In military terms the island made only a limited contribution to the British war effort. Despite the later efforts of the British Naval and General Staffs to make the most of the island's importance, their December 1917 evaluation came to claim the precise strategic services on behalf of Cyprus: "In the present war, although we have made a little use of Cyprus for military purposes, the mere fact that it is a British possession has been a great value to us, since it has constituted a permanent threat to the most vulnerable and most vital point of the Turkish communications, and has compelled the Turks to maintain considerable forces in this area throughout the war". Georghallides, 1972, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

<sup>22</sup> Cyprus supported British operations in the Levant logistically; provided provisions to the British army in Egypt and Macedonia; accommodated thousands of prisoners of war, refugees, and foreign troops for training; sent 13,000 thousand muleteers (Greekcypriots and Turkishcypriots) to the Salonica front, and exported thousands of mules and donkeys for the British army (p.89).

<sup>23</sup> In 5 November 1914 Britain annexed Cyprus.

<sup>24</sup> This was a decision of a desperate moment but not a hasty one. Already in 1912 a navy report was considering that Cyprus could be used as an object of exchange to Greece in case of emergent needs. (Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

no mass demonstrations on the side of the Greekcyriot community owing to the harsh wartime conditions, the confused political climate in Athens and the martial law.

However, Greekcyriot politicians wrote a letter to High Commissioner Clauson expressing their appreciation of British liberal thinking. On the other hand the Turkishcyriot community, and especially its leading politicians, were worried by the news which was then expressed in the Legislative Council. High Commissioner Clauson in his answer to the Greekcyriot politicians' letter made it clear that after the rejection of the offer, the matter of union was closed for forever and he reminded them of their loyalty to the Empire. He also expressed to Turkishcyriots the British recognition of their loyalty to the Crown and the continuance of the British protection of their 'material and spiritual interests'.<sup>25</sup>

According to Holland and Markides, Cyprus became gradually, by subterranean ways, "indissolubly united" to the British imperial connection after the war. The British advance in the Middle East, around the Fertile Crescent,<sup>26</sup> and the growing emphasis on exploiting the spoils of war, relocated the British priorities strategically. Cyprus was no longer to be identified as Indian (as it had been occupied for securing the route to India), but was now Middle Eastern.<sup>27</sup>

Following the end of the war and the start of the Peace Conference in Paris, the Greekcyriot politicians were enthusiastic about the prospects of the Conference. Greece was victorious in Asia Minor and Venizelos was sympathised with by major British politicians, upon whom he sometimes has deep influence. A Deputation was set up by the Archbishop Kyrillos III and all but one of the Greek elected members of the Legislative Council, which then left for London on December 1918, to exercise pressure and lobby for the right of self-determination of Cyprus. They met with optimist and Anglophile Venizelos in Paris and later on went to London to talk with colonial and governmental officers. The Deputation was destined to fail on its mission since London was not in a position to talk about the union of Cyprus with Greece.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> Georghallides, 1972, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>26</sup> From Gaza up through the Levant, Jerusalem, Baghdad and Damascus.

<sup>27</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006. *op. cit.*, p. 179.

<sup>28</sup> A Colonial Office memorandum was disputing the strength of the Greekcyriot nationalism as well as the representative nature, even the honour of the Leading Greek Cypriot politicians. Also the Government of Lloyd George (1918-1922) could not spare time on Cyprus because of more urgent issues and debating about union was not helpful for his political situation. The Foreign Office was headed by Lord Curzon from 1919, who was a Tory and an imperialist with a great 'bias against Greeks'. On the other hand the Admiralty was sharing the opinion that Cyprus was important in connection with Suez Canal and Malta, also stating that "as long as it

From 1919 the situation turned against the Greek Cypriot hopes about a possible recognition of the right of self-determination to Cyprus: Venizelos was out of the Government, Greece was on the run with its Asia Minor Campaign (i.e. invasion of modern Turkey's mainland), Britain was struggling with its inner issues and its economics and there were challenges to British rule by nationalists in Ireland, India and Egypt. This indicated a return to inner politics for Cypriots.

After two years of abstention<sup>29</sup> from criticising British policies in the Legislative Council, in 1920 Greek Cypriot politicians returned to local agendas such as education, public works, rural finance problems and inequality between British and Cypriot civil servants.<sup>30</sup> While the enosis movement was turning on itself, British officialdom was doing the same. British officialdom tended to gain more control over the island in order to protect it from external influences and curb 'Hellenising' in Greek schools (the Colonial Office had more important issues, especially in the Middle East, which made the High Commissioner more alone in the repression of enosis). In this framework some important enosis figures in the Greek Cypriot political elite were deported and an education law changed the funding system of Greek schools. Following these developments, good news came for the British from the Turco-Greek agreement which did not take Cyprus in its agenda. Britain took the opportunity to cement its sovereignty on the island in 1925<sup>31</sup> by announcing Cyprus as a Crown Colony. In addition to this, an Order-in-Council increased the number of the members of Legislative Council without changing Greek, Turkish and British ratios. After this point, the Greek political elite was split around two opinions: one favoured continuing a

---

stays in our hands, it cannot be used against us". The War Office was considering Cyprus more important than before since it could now be used as an aircraft base in a region controlling Asia Minor and Middle East. There were also strong protests to Britain about leaving Cyprus to Greece from High Commissioner Malcolm Stevenson (1920-1926), the British-Israel World Federation, the London Muslim League and principal British trade and shipping circles. Georghallides, 1972, *op. cit.*, pp.108-109, 110, 116, 129.

<sup>29</sup> One form of politics that the enosis supporters chose later on that year was the 'opposition policy' which meant rigid abstentionism from British organs and most important from the Legislative Council. The decision for such policy was taken by the National Council (Pan-Cypriot Greek national organisation) in December 1921. Holland & Markides, 2006. *op. cit.*, p. 181.

<sup>30</sup> Georghallides, 1972, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-170.

<sup>31</sup> From 1920 till 1926 Cyprus was governed by High Commissioner Malcolm Stevenson (from 1926 on High Commissioners were officially called 'Governor'). He was devoted to opposing enosis and he continued to maintain the normality after the abstentionism campaign. He kept the Legislative Council functioning mainly with Turkish Cypriots whose loyalty had become his main objective to maintain. The London Government and Colonial Office, which were busy with other international matters, were accepting his interpretation of Cyprus politics. That's why handling the issue of enosis was left to his hands. *ibid.*, pp. 175-177.

low-quality agitation and the others<sup>32</sup> were sharing the idea that abstentionism had nothing to offer anymore.<sup>33</sup>

During the years after Lausanne until 1931, the only chronic debate in political life was over the 'Tribute'. It was a source of resentment for the local people and did much to inspire Turkish-Greek co-operation in the Legislative Council. In 1926 before the Legislative Council sitting for the approval of the 1927 Appropriations bill (budget bill), Greek and Turkish elected members after a common meeting agreed to throw out the Bill. The bill was rejected and created a short-term (this was the most important achievement of recently renewed Greek-Turkish Cypriot co-operation) 'constitutional crisis' which had to be communicated to London by the Acting Governor. This was going to be the first problem that the new Governor Ronald Storrs<sup>34</sup> (1926-1932) had to face on his arrival.<sup>35</sup>

Ronald Storrs saw the opportunity to relieve pressure on Cyprus matters when Winston Churchill became Chancellor of the Exchequer. He could now try to emancipate Cyprus from the 'Tribute' since Churchill's 1907 visit and his harsh critic on British policy over 'Tribute' were still in the minds of many. Only on his second year Storrs was faced with a new political deadlock. First of all, London was not in a position to pay all the money that it had received from Cyprus under the name of 'Tribute' in all those years. Secondly, his behaviours were no longer successfully seducing Greek politicians. They were sensing an attempt at 'dehellenizing'. Therewith the Greek politicians managed to put their differences aside and join ranks to exercise harsh politics in sittings of annual estimates of the Government (at a time when public revenues were falling in the wake of global economic crisis) in the Legislative Council.<sup>36</sup>

As generally accepted by the literature, the existing political situation in the late 1920s was a political crisis, a crisis of consent. The British officialdom's authority was now relying on continuous Orders-in-Council to pass any law. There was a conviction in the British ranks that the 1882 Gladstonian Constitution must be broken so that British authority could survive in Cyprus (p. 184). In the meantime, the relations with Turkish Cypriots were

---

<sup>32</sup> The latter were on the lines of enosis-autonomist which was supporting a way of administration in the model of Malta.

<sup>33</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006, op. cit., pp. 181-183.

<sup>34</sup> He was looking forward to creating a 'Cypriot patriotism' and move away the Greek nationalism towards a 'feeling of educational and cultural pride'. In addition to these he aimed to increase the social contact of the British officialdom with all of the local people, including rural. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

<sup>35</sup> Georghallides, 1972, op. cit., pp. 395-399.

<sup>36</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006, op. cit., pp. 183-184.

also becoming more complicated after the Turkish Government's emigration invitation to the Turkish population of the island. The British were depending more and more on Turkishcypriots for their support in the Legislative Council and police force (57 percent of the force were Turkishcypriots). Their massive emigration was not in the interest of Britain and the Cyprus Government tried to avoid such an event.<sup>37</sup> The resentment towards British rule and the traditional leadership was increasing in some Turkishcyriot circles which were pushing some members to 'flirt' with their Greekcypriots colleagues in the Legislative Council, creating worries for the British administration.<sup>38</sup>

Writers looking from the angle of nationalism, especially Greek nationalism, and its relations with the British establishment claim that by 1930 there were suitable conditions for a possible uprising in Cyprus. The first factor was Greekcyriot nationalists (mainly bishops and lawyers) in Kyrenia, a backward city in the north. They had more radical ideas about the struggle for enosis; they were criticising harshly the traditional political leadership and organising themselves at a pan-Cypriot level. As referred to above there was also a change in the ranks of the Turkishcyriot political elite (especially new graduates/nationalists from Turkish universities) which were questioning British rule and the old traditional leadership. These people were distancing themselves from the embracement of colonial politics and were getting closer to collaboration with Greekcypriots, especially in economic matters.<sup>39</sup> In this climate, the riot of October 1931 was produced by a secondary event that happened between the Greek and British official members in the Legislative Council about a draft-legislation for taxation. The episode resulted in the resignation of the Greek members from the Council and organisation of a spontaneous rally towards the Governor's palace. The rally ended up with the arson of the Governor's palace and the killing of several demonstrators.<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> The Turkish Republic after its foundation (1923) invited Turkishcypriots to emigrate to Turkey to settle in abandoned Greek and Armenian properties. In the end there was no massive emigration to Turkey and many of those who left Cyprus returned back in one or two years. Georghallides, 1972, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

<sup>38</sup> "Yet the consolidation of a secular, 'modern' republic in Ataturk's Turkey affected Muslim society in Cyprus as well. A younger generation felt at odds with the old-fashioned, religious, and fez-wearing Cypriot Turks whom the British traditionally patronized as interlocutors. Turks, just like the Greeks, often found Storrs' tactics too subtle by half." Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

<sup>39</sup> Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.* pp. 34-38.

<sup>40</sup> Irakleidis, A., 2006, 'Κυπριακό Πρόβλημα 1947-2004: Από την Ένωση στη Διχοτόμηση;', Αθήνα, Εκδόσεις '1. Σιδεράς', p. 80.

## 1.4 Economy and Society in Cyprus in the period 1900-1931

The British occupation in 1878 and its aftermath brought radical changes also in the issues of economics, taxation and production. The present thesis, while not ignoring the importance of earlier developments, will nevertheless restrict discussion to the post 1900 period. Substantial information on the earlier decades can be found in several works<sup>41</sup> such as the indispensable source *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century* by Rolandos Katsiaounis. Necessary information concerning the years between 1878 and 1900 will be given in each chapter concerned with that period.

We will see in Chapters 3 and 4 that Tribute had been an obstacle in front of the British establishment for engaging in capital-demanding infrastructure building. Churchill too, during his 1907 visit, had observed that the successive rejection for fixing a lower figure for the 'Tribute', which was emptying every year the treasury of Cyprus, had been responsible for the financial system imposed on Cyprus. Over this Georghallides comments that this provision made governing Cyprus "a thankless task and minimized the British administrative achievement". Furthermore, he claims that every official coming to Cyprus in some way or other was falling into lethargy as a consequence of the system.<sup>42</sup>

A change occurred in this arrangement following the appointment of Joseph Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary in 1895, which would mark a change in colonial politics. Chamberlain<sup>43</sup> "carved a niche in British politics advocating a stronger imperial government and vigorous development of colonies".<sup>44</sup> Cyprus would benefit from the historic Colonial

---

<sup>41</sup> See also Chapter One in Georghallides, G. S. 1979. *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, 1918-1926: With a Survey of the Foundations of British Rule*. Cyprus Research Centre.; Varnava, Andrekos. 2012. *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The Inconsequential Possession*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.; Baker, Samuel White, 2007. *Cyprus, as I Saw It in 1879*. Echo Library. and for an official colonialist opinion see Part V and Part VI in Jenness, Diamond. 1962. *The Economics of Cyprus: A Survey to 1914*. McGill University Press.

<sup>42</sup> Georghallides, 1972, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>43</sup> Chamberlain was also known as a promoter of railway investment.

<sup>44</sup> Varnava, 2010, *op. cit.*, , p.142

Loans Act of 1899,<sup>45</sup> which for the first time allowed the colonies to borrow on the same terms given to local British authorities.<sup>46</sup>

After the Ottomans, the British had made the taxation system efficient and more severe. In essence the new system was not allowing the farmer to gain more time to pay his tax and he was therefore always under the threat of dispossession as the Government would sell his movable and immovable properties. This was a source of continuous resentment.<sup>47</sup> Several severe droughts, such as those of 1887 and 1902, contributed to the start of creation of a small labour market in the island. The first labourers<sup>48</sup> were those farmers who had lost their property due to state taxation and mainly forced sales of immovable farming properties in the interest of money-lenders. This social change gained a substantial momentum after the First World War when the prices of agricultural products fell; they were the main source of income for the majority of the population. As most of the immovable farming properties were under mortgage with the fall of the prices, the biggest wave of forced sales in the history of the island was witnessed.<sup>49</sup>

The receipts of the Government started to increase at a slow pace after 1898 and by the time of 1913-1914 the receipts had doubled themselves in relation to 1878. This was indicating a slow rate of growth since it was the 36<sup>th</sup> year of British rule. In addition to the Government budget, the slow growth is observed in the value of immovable property and trade, which was on a better track in the 20<sup>th</sup> century until the First World War.<sup>50</sup> The island disposed an insignificant amount of modern industry. It was agriculture that dominated the broad economic advance in the first thirty-six years of the occupation.<sup>51</sup>

Except the boost that it gave for a while to the rural population due to exports for British army operations in the Levant (including mule production in Famagusta), the war brought many economic difficulties.<sup>52</sup> From the last months of 1920 the prices of Cyprus'

---

<sup>45</sup> See Chapter 3 for a detailed consideration of the Colonial Loans Act of 1899.

<sup>46</sup> For more on Joseph Chamberlain and Colonial Loans Act 1899 see Chapter 3.

<sup>47</sup> Georghallides, 1972, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>48</sup> Many of these dispossessed farmers were forced to seek a better life by migrating overseas; the majority of them took refuge in urban centres. Together with the poor class of workers of the small guild-like shops these people concentrated a satisfying number, so we can talk of the first working class (p. 25).

<sup>49</sup> Katsiaounis, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>50</sup> Georghallides (1972), *op. cit.*, pp. 34-36.

<sup>51</sup> Jennes, D. (1962). *The Economics of Cyprus: A Survey to 1914*. Montreal, McGill University Press, pp. 186-188.

<sup>52</sup> Holland & Markides (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 179.

agricultural exports began to fall, bringing again a financial crisis.<sup>53</sup> As mentioned above, the result was increasing dispossession of the rural people.

This rural indebtedness was the major economic problem of the period. In 1917 a Government commission investigated the matter and reached the conclusion that the problem lay in the 'unbusiness-like' methods and improvidence of the farmers. These frequently enabled the unscrupulous village merchants and money-lenders – the wealthier merchants having few direct dealings with the poorer villagers – to get the farmers in their powers as fully as if they were already insolvent. The result was the sale of the properties of the farmer who was not protected by the law. The Government passed four laws while the Deputation was in England in 1919. This caused controversies and economic repercussions.<sup>54</sup> The whole situation actually meant a financial crisis, a lack of capital which was crippling also Government investments. After 1920,<sup>55</sup> Cyprus was seriously affected by the post-war fall in commodity prices which further undermined confidence between lenders and borrowers. The result was less money available for lending and rarely on terms other than the mortgage of immovable property. In the end, the economic results of the four laws did not live up to the Government's expectations and the problems of the indebted peasantry of Cyprus remained acute during the rest of Stevenson's governorship.<sup>56</sup>

The prospect of dispossession of the poorer class of cultivators and of a more general slide into bankruptcy haunted the Cypriots, posing, as it did, a threat to their society. Entering an international economic recovery, the Cyprus Government could only help to improve the agriculturists' conditions and prevent their dispossession. This was economically and socially desirable since the people were more likely to escape destitution in their villages than in towns where, in the absence of large-scale industry, only limited employment opportunities existed at extremely small wages. To an increasing extent private capital now preferred bank deposits and the banks themselves did not trust the farmers to issue loans.

---

<sup>53</sup> <sup>53</sup> Georghallides (1972), *op. cit.*, p. 173.

<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

<sup>55</sup> The Great War affected nearly all classes in society. "The fall in the prices of the island's agricultural products was driving many farmers into bankruptcy, and in the towns, especially in Nicosia, there was considerable discontent at the cost of living and exorbitant rents" *ibid.*, pp. 219-220.

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 183.

The only alternative reaction of the Government to the rural crisis was to look favourably on the establishment of a private Agricultural Bank.<sup>57</sup> From 1925 onwards there was an improvement in Cyprus' trade. With the increased demand for Cyprus produce, the economic burdens of the population began to ease and the dangerous rush of expropriations had lost its momentum, though the problems of rural insolvency and poverty remained. However, they now could no longer tolerate the Government's bureaucratic and laissez-faire methods. In 1925 the Government spared £46,000 for several improvements such as expansion of facilities at harbours, improvement of secondary roads<sup>58</sup> and several state buildings. At last, in the same year, the Government established the long-awaited Agricultural Bank.<sup>59</sup> This was a relief for the farmers without any measures for those who lost their properties to the money-lenders.<sup>60</sup>

By 1926 Cyprus was in economic crisis again. The most despised taxes, the tithes, were abolished for cereals but Stevenson's government taxed or increased the duties on many imported goods which were items of mass consumption of poorer classes.<sup>61</sup> The new taxations created a crisis in the wine industry – also brandy and zivania, the local drinks of the poor – and then in the middle of 1926 it spread on to other sectors. There was a bad cereal harvest; the olive harvest had failed partly; and to make matters all the worse the carob import was low because of Spain's new tariff barriers, Britain's preference for molasses and the devaluation in France.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 295-296.

<sup>58</sup> £11,360 was spent on the construction of two main roads which had for years been demanded from the Government: Nicosia-Myrtou and Agios Amvrios with Akanthou.

<sup>59</sup> The farmers had to organize themselves in co-operatives in order to apply to the Agricultural Bank, a law which did not apply to Turkishcyprits. The Muslim leadership considered that if the above applied to the Turkishcyprits they would not benefit from the Bank since they could not establish credit societies. This was also transferred by Stevenson to the Colonial Office. He said that the Muslim minority suffered from "lack of initiative and organising power" and "the strength, both political and financial, of Moslem minority is dwindling". *ibid.*, p. 334.

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 330-334.

<sup>61</sup> His abolition of tithes did not earn him popularity among the population since his new taxations provoked complaints. The increased duties caused the prices of bread and sugar, mass consumption products, to rise, but he avoided taxing beers, whisky etc., which were preferences of British officials. Also he shifted the tax burdens of the cereal producers to consumers and to the wine industry and vine growers of Limassol. *ibid.*, pp. 363-366.

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 363-366.

Again, in many commentators' opinion, the solution lay in modernisation of agricultural methods and channelling capital to agriculturalists<sup>63</sup> because non-agriculturalists were drawing away their capital from the rural areas. In spite of the stable political environment that the Government had created, it did not act on these matters to change the priorities in the budget. They continued to rule Cyprus on the basis of the proposition that the misfortunes of the villager were inexorable phenomena of life. A few weeks later after the new taxation scheme Stevenson left Cyprus to be replaced by Sir Ronald Storrs.<sup>64</sup> These were the economic developments that resulted in the Greekcyriot-Turkishcyriot alliance in the rejection of the budget bill in 1927.

Cyprus witnessed the establishment of first Marxist circles in 1920. After the crisis of nationalism in 1922 we see the foundation of Cyprus Workers' Party (CWP) which was gathering together communist and socialist elements. This party after two years transformed into the Cyprus Communist Party (CCP).<sup>65</sup> In its home town Limassol, it found suitable conditions to spread its ideas in the working class: the wages were very low, the working hours were from sunrise to sunset and employers were free to express their superiority to workers in any way. In the meantime we see also the first class-based trade union (early 1920s) with demands for mass wage and labour condition negotiations. CCP had to confront not only the great displeasure of the bosses but other circles' as well. In its manifesto, the Party was demanding abolition of private property in the means of production and the expropriation of Church property and that of landowners. The Communists were faced with charges from the Police, and anti-propaganda from the elite political class and the Church, since the Party was also against the Christian religion. This would leave a sense of anticommunism in some parts of society, which would emerge at significant moments in the coming years.<sup>66</sup>

The establishment of CCP was the first time when the dominant ideology was being comprehensively questioned. It can be said that the period 1900-1930 was the height of

---

<sup>63</sup> Industrial development was also seen as highly desirable since only new industries could provide employment for the excess village population seeking work in the towns or emigrating (in 1926 many Cypriots emigrated to Argentina). *ibid.*, p. 367.

<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*, p. 367.

<sup>65</sup> "CCP was established by several Marxist-Leninist Limassol clerks and workers in 1922. The labouring class of Limassol, possessing on account of the wine factories, the port and other local industries, greater self-awareness than the workers in other towns, furnished the bulk of the followers of the few intellectual communists". *ibid.*, p. 309.

<sup>66</sup> Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

Greek bourgeoisie nationalism.<sup>67</sup> The Greekcyriot leadership was traditionally merchant/bourgeoisie and the clerics,<sup>68</sup> of whom the former class was the first to recognise the primary role of the Church in politics. These men of wealth and power, who also represented the Greekcyriots at the Council, were also, very often, money-lenders. Due to their economic relations with the farmers these money-lenders could exercise control over the latter. This was the basis of the relationship between the voter and the candidate corporatist.<sup>69</sup>

Besides the economic relations between the peasantry and the money-lender politicians – who were Elected Members in the Legislative Council – there was also the Greek Orthodox Church extorting the peasantry's consent. Figures like the Bishop of Kitium, who the reader will meet in Chapter 3, were men of 'God', 'money' and 'politics'. Also some of its main 'Ethnarchic functions' – inherited from Ottoman times – such as its overwhelming involvement in education, remained, even half a century under British rule. As a consequence, the Church was a political institution, a means of political representation and a "political plum".<sup>70</sup>

In the Turkishcyriot community things were a little different. First of all, the Turkishcyriot community lacked a bourgeoisie class; it seems that the wealthy and powerful political leaders were big landowners and administrators.<sup>71</sup> In the general historiography it is considered that this class submitted to the colonial rule, which was a guarantee of its status in society. As mentioned before, colonial rule depended very much on the submissiveness of the Turkishcyriot leadership. It is indicative that the Turkishcyriot educational system fell under total control of the British administration early in the 1900s. In fact, in comparison to Greekcyriot political and social life, Turkishcyriots' experienced a slow rhythm of transformation, and changes and developments were less significant and slower. Modernist thinking was nearly absent in this community and its

---

<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>68</sup> In the first 40 years of the colonial regime in Cyprus, the British could not manage to build relations inside the farmer folk. The political line that was decided about the clergy and the ruling class of bourgeoisie was followed by the popular classes. Until the first years of the period between the two World Wars, farmers and workers could not manage to create a different politics of their own against British rule. This was the result of the totalitarian control of the clergy and the capitalists on every part of the organisation in the life of the farmers. *ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>69</sup> *ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>70</sup> Attalides, M., 1979, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, Edinburgh, Q Press, pp. 24-25.

<sup>71</sup> *ibid.*, p. 41.

ruling class until the 1920s.<sup>72</sup> The 1920s contributed a lot to the national consciousness amongst the Turkishcypriots, especially the educated and the wealthy. The foundation of a 'modern' and a 'secular' Turkish Republic had its impact on the younger generation. These people were starting to resent the "old-fashioned, religious, and fez-wearing Cypriot Turks whom the British traditionally patronized as interlocutors".<sup>73</sup> On the other hand, the first Turkishcyriot graduates of the universities of the new Turkish Republic were returning to Cyprus by the late 1920s. Together with them they were bringing also Turkish nationalist ideas that would mark a turning point in the change of the Turkishcyriot community. These nationalist and Kemalist graduates were one of the factors that presented a serious potential catalyst for emancipation from the British authority. These changes in the Turkishcyriot political elite caused a part of the community to question and to distance itself from the British political hegemony. This meant that a part of the community was in position for a 'flabby' cooperation with Greekcyriot counterparts against the colonial rule.<sup>74</sup> Their influence and the role they played in the political crisis of the late 1920s that led to the 1931 riot cannot be ignored.<sup>75</sup>

There was never a common language to unite the two communities against colonial rule. In the everyday life of the common people there was intercommunal cooperation but politically people voted for their traditional distinct leaders for public seats.<sup>76</sup> The rural indebtedness which gave birth to waves of dispossession of the peasantry was a big factor that gave a faster momentum to social change. Together with lengthy droughts at the beginning of the century and the crisis following World War I, many farming people were left without any property and forced to move to cities or emigrate. The last years of the 1920s were times when the Greekcyriot leadership was witnessing a loss of credibility in its politics. The removal of thousands of people from their property, which was inherited from their ancestors, in such a way, naturally created feelings of unfairness and immorality. In addition to the dispossession of the farmers, the closing of guild-like shops and their

---

<sup>72</sup> Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

<sup>73</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

<sup>74</sup> Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

<sup>75</sup> Some argue that Turkishcypriots adopted the reforms of Kemal and adored him as it happened in Turkey. Attalides argues that this argument probably does not stand. He argues that Kemal's reforms were not immediately adopted, keeping in mind that the educational system was under British control. He claims that the change was gradual and voluntary which was most probably induced by the nationalist materials and ideas that were brought from Turkey by new university graduates. Attalides, 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

<sup>76</sup> *ibid.*, p. 25.

transformation into the first small factories, in which the small technicians had become waged labourers, was another major factor putting question marks in the minds of people about the reasons for the general poverty and degradation. People were witnessing themselves or their fellow villagers being forced to sell their properties and get dispossessed by money-lenders, who were coming from the cities and putting obstacles to finance reforms. This created suspicion towards urban dwellers in the ranks of agricultural classes.<sup>77</sup>

## Part 2. From the Riot of 1931 to the Consultative Assembly of 1946

### 2.1. The Riot and Palmerocracy

With the 1931 riot Cypriots entered a new period which would be marked with widespread oppression. It also marked temporarily the end of the political crisis of the late 1920s and the start of a more autarchic type of governance, which was being wished for in British official circles (as mentioned in the previous section).<sup>78</sup> The name of this traumatic period in the collective memory of the Greek-speaking Cypriots was (and remains) 'Palmerocracy' after the name of the Governor and Commander-in-Chief Sir Richmond Palmer (1933-1939). It would be a period which had its own unique social and political framework.

The riot, as mentioned before, gave the British rulers the opportunity to impose an administration and political system along the lines of a dictatorship. Holland and Markides define this regime as follows:

---

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

<sup>78</sup> "The October riots had provided precisely the excuse for repressive action that was needed by the Colonial Office. A. J. Dawe, principal at that office, was to minute in 1933 that "the defects of the constitution had, of course, been realized and the riots of 1931 were in some respects a *godsend* [italics added], as they braced us up to abolishing it." Georghallides, G. S. & Markides, D. 1995, 'British Attitudes to Constitution-Making in Post-1931 Cyprus', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 13:1, 63-81, p. 68.

*During a decade of widespread depression a tendency to retreat behind a screen of petty absolutism characterized many British administrations overseas, but the Cypriot case had a special Mediterranean twist.*

As a Colonial official observed, in 1938 the administration in Cyprus resembled the ‘political philosophy of Mussolini’.<sup>79</sup> Right after the riot, the first thing done was to abolish the Legislative Council and suspend the 1882 Constitution. Instead of these institutions an appointed Advisory Council was established. It was banned to organize any national demonstration, hold public meetings or to use any national symbol, such as Greek or Turkish flags and anthems. The press was taken under strict control and censorship became a very frequently used tool. Teaching nationalistic material in the schools was banned and teachers doing it were threatened with charges. On the other side, the primary figures in the riots were exiled. The Greek Orthodox Church, of which some bishops were exiled, was especially targeted.

A few words must be said about the importance of the riot. From the Greek Cypriot point of view the riot had proven that the demand of enosis was not restricted to Church and bourgeoisie any more, it now had a wider mandate. Except for this it must be noted that no encounter was observed between the two communities. The British later in 1930 seemed to be taking the demand of enosis with little seriousness. However, the riot showed that it was not just demanded by a minority, but now resembled something of a mass movement. Despite the violence and especially the arson of the Governor’s House, the British believed that the Church would not allow use of weapons for any claim and they restricted their measures against the Church by sending several bishops to exile.<sup>80</sup>

In the Cyprus historiography one can observe that the 1930s are under-researched. The reason for this can be found in the impression of the scholars of the period – 1931 until World War II – as a dark one when social and political life was under constant repression and in a state of dormancy. However, for the British politics in the island of the period, “repression” was considered “merely” as a necessary step for laying the foundations of a polity purified from what they perceived as “petty politics”. What the successive governors

---

<sup>79</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006. *op. cit.*, pp.213-214.

<sup>80</sup> Irakleidis, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82. Attalides claims that the riot was not planned but it was a mixture of ‘nationalist verbal agitation’ and ‘spontaneous peasant riots’. Also the background of the enosis movement was a story of peaceful demands through media such as petitions. Attalides, 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

wanted to establish was “in the words of Governor Stubbs, “public spirit” in the minds of Cypriots ... and providing them with a “civic education,” in the words of his successor Palmer...”.<sup>81</sup> Bearing this in mind, the following section will be based on two strands: opposition to the regime; political perceptions and intentions of the British administration.

The Cyprus Orthodox Church, as the oldest and now the strongest political institution of the Greek-speaking community, was having difficulty showing some resistance to the status quo. However, in the political and moral vacuum created by the repression, the Church was strengthening its Ethnarchic role, giving a space for preserving the Hellenic culture while the enosis vision stood far in the future.<sup>82</sup> The deportations of two bishops and the death of another deprived the Church of three out of four of its bishops,<sup>83</sup> leaving the bishop of Paphos Leontios as the surrogate (*τοποτηρητής*) of the Church.

In time he gathered power owing to the extraordinary conditions and became the centre of opposition against Palmerocracy.<sup>84</sup> Around *Locum-tenens* Leontios<sup>85</sup> and the clerical circles, a petit-bourgeois intellectual group, largely composed of teachers and lawyers, developed close ties for an opposition to the regime. Their reactions were restricted generally around education and inside the borders of the law. On the other side a sense of discontent was developing inside the Turkishcypriot community's ranks.<sup>86</sup> Turkishcypriot nationalists, still a relatively small circle, were demanding the liberalisation and modernisation of the institutions of the community which was either under British control/influence or traditional collaborator leadership. Greek and Turkishcypriot factors found an opportunity to cooperate against the regime in 1937 – with the relaxation of censorship of the press – about the establishment of local political societies. The attempt

---

<sup>81</sup> Rappas, A. 2008. ‘The Elusive Polity: Imagining and Contesting Colonial Authority in Cyprus during the 1930s’, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 26:1, 363–397, p. 365.

<sup>82</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006. *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>83</sup> This had created the well-known ‘Archiepiscopal Question’. As the deported bishops remained rightful bishops according to the Ecclesiastical Law and their presence was needed for gathering the Holy Synod, as a consequence the elections could not be done ‘canonically’. A clash in the order of legitimacy occurred: for the Church legitimacy of the bishops “de-territorialized (it applied to all Eastern Orthodox Churches), timeless (it was rooted in the venerable resolutions of the seven Ecumenical Councils), and immaterial (or divine)” but for the British they had no legitimacy since it was “territorial (confined to the colony of Cyprus), circumstantial (linked to one event, the 1931 uprising), and material (i.e., human-made and thus revocable)”. Rappas, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 376

<sup>84</sup> Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

<sup>85</sup> A British official account of his actions see Hill, George, 2010, *A History of Cyprus Vol: IV pp-555-556*.

<sup>86</sup> Despite its absence in the 1931 riots the restrictions and oppression applied also to the Turkishcypriot community.

was rejected by the Government, resulting in the discharge of some of those involved from public posts and repression of newspapers.<sup>87</sup>

In spite of the repression the opposition remained, though weakened, and went underground. The latter was more visible in the Left, which was taking root and creating a space inside the society, mainly through strike action, which was something new in the society.<sup>88</sup> The Cyprus Communist Party emerged as one and unique political organisation that could pursue an organised opposition. The strikes were the key tools of struggle, in which communist circles played a big role in their organisation. However, in 1933 the Cyprus Communist Party was declared illegal and they were hunted continuously by the authorities. In the period 1932-1934 nearly all of the executive members of the Cyprus Communist Party were arrested and ended up in jail. Communists were considered as a 'virus' in society and even the local social and political leading class was expecting the Government to crush and destroy them.<sup>89</sup> British rule in the island would always find a wide consent to suppress the communists.

The period of Palmerocracy was distinct from the previous years of the Colonial rule – a fact accepted generally in the historiography of Cyprus. It symbolises the break from the lethargy and inertia of the administration to the matters of the island. Rappas finds indicative the preparation of three surveys<sup>90</sup> about Cyprus in the first half of 1930s. Now the policy was towards a more interventionist state, and understanding the workings of the local society. He claims that these surveys were the blueprints for creating an ideal polity in times when social engineering was at its best.<sup>91</sup>

The first, *Survey of rural life in Cyprus*, was a detailed report with statistics/figures and, more than that, the first ethnographic survey of the island. It had the prime concern of researching the life of the peasantry.<sup>92</sup> There were also suggestions for the development of

---

<sup>87</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 53-56.

<sup>88</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006. *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>89</sup> Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

<sup>90</sup> See Surridge, Brewster Joseph. 1930. *A Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus. Based on Reports of Investigators Who Visited Villages throughout the Colony during 1927 and 1928, and Amplified by Statistical and Other Information from the Records of Government, Nicosia.*; Oakden, Sir Ralph. 1935. *Report on the Finances and Economic Resources of Cyprus, Crown Agents for the Colonies*; and Stubbs, Reginald, 1933, *Memorandum*.

<sup>91</sup> Rappas, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

<sup>92</sup> "...most were small-proprietor peasants, crippled with debts (1930:36). 82% of the island's 59,175 peasant-proprietors owed money (1930:37), either to urban merchants, lawyers, or thriving farmers (1930:45-46)." *ibid.*, p. 366.

the welfare of peasants.<sup>93</sup> The second, *Report on the Finances and Economic Resources of Cyprus*, had the objective of suggesting ways for cutting down the administration's expenditures and proposing cost-efficient policies for inducing financial, legislative and institutional incentives for boosting the local economy with the sponsorship of the Government. The report strongly suggested investment in development and state interventionism in the domain of agriculture.<sup>94</sup> The last, *Memorandum*, can be seen as "a review of Cyprus's constitutional situation following the abolition of the Legislative Council in 1931". Its basic argument is the mistrust of the Cypriot who, the paper claimed, needed to be educated. As a method to 'reform the Cypriot', the paper suggested firstly a reform in education and secondly elimination of the 'bad' in society, who happened to be the Church and the Communists.<sup>95</sup>

In 1932 Sir Ronald Storrs was replaced by Edward Stubbs (1932-1933) who was known for his "practical and common sense qualities" and his experience as the Governor of Jamaica. Within his short term, he showed a firm hand on the issues; authoritarianism was established as the model of governance in the island and he fought particularly with the unionist movement. He pushed the communists out of the game for a while – until the late 1930s – with the amendment of the Criminal Code<sup>96</sup> in 1933. Before leaving the island he expressed his opinions about Cyprus to the Colonial Office with a memorandum.<sup>97</sup> He had the opinion that no representative institution<sup>98</sup> should be given to Cypriots, whom he considered "slave minded", and he argued instead that a new class of leaders must be, in his words, "bred" to clean the society from the "bad", the Church and the Communists.<sup>99</sup>

His successor Sir Richmond Palmer (1933-1939), a lawyer with a rich colonial experience, also a Lieutenant Governor, pursued a politics that was in line with his successors'. As a way of creating a "breed" of new class of Cypriots the Palmerian regime used the method of appointing Cypriots who sought compromise and co-operation with

---

<sup>93</sup> *ibid.*, p. 366.

<sup>94</sup> *ibid.*, p. 367.

<sup>95</sup> *ibid.*, p. 368.

<sup>96</sup> "To free the administration's hands, colonial authorities in Cyprus enacted a series of laws placing the whole judicial department under the direct authority of the executive (governor, secretariat officers, and district commissioners)". *ibid.*, p. 370.

<sup>97</sup> Georghallides & Markides, 1995, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-74.

<sup>98</sup> After the riot of 1931, the constitution was suspended but in 1933 it was reconsidered in London to restore the Legislative Council. However, after the advice of Sir Reginald Stubbs (the new Governor), the idea was retracted. Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-214.

<sup>99</sup> Rappas, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 369; Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

British rule to public posts. The appointees<sup>100</sup> were selected from the dominant class of the society and were appointed to high public posts in order to secure the application of British policy and to create a British-friendly public opinion.<sup>101</sup>

As mentioned above (the three surveys) in the framework of the British ideology what Cypriots needed was reforming their minds, a better material life –development – and stricter top-down governance. For the former the education system had to be changed and for the latter local administrations had to be given more authority. In relation to education the first concern was the dissemination of nationalist ideas in the schools of both communities. The curriculum in the Greek and Turkish schools was arranged by the Education Ministries of Greece and Turkey. The Education Bill of 1933 – under Stubbs – aimed to get the education of both communities under total control of Cypriots. The law was making the Governor the “central authority for all matters relating to elementary education”. The Government had given 10 years of struggle (1923-1933) to conquer the control of primary education and about elementary education it wouldn’t succeed completely till 1960.<sup>102</sup>

In local administrations the reforms aimed to give local authorities more authority to Commissioners in order to prevent the Government pre-emptively from any “popular clamour” and, in a way contradictory, to get the Government closer to people. District Commissioners became the first to enjoy this new redistribution of authority. Palmer wanted a team of District Commissioners<sup>103</sup> with “wide prerogatives”, “personal ascendancy”, “fluent in both languages” and visiting villages to make their point. Clearly the motive behind these measures was to repress any political movement or organisation before it reached the masses. In addition, local authorities in villages and municipalities were appointed by the Government in contrast with the old elective system.<sup>104</sup> Local

---

<sup>100</sup> Before 1931 for being appointed to a public post, electoral support was a precondition. This was being abolished while anti-communism, and the economic and social status of the appointees became the norm *ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>101</sup> *ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>102</sup> Rappas, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 372; Georghallides & Markides, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

<sup>103</sup> District Commissioners were placed high in the administrative hierarchy, coming after Chief of Justice and Colonial Secretary.

<sup>104</sup> Elections were postponed until 1943, which was the time period that Palmer needed to “educate” Cypriots into “good citizens” for such liberty. *ibid.*, p. 372.

authorities expected to work with District Commissioners to create a responsibility towards their communities.<sup>105</sup>

## 2.2 The economy and the Labour Issues of the period

The third survey about Cyprus, *Report on the Finances and Economic Resources of Cyprus*, indicated that the colonial rulers would be more interested in the material life of the people and its development. The biggest concern of the Government would be about agriculture, specifically rural indebtedness.<sup>106</sup> The Government put forward the development of co-operatives and the establishment of a Central Co-operative Bank in 1938. Palmer (or colonial rule in general), was expecting to crash down the corporatist relation between the peasants and the money-lender politicians, and create a class of small-medium agriculturalists that would support the colonial rule. The second move was to increase the Agricultural Bank's capital for loans and Palmer was appointed as official representative of the Bank to get it closer to Government control. However, these expectations would not be realised until World War II and the Palmer years would remain as one of the worst periods for the classes of farmers, workers and technicians.<sup>107</sup>

It must be noted that, during these years, in Conservative-Tory British circles the administration of Mussolini in the Dodecanese Islands was received almost with admiration. According to their consideration, political restrictions could be justified with the material development of the island.<sup>108</sup> The first plea for money from London had been made by Stubbs, but raising the question in the Treasury would be refused<sup>109</sup>.

---

<sup>105</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 370-371.

<sup>106</sup> "The main crops cultivated on these land holdings were wheat, barley, oats, and, above all, carobs. Cyprus's main market was the United Kingdom, which easily absorbed between twenty-five and thirty percent of the island's exports of agricultural products, although countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, such as Greece, Egypt (accounting for 14.9 percent of the total export trade), Palestine, and Syria as well as Germany and Italy bought Cypriot products." Rappas, A. 2009. 'The Labour Question in Colonial Cyprus, 1936-1941: Political Stakes in a Battle of Denominations', *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 76: 4, 194-216, p. 196.

<sup>107</sup> Rappas, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 374; Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-51.

<sup>108</sup> A Colonial officer had observed that the administration in 1938 resembled the "political philosophy of Mussolini". Hollanda & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>109</sup> Rappas, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 373-374; Georghallides & Markides, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

Another dimension of the decade of the 1930s that has been generally passed over by the general historiography is labour. Rappas and Ioannou have contributed with their works to covering this crucial dimension of life in this period. The labour question appears dynamically in the reality of Cyprus during the 1930s. After the crisis of 1929 and three-year droughts, agrarian Cypriot society started to acquire another socio-economic factor of change: the growth in labour availability. Landless villagers started to migrate either to cities or to work seasonally by wage.<sup>110</sup> Frequent strikes in different sectors for the basic rights of the waged-labour (such as pre-determined working hours, better salaries and restricting the arbitrariness of the bosses) and an increase in unionisation were also attracting sympathy from the wider society. The colonial administration proved to be in denial of such questions, which was in line with the official consideration of every societal issue as an extension of 1931. Basically, as far as labour was concerned, the period was a struggle for the labour force to obtain a political space for itself between the nationalists, the Church and the colonial Government.<sup>111</sup>

The 1930s were years when for the first time in Cyprus a labour legislation had been made and unions also acquired a legal basis. Despite this, due to restrictions in the law on founding unions, unionisation remained at low figures, restricted to only five.<sup>112</sup> The most important aspect of the period, in relation with labour, was the appearance of major strikes which found wide publicity also in the general press. In the politically suffocating circumstances of the Palmerian period, labour issues also meant, in many cases, the only political activity. Unionist/labour movement was on the rise both in quality and in quantity. Quantitatively<sup>113</sup> the numbers of strikes and the sectors attending to them had increased to impressive levels for such a period. On the other hand several strikes managed to create

---

<sup>110</sup> “Both companies employed an average daily labour force of two thousand Cypriots, though many of these worked seasonally at the mines and spent the rest of their time as agricultural labourers. Some 150 smaller companies also attracted dispossessed or impoverished peasants in the early thirties, while the public works and railway departments of the colonial administration employed 3,485 Cypriots. The emergence of a landless agricultural class—a freelance workforce operating part-time as miners, agricultural labourers, and builders—unsettled established social equilibriums and official certainties”. Rappas, 2009, *op.cit.*, p. 197.

<sup>111</sup> Rappas, 2009, *op. cit.*, pp.196-197.

<sup>112</sup> Ioannou, Gregoris. 2008 'Η εργατική τάξη και το συνδικαλιστικό κίνημα στην Κύπρο 1920 – 1960', Χρονικό του “Πολίτη”, τεύχος 37, Λευκωσία, Εφημερίδα “Πολίτης”, p.4. The article is a part of the rare and hard PhD work of Ioannou. See Ioannou, Gregoris. 2011. “Labour Relations in Cyprus : Employment, Trade Unionism and Class Composition”. PhD, University of Warwick.

<sup>113</sup> See Ioannou, Gregoris. 2008. 'Η εργατική τάξη και το συνδικαλιστικό κίνημα στην Κύπρο 1920 – 1960', Χρονικό του “Πολίτη”, τεύχος 37, Λευκωσία, Εφημερίδα “Πολίτης”

political niches, get important earnings and cross gender/ethnic boundaries.<sup>114</sup> In the 1936 Maurvouni miners' strikes Turkishcypriot and Greekcypriot miners managed to strike together (without any leadership from trade unions) or in other words to create a movement mobilising both of the communities on a class base. In the 1938 Famagusta women workers' strike for the first time women publicly and collectively became visible and demanded rights for themselves. In 1939 the victory of Nicosia construction workers about 8-hours would be the basis for the 1941 decision to make 8-hours apply to all sectors.<sup>115</sup>

### Part 3. The War and Post-War

As anywhere else in the world, World War II wrought dramatic changes in Cyprus. Most importantly, it marked the end of 'Palmerocracy' – re-organization of the colonial state and politics – and the change of Cyprus' importance in the British Empire. The historiography of the period emphasizes the rise of mass politics in Cyprus: labour struggles, municipal elections and mobilisation of the masses by nationalist politics.

World War II was propagandized by the Allied camp as the 'war for democracy' and this had a vital meaning for those under colonial rule. Specifically the Atlantic Pact Agreement of 1941 by Churchill and Roosevelt was interpreted by these people in these lines but Churchill<sup>116</sup> had made it clear – to avoid exactly such an interpretation – that it was referring only to those countries under Nazi occupation. However, the same interpretation was done also by Greekcypriots who now were united with the Allies against the Axis

---

<sup>114</sup> "In 1931, Cyprus's two main communities were the Greek-Orthodox and the Turkish-Moslem; according to official figures, out of a total population of 347,959, 79.5 percent of Cypriots were "Greek-Orthodox," and 18.5 percent "Moslem-Turkish." In 1946 these proportions remained practically the same, and 40 percent of the total working population of each community was still involved in agriculture. Craft industry was more important within the Greek-Cypriot community (19 percent of the community's working population), than within the Turkish-Cypriot community (16 percent), while Turkish-Cypriots showed a marked predilection for public service (5 percent of the community's working population) compared with the Greek-Cypriots (2 percent)". Rappas, 2009, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-197.

<sup>115</sup> Rappas, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 199; Ioannou, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>116</sup> Later on he declared that "no-one should have the wrong opinion about our positions...We will keep what we have won and I will not be the Prime Minister that will lead the dissolution of the Empire". However, Greek nationalism, with the relevant relaxation of the restrictive measures, started to reactivate its traditional circles and institutions. Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

powers.<sup>117</sup> It was the time for the enosis movement, after more than 10 years, to profit from this changed landscape. With the end of the service of Richmond Palmer in 1939, William Battershil took his place. In the oncoming war, Britain would need colonial subjects, and the rhetoric of 'war for democracy' and the moderate character of Battershil resulted in a relative relaxation of oppression and the infrastructure of the autarchic regime of Palmer. The hate for Palmerocracy had created some Nazi sympathisers, but Greece-Britain relations were motivating people to support<sup>118</sup> Britain in its war effort.<sup>119</sup>

With the relaxations, political activities found themselves a space to re-emerge and, consequently, in 1941, the members of the Cyprus Communist Party in collaboration with other communists, socialist, social democrats and petite-bourgeoisie elements established AKEL<sup>120</sup> (Progressive Party for the Working People). AKEL had created a political space in which Greekcypriots and Turkishcypriots could act together under the same umbrella. In the new political dynamic of the epoch, the liveliness of Left was frightening and energizing the Right, but British officialdom continued to act as 'masters in their own house'. As far as political planning was concerned, British officialdom had remained more or less intact in comparison with that in other colonies.<sup>121</sup>

In 1943, the Government decided to allow the conduction of municipal elections after a decade of their suspension. The municipal elections of March 1943 – this time they had strictly political more than corporatist character – resulted in the victory of AKEL which won in two towns, Limassol and Famagusta. In the same year, an important meeting had been made in London between Colonial Office and the Governor Sir Charles Wooley. In the discussion it was decided that the Government should strengthen its position among the peasantry who had enlisted *en masse* in the Cyprus Regiment<sup>122</sup> in contrast to city dwellers.

---

<sup>117</sup> *ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>118</sup> The illegal Cyprus Communist Party decided that the working people should not get mixed in war of imperialists and workers should not enlist in the British army. Παπαολiviου, P. 2004. 'Κύπρος 1940-1950: Ίδιες προσδοκίες, Νέες Αντιπαραθέσεις', Βασίλης Παναγιωτόπουλος (επιμ.) Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού 1770-2000), τόμ.8, σ. 363-372, Αθήνα: Ελληνικά Γράμματα, p.363

<sup>119</sup> Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-66.

<sup>120</sup> It was in the beginning a front party containing different but relative parts in which CCP was acting. In AKEL there were petit-bourgeoisie elements, socialist factors, members of syndicates, centre elements and young communists. Their common ideological point was having minimum relations with the Church. The manifesto had a worker-friendly and an anti-fascist character. *ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>121</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-217.

<sup>122</sup> Cyprus was the first colony to send soldiers in to World War II in the British Empire. The Cyprus Regiment had more than 20,000 (Greekcypriots and Turkish Cypriots) men and women, who were serving as auxiliary forces. Παπαολiviου, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

The most difficult issue was that of the Constitution. The Governor was sharing the idea that announcement of a Constitution was necessary in the face of a war that was conducted in the name of 'democracy'. Cyprus had no institution in which some public opinion could be heard but the Colonial Office was considering, having as a point of reference the riots of 1931, that Cyprus had not yet matured enough for a legislative body. Post-war policy for Cyprus would be shaped around the island's economic development and welfare. The Cyprus Government would engage in projects in areas like education, agriculture, health, social security etc. A substantial part of this developmental policy would also include infrastructure projects such as electrification, civil aviation, port construction etc.<sup>123</sup>

In addition to these, both sides appreciated that the Left would emerge victorious in such a Legislative body and a more conservative line was adopted.<sup>124</sup> In the second half of the 1940s there was a Labour party government in London which supported the preservation of the status quo in the Empire. In order to keep the British control over the island it was decided that Cyprus must be given a constitution. The new Governor Lord Winster, in 1947,<sup>125</sup> made an invitation to organisations within the civil society to attend in the Consultative Assembly (known as *η Διασκεπτική* in Greek) to debate about British constitution proposals. Attendance in the Assembly brought the political divide amongst the Greekcypriot community once again to the surface. AKEL decided to attend and the Church, rejecting it at once, attacked AKEL so much that it prevented the Right<sup>126</sup> from taking its place in the Assembly. The Assembly made its first session on 1 November 1947 with 10 Greekcypriots (all related to AKEL), 7 Turkishcypriots and 1 Maronite member. The British proposals were not to give authority to Cypriots: the Governor would still be holding all of the authority; the Cypriot members of the parliament would not have any essential jurisdictions. The self-governance of Cypriots was out of the question. Eventually, AKEL abandoned the Assembly and every expectation concerning Constitution and self-governance failed.<sup>127</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup> For British post-war colonial and Cyprus policy see Chapter 5.

<sup>124</sup> Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-90.

<sup>125</sup> In 1946 there were municipal elections. Elections gave birth to a new phenomenon in Cypriot politics, centre-left politicians who could shape politics around their personalities with the help of their public posts. *ibid.*, p. 146.

<sup>126</sup> The slogan of the Right and Church was "Enosis and only Enosis" and "Away from Cosntitution and ballot boxes".

<sup>127</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-220; Papapoliviou, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

The municipal elections of 1949 exemplified the change of the character<sup>128</sup> of Cypriot politics. The elections were clearly a race between AKEL and the Right, led by the Ethnarchy. In contrast with the 1946 elections, when AKEL and its allies had won in Limassol, Famagusta, Nicosia, Larnaca and 8 other municipalities, AKEL faced a great defeat, losing Nicosia and 10 other municipalities out of 15. With the result of the elections the Ethnarchy confirmed its leadership in Greek Cypriot politics. AKEL's attendance in the Consultative Assembly which was escorted with an attack, anti-communist and anti-patriotic in rhetoric, from the Right and the defeat of 1949 had contributed to pushing AKEL closer to a politics of enosis and nationalism.<sup>129</sup>

### 3.1 Labour Issues and Nationalism

In the literature it is widely accepted that it was in the 1940s, specifically after the war, when the national consciousness of 'being a Turk' had become widespread and consolidated itself inside the Turkish Cypriot community. From 1943 onwards several nationalist political organizations and parties started to appear and by 1948, when the enosis movement was at its climax, these new organisations became able to organise mass demonstrations against enosis.<sup>130</sup> However, increasing numbers of Turkish Cypriot workers were taking active part in the trade unionist movement in which they were acting together with Greek Cypriots of their class. After the first split in the unionist movement by the establishment of Greek Cypriot conservative unions, Turkish Cypriot nationalists followed, creating a second split inside the ranks of the island's labouring class.<sup>131</sup>

Turkish Cypriots in this period had nearly acquired an autonomous political organisation. The next Governor of the island was Sir Andrew Right, a senior official at the time of the riot in 1931. His instructions from London were vague and as it was reported by an American observer he saw the Cypriots as "children needing a firm hand and occasionally spanking". His real agenda was to "rebuild the defences of the British administration". After

---

<sup>128</sup> The tension between Left and Right recognised another dimension of it when the fascist X organisation from Greece started to act in Cyprus. AKEL after 1948 "sought its cue" from the Greek Communist Party abandoning its traditional distance from it. *ibid.*, p. 222.

<sup>129</sup> Papapoliviou, 2004, *op. cit.*, pp. 370-371.

<sup>130</sup> For the movements in the ranks of Turkish Cypriot post-war nationalism see Kızılyürek, N. 2002, 'Milliyetçilik Kışkırtıcılığı Kıbrıs', İstanbul, İletişim Yayıncılık A.Ş.

<sup>131</sup> Katsiaounis, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-183.

accepting the British offers of the Consultative Assembly, he concluded that the Turkishcyriot affairs needed more attention. He established a committee to solve their several grievances. This committee would later be influenced by some nationalist Turkishcyriot circles which would get the control of Evkaf from government-appointed delegates. Despite these developments, most historians share the opinion that Turkishcyriots remained until the mid-1950s on the sidelines of the political scene, not yet managing to become a decisive factor yet.<sup>132</sup>

The start of the war also marked the start of unemployment in Cyprus. The rise in prices brought to bankruptcy many small-medium shops and many mines on the island were closed. The Government Public Works and military expenditure came to save many from hunger. These Public Works which were for military needs, gave the Cyprus labour<sup>133</sup> power and opportunities to make struggles of major importance for wages and labour rights. In combination with the political relaxation, the union and unionised worker numbers exploded. Unionisation and mass employment at Public Works brought massive strikes for Cypriot standards. In the strike of military works in 1942, 8,000-10,000 workers attended and won their demands. A disagreement over the price index in 1943 between the Government and PSE caused a pan-Cyprian strike which was influenced by more than 20,000 workers.

The end of the war had given the Government the chance to repress the labour movement which was exposed to arrests, violence and even killings. There were also splits among the movement which were based on ideological and ethnic reasons (Left-Right, Turkish-Greek). By the end of the 1940s AKEL, in front of the Right, was politically in retreat, which was weakening the labour movement as well. The strikes of mine workers and construction workers in 1948 would end tragically in this climate. 1948 was the year of social compromise in Cyprus history. The political and class-based clash between Greekcyriot Left and Right proved that neither could rule the other. Consequently, this was

---

<sup>132</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 222; Attalides, 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

<sup>133</sup> In 1940 W. J. Hull, the Labour advisor to the Government came to Cyprus to report on the labour issue. It was the growing trade unionist movement that caused his arrival. His report established the basis of new labour laws and state departments that would regulate labour relations. Ioannou, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

These trade unions marked the period of World War II with their militant strikes and demonstrations. There was a serious labour issue in Cyprus that couldn't wait to be solved by the Government. From the August 1939 until 1941 there was an idea and attempts to create a pan-Cyprian union federation. At last, in 1941 at the second assembly of the pan-Cyprian trade union conference it was decided to establish the pan-Cyprian Trade Union Committee (PSE).

followed by the logic that the continuation of polarisation and opposition between two camps would only do harm upon the body of the nation. It is indicative that in the framework of national-liberation struggle the Left and the Right unions started to make common demands and struggles during the 1950s which would later be the tradition after independence.<sup>134</sup>

## **Part 4. The road to decolonisation and civil war: the decade of the 1950s**

### **4.1 Politics of the 1950s: a mixture of Cold War, national liberation and inter-communal violence**

By the end of the World War II Cyprus' strategic position had been reconsidered due to international developments, especially of those countries in its proximity. Reorientation of Cyprus' strategic importance was around the developments in the Middle East which were relocating Cyprus into the epicentre of British imperial interests. This was a sudden change that was increasing the factors affecting Cyprus politics. The emerging Cold War between the capitalist and communist blocs, troubles and petroleum in the Middle East, effervescence of the enosis movement and violence connected to it and last, the abrupt but decisive entrance of Turkish Cypriot nationalism onto the political scene were the factors that would determine the political complexity of the period. These are the main themes that come forward in the historiography of the period of decolonisation.

Late 1940s Britain was struggling to hold on its occupations in the Middle East. In 1948 it was forced to retreat from Palestine and this was followed by increased attacks of

---

<sup>134</sup> *ibid*, pp. 5-13.

Arab nationalists on Suez and rising social resistance in all of Egypt. The existing situation was creating a need for seeking new 'home' bases in the geography. While British existence was slipping away in the Middle East, Cyprus became almost the last bastion of British influence in the eastern Mediterranean, the focus for all her Middle Eastern strategy: "the point where the slide had to be halted".<sup>135</sup> Cyprus had the advantage of being sovereign British soil (remaining British bases were depending on agreements and arrangements with other countries) which also influenced the assessment of the Chief of Staff (after a Cabinet<sup>136</sup> question) about the "indispensability of Cyprus as base, not merely a base on Cyprus".

On the other hand, there were important developments in Cyprus as well. The clerical Right, the secular Left<sup>137</sup> and British colonial administration were in a constant battle between themselves to have the upper hand in politics. Each party was in crisis. The Church was trying to keep the socio-political status that it had gained in all those years. To keep its stakes alive, the Church used the methods of "exclusive control on enosis demand and the anathematizing of secular constitutionalism under colonial auspices". In this line the Holy Synod of the Church announced that on 1<sup>st</sup> December 1949 a plebiscite would be done on the question of enosis. The results showed that 96.5 percent of the voters were in favour of enosis. The event was communicated by the Governor Wright<sup>138</sup> to the Colonial Office as proof of the political immaturity of Cypriots; he requested consent for more repressive measures. The latter would be demanded continuously by successive Governors.<sup>139</sup> This was happening at a time when the Government was starting the first works of the island-wide electricity Grid (See Chapter 5).

---

<sup>135</sup> Porter, Bernard, 2004. *The Lion's Share*. 4<sup>th</sup> edition. Harlow, Essex, England; New York: Pearson, p. 312.

<sup>136</sup> During the Labour Government of the late 1940s and Conservative of the early 1950s Cyprus was preoccupying the politicians. Especially in the history of Labour government policy Cyprus occupies a central position. Hyam, Roland. 2006, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 1918-1968*, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 150.

<sup>137</sup> As mentioned before, by the late 1940s AKEL was politically on the retreat and was moving towards a more nationalist politics which was proven by its declaration in favour of enosis. Indicative to this is the letter of AKEL supported by municipal councils to the United Nations accusing Great Britain while expressing that Cyprus was a Greek island and demanding a referendum for its union with Greece. Kızılyürek, N. (2002), 'Milliyetçilik Kısacasında Kıbrıs', İstanbul, İletişim Yayıncılık A.Ş., p. 92.

<sup>138</sup> He was an old officer in Cyprus serving from 1923 till 1943. He was considered by British officials, who were in despair from his politics, as an "antedeluvian, unregenerate hard-liner who advocated a policy of firmness and repression, coercion and censorship". Hyam, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

<sup>139</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp. 222-223.

The evacuation of Britain in Suez, starting in 1954, led to the redefinition of Cyprus as a 'fortress' colony. From now on, Cyprus was being defined as a 'Commonwealth Fortress'; it was announced that the Headquarters of British Land and Sea Forces in Middle East be transferred to Cyprus (it had already been transferred in 1952 but the announcement was delayed for obvious reasons).<sup>140</sup> The connection of Egypt and Cyprus as it is seen here was a fact in British policy. Cyprus and Egypt<sup>141</sup> in British opinion were always in one or other way linked together. In this framework, the same day when British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden<sup>142</sup> reached an agreement with Kamal Abdel Nasser, a colonial officer announced, implying Cyprus, that some colonies will 'never'<sup>143</sup> get full independence because of their vital strategic importance for the Empire.<sup>144</sup>

The enosis movement, now with the Archbishop Makarios III elected in 1950, was trying to open the self-determination issue of Cyprus in the United Nations (i.e. the internationalisation of the Cyprus issue). Several attempts in 1949 and 1950 had failed. Makarios was putting pressure on the Greek government for the matter and to this end he made his first visit to Athens. He got mild support from Venizelos' minority government (Athens was reading the issue in the framework of Anglo-British friendship). However, in 1952 the Athens government rejected opening up the matter in UN and this frustrated Makarios. Despite this, the Government of Papagou in 1953 announced that it would put the question to the United Nations Council. In 1954 a Greek refuge to the Political Committee managed to pass but not be debated at the 9<sup>th</sup> General Assembly. Greek sides during the debates, in the organs of the UN, had realised two factors that were not in their consideration before. Firstly, Britain showed its closer alliance with Turkey over Greece and,

---

<sup>140</sup> The Cyprus historiography of the 1950s consists of many works of international and Cold War politics. This must have to do with the acceptance of Cyprus' imperial importance after Suez and the internalisation of the Cyprus problem in a Cold War framework.

<sup>141</sup> In 1952-53 'Suez Group Conservatives' were always reminding the Government about Cyprus while struggling to stop British leaving Egypt. Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

<sup>142</sup> Anthony Eden had stated that "No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that". Mallinson, W. 2005, *A Modern History of Cyprus*. London, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, p. 20.

<sup>143</sup> In Cyprus historiography this has remained as the 'never statement'. The statement was also a source of shame for Britain in front of the international community and especially the USA.

<sup>144</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 226; Rizas, S. & Stefanides, I. 2004. 'Το Κυπριακό Ζήτημα: Ο Αγώνας για ένωση, η Ανεξαρτησία, η Τουρκική εισβολή', Βασίλης Παναγιωτόπουλος (επιμ.) *Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού 1770-2000*, τόμ.9, σ. 97-110, Αθήνα: Ελληνικά Γράμματα, p.99

secondly, the UN was not in a neutral position about the issue. The USA was against the internationalisation of the issue.<sup>145</sup>

By 1954-55 the feeling of enosis was at its climax; the mistrust growing all these years between Greekcypriots and Britain had reached explosive levels. Simply Greekcypriots were demanding what they were seeing in other colonies, self-determination (also a global doctrine supported by USA) and the British were holding on as much as they could to their last asset in the region. It was this tension that caused the secret meeting between Governor Armitage and Makarios in March 1955 to be cancelled by Anthony Eden, who considered that it would be a source for triumphant feeling for the Greek Cypriots. On 1<sup>st</sup> April 1955 Cypriots woke up to a day with several bombings that were announcing the start of armed struggle of EOKA for enosis.<sup>146</sup>

In the Cyprus historiography 1955 is also called the 'watershed year', not just because of the EOKA violence<sup>147</sup> but of a turn in British politics. During the summer of 1955 the Cyprus issue was discussed in Whitehall by the Foreign Office, which was headed by Harold Macmillan. Macmillan was no colonist, had no interest in the Empire and his work was finding solutions or fixes to colonial problems. His plan was to keep Cyprus as a British colony but give Greece and, especially, Turkey a share in the governance (known as tripartite dominion). A conference was arranged for August-September 1955 with Turkey and Greece, but it was cancelled due to anti-Greek riots in Turkey. Macmillan's contribution, which created a watershed in Cyprus politics, was his addition of Turkey<sup>148</sup> in Cyprus matters. On Macmillan's advice, Governor Armitage was sacked for his inability and ex-Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field-Marshal Harding was appointed as the new Governor of

---

<sup>145</sup> Rizas & Stefanides, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

<sup>146</sup> Bombings also cancelled the works of Governor Armitage over a constitution proposal which was cleared away totally when on 5 April Anthony Eden became Prime Minister. Also the idea of armed struggle was decided during 1951 and a 'committee of struggle' set up by Makarios himself had started the preparation in 1953 under ex-Colonel Grivas – of Greek fascist anti-communist X organisation. *ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>147</sup> "...all over the island the pattern of attacks on army and navy bases, administrative posts and especially police stations quickly became apparent. Bombs thrown at the Secretariat building and at Wolseley Barracks hit their targets,..." . Anderson, D. M. 1993. 'Policing and communal conflict: The Cyprus emergency, 1954-60', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21: 3, 177-207, p.83

<sup>148</sup> Turkey was becoming a more important ally (in comparison with Greece) of Britain during the mid 1950s. Especially under Macmillan, the Foreign Office was really pro-Turk and, in March 1955, Britain had joined the Baghdad Pact which was signed between Iraq and Turkey.

Cyprus. He was ordered to destroy EOKA and 'to get moving on the road to self-government if possible', in that order of priority.<sup>149</sup>

EOKA attacks were reaching their climax while Harding understood that EOKA violence could not be stopped unless a British proposal was made to let Greekcyprits see what was coming at the end of tunnel. The Cyprus question had been internationalised since 1954 – when Greece opened up the issue in the UN – and eventually American interest in the issue had become another decisive factor in British foreign policy. That's why Harding's thoughts were also shared by the Colonial Office and Eden. In this line, Harding-Makarios talks started to take place with an agenda of finding a solution that would extend British presence, provide self-government and eventually self-determination. The Greek<sup>150</sup> government avoided exercising any pressure on Makarios but Grivas was publicly expressing his discontent which was escorted by the escalation of EOKA attacks. In this climate and despite the visit of Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd to Cyprus in order to find a solution, the talks failed in February 1956. The failure – by Makarios' rejection of proposals as a basis for co-operation – was followed by, in March, the deportation<sup>151</sup> of Makarios – who was at that time demanding the general amnesty of EOKA convicts – to the Seychelles. As anti-enosis oppression was always twinned with the oppression of the communists, AKEL was declared illegal for "reinforcing the intransigency of Greekcyprits".<sup>152</sup>

Mallinson explains the USA factor in the Cyprus issue with the following words:

*The Suez debacle, when America had shown Britain (and France) that she (the USA) was now the main western policy-maker, also had an effect on a Cyprus 'solution', as*

---

<sup>149</sup> Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

<sup>150</sup> "The tendency, particularly of some members of the Ethnarchy, to retain a Cypro-centric approach to union with Greece, after the issue had been substantially internationalized, soured relations with Greek ministers. The Ethnarchy clearly did not understand their very real fear of provoking a further Turkish attack on the Greeks in Istanbul which would require a firm response from Athens." Markides, D. W. 1995. 'Britain's 'new look' policy for Cyprus and the Makarios-Harding talks, January 1955-March 1956', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 23: 3, 479-502, p. 498.

<sup>151</sup> "Harding had made it clear during his visit to London that he would not tolerate the uncertain circumstances any longer. If Whitehall could not appease Makarios, there would be no alternative to his deportation and an all-out security campaign to defeat EOKA. It was considered essential, both because of deteriorating security in Cyprus and volatile conditions in the Middle East, to bring an immediate end to violence in the island." *ibid.*, p. 498.

<sup>152</sup> Rizas & Stefanides, 2004, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101; Hyam, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

*for example when Britain was obliged to release Makarios in the spring of 1957 (but not yet allowing him back to Cyprus).*<sup>153</sup>

After Suez, the British government came to terms with the fact that Cyprus was not manageable any more. At this point her “manner of proceeding was to make self-determination subject to the option of partition”. This was not a tendency to move towards partition<sup>154</sup>; the objective was to frighten Greek Cypriots into reconsidering the merits of the status quo. In the same year, the Prime Ministership passed to Harold Macmillan, who was seeking an internationalised solution of the Cyprus question that he had tried with the London conference of 1955. His plan was to put in front of the Greek government and Greekcypriots the threat of partition or a war with Turkey so that he could achieve ‘co-sovereignty’ on the island. On the other hand the United States could no longer tolerate British policies over its colonies and Britain’s last solution for a colony – India – was a worrying memory. So a less dangerous and harmful solution was sought for Cyprus and the result of it was a concept of “self-standing, unitary, and independent Cyprus”.<sup>155</sup> Despite the diagnosis of Cyprus’ uncontrollable rebellion, the Government was still seeking ways to enlarge the Famagusta Harbour which would be expected to cost £5 million (see Chapter 6).

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1957 Turkishcyriot armed organisation TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation) was established for defending Turkish interests and fighting for *Taksim* (partition). By 1958 it had escalated its subversive armed activities, making the security problem more confused for the British. Actually its predecessor *Volkan* (what TMT was initially known as) from 1955 had threatened that any attack by EOKA to Turkishcypriots would be met with retaliation. After mid 1950s British policing was coming to depend heavily on Turkishcyriot Auxiliary Forces. EOKA attacks by 1956 were also creating Turkishcyriot casualties who were policemen which were followed by anti-Greek riots.<sup>156</sup> These marked one of the first major inter-communal confrontations.<sup>157</sup>

---

<sup>153</sup> Mallinson, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>154</sup> However, even the Members of the British Cabinet were seeing the dark possibility of ending up in a situation like what happened in Palestine – getting caught up in cross-fire and not to know what to do.” Partition for British policy makers might harbour powerful attractions, therefore, but it also possessed a strong element of repulsion”. Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

<sup>155</sup> *ibid.*, p. 233.

<sup>156</sup> EOKA in the beginning of its campaign avoided attacking Turkish Cypriots, concentrating only on colonial targets. This would change by 1957.

<sup>157</sup> Anderson, 1993, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

Governor Harding in October 1957, on the wake of a new EOKA campaign, resigned and was replaced by more 'sympathetic' Sir Hugh Foot<sup>158</sup> who came from a liberal background and had credibility with the Labour party. He made gestures to the public by going around without guards and by releasing EOKA suspects who were filling massive detention/concentration camps.<sup>159</sup> The extremity of the situation in Cyprus and the developments in other colonies – Eastern and Central Africa – were pushing Macmillan to find a way out. The elections were soon and all these developments were providing ammunition for the Labour party against the Conservatives. "Macmillan has always believed – like Foot's officials in Nicosia – that it was only by seeming to readmit a Turkish presence into the island that the Greeks could be cowed into accepting something less than enosis."<sup>160</sup> After the first eight months of 1958, which were marked by escalated inter-communal violence and assaults of EOKA to AKEL members, Britain publicised (June-August) the 'Macmillan Plan' which was proposing self-governance with separate ethnic parliamentary and other public departments. Although Athens rejected the proposal, Britain forwarded a realisation of the Plan and in the framework of the Plan a Turkish representative arrived in Cyprus as resident-advisor of the British Governor (a development much desired by Turkey). Makarios – without communicating with Greece – would make, in September, the declaration that he accepted 'guaranteed independence' which would exclude partition but also enosis.<sup>161</sup>

In December 1958 Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu expressed to his Greek colleague Averof his government's will to get into a bipartite understanding with Greece about Cyprus. At Zurich, in February 1958, the two sides announced that they had agreed on a guaranteed independent Cyprus on the basis of bi-communal governance. After the London conference – with the attendance of two Cypriot leaders, Greek, Turkish and British ministers – on 19

---

<sup>158</sup> "The new Governor's notions had nothing to do with self-determination – given the role of Cyprus in British politics; he would not have been appointed if they had. Indeed, he firmly believed that it was only by 'freezing' the whole question of ultimate status that inter-communal tension could be moderated and an opportunity created for an experiment in local self-government under continuing British sovereignty". Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

<sup>159</sup> He was in disagreement about his policy with his officials who were considering any compromise between Greeks and Turks illusory and even undesirable since Britain needed to base its support on one of the community. With the Greeks they were literally in war and Turkish Cypriots were the backbone of the security forces. *ibid.*, pp. 234-235.

<sup>160</sup> *ibid.*, p. 236.

<sup>161</sup> Irakleidis, 2006, *op. cit.*, p.95; Rizas & Stefanides, 2004, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-103; Holland & Markides, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

February 1959 all sides signed the agreement that made up the constitution of the Cyprus Republic.

## 4.2 Economy and Society in turbulence

The decade of the 1950s was a period of transition for the consolidation and growth of state and civil society institutions that had been developed in the past decade. In this decade the birth of a new class – the middle class – is observed, which was coming from the extension of the public sector and its services. The unionist movement had created its own system of security which would be forwarded as a demand from the Government for the recognition of the right and establishment of a universal social security system. Despite the Government's opposition, but with the continuous pressure of labour and anti-colonial movement in 1956 – when EOKA had already started its armed campaign – the Government moved towards the first social security legislation.<sup>162</sup> The trade union movement besides such success had very troubled years during the 1950s. If we exclude divisions and internal antagonisms, the movement suffered most from the EOKA armed campaign in 1955-1959. EOKA, and the enosis movement in general, was strictly anti-communist. PEO<sup>163</sup> (Pancyprian Federation of Labour) leaders were executed by EOKA as traitors.<sup>164</sup> Correspondingly TMT, also anti-communist, was forcing, by threatening and violence, Turkishcyriot workers and trade unionists to leave PEO. Many workers had to resign en masse from PEO and sign up to Turkish unions.

Cyprus in 1960 was a typical 'underdeveloped' ex-British colony with a purchasing power that could rank 40<sup>th</sup> out 125 countries in the world and per capita income 20% of that in the USA. It was a rural society; two-thirds of 573,000 Cypriots were living in rural areas. 18% of the population and 27% of women were illiterate, which was not a surprise since 25% of the total and 36% of women (over the age of 20) had never attended a school. In

---

<sup>162</sup> Ioannou, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>163</sup> Established in 1947. It was actually the successor of PSE-Pancyprian Trade Union Committee – which was dissolved in 1946 after the arrests and imprisonment of all its leadership.

<sup>164</sup> Christodoulou, D. 1992, *Inside the Cyprus Miracle: The Labours of an Embattled Mini-Economy*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, pp. 35-36.

such a society the agricultural sector was employing 46% of the population and producing 16% of GDP.<sup>165</sup>

Cyprus had an economic boom during the early 1950s which owed mostly to British military expenditure and relatively good prices of its mineral and agricultural exports. However, Cyprus entered a financial crisis from 1957 to 1960 which lowered the GDP by 10%. Cyprus' biggest trade partner was Britain by purchasing 30% of its exports and supplying 30% of its imports. While Britain was purchasing agricultural products, minerals were mainly exported to West Germany. In the 1950s colonial development was at its height, seeing five or ten years of successive development (see Chapter 5) programmes, though the Administration was spending only 12% of its budget for development.<sup>166</sup>

## Summary

This chapter draws a narrative of colonial Cyprus' political, economic and social history by using sources that either followed or created the general trends in Cyprus historiography, or have been taken as foundational studies. This exercise has served a twofold purpose. Firstly it introduces the reader to Cyprus' history and provides her with a historic guide to which she can refer in the rest of the study. Moreover, it also serves this study to elaborate its findings with the main trends in the Cyprus historiography.

The narrative begins with the foundations of British rule in Cyprus, local political and economic factors and situation. This reaches until the First World War period, Cyprus' annexation and the years of 'crisis' that led to the riot of 1931. In the historiography, the 1930s emerge as a separate, 'dark' and highly understudied period in the island from many aspects. We see that Cyprus in the Second World War, if considered as a distinct period, has been touched upon from certain aspects, namely labour struggles and the revival of unionist

---

<sup>165</sup> Strong, P. (1999), 'An Economic History of Divided Cyprus: The Economic Consequences of Ethno-national conflict and the Development of two Siege Economies after 1963 & 1974', PhD, University of London, London School of Economics, pp. 63-64.

<sup>166</sup> Strong, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

nationalisms. The process of decolonisation, i.e. the 1950s, has been greatly studied as a political struggle between certain actors, both locally and internationally.

The following chapters explore certain episodes in the history of Cyprus and its economic development. Chapter 3 focusses on the history of the Famagusta-Nicosia railway line and the Larnaca branch dating to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Chapter 4 will complement and also overlap with Chapter 3. The reader will find the rest of the Larnaca railway branch story, but it will be about the Larnaca harbour. The rest of Chapter 4 complements the colonial development policy of Cyprus that will be referred to in Chapter 3: Famagusta Harbour's construction as an 'organic' part of the Famagusta-Nicosia railway. Chapter 5 presents the making of Cyprus' electrification under an island-wide grid as a part and parcel of post-war colonial Cyprus policy. Finally Chapter 6 will tell the story of the unrealised harbour projects through the same chronological period as the electrification scheme.

# Chapter 3: the (non)-making of railway in Cyprus: railway lines towards the sea

---

## Introduction

For today's generation in Cyprus on both sides of the island, railways are a means of transportation seen only in the big countries that they visit. Few know that once across the plain of Mesaoria there was a railway line connecting Famagusta Harbour with the capital Nicosia and Karavostassi/Gemikonagi. The residents of Famagusta must be an exception since a locomotive of the Cyprus Government Railway (CGR) is still displayed near the city centre. Despite the fade away in the social memory, in recent years there has been an increase in the references to the railway in the local newspapers. These could be small articles, photographs or small informative leaflets about the Cyprus Government Railways. However, even after 60 years since the abolition of the Cyprus Government Railway, there is so little that has been written on it. B.S. Turner's "The Story of Cyprus Government Railway" has been a unique source for rail and history hobbyists. The latest publication on the railway by Robert Radford is also no more informative than Turner's work. Radford contributed to discovering small railway lines and branches, and precious photographic material. In fact, it would not be unfair to say that Radford's real contribution was republishing Turner's virtually extinct book –there must have been not more than 10 copies, mostly in Britain and few in Cyprus – by adding some extra information and many photographs. Both sources are overwhelmingly interested in the technical aspect of the railway stock, buildings and organisation. In both works, there is every detail on each material part of the railway – from locomotives, wagons, machines, repair shops to the tracks and buildings, bridges etc. However, the human side of the Cyprus Government Railway is restricted mostly to the management structure – some references to the railway staff and accidents. The questions

on the social, political, geo-strategic and economic reasons for the construction/abolition of the railway; the decision takers and major actors of its history; and the people using, working, protesting, sabotaging, competing and managing it, remain mostly unanswered.

This chapter will begin with the question of why it was decided to construct a railway in Cyprus. This question will be answered by following the decision takers while placing their arguments in the historical framework of the period. I will try to extract the political visions and ideological projections to be found in the arguments over the construction of the railway. While telling the story of the design and decision taking I will also trace the local Cypriot voice over the imperialists' arguments. This story will reveal to us smaller stories of branches never constructed, protests, competition and failed modernisation attempts. Together with the main stories of construction and abolition of the CGR these small stories will tell us about the political tensions between the colonialists and the local, different political agendas of different actors and their expression in the body of the railway. Last, I want to note a priori that the story of the Cyprus Government Railway was always linked to the history of Famagusta Harbour. Actually it would have been more appropriate to study the CGR and Famagusta Harbour as a single integrated project rather than studying them separately. For reasons of analytical practicality, I prefer to study them separately but histories – railway and harbour – will continuously communicate with each other and it might be appropriate to talk about co-construction of the two infrastructure systems.

During the period covered by the construction phase, the structure of the colonial state had a – though in reality symbolic – legislative body. This body, called the Legislative Council, was comprised of local elected members (Greekcypriots and Turkishcypriots) and official members of the Empire.<sup>1</sup> In this group of politicians, the clergy were present but not as they were in the last years of the occupation. The High Commissioner and the Chief Secretary were the most powerful men in the island, probably more powerful as the Colonial State was still under construction. They were responsible to the Foreign Office until the 1890s, when Cyprus was transferred to the Colonial Office's control. In the Cyprus of the late 1800s and early 1900s there were no political parties or trade unions to affect the political scene of the island. Communists as a political pressure group and political activity of intervention were to appear in the 1920s, and though nationalism seemingly consolidated

---

<sup>1</sup> For more detail see Chapter 1

itself in mass politics only in the early 1900s – though this is disputable. The nationalist tone will be traced below in the story line. This will be, as a generally accepted fact in the historiography, what is taken to be Greek nationalism.

The chapter provides a historical reconstruction of the making of the railway, stressing particularly the point of the co-construction of politics and imperial policies with the relevant transport infrastructure. Focusing on the techno-politics and the shaping of the technical and design characteristics of the system, the story provided in the chapter is one of the decision making, the design, and construction of the railway line (1879-1905).

## **Part I: Deciding to build a railway in Cyprus and its Construction 1879-1906**

### **1.1 First Ideas after the British occupation**

The idea of building railways, not just one line but several branches, must have been conceived from the first months of the British occupation in 1878. At that time Cyprus did not just have no railway; it possessed only one road even nearly appropriate for carriage transportation.<sup>2</sup>

British occupation started in Cyprus in July 1878 with the disembarking of the first British troops in Larnaca. In just a few months after the occupation, in November 1878, Samuel Brown<sup>3</sup> was instructed to report on several matters. Brown's occupation in Egypt was the main reason for his selection. Specifically, he was to report on the "Railways, Harbours and other engineering matters affecting the island of Cyprus". He was to start the survey in December 1878 and submit it by the next summer in August 1879. The report

---

<sup>2</sup> "At the time of the British occupation Cyprus possessed no harbours, no railways, and only one road, twenty-six miles in length, which connected the port of Larnaca with the capital." Orr, Sir Charles William James. 1972. *Cyprus under British Rule*. Zeno.

<sup>3</sup> "OBITUARY. SIR GEORGE ELLIOT, BART, 1815-1893." Minutes of the Proceedings ICE, 116 (1894): 355-57; "OBITUARY. SAMUEL BROWN, 1836-1891." Minutes of the Proceedings ICE, 109 (1892): 395-98

contained surveys on railway lines, the ports of Famagusta, Larnaca and Limassol, the Salt Lakes and the water supply, and offered some general considerations in conclusion.<sup>4</sup>

There are two sources on the origin of the instruction given to Samuel Brown. In his obituary written by the Institute of Civil Engineers, we read that he accepted the position of “Engineer to the Governor of Cyprus in the autumn of 1878”. It continues to say that during the winter of 1878-9 Brown surveyed the island at the request of Sir Garnet Wolseley, the first High Commissioner of Cyprus, and the next year he was appointed by the Colonial Office as Government Engineer of the island with the work, principally, of harbour improvements, erecting landing-stages, and making roads.<sup>5</sup> Though we read as well from his and the Imperial department’s despatches that he was working for Sir George Elliot<sup>6</sup>. Elliot was a well-known figure in England. He owned several coal mines and was involved heavily in the business but he was also active in politics. He had been member of a number of royal commissions, including the Royal Commissions on Coal Supply and on Accidents, and had thereby influenced legislation. Besides other sectors, he was also familiar with and active in harbour and railway constructions. He undertook railway works for his coal mines in the United Kingdom and as a partner of Greensfield and Co., he took a significant share in the construction of the Alexandria port in Egypt<sup>7</sup>. As the Foreign Office wrote to the Colonial Office, the report, surveys and proposals were the personal work of Sir George Elliot with his own money and time.

The Egyptian connection was going to be a familiar and repeated theme in Cyprus’ development issues. In the British mind, Egypt and Cyprus were probably considered to fit both in geography and culture; Egypt was also the British ‘mainland’ in the region. In the beginning Samuel Brown had to be working for Elliot, who was obviously hoping to do more business in the region. Since 1870, Brown had been the second man in command of Elliot’s Harbour Works in Alexandria, from where he left to go to Cyprus. Brown proposed a system of railway lines which were to be constructed in an order of priority: the Larnaca-Nicosia

---

<sup>4</sup> CO 67/7, Samuel Brown to Sir George Elliot, 31st March 1879

<sup>5</sup> <sup>5</sup> OBITUARY. SIR GEORGE ELLIOT, BART, 1815-1893.” Minutes of the Proceedings ICE, 116 (1894): 355–57

<sup>6</sup> Sir George Elliot has been a capitalist and had interests in the amalgamation of coal mines and the establishment of a giant coal trust. His mentality reflects with his proposal in Cyprus. He died in 1894. In 1878 he obtained parliamentary authority to lay the Pontypridd, Caerphilly and Newport Railway, to serve his collieries in exporting. He was building railways to his mines in order to connect them with ports. *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> “OBITUARY. SAMUEL BROWN, 1836-1891.” Minutes of the Proceedings ICE, 109 (1892): 395–98

line; sanitation and drainage works in Famagusta city; dredging and extension works in Famagusta Harbour; the Famagusta-Nicosia Line; and the Nicosia-Karavostassi Line. The remaining lines and harbour works were to be completed whenever there were available sources.

Brown was a man of 'progress'; he claimed that Cyprus' material progress depended on good communications carried out by a system of "light and economical railways laid on a narrow gauge".<sup>8</sup> His choice of route had two criteria: the flatness of terrain and the amount of agricultural production in the surrounding areas traversed by the lines. From the map he had produced for the proposed railway lines one can also observe that the Famagusta-Nicosia line passes through more densely populated areas (see Map 1). That's why the line coming out of Famagusta makes a curve southwards and reaches Nicosia through a route with a higher gradient from a possible northwards curve.<sup>9</sup> In the mountainous areas of south Cyprus the lines pass from the lowest gradient, the sea level, with the scope of connecting the cities of Limassol and Larnaca. The line connecting Karavostassi to Nicosia passes from low gradient and more densely populated areas. Thus, in general, the system was designed to tap densely populated agricultural areas and carry their produce to the closest port; to create the link between the cities and their rural areas with the principle of low construction cost.

---

<sup>8</sup> This was a classical argument of the Victorian era which had a thrust for technological advance and 'improvement'. Denis Judd refers to similar arguments about railway building in British India in the Victorian period. Judd, Denis. 2004. *The Lion and the Tiger: The Rise and Fall of the British Raj, 1600-1947*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, p.68,98.

<sup>9</sup> CO 67/7 , Samuel Brown to George Elliot, 31<sup>st</sup> March 1879



Map 1. Extract of map from the Brown report. The dotted lines stretching southwards from Larnaca represent the provisional route of Larnaca-Limassol. See that Famagusta-Nicosia route passes from the south-eastern Mesaoria, closer to the bigger villages of the region. (Famagusta-eastern terminus; Karavostassi-western terminus; Nicosia-centre; Larnaca-southern terminus). CO 67/7, Samuel Brown to George Elliot, 31<sup>st</sup> March 1879.

These reports, surveys and proposals were read by Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, though they were not taken up by the Cyprus Government.<sup>10</sup> Sir Garnet Wolseley, the High Commissioner of Cyprus, wrote to Lord Salisbury regarding the opinion of the Chief Secretary of the Cyprus Government:

*I should prefer postponing any definite expression of opinion upon Sir George Elliot's proposals until the negotiations, now being conducted by Colonel Biddulph at*

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, Foreign Office to Under SoS Colonial office, 21st August 1879

*Constantinople, have been brought to an end and until the amount we are to pay the Porte under the Convention of June last year as been arranged.”<sup>11</sup>*

We observe two issues appearing here which would always be used against the construction of the railway. Biddulph, the successor of Wolseley, was negotiating on the amount of the infamous ‘Tribute’. The ‘Tribute’ would, later on, be meshed with nearly every discussion over port improvements and railway construction. Neither was Wolseley hurrying for a railway. The second point other than the Tribute is the relation of Famagusta harbour to the railway. Wolseley agreed with the comment of George Elliot that the line to Famagusta followed the improvement of Famagusta for “imperial purposes” and not the other way round.<sup>12</sup> This was the first time that the fates of Famagusta Harbour and the railway were married together. Neither Cyprus, (the High Commissioner and Chief Secretary), nor the Foreign Office ( the imperial department responsible for Cyprus’ matters) were eager to build railways in this new small colony. Nevertheless, Lord Salisbury asked the Colonial Office to acquire the opinion of the civil engineer advising the Office on railway projects.<sup>13</sup> This would be the Brown report that would serve as the basis for engineers and politicians after him.

George Elliot’s initiative was declined by London. The Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Crown Agents jointly decided that the scheme should be dropped. The Crown Agents found Brown’s estimates very low, and then a Foreign Office memorandum showed that there was no question of looking for a Cyprus loan.<sup>14</sup>

During 1880 between the Admiralty, War Office, Foreign Office and Colonial Office, there was a series of exchanges of opinions on the imperial, naval and military use of Famagusta city and her harbour. They were looking to see if Famagusta could be the main port of the island, especially, a “centre of emporium” and a major naval station in the Mediterranean. There was a question of where to locate the military barracks in the island

---

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, Wolseley to Salisbury, 30th April 1879

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, Foreign Office to Under-SoS of CO, 13th May 1879

<sup>14</sup> CO 883/4/25, Memorandum in Connexion with Mr Provand’s Scheme for the Establishment of Railway Communication in Cyprus, 21<sup>st</sup> March 1894

and the potential for a permanent military station had implications for port facilities. The War Office reported to the Colonial Office in favour of Famagusta as the place for the military units on the island.<sup>15</sup> The new Governor Sir Biddulph, in his despatch to the Secretary of State (SoS) of the Foreign Office, the Earl of Granville, was positive as well in making Famagusta a centre of commerce and a major port in the region.<sup>16</sup> The Admiralty and Colonial Office were in search of information on sanitary conditions, present and prospective, of Famagusta to have a better view of the situation. There was no reference to constructing a railway.

Until the mid-1890s the railway issue is absent in the archives while the question of whether to improve the Famagusta Harbour or not was still being discussed. Then in 1894 a liberal MP and capitalist named Andrew Dryburgh Provand came up with a package of proposals in which constructing railway lines was one.<sup>17</sup> He got in contact with both the Colonial Office and the Cyprus Government. He had had for some time a personal interest in a railway in Cyprus. For this purpose, he had sent three engineers to survey the island. He was claiming that his renewed interest had to do with the Government's admittance of the advantages of a railway. Before writing to the High Commissioner, he had a face-to-face meeting with the Under-Secretary of State for Colonies Sydney Charles Buxton on the subject. His proposal was not just for a railway but a number of interrelated schemes. The railway was just a means to an end, without which he would not invest<sup>18</sup>. His plan was to establish a Cyprus Cultivation Company to make irrigation works and establish a Cyprus

---

<sup>15</sup> See *ibid.*, War Office to Under-SoS, 24th May 1880

<sup>16</sup> CO 67/16, Biddulph to Earl of Granville of Foreign Office, 24th June 1880

<sup>17</sup> "...Andrew Dryburgh Provand who was the MP for Blackfriars Division Glasgow. Provand had made an important contribution as a parliamentarian. He served as MP for the Blackfriars and Hutchesontown Division from 1885-1900. As a Liberal, Andrew introduced a resolution regarding Land Taxation in a speech recorded in Hansard in 1891/2. He is also listed as a Board Member and later President of the Chignecto Investors Groups and also a member of Moss Valley Royal Societies Club, St James's Street. In 1894 he is listed as having attended the International Bimetallic Conference held in the Mansion House, London between the 2nd and 3rd May. His resolution merited a mention in "The New York Times" on 9th March 1895. "He moved that "no system of taxation can be equitable unless it include the direct assessment of such enhanced value of land as is due to an increase of population, wealth, and growth of towns." Andrew Dryburgh Provand was defeated by Andrew Bonar Law in the General Election held in 1900. He died on 18th July 1915". Provand had business interest in Chignecto Marine Transport Railway Co., Ltd in Canada. The origin of his interest in Cyprus is unknown.

See. Provand, A. D. (Andrew Dryburgh). 1901. *Chignecto Ship Railway Case: Mr. Provand Addresses a Meeting of Senators : He Explains the Position of British Investors in the Chignecto Ship Railway Project and Claims the Moral Obligation of the Government*. Ottawa;

His Parliamentary speeches on different issues can be found in the Parliamentary archives (Hansard).

<sup>18</sup> CO 67/89, Andrew Dryburgh Provand to Sendall, 21st December 1894.

Bank, introducing new products and methods in agriculture. Provand wanted to make agricultural business increase the “agricultural wealth of the island” in Cyprus, where he would improve Larnaca harbour and connect it to Nicosia with a railway. He was talking about a subsidized line; the company would take the wharfage dues of Larnaca for 20-25 years, of Larnaca-Nicosia with a branch at Kythrea. The total of 44 miles of track length, as he proposed, was anticipated to be not very lucrative in the first years; the Government would instead subsidise its operation. One reason that the gauge was small had to do with keeping the initial cost of a short line; it was mainly a matter of economies of scale. The first branch to be constructed would be to Famagusta. He also stated that he had more proposals for the development of the island.

Elliot had been given early warning from inside, i.e. the Under-Secretary of State Buxton, that the Government saw advantage in a railway but it was undecided only as to whether it would be advisable to carry it out by private or public means.<sup>19</sup> Provand was also aware of the worries of Larnaca merchants about competition with Famagusta if the latter was given a railway branch. Indeed, in the coming years, Larnaca merchants would be presenting their fears about Famagusta openly and frequently. Provand was planning to create an agricultural monopoly on the island where he wanted to construct the essential infrastructures which were coming as a single package of proposals, not as separate ones. The railway was just “a means to an end” as he called it. His order of development plans was: first the railway, then the wharf outside of Larnaca, the Agriculture Company and lastly the Bank. Provand was in continuous communication with Buxton, lobbying heavily, and pushing for a quick answer.<sup>20</sup> What we find as an answer to his proposals is a memorandum based on the report by Frederic W. Fuller of the Colonial Office. The contents of this memorandum are important in order to acquire the official opinion of the Colonial Office on the subject of a railway in Cyprus. In the framework of this “report on financing and plans for proposed scheme”, Fuller had visited Cyprus where he had met with local British officialdom in Nicosia.<sup>21</sup> He was told that only the Colonial Office was fond of the proposal; there seemed to be no interest in railways. For Fuller, the branch to Larnaca did not seem to him particularly important, as that road was straight and the best on the island. He would

---

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, Andrew Dryburgh Provand to Sendall, 28th December 1894

<sup>21</sup> See CO 883/4/25

prefer, if there was money, to pass the railway from the best places in the Messaoria rather than from unimportant Kouklia, a region-junction on the possible route to Larnaca. He was of the opinion that, if dredging and repairing be done to the “fine old harbour”, the Famagusta branch must be the first to be built. He reported that Famagusta could have become a coaling station and awakened into activity from an “old Turkish dead city” but for reasons which he did not want to talk about, the Government instead invested in Kyrenia harbour.<sup>22</sup>

Messaoria – the grain country – Famagusta Harbour and the railway had been a constant trio in the British colonial mind from the beginning of the occupation. Fuller commented and proposed different ideas originating from Provand’s scheme: financing, subsidies, gauge size, best routes etc.<sup>23</sup> He even considered convict labour for the construction. Interestingly, he was suggesting the engagement of Mayor of Larnaca Rossos for co-operation in case of a railway. Fuller noted that Rossos liked Provand’s scheme but he could be talked into any agreement thanks to his love of Larnaca. According to him, the real question was something else: “...is there any reason for hurrying on the railway?”. He thought that Provand’s argument that public opinion considered the railway the most necessary of all public works was not necessarily true. He had been in contact with “every kind of men” in Larnaca, the town of foreign embassies and trade, and understood that the farmers and the merchants wanted four objects: the remission of the Tribute and consequent decrease of taxation, a subsidized line of steamers, improved landing accommodation, and a railway. The two former objects being closed to “official discussion”, the latter two were considered as one object, and the “blot on the ill-digested scheme” of Provand.<sup>24</sup> Fuller, as many others after him would do, thought that improving landing and embarkation in ports and their link with a railway would increase exports. The railway must come after making improvements at ports. Moreover, Egypt would be a source of tourism:

---

<sup>22</sup> “Famagusta is an old Turkish dead city, and the suburb of Varosha alone shows faint signs of life, so that it does not appear that this port would call for special consideration in the present circumstances of the Island.”. *ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> On the cost he says that Provand’s engineers probably did not do an accurate estimate. He also notes that neither did Provand trust his engineer’s estimates. As for the gauge size, Provand first recommended a 2 feet 6 inch gauge then Henry Bulwer thought that this was too narrow and changed it to 3 feet. Generally, narrow gauge had been a constant characteristic of railway proposals in Cyprus. Though it was never justified openly, this choice originated from it having a low starting cost for a place with no railways. *ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*

*I have heard it seriously mooted in Egypt during the summer Alexandrian merchants would gladly go for a few days to Cyprus or send their families, if there were secure landing accommodation and easy access to Nicosia, where the nights at least are fairly cool.*<sup>25</sup>

On the final answer to Provand, Fuller thought that the High Commissioner would consider the general scheme impracticable and too unfavourable to the island, as expressed already by Sir Henry Bulwer (the previous High Commissioner, 1886-1892).<sup>26</sup> He proposed to write to Sendall, the High Commissioner, asking his opinion without “conveying any pledge that the Treasury could be approached in respect of an Imperial loan, except in so far as the subject is cognate to Mr Provand’s scheme”. The Colonial Office, according to him, should draft carefully the letter to Sendall. The Colonial Office was not so eager to provoke the High Commissioner about building railways:

*He may declare the whole railway scheme impossible, and then we shall be relieved for a rebuff, which we should be courting if we went to the Treasury now, within sight of another deficit on the financial year... I feel sure that we can do nothing here except by suggestion, in the present stage, and that Cyprus must work out for itself the question of improved means of communication.*

*In any case, under existing circumstances, the island can never become a success.*<sup>27</sup>

Here we see that the ambiguity of Cyprus’ place and role in the Empire, combined with the burden of Tribute on the general revenue, kept both the Cyprus Government and London away from any substantial and costly initiative such as a railway. However, these first reports on the railway and proposals would serve as base for future designs. The joint fate of Famagusta Harbour and a railway connecting it to Nicosia was clearly in the minds of some from the beginning of the occupation. The Cyprus development model envisioned by Joseph Chamberlain’s policy would also resemble the Provand scheme.

---

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*

## 1.2 Chamberlain at the Colonial Office

The spirit of the Opening Speech of the High Commissioner to the Legislative Council Chamber in 1896 was ‘colonial development’. This was the year after the appointment of Joseph Chamberlain to the post of Secretary of State at the Colonial Office. The High Commissioner talked about the necessity of improving the productiveness of soil and proposed ideas towards the resolution of the problem. Behind his words, he was indicating the interest of the British Government in the necessity of improving agricultural production:

*It is a question [increasing the productivity] moreover upon which the interests of Great Britain are identical with the interests of this Island, and I had abundant evidence when I was in England that Her Majesty's government are fully alive to its importance.*<sup>28</sup>

This statement, when considered together with the whole development rhetoric below, captures the spirit of Cyprus development; merely Cyprus' material well-being would satisfy the UK's interests in the island. We will see below that Cyprus' material well-being would answer both those questioning Cyprus' occupation and the crisis in the island. The emphasis on 'identical' was far from random. The High Commissioner's following remarks are taken from Parliament sitting in 1895, on the potential for returning Cyprus to the Ottoman Empire. This debate had provoked the spirits in Cyprus and had caused a wave of protests, which I will refer to below. These protests were part of the evolving crisis in Cyprus. From this perspective, it is easy to see his effort to define Cypriot and British interests in the island's economic development as 'identical'.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> CO 69/9, Fifth Session of the Third Legislative council of Cyprus, 4th March 1896

<sup>29</sup> There were debates in the Parliament about getting out of the Island and returning Cyprus back to the Ottoman Empire. HC Deb 08 March 1895 vol 31 cc683-98  
Sendall from the same speech:

“The debate which took place in House of Commons last year upon the subject of Parliamentary Grant of Cyprus, gave rise here to a certain amount of popular agitation, which elicited from Her Majesty's Government a renewal of the assurance, which had been given in the previous year, that there was no intention of abandoning the administration of the island. A memorial was afterwards drawn up for presentation to HMG's

Sendall was announcing that Secretary of State for the Colonial Office Joseph Chamberlain had already appointed an officer called Medicott from India for irrigation surveys. This was a swift action reveals us the extent to which policy on Cyprus, at least as a collection of ideas, had been prepared even in the early months of Chamberlain's Colonial Office years. Sendall reported that Britain, and thus Joseph Chamberlain, was ready to hear Cypriots:

*"It cannot be doubted that of all conceivable measures for the development of the agricultural resources of this island, works of irrigation are amongst the most important that could be named; and the Council will not fail to recognize that in taking this matter up for enquiry, Mr Chamberlain has unmistakably evinced his readiness to turn an attentive ear to any suggestions that are put before him for promoting the material welfare of the country<sup>30</sup>."*

The matter of the railway had not been opened by Chamberlain or Sendall, but by the Elected Members of the Legislative Council. They had talked after the Address to the Council of the High Commissioner in the 1895 Opening Session. Members had expressed the necessity for "improved means of communication, which in their opinion could be best be effected by the construction of a railway."<sup>31</sup> This issue was connected with the previous one. This was the classical trio of mass agricultural production (grains of Messaoria) – 'modern' means of transportation (railway) – and exportation (harbour):

*This question is indeed inseparable from the one which I have already touched upon [irrigation and soil productivity]. Increased production means increased traffic, and increased traffic both postulates and justifies improved means of internal communication: better roads, more bridges, and when the expansion of trade requires it, a railway also.*

This agricultural development was to be export-oriented:

*"Nor is it only the extension of facilities for internal communication that the trade and traffic of this island would be benefited and developed. Cyprus is favourably*

---

conveying the views of a portion of the inhabitants of the country upon various matters of public interest and importance. This memorial was and duly forwarded to the SoS by whom its contents are still under consideration." CO 69/9, Fifth Session of the Third Legislative council of Cyprus, 4th March 1896

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*

*situated for carrying on large trade with the neighbouring countries in perishable goods such as fruits and vegetables; and the establishment of regular and frequent steam communication with Egypt is an object of the highest importance, and in which the Government have under their serious consideration.*<sup>32</sup>

These were the general lines of the model of development designed for Cyprus. On the other hand, the High Commissioner identified the reason for Cyprus' economic misery to the soil's productivity and not her governance. Thus, for the official opinion, the matter was neither economic nor political; it was a technical matter which could be remedied by proper infrastructures.

### **1.3 Chamberlain's Constructive Imperialism**

In the historiography of the British Empire and colonialism, the period of Joseph Chamberlain's service in the Colonial Office and his policy are described generally with terms like 'constructive colonialism', 'new imperialism' etc. This terminology noted a moment of rupture in the imperial policy with the coming of Joseph Chamberlain to the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies. However, some case studies have shown that there was no such rupture in the imperial policy, rejecting this interpretation of Chamberlain's period in the Colonial Office.<sup>33</sup> The degree of uniqueness and the depth of departure from the past politics and practices of this specific period do not concern this study. However, here it is recognized that Chamberlain's policies do appear to contain a change towards the colonies, and it was obvious that he had another vision for British imperialism and her 'estates'.

Joseph Chamberlain became the Secretary of State for the Colonies in June 1895. He was appointed to his post by the Third Unionist Government at the height of his political career. His appointment was seen as the recognition of the Empire's importance to Britain at a period of rapid extension of the borders of the Empire. His intention was to initiate a

---

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> See. Malmsten, Neal R. 1977. "British Government Policy toward Colonial Development, 1919-39." *The Journal of Modern History* 49 (2): 1249-1287..

new phase of imperialism, resulting in the creation of an imperial economic community, a domain over which he would have direct authority: Crown Colonies and Protectorates. This could explain why he had chosen this post when he was offered by Lord Salisbury any office he wanted. Worboys claims that the 'colonial estates' policy was seen by the New Liberals as an important mechanism for consolidating Empire and especially increasing the wealth of Britain. This policy aimed at increasing the industrial capacity of Britain against foreign competition while developing markets and cheap raw materials for it.<sup>34</sup>

In addition, as Havinden claimed, Chamberlain feared that the power, wealth and prestige of Britain were in decline in the face of competition from countries like the USA, Russia, and Germany. This was to be stopped through imperial union and development. Thus what was necessary to create a strong empire with prosperous and contented subjects within the empire and Crown colonies, raising sufficient revenues in order to contribute both to their administration and to the metropole by ever-growing economies. Naturally, this pattern was designed in the interests of Britain, which would be in place to invest, finance, and trade actively in these Colonies.<sup>35</sup>

Like many federationists- those defending the political union of the Empire- Chamberlain campaigned for a Zollverein, a customs union which would make the Empire self-sufficient and stronger against competitors. He envisioned an Empire connected commercially, an Empire open to more intense exploitation. As Chamberlain would say at some point, "it was not enough to occupy certain great spaces of the world's surfaces unless you can make the best of them, unless you are willing to develop them".<sup>36</sup> Porter argues that behind these arguments lay a certain unease which originated from the perception of a Britain under siege. The contemporary analysis saw Britain as alone and under threat by competition from other big powers. The imperialists' answer for this situation was to rally the colonies around Britain and prepare for the siege. Thus, his arrival at the head of Colonial Office strengthened the economic side of the colonial administrations. The Colonial Office had always been concerned with the economies of the colonies, but mainly it wished

---

<sup>34</sup> See. Worboys, Michael. 1979, *Science and British Colonial Imperialism, 1895-1940*, PhD, University of Sussex

<sup>35</sup> See. Havinden, Michael Ashley. 1993. *Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960*. Routledge.

<sup>36</sup> Porter, Bernard. 2012, *The Lion's Share: a Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-2004*. Harlow: Longman, p.187

to keep their costs down in order to give less trouble to the 'British taxpayer'. Chamberlain modified the purpose of Colonial Office to make the colonies profitable and not just less costly:

*For Britain the proper exploitation of her colonial estates could mean prosperity and a contented (because fully employed) proletariat; more than that, it could bring her ultimate security, the kind of security which only economic self-sufficiency could guarantee.*<sup>37</sup>

A proper exploitation meant, for the businessman and 'ex-municipal socialist' Chamberlain, a vital role for state involvement, encouragement and direction in economic development.<sup>38</sup> Particularly important for this study, was that an important aspect of Chamberlain's colonial policy was the construction of railways. His 'undeveloped estate' theory did not foresee only an active role of colonial governments in economic development, and encouragement of private investment, but also railway networks. According to him, the governments had to establish a railway network in every colony.<sup>39</sup> Thus, the British would become builders of locomotives, tracks, rolling stock etc. We must not forget that Chamberlain was from Birmingham, the steel manufacturing capital of Britain. In addition, Havinden and Ashley note that in the 'Chamberlain model' much emphasis was given on constructing railways. This was considered to be 'sound' and 'beneficial', but this never seemed to be investigated and tested in the colonial conditions.<sup>40</sup> They point out that the turnout most of the time was financially burdensome. Railways were extremely expensive, which put an unbearable economic burden on the colony. This led to seeking cash and foreign currency through the agriculture of "cash-crops" and mineral exports.<sup>41</sup>

Some argued, especially in case studies during the 1970s, that Chamberlain's 'major policy aim of recasting the machinery of Imperial development aid to crown colonies was abortive...'.<sup>42</sup> As the story-line below will confirm, during his years the Treasury maintained

---

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Crosby, Travis L. (2011). *Joseph Chamberlain: A Most Radical Imperialist*. I.B.Tauris, p.115.

<sup>40</sup> Havinden, 1993, *op. cit.*, p.21.

<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> See Will, H. A. 1970. "Colonial Policy and Economic Development in the British West Indies, 1895-1903." *The Economic History Review*, New Series, 23 (1): 129-47; Dumett, R. E. 1975, "Joseph Chamberlain, Imperial

its control of the detailed expenditure of the monies which were also supplied as loans rather than grants for the sake of the Treasury's option. These were considered to lessen the expected effect of the development loans. Bernard Porter also agrees that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not ready for "a full-blown programme of state-aided colonial development" and not sure that the taxes should be spent on such a thing.<sup>43</sup>

Cyprus was amongst those colonies that Chamberlain managed to get Parliamentary support for, which was equally sceptical with the Treasury about 'positive' colonialism. The major schemes were in the West Indies, West Africa and Cyprus (but also Malaya and islands of the Indian Ocean) from an amount totalling £3,500,000 of the Colonial Loans Act 1899 (See Table 1). In the list of colonies borrowing loans from the Act it is remarkable that Cyprus received £314,000 when compared to vast colonies like Malays States, Sierra Leone and Lagos. Moreover, the list contained, with the exception of Cyprus, almost exclusively tropical countries, which was something expected for the period. During this period in imperialist circles, tropical colonies were seen through a mythology of "a treasure chest of unimaginable wealth waiting to be gathered in the form of undiscovered mineral resources, unknown economic products, virgin land and cheap labour".<sup>44</sup> When Chamberlain took the Colonial Office, Cyprus had already spent 17 years under British occupation. This fact compels us to answer the question of the selection of Cyprus by Chamberlain for his policies in the Colonial Office. His biographies do not give us much clue to answer this question. However, we do know that he was very satisfied with the occupation of Cyprus, which he had referred in a declaration in October 1880.<sup>45</sup>

---

Finance and Railway Policy in British West Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century." *English Historical Review* (90) 287-321

Havinden, 1993, *op. cit.*, p.21

<sup>43</sup> Porter, 2012, *op. cit.*, p.188.

<sup>44</sup> Worboys, 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

<sup>45</sup> Jeyes, Samuel Henry. 1896, *The Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain*. London, Bliss, Sands and Foster, p.22

Name of colony or place	Purpose of Loan	Maximum amount to be advanced in £
Gold Coast	Railways	578,000
Gold Coast	Accra Harbour Works	98,000
Niger Coast Protectorate	Harbour Works	43,500
Jamaica	Public Works	65,000
	In aid of Revenue	150,000
	Completion of Railway	110,000
	Interest on Railway Debenture	88,000
	Water Works	40,000
Lagos	Railways	792,500
Sierra Leone	Railways	310,000
Trinidad	Railways and Public Works	11,000
Malay States	Railways	500,000
Barbados	Hurricane Loan	50,000
St. Vincent	Hurricane Loan	50,000
Seychelles	Roads and Survey	20,000
Cyprus	Harbour and Railways and Irrigation	314,000
Mauritius	Public Works	32,820
Total		£ 3,351,820

Table 1. The colonies and amount of colonial loans allocate from the Colonial Loans Act 1899. See that Cyprus is the only non-tropic colony in the list.

## 1.4 The first 'the Government is doing on its behalf': ease the pressure at home and the crisis in the Island

Joseph Chamberlain became the head of the Colonial Office on 29<sup>th</sup> June 1895. Within a month he was speaking about his prospective policy towards Cyprus in Parliament. His intervention – following the Conservative MP for Warrington Robert Pierpoint (who proved in the coming years to be interested deeply in Cyprus and her welfare), gave the framework of his approach towards Cyprus in his theory of “undeveloped estates”.<sup>46</sup> Before he started his speech, Chamberlain felt it necessary to point out that he was not related in any way to the occupation of Cyprus. The occupation of Cyprus and one of the terms of the Convention, the Tribute, had been the subject of much discussion and grievance both in the House of Commons in London and in Cyprus by politicians and the general public.<sup>47</sup> Chamberlain had the opinion that despite the annual heavy burden of £90,000 (nearly one third of island’s revenue at that time), of the annual Tribute, which was going into the pockets of British and French bondholders of Ottoman Debt of 1855, Cyprus had benefited from the British occupation. He continued as follows:

*I agree, however, that we have not done all we could do, or, I will say it frankly, all we ought to do ... This is one of the cases I had in my mind when I expressed the other day an opinion as to the general principles which ought to influence English administrators when dealing with colonies of this kind. I think the principle undoubtedly applies in this case [referring to Cyprus]...*<sup>48</sup>

Thus, Cyprus was an ‘undeveloped estate’ about which the British felt uneasy.

In debates concerning Cyprus in the House of Commons, Chamberlain, on almost every occasion, had to answer the same question: the Tribute and injustices done by it to Cyprus. In return, Chamberlain answered each time with similar arguments. A common opinion in certain circles in British politics claimed that Cyprus was being done an injustice

---

<sup>46</sup> Robert Pierpoint was referring to Chamberlain’s earlier words that followed as:

“I regard many of our colonies as being in the condition of undeveloped estates, which can never be developed without Imperial assistance.”

HC Deb 28 August 1895 vol 36 cc1021-91

<sup>47</sup> For information on the Tribute question see Chapter 1.

<sup>48</sup> HC Deb 28 August 1895 vol 36 cc1021-91;

by Britain. The administration of a protectorate in this way was a disgrace. For some MPs this resembled too closely the ways Spain treated her colonies. The proposals differed from the return of Cyprus to Greece, not to the Ottomans, and to spending on public works on the island.<sup>49</sup> Chamberlain's first reaction was to defend the British occupation of the island. According to him, Cyprus, despite the unfortunate Tribute, had benefitted from the liberal British administration. He agreed that the island had been neglected to a certain level by the previous British Governments. He was sure that also the islanders shared the same opinion but:

*I am prepared to prove that they are certainly much better off than they were under their Turkish masters. If that is not the case, I should be surprised to learn if, on a vote, the islanders would be prepared to express any desire to revert to their old régime.<sup>50</sup>*

Chamberlain was challenging not just the Members of Parliament, who had moral and political concerns about the island's administration, but also the Cypriots. This was not a rhetorical reference. Cyprus in those years was an uneasy place and the Cyprus Government had been facing a growing social crisis and loss of faith in her legitimacy. Just the same summer when Chamberlain had taken his post at the Colonial Office, the Government had witnessed waves of protests, to be discussed below. Chamberlain was talking both to Parliament and to Cyprus simultaneously. Britain had already shown that she was better than the 'Government of the Turk':

*They [Cypriots] were not moved in the slightest degree by any suggestion that in certain circumstances there might be a British garrison or a British fleet there, but they were moved by their natural desire to escape from the Government of the Turk, and, independently of the material benefits to which allusion has been made, they have since enjoyed equal justice, absolute honesty in the Government, and a great share in the government, of which they were always previously deprived.<sup>51</sup>*

---

<sup>49</sup> HC Deb 11 August 1896 vol 44 cc521-57 ; HC Deb 08 August 1898 vol 64 cc502-22

<sup>50</sup> HC Deb 08 August 1898 vol 64 cc502-22

<sup>51</sup> HC Deb 26 May 1902 vol 108 cc619-61

He disliked the remarks about mismanagement of the island by Britain. He was a true colonialist, but it was not just this that made him react against such remarks. He feared something else too. In one of these rare occasions that he talked about Cyprus in Parliament, he was again attacked about the issue of Tribute, but one MP was particularly confrontational. It was the summer of 1896 and this MP expressed the view that Britain was extracting money brutally from Cyprus, like Spain used to treat her colonies. We understand Chamberlain's worries about Cyprus:

*But, if what he [Robert Pierpoint] has said is inaccurate, then I cannot help saying that a speech such as he has made is really calculated to do a great deal of mischief... because there is no doubt that the Greeks and other people who inhabit Cyprus are perfectly ready to accept as gospel, statements of this kind, and to assume that they are badly treated, and to be discontented in consequence.*<sup>52</sup>

This was the spirit of the Cyprus Development. Chamberlain had to do something because Britain's establishment was under scrutiny at home and on the island as well.

He needed to emphasise also the economic aspect of it, because this was his real interest in colonial development. Chamberlain reminded Parliament of the amounts paid to Cyprus annually in Grant-in-Aids, which he had raised to £19,000 from £9,000-10,000.<sup>53</sup> Not just Cypriots but also the 'mythical' British taxpayer was also burdened by it through the Grant-in-Aids. A peasant Cypriot would laugh at this analogy. The Cypriot and British taxpayer would be eased by increasing the amount for the expenses of the administration – by increased Grant-in-Aid – and developing the resources of the island “either by improved communications or by system of irrigation”.<sup>54</sup> This also meant spending more of the British taxpayer's money and burdening the Cypriot with more loans. He claimed, at an early date,

---

<sup>52</sup> HC Deb 11 August 1896 vol 44 cc521-57;

A similar remark had been made by Chamberlain also in 1900 and 1902. HC Deb 15 June 1900 vol 84 cc211-48; HC Deb 26 May 1902 vol 108 cc619-61

<sup>53</sup> In his own words:

“I am giving the actual expenditure on public works. What my hon. Friend means by expenses I do not understand; this is the actual money expended on public works in the island of Cyprus in the three years stated, and the average is £10,000 a year. But what I want to say is that for the present year, with the assent of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I have nearly doubled that amount, and the expenditure estimated for 1896–7 is to be £19,000.” *ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*

that Cyprus was “well worth the interest” of Britain to develop in “a reasonable and cautious matter”:

*...all I can say is that It [Cyprus development] is receiving my most careful attention, and I hope that by the assistance of the Imperial Government in making these improvements in the country, we can secure a satisfactory return, which will, in the first place, make the British taxpayer secure, and, in the second place, develop the resources of Cyprus.*<sup>55</sup>

By 1898, he was very proud to present the improvements in the conditions of the island during his service in the Colonial Office. His list included items such as agricultural education, silk production, taxation and banking. There were also bridges and roads, a survey for ‘a proper railway to go to Nicosia, Famagusta and Larnaca’, and a commercial Famagusta harbour. Chamberlain announced proudly that they, as the British administration of the island, were doing their job, a motto which would also echo in the 1940s from the mouth of Governor Wolseley (“the Government is doing on its behalf”):

*We are doing all that we are called upon to do at present. In asking this House to be liberal to the island, I undertake a considerable personal responsibility, and I should not ask for the money unless I thought the investment would make a good return. I do think it right to proceed prudently and cautiously, and not to make increasing demands upon the Exchequer, without giving some proof that my expectations are likely to be fulfilled.*<sup>56</sup>

He was claiming that there was already progress in Cyprus but what was considered improvement was vague:

*...I say, then, I think it can be shown that in recent years the condition of the island has improved, regard being had to certain general features, to which attention should always be paid when we test the prosperity of a dependency. I find that in less than 10 years the population of this island, which, we are*

---

<sup>55</sup> HC Deb 28 August 1895 vol 36 cc1021-91.

<sup>56</sup> HC Deb 08 August 1898 vol 64 cc502-22

*told, is now in a worse condition than when under the barbaric rule of Turkey.*<sup>57</sup>

He was both challenging and optimistic. In just one year after this speech, Chamberlain was being congratulated by MPs of the Conservatives, Liberals and even the Irish Parliamentary Party for his achievements in the development of Cyprus. Their emphasis was on the road and bridge improvements, which was an easily observable fact. One Conservative member was enthusiastic about the irrigation project for which he held up the example of Egypt where it was supposedly proving remunerative.<sup>58</sup> The Aswan Dam project had just started in 1898; he was forgetting that Cyprus did not possess a Nile of her own. Even the afforestation of Cyprus, which was a state policy followed from the very beginning of the occupation, had been acknowledged as one of his policies.

### **1.5 Chamberlain's worries: the Cyprus of the 1890s**

Now I return to the Cyprus of the late 1890s but especially 1895, which can be considered as a critical year, or a climactic year. Three themes come forward from the period: economic difficulties of the peasant and labouring people, increasing cries for enosis, and social banditry as a sign of social dissolution.

For the first 25 years of the British occupation, Georghallides draws a grim picture of the economic situation of the island. He puts forward the Tribute as the main reason.<sup>59</sup> Georghallides elaborates much on Winston Churchill's report on Cyprus, which he visited in 1907. Churchill blamed the Treasury and the imperial politics – he defined it “an iniquitous and immoral arrangement” – for the dreadful financial system imposed on the island.<sup>60</sup> According to Georghallides, this economic situation and financial policy of the British occupation had far-reaching political consequences. The political opposition both of Turkish Cypriots and, to a larger extent, Greek Cypriots, to the British administration was generally being constructed around these financial and economic grievances. There were repetitive

---

<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> HC Deb 04 August 1899 vol 75 cc1510-31

<sup>59</sup> Georghallides, G. S. 1979. *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, 1918-1926: With a Survey of the Foundations of British Rule*. Cyprus Research Centre, pp. 28-30,

<sup>60</sup> For a detailed account of the finances of the British administration see Chapter Two Financial Questions 1878-1914 in Georghallides (1979). .

protests in the Legislative Council and newspapers, and memorials directly to High Commissioners or Joseph Chamberlain (one on 26<sup>th</sup> July 1985, at the date of his arrival to the Colonial Office) and Winston Churchill (1907). The taxation system was also particularly unpopular because under British rule it had become very efficient and severe. As one Elected Member claimed in the Legislative Council in 1894, when the Ottomans issued a 'the payment cannot be made' notice the British legislation and executive authority sold movable and immovable property to cover the payment of taxes. In the Legislative Council Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Elected Members alike were complaining that the Tribute was sucking up the resources of the island, which could be invested in items like roads, harbours and public works, education, health and an Agricultural Bank<sup>61</sup>.

All of these complaints and problems had been acknowledged by several British Officials. Georghallides adds that many British officials of the Colonial Office and Cyprus Government had private sympathy for the complaints of Cypriots. Sir Charles King-Harman, in 1904, who was one of the most pro-Cyprus High Commissioners, reported to Joseph Chamberlain's successor, SoS Lyttleton that the taxation was "excessive", and the Tribute was an "intolerable burden laid upon a poverty-stricken country". Between 1887 and 1890 there had been an intense exchange of arguments and counter-arguments between British Officials and the Greek Cypriot Elected Members on the financial rigidity of the British status quo. These exchanges did not lead to any reforms and only after 1897-1898 did the revenue of the island begin to rise slowly and exceed £200,000. There was the effect of the increase in the public spending. It would take thirty-six years for the public revenue of the island to double itself under the British rule. Public spending in 1895-1896 rose, under the influence of Chamberlain's increase in Grant-in-Aids, to £113,851 in 1895-1896 to £140,284 in 1903-1904.<sup>62</sup>

The Greek Cypriot memorial of 26<sup>th</sup> July 1895 to Chamberlain was an exemplary document for the issues mentioned above. Turkish Cypriot members did not take part in the memorial because they did not agree with the reference to union with Greece. This reference had been added despite the recommendations of Greek Cypriot members like Constantinides, Liassides, Rossos and Abbot Gerasimos. Despite the enosis reference in the

---

<sup>61</sup> Georghallides, 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>62</sup> Georghallides, 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 32

memorial, as a framework, it contained common Cypriot complaints, a fact which Turkish Cypriot members admitted: it demanded an increase in Cypriot representation in state posts, more executive power to local representatives etc. Demands of this nature, more powers in legislation and administration, were shared both by some Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriot political elite. In the years 1894 and 1895 there were more events in the background of the political scene. Wine-growing Districts such as Limassol saw great unrest resulting from wine tariffs in 1894 which experienced mass gatherings followed by memorials of complaint to the High Commissioner Walter Sendall. George Hill, sensitive to enosis as an historian of the official British position, notes that the spring of 1895 experienced a wave of 'agitation' for enosis.<sup>63</sup> This had its roots in the 8<sup>th</sup> March 1895 House of Commons debate, when Sir William Harcourt commented on the status of the island.

Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir William Harcourt, at a House of Commons debate on Cyprus Grant-in-Aid, repeated what he had been saying in his years in opposition: the acquisition of Cyprus was impolitic and it had no use to Britain. This statement had consequences in Cyprus; it created the impression among certain Cypriots that Cyprus was to be abandoned. Following the speech, there were lively Greek Independence Day celebrations around the island; Archbishop Sophronios and some Greek Cypriot politicians wrote to Walter Sendall that the islanders were not able to pay the taxes any longer and if His Majesty's Government was tired of administering the island then it should cede it to the Greek Kingdom. Many towns passed resolutions with demands for enosis with Greece. These activities and Turkish Cypriot complaints on top of public demonstration of the enosis demand had reached even Constantinople, where the British Ambassador had to assure Said Pasha that there was no friction between the two communities.<sup>64</sup>

In the years of the late 1880s and 1890s there was also another phenomenon that ravaged the island: social banditry. The British administration was concerned in the face of this high-level violent activity, but especially the support it enjoyed from the wider population caused anxiety for the Administration. Rolandos Katsiaounis approaches the phenomenon in a classical Marxist way and claims that social banditry was:

---

<sup>63</sup> Hill, 2010, *op. cit.*, p. 456..

<sup>64</sup> Hill, 2010, *op. cit.*, pp. 499-503

*...the most serious manifestation of primitive opposition by the labouring poor, against both wealth and the colonial Government.*

The phenomenon had appeared during the late 1880s and 1890s when, according to Katsiaounis, it was an epidemic caused by mass pauperization and economic crisis. The social banditry, as presented in the gang of Hassanpoulia of the Paphos Mountains, was located in the historical context of the breakdown of the fabric of rural society which began after the agricultural crisis, the latter beginning in 1887.<sup>65</sup> These gangs had been very popular among the lower strata of Cypriot society, both Muslims and Christians alike.<sup>66</sup> By 1895 the gangs had become so popular and well-supported that the Legislative Council passed a special law designed just for them, the Out-laws Proclamation Act of 1895.<sup>67</sup> This law resembled state of emergency legislations, giving extraordinary powers to the Executive authority in times of crisis.<sup>68</sup> Especially the second generation of Hassanpoulia was committing crimes against certain targets which were both British and Cypriot: policemen, informers and money-lenders. These targets had no sympathy from amongst the poor of the cities and rural areas. Katsiaounis discusses the phenomenon briefly and shows us the severity of the social situation as follows:

*Banditry appeared as a response to painful social disruption at a time when the political consciousness of the labouring poor was fairly low and political movements had not arrived on the scene. Being themselves men of modest peasant stock, bandits became champions of an impotent and pre-political folk, who put their faith in those who righted wrongs and turned oppression upside down.*<sup>69</sup>

‘Constructive imperialism’, as a general imperial policy, fitted Cyprus’ situation, at least in the colonial British minds. Thus, it was not odd that Cyprus was the only non-tropical country to be added in the Colonial Development Act of 1899.

---

<sup>65</sup> Κατσιαούνης, Ρολάνδος., 1996. Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century. Texts and Studies of the History of Cyprus 24. Nicosia: Κέντρο Επιστημονικών Ερευνών Κύπρου, pp. 258-261,

<sup>66</sup> The best known and still remembered one was the gang of Hasanpoulia. For the phenomenon see also: Cassia, Paul Sant. 1993. “Banditry, Myth, and Terror in Cyprus and Other Mediterranean Societies.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (4): 773–95, p. 776; Coronil, Fernando, & Julie Skurski. 2006. *States of Violence*. University of Michigan Press.

<sup>67</sup> Bryant, Rebecca. 2004. *Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*. I.B.Tauris, p.68.

<sup>68</sup> See Agamben, Giorgio. 2008. *State of Exception*. University of Chicago Press.

<sup>69</sup> Katsiaounis, .1996, *op. cit.* , p.272

## 1.6 The Railway as a precondition of development: a `Chamberlanian` ideology

It is important to say that constructive imperialism`s expression in Cyprus required, first of all, more funds for Public Works. Chamberlain was interested personally in these matters. During the summer of 1897 Sendall sent him statistics of goods and passenger traffic on the Nicosia-Larnaca road. He had attached also a short survey for a 2 feet 5 inch gauge railway line on the same route prepared by the Government Engineer Cunningham of the Public Works Department (PWD). Consequently, Chamberlain would be the first to open the discussion on the construction of a railway and a harbour for the island. He pointed out that there were no appropriate harbour accommodation facilities on the island. According to him, this was necessary to “reap” the benefits of the development and public works in progress or contemplation.<sup>70</sup> Having found the Brown report on the railway and Famagusta harbour, Chamberlain asked Sendall to check and renew Brown`s estimates. Similarly Chamberlain would also be the first to open the discussion on the terminus of the railway at Famagusta. His first impression on the route of the railway was doubtful on the necessity of a line to Larnaca. He would say to Sendall:

*...it appears to me that the railway should have a terminus there [Famagusta] as well as Larnaca, if indeed, one would be required at the latter.*<sup>71</sup>

High Commissioner Sendall, a pro-Cyprus figure sympathised by the majority of Cypriots, was quick to move and take advantage of Chamberlain`s interest. He considered that the harbour and railway would enable them to “take advantage of the monies expended and to be expended in developing the island”. This was precisely what Chamberlain wanted to hear. Six Elected Members of the Legislative Council, he noted, were also of this opinion, and ready to pass a resolution enabling the Government to draw annually £2,000 from the infamous Locust Destruction Fund (LDF) to meet the charge for interest and sinking fund.<sup>72</sup> This fund had been established to collect extra tax from the people to take precautions and measures against the mass locust visits to the island. Although the measures worked and

---

<sup>70</sup> CO 883/6/5, Sendall to Chamberlain, 30th July 1897; Chamberlain to Sendall, 20th August 1897

<sup>71</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> *ibid.*, Sendall to Chamberlain, 30th December 1897

the threat of locusts disappeared, the tax remained intact for funding other projects like mail subsidies, railway and harbour constructions, as we will see. By mid-1898 Acting Governor Young was contemplating passing a resolution that was appropriating the LDF to secure a source of £2,500 annually for meeting the interest charge and sinking fund of the loan for the railway and the harbour.<sup>73</sup>

After these short communications between Chamberlain and Sendall was an agreement on making progress with railway and harbour projects. Upon these three communications, the Colonial began negotiations with the Treasury. In this first communication, the Colonial Office was conceptualising the policy for the construction of a railway and harbour in Cyprus. It was in the framework of the developmental policy which had been applied to the island since 1896 and the Colonial Office knew that Treasury needed proof of economic growth:

*The more generous policy which their Lordships have, at Mr Chamberlain's instigation, purposed towards the island during the last two years is already bearing fruit in the awakening of hope and confidence in the future. Capital is being attracted to the island, and the trade both with this country and Egypt is increasing in spite of difficulties under which it labours from the defective nature of the internal as well as the external communications.*<sup>74</sup>

According to the Colonial Office, the inland communications and transportation of the island were a bottleneck to her development and prosperity. These were opinion informed both by Chamberlain and the developmental ideology of the period: improved inland communications were a must; the most efficient and modern method was the railway.<sup>75</sup> Though Cyprus had been allocated an amount of money from the increased public works grants during the last two years for building roads and bridges, the Colonial Office deduced that it was not efficient for progress: the island did not have good building material for constructing the best roads; roads were expensive to upkeep; and roads were deteriorating rapidly. Thus, according to the Colonial Office:

---

<sup>73</sup> *ibid.*, Young to Chamberlain, 15th April 1898

<sup>74</sup> *ibid.*, Colonial Office to Treasury, 17th February 1898

<sup>75</sup> See Havinden, Michael Ashley. 1993. *Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960*. Routledge.

*...development of the trade in which its future progress largely depends, it is indispensable that quicker and more satisfactory means of communication than road should be provided.*<sup>76</sup>

The theory followed that the future of Cyprus lay in trade and agriculture, and eventually it had to compete with other countries which were better equipped with ports and better means of transportation. In this line of thought, the Colonial Office framed that railways were necessary to the island. As the Colonial Office rightly stated, this was not a new idea, and Chamberlain had concurred that:

*...proposals for railway have been brought in to agenda by successive Secretaries of State since the occupation but though it was recognised that it would have an enormous influence in stimulating the development of the Island, and would in a few years prove self-supporting, it was not taken up.*<sup>77</sup>

These opinions were both misleading and speculative. There had never been a consensus on the idea of a railway but Chamberlain had to justify himself to the Treasury, which was not so sure about funding pioneering works with public money.<sup>78</sup> He continued:

*... It was felt [by the past Administrations] that the very low scale on which the public works grant was fixed left no margin to provide the balance of interest and sinking fund during the first few years after construction [of a railway], and it was also recognised that the provision of harbour accommodation must be undertaken at the same time, if the Island was to reap the full advantage of the Railway.*<sup>79</sup>

Cyprus needed development, it had been neglected and Britain had a responsibility to make amends for its negligence. Cyprus was designated economically to survive on agriculture and trade with neighbouring countries, especially with the 'mainland' Egypt. However, to take the full advantage of the development expenditures, the island needed to have good internal and external communications. Since Cyprus could not build British standard roads then railways had to be built to secure the best way of transportation internally. However, a

---

<sup>76</sup> CO 883/6/5, Colonial Office to Treasury, 17th February 1898

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.*, Colonial Office to Treasury, 17th February 1898

<sup>78</sup> Havinden, 1993, *op cit.*, pp. 20-21

<sup>79</sup> CO 883/6/5, Colonial Office to Treasury, 17th February 1898

railway without a connection to a good harbour would have no great effect. Thereafter, Cyprus had to build a railway and a harbour at the same time as a joint project. This was the summary of the policy of Chamberlain and the reason for the present situation of Cyprus:

*It is to these deficiencies in its internal and external communications that Cyprus, situated as it is, within easy reach of the best markets, with all its advantage of soil and climate, and with an intelligent and industrious population has an external trade of less than £3 per head, a figure far below that of any part of Her Majesty's Colonial possessions.*<sup>80</sup>

Chamberlain was confident that this situation should be credited to the British Administration, and that steps should be taken as soon as possible to remove the 'reproach'. Chamberlain's proposals for rectifying the situation were:

- To dredge out the old harbour of Famagusta to a depth of 24 feet and to build a wharf wall of 200 yards in accordance with the plans of Samuel Brown, Engineer to the Cyprus Government in 1881 at an estimated cost of £50,000
- A metre gauge railway from Nicosia to the harbour at Famagusta with a branch to Larnaca at an estimated cost of £100,000

Chamberlain considered that the harbour improvements would create enough accommodation for the future expanded trade. It must be added that the scheme for the Famagusta Harbour was its improvement, or re-opening for commercial use; there was no reference to imperial or naval use. Additionally, he thought that the importance of Larnaca would 'no doubt' be diminished by the 're-opening' of Famagusta Harbour, but due to its geographical position it would remain an important entrance to the island. The Colonial Office asked for a loan of £210,000 (of which £60,000 were for irrigation) for Cyprus from the Imperial Funds.

---

<sup>80</sup> *ibid.*

## 1.7 Convincing the Treasury

The Treasury received Chamberlain's schemes for Cyprus positively. Irrigation projects had been promoted as the major development scheme in Cyprus where railway and harbour schemes were to complete the whole enterprise of Cyprus development. For the Treasury, the estimate of £150,000 was optimistic and the financial sources (i.e. Cyprus Government General Revenue) for repayment of the loan uncertain. Again, Treasury found Walter Sendall very optimistic about the success of the irrigation works and the surplus which the rail traffic would bring. However, these were details to be solved later on after the approval of the schemes in principle. The Treasury differed only on the time and method of the schemes:

*My Lords have much sympathy with Mr Chamberlain's desire to develop the resources of Cyprus and prove to her the commercial benefits of British administration; and no one can doubt that the works he proposes, if executed at a moderate cost, would be efficient means to this end.*<sup>81</sup>

The Treasury asked for the opinion of an 'authority' to comment upon the estimates, firstly upon the harbour then on the railway. This 'authority' meant someone with a relevant education and an active involvement in the business. In the case of Cyprus, the Treasury would several times make the same demand which, in every case, suggested the involvement of the Crown Agents. They had in their hands Ormiston and Brown's report on the Famagusta Harbour; the only report in their possession on the railway was that of Brown. The Crown Agents hired Coode, Son and Matthews to report on the development of Famagusta Harbour and give their opinions about the already existing reports on the subject: the Brown report, a parliamentary paper dating from the 1880s, the Ormiston report and the Admiralty survey.<sup>82</sup> They also had old railway reports for comparison: the Department of Public Works (DPW) report on Cyprus by Frank Cartwright of 1898, and the Brown report /Elliot survey referred to above.<sup>83</sup>

---

<sup>81</sup>CAOG 10/11, Francis Mowatt (Treasury Chambers) to Under Secretary of State of CO, 2nd March 1898.

<sup>82</sup> These reports will be referred in the next chapter.

<sup>83</sup> *ibid.*, Bertram Cox to Crown Agents, 12th March 1898

The Crown Agents' (CA) answer was to employ an engineer to survey the ground for the Famagusta Harbour. CA complained that latest data was from 1878, thus very old. This would also satisfy the Treasury's demands on getting the opinion of a 'responsible authority'. The Crown Agents proposed new surveys both for harbour and railway; Chamberlain accepted the proposal and directed the matter to be handled at an early date. He ordered full designs, estimates and reports on the objects.<sup>84</sup> Civil Engineer Crosswaite of Matthew and Coode was sent to Cyprus, to survey the harbour, at the end of October 1898, and he submitted his reports by January 1899 (for these reports see Chapter 4).

When commenting on Crosswaite's report, the Crown Agents and Consulting Engineers drew attention to the limited trade at Famagusta. According to them, the financial success of Famagusta harbour entirely depended on the connection of Famagusta with Nicosia by means of a railway. The Crown Agents said that they had no knowledge if Chamberlain had such a thing in mind. They considered that Cyprus presented no engineering difficulties and if necessary surveys could be made and the railway could be completed in three or four years, which would be required for the construction of the harbour works<sup>85</sup>.

Chamberlain and the local Government, i.e. High Commissioner, had already decided that both projects would be considered as parts of one scheme by mid-1898. This did not mean that the works would start simultaneously, decision justified by the 'limited extent of local labour market' at that time<sup>86</sup>. However, preparations of both were being operated simultaneously. While arranging an engineer visit to the Famagusta Harbour, the Colonial Office was also discussing railway studies as well. The Government was asked to give opinion on George Elliot's railway plans. In the meantime, the Locus Destruction Fund Law had been appropriated to secure, beforehand, £2,500 annually for the loans for railway and harbour schemes.<sup>87</sup>

The new, young High commissioner Sir William Frederick Haynes Smith – a man of 'action' – (23 April 1898 - 17 October 1904) was inclined to take the matter from the

---

<sup>84</sup> *ibid.*, CA to Matthews, 16th March; *ibid.*, Coode Son Matthews to CA, 6th May 1898; *ibid.*, CA to Under Secretary of State of Colonial Office, 10th May 1898; *ibid.*, Downing Street Bertram Cox to CA, 18th May 1898

<sup>85</sup> *ibid.*, CA to Under- SoS of Colonial Office, 11th January 1899

<sup>86</sup> CO 883/6/5, Graham CO to Treasury, 2nd June 1898

<sup>87</sup> *ibid.*, Graham CO to Treasury, 2nd June 1898; *ibid.*, Chamberlain to Haynes Smith, 2nd June 1898; *ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 24th June 1898.

beginning.<sup>88</sup> He wanted new data and surveys for the railway. He also demanded the services of an engineer to go over the proposed route of the railway to connect Nicosia to Famagusta and Larnaca, and settle the best line to take. He had two names, one for the survey and one for superintending the construction. There were two patterns here which ran throughout the whole occupation of the island by the British Empire: the Crown Agents system<sup>89</sup> and the Egypt connection. Cyprus remained a client of the Crown Agents until the end of the British occupation and even in the post-colonial period Cyprus continued to work with the same Consulting Engineers. Egypt was the 'mainland' country for Cyprus and, in technical matters and trade issues, there had always been a reference to Egypt.

Consequently, Cyprus contacted Egypt for technical advice. Specifically, Cyprus had recommendations from Lt. Colonel Green, commanding the Royal Engineers in Egypt, on the names of suitable engineers for the work. Lieutenant Pritchard or Lieutenant Stephenson of the Royal Engineers were names for both surveying and the writing of the report, and Lt Midwinter of the Royal Engineers for superintending the construction of the line.<sup>90</sup> Colonel Green was in Cyprus for inspection, and he recommended these engineers for their success in laying down the Sudan Railway "in most expeditious and economical manner".<sup>91</sup>

Lt. Pritchard was selected for the job. He finished his survey of Cyprus by March 1899. Haynes Smith had asked the Colonial Office to hire him as the superintendent of the construction works for which he had experience thanks to similar work in Sudan.<sup>92</sup> The Colonial Office and Cyprus wanted to go further in the materialisation of the railway project together with the harbour. However, they had to get the consent of the Treasury first. One reason that they had hired Pritchard was to help to convince the Treasury, which was demanding a survey for every scheme from a 'responsible authority'. Despite the High

---

<sup>88</sup> He had a drastic policy which showed itself both in the coordination of relief works against famine of 1901-1903 and the Archbishop issue. Varnava, Andrekos. 2012. *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The Inconsequential Possession*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 145, 152.

<sup>89</sup>For the Crown Agent system in Engineering issues, see Chapter 7 Miscellaneous Roles in Sunderland, David. 2007. *Managing British Colonial and Post-Colonial Development ; the Crown Agents, 1914-74*. Woodbridge, UK; New York: Boydell & Brewer

<sup>90</sup> CO 883/6/5, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 14th July 1898

<sup>91</sup> Haynes Smith was noting that Director of Public Works had no specialisation on railway construction. That's why he was asking the services of the army engineers. In the case of not employing these engineers, he was proposing to get someone experienced from railway works of Egypt. *ibid*.

<sup>92</sup> *ibid* ., Bertram Cox to Treasury, 10th March 1899

Commissioner<sup>93</sup> and Chamberlain, the Treasury thought that the harbour was the most urgent matter for the time being and not the railway. The Treasury demanded retaining their full freedom as regards to the railway until they reached a decision, in communication with Chamberlain, and they “would accordingly be averse to retaining Pritchard’s services beyond the period necessary for the completion of his survey and report”.<sup>94</sup>

Pritchard’s report was important for the shaping of the Cyprus railways. The famous London consulting engineer and the man who designed the Cyprus Government Railway, Frederic Shelford, would base his report upon the Pritchard and Samuel Brown reports. Amongst all the railway reports, including the Shelford report, Pritchard’s stands out for its detailed account in justifying the proposed technical characteristics of the railway. For Pritchard, there were three main characteristics that had to be resolved: class, gauge and route. His choices show us that the target of his design was to provide a light railway with economic working expenses in order to carry as much of the grain produce of Messaoria at competitive prices lower than animal transportation.

The railway was proposed to be concentrated on carrying agricultural goods.. Passenger traffic was a secondary concern; speed was no consideration. The primary object was to carry goods cheaper than animal transportation could in as few trains as possible. He believed that if the speed was slightly faster than animals then the passenger traffic would be satisfied. In the selection of gauge he decided in favour of narrow gauge, which he claimed was economic in the construction of the earthworks. He compared gauge lengths between 4' 8 ½" (standard “English gauge”), 3' 6", 3' 3", 2' 6". He chose the 3' 6" as having the advantage of lower construction cost, which compensated the disadvantage rendering the locomotive less simple and more likely to require repair.<sup>95</sup>

Unfortunately, the maps and drawings of Pritchard have not been found. However, his route selection would affect Shelford’s decision; he would choose the same route

---

<sup>93</sup> One note about the thoughts of Haynes Smith on Cyprus, in a letter dating January 1899 to Chamberlain he was saying: “I understand that those who have had authority in Greece [to] advise the agitators here that Greece can only obtain Cyprus through England, and that they should help the Administration. trust I may be excused for saying that the inhabitants of Cyprus, in the meantime, may be made an English-speaking community with British aspirations and sentiments”. *ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, January 1899.

<sup>94</sup> *ibid.*, Francis Mowatt to CO, 16th March 1899

<sup>95</sup> CO 67/117, Report on Project for A Light Railway in Cyprus Connecting Nicosia, Famagusta and Larnaca by Lieutenant Pritchard, D.S.O., R.E.

proposed by the Lieutenant (see below Map 2). This reference and to/with previous reports existed also in Pritchard's work, especially on the route. His observations on Famagusta-Nicosia-Karavostassi branches are important for this study. Agriculture, irrigation projects and, especially, grain-producing villages were the main criteria in this selection. As was pointed out above, Brown had chosen a southward route between Famagusta and Nicosia. Traditional grain-producing villages and the 'grain country' called the plain of Messaoria lay northwards towards Prastio, Marathovouno, Yenagra and Kythrea. So he pulled the route further north to pass nearby the "most productive parts of the Country and thereby to gain an increase of traffic".<sup>96</sup> His choice would affect the report of Frederic Shelford, who would use the formers` report extensively.

The Cyprus loan had not yet been voted, and the amount to be demanded had to be clarified and justified to the Treasury. Even though the latter thought that the railway was not an urgent matter, its price had to be settled. The High Commissioner could not come up with a clear estimate for the railway, something that disturbed Chamberlain personally. He was dissatisfied with the estimates of the High Commissioner. Chamberlain had taken a personal interest in the matter; his tone and language were harsh and categorical:

*You were aware, as you admit, that the total possible loan for works in Cyprus was £250,000 of which £60,000 was definitely allocated to irrigation works and also that the railway and harbour works were regarded as inseparable.*<sup>97</sup>

In light of these known facts, Chamberlain could not understand how the High Commissioner left only £10,000 for the harbour works after his estimates. Indeed, Haynes Smith had twice sent estimates from different sources which were lacking an appropriate and exact estimation of cost and method of calculating them. Chamberlain was angry with the Governor and his Administration for not being able to supply the minimum for these projects in which he, obviously, took so much personal interest. For him these first loans for the economic development of Cyprus were part of grander future plans for the island. On the proposal of Haynes Smith to spend monies on afforestation from the £60,000 set aside for irrigation, Chamberlain reminded him that the money was only for immediate and direct reproductive purposes. Chamberlain wanted quick results from Cyprus. Chamberlain

---

<sup>96</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> CO 883/6/5, Chamberlain to Haynes Smith, 28th April 1899

warned Haynes Smith that he should be careful for the success of this 'experiment.' If it failed, it was unlikely to obtain further loans. His message was:

*The greatest precautions must, therefore, be taken to keep within the estimates, and to secure the promised result and every penny must be spent with care and forethought.*<sup>98</sup>

The inability of Cyprus to give accurate estimates and the general rise in the costs did not alter Chamberlain's position. Chamberlain explained to the Treasury the new estimates, the reports on the railway line and the Famagusta Harbour. This communication was intended to give the general features of irrigation, railway and harbour schemes. Chamberlain's Under-Secretary Wingfield indicated to the Treasury, that the estimates "far exceeded those contemplated" when they were first brought before the Treasury. The harbour's estimates had risen from £50,000 to £124,000; railway estimates were now £177,000 for a line at Nicosia-Famagusta with a branch at Larnaca and £130,000 for Nicosia-Famagusta only. Chamberlain had no more arguments than those he had stated in his 17<sup>th</sup> February 1898 communication, but he could comment on the prospects of the island's trade. He was prepared to speak the language of the Treasury and prepared pages of data on the current statistics on agricultural production, livestock, imports and exports of the island. The general optimism that ran through Chamberlain's thoughts, at least on the Cypriot future, was present here as well. He concluded that production and trade were increasing with fluctuations due to drought and seasonal causes which were going to be rendered by the irrigation work scheme.<sup>99</sup> In the colonial mind, the project and future of Cyprus were calculated and ready for success with the double result: Britain would answer all those who were talking about the mismanagement of the island, and the policy of colonial development would have, maybe, another success story. In the words of Wingfield:

*These figures [of all trade, production, livestock, imports and exports], Mr Chamberlain trusts, satisfy their Lordships that the island is progressing and that with improved facilities for internal and external communication, still further and more rapid progress may be anticipated, and that works intended for that purpose even if*

---

<sup>98</sup> *ibid* .

<sup>99</sup> *ibid* ., Wingfield to Treasury, 28th July 1899

*not immediately self-supporting are likely to become so within a reasonable period.*<sup>100</sup>

Cyprus was already developing, which meant that further investment would boost production:

*In approaching the consideration of the question of railway and harbour also it is to be borne in mind that the irrigation works in progress are confined to the area which would be served by them, and as it is estimated that the production of the district will be increased by about 40,000 [okes] per annum, it may be safely assumed that estimates of traffic and revenue based on the existing production will be well within the mark.*<sup>101</sup>

Wingfield explained that quick returns were in prospect:

*I am to add, in conclusion, that Mr Chamberlain is satisfied that the works will prove of very great benefit to the island and that they will in a very few years not only meet all the charges but yield a surplus the benefit of which will of course principally accrue to the Imperial Exchequer.*<sup>102</sup>

The proposal to the Treasury was to provide Cyprus with an Imperial loan of £314,000: Irrigation £60,000 + Harbour £124,000 + Railway £130,000 concentrating on the Famagusta branch only. The Treasury was given a detailed estimate of receipts, working expenses and maintenance expenses for these schemes. The irrigation scheme's estimates were considered to "be safely relied on" because the works were similar to those in Ceylon, thus experimented. Optimism continued. According to Chamberlain, the railway and harbour estimates were moderate, and "especially having regard to the prospect of an early increase [in traffic] consequent on the irrigation works". It was proposed to start with the harbour works, preferably with the departmental mode, which would take two or three years, and then take on the railway works.<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>103</sup> *ibid.*

## 1.8 Cyprus gets the loan

The Treasury added £314,000 to the Colonial Loans Bill before Parliament for Cyprus schemes with loan terms applied no better than those in the UK. The Treasury disappointed Chamberlain, who had been asking for more favourable loan conditions to Cyprus. He was of the opinion that Cypriot circumstances were entirely different in view:

*...both of the position which Cyprus occupies, and of the nature of the works contemplated, the object of which is to relieve the Exchequer ultimately by furthering the development of the island*<sup>104</sup>

While making proposals for better loan conditions, he was arguing in favour of the departmental mode of construction, especially its application in the case of Famagusta harbour.<sup>105</sup> That must have been the reason for not proceeding with the typical Crown Agents system. If it did, the CA would hire some Consulting Engineers who would do the survey and then appoint a Resident engineer to supervise the construction. Instead, Cyprus and the Colonial Office had hired Pritchard and then asked for his services to be continued as the supervising engineer of the works. In Uganda there was an ongoing experiment on departmental mode of construction, which I will refer to further below.

Chamberlain also recommended the use of convict labour in quarrying for the harbour works.<sup>106</sup> The Treasury eventually accepted the loan conditions proposed by Chamberlain, giving Cyprus a special treatment of 3 ¼ % interest charge with repayment by equal annual instalments within 50 years from the date of advance. Of course Cyprus would contribute from Locust Fund and Public Works Vote Grants.<sup>107</sup>

---

<sup>104</sup> The Treasury was doubtful about the departmental mode of construction. The recent Uganda Railway, which was constructed by the colonial state, was the first example, and the Treasury wanted time to judge the results. *ibid.*, Francis Mowatt (Treasury) to Colonial Office, 17th July 1899; *ibid.*, C.P Lucas (CO) to Treasury, 29th August 1899.

<sup>105</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> This was not the first time that convict labour was recommended as a cost-reducing method. In his report, Frederic W Fuller of Colonial Office, on the Provand proposal claimed that "The crimes arising out of drunken brawls and sheep-stealing alone prove a large supply of this [convict] labour." CO 883/4/25, Memorandum in Connexion with Mr Provand's Scheme for the Establishment of Railway Communication in Cyprus 1894.

<sup>107</sup> CO 883/6/5, W. Hamilton (Treasury) to Colonial Office, September 6th 1899.

## Part 2. The Making of the railway

### 2.1 Closing the final design: The Shelford report

Between 1900 and 1903 progress was made in the Famagusta Harbour project. Designs were finalised; contracts were given; and the start of construction was authorised in January 1901. The railway issue was generally out of discussions of the Legislative Council and London from 1901 to 1902. The main discussions in these years, in the Legislative Council, the Colonial Office and the Cyprus Government, were around the Larnaca branch. These discussions, which will be analysed in detail in the next part, did not change much in the design of the railway. Actually, the Government and Colonial Office had managed to have their choice of design accepted, but Cypriot politicians would make them pay for this.

The final design of the Cyprus Government Railway would be based on Frederic Shelford's survey and report. Frederic Shelford<sup>108</sup> of Messrs Shelford and Son were one of most the famous Consulting Engineers working for the Crown Agents. The Crown Agents recommended him to the Colonial Office because of his experience in small gauge railways (2 foot-6 inches), especially in the construction of Sierra Leone Railway.<sup>109</sup> He was firstly to survey and report on the Ismailia Railway for use in Cyprus and on a possible railway scheme in Cyprus. Shelford took the job and before he set out for Egypt, held a meeting with the ex-Director of Public Works of Cyprus, Charles Vincent Bellamy. Bellamy was eager to buy the Ismailia Railway. After their meeting, Shelford was positive as well but he insisted on going to Egypt and doing the survey on the ground.<sup>110</sup> His report was ready by the summer of

---

<sup>108</sup> Frederic Shelford was the son of William Shelford, a big name in London civil engineering circles. Father and son worked as partners in Shelford and Son engineering consultancy company till 1905 when William died. Frederic Shelford was a supporter of engineers going to overseas, and his main business was mainly overseas and in colonies. Shelford directed, designed and constructed many railways in West Africa, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gold Coast. These were all 'Chamberlain' railways. William Shelford had kinship relations with the Crown Agents from which he benefitted. Frederic Shelford enjoyed the fruits of this privileged connections with the Crown Agents and lived a luxurious life amongst the elite engineering circles. He was the extreme case of Great George Street Clique phenomenon. See. Andersen, Casper. 2011. *British Engineers and Africa, 1875-1914*. London: Pickering & Chatto. Also for a detailed account of Shelford-Crown Agents relations see Sunderland, David, 2004. *Managing the British Empire: The Crown Agents, 1833-1914* Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK; Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society ; Boydell Press.

<sup>109</sup> CO 67/136, CA to CO, 28 April 1903

<sup>110</sup> *ibid.*, Messrs Shelford and Son to CA, 27th April 1903

1903, and his opinion was negative. In general lines, he argued that its gauge standard of 2 foot 5 ½ inches was inconvenient; Cyprus would be making a saving of £6,000 at the expense of getting a ten year old railway stock and machinery. As approved by the Crown Agents too, he was proposing a 2' 6" gauge railway to be built by a construction mode in which the Colonial Government let the work by contract.<sup>111</sup> His report titled "Cyprus Proposed Railways Report", dated 15<sup>th</sup> July 1903, would be the basis for the construction of the CGR. His report was not just papers on engineering proposals but contained a diary of his journeys to Egypt and Cyprus throughout which he was making broader observations and comments. For example, we learn that he had made a 24-hour steamer journey from Port Said to Larnaca, where he took a carriage and made 26 miles in three hours to arrive in Nicosia. His first impression was that the Government had good carriage roads that could be driven in all directions. This is an important observation since he was an engineer; his judgment gave a reliable sense of the technical quality. This must have been the results of 'Chamberlain Grants-in-Aid' which had been given since 1896 for public works spending. Before going to Famagusta, by making 38 miles in 7 hours, he had visited a sitting of the Legislative Council. His observation was interesting in showing the British perspective of the island's governance situation:

*At the Council I noticed that 6 official members [appointed British] of the Council were using their best endeavours on behalf of the country from the somewhat unusual standpoint of a minority, for against these official members were 9 Greek members and 3 Turkish members, elected by the people. The Administration of the Colony under such circumstances must be very difficult.*

This was a picture of joint Cypriot opposition against the minority British Government representatives. Frederic Shelford also had the traditional British reaction towards Famagusta. He was impressed by the ruins and the castle of the city. Like many British visiting, he must have heard about the 'glorious' past of the city:

*During this inspection [harbour works] I had an opportunity of seeing the wonderfully interesting Ruins of the ancient city of Famagusta, and obtained some photographs. I was very much impressed with Famagusta which appears to be almost an ideal spot*

---

<sup>111</sup> *ibid.*, CA to Under SoS, 28th July 1903

*for a short stay for a tourist with its interesting ruins, pleasant surroundings, and delightful climate.*<sup>112</sup>

His report's third section was on the proposed Famagusta-Nicosia Line. As he pointed out above, he had made a visit to the harbour works for which he had access to the Matthews and Coode reports. He pointed out that the city was "deliberately selected as the Port of the island". His main argument for the construction of the railway to the city was as below:

*The construction of the Famagusta harbour renders of a light railway imperative, as without such communication Famagusta is an out-of-the way spot far removed from the main trade of the colony.*<sup>113</sup>

He added that the route was very easy to build throughout the Messaoria Plain,<sup>114</sup> which had promising irrigation works near Famagusta. He believed that the city was "extremely interesting and quite healthy" despite there being in the last decades many observations on the poor levels of public health. This was a result of the drainage works carried out to minimise malaria cases. Briefly, Shelford was of the opinion of the construction of the line, especially now with the 'perfect harbour' being built in the city.<sup>115</sup>

In general lines, his proposal had the following characteristics: The railway would be comprised of 36 miles between Famagusta-Nicosia with an extension of 34 miles, Nicosia-Morphou-Karavostassi (Gemikonagi). The Larnaca-Prastio branch would be postponed. This route was considered to have poor and scanty crops on its course; it was hard and costly to build due to detours and slopes. Money was a technical constraint. It would just increase the cost of the railway for the mere result of multiplying the connections to the capital. The Karavostassi extension was targeting the collection of the products of the fruit growing part of the Western Plain. Products such as carobs, oranges and wine would be collected by railway to be shipped to the "great markets of Egypt via Famagusta". Shelford was proposing a small railway of the size 2 feet-6 inches, a standard gauge size like the ones used in Sierra Leone and other Western Africa colonies, the Egyptian Light Delta Railways

---

<sup>112</sup> *ibid.*, Cyprus Proposed Railways Report by Mr Frederic Shelford M.Inst.C.E. July 15th 1903

<sup>113</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> He must have read about the Messaoria plain because he refers to the description of geologists, palaeontologists and one time Cyprus visitor Albert Gaudry "'un des lieux les plus fertiles du monde" from his research of "Recherchés Scientifique en Orient".

<sup>115</sup> *ibid.*

and some lines in India. For him, the cheapness of the construction was essential because traffic was likely to be light and comprise products of low value; there was also competition from good roads and transport by camel and bullock cart;<sup>116</sup> there was a necessity to open as much of the island as possible to the railway with the available money.<sup>117</sup> The choice of narrow gauge had been established as standard colonial practice in West African colonies. Low standard railways had been favoured for building longer lines and easiness in making new routes and extensions. Crown Agents and Consulting Engineers favoured higher standards that gave them better commissioning monies. However, in cases where the colony was considered to have difficulty in paying the debt of the lines, they compromised in proposing low standard and narrow-gauge lines.<sup>118</sup> This belief in the economic advantages of the narrow-gauge had risen to a point of ideology; it was believed and propagandised by many “enthusiast” during the late 1800s. It was presumably believed to have lower capital and operating costs<sup>119</sup>. Shelford estimated 1,442,930 tons per annum mileages of goods. He was, while admitting that he was doing a mere theoretical approach, less sure about the passenger traffic because of human behaviour. The passenger traffic estimation was a difficult matter for him, and he added the comment below:

*The population of Cyprus is naturally slow to adopt new methods and it will probably require some considerable inducement to make them travel by a more speedy method than that afforded by the family donkey or camel.*<sup>120</sup>

---

<sup>116</sup> This point had been noted by others before Shelford. Haynes Smith was warning Chamberlain for the need of having cheap fares for the railway. He was saying that they cannot raise the charges because people using carts and camels had their deliveries on the spot but with the railway, they should also hire cart or camel to carry to the spot desired. Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 3rd April 1899 at CO 883/6/5 In a report dated 1891, by Sir J.A. Sweetnam, it was written that that peasants who grew for exports owned beasts of burden and carried their own goods to the port. This was costing them nearly nothing. He continued: “..it is to be expected that many such persons will still prefer to take their produce to other port (when once it is loaded on their animals) in preference to taking it to the railway and their paying freight, especially as the freight will necessitate an outlay of money.” The same comments had been made in 1894 by the late Director of Public Works W. T. Taylor. *ibid*.

<sup>117</sup> CO 883/6/4, Shelford to Crown Agents, 15th July 1903

<sup>118</sup> Sunderland, David. 2004. *Managing the British Empire: The Crown Agents, 1833-1914*. Boydell & Brewer Ltd, pp. 108-110

<sup>119</sup> This “narrow-craze” was a global phenomenon. United States, Great Britain, Europe and Latin America had been caught up with this idea. The motivations behind were both economic and political within the framework of the industrial depression starting during 1870s, especially in US. However, the cost myth, for example in US, proved to be incorrect. Many narrow-gauge lines in US had been switched to standard gauge later on. Grant, H. Roger. 2005. *The Railroad: The Life Story of a Technology*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood, pp. 31-37

<sup>120</sup> *ibid*.

Consulting Engineers and Crown Agents tended to inflate traffic numbers, which worked to convince the Colonial Office to approve the scheme. Additionally, their recommendations were also excessively optimistic. Even Chamberlain expressed his distrust of these estimates which, in fact, were by Shelford.<sup>121</sup> Sunderland claims that the Consulting Engineers were not known to be the most honest people, particularly Shelford. And as I have shown above, there was a common understanding that the railway traffic would face competition from the local means of transportation. From this point of view, it was a good tactic to put a possible, or even foreseeable, failure on the local culture:

*It is however encouraging to notice how great a revolution has set in in Egypt owing to the introduction of railways and electric tramways, which have been eagerly welcomed by the inhabitants. The Arab is, however, a very enterprising person, fond of excitement and novelty, while the Cypriot, steady, preserving and industrious, is much slower to adopt novel methods.*<sup>122</sup>

Cyprus was a colony and Shelford had seen several of them. Thus, he was proposing to compare Cyprus with other colonies in order to make a more accurate estimation on passenger traffic. Here again, Egypt was the point of reference. For Shelford India was too big, and West Africa was “quite uncivilised country” to compare with Cyprus. The best match was Egypt, the Egyptian Delta Light Railway figures. Thus, he calculated 270,600 passengers per annum (from a population of 130,800 to be served), with an average journey of 10 miles and price of 6d. For the beginning, two trains going per day would be sufficient where the line could accommodate 8-10 trains per day. He concurred that “upon scientific basis a 2 feet-6 inch gauge is sufficient for the needs of the island for some time to come”.<sup>123</sup> Shelford had calculated the cost of the scheme as £140,000, for which a line on the route of Pritchard (Nicosia-Famagusta) and George Elliot (Nicosia-Karavostassi) could be constructed after making a better survey to improve the rough nature of these routes.<sup>124</sup> Lastly, he proposed the departmental mode of construction instead of the Crown Agents system.

---

<sup>121</sup>Sunderland, 2004, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-122


<sup>122</sup> CO 883/6/4, Shelford to Crown Agents, 15th July 1903

<sup>123</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> The cost of the CGR per mile compared to Delta Railways was a little bit more, due to better permanent way and smaller mileage. The estimate of £2,000 for Cyprus can be compared with Indian railways. Compared with them it was cheaper. *ibid.*



Map 2. Extract from the Shelford Report. The proposed route is the line passing in the middle of the Island. Red-dotted lines represent the region from which traffic was expected according to Shelford's estimations. See that Famagusta-Nicosia part follows a path towards the north-east Messaoria (Pritchard's route) while Nicosia-Karavostassi part lies on the route drawn by Samuel Brown. CO 883/6/4, Shelford to Crown Agents, 15th July 1903



Map 3. Extract from the map in a 1931 railway report. The map shows the competitive roads (blue lines) to the railway (red line). It is indicative to see the traffic and population around the railway route. CO 67/246/1

## 2.2 The construction of the Famagusta-Nicosia Line

The Colonial Office was satisfied with the Shelford report, the estimate of £141,526 out of £160,000 from the Act and the proposed mode of construction; and asked for the sanction of the scheme, of Shelford's version, by the Treasury. The Colonial Office again reminded the Treasury of the 'combined faith' of the railway and the harbour.<sup>125</sup> The Treasury's answer gave the last touches to the scheme. First of all, the Treasury was against, for the time being, any other line that had been proposed at various times other than the Famagusta-Nicosia-Morphou line.<sup>126</sup> The Treasury stuck to the repeated 'dogma', which claimed that the success of the schemes [harbour and railway] in the island depended on one condition: the whole traffic between the Messaoria and the sea-coast should be concentrated on one railway and at one port.<sup>127</sup>

The Treasury agreed with Shelford and the Colonial Office on the Ismailia Railway, but on the mode of construction it had other concerns. Firstly, the Colonial Office was warned not to exceed the £165,320 allocated by the British Parliament for the railway. The estimates of Shelford were considered doubtful, and the Treasury concluded that the departmental mode of construction would exceed the estimates. For the Treasury, "the experiment of State construction in the case of the Uganda Railway" could hardly be regarded as encouraging. The Treasury wanted a construction process in which the cost was known from the beginning, as in giving it to a contractor. It proposed the same method applied to the Famagusta Harbour works: "inviting an inclusive tender from a firm of responsible contractors". This meant that there was going to be no extension to the budget but there would be a legal liability of a private entity in face of delays, and divergence from the quality and design.

There are two points here in these remarks of the Treasury: a sense of distrust of Shelford and the departmental mode of construction. The latter had been experimented with in the construction of Uganda Railways, which was not considered a success. The

---

<sup>125</sup> CO 883/6/5, Colonial Office to Treasury, 7th October 1903

<sup>126</sup> Karavostassi must have been considered a serious port by the Treasury. In reality, it was just an open roadstead for very small sailing ships.

<sup>127</sup> Treasury was quoting the Ashmore report. *ibid.*, Treasury to CO, 31st October 1903

latter's construction time and budget had been 'overstretched', provoking criticism from the House of Commons.<sup>128</sup> In this method, the British Government, through the Foreign Office, directly hired the engineers in charge of the construction process. The Colonial Office's insistence on this method is understandable due to Chamberlain's close personal interest in the Cyprus case. He sought a relative control over an issue for which he had to challenge both the House of Commons and Cypriots to prove the 'boons' of British administration in Cyprus. Moreover, by this method the time consuming process of tendering for contractors was avoided. On the other hand, if this mode was accepted, Frederic Shelford, who advised this mode of construction, would certainly guarantee extension of his contract. He already had the Colonial Office as his client and, as the history of the departmental mode of construction showed, he would name a resident engineer of his own and could arrange tenders to firms he favoured.<sup>129</sup>

The Colonial Office placated the Treasury about the Karavostassi extension since, as the Colonial Office rightly claimed, the so-called Karavostassi harbour was not likely to divert traffic from Famagusta.<sup>130</sup> On the mode of construction, the Colonial Office was still defending its proposal by comparing Cyprus with the Uganda Railway case. Uganda had relied upon imported labour and imported food for the more difficult work in engineering. In Cyprus, this mode had already been experimented with in the PWD's road building projects in which the villagers were contracted and supervised by the Public Works Department. In the railway case, the same would apply but the supervision would be carried out by a Resident Engineer and his staff; the material and rolling stock would be supplied by the Crown Agents on favourable terms. This was going to be the mode of construction of the Cyprus Government Railway. On 21<sup>st</sup> November 1903 the Colonial Office authorised the Crown Agents for the construction of a railway from Famagusta to Nicosia, to be extended on the completion of the section towards Karavostassi as far as the funds available allowed. For the post of Resident Engineer, G.A. Day<sup>131</sup> (with a salary of £800, plus housing and

---

<sup>128</sup> Andersen, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 49

<sup>129</sup> More on this system see Chapter 7 The Department System of Infrastructure Construction, in Sunderland, David. 2004. *Managing the British Empire: The Crown Agents, 1833-1914*. Boydell & Brewer Ltd.

<sup>130</sup> Many producers of the region were from Morphou who used to send their produce Larnaca via road. CO 883/6/5, CO to Treasury, 10<sup>th</sup> November 1903

<sup>131</sup> George Albert Day had 20 years of experience in railway survey and railway, pier and canal construction in England, Siam, British Honduras, Gold Coast and the Strait Settlements. From 1897 to 1903, he worked in the Federated Malay States Railway, first as an assistant and then as a divisional engineer. Day was proposed by

travelling allowances) was appointed on the recommendation of Shelford, whose company, Messrs Shelford and Son would be the Consulting Engineers earning £2000 per annum.<sup>132</sup>

Briefly the scheme was to be completed in accordance with the following terms:

- Authorised expenditure of £141,526 for the construction in general accordance with the 15<sup>th</sup> June 1903 Report of Frederic Shelford.
- The first line to be constructed was to be Famagusta-Nicosia, which would be extended towards Karavostassi as far as the funds allowed.
- The method of construction was to be Shelford's departmental mode of construction method.
- Local control of the works would rest on the Resident Engineer,<sup>133</sup> responsible for all technical work and who would report to CE, Shelford and Son, constantly on his and the Government's opinion.<sup>134</sup>

In August 1904, Haynes Smith inspected the harbour and railway works; he reported that the railway works were in progress, all of the requested land had been purchased and the first twelve miles would be opened within the next three months. The Karavostassi extension had been left to be considered after the Famagusta-Nicosia line was constructed.<sup>135</sup> Haynes Smith, being very eager about the economic development of the island, kept the issue alive for the Colonial Office. Though a small line, for Haynes Smith it was necessary to ensure the holism of the Cyprus development projects: the railway, Famagusta harbour, and, to a smaller extent, irrigation and Larnaca harbour improvements. The economic development of the island was the main and the sole target for the Administration on the island. For the sake of the irrigation-railway-harbour triad of economic development, the biggest port and city of trade, Larnaca, was left out of the future plans. For the British, preferred outcome was that Messaoria products should be

---

Shelford and Son with which he had worked previously in surveys of British Honduras and Gold Coast Railways in 1895 and 1897 respectively. *ibid.*, Shelford to Crown Agents 17<sup>th</sup> December 1903

<sup>132</sup> *ibid.*, Crown Agents to Colonial Office 21<sup>st</sup> December 1903

<sup>133</sup> This kind of arrangement was developed by transferring modes of work division tested in the centre either in London or in provincial cities and boroughs in mainland Britain. See Arapostathis, Stathis, 2008, "Morality, Locality and 'Standardization' in the work of British consulting electrical engineers, 1880-1914", *History of Technology*, 28, 53-74; Dutfeld, Graham, and Stathis Arapostathis. 2013. *Knowledge Management and Intellectual Property: Concepts, Actors and Practices from the Past to the Present*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

<sup>134</sup> *ibid.*, Cameron to Chief Secretary of Cyprus, 16<sup>th</sup> December 1903

<sup>135</sup> CO 67/136, Minute W.D.E to J Anderson, 7<sup>th</sup> August 1903

carried by the railway to the port of Famagusta, which was selected to be the port of the island. For the sake of Famagusta, any move to divert traffic somewhere else had to be avoided. That's why Karavostassi port, though insignificant in size and importance even by the Cypriot standards of the early 1900s, was left to be considered later on. Haynes Smith, at some point before leaving his post, wanted to bring the matter to the attention of his new liberal Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alfred Lyttelton:

*The financial success of these important works depends on their being carried out to the extent of making the Famagusta harbour a convenient place of call, and on carrying the railway from Famagusta to Nicosia, and thence across the island to Karavostassi on the West coast.*<sup>136</sup>

Haynes Smith claimed to have communicated with the target clients of the railway and harbour enterprise:

*I have endeavoured to ascertain whether the various steamships belonging to the different lines calling at Cyprus or trading with the Levant will use the harbour, and the result of my enquiries goes to show that they will be in willing to do so unless the harbour is somewhat enlarged... it is essential for the welfare of Cyprus that the railway and harbour works should be carried out in such a manner as to ensure their financial success."*<sup>137</sup>

### 2.3 Not a failed policy but a 'short one'; or Cyprus needs more railway

The state of railway construction by the end of 1904 was reported by the new High Commissioner, King-Harman.<sup>138</sup> The Famagusta-Nicosia line was expected to be completed by May 1905. The new High Commissioner had to consider the subject of management which had not yet been discussed at all. First of all, unlike the Resident Engineer Day, he was

---

<sup>136</sup> CO 883/6/6, Haynes Smith to Lyttelton, 17th august 1904 at

<sup>137</sup> *ibid.*

expecting a low level of traffic. The reasons for his pessimistic calculations were the short distance of the line, thus the limited area served, and “ultra-conservative habits of the Cypriot farmers and, and the excellent roads which now permeated the Messaoria”.<sup>139</sup>

He had interviews with people from concerned parties on the prospects of the line. For example, a leading agriculturist from Messaoria had expressed to him his opinion that the farmers of the region covered by the railway, in East Messaoria, had such good roads and such a sufficient stock of traction animals as leave them with no need for a railway. On the other hand, the community leader of Vatili, a large important agricultural village 5 miles away from the line in East Messaoria, had told him that the distance to the line was too large to encourage anyone to use the railway. These opinions were enough to confirm his impression that no large area would be attracted to the line.<sup>140</sup> The High Commissioner thought he was foreseeing a small disaster on the horizon, one which could only be somewhat ameliorated. First of all, he did not want the management directly under the Public Works Department. What he was proposing had the scope to separate the railway from the direct state management, giving the Government distance from the enterprise. He was suggesting that the railway be managed as a “commercial concern on a system wholly at variance with the ordinary procedure of a Public Works Department”. He believed that until the line attracted traffic with low rates allowing people to save money, thus not in immediate future as statistics estimated, the staff should be kept at the most economical scale. In the meantime, the account of the line had £107,736 left (£27,000 had been given to harbour works and there was an additional £8,000 to be spent) which was, according to the Crown Agents, enough to complete the line till Morphou, stations being omitted. Consulting Engineers Baker and Shelford suggested preparing the plans for the Morphou extension, and to carry out the works as far as the amount left allowed.<sup>141</sup>

The line of thought of the High commissioner was shared by the Crown Agents as well. The line was proposed and decided to be opened not before July 1905 when it would be completed as far as Nicosia. The system of management that the High Commissioner had

---

<sup>139</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Lyttleton, 18th November 1904

<sup>140</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>141</sup> After the death of William Shelford in 1905, Frederic Shelford became partners with the big-name engineer Sir Benjamin Baker.

in mind must, according to the Crown Agents, be applied to Cyprus, which would follow the example of West African Railways.<sup>142</sup>

By August 1905 the Famagusta-Nicosia line had been constructed and opened for service. The Cyprus Government was asking for a £12,000 excess of the estimated revenue surplus of £68,000, for constructing the extension of the line further to Morphou and Karavostassi. The Colonial Office tried to save the amount from being cut by the Treasury, which would use it to minimize the Grant-in-Aid to Cyprus amounting to £16,000 for the coming year. In fact, Cyprus had given that year, like every year since the Occupation, £60,000 for the Tribute. King-Harman had pushed the Colonial Office since May for this action which was, as he claimed, essential for “many necessities in the island”. He, believing only in the profitability of a long-lead railway, considered the extension of the railway further to Morphou and Karavostassi as the foremost necessity of the island:

*I further indicated that the extension of the railway might be regarded as perhaps amongst the foremost of those necessities, and I prayed in behalf of the people of this country that £10,000 might be allowed for the extension of the line and that the balance of £2000 might be devoted the augmentation of the public works vote as a set off against the debits on account of the public debt which are charged against the vote.*<sup>143</sup>

He opined that without this extension the Cyprus development trio would fall apart. The particular problem highlighted was the short distance of the line, not the price and competition from traditional modes of transport, now with better roads. These roads had been the product of the same ideology that had built the railway and harbour as well. Like the successor of Chamberlain, Secretary of State Lyttelton had sympathy towards Cypriot demands. He pressed the Treasury on behalf of King-Harman to raise funds for the needs of the island, and he had used arguments against the Tribute to achieve this end. He demanded from the Treasury the short approval note for the £12,000 for which the High Commissioner was pressing. He was of the opinion that the annual Grant-in-Aid must be raised from £19,000. Lyttelton did not consider this amount sufficient even for the ordinary works, which resulted in Cyprus borrowing from the Public Works Fund, a loan fund

---

<sup>142</sup> *ibid.*, CA to CO, 16<sup>th</sup> December 1904

<sup>143</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Lyttelton, 29th August 1905 railway

allocated for public works use. In a typical Crown Colony, he claimed, these could be paid for out of current revenue or from the accumulated surplus of previous years. However, Cyprus was burdened by the annual payments of the Tribute which sucked up the local funds of the island.<sup>144</sup> Cyprus was not permitted to acquire any amount by the Treasury, which promised Cyprus a larger Grant-in-Aid next year. The answer from the Treasury via Lyttelton to King-Harman was:

*I recognize however, that it will be desirable that the railway should be extended to Morphou, if not to Karavostassi, in order to increase the possibility of the line becoming remunerative...*

There was a 'but' in the Treasury's reply. They wanted to know about the prospects of the extension in the area.<sup>145</sup>

After revealing a miscalculation in their accounts, the Consulting Engineers informed the Cyprus Administration that there was still an unexpended amount of nearly £44,000 for the railway. It is unknown how they managed to miscalculate £44,000. This would suffice to carry the works till Morphou but not Karavostassi which would need another £18,000. In the meantime, three months of working of the railway had not been very encouraging. The monthly receipts of the Nicosia-Famagusta line averaged, in three months, to £300 as against Shelford's estimate of £18,296 per annum.<sup>146</sup> . The High Commissioner did not want to judge the prospects of the line by these estimates but he was of the opinion that railway management would need a careful policy:

*I would be content to record my opinion that, if the railway is treated liberally in the matters both of administration and maintenance and if goods rates and passenger*

---

<sup>144</sup> *ibid.*, Colonial Office to Treasury, 5th October 1905; *ibid.*, King-Harman to Lyttelton, 29th August 1905

<sup>145</sup> ... but, before considering in what way funds may be made available for an extension of the railway and what point should now be aimed at as the ultimate terminus of the line, I desire to have further information on the following points, in the light of experience gained after existing lines has been working for some months:

1) What area will be served by the railway, when carried as far as the funds at present available will permit, and what may be regarded as the probable ultimate annual receipts, If the railway is not carried beyond that point?

2) To what further area would be served if the railway were to extended a) to Morphou or b) to Karavostassi and what would be the probable ultimate additional earnings of the railway in each of these cases?"

*ibid.*, Lyttelton to King-Harman, 10th November 1905

<sup>146</sup> Annual receipt estimates from Famagusta to Morphou £22,007, + Karavostassi £1,219. Actually these estimates were based upon the canalisation of the whole trade and traffic of whole region to the railway.

*fares are fixed at popular prices, the people of Cyprus will, in due course of time, find it to their advantage to patronize the line and to use it in paying quantities. The extension of the line to Morphou which is now being proceeded with will undoubtedly give material assistance towards desirable a consummation.*<sup>147</sup>

The Consulting Engineers made some interesting comments when they were reporting on the prospects of the line. Besides the repetition of the importance of the extension to Karavostassi and request for communication with the General Manager of CGR, the Consulting Engineers also criticised the estimates of the High Commissioner. Those estimates were taken from the Shelford report of 15<sup>th</sup> June 1903, and were considered by the same Shelford theoretical work. In justification of their old work Shelford and Baker wrote to the Crown Agents:

*We may perhaps recall that at the date of the report of July 15th 1903 it was generally assumed that the island of Cyprus was about to enter a new era marked by considerable activity and progress. Famagusta had been settled upon as the future port of the island, and the entire central district was to be served by the railway traversing it and dependent upon Famagusta as a port.*<sup>148</sup>

This was an easy excuse. We then get further sense of the speculations around Cyprus development:

*Improved and more rapid communication with Egypt, and possibly direct communication with Brindisi [Italy] was under discussion; irrigation works were in progress; an hotel on a large scale at Troodos was contemplated; and the general opening up of the island to tourists, as well as to trade, was anticipated.*<sup>149</sup>

In addition to these comments upon the past, they were commenting on the present of the island. While not knowing in the most recent developments on the island, they were of the opinion that Cyprus needed much more development work:

*Postal communication is certainly now slower and more irregular than in 1903; we understand that the island can no longer be reached in five days from London, and*

---

<sup>147</sup> CO 883/6/9, HC to Earl of Elgin, 23rd January 1906

<sup>148</sup> *ibid.*, CA to CO, 20th June 1906; *ibid.*, Baker and Shelford to CA 11th June 1906

<sup>149</sup> *ibid.*

*we know that small consignments of stores destined for the railway at Famagusta have to be shipped to Larnaca and sent thence to Famagusta by road, and Famagusta is only available as a port for large consignments. Under these circumstances it is obvious that the vital condition of the development of traffic on the railway – shipping facilities – is wanting.*<sup>150</sup>

The Consulting Engineers tried to liberate themselves from any criticism. Shelford and Baker completed their estimates admittedly around mere speculations and the most optimistic expectations. They even knew about the possible competition from other modes of transportation and the user habits which had been referred to by several officials. Consequently, they again put the blame on unrealistic expectations, lack of infrastructures and local culture, thus, re-defining the problem not just politically and culturally by technically as well.

The High Commissioner prepared a report to the Colonial Office on the steps to be taken for the works of the railway. He had in his hand, the figures and the report of the General Manager and the ex-Resident Engineer, George Albert Day on the Open Line between the dates of 7<sup>th</sup> August 1905 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 1906. The High Commissioner had trust in his General Manager in the matters of the railway. Both of them were in agreement that lowering the fares and rates, as had been proven, would increase the traffic. He was the first one to suggest decreases:

*I have from time to time suggested to him that in a competition with carts, carriages, and pack animals, it would be in the interests of the railway to reduce the charges and whenever he has proposed any such reduction I have given it my prompt approval.*

They had lowered the rates, which had caused a slight increase in the traffic. He continues with a typical British stereotype of the Cypriot's so-called strong material instincts:

*I think that the General Manager is beginning to grasp the fact that the Cypriot peasant attaches little value to either comfort or to the saving of time; but that the*

---

<sup>150</sup> *ibid.*

*difference of a piastre or two in expense will at once decide him as to his means of transport.*<sup>151</sup>

The High Commissioner took measures, after Day's suggestions, to increase the traffic both on the railway and the Famagusta Harbour. Actually, the trade of Cyprus through Famagusta Harbour had been defined as the main issue so, as the means of transportation of this Harbour, the railway had a secondary but major importance. There had been arrangements with the Limassol Steamship Company – carrying mail from Egypt – so that Famagusta for 8 months of the year would have direct connection with Egypt every alternate week. King-Harman had also stipulated that freights from all parts of the island for Egypt shall be identical. He would also allow the construction of a grain storage facility at the Famagusta quay. It can be seen that the measures were targeting the mutual increase of the traffic at the railway and the harbour. The High Commissioner and General Manager (and the Consulting Engineers) were thinking of a reconsideration of the whole policy around the Harbour and the railway, naming this the 'intimate connection which must exist between the futures of the railway and the harbour'. Day was in favour of a broad policy regarding the harbour such as regulating shipping dues.<sup>152</sup> However, the general opinion was that it was too early to make a concrete policy before some time passed and the extension to Karavostassi constructed.

---

<sup>151</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Earl of Elgin, 16th august 1906; *ibid.*, Report on the working of the Open Line from 7th august 1905, to 30th June 1906 with suggestions as to means of increasing the trade on and Revenue of, the Railway

<sup>152</sup> But the matter, urgent as it is from the point of view of the railway, as well as of the harbour itself, cannot be settled without further experience and due consideration and although it may be assumed that the railway would bring cargo to the harbour if steamers were there to carry it way, it might with equal force be suggested that if the cargo were at the port steamers would come and fetch it. I should not like to express a definite opinion on the question of reducing the dues at Famagusta Harbour until the railway from Nicosia to Morphou is in full working order. " the Anglo-Egyptian Land Allotment Company, disposing all the state lands in the Messaoria in connexion with the irrigation works, was in move to build its business in Famagusta with the on-going developments at the city. *ibid.*; *ibid.*, Messrs. Baker and Shelford to CA, 22nd November 1906; *ibid.*, M.A Cameron to Colonial Office, 8th December 1906.

## **Part 3. Putting out fires with gasoline: local agendas and vested interests in the Larnaca issue**

The Larnaca branch had been abandoned by Chamberlain from the beginning. This would cause a series of complaints and discussions in Cyprus until the 1910s. During the time of these discussions, Larnaca was the centre of cultural and economic activity (import/export, foreign bank branches), embassies and foreigner settlement, and the port of the island. The best road on the island connected the capital Nicosia with Larnaca. The city was also active in politics which was, almost as a rule, occupied by petit bourgeois (generally lawyers and doctors) from both of the communities, and merchants/moneylenders.<sup>153</sup> Thus the city, or those who had invested interests in the city, had a substantial voice in the Legislative Council. We have seen that the initial schemes/ideas on railway construction on the island, generally, had the scope of connecting the capital with Larnaca, the port of the island. The immaterialised Larnaca Branch story deserves a comprehensive part in this chapter.

### **3.1 The Legislative co-operation: The Locust Fund debate**

Larnaca had been on the agenda since the first surveys and reports. However, by the time of the final decision on the railway, irrigation and harbour schemes, it was abandoned temporarily. Later on this decision would prove to be final. The Legislative Council would, from the 1890s on, bring up the subject of Larnaca in the sittings of the Council and create political agendas upon it. As I will show, in many cases the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot or Christian/Muslim divide was either vague, either breached or totally absent. Larnaca harbour and railway discussions had to do with local interests and regionalism.

By 1895 the Legislative Council's Elected Members, at the Opening Session, had expressed their opinion on the necessity of improving the internal means of transportation

---

<sup>153</sup> For more see, Κατσιαούνης, Ρολάνδος. 1996. Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century. Texts and Studies of the History of Cyprus 24. Nicosia: Κέντρο Επιστημονικών Ερευνών Κύπρου..

for which they considered the railway the best medium.<sup>154</sup> This had been repeated by the High Commissioner in 1896 when he was giving the first hints of the ‘constructive imperialism’ of Joseph Chamberlain for Cyprus. The news had come during the Opening Session of the Legislative Council in 17<sup>th</sup> February 1897, the first session of the newly Elected Members. The theme of the speech of the High Commissioner was Cyprus development and the irrigation project of Messaoria.<sup>155</sup> It was in 1898 that a hint about constructing a railway and a harbour for the island was delivered to the Elected Legislative Council Members.

*The Council has already recorded an opinion that the construction of a railway is one of the works of utility required in Cyprus: this question and that of improving the harbour accommodation at Famagusta have been receiving the careful attention of the Government, and with your cordial co-operation, I hope that at no distant date both a Railway and a Commercial Harbour may be accomplished facts.*<sup>156</sup>

This was an important period of change in Cyprus’ politics. The elections of the year 1896 had been “even if mildly, imbued with an ideological content” for the first time.<sup>157</sup> Several candidates were self-declared as nationalists and created a loosely attached front. They were two young lawyers graduated from Athens, Theophanis Theodotou (Nicosia-Kyrenia districts) and Joannis Economides (Famagusta-Larnaca) allied with the older generation nationalists such as Philios Zannetos and Joannis Kyriakides<sup>158</sup>. Nationalists claimed victory having been elected and leading the polls in their districts. However, the Greek conservatives, representatives of the traditional ruling elite, kept the majority in the Council and monopoly over the Greek posts in the Administration.

In May of the year 1898, the Government opened up the railway and harbour issue to the Legislative Council. The Chief Secretary moved a resolution that would start years of exploitation of the Locust Destruction Fund for uses other than locust destruction. The motion read as follows:

---

<sup>154</sup> CO 69/9, Fifth Session of the Third Legislative council of Cyprus, 4th March 1896

<sup>155</sup> CO 69/10, Legislative Council Minutes 1897

<sup>156</sup> CO 69/11, Opening Speech C, 16th May 1898

<sup>157</sup> These elections also witnessed a rise in the number of registered voters. Besides other factors, this also had to do with the increasing interest of poor classes into politics. Katsiaounis, 1996, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-226,

<sup>158</sup> All four were freemasons. Katsiaounis, 1996, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-226,

*The Council resolves that funds collected under the authority of Locust Destruction Expenses Ordinance 1881 to give a part of it for the “purpose of providing for the part payment of interest and of a sinking fund in connection with the expenses incurred both in the construction and maintenance of railway connecting Nicosia with Larnaca and Famagusta, and the construction for a harbour at Famagusta.”*<sup>159</sup>

Though it was the first time such a resolution was brought to the Council, the idea had originate in 1897. In a letter to Chamberlain, Sendall gave the hint that the Government had lobbied amongst the Elected Members:

*I fully consider that this railway and harbour will tend to enable us to take advantage of the monies expended and to be expended in developing the island, and in this opinion six of the Elected Members who have been sounded on this project concur, and are prepared to resolve that £2000 a year shall be taken from the Locust fund to meet the charge for interest and sinking fund.*<sup>160</sup>

The motion provoked two days of discussions. This was one of the biggest discussions in the Legislative Council on the construction of Famagusta harbour and the railway. The Chief Secretary (CS) introduced the motion as a measure to materialise projects such as the railway for which there had been, as he claimed, ‘voluminous’ correspondences between the Government and Secretary of State, but the finances were always a ‘stumbling block’. The CS was presenting figures, statistics and surveys to defend his case, which was for a railway linking Larnaca and Nicosia.<sup>161</sup> These were Larnaca-Nicosia road traffic statistics, Agricultural Board estimates of revenue for a railway, and Cunningham’s and Brown’s railway estimates and proposals. His presentation shows that the Government had no concrete project and estimates towards that end. This was indeed the case as we have seen in the previous section. The Government was choosing a secure way to pay the loan and was presenting it in the Council as a tool for convincing the Treasury. We have seen above that this was not the case, and LDF was not played as a significant card in the negotiations with the Treasury.

---

<sup>159</sup> CO 69/11 , Legislative Council Session, 26th May 1898

<sup>160</sup> CO 883/6/5, Sendall to Chamberlain, 30th December 1897

<sup>161</sup> “What was then [1896-1897] before the Government was a railroad between Larnaca and Nicosia going round by Messaoria. It was always borne in mid that there might be a branch to Famagusta and Morphou if the railway worked well.” CO 69/11, Legislative Council Session, 26th May 1898

The Locust Destruction Fund was an additional heavy burden for the people of Cyprus, and the Legislative Council had relative control over it. It was meant to be used for destroying locusts which proved to be a successful campaign. Cyprus no longer had a locust problem but the Fund was being used as a pool for different subsidies and special payments. Since it was not controlled by the British Exchequer but by the Council, the Elected Members of the Council had a say upon this policy and the policies shaped around it. And again, such a relative political influence could be used by the Elected Members both as a tool of leverage against the Government but also some level of responsibility in the eyes of their townspeople.

Such factors forced the Chief Secretary (CS) to present many details in order to back up his case. Otherwise, it would, as it eventually did anyway, provoke annoyance and grievance amongst the Elected Members and the general public. The proposed amendment law was asking for £2,500 per annum from the Fund, which would also be spent on the working expenses of these schemes. The CS was demanding the consent of the Elected Members, threatening that the rejection of the Law would lower the amount for the mail steamer subsidies. The High Commissioner approached the matter with some sincerity. For him the question which must be answered was how they were going to find an amount that would pay for a loan of a quarter of a million pounds for the three projects. It was, as he stated, important to get the Grant on the most favourable terms. If the Elected Members passed this Law, Walter Sendall claimed, then this would strengthen the hands of the Government in front of the Imperial Parliament which had not yet given a decision on the Grant. As far as the railway line was concerned, the Government's position was very superficial. Commenting on the railway line, Sendall said:

*The particular line which the railway would take was a matter which could not be definitely settled at the moment. The three points of Nicosia, Larnaca and Famagusta were definitely settled; but what would be the most economical line to take for joining them would have to be determined by the Engineers.*<sup>162</sup>

The Bishop of Kitium was the first of the Elected Members to speak, and he opposed the Law. He was not against the provision of a harbour and railway but he opposed financing

---

<sup>162</sup> *ibid.*

them with the Locust Fund. His opposition contained resentment and irony towards the Administration. He stated that the confidence which existed between the Government and Elected Members had long been on the wane, and pointed out that the Tax was intended to continue so long as it was necessary for the destruction of locusts. His words were echoing the political atmosphere of these years of political and social crisis. The Bishop of Kitium, known as Kyrillos Papadopoulos, was an active politician and a 'violent' enosist. He had made fame with his fierce opposition to the British Administration and the violent speeches made against the Government.<sup>163</sup> He was to be a central figure in the coming years during the Archbishopal issue which dominated Greek Cypriot politics for nearly a decade ( He would eventually become the next Archbishop). Supported whole-heartedly by the poorer classes of Limassol and Larnaca, his populism owed much to his favouritism to the reduction of taxes.<sup>164</sup>

Moreover, the Fund had been assigned, as he claimed, by law to a far more beneficial purpose than the construction of a railway, i.e. the establishment of an Agricultural Bank. According to the Bishop, in other countries, Governments were covering the expenses of public utility works from their own treasuries "and not out of the treasuries of the poverty stricken people *whom they rule [italics added]*".<sup>165</sup> He was implicitly merging two themes that he was well known for exploiting: opposition to the Government and populism against taxation. S. Frangoudes, taking the turn from the Bishop of Kitium, showed a selective opposition. He was to vote for funding the railway but not the harbour because the harbour, in his opinion, should be constructed at the expense of the Treasury of the Imperial Government, who might someday make use of it for the purpose of harbouring her ships of war. Frangoudes was also a Hellenist but he was also a wine merchant and a Board member of the Ottoman Bank in Limassol. Provided it was for trade purposes he had no objection to the resolution.

Dervish Pasha and Pascal Constantinides were also for the resolution without being enthusiastic about exploiting the LDF. Constantinides fully supported the railway scheme. He stated it was the "dream of the inhabitants of the island to see their village traversed by

---

<sup>163</sup> Hill, 2010, *op. cit.*, pp. 577-578

<sup>164</sup> Hill, 2010, *op. cit.*, pp. 587

<sup>165</sup> CO 69/11, Legislative Council Sessions, 26th May 1898.

a railway” and a “desire shared by all classes in general”. Profoundly pragmatist, Constantinides wanted to get started with the construction of a line wherever possible which would probably result in the construction of more lines in the future. It was important to get started and the rest would follow. His line of thought suggested that at the end of the day, the lines would be the property of the island despite the present British administration. While Cypriots would be gaining railways, on the other hand, he thought, the British would gain something more important; trust. He said explicitly:

*Moreover, the expenditure of large sums of English money would sweep away once for all the rumours which from time to time were circulated that England intended to abandon the island.*<sup>166</sup>

He saw this as an opportunity to consolidate the trust of the people to the British Administration. Constantinides was therefore, apparently, not from the faction of the Bishop of Kitium but from the opposite faction. These people, who would later be called *Kyreniaki* during the Archiepiscopal Question, represented the conservative camp of the Greek Cypriot political elite. They were pro-British and thought that the secular leaders must try to improve the material conditions of the people, through a politics of co-operation. For them, Cypriot Christians were identified by their Orthodoxy but not by their Greekness.<sup>167</sup> His above intervention in the railway matter fitted perfectly with his political stance. It must be added that he was also a ‘considerable money-lender’.<sup>168</sup>

Dervis Pasha was a merchant who was acquiring nationalist sentiments and would be at odds with the Cypriot Moslem pro-British elite in the coming years, during the Evkaf Issue of the 1900s. Together with the Bishop of Kitium, he would challenge the traditional social, political and cultural structures of Cyprus society.<sup>169</sup> He had a newspaper and was employing writers critical to the colonial Government and Sultan. However, here, on this matter he had nothing to oppose the British.

---

<sup>166</sup> He also wanted the following appropriation: “The amount of 2,500 would be voted for the construction of both railway and harbour and if any part of these conditions were not carried out by the Government the people of Cyprus would consider themselves freed from all obligation.” *ibid.*

<sup>167</sup> Varnava, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

<sup>168</sup> Κατσιαούνης, 1996, *op. cit.*, pp.107-108

<sup>169</sup> Varnava, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183

He was followed by Jassonides who welcomed the railway construction as “one of the most important public wants, provided that the line which the railway took connected the remotest with the most central parts of the island, that the chief ports of the island were connected and the traffic of the island were thereby increased”. Unlike Constantinides, for him the route of the line mattered and it should not prejudice Larnaca which would be injured by the construction of Famagusta harbour. Thus Larnaca had to be made a “free port” and connected to the railway simultaneously with Famagusta.

The new nationalist lawyers Theodotou and Economides were more optimistic than the pro-British Constantinides; Theodotou even suggested that £2,500 from the Fund would supersede the amount earned by stimulating trade in the island. For Economides, it was incompatible with the duty of the Members of the Council to “throw obstacles in the way of their accomplishment [harbour and railway]”. They were looking from a ‘trade’ point of view and not from political ideological perspectives. It must be noted that there were also discussions on devoting the money of LDF to establish an Agricultural Bank.<sup>170</sup> Consequently only the Bishop of Kitium considered that the Fund must be used for establishing an Agricultural Bank, which must have been to the distaste of many Elected Members who also happened to be money-lenders. Hill presents the establishment of the Agricultural Bank and the Co-operative societies as an end to money-lending and usurers, and also to the decrease of litigation.

Vondiziano and Liassides announced their support for the resolution briefly, and the voting continued. Achilleas Liassides was also a pro-British Member. He and Constantinides were even appointed as members of the Executive Council, a closed advisory council for the Government, which became a part of the Government in 1895. H. Bulwer, the High Commissioner of the time, had even described them as moderate and sensible persons. He was a defender of Nicosia merchants, vindictive against the poor, tax-friendly and highly unpopular amongst the lower classes.<sup>171</sup> The Resolution passed with 14 for and 3 against

---

<sup>170</sup> The Agricultural Bank issue was a long discussed matter which was supposed to modernize the agricultural financial system and slow down the increasing rural indebtedness caused by usurers, money-lenders and efficient taxations.

<sup>171</sup> Katsiaounis, Rolandos, 1996, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the second half of the nineteenth century*, PhD, University of London, p.371

which came from Ramadan Effendi, Frangoudes and the Bishop of Kitium.<sup>172</sup> Thus, the nationalists were siding with the conservatives to burden people with more taxation. They were a priori accepting also the burden of a loan by the colonial Administration. Except for the Bishop of Kitium, trade interests seemed to be overwhelmingly nationalist and anti-British politics.

### 3.2 The Omission of the Larnaca branch: catastrophology or who is going to be ruined

While the policy towards the railway and harbour schemes' was assuming its final shape – Chamberlain was excluding the Larnaca from the railway scheme (see above 28<sup>th</sup> July 1899) – the Legislative Council was quiet. In his Opening Speech at the Third Session of the Fourth Legislative Council of 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1899, High Commissioner Haynes Smith, drew an optimistic picture of the country's matters without going into detail on the projects. The harvest was good; revenue was well and in excess of estimates; a part of the irrigation works had been completed; the government was extending further the mileage of the public roads to 600 miles; engineers were working on surveys and plans for the Famagusta harbour, and a railway connecting Nicosia with Larnaca and Famagusta.<sup>173</sup> The railway was out of discussions until 1900, when Cyprus had already been given £314,000 in loan from the Colonial Development Loans.

However, by 1900, Larnaca had been omitted from the Locust Destruction Fund Appropriation Law 1898, the fund for the loan payments of railway and harbour schemes. Besides that a new Law was voted to allocate funds (for the working expenses and sinking fund of this branch) from a special tax burdening only Larnaca when a railway branch line was to be constructed for the town. Petitions started to flow from Larnaca protesting at the exclusion of the city from the railway system.<sup>174</sup> During the summer of 1900, a long debate opened on the issue in the Legislative Council. Liassides asked to send a letter to

---

<sup>172</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>173</sup> CO 69/12, Legislative Council Sessions 1899

<sup>174</sup> CO 69/13, Legislative Council Session, 7th March 1900

Chamberlain explaining the arguments in favour of the inclusion of Larnaca in the railway scheme. The Government asked for amendments to the Law, but some Elected Members wanted to postpone any decision before they resolved the Larnaca issue. They had in mind a joint action of the interested Elected Members and a postponement would give them the time to prepare a well-rounded proposal.

High Commissioner Haynes Smith favoured such an initiative. He was aware of the genuine grievances, particularly from the Tribute,<sup>175</sup> and that there were social/political tensions building. This period had been preceded only a few months earlier by the death of the Archbishop Sophronios, and thus the start of the Archiepiscopal Question. Enosists, the *Kytiaki*, as part of their propaganda, would be constantly blaming the Administration for the poverty of the people and proposing enosis as a remedy. Besides Larnaca there was a matter that could unite trade – national interests in Moslems and Christians alike.

The amendment of the Law would make it easier for the Government to spend money on the railway between Famagusta and Nicosia, and the Famagusta harbour. The High Commissioner was positive but other Elected Members had different ideas. Frangoudes, one of the three members who opposed the Law of 1898, repeated his opinion on the railway more explicitly. Frangoudes now sounded more like a nationalist. For him, the sum from LDF was disproportionate to the resources of the country which was being burdened by an item of luxury, a railway, but not of necessity. In his opinion, carts would be cheaper as a means of transportation. He opposed the whole Bill, as he did previously, and not just the resolution demanding the inclusion of Larnaca. Like many leading nationalists Frangoudes too had his trade interests, in Limassol. He did not want to pay for the Famagusta Harbour which would, according to him, benefit only Famagusta. He saw no financial benefit from these schemes; if Famagusta wanted the harbour, it had to pay the expenses itself. The other strong voice of the opposition, the punctual Bishop of Kitium (BoK), voiced the argument that would be repeated continuously by those who would act for a railway branch to Larnaca. Familiar to the terminology as a bishop, he was using ‘catastrophology’:

---

<sup>175</sup> Varnava, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 181

*The Government had shown itself very superficial when it made so large an underestimate of the works. The law of 1898 had been passed by the Council on the condition that Larnaca would be connected to the railway line; if the present Bill was passed it would be condemning the town of Larnaca to everlasting ruin.*<sup>176</sup>

To avoid the “everlasting ruin” of Larnaca, the Bill, thus the railway and harbour projects, should be rejected as a whole. Larnaca was where his base lay and now he had to take care of it carefully, as the Archbishopric throne was becoming a near possibility. However, the Bishop of Kitium, like his successor Hafiz Effendi, wanted to postpone the matter. Hafiz Efendi’s arguments had more realism than BoK but were overlapping in general:

*[Hadji Hafiz Efendi] was afraid that the decision of the SoS was an insurmountable barrier to anything being done especially as the sum which Cyprus was able to borrow was laid down in the Colonial Loans Act. Representations to the SoS would be an avail and his reply no doubt would be that the Treasury had no power to lend more than the Act permitted.*

He, too, was using catastrophology:

*This Bill if passed would condemn the town of Larnaca to ruin. Rather than do this he would prefer to vote against the Bill. He thought however that the best plan would be to postpone the matter.*<sup>177</sup>

Hafiz Efendi was no pro-British Member but his stance at the time was milder. He was the headmaster of the highest Turkishcyriot education institution, a Mufti and Member of the Council several times. He was considered to have failed to take a leading role in Turkish nationalist circles. He was not to be called a trustworthy person by the British officialdom, having voted against it several times. As a member of the political elite of the period-he was rich- involved closely in money making- and influential.<sup>178</sup> These two influential anti-British, or not pro-British, Members were asking for postponement, a decision seems to had been taken beforehand unanimously.

---

<sup>176</sup> CO 69/13, Legislative Council Session, 28th June 1900

<sup>177</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>178</sup> Nevzat, Altay. 2005. *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*. Oulu University Press, p.123,213-214

The matter was postponed to be re-opened in November and in the meanwhile Haynes Smith emphasised the importance of the matter to his Secretary of State. The postponement would give time for the Members to lobby and prepare a proposal, and Haynes Smith would push Chamberlain's attention towards the demand. Chamberlain had already been informed about the reactions concerning the exclusion of Larnaca. The High Commissioner was now informing him again that the Elected Members would pass the amendment, but they desired the inclusion of Larnaca. Elected Members even sent a representative to Chamberlain offering special and local taxes in order to fund the Larnaca branch.<sup>179</sup> They would return to Chamberlain in few months with a more elaborate memorandum. Haynes Smith wanted to satisfy the complaints of the Elected Members without diverging from the policy of Chamberlain. He explained that neither the Turkish nor Greek elected Members were willing to pass a bill that would omit Larnaca which they believed:

*...[that]the omission would ruin the townspeople and merchants of Larnaca and they shrink from taking any action, as they say, will "kill" Larnaca although they are prepared to raise further funds if the original scheme can be carried out.*<sup>180</sup>

In this matter there were two classes in Larnaca: townspeople and merchants. Trade interests around Larnaca had been organised, all Elected Members were united, and the Government, which supported the case in principle, had to give answers to them. Haynes Smith also passed Chamberlain a petition written by the Mayor of Larnaca and Elected Member of the Legislative Council, the infamous lawyer and politician Nikolaos Rossos, who was praying for a branch to the city. The petition, addressed to Queen Victoria, had been written in September 1899 but had been deliberately delayed by the High Commissioner Haynes Smith. As he told Chamberlain, he had done so pending the debates on the amendment of the Locust Fund Bill after the instruction of Chamberlain. The latter had asked to enact the law in order to permit the use of money allocated from LDF for separate parts of the schemes and not only for the whole. This meant that the money could be used only for the railway line Nicosia-Famagusta, without taking into consideration the part of the Law which included the branch of Larnaca. With this move, the power of Legislative

---

<sup>179</sup> CO 883/6/5, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 11th August 1900

<sup>180</sup> *ibid.*

Council's annoyed Elected Members who could block the schemes of railway and harbour by vetoing the use of LDF had been overcome.<sup>181</sup> Haynes Smith's final tactic was to make the amendment only for the Famagusta Harbour for which the Elected Members would not disagree.

In the petition, Mayor N. Rossos was using the same catastrophology that had been voiced in the Legislative Council. The theory of this catastrophology considered that, Rossos wrote explicitly, the exclusion of Larnaca from the railway scheme and constructing the railway exclusively between Nicosia and Famagusta would divert all the import and export now carried on between Nicosia and Larnaca to the harbour of Famagusta, and "to cause not only the decline, but even the ruin of the town of Larnaca".<sup>182</sup> The words of Rossos below frame, in general, the borders of the discourse of Larnaca's exclusion from the railway scheme:

*That the town of Larnaca was prospering under the Venetians and served under the Turkish rule as the principal commercial port of the island, and continue to do so up to the present day; under these conditions all our townspeople, native and foreign, have invested very considerable amounts of money, and many of them all their fortunes in the acquisition of immovable and while contributing to and paying the Locust Destruction Fund will be liable to be entirely ruined, if Larnaca is for the present excluded from the projected line of railway, to the exclusive advantage of Famagusta.*<sup>183</sup>

Nikolaos Rossos represented multiple classes. He was a lawyer, Elected Member and Mayor of Larnaca and the person with the longest service at his post. He was a member of the petit bourgeoisie, lawyer-merchant-money lender class. He was also well connected with the foreigners as well. He would serve for a period as Honorary Consul of the Austria-Hungary Empire. His 20-years long stay at the Municipality indicates the mass support of his personality; he had also made populist gestures such as donating his whole salary to the Municipality during his entire service. He told Chamberlain that the city of Larnaca felt

---

<sup>181</sup> *ibid.*, Chamberlain to Haynes Smith, 14th December 1899; *ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 8th August 1900

<sup>182</sup> *ibid.*, President and Municipal Council of Larnaca, N. Rossos to Victoria the Queen, 1st September 1899

<sup>183</sup> *ibid.*

threatened by his scheme; Larnaca had centuries-old, foreign and local, vested financial interests in the form of trade and property. He also added that the general public would not be sympathetic to being burdened with the LDF. He was not challenging the Government's schemes but presenting a compromise which would be paid by all Larnacans, poor and rich alike. A possible extra immovable property tax would even help the money-lender class which for years kept the property prices low to maximise their benefits from expropriations.<sup>184</sup> He expressed that they were not against the project but such an exclusive measure would work to the detriment and ruin of the town "not as a result of a regular and natural course of events but through the pressure and deliberate action of the Executive Power"<sup>185</sup>. This was how the matter would be seen and used in an atmosphere with an increasing nationalist rhetoric: the blame would be put solely on the colonial Government.

### 3.3 Re-appropriating the Cyprus development policy: why the sympathy?

Chamberlain sympathised with those who wished for Larnaca to be included. He did not want to create a crisis that could gather all the political elites of the island against his schemes, to which he gave so much personal interest. This would interrupt the policy of loans for Cyprus. On Chamberlain's orders, the Colonial Office told the Treasury the difficulty of excluding the city altogether from the proposed scheme. Chamberlain asked to be advised by the Treasury on the matter to avoid "the great loss and hardship to the inhabitants which would result from the transfer of the bulk trade to Famagusta".<sup>186</sup>

The Colonial Office's, or Chamberlain's, opinion was that the present shape of the scheme was in the best interests of the island. Chamberlain would not allow the expense to fall on the General Revenue, in other words to the British Exchequer as well, from the charge of the extension to Larnaca (estimated by Pritchard to be approximately £47,000). However, Chamberlain would be glad to approve it readily if some money could be found by

---

<sup>184</sup> For relations of money-lending, politics and rural crisis see Chapter 5 in Κατσιαούνης, Ρολάνδος. 1996. *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century. Texts and Studies of the History of Cyprus* 24. Nicosia: Κέντρο Επιστημονικών Ερευνών Κύπρου.

<sup>185</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>186</sup> *ibid.*, Colonial Office to Treasury, 5th October 1900

means of a local tax supplemented by a contribution from the Locust Fund or other sources under the control of local legislature.<sup>187</sup> In his reply letter to Haynes Smith, the policy towards the issue had been pretty much decided. Any amount required for Larnaca, which was not included in the £314,000, presupposed the authorisation of the House of Commons, where it would be impossible to open a discussion on it. Constructive imperialism was considered neither popular nor apparently successful. Chamberlain, in agreement with the High Commissioner's proposal, approved the amendment just for the Famagusta harbour for the time being. As for the Larnaca, a further loan for any extension would depend on proposals that secured the interest and sinking fund from special sources, additional local taxes other than the general revenue, which was under the control of the British Treasury. The Bill had been amended in December 1900 for funding the works at Famagusta Harbour.<sup>188</sup>

### 3.4 LDF Law amendment debate: the railway that leads to harbour improvements

Returning to the Legislative Council, the matter was reopened in November of 1900. The first proposal was the appointment of a Select committee of Elected Members to examine the Bill and a committee of Gentlemen appointed by the people of Larnaca to submit a memorandum to Chamberlain via the High Commissioner. The proposal was agreed unanimously, by all Elected Greekcypriot and Turkishcypriot members, indicating that the proposal had been agreed beforehand between the Elected Members.<sup>189</sup> This was neither a communal nor a national matter but concerned vested class interests. In the coming day's sessions, the discussions centred around the Larnaca branch and the latest letter from Chamberlain (see 19<sup>th</sup> October 1900, Chamberlain to Haynes Smith) to the Council. The Cypriot opposition was now discussing the terms set by Chamberlain. By making this compromise, the Elected Members could have the leverage to negotiate with

---

<sup>187</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>188</sup> *ibid.*, Chamberlain to Haynes Smith, 19th October 1900; *ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 12th December 1900

<sup>189</sup> CO 69/13, Legislative Council Session, 22rd November 1900

Chamberlain. It was also a success since there was now a new prospect for the interests in Larnaca.

The opposing Elected Members habitually relied on the language of catastrophology. Additionally, Members were talking in terms of rivalry and favouritism for one city at the expense of another. P. Constantinides would say that Larnaca should not be “sacrificed” for the “sake” of Famagusta”.<sup>190</sup> The rivalry between Larnaca and Famagusta in the eyes of the Larnacans would appear even in the 1950s, again over infrastructural development.

In the sessions during late November and early December 1900, the opposition said many things but, as we understand in the end, demanded one thing – provision for the Larnaca branch. That was clear in the session of 27<sup>th</sup> November when P. Constantinides spoke in the name of the rest of the Elected Members. As the most pro-British Member he was the best choice for representing everyone, while negotiating with the Government. He asked to learn the estimates for a Larnaca branch in order to see what measures could be taken to satisfy the terms of Chamberlain.<sup>191</sup> In these debates, the High Commissioner kept a moderate and conciliatory stance towards the Elected Members in order to pass the Amendments. What the Elected Members did not know was that the High Commissioner had agreed with the strategy of Chamberlain to pass the Amendments in the first instance without giving any concrete decision on the Larnaca issue with which they, the High Commissioner and Chamberlain, had a limited sympathy. He tried, and succeeded in the end, to push the Elected Members to have concrete and written proposals on Larnaca so they could be used by him and Chamberlain for reaching a common solution.

Constantinides had prepared proposals for the matter, which indicated that the Elected Members had done preliminary preparations. Bishop of Kitium was the only one to speak after Constantinides; he proposed to enact a law to tax the revenue of Famagusta

---

<sup>190</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>191</sup>” The elected members were prepared to meet, he continues, the views of the SoS to a certain extent but they first wished to hear what would be the amount of the money to be provided and the amount of the interest and Sinking fund to be so provided, because it was only when the figures were before the council that the elected members would be able to say how far they would be able to meet the SoS’s wishes”. Chief Secretary’s answer was the estimate from Prastio to Larnaca branch. This estimate was £47,000 for the 24 miles; working expenses 2,080 with train running each way. Interest at %3 ½ making 1,918 and total 4,700 for one train only.”

*ibid.*, Legislative Council Session, 27th November 1900

port to create extra funds for Larnaca branch. Despite his moderation, the High Commissioner could not allow any change and discussion around Famagusta: it had become dogma of Cyprus development policy. He threatened abandoning the idea altogether as a method to curb sharp edges like the Bishop of Kitium. It proved that Elected Members really wanted something to be done in favour of Larnaca; eventually they let Famagusta alone.

The disagreement over the Amendments on the Bill and Chamberlain's proposal for the finances of the Larnaca branch was simple. With the Amendment, the LDF would be responsible for the deficit in the working of the Nicosia-Famagusta line, and as for the Larnaca branch, the Government was asking security for the whole expense of its construction. Economides put it simply that "the whole burden" would be passed onto LDF while the Government and British Exchequer was freeing itself from responsibility of any deficit on the workings of the railway.<sup>192</sup> The latter suited London since the Cyprus revenue was under Treasury control but LDF was controlled almost entirely by the Legislative Council. Economides put it plainly:

*...the Council should abide the enactment of 1898, and the Government should not seek to obtain anything more out of the poor Cypriot. The Secretary of State was making every effort to protect the public revenue and following his example the Elected Members intend to protect the Locust fund which was under the immediate control of the Council.*<sup>193</sup>

Though the Elected Members had accepted the terms of Chamberlain, this did not mean they would stop criticising the Administration. Nationalists were trying to make Britain liable for the expenses. Economides was proposing to limit the whole liability of LDF to 35% for the payment of interest and sinking fund but in return the fund should not be made responsible for the payment of the working expenses. Theodotou was in agreement with Economides. He was in favour of leaving a proportion of the general revenue aside in order "to prevent Larnaca from destruction". For him, it was totally unfair that Famagusta was the object of so much favour whilst Larnaca was overlooked. Jassonides agreed with the latter. Economides was supported by Hadji Dervish Pasha who considered the railway of more

---

<sup>192</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>193</sup> *ibid.*, Legislative Council Session, 29th November 1900

benefit than the harbour.<sup>194</sup> From the Government's side the Receiver-General was defending their amendments that he would do anything to prevent "a scheme being wrecked which was so much for the benefit of the country". He was arguing that the Government was exposed to risk under the current proposals; he considered the terms stated in the Law of 1898 less 'harmful'.<sup>195</sup>

In the next two sessions of the Council, the effort of Elected Members to gain a provision for the Larnaca branch was the main focus. The Bishop of Kitium disagreed that the LDF should also pay for working expenses. In essence what he did was regionalism. He first argued that it was the duty of the Council to protect the LDF but, then, he changed his target. He asked, as an exchange for the Bill, the funds for the districts of Nicosia and Famagusta Public works, to be channelled to other districts in order to counterbalance the injustice. The High Commissioner reminded the Council that this discussion was delaying the schemes for which the Imperial Treasury lent a quarter of million pounds in terms "which many Colonies would be glad to jump at".<sup>196</sup> The Bishop of Kitium reminded him that the Government should be grateful for this Fund for so often coming to the aid of the Government.

Liassides took the side of the Government. Even Frangoudes, who was rejecting totally the schemes of Famagusta Harbour and Railway, stated that he would not oppose in the face of unanimity and, he really wished these works to be carried out. He claimed that this was the wish expressed by the District of Nicosia. However he would like to see a provision to be made by the Government for a branch between Larnaca and Prastio. Vondiziano, agreeing with Frangoudes, informed us that representatives of Larnaca had

---

<sup>194</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>195</sup> "One of the objections taken by the Economides was that a possible loss on the working expenses should be taken in to account. The possibility of the deficit on working expenses being taken into account making any difference was very remote. The expense required for payment of interest and sinking fund in 50 years was 10,000 and 36 ½ % on this sum made 3,050 and the government only asked the council to contribute 2,500. The Government hoped that it would be able to dispose of certain other sources of revenue to lighten the burden on the railway fund and the Government being willing to devote any extra revenue from tithe accruing through the irrigation works to the payment of the railway loan. If the Government wished, it could undertake such a work without losing a penny over it by making economies elsewhere. Unless the railway was a moderate success the LDF would have to pay the 2,500 but HMG would be responsible for the remaining sum of 7,500, so that the Government undertook much more risk than the Locust fund. This railway was an experimental one and if successful would probably be extended for the benefit of the whole island. The extreme limit of the risk assumed by the Council under the present bill was no larger than the assumed in 1898, whilst the extreme risk assumed by HMG was much larger than which it had assumed in 1898." *ibid.*

<sup>196</sup> *ibid.*, Legislative Council Session, 3rd December 1900

earlier visited Nicosia with proposals for finding the necessary funds for Larnaca.<sup>197</sup> The Larnaca and Nicosia elites were united in finding a solution against the possible competition that, they thought, the railway and the harbour would create in Famagusta.

Finally the Bill was amended: the Nicosia-Larnaca railway was omitted from the Law; limitation of 36 ½ % on the deficit was abandoned, giving the High Commissioner the power to draw money for the working expense deficits; and the class of harbour of Famagusta restricted to a commercial harbour only.<sup>198</sup> The latter was to avoid any criticism of the possible future imperial use of the harbour. The High Commissioner was expressing the pressure he was exposed to by the Elected Members, through various petitions and deputies, but he was satisfied to convince the Council of a separate Bill concerning the Larnaca Railway. Besides the Amendment Bill, Elected Members voted unanimously a Bill “to provide funds for the payment of interest and sinking fund on a proposed loan for the construction of a railway between towns of Larnaca and Nicosia and for meeting a possible annual deficit on working the same”. This was intended to satisfy Chamberlain by proposing special taxes and funds, like additional property tax in Larnaca and the *Locust Destruction Fund*, which they had opposed so much. The High Commissioner’s opinion on the law was optimistic. He was happy that Chamberlain’s terms were satisfied by guaranteeing that the island got the larger share of the risk on the whole undertaking. Besides Haynes Smith was supporting the scheme:

*I would however, convey to you the earnest and respectful desire of the inhabitants of the island that the railway should be constructed so as to connect the three towns. ... and that the work should be carried out as one undertaking...*<sup>199</sup>

He supported the Larnaca Branch because he was now facing a united Legislative Council supported by the most influential people and their patronage alike:

---

<sup>197</sup> Before the session was being adjourned Constantinides presented his proposal: £1500 from LDF and £450 imposed on Verghi tax of Larnaca which would cover the interest and sinking fund; £2,900 remaining working expenses. The proposal from Larnaca foresaw that after deducting the receipts the deficit should be raised by an additional charge on the Verghi and other taxes of the town and district of Larnaca. It also added that remote villages would not pay as much as the town. Town would pay £450 per thousand and the remainder only would be paid by the rest of the district and town. On the other hand Theodotou wanted to know if capitalists would be allowed to undertake the work. *ibid.*

<sup>198</sup> CO 883/6/5, Report upon a Law “To amend the Locust Destruction Fund Part Appropriation Law, 1898” by Tho. W. Haycraft Acting Queens Advocate, 10<sup>th</sup> December 1900

<sup>199</sup> *ibid.*

*...The recitals in the preamble to the Bill that it is the general wish of the inhabitants of the Island that the railway connection with Larnaca should be made, and that they believe it would be for the benefit of the Island state accurately, I think, the general and anxious feeling on the subject.*<sup>200</sup>

These would not help with the realisation of the Larnacan demand for a railway but would evolve into a scheme for harbour improvements.

### 3.5 Alternatives to avoid another crisis

In the meantime, Receiver General of Cyprus, A. M Ashmore, wrote a report on the proposed lines of railway in Cyprus. For the Famagusta-Nicosia branch, he generally repeated the same arguments that we have seen up to now. However, his ideas on Larnaca would influence the opinion in the Colonial Office on the matter. This opinion was being shared by many, including Chamberlain, but now it had also a technocratic base.

Ashmore,<sup>201</sup> speaking as an economist well versed in the language of the British Treasury, put it in terms of the Cyprus development dogma:

*It would be pity to allow the Government of Cyprus in the supposed interest of the town of Larnaca to make away in a fit of misguided philanthropy with this chance of financial success and to spend £50,000 extra whether their own money or other people's with the certain result that it will render the first expenditure of £250,000 from a revenue point of view, unproductive.*<sup>202</sup>

Ashmore had had a long and successful career with experience in several colonial posts. Upon his report Chamberlain jumped directly to the conclusion that there would be no Larnaca branch. He doubted if, after the Ashmore report, any proposal could justify the

---

<sup>200</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>201</sup> Alexander Murray Ashmore was a careerist colonial civil servant. He died as Lieutenant Governor of Ceylon where he had started his services. He worked as a Police Magistrate, Ceylon Government Agent, and Assistant to Colonial Secretary till he was appointed as acting Colonial Secretary in Gold Coast. In 1894 he went to Cyprus as Receiver General which he exchanged for Acting Chief Secretary for some periods. Ashmore would be appointed in April 1901 as the Government Secretary of the Colony of British Guiana. Wright, Arnold. 1907. Twentieth Century Impressions of Ceylon: Its History, People, Commerce, Industries, and Resources. Asian Educational Services, p.94

<sup>202</sup>CO 883/6/5, Ashmore to Colonial Office, 24th January 1901

British Government to give more loans to build the branch.<sup>203</sup> However, this did not mean that he gave up on Larnaca. Chamberlain had close interest in satisfying the inhabitants of the whole island and not just one region, in some way or the other. He really did not wish to provoke any grievance coming from the region. Chamberlain wanted to show the benefits of the Administration to Cypriots and British alike, and prove his developmental policy. The first thing he did after his decision was to ask if there were any protests either from inhabitants of the district who would be required to contribute to the cost of the railway and would themselves derive little or no benefit from its construction or from any other bodies or persons. He was clear in his policy towards Larnaca:

*It appears certain that the branch railway [to Larnaca] will be unrenumarative and will seriously impair the success of the Famagusta line and in these circumstances though I am anxious to meet the wishes of the inhabitants of the Island as far as possible, the expenditure seems very improvident and inexpedient.*<sup>204</sup>

The High Commissioner Haynes Smith still believed that Cyprus needed the Larnaca branch.<sup>205</sup> When the offer for the Ismailia Railways was made, his first reaction was enthusiastic. Haynes Smith and his advisors were of the opinion that without a long lead railway, the scheme would not be a success, at least financially. For Haynes Smith a line only between Famagusta and Nicosia would serve a limited region whilst other examples from the Middle East were proving the success of long-ranged railways. He had long reports on the Damascus-Beirut Railway which could not compete with pack animals. The High Commissioner was also talking to experts in the region.

One of those was Sir William Garstin who was somewhat legendary in Egypt. He had worked as under-secretary of Egypt's public works department (until 1904) and director of the Suez Canal Company, and helped to plan and build the first Aswan Dam. He had vast engineering experience and knowledge in Egypt while he also enjoyed the sympathy of the

---

<sup>203</sup> *ibid.*, Chamberlain to Haynes Smith, 4th April 1901

<sup>204</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>205</sup> By June 1901 the policy towards the expenditure of the Loans was consolidated in a Colonial Office memorandum. In the memorandum it is stated that the loan was only for the Famagusta-Nicosia line. It added that there was a considerable "agitation" in favour of a branch line to Larnaca for which Chamberlain had promised favourable consideration. It continued that this scheme was abandoned for the time being since the proposals for securing funds coming from Cyprus were not yet satisfactory, and as the report of late Receiver General Ashmore stated it was considered to be a failure and danger to success of Famagusta. CO 67/129

local people as well.<sup>206</sup> Deriving from his Egyptian experience, Garstin suggested a long-lead railway to keep the prices low in order to out-compete camels and donkeys which, Gastrin claimed, were difficult to oust after having been a means of transportation for centuries. The High Commissioner considered that the 1898 Railway Law could be extended for a longer route with “eager consent”. In The High Commissioner’s calculations a long-lead railway including many branches like Larnaca would heal many sores:

*...Such a railway [longer-lead] would also get rid of the sore grievance felt by the town and district of Larnaca at the proposal to leave them out of the railway system, yet oblige them to pay a portion of the loss through the Locust Destruction taxes. Above all, it would save the heavy annual loss which must occur on the working of a line connecting only Famagusta and Nicosia.*<sup>207</sup>

From The High Commissioner’s arguments two things come forward. Firstly, there was a serious expectation that, at least for the first years, the Famagusta-Nicosia line would not have sufficient traffic to pay for the working expenses, interest and sinking fund. Beirut-Damascus Railways and Egyptian experience together with the reports of Acting Receiver General Collet and Director of Public Works Bellamy were pointing out such an outcome which the High Commissioner believed. The other issue was the Legislative Council. Haynes Smith considered that a single line, as well as financial issues, would have political consequences:

*... [construction of a single line is] a constant source of annoyance and of friction between the local Legislative Council and the Island and Home Government, for the Legislative Council will constantly resent the Locust Fund and the Public Works Vote being appropriated to pay deficits on an unrenumarative railway, which would serve very few interests.*<sup>208</sup>

In the end, Larnaca’s reaction in relation to her exclusion from the railway scheme was not actually about the railway itself. What made the Larnacan interests feel threatened was the construction of the Famagusta harbour which would not just be the most

---

<sup>206</sup>See Goldschmidt, Arthur. 2002. Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt, Lynne Rienner Publishers

<sup>207</sup> CO 883/6/5, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 12th August 1902

<sup>208</sup> *ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 10th December 1902

developed harbour but it would also be served by a railway. Centuries of trade interests invested in Larnaca were, for the first time feeling the possibility of a competition coming from another city. Larnaca harbour's situation was known to be highly disadvantaged; British officers of different circles had the tradition to name it as "an open roadstead". It lacked basic facilities and security measures which frequently resulted in deaths, injuries and damage to cargo. These are the subject of the next chapter. The point here is that railway demand from Larnaca, with all the tension in the Legislative Council, was canalised or evolved into demand for harbour improvements. This would ease also the hand of the High Commissioner as well.

Basic improvements of security and operation in the main harbour of the island, in sight of the low expectations from the irrigation and railway, were easier to negotiate and support. Despite High Commissioner's belief that a long-lead railway would promise financial success, the Colonial Office and Treasury were not convinced. There was also the dogma of Famagusta to contend with. Even Chamberlain, with all his positive activity about Cyprus development schemes, had second thoughts, even doubts. Consequently, the High Commissioner could take the pressure off the central politics and present a positive constructive policy. The new Legislative Council elected in late 1901 was compromised of only nationalists, *Kytiaki*, Greek Cypriots; the Archiepiscopal Question had made enosis part of the common rhetoric for both factions. In this way, the ruling local class, unified around financial self-interest, would be satisfied and a development scheme presented to the people of this second large city too. Larnaca harbour improvements provided the stepping stone for the High Commissioner to divert the case to something that he also believed and could work on. Improvements in Larnaca harbour would prove both politically valuable, by answering to a popular local demand, and economically productive, by creating better conditions in the port of trade of the island.

### **3.6 All Interests satisfied?**

The opening session of Legislative Council in 29<sup>th</sup> April 1903 has been recorded in the history of Cyprus as the first official expression for union with Greece. This address of Greek

Cypriot members was not just an expression of national sentiments but included long complaints and criticisms of Government policies. The year 1902 was very harsh to the islanders, who had experienced the worst draught in the recorded history of the island. Drought, long bitterness over the Tribute, agricultural and taxing policies, the Archbishopal Question, the Mufti Question, education, rights and liberties, forests and enosis were amongst the long list of complaints, criticism and demands. This was a political crisis; society's basic structures were under pressure. In their Council speech, Enosists spoke on the Famagusta harbour works and the railway as well:

*[when talking about rural indebtedness]...The Council declares openly that it considers the Agricultural Bank to be more necessary and advantageous than the Railway.*

The Agricultural Bank was not so much in their interest but probably it had a popular touch in the face of rural indebtedness. However, the Agricultural Bank would be from now on a constant demand from the Legislative Council.. They continued:

*... The Council does not know how far it can accept Your Excellency's congratulations on the improvement of the Famagusta Harbour, as it doubts whether the work, executed in the way it is, will meet the object in view. The Council can but express its astonishment that the contract for the construction of the Harbour in question should not yet have been published so that the people how are paying the expenses might learn in time what precisely is being done.*<sup>209</sup>

In the coming sessions, the Famagusta harbour works would be the main target for attack from those opposing the Government. The leading figure was Dr Zannetos, who managed to attract the resentful eyes of the Government upon him. He had focused on the Famagusta Harbour works but also led the dissent over the Locust Fund.<sup>210</sup> Haynes Smith wrote a confidential letter in relation to Zannetos, explaining the underlying agenda of enosis running through his politics.<sup>211</sup> Haynes Smith was referring again to the resentment of Larnaca which Zannetos was using very well. By September 1903, it was clear that the

---

<sup>209</sup> CO 67/17, Address of the Legislative Council to the Speech of His Excellency at the Opening on 29th April 1903

<sup>210</sup> See CO 69/17

<sup>211</sup> CO 883/6/5, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 21st July 1903

Government had to do something on the issue. The Municipal Council of Larnaca had taken the issue to the High Commissioner, who shared it with Chamberlain. However, this time the Municipality was asking for improvements to their port facilities. This meant a change in strategy which could be considered clever in the face of Chamberlain's final decision. The High Commissioner must have kept the Larnacan interests informed about his contacts with the Colonial Office. Haynes Smith was noting the general impression of the people in the island:

*There is a very strong local feeling on the subject not only in Larnaca but the Island, and many view with great regret the probability that the improvements at Famagusta Harbour and the Railway will injure the ancient and best known port of Cyprus. There seems reason to suppose that financial reasons make it difficult to include Larnaca in the Railway construction and if Larnaca be excluded from the Railway connection and be refused any improvement in the shipping facilities at the Port there will be much bitterness of feeling.*<sup>212</sup>

He believed that total exclusion of Larnaca from infrastructural developments would leave a sore in the community. The High Commissioner was also writing that he had been informed that the Larnaca community would "readily surrender all claim to be included in the proposed Railway" if Chamberlain sanctioned improvement of the shipping facilities at the Larnaca port. He suggested wholeheartedly accepting this proposal in order to settle two matters which "give rise to much bitterness and to hostility to the British Administration".<sup>213</sup> By 1904 the debate over a railway branch to Larnaca had nearly disappeared and was replaced by the issue of Larnaca harbour improvements. This marked the definite abandonment of connecting Larnaca with rail by the Government and Colonial Office.<sup>214</sup> However, the Legislative Council would see more debates, petitions from cities and villages, and demands from the Elected Members for railway lines in different parts of the island and not just to Larnaca. These were rejected in face of the losses the Cyprus Government Railway (CGR) gave annually. By 1911 it had £6,013 net loss of working costs over the capital interest charges. From the 1920s until its abolition in 1952, experts periodically visited the

---

<sup>212</sup> CO 67/136, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 7th September 1903

<sup>213</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>214</sup> CO 883/6/7, Treasury, Hamilton to Colonial Office, 20th May 1905

island for surveying the railway and preparing proposals for its profitability. These attempts of modernisation, in general, failed and, in the end, CGR, as a public utility with state subsidy, was abolished in 1952 without any investment made to its initial capital-tracks, rolling stock etc.

## Conclusion

The aim of the Cyprus development was to answer the odd voices both in London and Cyprus about the legitimacy of her occupation by Britain. The 'benefits' of the British rule in the island were to be proved for all. This was the imperial policy for Cyprus. The economic 'backwardness' of Cyprus was defined as the source of the criticism in London and discontent in Cyprus. Thus, Cyprus would be given loans on good terms to increase her agricultural production, compete with the neighbouring countries and export her produce. The 'bottleneck' for the development of Cyprus was her poor inland communications: Cyprus did not possess railways while the neighbouring countries like Egypt did. Chamberlain himself was fond of promoting railways in the colonies. Constructing a railway was chosen as the right policy to be implemented.

The implementation of the policy on the ground was not straightforward as expected. It was firstly acknowledged that the railway had to have cheap rates in order to compete with traditional transportation methods such as bullock carts and camels, and improved roads. To satisfy this and keep the cost within the amount allocated for Cyprus, a narrow gauge railway was selected. Despite this choice, the first estimates and expectations of the railway showed that the 'benefits' of British rule were not more attractive than bullock carts.

There were two other features of the railway that proved trickier than initially thought: the route and the payment of the loan. The Cyprus Administration chose to cover the working expenses and the sinking fund from the Locust Destruction Fund, a special tax controlled by the Legislative Council, to keep the British Exchequer from being liable to for the loan. However, Elected Members had some control over the LDF that gave the space

and reason to pursue their interests. In the beginning, some nationalists and more anti-British Members were against burdening the LDF which meant the burdening of the people of Cyprus for an item they did not ask for. However, such argumentations were scarce and not punctual. No serious nationalist or anti-British camp organised amongst the Elected Members which showed that more taxation was not an issue. However, the route of the railway nearly united all Elected Members, Turkishcyprits, and Greekcyprits, pro or anti-British together. They were united against the danger of "Larnaca's ruin".

The exclusion of Larnaca and the Government bias over the Famagusta line and Harbour was perceived as threatening the ancient trade interests. With the choice of one city over the other, the British establishment was creating further discontent by uniting all against herself instead of proving to them her 'benefits'. The island's successive High Commissioners, Haynes Smith and King-Harman, saw the coming crisis and the dangerous mixture in the opposition, local people of wealth and the Elected Members. The route of the railway could lead to a political deadlock or further crisis with the danger of being meshed in anti-British rhetoric; imperial designs were being challenged on the ground by the local interests. For the local Government, the imperial policy of railway construction had to be altered to satisfy both the opposition of the influential vested interest in Larnaca and Chamberlain, who was determined to stick with the initial development plan.

The route of the railway became a policy under negotiation. The close engagement of High Commissioners like Haynes Smith with the resolution of the resentment of Larnaca led to informal negotiations between Chamberlain, his successor Lyttelton, and the Larnacan interests. Larnacans accepted Chamberlain's terms to fund the Larnaca branch with special taxations, a not so patriotic design for the local political elite. This was not a compromise since they were making Chamberlain liable to satisfy the expectations. The dogma of one port and one railway line had been consolidated as the foundation stone of Cyprus development politics; it was unalterable. This cancelled the Larnaca Branch for further negotiation, but the promise around the city remained. The High Commissioner and the Larnacan interests made a proposal that could not be easily refused: all the claims for a railway would be dropped if the city's harbour was given improvement works. The Larnaca branch would lead to Larnaca harbour improvements as a result of local economic/political factors and local colonial Administration.

# Chapter 4: Negotiating/translating imperial policy, nationalism and vested interests into harbours: the making of Famagusta Harbour and Larnaca Harbour improvements 1900-1906

---

## Introduction

Engineering reports regarding Famagusta in relation to Cyprus' position within the imperial system chart a striking change in how the region was perceived. An opinion of this type from the Admiralty's own specialist seals off and ends the discussion of a Famagusta 'naval station'.<sup>1</sup> None of the reports and proposals on Famagusta suggested the creation of a great naval station. Each instead emphasised the inner port which was enlarged, dredged, and provided with mercantile port facilities. Generally inner port and port facilities were destined for mercantile use and not for a major naval coaling station. The ambiguity around the character of the port also reflects the confusion, in London, on what to do with the port and, in general, the island: recognition of great natural possibilities for a naval post while harbour improvement designs were geared towards creating a mercantile port. In Cyprus, officials were concerned with more commercial issues: in short they desired a mercantile port. An 'entrepôt' of the Levant, creating a steady and substantial trade, was the dream of the first British officials in Cyprus, which would benefit her unstable economy – mostly due to harsh periodical droughts – and crippled by the heavy Tribute.

---

<sup>1</sup> Just one year before, Admiralty put forward the pre-conditions for creating a coaling station at Famagusta: sanitation, stationed army barracks and fortifications. See CO 67/22.

The ambiguity of Cyprus' role in the Empire had been aggravated by the absence of a proper imperial harbour. However, the same ambiguity was an obstacle to itself: Cyprus was to pay the Tribute, which would prevent it from investing in a harbour. And Britain was not in a position to invest in an ambiguous asset. As Pasley would describe it later, Cyprus' mere occupation by British forces satisfied the ends of the Empire.

In the first three years of the occupation, there were three key surveys and/or proposals on the Famagusta harbour. These were firstly, Samuel Brown's report and survey for Sir George Elliot (1879), secondly the Admiralty report of John Millard (1879) and finally the Ormiston survey (1880). As we have seen in the case of the railway, past reports and surveys had been influential in the shaping of certain technical characteristics. This had been true in the case of the railway for which the Brown report of 1879 remained in the discussions during the Chamberlain period as a point of reference.

## **Part 1. The ambiguity of Cyprus: between emporium of the Levant and a pestilential Island**

### **1.1 The Brown report: Searching for a second Alexandria**

As has been discussed in the previous chapter, Samuel Brown had been instructed to report on railways, harbours and various engineering possibilities on the island during 1878-1879. Samuel Brown, who was preparing the report<sup>2</sup> for Sir George Elliot, would become the engineer for the British Administration of the island following his report. Besides railways and irrigation, he had also surveyed and reported on the ports of Limassol, Larnaca and Famagusta. It was the latter to which he devoted the most energy and thought. The reason for his concentration on Famagusta was the fact that, like many others, he found that the Limassol and Larnaca ports were open-roadsteads, technically inferior, providing nearly no cover for the winds of the South and East. Thus, for engineers like Brown, the choice of

---

<sup>2</sup> The Brown report can be found at CO 67/7.

Famagusta was first of all technical. He highlighted that the landing of ships in bad weather at these two other ports were impracticable, which caused delays for the disembarking of merchandise and passengers.

Their exclusion from any improvement scheme was defined as a matter of landscape characteristics. In contrast, according to Brown, Famagusta possessed something special which had been repeated by different people before and after Brown: *a natural advantage*. It needed “comparatively little” to be converted into “a port of the first order”.<sup>3</sup> A ‘port of the first order’, in the British imperial jargon concerning the Mediterranean, generally meant a port comparable to the grand harbours of Valletta and Alexandria. Brown combined this natural ‘advantage’ with the British imagination of Famagusta: Famagusta had been the chief port of the island during classical and medieval times.

Famagusta Harbour provided cover for all winds except those blowing from Northeast to Southeast, but easterly winds were not severe in the region. This ancient port in 1878 had a basin of 3400 feet long and from 1000 feet to 1800 feet wide, with an area of 100 acres. It was sheltered by islands of reef from southward and eastward which functioned as natural breakwaters. The harbour had been filled with years of accumulation of mud and rocks and now had a depth of 12 feet at the entrance and a very small portion of the basin, a factor forbidding larger vessels to enter. The port had also an outer part northwards, between the shore and a reef of rocks. It had a length of 6600 feet and an average width of 2700 with an area of 410 acres,<sup>4</sup> of which 220 acres was deep enough to be enlarged to 300 acres, which was amounting nearly the same area as the Harbour of Alexandria within the line of the Mole.<sup>5</sup> Samuel Brown, working for a capitalist called Sir George Elliot, was proposing a merchant harbour that could be built with relative ease. There was no discussion on whether such a harbour was needed or what purpose would it serve. The company in which Elliot was a partner had been involved in the construction of the Alexandria Harbour and Samuel Brown was the second man in the engineering of the project for several years. Simply, Brown was offering a second Alexandria.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> 1 acre is 4046 meter square or 0.00404686 square kilometre.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> OBITUARY. SIR GEORGE ELLIOT, BART, 1815-1893.” Minutes of the Proceedings ICE, 116 (1894): 355–57. 1892. “OBITUARY. SAMUEL BROWN, 1836-1891.” Minutes of the Proceedings ICE, 109 (1892): 395–98..

First of all, the Famagusta harbour offered two ports: inner and outer harbours. The inner part, according to Brown, was nearly ready to use as a harbour for merchant vessels, but it only needed dredging at the Inner Basin<sup>7</sup> to a depth of 25 feet (75 m) over an area of 12 acres and deepening the entrance and the approach channel to the same depth. The Famagusta harbour is just outside of the ancient Venetian city walls that surround the city. Thus, the walls ended into the sea; we observe this in old photographs. Brown was insensitive to the walls, which he suggested levelling to the east of the fortifications or the sea side of the town, and moreover to use the material employed in forming a quay of about 100 feet (300m) in width so as to create a port space. This was a typical British method in massive construction projects. (People in Cyprus still talk about urban legends of the British carrying the stones of some ancient ruin to the Suez Canal as construction material.) The quay would be escorted with two iron jetties in dimensions of 200 feet to 400 feet (600m to 1200m) creating a space large enough for most vessels of the time. The quay, built by the stones of the Venetian walls, would have rail tracks to create access to the railway proposed earlier in his report.<sup>8</sup> This inner part would cost £50,000 in accordance with his proposals. As to the outer harbour it needed more work to develop it into a 'second Alexandria'. He was proposing a breakwater along the eastern reef with a length of 1800 to 2200 yards (1.6km to 2km). Thus, after these constructions, there would be an area in the southern portion 9 feet deep for 1200 yards and 22 feet deep in the northern portion. These dimensions would easily provide space for fourteen ironclads to moor and drop their anchors. Brown noted the following:

*It is believed that such a harbour would as regards accommodation, perfect shelter and facility of access in all states of the weather both by day and night, be second to none in the Mediterranean.*<sup>9</sup>

As to the ports of Larnaca and Limassol he had improvement proposals but, as we meet the same argument later on, he considered them as mere roadsteads and by far inferior to Famagusta harbour with regards to possibilities. Brown had in his mind a commercial port, not a naval base: the 'unquestionable natural merit' destined the harbour

---

<sup>7</sup> A basin is the open water area inside a harbour.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

to become the 'Chief Commercial Port of Cyprus'. And for this reason it was also destined to be served firstly by the railway. However, as a pre-condition to this, he emphasised the need to drain the swamps around the city for which they had been a serious source of malaria. The Brown report had not been seriously taken into account in the circumstances of the time. London was not prepared to spend outlay on a new 'asset' for which there was no clear incentive for the UK. The only outcome was new iron jetties for the harbours of Limassol and Larnaca.<sup>10</sup>

## 1.2 Hornby and Biddulph: trade, strategy and malaria

After Brown's report, the British Admiralty too had surveyed the Famagusta Harbour. At this point, it is interesting to consider the naval, thus more overtly imperial, considerations on Cyprus through discussions on the Famagusta Harbour itself. We observe that Cyprus's position in the Empire and her harbour were, in many cases, considered to be joined. Interestingly, the indecisiveness and the contradiction of the British policy and her view of the purpose and particularities of the island were present in the opinions of different parties for Famagusta.

The capabilities of Cyprus as an imperial post much like Valetta or Alexandria, starting from 1881, were something that a number of departments in London often considered important. The Colonial Office was the first to ask the opinion of the Admiralty on the new British protectorate, Cyprus. The Colonial Office approached the matter both from an imperial (naval) and colonial (trade) point of view. In particular, the request was the Admiralty's opinion on the:

*...general question of the formation of a harbour at Famagousta [Famagusta], Cyprus, both from the point of view of its utility as a Naval Station, if constructed, and its capabilities as a general port.<sup>11</sup>*

---

<sup>10</sup> CO 67/15, Under. SoS of Foreign Office to Samuel Brown, 17<sup>th</sup> July 1880.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 11<sup>th</sup> September 1880. During the first years of the occupation, Cyprus was under the control of the Foreign Office from which later it was transferred to the Colonial Office.

There were already thoughts on making a military station in the town of Famagusta and making the Famagusta Harbour as the 'principal port of the Island'. This indicates to us that Famagusta was seen both as a British, naval, and a Cypriot, principal port, harbour. The High Commissioner, Sir Biddulph, expressed his opinion on the matter of the ports to the Earl of Granville, the Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, in a despatch. We see from his despatch that right from the first year of the occupation, the official British opinion (especially in the Cyprus administration, but also in some departments of London), emphasised the superiority of Famagusta harbour and the need to make her and the city the principal sea entrance of the Island. This would be consolidated as a dogma in the final years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Biddulph too was repeating that the Limassol and Larnaca ports were just mere open roadsteads and open to dangers in embarking and disembarking. He had practical reasons to refer to that: just that year the War Office had lost several lighters in those ports during the month of December. Biddulph referred to Admiral Sir G. Hornby, who was an experienced Admiral, Commander-in-chief of the Imperial Naval Force in the Mediterranean during 1878.<sup>12</sup> He had been to the island only in 1878 with the Admiralty to survey the ports of the island. For Biddulph, Famagusta Harbour was a trade potentiality. His trade concern for the Island cited particularly the following opinion of Admiral Hornby:

*The late Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean further expressed to me his decided opinion that Famagusta is the only port in this part of the Mediterranean which is capable of being made into a good mercantile harbour, and I believe there can be no doubt that with a comparatively small expenditure of money, Famagusta might be made a first class harbour, and an emporium for all the trade of Syria and Karamania.*<sup>13</sup>

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in the Mediterranean was generally talking about a mercantile harbour rather than a naval station. From the beginning of the occupation, it

---

<sup>12</sup> "He was appointed Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's naval forces in the Mediterranean, and had held that responsible position during the trying times in 1878, when war was apprehended between this country and Russia, and when the British fleet was ordered to the Dardanelles."

"DEATH OF ADMIRAL SIR G. HORNBY. A DISTINGUISHED CAREER. London, March 4." 1895. *South Australian Register*, March 5.

<sup>13</sup> CO 67/16, Biddulph to Earl of Granville, 24<sup>th</sup> June 1880

seemed that the Navy was not interested in Cyprus or, in other words, had no serious strategic designs concerning Cyprus and Famagusta. Hornby had been to Cyprus in October 1878, when he had visited Larnaca, Famagusta and Kyrenia, and made close conversations with the High Commissioner Wolseley. In his return, he had written to his Secretary of State of the War Office, Lord Derby, a detailed account of his observations about Cyprus. He was optimistic about the potential of the Famagusta Harbour as a “*mercantile port*” after he had attended the Admiralty’s survey. Hornby saw it also as a strategist but not an enthusiastic one. He considered that the Harbour was sufficient for serving as a coaling-station for the war ships watching the Suez Canal.<sup>14</sup> Before the occupation of Egypt, British naval eyes, when they looked at Cyprus, saw Suez.

In the rest of his despatch, Biddulph presented views that were very familiar. The familiarity comes from the longstanding perception of and vision for Cyprus’ development. Biddulph believed that the ‘fertile plain’ of Messaoria was a source of potential agricultural revenues and the Famagusta port, in his words, Messaoria’s ‘natural outlet’; Famagusta’s ‘birth from her ashes’ was something unavoidable. Biddulph’s belief in the importance and necessity of Famagusta harbour’s re-construction was something known and recorded. His perception, like that of many others, stated that Famagusta was destined to regain her ancient and medieval fame and glory.<sup>15</sup> This was the repeated motto of the British colonial perception of the Famagusta harbour and, through the latter, the city itself. It had one problem, which was the malaria coming from the marshes and swamps around the city. Referring to Bocci’s – an Italian expert on irrigation and waterworks – irrigation and sanitation report,<sup>16</sup> Biddulph expressed his view as follows:

*...but I believe he [Signor Bocci] was of opinion that there is nothing to prevent Famagusta from being made as healthy as it was presumably, in ancient times, when it was the chief port and fortress of Cyprus.*<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> Egerton, Mary Augusta Phipps. 1896. *Admiral of the Fleet : Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, a Biography*. Edinburgh : W. Blackwood

<sup>15</sup> See CO 883/2/13.

<sup>16</sup> David Bocci was the Chief Engineer of the Royal Engineers. He conducted for the Cyprus Government a survey which was followed by a report in 1800. The report bore the title of “Report on the sanitary condition and drainage of the District of Famagusta and the Mesaoria in Cyprus”. Further information about the content of the report can be found in Hook, Gail Ruth. 2009. “Britons in Cyprus, 1878-1914”, PhD, University of Texas.

<sup>17</sup> CO 67/ 16, Biddulph to Earl of Granville , 24<sup>th</sup> June 1880

Admiral Hornby, besides his letter to Lord Derby, had written his remarks on the Famagusta harbour in a report, on the ports and anchorage in Cyprus, dating to February 1879 prepared for the Admiralty. Hornby mainly saw a strategic asset in Famagusta rather than a mercantile port which Biddulph emphasised for his purposes, comparing the potential of Famagusta harbour as a port with the great harbours at Malta and Alexandria. Hornby was also one of those who considered that at a “small expense” the Famagusta harbour could easily “shelter more ironclads than the grand harbour at Malta”. Unlike Brown, who was acquainted with Alexandria, Hornby had Valetta for comparison. After being informed by the survey of the “Minotaur” captained by Harry H. Rawson, he briefly compared Famagusta with the Valetta Harbour. According to him the outer harbour, with a breakwater a mile long, would shelter fourteen ironclads whereas Valetta could shelter only nine ironclads. Outer harbours were considered generally for harbouring the warships. As to the inner harbour, he regarded that, after dredging, Famagusta would better accommodate both merchant vessels and “men-of-war” as well, than the Valetta harbour. He was an experienced seaman, having served as a Lieutenant to Nelson in the war with Napoleon; he knew the Mediterranean, in which he was the Vice-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief for the British Empire. Despite his position as a senior naval man, he saw in Famagusta a trade potential, just as in the Levant:

*It is almost needless to speak of the position of Famagousta, for it must strike the eye of every seaman. Situated 250 miles from the entrance of the Suez Canal, the maritime power holds it must always command that important highway, while at less than half the distance from the open roadsteads of the Syrian and Karamanian coasts, Acre, Beyrout, Tripoli, Latakieh, Alexandretta, &c, it would seem that the whole trade of those coasts must be drawn to the only port which can offer this perfect shelter, and the facilitates for rapid loading and discharge which merchant ships require.<sup>18</sup>*

The impressions of the naval engineers conducting the survey for the Admiralty were no different from Hornby’s. The first findings were so ‘promising’ that the Admiralty had

---

<sup>18</sup>Reports Made to the Admiralty on the Anchorages, &c. of the Island of Cyprus, 18th February 1879. *ibid.* ., G. Phipps Hornby to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 20<sup>th</sup> January 1879

sent an experienced surveying officer from Malta, Staff Commander John Millard. The hydrographer of the survey, Frederick Evans commented that the natural capabilities already existing were so great that with improvements the harbour would offer striking facilities. Millard had stayed long enough to survey around the city and the city itself. Millard had the same optimism about the potentials of Famagusta Harbour but he was asserting the sanitation improvements in the city as a precondition to any development.<sup>19</sup>

These surveys gave a gaze to London about the new territory and her famous ancient port. Following these, the British Government hired an engineer to make proposals for developing the Famagusta Harbour accordingly. He had been ordered by Lord Salisbury, who was anxious to learn the cost of the improvements. Thomas Ormiston constructed the report in comparison with the Alexandria port which he had visited just after his visit to Famagusta.<sup>20</sup> He proposed, for the outer harbour, 1 ¼ miles of breakwater, creating a port space of 460 acres with a depth of 30 feet, and, for the inner harbour, dredging and 150 feet of wharf.<sup>21</sup> Ormiston proposed a large and deep outer harbour, suitable for ironclads and warships, accompanied by a small inner harbour.

### **1.3 Cyprus is neither strategic nor emporium but uncertain and pestilential**

The Ormiston report on the development of Famagusta Harbour had been laid before the House of Commons and House of Lords. It was discussed on 2<sup>nd</sup> December in the

---

<sup>19</sup> Memorandum on the anchorages of Cyprus; and on the other questions, chiefly nautical, connected with that island. By the Hydrographer to the Admiralty 1878 by Frederick Evans. He noted that from the 300 male inhabitants (total population was approximately 500 inside the only-Muslims ancient city) everyone had fever that winter, one half of the population had ophthalmia and about one sixth suffered from an eye disease that could to blindness. *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Thomas Ormiston was an Engineer who had been involved in several harbour and lighthouse works and reports. The climax of his career was in Bombay, India. In October 1864, he received the appointment of chief engineer to the Elphinstone Land and Press Co. of Bombay, formed for the purpose of reclaiming a large extent of land from the foreshore of the harbour, the formation of a series of tidal basins for native craft and boats, the construction of warehouses, roads, &c.. The Government of India purchased the Elphinstone estate in April 1870, and took over the services of Mr. Ormiston as engineer, transferring to his charge the reclamation works in Mody Bay, which had for a long time been in progress. In 1873 the Bombay Port Trust was formed, which took over the administration of the entire harbour of Bombay, Mr. Ormiston being appointed chief engineer. In 1877 he relinquished the post of chief Resident Engineer, and became Consulting Engineer to the Bombay Port Trust in London. His last visit to India was to attend the opening of the Prince's Dock in January 1880, on which occasion he received the decoration of Companion of the Indian Empire. He died in 1883. He was a member of Institute of Mechanical Engineers since 1880.

. "OBITUARY. THOMAS ORMISTON, CIE, 1826-1882." Minutes of the Proceedings ICE 71, (1883): 409-14

<sup>21</sup> Report by Mr. Ormiston, C.I.E, M.Inst.C.E., on Improvements proposed at the Harbour of Famagousta, date January 10, 1880

House of Lords. The report was not welcomed as a scheme but as a political proposal. For the Liberals, the discussion on construction of a harbour in Famagusta presupposed a discussion on the status of Cyprus. The opposition found the occupation unnecessary and inconvenient, an opinion which was made particularly potent by the issue of Tribute. For the Duke of Somerset, who had visited Cyprus lately and would frequently show interest about the island later on, it was 'repugnant' that the Queen of England would hold the island as a tributary for the Sultan. According to him, the Tribute was a derogation of the moral position of England and would cause harm to the people of Cyprus, now burdened with a sum of nearly £100,000. He implied that the island would not be self-sufficient in essentials and basics, and probable Imperial help would be limited and undesirable.<sup>22</sup> For Somerset, the point was that Cyprus was not in a position economically and politically to be given an 'effective military harbour'. Besides the ambiguity of its accession, Cyprus, as he implied, would not even serve as a military point: Cyprus neither had the suitable infrastructures, especially harbour facilities, nor the sources to sustain one.

One can meet similar views on the Cyprus matter throughout the House of Commons and House of Lords debates until the 1900s. The current Government was the Liberals of Gladstone; the Earl of Kimberley held the position of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Liberals had been in opposition at the time of Cyprus' occupation; they reacted against this decision. The Earl of Kimberley then and now had a negative opinion on the whole Cyprus matter. His reply was sincere and informative:

*I had never had any hesitation in saying that the mode in which Cyprus was acquired was most unfortunate, and that the tenure by which the Island was held most embarrassing and disagreeable...it was impossible to convert a bad bargain [referring to Cyprus Convention] into a good one at will.*<sup>23</sup>

Cyprus' acquisition was a 'bad bargain' both ethically and politically. This was how it was defined by a top minister of the British Government. The ambiguity and the conditions of her acquisition were making it a 'negative' asset both for economic and imperial purposes:

---

<sup>22</sup> QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS. (Hansard, 2 July 1880)

<sup>23</sup> QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS. (Hansard, 2 July 1880)

*If this was an ordinary Colony, there might be many modes by which money could be raised for improvements in the Colony, and for the creation of a military harbour; but to embark upon a large expenditure on an uncertain tenure would be a difficult operation, and would require much consideration.*<sup>24</sup>

Especially his last sentence helps define Cyprus' position in the Empire as an 'uncertain' asset. This perception was making Cyprus policy ambiguous and confused. Cyprus' Famagusta Harbour could be made into a coaling station, a port of 'first class', a second Valetta or Alexandria, if Britain had a better idea about her acquisition or if Cyprus had a better harbour and finances. Moreover, as the Earl of Kimberley had already noted, expenditure to the harbour was not enough to consolidate it as a major port, naval and mercantile, in the region. Famagusta needed money also to drain the swamps and make it healthy; a naval harbour would also need fortifications. The expenditure of quite large sums from the Imperial exchequer – Cyprus did not have money due to Tribute – to an 'uncertain tenure'; a tributary of the Sultan, was not 'desirable'. The Earl of Granville of the Liberals in 1879 defined Cyprus policy and Cyprus' position in the Empire through the Famagusta Harbour discussion. Discussing Famagusta Harbour and possible expenditures, while referring to Dover Harbour improvements, he said that the Government was not prepared to spend money on

*...imperial interests at home in our own Island... [but on] a pestilential Island like Cyprus.*<sup>25</sup>

In Cyprus, there were vague imperial interests from the beginning. The question of whether Famagusta harbour could be made into a second Valetta or Alexandria became moot by 1882. The Khedivate Egypt fell under British influence; the Suez Canal and the Alexandria Harbour were now under British control. However, just one year before the developments in Egypt, a small opportunity appeared to make the Famagusta harbour expansion a possibility. The Anglo-Egyptian Bank made a vague proposal for concession to build the Harbour of Famagusta which would, as proposed, be built to accommodate three or four ships of war to take in coal and provisions at the same time. It was a proposal to make the harbour a coaling-station. The proposal in that form did not interest the High

---

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS. (Hansard, 21 March 1879)

Commissioner, though he forwarded his own proposal to Lord Kimberley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies: to develop the harbour sufficient enough to make the island an entrepôt in the Levant.<sup>26</sup> Cyprus was not included in imperial and strategic designs of the Empire but the High Commissioner thought it could be made suitable for mercantile development. Biddulph sent a new report by Samuel Brown, who now was the Chief Engineer for the Government of Cyprus. Constructing his report upon the survey of engineer Ormiston, Brown proposed a harbour constructed in similar fashion to the port of Alexandria, which he knew so well.<sup>27</sup> The whole report contains this comparison, and he estimated a cost of £136,781 where most of the sum was allocated for the construction of the inner harbour and its facilities. Since the outer harbour was considered generally for harbouring the naval ships, this implied that the Harbour was designed for mercantile shipping. The Secretary of State's reply to Biddulph was brief and summarised the arguments above:

*I do not propose now to discuss these plans in detail, as Cyprus had not the funds for carrying into effect even the most limited of Mr Brown's proposals, and I do not consider that the circumstances would justify an application to Parliament to supply funds for the construction of a commercial harbour, in addition to the heavy annual charge [the Tribute] which in present financial position of the Island must be borne by the Imperial Treasury in aid of the local revenue.*<sup>28</sup>

In 1882 Famagusta had been disregarded by the Anglo-French fleet going to fight in the Egypt Expedition; they had been stationed at Suda Bay in Crete.<sup>29</sup> By 1882 the subject of building the Famagusta Harbour was out of the agenda, at least of Imperial designs. This was marked by the report of Major-General Charles Pasley R.E., director of works and of architecture at the Admiralty, who expressed some of the most negative opinions on Famagusta and her harbour. Pasley was not an ordinary engineer of the Admiralty. He had vast experience in harbours and war ships; he had close contacts with Secretaries of the War Office and the Admiralty; he had inspected the harbours of Malta and Gibraltar, reported on Alexandria harbour works and, accompanying the Lords of the Admiralty and

---

<sup>26</sup> CO 883/2/4, Biddulph to Earl of Kimberley 27th October 1881.

<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*, Brown to Chief Secretary, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1881

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*, Earl of Kimberly to Biddulph, 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1882

<sup>29</sup> EGYPT (POLITICAL AFFAIRS)-THE ANGLO-FRENCH FLEET AT SUDA BAY. (Hansard, 8 June 1882)

War Office, visited major French and Italian military ports, Alexandria and Suez besides his similar services in Australia.<sup>30</sup> He was closely related to the Admiralty, War Office and Mediterranean, and thus his word counted for much. According to him, there was no imperial nor local interest that could justify such expenditure in Famagusta, which could never 'compete' with the naval station in Malta. Technically, Pasley was noting that Famagusta harbour was external but Malta's was internal; with the strong fortifications around, it was supplying enough protection to the ships of war. Strategically, for Pasley, there was no need of a second coaling station in the Mediterranean and Cyprus' importance was the simple fact that it was occupied by Britain and not some other power:

*I believe that the prospective value of Cyprus to the Empire arises from its possession enabling the Government to collect a much larger British force than can safely be placed at Malta (an army if necessary in the Mediterranean) without having to ask the permission of any foreign Government, or to occupy foreign soil. In the event of impending war against Russia or Turkey those would be of immense importance. In such a case, we might fairly count on retaining the command of the sea, and thus being able to dispense with fortresses on the island.<sup>31</sup>*

The above harbour development debates followed a certain line of thought. From the beginning of the British occupation, Cyprus' position and its utilisation within the Empire system had been related to her harbours, particularly to Famagusta Harbour. In the face of the importance of maritime transportation and Britain's global superiority in the sea, it was understandable for a naval imperial force to seek a substantial harbour in a Mediterranean island colony. This was a two-way equation. If Cyprus was going to have an imperial value, it had to have an imperial harbour. Or if Cyprus had an imperial harbour, it would have an imperial value. Even the terms of Cyprus' occupation were prohibitive: instead of paying her infrastructures, Cyprus had to pay the British and French bond holders of the Ottoman Debt of 1855. By Egypt's fall into British control in 1881 it was clear that Famagusta Harbour's 'potentials' would need wait to be dug out of the mud. In a similar way the same applied to Cyprus as a whole. The island's potential was in its non-utilisation by another force. From an

---

<sup>30</sup> Robert Hamilton Vetch, in Lee, Sir Sidney. 1895. The Dictionary of National Biography. Volume 43,. Macmillan.

<sup>31</sup> CO 67/28, Admiralty to Under-SoS to Colonial Office, 7th November 1882

infrastructural and imperial point of view this meant that Cyprus could be left 'untouched' in the material conditions it was occupied. When it was decided by Joseph Chamberlain to invest in the island's infrastructures, Famagusta Harbour would be one of the three items in the list of colonial loans.

## **Part 2. The making of Famagusta Harbour and Larnaca Harbour Improvements**

### **2.1 Deciding to construct the Famagusta Harbour: a quick and ready-made process**

The period of Joseph Chamberlain's service at the Colonial Office would intervene in the status quo in the affairs of Cyprus, accompanied by infrastructure schemes. Larnaca port was the main port of the island; Limassol seconded with its trade of specific products of the regions around, especially wine. There had been no improvements at the Famagusta harbour. Larnaca and Limassol were afforded new piers and Kyrenia had been granted money for her harbour's improvement, which proved a failure and purposeless in many aspects.

The Colonial Development Act of 1899 would grant money to the island to improve her inner and outer communications, and her agricultural production. Cyprus, so it was argued, was a vague asset and one that had been treated unfairly due to circumstances and not by Britain. This was the perspective in London. Thus, as a remedy for all, Cyprus would be developed into a grain and fruits producing country which would give her trade with the countries of the region, though mainly with Egypt. Accordingly, irrigation would increase agricultural production; the railway would provide the modern, efficient and cheap means of inner transport; and a modern port connected with the railway would be Cyprus'

connection with the outer world.<sup>32</sup> These were the general lines of the philosophy of the 'constructive imperialism' for Cyprus's development.

Subsequently, there were two questions to be answered before all this was to happen. In reality both were asking the same thing: where would be the terminus of the railway or which port would be developed? The first question had several answers and combinations, but the second one had pretty much been answered beforehand; Famagusta Harbour was to be improved and developed. In the whole process of deciding on the design of the railway, the main target of all schemes was to make Famagusta the main harbour of the island. This was a British intervention to the material order of things that had been pretty much unchanged for centuries. A possible shift of trade or a shift of importance from one port to the other in an island bears significant social implications. Larnaca had been the source of trade, the town of the island's big merchants, influential politicians, merchants, petit-bourgeoisie, a place of foreign representatives and embassies, a port of call for mail steamships and nationalism. It was the main junction of Cyprus' connection and inter-connection with the outer world. Whether or not the colonial administration consciously wanted to alter the existing power relations, it wanted to change this regime.

By 1898, the preliminary plan was ready and the Colonial Office was seeking the consent of the Treasury for the allocation of funds for the Famagusta Harbour from the Colonial Development Act. This had been followed by Cyprus's preparations for the scheme. The Director of Public Works had been studying the issue since September 1897 and had prepared a report for the High Commissioner, Walter Sendall.<sup>33</sup> It foresaw dredging a silted-up harbour of 9 acres to a depth of 24 feet and an entrance channel, 300 feet wide to a depth of 26 feet, and building 200 yards of wharf wall. The whole project of harbour and railway of 52 miles without rolling stock was optimistically estimated to be £150,000 by the Colonial Office. It was noted that Famagusta Harbour was to be for commercial purposes.

---

<sup>32</sup> The exact expression was as follows: Secretary Chamberlain and Walter Sendall (the late High Commissioner), join in recommending the scheme [railway connecting Nicosia with Famagusta and Larnaca, and restoration of ancient Harbour of Famagusta], as the complement of the Irrigation Works for which a loan of £60,000 will be acquired from Imperial Funds. "Those works will it is hoped greatly increase the productiveness of the Messaoria; but the benefit of this increase cannot be realised unless facilities can be given for carrying the produce to market, by providing Railway transit and harbour accommodation." CAOG 10/11, Francis Mowatt (Treasury Chambers) to Under Secretary of State for the CO, 2nd March 1898

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*, Report of Director of Public Works Frank Cartwright, 7th February 1898

The Treasury asked for the opinion and estimate of an authority, which meant that the Crown Agents would be hired for the job. Messrs. Coode, Son and Matthews<sup>34</sup> were selected to be the consulting engineers for the harbour scheme and were ordered to prepare a report.<sup>35</sup> They received the three previous surveys and reports on the harbour: the Brown Report, the Ormiston Report and the Admiralty Survey. The Consulting Engineers asked for a new survey for which they would send an experienced Assistant Engineer. This was something that could not be denied by the Colonial Office, which would use the report to persuade the Treasury into giving consent to the loan in any case.

P.M. Crosthwaite surveyed the harbour during the summer of 1898, and by January 1899 the report was ready. The Crown Agents (CA), commenting upon the Consulting Engineers' report, proposed a design based on the Samuel Brown's report. The difference between two was increasing the quay wall from 600 feet to 800 feet; reducing the width of the approach channel at bottom from 300 feet to 250 feet; and adding two masonry piers or spurs to define the entrance to the harbour. There would be 9 acres (500x800 foot square) of space for the inner basin which would be dredged to a depth of 24 feet. The report was making a rough prediction that there would be no circumstances of two 400-foot ironclads visiting the harbour. In such a case, these dimensions would not be sufficient to accommodate both.<sup>36</sup>

The consulting engineers' estimate was far more than that of Samuel Brown, reaching to £124,000. The Crown Agents (CA) had also two opinions as to how to commence the construction and develop the harbour. Firstly, they commented on the near non-existence of trade at Famagusta for which they had proposed railways. CA's opinion was typical and, again, not explanatory: the financial success of the Harbour depended on the connection of Famagusta to Nicosia via railway. This was a pattern observed in West Africa where railways, mostly constructed by Shelford and Son, had their terminus at a harbour, mostly constructed by Coode, Son and Matthews. The second proposal was concerned with the mode of construction, for which CA were proposing that the Government undertake the

---

<sup>34</sup> Coode & Son had been involved in colonial harbour projects, especially in West Africa. Nearly wherever Shelford & Son constructed a railway, the connecting harbour was constructed by Coode and Son. It was one of the best known engineering firms, like Shelford and Son. Andersen, Casper. 2011. *British Engineers and Africa, 1875-1914*. London: Pickering & Chatto, pp.65-69.

<sup>35</sup> CAOG 10/11, Bertram Cox to Crown Agents, 12th March 1898

<sup>36</sup> See Famagusta Harbour, Cyprus :Report by Messrs. Coode, Son & Matthew, 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1899 in CO 67/121

whole project. This was the state mode of construction, and, as CA claimed, proved to be less costly and satisfyingly safe than giving contract to a firm.<sup>37</sup>

The report and CA's comments did not provoke any major reaction from Chamberlain, who was quick to order the first steps to be taken, such as the purchase of a dredger.<sup>38</sup> By January 1900 Chamberlain and the High Commissioner were ready to start digging, and they called Matthews & Coode to act as Consulting Engineers of the scheme which would be commenced in the state mode of construction.<sup>39</sup> The control of the construction was a point of discussion for which the Consulting Engineers knew they could win. They had objected to the proposal of Chamberlain and stated that they would not work unless they appoint a Resident engineer and staff on the spot. The resident engineer would be directly liable and responsible to Matthews & Coode, who would be the channel of communication between the Government and the construction crew. Thus, in a way, the Consulting Engineers would be taking control of the construction.<sup>40</sup> The strong belief and insistence of the Treasury in the big private firms and Chamberlain's eagerness to get its approval for the Cyprus Loan helped the consulting engineers to impose their way.<sup>41</sup> By the spring of 1901 Matthew & Coode had been ordered to prepare the plans with a view of inviting tenders. Chamberlain also gave directions for the preservation of the Venetian

---

<sup>37</sup> CO 67/121, CA to Under- SoS, 11th January 1899

<sup>38</sup> The dredger was called Pholas which was to be bought from the Government of Antigua. However this purchase failed. CAOG 10/11, Bertram Cox to CA, 19th January 1899 ; *ibid.*, CE to CA, 9th February 1899; *ibid.*, Ommaney to Under- SoS, 15th February 1899; *ibid.*, Under-SoS to CA, 24th October 1899

<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*, Bertram Cox to CA, 8th March 1900

<sup>40</sup> *ibid.*, CE to CA 9th May 1900. Consulting Engineers' approach could be briefly described as follows:


"...appointment of the Resident engineer and the Staff engaged in the actual execution of the works, should devolve upon us [CE], and that the officer in question should be directly responsible to us, receiving and acting upon our instructions from time to time as the circumstance of the case may demand." CE believed that this is the procedure followed in every rail and harbour work carried out in other Colonies.

CE would not accept the agreement if they are not represented on the spot by an officer directly responsible to them. They claimed that in such works resident engineer is a must since he has to devote all of his time to the works and even if an engineer is transferred from PWD there would a void of engineer in PWD since he would not have other time for other works. *ibid.*

CA were in full agreement with the Matthew & Coode which, CA claimed, would not accept any engineer with experience as a Resident Engineer. They also feared a repetition of "...that of Sierra Leone...when the construction of an important wharf wall was entrusted to the PWD an Engineer of certainly much greater experience than is now available in Cyprus, whose uncontrolled direction of the works resulted in complete failure and the waste of £80,000." *ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> The same issue had occurred in the railway construction. See Chapter 4

fortifications which had been considered as construction material by the previous engineers such as Samuel Brown.<sup>42</sup>



Plan 1. Proposed Famagusta Harbour design of Coode, Son & Matthews. Dark red spot shows the quay area that was acclaimed. See that there are no provisions for the outer harbour.. CO 67/121

<sup>42</sup>*ibid.*, Under Sos to CA, 9th April 1901. There were many who were disturbed by the possibility of using the ancient walls as construction material.

The main decision makers for the harbour scheme were Chamberlain and successive High commissioners Haynes Smith and Walter Sendall. During 1898 and 1899 they had been in close contact and discussed the characteristics of the scheme. We have seen that the first High Commissioners of the colonial Cyprus Government had been very keen to construct the Famagusta Harbour, thereby switching the main entrance of the island from Larnaca to Famagusta which would then expected to be the 'entrepôt' or 'emporium' of the Levant.<sup>43</sup> By July 1899, the preparations and estimates were ready. The latter had exceeded the initial numbers given to the Treasury. The final estimate for the harbour had been sealed at £124,000, a number that surpassed the 20 years old estimate of £50,000.

However, Chamberlain had no intention of changing the policy he had previously communicated to the Treasury on 17<sup>th</sup> February 1898 (see chapter 3). According to Chamberlain, Cyprus had started to show signs of life, with increasing trade and returns since the occupation. However, it needed certain facilities to boost the economy as mentioned in the previous chapter. The Treasury could not oppose but had objections as to the mode of construction proposed by Chamberlain, who was in favour of the Cyprus Government being responsible for the construction. This had been experimented with in several colonial harbour constructions, including Colombo (Ceylon), Port of Spain (Trinidad), and Castries (St. Lucia).<sup>44</sup>

From the point of view of Chamberlain, the state mode saved time and money which could be lost for tenders and delays. Chamberlain wanted quick results. This was accepted by the Treasury and Haynes Smith was given the go ahead to get ready for the construction for which the Crown Agents would be asked to advise when there were "engineering difficulties". The Public Works Department and its engineers would undertake the construction, for which detailed plans and designs would be prepared by Matthews & Coode. However as has been noted above, Matthews & Coode did not accept the offer that would eliminate their control over the construction.<sup>45</sup> The Cyprus Government wanted the harbour. The Director of Public Works wrote to the Chief Secretary that although he could go independently to the harbour works, in large constructions like this one there were

---

<sup>43</sup> Beirut had been taken as guide in framing the tariffs at Famagusta. CO 883/6/5, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 17th May 1899.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, Bertram Cox (CO) to Treasury, 28th September 1899

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 15th February 1900

always occasions that only the “highest authority in the profession would be able to satisfy the Lords of the Treasury”. Thus, in order to satisfy the ‘source of money’, he proposed to make the Consulting Engineers related directly in some way to the whole progress of the construction.<sup>46</sup>

## 2.2 Creating a central port is not an easy matter: Larnaca interests blur the water

Just when the Famagusta harbour project was being settled according to the specifications of the CE report (surveyed by Crosthwaite), a new problem arose for Haynes Smith and Chamberlain. Larnacans were agitated by the news that their city would be denied both the railway branch and harbour improvements. They could clearly see that the British had selected Famagusta to be the main port of the island. This was perceived as a threat to their vested interests in Larnaca. Of course no one could guarantee, even with the optimism of British officials’, that Famagusta would attract much of the trade of the island and a share of the Levant trade. However, the opposite was not guaranteed either, because now Larnaca had a competitor which would have superior and safer facilities, Government support<sup>47</sup> and a railway line terminating in it.

The ‘discontent’ in Larnaca was first about her exclusion from the railway scheme. The Mayor, the economic and the political ‘factors’ of the city were demanding their inclusion to the scheme, which initially foresaw Larnaca’s connection to the capital Nicosia via railway. As has been analysed in Chapter 3 the Legislative Council had been busy with discussions on Larnaca and its inclusion in the railway scheme. However, it was not to be served by a railway but would be given improvements to its Harbour. This was a modification of the imperial policy by Cypriot politicians and local Administrators. High Commissioner Haynes Smith would be the most influential one who redirected the discontent and demands for a railway into a direction that would be more acceptable to Chamberlain and Larnacans alike.

---

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, Director of Public Works C.V. Bellamy to Chief Secretary, 31st January 1900

<sup>47</sup> The Mayor of Larnaca was noting in his protest letter to the Chief Secretary that exclusion from railway would mean the detriment of the city “not as a result of a regular and natural course of events but through the pressure and deliberate action of the Executive Power.” *ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 8th August 1900

### 2.3 The way from the railway to the harbour: political manoeuvring of a High Commissioner in the middle

High Commissioner Haynes Smith sent a confidential despatch to Joseph Chamberlain to discuss exclusively the case of Larnaca. He was expressing the general dissatisfaction amongst townspeople and merchants, and the Elected Members, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike, with Larnaca's exclusion from the railway scheme. Haynes Smith was building a case for the improvement of the Larnaca harbour. He saw in this a way out of the discontent and possible future crisis. He had to persuade Chamberlain first. He argued that financial officers' opinion did not favour the inclusion of Larnaca branch from a financial point of view. He did not give details about this view.

However, he had another idea, which was to promote shipping in Cyprus. He pointed out that the existence of British Administration was an advantage in the region. The reasons were numerous. British Administration had standard reliable procedures and profoundly low corruption at the ports as a result of state's modernisation from the Ottoman model to a British one. This was a factor of security for the ships which, according to Haynes Smith and his "data", were willingly calling for Cyprus instead of Beirut or Syria where they used to meet 'baksheesh' (meaning 'tips' in Turkish), a kind of bribe.

He gave examples from the previous year when Cyprus was applying 'unusually' strict quarantine rules at the Larnaca port; ships were still calling to Cyprus from the wider Levant.<sup>48</sup> Haynes Smith had the following proposal: even though the position and construction of Famagusta were "exceedingly favourable for carrying a large distributing trade" in connecting the neighbouring countries, improvements to Larnaca harbour must be put onto the agenda. He claimed that his proposal would work twofold: satisfying the demand for British ports in the region, and persuading and calming down the Larnacans and

---

<sup>48</sup>*ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 11th august 1900

the Elected Members, who would not be able to object to passing the Locust Destruction Bill if the improvements at Larnaca were added to the Bill.<sup>49</sup>

The reaction of Chamberlain was indicative about the policy of Colonial Development in Cyprus. As we have previously claimed, Cyprus was not included in the Colonial Development Act for the immediate sake of the Imperial Exchequer, though it was a strong secondary motive. The Colonial Development Act aimed to reversed the Imperial legacy in Cyprus as it was until the late 1890s (see part 1 Chapter). At this point, it would be contradictory to provoke the most influential social class and the most 'prosperous' city of the island. As Chamberlain explained to the Treasury, 'it would be so hard' if Larnaca were to be excluded altogether from the proposed schemes. Chamberlain was seeking help from the Treasury to be advised on the matter to avoid "the great loss and hardship to the inhabitants which would result from the transfer of the bulk trade to Famagusta".<sup>50</sup> Chamberlain was ready for any self-funding proposal that would satisfy the local demand without committing further money from the British Exchequer.<sup>51</sup> Haynes Smith was successful in persuading Chamberlain for the time being. However, his conditions, thus financing, would be a bottleneck as usual.

In Cyprus, Haynes Smith managed to pass the Bill<sup>52</sup> with an amendment foreseeing extra measures to secure funds for a possible loan for a Larnaca railway branch. This was a way to divert the pressure into another direction and delay it while the works at the Famagusta Harbour started to be commenced.<sup>53</sup> Elected Members of the Legislative Council had read the letter of Chamberlain dated 19<sup>th</sup> October, which they tried to satisfy with the Bill. The Bill had been passed unanimously; it was titled as a "Bill to provide funds for the payment of interest and sinking fund on a proposed loan for the construction of a railway between towns of Larnaca and Nicosia and for meeting a possible annual deficit on working the same".

---

<sup>49</sup> *ibid.*.

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.*, Colonial Office to Treasury, 5th October 1900

<sup>51</sup> More funds from the Colonial Loans Act would require the authorisation of Parliament which would not open such a discussion. Chamberlain had also laid the petition of the Mayor of Larnaca before the Queen. *ibid.*, Chamberlain to Haynes Smith, 19th October 1900

<sup>52</sup> The Bill was restricting the class of harbour as commercial in Famagusta.

<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 12th December 1900

Elected Members had accepted to create funds from sources not so popular and patriotic, such as additional taxation of immovable property in the town. This was their first compromise, but on the other hand they engaged the other side, the Government/Colonial Office, into the bargain. Their control of the Locust Destruction Fund was a point of leverage that they could use in their favour. The Colonial Office asked for the opinion of the Receiver General of Cyprus, Ashmore, upon the Bill and a possible railway line at Larnaca. This report, as we have seen in Chapter 3, would seal the discussion, as far as the Colonial Office was concerned, about a line to Larnaca. Receiver General Ashmore argued that the fate of the railway and harbour at Famagusta was a joint one and their success depended on the concentration of the available traffic on the sea coast and Messaoria on the one railway and one port. Ashmore, as a devoted career official in the colonial service, the future Governor of Ceylon, had weight in the Colonial Office. He made his opinion clear with the following words:

*It would be pity to allow the Government of Cyprus in the supposed interest of the town of Larnaca to make away in a fit of misguided philanthropy with this chance of financial success [of the railway and Famagusta Harbour] and to spend £50,000 extra whether their own money or other people`s with the certain result that it will render the first expenditure of £250,000 [Colonial Loans Act] from a revenue point of view, unproductive.*<sup>54</sup>

Chamberlain used the report to reject the construction of the Larnaca branch altogether. The report provided him with the technocratic base for his unwillingness to risk his Cyprus development dogma of ‘Messaoria irrigation-Nicosia-Famagusta railway-Famagusta Harbour’. The Treasury was especially fond of such reports. Famagusta had to be protected from any failure or, as Chamberlain put it, it had to be prevented from anything that would impair its success.<sup>55</sup>

A whole year passed over these discussions, while tenders had been called for the Famagusta harbour construction. The matter of Larnaca, though, remained unsettled and a

---

<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*, Ashmore (Receiver-General, Cyprus) to Colonial Office, 24th January 1901

<sup>55</sup> “It appears certain that the branch railway will be unrenumerative and will seriously impair the success of the Famagusta line and in these circumstances though I am anxious to meet the wishes of the inhabitants of the Island as far as possible, the expenditure seems very improvident and inexpedient.” *ibid.*, Chamberlain to Haynes Smith, 4th April 1901

source of “annoyance and friction” between the Legislative Council and the Government, largely represented by the Colonial Office. Haynes Smith reported that the Legislative Council would constantly resent the Locust Fund and the Public Works Vote being appropriated for paying the deficits on an “inefficient railway”, the Famagusta-Nicosia Line.<sup>56</sup> It is striking that he was already convinced that the ‘Famagusta railway’ was going to be inefficient. We know from the previous chapter that he had been persuaded by several experts, such as Sir Garstin of Egypt, that a long-lead railway was necessary for the profitability of the railway in the circumstances of Cyprus. The Ismailia Railway appeared as the last opportunity to cool off the spirits in Larnaca definitely. Haynes Smith believed that the purchase of the Ismailia Railway would also secure the remuneration of the future railways since it would be a long-lead railway satisfying the warnings of the experts. The consultant Engineer for the railway scheme, Frederic Shelford would rule out the purchase of Ismailia by ruling out the connection of Larnaca by railway. Haynes Smith now had only harbour improvements left to debate.

## 2.4 The common ground: Larnaca harbour improvements

In 1902 the tenders had been invited for Famagusta Harbour and four companies were picked for the final selection. These were C.J. Wills, Messrs C.H. Walker & Co, Sir John Jackson and Messrs S. Pearson & Son.<sup>57</sup> All four were known contractors of public works and involved both in colonies and Britain. The offer of C.J. Wills was recommended by the Consulting Engineers because it was the cheapest. Wills proposed to commence the works for £88,770, a sum considered by Matthew and Coode to be destructively low for the contractor. The Consulting Engineers had been estimating an amount of approx. £120,000 for the whole project.<sup>58</sup> They considered that Willis would be financially harmed but

---

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 10th December 1902

<sup>57</sup> The tenders received were as follows:

C.J. Wills £88,770

Messrs C.H. Walker & Co £125,000

Sir John Jackson £148,774

Messrs S. Pearson & Son. £ 212, 660

These companies were all known construction companies involved both in the colonies and Britain.

<sup>58</sup> This again shows how the system of Crown Agents-Consulting Engineers were costly to their clients, thus colonies. David Sunderland’s two-volume work on the Crown Agents conclude to this general fact.

nonetheless they recommended the offer.<sup>59</sup> Willis' experience of previous work and knowledge of the labour in Cyprus were the main points favouring his approval. Willis' knowledge of the local situations must have been the main reason for his relatively low offer. The Famagusta Harbour project was not a matter of debate in the Legislative Council, at least for the moment. While the last touches were being made to the Famagusta Harbour project's construction preparations by the Government and Consulting Engineers, another agenda, but not a new one, appeared before the Cyprus Government's and Colonial Office's. It was again Larnaca. The earlier discussions in the Legislative Council (of late 1890s and 1900-01) concerning the projects of the railway and Famagusta Harbour were repeatedly bringing up the exclusion of Larnaca from the railway. However, by 1902-1903 this changed and High Commissioner Haynes Smith took the initiative to extract some kind of promise from Joseph Chamberlain. Now the Council of Larnaca Municipality was sending petitions asking for port improvements which were also becoming a subject of discussion – together with the construction at Famagusta – in the Legislative Council.<sup>60</sup>

Haynes Smith, in his long despatch dated 7<sup>th</sup> September 1903, to Joseph Chamberlain, showed his intentions concerning the Larnaca port. This despatch gives us a general idea about the feelings of the interested parties in the island. First of all, we understand that Haynes Smith had been making preparations on the matter for some time. The last chance of including Larnaca in the railway scheme had been excluded by the report of Shelford. The disappearance of the Larnaca railway discussions in the Legislative Council during this period prepared the case for a new demand. We will understand later on that Haynes Smith had been in close contact with the local 'factors' in finding a way to satisfy the Larnacans and overcome another crisis in the hard times the Administration was facing. His objective was to get the Colonial Office (Joseph Chamberlain), convinced about the Larnaca port improvements.

Haynes Smith reminded Chamberlain of his own words in 1900 when he had decided on the wharfage policy in Cyprus. Wharfage dues of each port in Cyprus had been imposed to provide funds that would then be spent on the improvement of the shipping

---

<sup>59</sup> CO 67/133, Coode Son & Matthews to Crown Agents 28<sup>th</sup> July 1902.

<sup>60</sup> In May 1903 Haynes Smith Laid the Memorial of Municipal Council of Larnaca which was urging the 'the improvement of the shipping facilities at the Port'. CO 67/136, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 7th September 1903

facilities of the same port. However, despite provoking complaints of the Elected Members of the Legislative Council and the Municipal Council of Larnaca, this sum was transferred to the General Revenue of the colonial Administration, patching up the hole of the Tribute.<sup>61</sup> In November 1900, when there was a possibility of including a pier construction at Larnaca port, Haynes Smith cited what Chamberlain had concluded:

*Apart from theses general considerations, I fully appreciate the importance of the trade of Larnaca and I should be glad to consider any reasonable measures for giving increased facilities there: but as you are aware Her Majesty's Government are awaiting a report on the possibility of considerable Harbour Works at Famagusta, and until the question has been definitely settled I am not prepared to entertain any proposal for the extension of the pier at Larnaca.*<sup>62</sup>

Now the construction of Famagusta Harbour had been settled and put in progress. Haynes Smith was implying that Chamberlain had another promise to the island and the islanders were keeping it in mind. Moreover, Haynes Smith had been doing his own researches about the subject to have a concrete proposal to Chamberlain. He had ready estimates and designs prepared by his Director of Public Works, Charles Vincent Bellamy. Public Works' first estimate was £47,000, which Haynes Smith considered too big to lay as a proposal before Chamberlain.

Consequently, things had taken a different course and Famagusta Harbour had been contracted to on an amount far less than it was estimated in the beginning. The contract had been given to C.J Willis who had offered an exceedingly low figure.<sup>63</sup> The amount offered by Willis was £88,770, whereas in the Colonial Loans Act an amount of £124,000 had been allocated, which meant that there was a surplus from the Act. Though this did not mean the direction of monies to Larnaca – this needed Parliament's amendment of the Colonial Development Loans Bill – it was surely an advantage in favour of the city. In order to get the figures down, Haynes Smith had been in communication with the merchants and "those interested in shipping at the Port". It is not surprising that Larnaca was not debated in the Legislative Council during this period. All these parties in Cyprus had discussed what

---

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.*, Extract from Chamberlain to Haynes Smith, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1900.

<sup>63</sup> CO 67/133, Under Secretary of State for the Colonies to Crown Agents 1<sup>st</sup> November 1902

would be the basic improvements to serve the ends of all. The result was a new figure of £15,000, which would be spent on lengthening the pier 450 feet and giving further protection by a T-end.<sup>64</sup> This would give more space for loading and unloading with a slightly improved protection from the surf created by the winds. Thus, the design was trade-oriented rather than passenger-oriented: it was giving priority to trade activities by creating more space rather than being concerned primarily with the security of the passengers and labourers.

The despatch finished with the hot topic of local “resentment and annoyance” which is the core of the letter. It must be noted that the letter had been a product of Haynes Smith’s close contacts, consultations and communications with the local factors at Larnaca. As he discussed the estimates with the merchants and ‘those interested in shipping’, he had come to terms with the political and economic leaders of the region. These people within the social and economic hierarchy could effect and mobilise people from the lower classes. Haynes Smith reminded Chamberlain that the Famagusta Harbour and Railway had been perceived as developments prone to injuring severely the “ancient” and the “best known” port of Cyprus. These remarks informed Chamberlain of the pan-Cyprian dimension of the matter. He now used the arguments of Larnacans. His following words tell us about his conduct in the region:

*Any improvement of the Larnaca would be accepted with gratified feelings, while if to be excluded from all benefit, the improvements at Famagusta and Railway will only leave a sore feeling in the community. The Larnaca community will, I am informed, readily surrender all claim to be included in the proposed Railway if you will sanction the improvement of the shipping facilities at the Port...*<sup>65</sup>

This was a compromise and a common product of Government and the ‘Larnacan interests’. The ‘Larnacan interests’ would secure better means for their trade and the Government would contain and depress both a potential political and social crisis:

*Such a course [Larnaca giving up claims for railway and creating funds for improvements] would give a general gratification and settle down two matters*

---

<sup>64</sup> CO 67/136, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 7th September 1903

<sup>65</sup> *ibid.*

*[railway branch and port improvements to Larnaca] which give rise to much bitterness and to hostility to the British Administration... I place these suggestions before you because I am aware of the strong general desire in the Island on the subject.<sup>66</sup>*

The first discussions in the Legislative Council about the projects of the Colonial Loans Act were generally interested in the construction of the railway. Again when Larnaca was taken into consideration, the main point was that the sole reason for its probable 'destruction' would be its exclusion from the railway scheme. Thus Larnacan interests, who held mass of the then trade of the island, felt threatened by the obvious selection of Famagusta as the main port of the island. In the beginning, the Famagusta Harbour by itself did not render a severe competition to the trade of Larnaca but her rail connection to the capital was conceived as a fundamental change. This was the framework of the local opposition argument. The opposition to the Government on the matter, as discussed in Chapter 3, would fade away by 1903 but Famagusta Harbour took the place of the object of criticism towards the Government. It was Zannetos who brought the first offensive upon the Famagusta Harbour scheme and design. The Colonial Administration would take this offensive seriously because there was more than a criticism of the harbour design. The criticism over the design had a strong nationalist touch.

## **2.5 Nationalist attack on Famagusta design: Zannetos case**

Greek nationalist Members used the finances and expenditures of the Government in their nationalist agenda. Only in that April, the first official demand of enosis had been made in the Legislative Council. The summer of 1903 witnessed the offensive against the Government from the Legislative Council. The figure who stood forward in the offensive was the Elected Member of the Larnaca-Famagusta region, Dr. Philios Zannetos.<sup>67</sup> Zannetos was

---

<sup>66</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> Φίλιος Ζαννέτος-Filios Zannetos (1863-1933), was born in Peloponnese, Greece into a family with history in the 1821 Greek Revolution. He studied Medicine in University of Athens, and in 1888 he moved to Larnaca. He became one of the leading personalities of the town, known as "the doctor". He was elected twice, in 1901 and 1916, as the representative member for Famagusta –Larnaca District. He also served as Mayor of Larnaca twice, 1917-1922. In the national matter was a supporter of the Greek King Constantinos. He was sent to exile

a known nationalist and a Greek subject. He would even be deported for his nationalist politics in 1922. During May 1903, the Legislative Council had been discussing the Famagusta Harbour scheme for which the Elected Members had complaints and demands. The Elected Members were demanding to see the contract and the price list of the Famagusta Harbour Construction. This was something new. Elected Members had not typically before been so interested in the amount of money spent and the way it was spent on these development schemes.

The UK Government saw this as a clear political attack. The Government did not know what to do with the case in which they saw “the chief object” to be “adverse criticism” of the Government.<sup>68</sup> The Crown Agents advised the Colonial Government that there would be no objection to publishing the contract and the price list but it would not be desirable. The contractor had offered a price far lower than the next lowest offer, and the Crown Agents were considering that since the contractor presumably did not know how much lower a sum he tendered, it was “not altogether desirable to enlighten him”.<sup>69</sup>

During the first session of 1903 of the Legislative Council several votes of censure had been passed by the Elected Members of the Legislative Council. This tells us that there was a co-operation between the Greekcypriot and Turkishcypriot members, since it was the only way for a local majority, Greekcypriot— Turkishcypriot, to pass the votes. The Elected Members complained that they had not been informed accordingly about the details of the contract and the tenders of the Famagusta Harbour Works. They asked for the schedule of prices in order to compare the prices tendered by the contractors. Earlier, the contract had been demanded by the Member Dr Zannetos and it was laid before the Council without the schedule of prices.<sup>70</sup> Zannetos wanted to show that they were holding the Government to account for the monies of the people it was spending. After communicating with the Resident Engineer of the Works, who disagreed categorically, and the Crown Agents, Haynes

---

by the Colonial Administration in 1922 after he rejected signing a statement of abstinence from political activity which was foreseen by the Foreigner’s Act.

Παπαπολυβίου, Πέτρος, Φίλιος Ζαννέτος (1863-1933), *Ο Φιλελεύθερος*, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2013

<sup>68</sup> CO 67/136, Extract from Chief Secretary to Crown Agents, 21<sup>st</sup> May 1903; *ibid.*, Crown Agents to Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25<sup>th</sup> May 1903 at

<sup>69</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> CO 883/6/5, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 21st July 1903.

Smith had decided not to publish the schedule of prices. Upon this Zannetos had enquired of the High Commissioner on the details of the Works.

On July 21<sup>st</sup> Zannetos came up with a detailed and well-prepared complaint against the Harbour Works. According to him the harbour would be a 'sea-tank' of "no use". His complaints had two concerns: whether the design of the works would enable the harbour to serve the object it was constructed for, and the amount of the contract.

Zannetos complained, firstly, about the dimensions of the Harbour. The Inner Harbour was constructed to have dimensions of 500 feet to 800 feet. According to Zannetos, he counted several steamers calling at Cyprus ports (with lengths ranging from 350 to 433 feet), the Harbour was small enough to let only one steamer of the modern sizes to turn inside the Harbour. Zannetos argued correctly that the width was insufficient when the increasing sizes of the steamers was considered; it would be necessary to empty all of the harbour from boats for a steamer to manoeuvre inside. The conclusion was that the Government spent monies of the people for a sea-tank rather than a harbour of an 'emporium'.

His second point on the design was the dredging which, he claimed, was promised by the Government in 1898 to be for the whole 80 acres and not just 9 acres. This was making the area suitable for steamers smaller than the already promised size. He was referring to the whole of the Brown report, which foresaw not just an inner harbour but also an outer one. As to the cost of the scheme, he had his own calculations which were far lower than the contract. He calculated £16,536 for the project and added rather sarcastically that he was ready to allow 50% profit for the contractors.

Zannetos built his case to make a certain point: the Government was stealing from the people of Cyprus. He said that the Government was giving away generously the island's money to British contractors, who were making astronomical profits over the taxes that burdened the people of Cyprus. Moreover, the work commenced, according to Zannetos, could be done by local contractors easily and at a low cost. He gave the example of the

openings of the fortifications on the harbour coast.<sup>71</sup> Zannetos had not been given the schedule of prices but he had researched the works well. The British contractors had sub-let the work to a local mason at a per foot rate, and in the end three openings cost £60 for the contractors who then charged the Government with £1800 for the work. The minutes of his memorandum read as follows:

*He [Zannetos] says that either the Government should enlighten the Council on the subject or that they should stop this work which is being carried out at such a great cost to the Cypriot. We are in time to stop the work because we are just at the commencement of it...*

And for another time the Agricultural Bank was being named as a counter-policy, a pro-Cypriot one, in front of the Government expenditure on schemes of railway and harbour:

*By a mere guarantee the Government could endow the Island with an Agricultural Bank and while refusing to do this the Government burdens the Island with a loan of hundreds of thousands of pounds for which we have not asked...Hopes Government will take measures which would help to avoid future consequences.*<sup>72</sup>

As a nationalist of high calibre, he knew that putting the Agricultural Bank represented a popular bourgeoisie policy to remedy the rural indebtedness (a deep social issue), in contrast to a harbour for which 'they had not asked'; it could be represented as a further burden through taxes and could easily be communicated to an impoverished and highly taxed peasant public. The remark for "future consequences" was not random. The High Commissioner's reply was not immediate to the charges of Zannetos ending with threats. He asked for the opinion of the Colonial Office which sought, not surprisingly, the technocratic solution. The Consulting Engineers were asked to answer the "ill-informed criticism" of the Government.<sup>73</sup> An engineering report would take the issue from the sphere of politics, towards which Zannetos and nationalists were driving the debate, to the sphere of engineering.

---

<sup>71</sup> Three gates were opened on the ancient walls from the side of the harbour construction in order to carry the cement blocks. The stones of the wall were numbered and taken to preservation under the surveillance of the Antiquities Department of the Administration.

<sup>72</sup> CO67/135, Minutes from the Memorandum Zannetos 21<sup>st</sup> July 1903.

<sup>73</sup> CO 883/6/5, Crown Agents to Colonial Office, 27<sup>th</sup> August 1903; *ibid.*, Crown Agents to Consulting Engineers 18<sup>th</sup> August 1903; *ibid.*, Coode, Son, And Matthews to Crown Agents 22<sup>nd</sup> August 1903.

The reply of Matthew and Coode argued that the tender was one of the lowest in the chronicles; only the cost of construction plant – buildings, dredger “Famagusta” being built in Holland – had a cost of £27,634. As far as the harbour area issue was concerned, we understand that the Consulting Engineers had a minimum-cost philosophy in the design. When designing, they had considered that an area of 500 to 800 feet would provide ample room for the traffic expected at the Port where further extension was rendered possible by the design. This was a contradiction in front of the big promises like making Famagusta an ‘entrepôt of the Levant. No big numbers of traffic were expected at Famagusta. Also at the time being of the survey in 1899, the longest steamer to be accommodated was decided, on enquiry, to be 400 feet which would have enough room to turn inside the harbour. The policy of their design was the following:

*The instructions we received were to keep the expenditure to the lowest possible limit, having regard to the provision of harbour and berthage accommodation for such steamers as would be expected to visit the port in connection with the conjoint undertakings of the irrigation works and the railway, and this will be, we believe, fully effected by the harbour as designed, and for the execution of which the contract has been let to Mr Wills.<sup>74</sup>*

The design foresaw only the satisfaction of the traffic of Messaoria agriculture; it was neither Levant nor pan-Cypriot. These were the points emphasised by Chamberlain who directed the High Commissioner to explain them to the Elected Members, thus rejecting the reconsideration of the contract and the alleged exploded cost.<sup>75</sup>

In a separate confidential letter, Haynes Smith informed Chamberlain about the political agenda of Zannetos. This letter is valuable for showing us how in a colonial context, technological projects and their designs could be translations of political opposition by locals. As mentioned above, the year 1903 was a special year, especially in the Legislative Council. Already by May 1903 the High Commissioner was writing to Chamberlain about the “aggressive extension of the agitation of the Greek-speaking Cypriots for union with Greece”.<sup>76</sup> That year also witnessed the first demand of enosis in the Legislative Council by

---

<sup>74</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> *ibid.*, Chamberlain to Haynes Smith 4<sup>th</sup> September 1903.

<sup>76</sup> *ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 12<sup>th</sup> May 1903

the Greekcyriot Elected Members. Haynes Smith explained to Chamberlain who Dr. Zannetos was:

*Dr. Zannetos, who takes the lead in this matter [Famagusta Harbour works complaints], is a Greek subject, and the agent in Cyprus of the Central Association in Athens of the Hellenic Propaganda. He is also a resident in Larnaca, where his interests lie. He is an active leader in the agitation for union with Greece.<sup>77</sup>*

According to the High Commissioner, the attack led by Zannetos on the Famagusta Harbour Works was a part of a general policy among the unionist [enosist] politics. He was right on this point. The Greekcyriot Elected Members had already put an obstacle in the legislation of several laws as a way of paralysing the Legislative Council. Resolutions for paying the cost of the Island Coasting Service, and expenses of the Improvement Stock Committee from the Locust Fund had been rejected in the Session in which the above Famagusta Harbour Contract resolution was passed. There were other Bills that had been ‘wrecked’ by the Elected Members.<sup>78</sup> Zannetos had finished his memorandum with an open threat of “future consequences” for the Government in the case of pursuing the Famagusta Harbour Works. The High Commissioner’s interpretation of this threat was expressed in the following words:

*I have little doubt that the “unpleasant consequences” which Dr. Zannetos intimated, might ensue if the harbour works were not stopped, are intended to mean an organized resistance to the payment of the Locust Destruction Fund taxes, which are appropriated for part of the charges of the Harbour and Railway Loan. They hope, I think, to unite all classes in opposition to payment of any of the taxes which are in excess of the amount expended in the Island, and so attempt to force conclusions as to payment of any portion of the Tribute.<sup>79</sup>*

Haynes Smith understood what was being set up in the Legislative Council. The Locust Fund Tax and Tribute were matters of irritation for the whole of the island. The Locust Fund Tax had been rendered a source of money for the Government’s projects other than destroying locusts. The Locust Fund was the way the Cypriots were paying the loans and working

---

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Chamberlain, 21<sup>st</sup> July 1903

<sup>78</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> *ibid.*

expenses of Famagusta Harbour and Railway projects, which were imposed by the Administration on the people. For politicians like Dr. Zannetos it was an easy matter to unite the Locust Fund Tax, the Tribute and these projects in order to pursue his objective. The Tribute was sucking up the funds of the island and preventing any expenditure on her infrastructures. On top of this, the Government was still burdening the island with loans for projects she did not ask for and could not use adequately, but in return people were being asked to pay for them. This was the line of argument from the side of the Greek nationalist politicians. The design of the harbour and its financing were opening a way to a possible organisation of mass opposition to the Government. This threat was one of the first attempts to use mass politics against the British Administration.<sup>80</sup> Famagusta Harbour was an easy target since there were, as the High Commissioner noted, not only nationalist agendas but “also strong local opposition of the Larnaca interests”.<sup>81</sup> Zannetos was not articulating a purely enosis politics. Nationalist agenda and vested trade interests in Larnaca were utilising one another alternatively.

## 2.6 Nationalist politics or vested interests?

What had been a colonial development project of Chamberlain’s constructive imperialism was now a theme for the anti-colonial and nationalist object of opposition and/or a threat for vested interests. Its mere design and the mode of its construction were utilised for performing political opposition. Leading nationalists were men of wealth and political power which made them both defend their Larnaca interests, mainly of trade, and develop their unionist and nationalist populism. The way out for the Government was to bring a “Larnaca Port Loan Bill”, which arranged the repayment of a possible loan for the improvements at the Larnaca port.

This provoked a reaction in the Legislative Council, where the subject was again the Locust Destruction Fund. The Government was again burdening the Fund for funding things other than destroying locusts. While there was not a ‘Greek-nationalists front’ in the

---

<sup>80</sup> Rolandos Katsiaounis dates the start of the mass politics in Cyprus to the ‘Archiepiscopal issue’ in 1900.

<sup>81</sup> *ibid.*.

Legislative Council, the Bill nevertheless caused differences to surface between the Elected Members. The discussions over the Bill took two days and Theodotou had led the opposition against the Bill. He was against imposing more tax but proposed that the Government pay for the improvements from the general revenue. This meant that if the government revenue estimates failed the British Exchequer would share the cost of the improvements: Britain was being made liable for it. He also charged the Government with creating dissent between the Elected Members. Just two weeks before the introduction of the Bill, another Bill, for the improvement of Stock and combating the Plant Diseases etc. from the Locust Destruction Fund, had been rejected by some Elected Members, who wished the money of the Locust Destruction Fund to be spared for the establishment of the Agricultural Bank Fund, which needed a starting capital of £200,000.<sup>82</sup>

There was a common understanding between the Elected Members on the issue of the Agricultural Bank. Mayor of Larnaca Rossos was known to be on good terms with the Government when it came to Larnaca (see Chapter 3). Theodotou especially attacked him, whom he accused of being the only person suggesting the Government should introduce the Bill. However, the rest of the Legislative Council had not been spared from the criticism of Theodotou. Defending the Locust Fund and offering its sources for the Agricultural Bank had become a theme of nationalist politics in the last two years. Theodotou was doing exactly this. His interests also lay in Nicosia and not in Larnaca. He accused the Council, but especially Rossos, for accepting the Bill for the 'Famagusta Railway', as he named it instead of the Cyprus Government Railway; for passing the Bill and believing in the statistics of the Government.<sup>83</sup>

The next day discussions continued and it seemed that Theodotou was in the minority opposing the Bill. Even Zannetos was on the side of the Government. Dervish Pasha was evolving into a leading figure in anti-British politics and the traditional Moslem elite. He, on the side of Theodotou, explained that as Elected Members, even though Famagusta would make Larnaca 'suffer', it would be a disgrace to impose taxation on the whole population for the 'benefit' of a small proportion of it.<sup>84</sup> The other Turkish Cypriot Member,

---

<sup>82</sup> CO 69/18, Session of 15th June 1904.

<sup>83</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *ibid.*, Session of 16th June 1904.

Hadji Hafiz Efendi, saw no reason to vote against and claimed that this was the only way to recover Larnaca from the 'great injuries' suffered from the construction of Famagusta Harbour. Zannetos, also owner of a tobacco factory in Larnaca, sounded more opportunist. His business interests seemed to be overwhelming his nationalist sentiments. He accused the Government of neglecting Larnaca deliberately, but for him the question was whether it was worth letting that city 'ruin' for £2,000 a year. Following Zannetos, the Bishop of Kitium talked on the matter. He was long a defender of the Locust Destruction Fund, but now he approached the matter differently:

*If it was true that the wealthy British nation was reduced to the position to have recourse to special taxation when it was desired to do something for the people under its sway, then no doubt the SoS would have to commend the High Commissioner, but otherwise the curses of the people would fall on, His Eminence did not know whom.*

Larnaca was his city and he had been involved in a fierce battle in the Archiepiscopal issue. In the circumstance of the diminishing opportunities, he chose to tax the Cypriot by Cypriot:

*The question now was the Cypriots showing themselves as merciless as [by opposing the Bill] the Government and not help the Town of Larnaca from utter ruin?<sup>85</sup>*

A shared feeling on both sides of the Elected Members was that the Government was deliberately neglecting Larnaca to lessen her influence and creating separation inside the ranks of the Elected Members. Kyriakides expressed this in the following words:

*The Government had always been opposed to the progress of Larnaca and in its endeavours to injure Larnaca had made efforts to resuscitate ruined towns and to give the name of a town to insignificant villages such as Zygi... The policy of the Government was to endeavour to ruin every strong town, village or individual but it was not the duty of the Elected Members to come to their assistance on every occasion...*

However, the discussions ended with the voting which was in favour of the Bill. Only Theodotou, Dervish Pasha, Sozos, Chacalli, and Kyriakides were against. Dervish Pasha was a

---

<sup>85</sup> *ibid.*

Young Turk supporter merchant in Nicosia and for the time being he was engaged in mass politics on the issue of *Evkaf* and Moslem education.<sup>86</sup> He needed popular support. Theodotou was a lawyer in Nicosia. During his first election, he had been promoted by some local press as the man who would struggle for the people.<sup>87</sup> We can say that they were not threatened by the Larnaca port's improvement. Their rejection of the Bill could be attributed more to ideological reasons. George Siakallis was a graduate in law from Athens and English literature from England. He had been referred to by the famous Greek poet Konstantinos Kavafis, in 1893, for his book on Cyprus and her fate in enosis.<sup>88</sup> From the content of the book and the references of Kavafis we can derive superficially that he could have a more ideological stance on taxation. Christodoulos Sozos and Ioannis Kyriakides were the other two against the Bill. Both were leading nationalists and two leading *Kytiaki* after the Bishop of Kitium, law graduates from Athens, freemasons and entrepreneurs. They were both active in the political and economic life of Limassol: Kyriakides had set up the first iron foundry on the island and Sozos would become Mayor of Limassol. Sozos would prove his nationalism by getting killed in 1912 in the Bizani fighting against Turks as a volunteer of the Greek Army. In the Archiepiscopal dispute they emphasised "enosis and solidarity amongst the regimes' opponents".<sup>89</sup> They could easily vote for popular nationalist politics. Thus, we can say that there was a loosely made anti-British/nationalist, inter-communal block.

This sealed the deal for the Larnaca improvements. In March 1904, the High Commissioner in his opening speech in the Council had put forward two options for the funding: surplus from the Imperial Loan or the Locust Destruction Fund.<sup>90</sup> He played the second to the Colonial Office which would be, as proved, inclined not to object. He must have calculated the overwhelming interests of the many Elected Members in Larnaca and pushed for the Locust Destruction Fund successfully.

---

<sup>86</sup> Varnava, A. 2012. *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The Inconsequential Possession*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.p.183

<sup>87</sup> Κατσιαούνης, Ρολάνδος. 1996. *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century*. Texts and Studies of the History of Cyprus 24. Nicosia: Κέντρο Επιστημονικών Ερευνών Κύπρου.p.381

<sup>88</sup> -Καβάφης Κ.Π., 2003, *Το Κυπριακόν ζήτημα, Τα πεζά (1882;-1931)*, Ίκαρος Εκδοτική Εταιρεία

<sup>89</sup> Κατσιαούνης, *op. cit.*, p.404.

<sup>90</sup> CO 69/18, Speech to the Legislative Council, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1904.

## 2.7 Alliance of the Government and Larnaca: a hybrid design of the Nicolls report and Rossos Memorandum

When we enter in 1905 the situation of both harbour projects in Larnaca and Famagusta was as follows: the Larnaca Law that secured £1,000 from the LDF for the possible loan for the improvements had been declined by the Secretary of State for the Colonies; the new extension of the Famagusta Harbour has been approved and the works had been commenced. As to the Larnaca harbour improvements, the new High Commissioner had a new solution. LDF had already accumulated an amount of £10,000 which was laying idle. This was to be used for the improvements, a proposal agreed by the Secretary of State as well. The total cost of the improvements had been calculated to be around £28,000, of which the remaining £18,000 would be sourced from a loan on the security of the General Revenue of the island, and the shipping dues being increased for the purpose.<sup>91</sup>

The Larnaca Harbour improvements fell into the agenda of the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alfred Lyttelton, during early 1904.<sup>92</sup> Lyttelton's coming did not alter

---

<sup>91</sup>CO 69/19, Speech of High Commissioner to the Council 1<sup>st</sup> March 1905.

<sup>92</sup>“Unwilling to buck the family tradition during Gladstone's political lifetime, Lyttelton waited until 1894 overtly to declare his Liberal Unionism. He was Liberal Unionist MP for Warwick and Leamington from 1895 to 1906. He also increased his standing at the Bar, being recorder of Hereford, 1893–4, and of Oxford, 1894–1903, and taking silk in 1900. In that year Joseph Chamberlain rather surprisingly sent him to South Africa as chairman of the Transvaal concessions commission to plan post-war reconstruction, his elder brother Neville Lyttelton becoming commander-in-chief at almost the same time. Alfred Lyttelton impressed Milner, who suggested to Chamberlain that he should succeed him as high commissioner. On Chamberlain's resignation in September 1903, Lyttelton was appointed colonial secretary, a dramatic elevation and one for which he felt himself unprepared and unsuited. He accepted, against the advice of his officials, demands from Milner and the mine owners for indentured labour to solve the labour shortage in South Africa; the Chinese Labour Ordinance of 12 March 1904 led to the outcry over ‘Chinese slavery’ and 50,000 Chinese on the Rand, an important factor in the 1906 election, though the Liberals, once in office, were unable immediately to cancel the ordinance. He also, by letters patent of 31 March 1905, granted representative government to the Transvaal, a constitution abrogated by his Liberal successor on 8 February 1906. In April 1905 Lyttelton sent a dispatch advocating what he hoped would become a permanent ‘imperial council’; the Unionist government fell before this body met and the Liberals used the traditional term ‘colonial conference’, and abandoned Lyttelton's proposal for a permanent secretariat. As in all his major initiatives as colonial secretary, Lyttelton acted against the advice of his officials.”

the Chamberlain policy concerning Cyprus. His ascendance was sudden and largely due to his calibre; he had labour and African issues in front of him. By February 1904 Haynes Smith was sending his proposal with a design and estimates from his Director of Public Works, E.H.D Nicolls. Not only the Government but Municipality and 'certain inhabitants' of Larnaca had their proposals ready to be submitted for the consideration of the Colonial Office (for both designs see below). Haynes Smith, in his long despatch, had to refer to the necessity of the improvements and their relation to the development of the Famagusta Harbour and the funding of the project since Lyttelton was new to the Office.

Haynes Smith was more straightforward with the new SoS. His first suggestion to Lyttelton was to "do what they want", which meant adopting the improvements proposed in the Memorandum of the Mayor of Larnaca. He considered that "to carry out what they do not want only...be an additional grievance and would be more resented than doing nothing".<sup>93</sup> The Government wanted to get over with this situation that risked getting more complex by prolongation.

Accordingly, he set the objective of the improvements for the facilitation of trade and giving the community of Larnaca what they required for the commerce of the town. Merchants wanted the improvements, so the improvements would be trade-oriented. On the dogma over whether Famagusta would be injured or not after the Larnaca improvements, he believed that Famagusta's success depended only on whether "proper facilities are afforded to large ships" to make the city a distributing point, entrepôt of the Levant trade. This was an important argument in the light of the parallel developments at the Famagusta works, where the initial design had been altered to enlarge the port more. Zannetos was proven right; the nationalists had won enlargement of the Famagusta Harbour. On the funding, he stated that the Larnacans were willing to pay by a special contribution and the Locust Destruction Fund would be left for establishing the Agricultural Bank. This was also a step forward for the anti-British, both Greekcypriot and Turkishcypriot, camp of the Legislative Council. Mass politics was surpassing the Cypriot society during these years and those, like *Kytiaki* and Dervish Pasha, who were challenging the social and

---

Matthew, H. C. G. , 2004, 'Lyttelton, Alfred (1857–1913)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press

<sup>93</sup> CO 883/6/6, Haynes Smith to Lyttelton, 17<sup>th</sup> February 1904.

cultural establishment had recorded a populist demand in the agenda of Cypriot politics; the Agricultural Bank. Haynes Smith closed his despatch by repeating the existence of “strong public feeling” on the matter of improvements.

Haynes Smith, eager to materialise the improvement works at Larnaca, had enclosed both Nicolls’ and Rossos’ proposals. For the latter, he also asked Nicolls to calculate estimates indicating his open willingness to forward the proposal of the Municipality, thus the local design. The Government was translating Larnacan interests in technical terms as well. Nicolls, in his report, foresaw the extension of the pier and the construction of a breakwater. Larnaca port was exposed to all winds between east and south; the waves never exceeded four feet in height. He reported that heavy gales were never experienced and as the anchorage was good, “no difficulty or danger is experienced by any ships when lying at anchor about three-quarters of a mile off shore”. In addition, there was hardly one day when work could not be carried out at the ship’s side. According to him, the difficulty was to traffic arose from the in-shore surf, especially with winds blowing from north or north-east.<sup>94</sup> He was not proposing a long extension of the pier deep in the sea, since the depth of the bottom was increasing not more than one to two feet, which did not make a significant difference to enabling the anchorage of larger vessels. Nicolls added that the system of anchorage at off-shore and carriage of merchandise and passengers by lighters to the pier at weather not suitable for docking at pier – heavy ships did not have this difficulty – should be adhered to, but modified for traffic in all weathers. Nicolls’ design gave weight to security.

Since the necessity was to protect the lighters from bad weather, he proposed to lengthen the pier 200 feet (it was already a 450 feet long T-head) and, at a distance of 75 feet from the end, constructing a 430 feet long breakwater<sup>95</sup> at a distance of 125 feet seaward from the pier. Thus the Tee head of the pier would be carried seaward where a shoal existed, thus increasing protection, and the breakwater would enable easier discharge to lighters and shelter to the latter at the pier. The whole project was estimated to cost

---

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, Report of Director of Public Works on proposed improvements, Port of Larnaca dated 27<sup>th</sup> January 1904

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

around £15,000. While on the other hand Mayor Rossos' memorandum had a different approach, because it had other ends to satisfy. He wrote the following on Nicolls' plan:

*...a plan which is found by the Municipality of Larnaca and the townspeople generally to be wholly inadequate to the requirements of the case.*<sup>96</sup>

The Mayor's memorandum was well informed about the characteristics of the sea-bed, the winds and the wave map of the shore. The memorandum asked for the fulfilment of two objectives: to clear the broken water or avoid the surf which is attainable at a distance of 1200-1250 feet from the shore; to obtain a depth of water of about 12 feet in order to allow crafts of small vessels and lighter to work in any weather. Rossos' design gave slightly more weight to capacity. He wanted more capacity and depth, together with security and length of pier. The first could be achieved, according to the memorandum, by extending the pier further than Nicolls' plan. Rossos left the calculation of the length of the pier and breakwater to "experience" to decide. The memorandum ended with a threatening language that expressed the possible feelings provoked by the refusal of its proposal:

*If, on the contrary, the proposed plan to build the breakwater at a depth of nine feet of water [Nicolls' plan] is sanctioned, the people of Larnaca shall consider this to derisive [ridiculing] fulfilment of their legitimate wishes and the requirements of the town's trade, and in contradiction to the decision of the Secretary of State to effect a substantial improvement in our port. They shall too, be affected by the niggardly [stingy] spirit with which everything concerning our district and town is dealt, and they shall continue be completely dissatisfied by such a result of the unceasing claim on the subject of this important commercial centre in the island.*<sup>97</sup>

Rossos was a member of the high class, a lawyer who had devoted his salary over 22 years at the post to the revenue of the Municipality.<sup>98</sup> He was a devoted Mayor and man of daring politics. In 1887 he had written a memorandum addressing the Secretary of State for the Colonies to whom he and other petitioners were complaining against the Cyprus Convention

---

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, Memorandum, N. Rossos, Mayor of Larnaca.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> "Οι Δήμαρχοι Λάρνακας Από Το 1878 Μέχρι Την Πρόσφατη Εκλογική Μάχη Της 18ης Του Δεκέμβρη 2011." KITION - ΛΑΡΝΑΚΑ - ΣΚΑΛΑ. <http://larnacainhistory.wordpress.com>

and its result, the Tribute.<sup>99</sup> His mild threat was most effective precisely because such a result was increasingly likely. We know that, in the same period of 1904, Haynes Smith was writing to Lyttelton about the “burning questions of the agitation amongst the Greek-speaking Cypriots for union with Greece” and Greek Elected Members pursuing these ends engineered by a “foreign organization”.<sup>100</sup>

## 2.8 Adding London into the ‘Cypriot’ design: the hybrid of hybrid

The Larnaca improvements had become Cyprus state policy. Consequently, Nicolls had prepared plans according to the proposal of Rossos, creating a hybrid design. He was extending 450 feet further seawards, as proposed by Rossos, and altering slightly the direction of the breakwater which he previously drawn.<sup>101</sup> The estimate of the cost was reaching £25,300, which was not commented on by Haynes Smith, as was the common practice among British officialdom, despite its size. This is an important point since Nicolls, in his own plans, was writing that a pier extension of more than 200 feet, which was the length he proposed, was unnecessary. Of course, Lyttelton did comment on this point as expected.<sup>102</sup> This drove Haynes Smith to negotiate the plans; the result was a third plan from Nicolls that would have scope to satisfy Larnacans in design and Lyttelton in economics. Nicolls and his reports were the medium of this negotiation. Nicolls explained the third scheme:

*Scheme No:1, which I first submitted, was designed to give as much as accommodation as possible, while keeping the cost within the sum of £15,000, but, as this did not, in the opinion of the Mayor and the merchants of the port of Larnaca [who had asked also for comfort and safety for lighters], give sufficient accommodation behind the breakwater, and as it was found possible to increase the sum that might be spent to £20,000. The additional £5,000 enabled me to increase the length of the breakwater from 430 feet to 550 feet, and to place it further*

---

<sup>99</sup> Hill, George. 2010. A History of Cyprus Vol.4. Cambridge University Press, p. 506

<sup>100</sup> CO 883/6/6, Haynes Smith to Lyttelton, 14<sup>th</sup> January 1904

<sup>101</sup> *ibid.*, Nicolls to Chief Secretary, 10<sup>th</sup> February 1904

<sup>102</sup> *ibid.*, Lyttelton to Haynes Smith, 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1904

*seawards [50 feet more], giving an extra 50 feet of width between it and the pier head.*<sup>103</sup>

Thus, Haynes Smith concluded, a £20,000 loan could be made, of which the £1,200 annual charge would be covered, mostly, by LDF, which would devote £1,000. He had also contacted “various quarters” to “convey... the general and earnest desire that the proposed works may be constructed”.<sup>104</sup> Following these communications the Colonial Office was engaged, which approved the idea and undertook the expected step: asking the opinion of the Crown Agents and Consulting Engineers. Lyttelton’s instructions were to have the opinion of Consulting Engineers on the last scheme designed by Nicolls. As Cyprus was an economy supported by the Imperial Treasury the cost must be narrowed to the lowest possible “with a definite improvement in the shipping facilities of the place”.<sup>105</sup> Consulting Engineers, Coode, Son and Matthews, replied in October. In consistency with their business conduct which typically erred on the side of caution when financial estimates were involved, they estimated £28,000 for the last design of Nicolls. They suggested accepting this design in principle with alterations to the breakwater, they wanted to conduct an examination of the sea bed by special boring, but in general lines there would be extension of the pier by 200 feet with a T-head and the construction of an isolated sheltering arm – breakwater – of 550 feet.<sup>106</sup> The Crown Agents had no more to add upon the report but they had some suggestions. The amount of £28,000 was equal to the cost of the new extensions of the Famagusta Harbour, of which the initial design was decided, in the end, to be small for its purpose (this will be discussed further below). CA would prefer spending the money, if there was only that much available, on Famagusta and to pull the railway to Karavostassi before operating any improvement works at Larnaca.<sup>107</sup> This report would settle the fate of Larnaca improvements, approving the design and the idea, but making them a matter of low financial priority.

If the Legislative Council debates above are recalled, we see that LDF had been amended in order to supply funds for a loan for Larnaca harbour improvements during the

---

<sup>103</sup> *ibid.*, Nicolls to Chief Secretary, 9<sup>th</sup> June 1904

<sup>104</sup> *ibid.*, Haynes Smith to Lyttelton, 9<sup>th</sup> June 1904

<sup>105</sup> *ibid.*, Bertram Cox to Crown Agents, 13<sup>th</sup> July 1904

<sup>106</sup> *ibid.*, Coode, Son and Matthews to Crown Agents, 8<sup>th</sup> October 1904

<sup>107</sup> *ibid.*, Crown Agents to Bertram Cox, 14<sup>th</sup> October 1904

summer of 1904. That would lead to a pause in the process of the Larnaca improvements. Lyttelton, in his long despatch to Acting High Commissioner Arthur Young, put many financial reasons (such as the priority and severity of establishing an Agricultural Bank), to disallow a loan that was being sought by Haynes Smith. He had already sent a notice to be issued, calling for tenders for a loan of £20,000 to the Cyprus Public Works Loan Fund Commissioners.<sup>108</sup> Lyttelton acted and blocked the progress. In addition to this, he refused to sanction the enactment of the LDF Law as it was amended for the Larnaca improvements. He argued to new High Commissioner King-Harman, a philhellene, that, firstly, there was no loan in consideration. Secondly, LDF had been burdened with paying other ends than destroying locusts, which made Lyttelton have doubts whether LDF would be able to bear an additional £1,000.<sup>109</sup> Last, of course, it was about Famagusta harbour which was being extended now. Lyttelton had the same question in mind as the others before him:

*...how far the proposed scheme [Larnaca improvements], or any modification thereof, could be carried out without endangering the financial prospects of the Famagusta Harbour?*<sup>110</sup>

King-Harman was as clear as his predecessor on the subject. In fact, his reply to Lyttelton had references to Haynes Smith from the beginning to the end. Haynes Smith was the central figure in the shaping of the whole Larnaca policy. The Cyprus Government had a state policy on the matter; he shared the same views as Haynes Smith on the question. He explained that there was a general consensus that a part of the trade would always go to Larnaca. Moreover, he showed that LDF had an annual surplus over expenditure of £2,000, from receipts totalling £10,600.

In the first instance, he proposed giving the whole surplus for covering the cost and then applying for a local loan.<sup>111</sup> The disallowance of the Law provoked not just the protest of the High Commissioner but also Larnacan interests. This was understandable since the LDF appropriation was a solid step towards consolidating the local demand for the improvements. For the Elected Members, as shown above, it was not a simple and

---

<sup>108</sup> *ibid.*, Lyttelton to Arthur Young, 7<sup>th</sup> October 1904

<sup>109</sup> *ibid.*, Lyttelton to King-Harman, 21<sup>st</sup> October 1904

<sup>110</sup> *ibid.*, Lyttelton to King-Harman, 21<sup>st</sup> October 1904

<sup>111</sup> CO 67/139, King-Harman to Lyttelton 19<sup>th</sup> November 1904.

straightforward task to approve additional burdening of a Fund that was harvested through an unpopular tax. As far as the Mayor and the local merchants were concerned, this history had become very prolonged. King-Harman expressed the first reactions to the disallowance with a touch of his feelings as well:

*The promulgation of the disallowance of the Law has caused the greatest consternation in Larnaca and Mr Rossos the Mayor at once came to Nicosia to interview me on the subject. In eloquent and indignant terms he laid before me the claims which Larnaca has for consideration in the matter of its Port. These claims have been laid before you by my predecessor and constitute, I venture to say, an indictment of the Government on account of neglect of the Chief Port of the Island.*<sup>112</sup>

Now the agents of regular lines of steamers calling at Larnaca sent a protest letter to the High Commissioner.<sup>113</sup> What followed, as expected, was the Memorandum of the Mayor in the name of the Larnacans. The High Commissioner presented it as follows:

*...a temperate expression of a strong feeling of bitterness and disappointment which I am aware exists at Larnaca with reference to what the people interested in the trade of the town regard as the neglect of their interest by the Government, and I venture to bespeak your favourable consideration of what I recognise to be a reasonable request on the part of the municipality.*<sup>114</sup>

The Memorandum was indeed soft in language. It made a historical summary of many references to the necessity or promises for the improvements out of a diversity of sources, such as technical reports or despatches of High Commissioners and consecutive Secretaries of State. He stated that the people of the town, “8,000 people in a progressed state of civilisation” as he defined them, would not stop to urge their grievance and claim, and would not let themselves be treated as a “negligible quantity”. Additionally, he gave a sheet of Larnaca’s contribution to the General Revenue and most strikingly he gave examples of policies of extra port taxation for such purposes in France, especially, and other British colonies.

---

<sup>112</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Lyttleton 19<sup>th</sup> November 1904

<sup>113</sup> CO 883/6/6, Beraud, Mantovani, Pierides, Cirilli, Rahbe Khedival Agent to High Commissioner, 8<sup>th</sup> November 1904

<sup>114</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Lyttleton 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1904

King-Harman had a crisis on his hand. He took the matter very seriously and paid a visit immediately to the city. After his visit he sent two confidential letters to Lyttleton, one on the matter of the Legislative Council and the Elected Members, and one on his visit to Larnaca. With the former, he must have provoked serious concerns in the Colonial Office as well. The Larnaca improvements were exacerbating the situation to a point which forced the colonial establishment to rethink certain features of the occupation, particularly the Tribute. The Colonial Office took the initiative to negotiate with the Treasury a kind of financial relief from the burdens of the island, suggesting doing 'something' with the Tribute. British official opinion saw these two as inter-connected. The Tribute was arousing bitter feelings amongst those Cypriots who had some interest in the administration of the island. The mere expression of them was the Elected Members who were operating in "suspicion and hostility towards the Government", which rendered taking any legislative measure in the Council very difficult. This was how King-Harman saw and experienced things before he went to Larnaca.

On the other hand, the Colonial Office laid down two options for the crisis: an intervention in the working of the Legislative Council in favour of official representation or changing the regime of Tribute.<sup>115</sup> The Government had to do something: either to reward, diminishing the Tribute, or punish, diminishing the local political representation at the Legislative Council. The harbour improvements could lead both ways.

As to the visit of the High Commissioner, his sympathy towards the city's demand was utmost. His purpose was to meet "officially", first of all, the Mayor Rossos, and the "leading people" of the city. The meeting, as King-Harman describes, with the Mayor was crowded. King-Harman, after his visit, had been much convinced about the necessities of the improvements, and he was committed to their accomplishment:

*I have great sympathy with the people of Larnaca in this matter, and the more so because, although they have for many years contributed largely to the general revenue by the payment of wharfage dues and Verghi tax on what I believe to be an inordinate over-valuation of the town property, the*

---

<sup>115</sup>*ibid.*, Colonial Office to Treasury, 29<sup>th</sup> December 1904

*great desideratum of the port, the one improvement for which they never ceased to ask, remains still unattended to.*<sup>116</sup>

The common design agreed in Larnaca was that of Coode and Matthews:

*In view of these considerations I have earnestly hoped that my recommendation that the scheme favoured by Messrs. Coode and Matthews should be sanctioned will be favourably entertained, and that a commencement of the work may be authorised as speedily as possible.*<sup>117</sup>

Lyttelton's choice was either the escalation of the tension and putting the new High Commissioner on the line, or to approve his proposal. The approval of Lyttelton proved certain after this despatch; he sanctioned the scheme in January 1905 on condition. His condition was the funding, which had to be negotiated for its type and source,<sup>118</sup> mainly to convince the Treasury as to its approval. This would be the main discussion during 1905 about the Larnaca harbour improvements.

## 2.9 Who will pay for it: a hybrid design for finance

There were some options for the funding of £18,000. A sum could be extracted from the LDF and the rest would be acquired by loan, either from a local source or the London market. Then the owner of the loan could be the Government or Larnaca Municipality, and the charges of the loan could be paid either by special taxation of Larnaca and its port or the whole island and her trade. King-Harman, in the first instance, preferred a loan of £18,000 on the General Revenue of the island so that Larnaca would not be further burdened. As he put it, the city had already paid and contributed to the General Revenue by wharfage taxes and property tax on excessively valued town property. He also preferred a local loan at four per cent, a rate he believed achievable. He had also been tipped by a "private source" that there was capital "at Larnaca waiting for investment, and that a loan on Government

---

<sup>116</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Lyttelton, 16<sup>th</sup> December 1904

<sup>117</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>118</sup> CO 883/6/7, Lyttelton to King-Harman, 13<sup>th</sup> January 1905

security would be taken up at four per cent".<sup>119</sup> It would not be a surprise to learn that those asking for the improvements were also the same with the 'capital waiting for investment'. On this point we cannot be certain, but is it understood that the communications between the High Commissioner and Larnaca interests had become very close. For the charges of such a loan, he preferred a small tax on the whole shipping trade of the island rather than taxing only Larnaca. He argued that this would endanger diverting the traffic to Famagusta and Limassol, making Larnaca worse off than when it started.<sup>120</sup> He was also protecting Larnaca's interests. As noted above, he had brought the theme to the Legislative Council in the Opening Speech. The subject had been discussed and the necessity of improvements was agreed unanimously.<sup>121</sup> The general view was against withdrawing £10,000. He was also in favour of using LDF for establishing the Agricultural Bank.<sup>122</sup>

Lyttelton's position was simple: don't ask more for the Loan and do not tax Famagusta for Larnaca. These meant that Cyprus should reconsider drawing £10,000 from LDF and putting extra tax on Larnaca port dues only before the Colonial Office asked for sanction from the Treasury.<sup>123</sup> The High Commissioner, acting now as a mediator between Legislative Council/Larnaca and Lyttelton, needed to adjust his proposal. He ruled out using the LDF, because such a measure would create reaction in the Legislative Council.<sup>124</sup> The whole amount would be acquired by loan, of which charges would be paid by a general increased tax over shipping dues, except Famagusta, an increase in the immovable property tax in Larnaca District and a contribution from the General Revenue. Like the lobbying and the design of the improvements, the financing was proposed to be a hybrid of Government and Larnaca interests, with special attention to the preservation of the Famagusta dogma.

The proposal would satisfy Lyttelton, who forwarded it for the approval of the Treasury.<sup>125</sup> This, as on many occasions, would prove a slow procedure, but there was no escape from it. Cyprus was Treasury-controlled and even the Crown Agents, for whom the

---

<sup>119</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Lyttelton, 15<sup>th</sup> February 1905

<sup>120</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Lyttelton, 9<sup>th</sup> March 1905

<sup>122</sup> Finally, the Agricultural Bank was established in 1925.

<sup>123</sup> *ibid.*, Lyttelton to King-Harman 24<sup>th</sup> March 1905

<sup>124</sup> "...in the face of strong feeling in the Legislative Council against the further diversion of the proceeds of the Locust tax, it would be to avoid any appropriation of the Locust Fund for the purposes of the Port of Larnaca..."  
*ibid.*, King-Harman to Lyttelton, 11<sup>th</sup> April 1905

<sup>125</sup> *ibid.*, Colonial Office to Treasury, 3<sup>rd</sup> May 1905

Colonial Office traditionally had a high regard, were suggesting raising the loan through the British Treasury.<sup>126</sup> The Treasury regretted that an immediate decision, what the “anxious High Commissioner” expected, would not be the case because the Treasury was asking for explanations. The Treasury, being out of the whole discussion on the Larnaca improvements, had questions concerning the whole policy of Cyprus development:

*...and My Lords [of Treasury] had gathered that the policy of the Secretary of State was to make Famagusta the central port of the whole Island, leaving the other coast towns to depend for their prosperity on the general development of the country. The construction of harbour works at Larnaca could not fail to divert from the railway and Famagusta harbour much of the traffic of the southern portion of the Island, and thereby to prejudice the financial position of those undertakings which is not too promising at present.*<sup>127</sup>

On the machinery of the funding proposed by King-Harman, the Treasury had no essential objection because the condition of “no charge falling on the British taxpayer” was satisfied. In general, the Treasury suggested the method of “wait and see” for several years in order to get an idea of the workings of Famagusta harbour and railway, and irrigation.<sup>128</sup> This reply must have been frustrating for King-Harman. The Treasury was proposing to wait for several years on a matter that had been pressing for many years and had reached its final phase. The Larnaca improvement had become an immediate obligation of the Government which had to produce an immediate result. He pressed this perspective strongly in his reply to the Treasury. Additionally, he did not have any new argument on whether the improvements would prejudice Famagusta,<sup>129</sup> except that he added that Famagusta would never be the central port of the island from its situation.<sup>130</sup> The Colonial Office knew the history behind the matter and its importance. Thus it intervened to convince the Treasury into finalising the whole Larnaca improvements procedure as soon as

---

<sup>126</sup> CO 67/144, Crown Agents to Colonial Office, 10<sup>th</sup> May 1905

<sup>127</sup> *ibid.*, Treasury to Colonial Office, 20<sup>th</sup> May 1905

<sup>128</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>129</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Lyttelton, 28<sup>th</sup> June 1905

<sup>130</sup> On the works he added that “The proposed scheme for the improvement of the Larnaca port can scarcely be dignified by the name of harbour works.”. *ibid.*

possible. Lyttelton expressed his belief in the arguments of King-Harman, both on the necessity of improvements and the relations with the Famagusta Harbour.<sup>131</sup>

Protests over the delay were not late in coming. Agents of shipping companies were the first to complain.<sup>132</sup> A whole year had passed since the approval of the Colonial Office and at least six years from the discussions on Larnaca, either construction of the railway branch or harbour improvements. Even in 1904 there had been enough tension produced on the matter, both in the town and in the Legislative Council. Now it was late November 1905, and we should not forget that the railway had started working and the Famagusta harbour extension works were being commenced, and still there was not a single solid action on the Larnaca harbour improvements. King-Harman, having met privately with the Mayor Rossos and G. Pierides, the elected members of the district, wrote again to Lyttelton for immediate action. This letter had been a joint production of Rossos, Pierides and King-Harman who noted that the insistence of Pierides, who was also a shipping agent in the city, had been the major motive. These were high trade interests not just of Larnaca but of the whole island. The High Commissioner had nothing to add to his arguments, but just emphasize the possible outcome of a governance problem in Cyprus:

*...and it only remains for me now to add that the delay in the commencement of a work which received your approval so far back as January last is fostering a spirit of resentment and discontent very detrimental to the peaceful government of the Island.*<sup>133</sup>

He wanted to go to the Legislative Council with the approval of the Colonial Office for the legislation of a law for raising a small loan, just for the beginning, for the improvements. In the meantime, by December 1905 the Secretary of State for the Colonies was Lord Earl of Elgin of the Liberal government. This meant that the ten-year rule of Liberal Unionists, Joseph Chamberlain and Alfred Lyttelton, was ending and power over the post passing to a Liberal. This change reflected reluctance against the Larnaca scheme. The Treasury again repeated the same argument of protecting “the superior and wider interests of Famagusta”.

---

<sup>131</sup> *ibid.*, Colonial Office to Treasury, 1<sup>st</sup> November 1905

<sup>132</sup> *ibid.*, Girilli, Mantovani, Breaud &Fils, Pierides, Mavroidi's Son, Rahbe&Cie to Chief Secretary, 15<sup>th</sup> August 1905

<sup>133</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Lyttelton, 28<sup>th</sup> November 1905

However since the Treasury stated that the previous Secretary of State had aroused the local expectation, they were willing to accept a less comprehensive scheme.

Unlike Chamberlain and Lyttelton, the Earl of Elgin readily accepted this and ordered a report by Matthews, of Coode and Matthews, who was going to Cyprus to inspect the Famagusta Harbour works. He asked for a cheaper scheme that may omit the covering breakwater or adopt some form of T-head to the pier instead of a breakwater to afford sufficient protection.<sup>134</sup> This was a blow for King-Harman, who had nearly brought into realisation an important state policy that he had inherited with enthusiasm from his predecessor Haynes Smith, a big enthusiast for the harbour of Famagusta. He expressed this with the following words:

*The decision of His Majesty's Government in this matter is naturally a disappointment to me; and especially so, as I have been at some pains to make it clear to His Majesty's Government that the proposed improvement of the landing facilities at Larnaca are vitally necessary for the safety of passengers and goods which will always be landed at that Port ...*<sup>135</sup>

A partner of Matthews – he could not come to Cyprus due to his prolonged work in Singapore – Mr Wilson arrived on 15<sup>th</sup> April at Larnaca to make the surveys and investigations at Famagusta and Larnaca. His report on the Larnaca improvements was delivered to the Colonial Office in July, but King-Harman had already talked with him in Cyprus and agreed upon his proposals in advance.<sup>136</sup> The report was sent to King-Harman on 16<sup>th</sup> August and the result was definite. Wilson conducted meetings, all private and in quick succession, with every interested party: Nicolls, Director of Public Works, Ansell, and the Collector of Customs at Larnaca, King-Harman, Mayor Rossos and agents of the principal shipping companies using the port.

Wilson had to come up with a design for the satisfaction of all. It was agreed commonly that the shelter for the general protection of lighters, so as to enable them to lie anchored during the winter was not a prerequisite. However, a limited amount of shelter

---

<sup>134</sup> CO 883/6/9, Treasury to Colonial Office, 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1906 ; Colonial Office to Crown Agents, 4<sup>th</sup> January 1906 ; *ibid.*, Earl of Elgin to King-Harman 4<sup>th</sup> January 1906

<sup>135</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Earl of Elgin, 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1906

<sup>136</sup> *ibid.*, King-Harman to Earl of Elgin, 26<sup>th</sup> April 1906

should be provided for lighters to go alongside the jetty and deliver to vessels coming into bay in order to conduct the service demanded in bad weather. Thus, the scope was to make the cargo and passengers loading/unloading safer and make the trade available in all weathers. Wilson's design did not differ a lot from the hybrid design of Nicolls – a combination of his first and the proposal of Rossos: to lengthen the existing jetty by 450 feet, which would give an additional depth of two feet, or eight feet in sum, and to construct an outer sheltering arm 250 feet long to afford protection to the outer end of the jetty.<sup>137</sup> The cost was estimated £21,500, the only feature concerning the Earl of Elgin. The job of satisfying the Treasury was left to Coode and Matthews. They gave their opinion on the Famagusta-Larnaca competition which, as occasioned in most cases, would satisfy both the Treasury and the Earl of Elgin:

*The conditions which obtain at the two ports are entirely dissimilar. At Famagusta there is a close harbour with berthage for vessels alongside a quay having a depth of 24 feet at low water, and in direct communication with the Cyprus Government Railway...At Larnaca there is an open roadstead trade being carried on by means of lighters, and at present there is no direct communication with the railway.*<sup>138</sup>

These two harbours were of different class and the improvements would not change that:

*The improvements which we have proposed for adoption will no way alter the existing conditions under which trade is conducted, but will merely facilitate its progress by allowing it to be carried on during certain days when at present this is impracticable. We, therefore, do not consider that the proposed improvements at Larnaca would have any injurious effect upon the trade of Famagusta.*<sup>139</sup>

Elgin gave his first approval on the condition of taking a sum from the General Revenue because the London loans market had now more disadvantageous terms of crediting. King-

---

<sup>137</sup> CO 67/147, Crown Agents to Colonial Office, 24<sup>th</sup> July 1906; CO 883/6/9, Coode, Son and Matthews to Crown Agents, 14<sup>th</sup> July 1906 ; *ibid.*, Earl of Elgin to King-Harman 16<sup>th</sup> August 1906  
The jetty would be provided a three feet gauge of railway track in case of extension of Cyprus Government Railway to Larnaca.

<sup>138</sup> *ibid.*, Coode, Son and Matthews to Crown Agents, 14<sup>th</sup> July 1906

<sup>139</sup> *ibid.*

Harman, in his reply ruled out making Larnaca paying for the improvements, arguing that Elected Members and people saw the payment as an obligation of the General Revenue, as in the cases of Limassol, Famagusta and Kyrenia ports. He preferred the General Revenue to pay the whole amount, a proposal, he considered, agreeable willingly by the Elected Members. We should remember that, as a side consequence of the Larnaca improvements discussions, Cyprus now had an increased amount of Grant-in-Aid from London. For the year of 1908-1909 Cyprus was expecting £50,000 Grant-in-Aid.<sup>140</sup>

The Earl of Elgin approved the scheme, on the lines of Coode, Son and Matthews' report, to be carried on, and the cost to be covered by the "increased grant-in-aid" during the next three years.<sup>141</sup> By the end of April, plans were drawn up; Nicolls was appointed as the head of the works under the supervision and instructions of the Consulting Engineers; tenders were accepted.<sup>142</sup> The lowest tender was again from C.J. Willis and Son, which was the contractor of the Famagusta Harbour Works. However, the cost went up to £23,885 but caused no further delay to the scheme.<sup>143</sup> By January 1908 the story of the Larnaca harbour improvements ended with the full execution of the contract.<sup>144</sup>

---

<sup>140</sup>


One week before the despatch, a lighter full of goods was wrecked when trying to unload from a steamer. This had provoked a wave of complaints and protests; the local press cried out for the "inactivity of the Government in the face of dangers of to life and property at the central and most important port in the Island." CO 67/146, King-Harman to Earl of Elgin 7<sup>th</sup> November 1906

<sup>141</sup> *ibid.*, Earl of Elgin to King-Harman 21<sup>st</sup> December 1906

<sup>142</sup> Co 883/7/1, Earl of Elgin to King-Harman, 20<sup>th</sup> April 1907; Consulting Engineers to Crown Agents, 25<sup>th</sup> March 1907

<sup>143</sup> *ibid.*, Crown Agents to Colonial Office, 20<sup>th</sup> November 1907 ; *ibid.*, Earl of Elgin to King-Harman, 27<sup>th</sup> November 1907

<sup>144</sup> *ibid.*, Crown Agents to Colonial Office, 30<sup>th</sup> January 1908



Plan 2. The final design for the Larnaca harbour improvements. There is no breakwater but a sheltering arm for the protection of lighters. CO 67/152

## 2.10 Big promises, small harbour: a contradictory design

During the years 1903 and 1904, the technological agenda was occupied by the issue of Larnaca port improvements and, mainly, the railway. In this period the works at the Famagusta harbour were being commenced and there seemed to be no major matter in relation to the construction. The only time that it was brought under discussion was, as noted above, the memorandum of the Greek Cypriot Elected Member of the Legislative Council, Dr Zannetos. One of his several criticisms was the incapacity of the port's new dimension which, according to him, proved small for the needs of the modern shipping, and not big enough to accommodate large steamers. The British Administration replied that the harbour was designed on the minimum-cost principle to provide room for steamers that would be expected for trade carried out by the works of irrigation and railway. This meant

that the steamers calling at Famagusta would be expected to be for transport of the grain of Messaoria, but not for Levant trade as stated at the beginning of proceedings. All these estimates had been done without any communication with shipping companies, naval authorities or any person involved in shipping.

But by 1904, just one year after Zannetos' memorandum, Haynes Smith had come to the same conclusion: the new harbour was small for "a convenient place of call".<sup>145</sup> The High Commissioner reported that after his enquiries – he did not state to whom – he learned that different steamship lines that were calling at Cyprus or doing trade in the Levant would not be willing to call at Famagusta "unless the Harbour is somewhat enlarged". The general opinion, he continued, was in favour of making an extension 100 feet in width and 200 feet in length. He proposed these extensions together with bringing the railway onto the quay, prolonging the wharf on iron piles from the quay to the land and a channel dredged out sufficiently deep to allow sailing vessels to use it.<sup>146</sup> These improvements had the scope to increase the capacity of accommodation of the inner harbour and opening more space for the entrance and anchorage of the large steamers – mainly of the grain trade. The High Commissioner's call for more works at Famagusta was accompanied by the call for extension of the railway to Karavostassi since, as was repeated many times, the harbour and the railway were considered a joint project:

*The financial success of these important works [railway and harbour] depends on their being carried out to the extent of making the Famagusta Harbour a convenient place of call and on carrying the Railway from Famagusta to Nicosia and hence across the Island to Karavostassi on the western coast.*<sup>147</sup>

Finally, the High Commissioner attached two documents having technocratic support for his case, a natural instinct observed in the practice of British politicians both in London and in Cyprus. These were a report from Captain Slade J.W. of HMS Diana of the British Admiralty and a log of a steamer anchored in the outer harbour of Famagusta.<sup>148</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup> CO 67/139, Haynes Smith to Lyttelton, 17<sup>th</sup> August 1904

<sup>146</sup> I= *ibid.*

<sup>147</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> The same year the Cyprus Government had decided to put lighting and buoys to the Famagusta Harbour to make the latter more effective for shipping. See CO 883/6/ 6.

What the Colonial Office learned from the Crown Agents was that King-Harman, who was to be High Commissioner in October, and Consulting Engineers Coode, Son & Matthews, had discussed the matter in June. As a result of the discussion, the latter had also prepared a report. Their proposal was to lengthen the quay and deep-water area by 100 feet, to widen the dredged area from 500 feet to 600 feet, to dredge a basin 15 feet in depth, 450x200 feet for small local vessels at a new iron-jetty, in order not to interfere with steamships manoeuvring inside the inner harbour. These were the changes that the High Commissioner demanded. The total cost was estimated at approx. £26,500.<sup>149</sup> The Consulting Engineers had conducted research, by Resident Engineer Hobbs, at Larnaca port as to the probability of two or more large steamers calling at the port simultaneously. He found that sometimes the steamers of Messageries and Austrian Lloyd met there. These were vessels of 300 feet and 400 feet respectively. In addition, steamers of Italian (with steamers of the size of Austrian Lloyds'), Khedival, Princes, and Deutsch Levant and Bell lines were also calling at Larnaca. This meant that as many as four or five large steamers could and would be lying at Larnaca at one time.<sup>150</sup> Thus the extensions had to serve the following:

*...ample accommodation would be provided for two of the largest steamers (say, Messageries or Austrian Lloyd class) to lie alongside the quay simultaneously and for berthing the additional steamers by the latter lying "double-banked" when necessary. The increased width would also admit of the ready turning of the largest class of vessels, when two of the same are berthed alongside the quay.*<sup>151</sup>

The Consulting Engineers also confessed that the original design was "undoubtedly somewhat more cramped than is desirable". Thus, the new design would clear the smaller local vessels from the quay which would have enough room for comfortable loading, manoeuvring and anchorage of the large steamers. The Treasury accepted both the extension of railway and the harbour extensions without much argument.<sup>152</sup> They agreed for the sake of the 'joint success' dogma. The Colonial Office gave the orders to the Crown Agents for the necessary steps. However, the Colonial Office added that, as stated by the

---


<sup>149</sup> CO 883/6/ 6, Crown Agents to Colonial Office, 14<sup>th</sup> September 1904

<sup>150</sup> *ibid.*, Consulting Engineers to Crown Agents, 17<sup>th</sup> August 1904

<sup>151</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>152</sup> *ibid.*, Treasury to Colonial Office, 14<sup>th</sup> October 1904

Treasury, the total amount of £254,000 from the Loan would not be breached. This meant that the track of the railway would not be carried further from the point at which the railway could be equipped and completed from the remainder of the Loan balance after the harbour works had been deducted.<sup>153</sup>



Plan 3. Extract from the map of Code, Son & Matthews. Famagusta Harbour extension works. The green areas are extensions of the quay and area to be dredged for ironclads. The brown area extends the quay by a pier and creates a pocket for sailing vessels outside the area of deep harbour for ironclads.

<sup>153</sup> *ibid.*, Colonial Office to Crown Agents, 15<sup>th</sup> October 1904

Interestingly, at this last minute, the Admiralty also had the need to comment on the Famagusta Harbour Works. The Admiralty report repeated the necessity of extending the harbour, but this was not the distinct point of the report. The Admiralty report claimed that in order to make Famagusta a centre of trade in the Levant and the depot of the island, one must, firstly, bring the 'Greeks' to the town. It said that the biggest disadvantage of the city was that it was inhabited by Muslims – Turkishcypriots– and Greeks were being discouraged from the city, which was the major obstacle for the development of the city's trade.<sup>154</sup> This was a comment outside of the context; no discussion was provoked and the extensions were put in commencement.



Photograph 1. Picture of Famagusta Harbour extension works. View of harbour entrance from the Southeast Bastion, taken 2<sup>nd</sup> May 1906. CO 1069/696

---

<sup>154</sup> "The peculiarities of the place must also be borne in mind. Famagusta has been, up to the present, *exclusively* Musselman, and by exclusively I wish to convey all the word implies, which is that Greeks, &c., have not been tolerated there, and as, to make Famagusta successful port, transfer to its vicinity of merchants, mostly Greek, will be necessary, it becomes all the more expedient there should be no possibility of this enterprise receiving a check."  
*ibid.*, Rear Admiral B.W. Walker to Admiralty 29<sup>th</sup> August 1904 ; *ibid.*, Admiralty to Colonial Office, 17<sup>th</sup> October 1904

## 2.11 Two decades after Famagusta Harbour construction: a look at shipping trends

A good source for understanding the trends in trade and ships calling at the harbours of Famagusta and Larnaca, after their development/improvement in the 1900s, is the report of Consulting Engineers for the Crown Agents, Coode, Fitzmaurice, Wilson & Mitchell – this is the same consulting company which designed and supervised the Famagusta harbour works. The report was prepared after the visit of a partner, Vaughan-Lee, who had been surveying in Sudan. We observe in the report that the steamers visiting Famagusta harbour had risen from 95 in 1912 to approximately 160 by 1925, whereas the number of sailing vessels, responsible for the shore trade, was largely stable. It was reported that the harbour was already being called on by ships larger than 400 feet. The idea of the Chief Collector of Customs was to make extensions to the harbour, especially lengthening the berthage and the quay and increasing the dredged area.<sup>155</sup> These, as it was reported, larger steamers were reluctant to enter the harbour because of the width of the entrance and the size of the inner basin.<sup>156</sup> Both reports were estimating the increasing trend of steamers visiting Famagusta to continue in the coming years. Indeed, in the next five years Famagusta had been called on by 160 steamers in 1924-25, 226 in 1925-1926, 245 in 1926-27, 269 in 1927-28 and 259 in 1928-1929, which demonstrates an increase of 70%. The Prince Line, a larger steamers shipping company, had started direct service between the UK and Famagusta instead of, as previously, transshipping their cargo at Alexandria. The Company desired a second line to Famagusta.

However, other shipping companies interested in the harbour were reluctant about calling at the city because of the danger accompanied by the size of the harbour.<sup>157</sup> When we look at the value imported/exported from the three main harbours of the island we see that Famagusta had attracted goods equal to £672,466 in 1926 whereas at Larnaca and

---

<sup>155</sup> BT 188/262 Report on The Condition of the Harbour Works at Famagusta by Coode, Fitzmaurice, Wilson & Mitchell, 16<sup>th</sup> September 1925

<sup>156</sup> *ibid.*, Report of the Director of the Public Works and the Chief Collector of Customs on the proposal for the Improvement of the Famagusta Harbour Works, 11<sup>th</sup> November 1925

<sup>157</sup> CO 67/231/12 Comptroller of Famagusta, G.F. Wilson to Chief Secretary, 8<sup>th</sup> July 1929.

Limassol, the figures were £449,620 and £378,000 respectively. This meant that Famagusta had managed to be the port for the imports of Nicosia. The number of packaged imported items had tripled those of Larnaca and doubled those of Limassol.<sup>158</sup> However, the value of exports is more interesting. In 1926, Limassol was responsible of exports at a value of £383,000, Larnaca £292,730 and Famagusta £197,319, while in 1922 the figures were £277,261, £287,532, £215,464 respectively. Famagusta was carrying out the most of the grains export, 323,696 kiles in 1922 (85,752 kiles from Larnaca)<sup>159</sup>, and agricultural products including citrus, sundry and poultry.<sup>160</sup> This was in accordance with the intention of the then Colonial policy to “tap” the Messaoria, the grain country, with the Famagusta Harbour. However, it did not satisfy the full vision. It was not the main harbour of the country, nor the central port. As the figures show, Limassol had emerged as a major port while it passed Larnaca in the figures. Limassol had the wine and grapes trade, which had made some people very rich, thanks to the products of its mountainous district.

## Conclusion

The role/position of Cyprus in the Empire had been joined with Famagusta Harbour; they were being used alternately. They both had ‘natural potentials’ which needed money to be developed. However, the Tribute, as a term of the Cyprus Convention, was a constraint on the island’s finances. The ambiguity of Cyprus’ occupation was keeping Britain away from any expenditure on the Famagusta Harbour; the undeveloped condition of Famagusta Harbour was making the ambiguity of Cyprus’ role in the Empire more ambiguous. Egypt’s fall under British control emptied the whole importance in the arguments both about Cyprus or Famagusta Harbour. In comparison with Alexandria, it was a pestilential place.

The improvement of Famagusta Harbour was part and parcel of the colonial development policy for Cyprus. It was decided that ‘superior’ modes of transportation, railway, would carry Cyprus’ produce ready to be shipped. In the colonial British mind, the

---

<sup>158</sup> BT 188/262, Memorandum of Chief Collector of Customs, 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1927

<sup>159</sup> Kile and oke are old Cypriot capacity and weight units. 1 oke was 1.27 kg/ and 1.27855 dm<sup>3</sup>. 1 kile is 28 oke.

<sup>160</sup> *ibid.*

harbour of this development policy had been too biased in favour of Famagusta. It was decided to give Famagusta Harbour improvements and a railway terminus; Cyprus policy was trade with the neighbouring countries. If it was to be an 'emporium' of the Levant, Famagusta needed to be enlarged to accommodate large steamers.

Cyprus development policy had produced the dogma of concentrating the mass of the island's produce at one port, Famagusta Harbour, which would be served by one line of railway. This policy excluded the Larnaca railway branch from the agenda, leaving interests in Larnaca feeling threatened. While the railway and Famagusta Harbour projects were aiming to answer Cyprus' inner political and economic crisis, their materialisation was going to be translated differently than thought by the political elite and the Larnacan interests. First of all, they become sources of "constant resentment and annoyance" through their loan payment method: the Locust Destruction Fund.

Finance proved to be a technical characteristic that was then translated in terms of local politics. The low-budget design of the Consulting Engineers did not give a lot of space for steamers to manoeuvre, but it gave enough to nationalists. Famagusta Harbour became a "sea-tank" instead of "emporium" of the Levant; a material failed promise of the colonial rule which was being built at the cost of the people. The development policy was building a harbour that gave the opportunity for consequences like mass mobilisation against the Government. The harbour and its design had become translations of political opposition by the local politicians.

The method of financing the loan and the working expenses of the harbour and the railway united a loosely knit anti-British inter-communal block in the Legislative Council. However, the power of trade interests vested in Larnaca was overwhelmingly the nationalist politics, including even figures like Zannetos. Vested interests and nationalism utilised each other politically upon the discussion over the Larnaca harbour improvements. The exclusion from the railway evolved into demands for harbour improvements. This local demand was both challenging and alternating with the imperial policy. The railway line was heading to crisis instead of Famagusta Harbour.

The local politicians enlisted the colonial Government in protecting their interests. The protection of these interests was in the form of the harbour improvements which

became a state policy, enduring changing High Commissioners. This state policy was documented in the form of a hybrid harbour design: a design that contained the Larnacan interests, the Government and, later on, the Colonial Office. Larnacans asked for increased trade space while the Government preferred more security. London would change the design by asking for economy in the cost. These designs became the way the negotiations were being done between Cyprus and London. The danger and the threat of governance crisis was the motive behind the negotiations. Despite the change of Government and policy in Britain, the Larnaca Harbour improvements demand was imposed and got accepted in a final design that contained all parties in it.

# Chapter 5: ‘Electrifying’ Cyprus

---

## Introduction

The current chapter follows the history of making a united electricity network – a grid – in colonial Cyprus, and consists of three parts. The first part of the chapter explores the proposals and ideas for creating an island-wide electricity supply network before the making of the Grid in the 1950s. Doing so helps us to make a comparison of pre-Grid period proposals and ideas on electrification with those leading to the electrification of Cyprus. It is illuminating to see the transition from an electricity policy based on private concessions and a Government-regulated power regime, to a full public monopoly on power production, distribution and sale. The second part is concerned with the history of the making of the island-wide Grid scheme. The history revolves around the Cyprus Government’s push for a change in electrification policy and the materialisation of a Grid constructed, financed and managed solely by the colonial state in the framework of post-war colonial and imperial Cyprus policy. The third and final part reveals the encounter of the scheme with the Cypriot political establishment; the interpretation of the scheme’s main objectives and policy in the framework of anti-colonial nationalism.

As far as we know, the pre-Grid electricity regime of Cyprus was simple and local. J.O. Hall’s survey – he will be introduced below – is the best known source.<sup>1</sup> In this regime those interested, public or private bodies, applied for an ‘Order’ which was granted by the Governor. Then a contract was signed between the Government and the concessionaire that defined broadly the terms of the Order. Main contract holders were Municipal Councils, of which several around the island operated generators belonging to a municipal corporation. Hall counts eighteen electricity undertakings which owned a generating plant and/or a distribution network. In many cases, the area of supply of the networks was

---

<sup>1</sup> Report on Electrical Distribution Survey in Cyprus by J. O. Hall, Electrical Engineer-on-Chief Public Works Department Nigeria, 25<sup>th</sup> October 1945, CO67/325/2

defined in the contract as a circle with a certain radius of the power station. Contract owners were municipality or small township undertakings, and private and mine companies which were generating power for their own use. It can be observed that there was not a certain standard in current (AC/DC), voltage, phase, cycle, tariff or timetable of supply. Another important point that can be drawn from the survey of Hall is on the use of electrical power. It was restricted to illumination in cities; mines used it both as a source of light and a driving force. Hall could not reach the information concerning the consumers of these undertakings. Looking at Nicosia, the largest city and capital, we see that Nicosia Electric Company had 6000 consumers served within a circle of 5 miles radius (8 kms). According to the 1946 census, Nicosia municipality had a population of 34,485. The fact that 6000 consumers included households, shops, industry and Government departments, leaves us only to speculate that the ratio of connectivity of the population to the network was low.<sup>2</sup> The approximate total of consumers in the main cities and townships with electricity undertakings was 12,437 out of a population of 450,114.<sup>3</sup> Even if all the consumers had been households with an average of 4.5 persons per house, that would leave some 85 percent of the population without electrical power.<sup>4</sup>

## **Part 1. First discussions for an Island-wide Grid 1937-1938**

### **1.1 The Gamlen proposal**

In 1937, when Governor Sir Richmond Palmer was entering his last years in service as the head of the Cyprus Government, he sent a letter to the Colonial Office about a draft Electricity Bill and a proposal for an electricity supply scheme. He communicated the

---

<sup>2</sup> The number of census of 1931 gives an average of approximately 4.5 persons per house in the general Nicosia district.

<sup>3</sup> This is the population of the island according to the 1946 census.

<sup>4</sup> In the Census of population and agriculture prepared by Cyprus Census Office we find some reference to the subject. The author acknowledges that his data is vague. His predictions state that an approximation of 65-70 percent of town households and 2.4 percent of the village households received electricity. In the meanwhile he records the rural population as 355,145 (78.4% of the population) and the urban population as 96,969 (21.6% of population). David Athelstane Percival. 1949. Census of Population and Agriculture, 1946: Report and Tables. Published by Crown Agents for the Colonies.

intentions to pass an Electricity Bill and Regulations which would set the future legislative basis of Cyprus' electricity supply, distribution and retail (i.e. giving certain powers to the Governor with a general electricity law). At that point, Cyprus did not have an island-wide network of electricity supply and distribution serving the whole population, but only small numbers of consumers, mainly in the major cities and towns, were being supplied by Municipal corporations or Companies under contract issued according to the Municipality Corporations Law.<sup>5</sup> These were generally small undertakings containing diesel generators (see Table 1 at the end of the chapter). The rest of the population which was the vast majority, were living with traditional methods of lighting and heating, such as kerosene lamps and wood burning.

In his letter to the Colonial Office, Governor Richmond Palmer<sup>6</sup> explained that he was motivated by the proposal of Robert Loraine Gamlen, who was representing Callender's Cable and Construction Company Limited.<sup>7</sup> Gamlen, who retired in 1935 as Director of Electricity Supply under the Government of HEH Nizam of Hyderabad, was asking the Governor for a licence to be granted to the company for a general electricity supply scheme.<sup>8</sup> For Palmer a concession of this kind was an 'interesting' proposal and a 'sound one'; he saw it as a way of investing in the material welfare of the island. However, for the time being he was not in a position to approve it. Palmer wanted to have the opinion of an electrical engineer on the conditions upon which such a licence could be granted; his

---

<sup>5</sup>CO 67/278/9, Palmer to Gore 9<sup>th</sup> April 1937

<sup>6</sup> Sir Herbert Richmond Palmer had served in several British colonies. He had also served as a colonial supervisor for Britain during the inter-war period. He was a Lieutenant Governor of Nigeria, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Gambia before becoming the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Cyprus. He was to be one that designed a colonial administration that has been defined as "colonial government by decree". His view on the people of Cyprus was 'Asiatics' without making any difference between Christian and Muslim. Consequently his harsh measures had been applied to the whole body of society. The administration had punished both Greekcyprits and Turkishcyprits even though the 1931 riot had been recognised as Greek.

Holland, R. F, and Diana Weston Markides. 2008. *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850-1960*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.214

<sup>7</sup> Robert Loraine Gamlen, member of Institution of Electrical Engineers, before going to India had been involved in construction and management of power stations in England. In 1906 he went to India where he was appointed after a while as Master of Mint. As Master of Mint he was responsible for all electrical and mechanical engineering work in the State of Hyderabad. Upon his retirement in 1936, he moved to Cyprus and lived there until he died in December 1937. Obituary Notices at Robert Loraine Gamlen," *Electrical Engineers, Journal of the Institution of December 1938*, vol.83, no.504, p.891

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*

Government had none.<sup>9</sup> In the meantime, the Cyprus Government had a draft Bill based upon the Palestinian Electricity Law of 1934.

In the archives of the Cyprus Government, there are more correspondence about Gamlen than those written to the Colonial Office. Gamlen had approached personally the Commissioner of Famagusta in late 1936 with intentions of buying land in the district. He asked for a grant of the promontory immediately 12,5 miles north of Famagusta to erect a power station. The Government did not show much interest in Gamlen's proposal, which was rejected in a matter of a week without any explanation being given.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, his name does not show up in the files where the application of Callender's is found. Several months before Gamlen, Callender's had approached the Council of the Municipal Corporation of Limassol for a grant of an exclusive licence for erecting a generation station for supply of electric power for industrial purposes and heating.<sup>11</sup> The Company was directed to the Governor for any decision regarding the Limassol Municipal Corporation. From the few communications found in the files, it seems that the general inclination was to go on with the Company's proposal without taking any power from the Municipal Corporation.<sup>12</sup>

The Colonial Office responded to Palmer seriously and initiated immediately the preliminary work. The whole proposal was presented to the Undersecretary of State at the Colonial Office as "an important contribution to the amnesties and development of the Island". The current power regime was labelled "parochial" and "inefficient", and the present scheme was promoted to:

...change all that, and Cyprus should be provided with a public utility concern which will stand in comparison with *European standards* [italics added]<sup>13</sup>

A.J. Dawe, at the Colonial official, put the 'European standards' in contrast with the existing regime of small municipality-owned parochial and inefficient undertakings.

---

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> SA1 :1458/36, Application of Gamlen for grant of promontory near Famagusta for the purpose of erecting electricity generating power station

<sup>11</sup> SA1:1040/36, Municipal Corporation Limassol to Commissioner of Limassol, 7th July 1936,

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, Minute 6<sup>th</sup> August 1936.

<sup>13</sup> CO 67/278/9, Dawe to Parkinson, 26<sup>th</sup> August 1937.

European standards meant supply of electricity on “large scale”<sup>14</sup> on the lines of the current proposal by a British private concern. Parochialism and inefficient were two words commonly used to describe the electricity regime of Britain before the establishment of the Grid, which had been in work at the time of these discussions. Regional networks, private and municipal suppliers resembled, in general lines, the British case in the mid-1920s.<sup>15</sup> Following Palmer’s letter, the Colonial Office communicated with the Crown Agents for an urgent consideration of the demands of its Cyprus Governor. From the recommendations of Preece and Cardew, the Consulting Engineers, and the considerations of the Colonial Office, three points came forward: Radio-interference, compulsory purchase, and public tender. The first one took attention because of general telecommunications worries; the distribution lines ought to not interfere with the radio communication frequencies. Palmer was recommended to consider the clauses of the new United Kingdom Wireless Telegraphy Bill which had been recently revised and proposed to the British Parliament.<sup>16</sup>

Compulsory purchase and public tender issues were more of a political nature than legal or technical. Here the question was on the method of decision-taking concerning the name of the concessionaire. Public tender would mean presenting every proposal to the public and, as accustomed, give the concession to the most economical bid. This meant giving an opportunity for public opinion to have a say about the Government’s decision. The other choice would be to choose the concessionaire along the lines of the Crown Agents’ advice and the Governor’s will, which would have meant that Callender’s would be given the concession.

According to their experience in other colonies, the Consulting Engineers recommended that, in theory, public tender was desirable but in practice it was causing delays: to their knowledge, if such a company like Callender’s was applying for a licence in Cyprus no other company would compete.<sup>17</sup> The Colonial Office seemed to be hesitating on giving an opinion about public tender, as can be seen in the repetitive communications with

---

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> See. Chapter IX Planned Systems from Hughes, Thomas Parke. 1983. *Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, Gore to Cyprus Governor, 8<sup>th</sup> September 1937,

<sup>17</sup> “There is apparently an understanding between the big electricity groups that they should not tread on each other’s toes and if Callender’s are after the concession, no other group would be likely to poach on their preserves”. *Ibid.*, Dawe to Parkinson, 26<sup>th</sup> August 1937; *Ibid.*, Gore to Cyprus Governor, 8<sup>th</sup> September 1937

the Crown Agents. The general climate was against public tender on the grounds of delays and non-competition of companies, and many officials were in favour of moving on according to the recommendations of the Consulting Engineers. Although the majority of officials were considering public tender “lip-service”, some were saying that “Cyprus is rather ‘politically minded’ ”, indicating possible reactions within the island. What they meant here was the fact that such an electricity scheme was not a small project and would not pass unnoticed by the general public. The Colonial Office considered that the Government would be attacked if Palmer would just give the licence to Callender’s without any effort to obtain competitive offers. On the other hand, the Colonial Office did not have the experience about electrification schemes. Thus, there was not a standard policy to be applied readily:

*...one sees relatively few electricity schemes and the circumstances of most of them seem to be rather special.*<sup>18</sup>

It was hard to give an opinion and they would better ask the Crown Agents. Neither Palmer nor the Colonial Office wanted to allow Cyprus public opinion to be expressed in one way or the other. Cypriots’ sentiments of justice could be ignored, but not those of the House of Commons. The Colonial Office worried about a possible criticism from the British Parliament, which would put in question the procedure that excluded a public tender. The Colonial Office and Governor agreed upon a scheme and a Bill based upon some general comments of the Consulting Engineers, but on the terms that Secretary of State for the Colonies would agree to face Parliamentary questioning.<sup>19</sup> Still, there was no concrete proposal and designs other than the general frameworks already mentioned.

After a year of discussions, the Secretary of State agreed to face Parliamentary scrutiny, and asked for a copy of the so-called “scheme of the Government of Cyprus for a central station for generating electricity”. He was going to answer questions in the House of Commons on 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1938 on the matter. Richmond Palmer, in his answer, wrote that there was no such scheme “in existence or in contemplation for the establishment of a station of this nature”.<sup>20</sup> It seems that in one year the Colonial Office had lost contact with

---

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, Minute, 3<sup>rd</sup> July 1937

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, Minute to Secretary of State, 27<sup>th</sup> August 1937

<sup>20</sup> SA1:1283/38, Palmer to MacDonald, 14<sup>th</sup> November 1938

the issue, since they asked for the copy of the scheme “for a central power station”, which had not been referred to in any document of the previous year’s discussions. However, there were no concrete technical specifications for a power station and network. In his reply, Palmer gave the framework of his intentions with Callender’s. What was desired, he stated, was to pass a law that would:

*...facilitate generation and distribution of electrical power on large scale at low cost to consumers by laying down the provisions with which Companies which might be authorised to undertake such supply would be required to comply”<sup>21</sup>*

Palmer had probably made clear the terms and details of Callender’s proposal, but he was not giving any specific details. Additionally, his clear intention and expectation from an island-wide electrification concession were not so clear but he considered it as a means for economic development. The project was to grant a licence to Callender’s to “carry out certain undertakings Limassol and Larnaca Districts” and also if a place was found for a power house in Famagusta, “in respect of a portion of the Larnaca-Famagusta-Nicosia Districts”. This was the model of concessions that had been applied in many colonies, and previously it had been applied in Palestine.<sup>22</sup> This licence would give Callender’s the bulk of the island’s demand, major cities and towns.

In the meantime, the electricity supplier of Nicosia town, Nicosia Electric Company (NEC), must have contacted the Colonial Office in fear of losing its monopoly or possible competition with the forthcoming Bill. Nicosia Electric Company, after the publication of the draft Bill, had represented its concerns to the Governor, who avoided giving them a clear answer in relation with their rights under the regime of the new Law. Palmer suspected that the Parliamentary question was a product of the complaints of these “certain local private interests”; the biggest of these being the Nicosia Electric Company (NEC).<sup>23</sup> Palmer had no categorical answer to give to NEC.

While the Secretary of State was getting ready to answer questions in the House of Commons about the Bill and draft licence on 2<sup>nd</sup> November, an engineer entrepreneur, John

---

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> See, Introduction in Shamir, Ronen. 2013. *Current Flow: The Electrification of Palestine*. Stanford University Press

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

A. Purves, contacted Cyprus Committee representatives, of the office representing the Cyprus Government in London.<sup>24</sup> This was not his first attempt to obtain licence for generating electricity in Cyprus. He appears in Cyprus electrification matters several times in a period of twenty years. His first appearance was in 1929, when he asked for a grant to obtain all the electric power, telegraph and telephone concerns and erect a central power station to supply electricity.<sup>25</sup> In 1938 he proposed a new scheme and a different legislative form. According to him, water and electricity supplies must be covered with a more comprehensive law. A Bill in the shape of “Omnibus Bill to include both Water and Electricity” must be passed, which would be accompanied by the establishment of a Public Utility Board, on the lines of British Central Electricity Board. He contended that a separate Electricity Bill would force the Government to issue smaller acts more and more often, something that had happened in Britain. His proposal appeared to concentrate the powers and control over the supply and distribution in the hands of Government PUB, which would control and collect the production or/and storage of electricity and water, establish and maintain all the trunk water and electricity mains, and sell bulk supplies of water and electricity to authorised large distributors for retail.<sup>26</sup> This was the model of the British Grid, which will be elaborated below.

The Cyprus of the 1930s did not have large-scale, technologically complicated networks and infrastructures. The road network was under the control of the Public Works Department, sea-ports were under the Comptroller Department, and the Cyprus Government Railway was a separate government department. Thus, in theory, the Government would have the means of production and sources of these commodities and sell them in bulk, guaranteeing low prices and constant revenue for the interests over the capital fund. This was in line with the existing governance regime. In addition, PUB would have the Governor as chairman, and representatives from the private sector and labour. Also, a separate Statutory Company (as in the Japanese example of the period) would be established, with representatives from the Board to deal with the distribution, thus giving power to the Government on retail. In relation to the compulsory purchase – the right of the

---

<sup>24</sup> According to the article of Statesman newspaper, 21<sup>st</sup> January 1941, Purves had established a construction company working, manufacturing and marketing of peat, cement, concrete bricks and other construction materials. See SA1: 1318/29,

<sup>25</sup> SA1:1318/29, Trade Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 1<sup>st</sup> November 1929,

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, Purves to Thorne, 24<sup>th</sup> October 1938

Government to buy the undertakings – which was in the draft Bill, he suggested more definite terms for the legislation. Compulsory purchase, as a potential in the legislative arsenal of the State, had been added by Palmer in the draft. This clause gave the State the right to buy undertakings, especially small ones, to allow distribution under the control of the State. Purves' claim was that this was the modern trend in the most developed countries of Europe.<sup>27</sup>

Purves lobbied for Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners for civil engineering works and Messrs Kennedy and Donkin for electrical work. He tried to push for a combined law in order to bid for the construction works of the whole proposed system: hydro-electric stations, irrigation projects and power stations/network. It seems that, in the first instance, he managed to halt the procedure concerning Callender's proposal. The Colonial Office needed the advice of Consulting Engineers and delayed the question in the House of Commons. The Colonial Office being problematized with the new proposal, but having severe doubts about its realisation, sought advice from the Crown Agents. The Crown Agents, in their reply, had the opinion that there was not enough information to see whether water and electricity could be married in Cyprus. However, based on their experience in Cyprus, they found the proposal uncertain and combining electricity with irrigation would most probably be disappointing.<sup>28</sup> The last despatches in December 1938 within the Colonial Office show that Purves'<sup>29</sup> contentions were not persuasive and the scheme of Callender's would be approved if Cyprus agreed with the revisions of the draft Bill and licence.<sup>30</sup> There would be no tender and Callender's would be granted with a licence to establish undertakings serving also Famagusta district and the eastern part of Nicosia district. Thus in other words, Callender's would be acquiring the "cream of the load" by serving the largest cities of the island. However, the Second World War broke only a few months after these considerations and no progress was made until 1945 and the announcement of the first 10-year development programme. The only material outcome of this short history of Callender's and Cyprus electrification, was the law named "The Electricity Law 1940".

---

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Spiller to Williams, 1<sup>st</sup> December 1938

<sup>29</sup> He showed up in the files in 1948 when the general electricity grid scheme was put into realisation. He was asking assistance for meeting people in Cyprus where he would be for holiday.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

While the War spread to every country around Cyprus, with the only exception of Turkey and herself, the scheme was put on hold. The Cyprus Government, in 1938, informed the Callender's Company that the draft Order approved licencing the company authority to generate and transmit electricity in Larnaca and Limassol Districts. Also, whenever a suitable site was found in Famagusta, an Order with similar terms would be issued to cover parts of Larnaca, Famagusta and Nicosia. Until 1940 the approval was given for enactment of a revised bill and the enactment took place on 15<sup>th</sup> October 1940 (the provisions of Law came into operation on 1<sup>st</sup> May 1940).<sup>31</sup> In the same year, the Company informed the Government that under the circumstances the Mediterranean region faced, the erection and manufacture of the plant was a difficult matter, but their intention to proceed with the proposed scheme, when possible, was unchanged. The Government, on 6<sup>th</sup> August 1941, informed the Company that developments in the war conditions around the Mediterranean affected the establishment of electricity undertakings and, under present conditions, the project should remain in abeyance for the time being. Callender's were also told that no grant would be issued. Callender's replied in January 1942. The Company reminded them that they had spent considerable sums of money in connection with the investigation of the project, therefore it wished to state again that it still desired to proceed with the Order as soon as the Government considered it possible to do so.<sup>32</sup>

## **Part 2: The making of the Island-wide Electricity Grid Scheme: 'the Government is doing on its behalf'**

The first part showed us that the electrification of the island had become an issue that would need substantial policy-making. The Cyprus Government had never been interested in making a step in all these years. The reasons must have been rather trivial. Newspapers of the period show no sign of any public cry for electrification; main cities, towns and Government departments had already been supplied in one way or the other;

---

<sup>31</sup> SA1: 509/32

<sup>32</sup> CO 67/325/2, Woolley to Stanley, 27<sup>th</sup> February 1945

mines as the heavy power consumers had their own generating plants. Since then, the electrical energy regime of the island had been regulated lightly,<sup>33</sup> and state intervention was only at the level of giving grants to local public or private companies. This policy had been based on low-voltage supply with small scale networks of distribution carried out in ad-hoc manner. Callender's proposal and the discussions that followed were about something new: large-scale production and distribution of electricity. Callender's proposal was not the first, but it was the first one to make its way up to the Governor and Colonial Office for serious consideration. However, the war had brought the matter of electrification to a halt, indicating that neither Cyprus nor the Colonial Office considered it vital or beneficial in time of war. Of course, the whole region in which Cyprus is located (with the exception of Turkey), had been transformed into battlefields, especially regions like Egypt and Palestine that were places of proximity with organic, colonial and economic ties. This must have been a prohibiting factor in the negotiations with Callender's. Cypriot electrification was not a priority in wartime.

## **2.1 Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1945 (CD&W Act) and Cyprus Ten-year Development Programme**

The post-war period of colonial policy is marked, amongst many others, mainly with comprehensive colonial development and welfare projects. This was officialised with the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CD & W) of 1945. The post-war Labour Government in the UK launched a programme of economic and social development which intended to boost the material and social conditions of the colonies and their natives. This was the continuation of the change of policy in 1940 when it was marked with the CD&W Act of 1940. The latter has been read as a "redirection of colonial policy...towards an approach that aimed to be interventionist and, innovative and modernizing in its pursuit of political,

---

<sup>33</sup> "There is at present no law in Cyprus of general application which empowers the Governor to grant licences for the erection of power houses and for the supply of electrical current to consumers, the requirements of Municipal Areas being met either by the Municipal Corporation concerned or by Companies under contract with the Municipal Corporations." CO 67/278/9, Palmer to Gore, 9<sup>th</sup> April 1937.

economic and social reform in the colonies”.<sup>34</sup> The CD & W Act 1945 aimed to act twofold. On the one hand, it would show that British imperialism was dead, at least in the form in which it was known until then, and on the other hand, by mobilising colonial resources, it would, as hoped by its architects, help to recover the metropolitan economy which was facing a currency crisis.<sup>35</sup>

On a more ethical or traditional and ideological level CD&W was reflecting the co-operation of Tory paternalism and Labour statism in the changing of the global conjecture. Before any colony was given self-government, it was Britain’s duty, according to the old concept of ‘trusteeship’, to produce the infrastructure for a “good” government. Immediate liberation would end in a political chaos.<sup>36</sup> It was in this general framework that the CD&W Act 1945 was announced.

In Cyprus, the general policy on the future of the island was to coincide with this policy of colonial development. The policy towards the future of the island was not foreseeing self-government but some kind of autonomy in internal matters while security and international relations were to be under total British control.<sup>37</sup> In view of the current and future withdrawals of British sovereignty from the soils of Egypt (1952-1955) and Palestine (1948), Cyprus was becoming gradually “the last British soil” in the region. Cyprus was being transformed from a backwater into a major geostrategic asset – a fortress colony – in the Middle East. Development was a way to consolidate further the colonial regime of the island. Development of Cyprus was important for imperial reasons rather than its direct financial effect on the metropolitan economy.

The internal situation in Cyprus was tense and uncertain in the wake of the post-war period. On this subject, there is no need to go deeper in analysis since it was mentioned in Chapter 2. However, it is helpful to point out the main characteristics that occupied the

---

<sup>34</sup> Clarke, Sabine. 2007. “A Technocratic Imperial State? The Colonial Office and Scientific Research, 1940–1960.” *Twentieth Century British History* 18 (4): 453–80

<sup>35</sup> Heinlein, Frank. 2002. *British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind*. Cass, pp. 27-30

<sup>36</sup> Porter, Bernard. 2012. *The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-2004*. Harlow: Longman, p.300.

<sup>37</sup> For a detailed account of post-war British proposal and discussion of a Cyprus constitution see Κατσιαούνης, Ροζάνδος. 2000. Η διασκεπτική 1946-1948: με ανασκόπηση της περιόδου 1878-1945. Κεντρον Επιστημονικών Ερευνών Κυπρου.

socio-political climate in Cyprus. During the war and, especially after, there was a tendency to ease the politically suffocating regime of the so-called 'Palmerocracy' of the interwar years. The municipal elections had been made after a decade and the left wing political party, AKEL, had proven to have significant popular support. The rise of AKEL ran simultaneously with the rise of the labour movement and the latter's militancy. Greek Cypriot nationalism was reviving in the form of *enosis*, which was gradually occupying the leftist agenda as well, a new development in the leftist politics of previous decades. However, not just Greek nationalism but Turkish nationalism as well, was establishing its first serious institutions and set its path to mass popularization.

As the Left, as in the case of the miners' strike, was transgressing the ethnic borders, nationalism was to infiltrate and break up the Left space on the grounds of ethnicity. Last but not least, much enthusiasm was provoked in nationalist circles by the announcement of the Atlantic Charter on the right of self-determination of nations. Thus in this climate, in the autumn of 1945, the Colonial Office contemplated many development schemes touching every aspect of the island's life and economy "with a sense of urgency".<sup>38</sup> This sense of "urgency" would run up through the electrification scheme. A reading of "Proposed New Policy for Cyprus" is helpful for understanding the British case. In this memorandum, the Colonial Secretary drew a rough picture of the situation in the island (i.e. the rise of Left and *enosis* sentiment, geostrategic concerns and possible Russian engagement in the region etc.) and explained to the British Cabinet the purpose of CD&W in the framework of Cyprus reality.<sup>39</sup> British Empire historian Roger Louis summarises it plainly:

*...the long-range weapon to be used in a potentially violent situation would be the Colonial Development 1945.*<sup>40</sup>

The political conditions in the island and developments around her had created this call for urgent, effective policy-making and exercising in Cyprus. Not just the British Cabinet, Lord

---

<sup>38</sup> Under-secretary Creech Jones wrote that "the whole unhappy problem of Cyprus would have to be taken in hand at an early date."

Louis, William Roger. 1985. *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism*. Oxford University Press, p.213

<sup>39</sup> CAB 129/11

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

Winster and the Colonial Office, Woolley too had been aware that the situation needed immediate action.<sup>41</sup>

The issue for us is to understand is the way the electrification scheme was inscribed in this political setting and how the colonial politics structured its socio-technical character. In the electricity sector we find that there was a demand for urgent decisions and actions and this turned out to be a matter of pressure, not only by Woolley's strategy but also his successor's, Lord Winster's, agenda too. Besides the difficulties appearing in the existing supply regime, the electrification scheme, like the ten-year development programme, was a priority policy to be enacted and completed.<sup>42</sup> It was also represented as a scheme that other projects' progress would be dependent on. As we separate the moves of the Cyprus Government, embodied in the letters and reports sent by Governors and the Colonial Secretary, from the somehow ponderous Colonial Office, they would prove this hastiness. What Cyprus did was to prove to the Colonial Office that this project must be materialised the sooner the better, despite its cost.

Another basic element in the strong belief for developmental policy was the long tradition of the British official perception of rural Cyprus. In the ten-year programme many

---

<sup>41</sup> The "urgency" appears from 1944. For Luke from the Colonial Office speaks to the Treasury about the Ten-year development programme:

"The position in which we find ourselves in Cyprus is difficult. In this letter it will suffice to say that the Secretary of State has promised to make a full statement on the future of the Colony and that in it he will deal explicitly with the movement for union with Greece. This movement has been fruitful cause of internal discord for many years in Cyprus and any statement will be closely examined by the Foreign Offices of other countries. In these political circumstances it is quite necessary that the statement in the House of Commons should contain a general reference to the development of the Colony and its resources, and that we should publish both parts of the Development Report at once."

"We must publish the Reports for reasons of external and internal policy as a matter of urgency; and I wish(?) now to tell you of the SoS's coming statement which will include a mention that the policy of development in Cyprus will continue by means of grants under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, by local loans and from revenue." CO 67/328/12, Luke to Treasury, Russels, 8<sup>th</sup> August 1946.

Woolley speaks to Secretary of State on the establishment of Development Commission:

"I am however most anxious to make an early start. This is desirable not only to get preparatory work under weigh with least possible delay but also to convince public that Government is pursuing active and constructive policy. In my opinion it is politically important that Government should maintain initiative following on publication of Wages Commission report". SA1 :S3/1/1944, Governor to Secretary of State (SoS), 28<sup>th</sup> June 1944

<sup>42</sup> Luke in his same letter talks about the electrification scheme as:

"But this [ten-year development programme] is not all, for we have now under examination an electrification scheme which the CE estimate at 3,351,000, but which it might be possible to limit 1,830,600. This is not included in either part I or part ii of the Reports which I enclose...We are not ready to put forward this scheme, but it must be kept in mind; to finance it we are thinking of a local loan and for its administration we have an idea of an Electricity Board which might employ some well know firm as its executive agency" *Ibid.*, Luke to Russels, 8th August 1946

projects were taking into account the development of the rural areas of Cyprus. The significance of rural Cyprus in the ten-year development programme, was related directly to the traditional British perception in connection with the enosis (for the latter see Chapter 2). As a traditional British official opinion, running through generations of administration officers, enosis was not considered to be an authentic movement with a strong organic basis in the smaller towns and villages.<sup>43</sup> The same ideology applied to the top British officials in Cyprus at the start of the developmental politics, the Colonial Secretary at Nicosia Roland Turnbull and Governor Lord Winster (but also his predecessor Woolley). Although they were two different politicians and personalities, they both believed that enosis was not an “authentic movement”.<sup>44</sup> Thus the British ideology of enosis being an urban movement automatically considered rural Cyprus, the majority of the population, a vital space for the continuation of the British rule. According to this line of thought, since enosis had not yet conquered the rural Cypriot, the Government could gain his heart by material means. The aim of gaining the consent of the rural Cypriot and the further consolidation of British rule passed through developing rural Cyprus. The Government itself had to create a wealthier rural Cyprus equipped with the most ‘modern’ means, like electrification, to show her benefits. Long human history showed that practice and theory did not always walk hand in hand.

The motto of the post-war Cyprus Government was “the Government is doing on its behalf” and, as Woolley believed, it had to show “the advantages of membership [of] Commonwealth for a small island”.<sup>45</sup> We can summarise the spirit of British colonial development in the particularity of Cyprus with the words and actions of Lord Winster, who was very enthusiastic with the announced ten-year development programme. The Governor, being a career politician, was devoted to the application and convinced of the good of the development programme in Cyprus. He had appointed a public information

---

<sup>43</sup> The confusion expressed by Ivan Lloyd Phillips, the district commissioner for Nicosia in 1949–51, is typical of that of many colonial officials. ‘It is difficult to attempt an estimate of how deep-seated the “enosis” movement really is,’ Lloyd Phillips wrote to his father in England. ‘Much of it is clearly emotional, but it lacks economic inducement and in the countryside, apart from a display of Greek flags, one sees little positive desire for it’. Morgan, Tabitha. 2010. *Sweet and Bitter Island: A History of the British in Cyprus*. London ; New York : New York : I. B. Tauris, p. 202. See also Holland, R. F, and Diana Weston Markides. 2008. *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850-1960*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>44</sup> Louis, 1985, *op. cit.*, p.219.

<sup>45</sup> Yiangou, Anastasia. 2012. *Cyprus in World War II: Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean*. London: I. B. Tauris, p.140.

officer to publicise government works in an attempt to convince the public that “substantial material improvement is underway” and that “the Government was doing on its behalf”. He was to challenge his subjects to compare Cyprus with the neighbouring regions:

*... [compare] other countries in Mediterranean, and ask where more is being done about soil erosion, about water, forest and health. Let our critics tell us where things are better. I shall not be afraid of the comparison”.*<sup>46</sup>

Having framed the origin and purpose of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 for Cyprus (of the electrification scheme in Cyprus as well) we can now pass to analysing its localisation. As mentioned earlier, the scheme was not in the first part of the ten-year development programme that was prepared by the Development Commissioner for Cyprus, Sir Douglas Harris.<sup>47</sup> Part 1 of the Ten-Year development programme was scheduled to be prepared from 1944, and it was completed by 1945 when Harris had resigned from his duty. Harris’ appointment was also marked with the Cyprus political peculiarities. By 1944 Cyprus had several schemes for application to the CD&W grants, but it was not a comprehensive development programme. The Colonial Office asked for a commission to be set up in Cyprus to prepare a complete and comprehensive development programme for the island. This commission, according to the Colonial Office, should also involve non-officials, meaning Cypriots as well. The Secretary of State was willing to encourage the “non-official opinion” in the reconstruction plans, and this was all the more significant in Cyprus where there was no platform for public political expression. Their exclusion was against his general policy.<sup>48</sup> Governor Woolley was negative about this policy in the face of what he called, the “peculiar circumstances of Cyprus”. Besides other things, he did not want to lose time:

*I am however most anxious to make an early start. This is desirable not only to get preparatory work under way with least possible delay but also to convince public that Government is pursuing active and constructive policy. In my opinion it is politically*

---

<sup>46</sup> Morgan, 2010, *op. cit.*, p.201

<sup>47</sup> See SA1:668/45/2 A. Douglas Harris had also prepared a development programme for Uganda in the same year.

<sup>48</sup> SA:S3/1/1944 , Secretary of State to Governor, 28<sup>th</sup> January 1944,

*important that Government should maintain initiative following on publication of Wages Commission report.*<sup>49</sup>

He explained to the Secretary of State that the leading personalities were either in the nationalist camp or with AKEL and Trade Unions, who were sceptical about co-operation with the administration.<sup>50</sup> He phrased it to the Colonial Secretary as follows:

*...but I am hopeful that opportunity for full discussion with the Commission of detailed plans for long-postponed major schemes of development and public welfare may do something to direct attention to more profitable channels than party strife and so-called national aspirations.*<sup>51</sup>

Finally, the decision reached between Cyprus and the Colonial Office was the appointment of Douglas Harris, who would not be sympathised with by the politicians but would presumably make fast progress on the issue. Sir Douglas Harris had been a development consultant who was, as in the case of Cyprus, drafting reports on economic and financial development programmes for the Colonies.<sup>52</sup> Thus the first part of the programme was determined by the Colonial Office through the appointment of Harris. The second part of the Ten-year development programme was the work of Cyprus Government officials. This Part II of the Programme did not involve the island-wide grid scheme as a clearly defined project. Electrification, like civil aviation, broadcasting, steamship services and reconditioning of the railway, was listed as an unspecified project for which there were no provisions contemplated. For Woolley, this was one of the major shortcomings of the report which did not include provisions:

*...for at least the most important item among these unspecified projects;...the electricity supply scheme...*<sup>53</sup>

By the time of this statement, the electrification scheme had been under consideration for at least 9 months.

---

<sup>49</sup> Woolley, in the typical mood of a Governor of the post-war period, was in hurry to start the development programme to show that the Government was working for the island in the sight of the political developments of Cyprus. He was obvious in his communications. *ibid.*, Governor to SoS, 28th June 1944

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, Governor to SoS 4<sup>th</sup> February 1944.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, Governor to Colonial Secretary (CS), 15 January 1944.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, Governor to SoS, 5 September 1944.

<sup>53</sup> CO 67/328/12, Woolley to George Hall, 7<sup>th</sup> June 1946.

## 2.2 No skimming the cream off: Cyprus has a new [electricity] policy

The first communications on the matter appear in 1945.<sup>54</sup> The Cyprus Government had taken the initiative and opened the matter of electrification with the Colonial Office. This was a significant period in the post-war imperialism of Britain marked with colonial development and welfare projects. Cyprus had already been visited by a Development Commissioner in 1944, who had surveyed the economy and development prospects, and that year the Cyprus Government had established a development commission.<sup>55</sup> By mid-1944 Cyprus had several development projects listed in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act.<sup>56</sup> Most of the projects were health, education and agriculture related schemes. The electrification would not be included in the list of projects funded by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. This would be a mainly Cyprus project located in the spirit of colonial development.

The first thing that draws our attention is the change in the policy, in which the Governor wanted to by-pass Callender's, from which he was expecting an approach for the renewal of the negotiations that had started in 1937.<sup>57</sup> Sir Charles Woolley, the Governor (1941-1946), wrote to the Colonial Office that it would be a "mistake" to realise Callender's scheme, which would create a system of small generating plants in the island. Woolley saw an opportunity, an item that fitted perfectly to his Government's new policy: state-driven development and welfare projects. According to him, in an island with a relatively small – limited – size, in the interest both of "economy and of general development is central generation and an island-wide grid system". While naming the way forward for electrification, the Grid, he added that "far-reaching benefits...would be derived in Cyprus from a scheme of this nature".<sup>58</sup> Far-reaching benefits were imagined on both the economic and political level: electrification was both a means and a complement to economic development, and a massive enterprise to present the Government's capabilities and will. These 'far-reaching benefits' would be made clear later on. The Governor put also the

---

<sup>54</sup> CO 67/325/2

<sup>55</sup> SA: S3/1/1944, Governor to Colonial Secretary, 15<sup>th</sup> January 1944.

<sup>56</sup> See CO 67/329/7

<sup>57</sup> It must be noted that the whole Callender's proposal was based on a concept of electrification rather than concrete technical details. There was no specification of the technical aspects of the proposal.

<sup>58</sup> CO 67/325/2, Governor Woolley to Oliver Stanley, 27<sup>th</sup> February 1945,

question of “public” or “private” and forwarded this as a “question of principle” to the Colonial Office. Woolley was missing something in this question: ‘public’ and ‘private’ was a British dichotomy. As we will see in the conclusion, for the Greekcyriot nationalist camp this ‘public’ meant ‘state’, thus British and colonial. As we will see in part three, the Greekcyriot opposition front would mean municipally-owned networks when they talked about the ‘public’ way of electrification.

This dichotomy was a strategy to open up the discussion for a scheme of public/state enterprise. The Governor defended his position on establishing a publicly-owned electrification scheme for the whole of the island. He argued that there was the advantage in a Government-owned operation since this would give her decision making power on distribution and planning. Thus, he continued, Government could ensure that the interests of the rural consumers would be paid due regard and the advancement of undeveloped areas which, for him, might not motivate a private company who would be looking for quick returns on capital expenditure.<sup>59</sup> This is one of the basic post-war Cyprus Government policies; it was based on a certain ideology. However, he added, the Government may not be the best agent to undertake such a work of this magnitude, for which a company could have more experience in establishing, operation and management than a Government Department. In other words, if Cyprus had the technical knowledge, there would be no second thoughts on private concession. In post-war Cyprus Government policies, the Government had to show that it was ‘doing on its behalf’.

Woolley made another argument that reveals his intentions for establishing a public enterprise. In 1945, Cyprus was to be given a ten-year development programme which would also be financed by Developments Grants for the Colonies (CD&W Act). In the light of the findings of the Development Commissioners who surveyed development opportunities of Cyprus, there were many, apart from the electrification, sound and desirable projects for the island. Woolley argued that in the face of many development projects which, to some extent, might depend upon the supply of electricity, there had to be more discussion on utilising private capital in order to secure the interests of development.<sup>60</sup> Thus, in a way, with the last argument, he was marrying the development of Cyprus and the future of the

---

<sup>59</sup> *ibid*

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*

development programme with the electrification scheme. In the end, the Governor proposed that if Callender's was ready to proceed, it must send an expert to Cyprus for surveying, and it must be made clear to them that Government required a full island-wide electrification scheme and not small concessions. In the case of the company not being willing to take part in a scheme of this nature, he further added, the Government would approach the matter with an independent investigation. Alternatively and desirably, he continued, the Government could apply to the Crown Agents to select a suitable person to carry out the investigation without further commitment to the company. The Cyprus Government was demanding urgent action from the Colonial Office for the investigation. Finally, he proposed that the Government should take the initiative if the agreement with the company was still enacted, so that the Government should be "fully armed" with a survey against the company until it re-opened the issue.<sup>61</sup> The Governor had the political will to defend his policy, and armed with a survey he could also present technical arguments.

The Colonial Office (CO) dealt with the letter almost immediately. From the discussions between the Crown Agents (CA), CO and Preece Cardew & Rider, the Consulting Engineers (CE), we get some sense of the common opinion on Cyprus electrification. First of all, it was not clear to them whether there were potential industries stimulated by cheap power supply in an island "half the size of Wales".<sup>62</sup> Another view regarded that the consumption would be from lighting which may have a doubtful amount of demand. CO regarded that Cyprus had committed, to some extent, to Callender's where the withdrawal of Cyprus from its position would be considered rather embarrassing. However, the official opinion in the minutes of inter-Colonial Office discussion on the ownership of the scheme was in agreement with that of Woolley.

This opinion considered that it was better for the Government to undertake the scheme because the company would want to take, as one official formulated, the "cream of the load", i.e. to supply light and power only in "congested areas where there was already considerable existing demand". It was also noted that such a company would take the profit outside of the country which would, in the case of a public enterprise, be directed again into

---

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, Minute to Luke, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1945

the utility. On the last point, officials added that, in the conditions of Cyprus where there was “no political interference” from the locals – unlike Ceylon, which was given as an example of a place of political interference – there was much to be said for Government dealing with a project like this. Politically it was correct but there was also a ‘but’: economics. As in many cases Colonial Office inclined to do, they noted that Cyprus did not have the funds for a project like this and the Government had no alternative to give it to a firm on the condition of compulsory purchase after a certain period of time.<sup>63</sup> These were the first thoughts of the Colonial Office which was, as seen, in contradiction to its policy and realism. A gloss of contradictory inertia in the makings and thoughts of the CO would continue in the course of the Cyprus electrification scheme.

After the letter, the Colonial Office, as usual, sought the advice of the Crown Agents (CA) who hired Preece Cardew & Rider<sup>64</sup> Consultant Engineers for recommendations.<sup>65</sup> This began the long involvement of Preece and Cardew in Cyprus electrification. Preece Cardew & Rider recommended that an independent expert should be sent for a survey of the possibilities of electrification. In their letter to CA, the consultants made comments that would support the Governor’s concerns. The engineers argued that Callender’s scheme as a commercial concern would not take interest in constructing networks in rural areas, as the Governor wished to do. Rural areas would not be expected to bring sufficient revenue for covering working costs and satisfying shareholders. Consequently, they considered that a survey from the company would be “unduly pessimistic” and an independent surveyor should be appointed. Alternatively, Callender’s could be given the contract and Government would subsidize it in the initial stages of rural electrification.<sup>66</sup>

Upon these comments, the Crown Agents proposed to the Colonial Office to appoint an engineer for a report “on the feasibility of an island-wide distribution scheme on Grid lines” as suggested by the Governor. CA suggested the name of J.O. Hall, Chief Electrical Engineer of Public Works Department of the Nigerian Government, for the survey of the

---

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> Preece Cardew & Rider, electric power and telecommunications specialists, was founded in 1893 by Arthur Henry Preece and later joined by his father Sir William Preece, engineer in chief to the General Post Office, Major Phillip Cardew, electrical advisor to the Board of Trade, and in 1915, by electrical engineer John Hall Rider.

<sup>65</sup> *ibid.*, Crown Agents (CA) to Barton, 12<sup>th</sup> May 1945, Jaxton Barton is the head of Mediterranean Department of the Colonial Office.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, Preece, Cardew & Rider to Crown Agents, 4<sup>th</sup> May 1945

island and an accurate assessment of power and lighting load in rural areas.<sup>67</sup> These two proposals of the Crown Agents would mark the Cyprus electrification history. The Crown Agents were naming the structure and the nature of the electrification system of the island, and involving Hall in his long Cyprus career. During the communications between CA, CO and CE, there was the dominant view that Callender's could not disagree with a report by the Consultant Engineers and that Callender's would be allowed to choose whether they accepted an island-wide grid-scheme. CE confirmed the CO officials' opinion that Callender's would be thinking of the interest of their shareholders and so to "skim the cream off" the island's supply.<sup>68</sup>

### 2.3 Different ideas to 'monopolise' the Grid

Until this point, the demand of the Governor for materialising a 'public' initiative project slowly took its shape. The Colonial Office agreed on a report from a so-called independent engineer, who was J.O. Hall of the Nigerian Government. The common opinion was that a private enterprise would make investment with the scope of getting the more efficient revenues, but the Government demand was to supply the whole island with an emphasis on the rural areas.

As recommended by the Crown Agents J.O. Hall was hired to do a survey on "the feasibility of an island-wide distribution scheme on Grid lines" which he completed in October 1945 and submitted to the Crown Agents and Colonial Office. The report drew a general picture of the electrical power regime of the island town by town (for the existing power generators in the Island see Table 1. at the end of the chapter). There were analyses of the power capacities and distribution networks of each power undertaking that was operating in the island for the time being. Hall calculated that the total demand existing on the island amounted to 7,385kW and the aggregate output at 42,438,130 kWh. According to his estimates, in a period of ten years, the amount of demand from an island-wide distribution scheme would be 25,290 kW and the output 97,524,000 kWh. He based these

---

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, CA to Under-Secretary of State, 12<sup>th</sup> June 1945

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, Minute between Mr Keen and Mr Billiard and Mr Pickworth and Mr Barton, 9<sup>th</sup> June 1945,

estimates on the expansion of the existing undertakings by the development of lighting, domestic and power loads encouraged by the “attractive rates” for electricity and the introduction of schemes whereby it was possible for “persons with medium and small incomes” to wire their houses and use electrical domestic appliances such as refrigerators and water heaters.<sup>69</sup> The small incomes category for the period meant peasantry, city-dweller labourers and miners of both communities, whereas persons of ‘medium income’ would range from city-dweller civil servants to small town merchants and tradesmen. In addition to ‘powering’ small incomers’, Hall also noted that the system would provide the facilities for electrically-driven irrigation pumps and motors for industrial production. The rest of the report contains suggestions for suitable sites for the plant to be erected. On this matter Hall commented that the place of the site would be contingent upon whether or not the Cyprus Mining Company was prepared to take its supply needs from the general grid. For him, this factor would change the overhead costs and maintenance charges of the transmission system since the company’s consumption would be quite substantial.

While slowly being “by-passed” by the Cyprus Government, in early 1946, Callender’s re-opened the matter and demanded a grant of Orders under Electricity Law 1940.<sup>70</sup> In fact, Callender’s was opening the negotiations by announcing that they were ready to modify the drafts prepared before the war. The Governor, in his communication with the Colonial Office, demanded the report of Hall so he could pursue the tactic of having an upper hand in negotiations with Callender’s.<sup>71</sup> The report would show him the feasibility of a central grid scheme, which would cover also the rural areas and prove that the Government had moved on to its own plans in relation to the electrification scheme since the war.

Eventually, he proposed to the Colonial Office to give an answer to Callender’s that would state that the Government had re-examined its position and recognised the benefits of an island-wide scheme instead of a partial plan. Then the Governor proposed a dilemma by stating that the company should consider its position whether they were ready for such a

---

<sup>69</sup> CO 67/325/2 , Report on Electrical Distribution Survey in Cyprus by J.O. Hall 25 October 1945

<sup>70</sup> In the meanwhile, General Electric Company Ltd approached the Colonial Office announcing their interest in any concession and equipment. General Electric was aware of the Callender’s position but since there was no agreement signed it was trying to get a piece in a possible island-wide grid scheme. CO 67/325/3, Preece, Cardew & Rider to CA, 19<sup>th</sup> February 1946.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* Woolley to Henry Hall, 11<sup>th</sup> March 1946

scheme or not.<sup>72</sup> The stance of the Governor clearly shows that the Cyprus Government was willing and pushing to undertake the whole scheme by itself, creating a monopoly in supply and distribution. To achieve this goal a report by an independent surveyor would be perfect at a time when colonies were in a position to find more and more funds.

The emphasis of the Governor on an urgent action of the matter was represented with supplementary reports by Cyprus Public Works Departments. One of those was a report on the urgent electrification need on the island, enclosed with the Governor's despatch for CO, prepared by the Conservator of Forests. The report drew a grim picture of the situation of Cyprus forests. The Conservator claimed that excessive grazing and wood exploitation had brought land erosion to a fearsome point. The report, written in the name of the Fuel Conservation Committee, explained that the war years and the oil fuel conservation imposed during these years had pushed people to wood fuel (i.e. cutting trees) for their energy requirements. Even if there was no fuel conservation policy, people would probably still be exploiting wood as an energy source, due to the harsh wartime economic situation. The Oil Conversion Committee had asked him to press the Government for an electrification scheme.<sup>73</sup> The report did not only play the environment card for the "picturesque colony" which would move the CO to some extent, but facilitated argumentation on social and industrial aspects of the issue.<sup>74</sup> The report argued that the efficient use of oil in industry preconditioned the use of electric current for driving forced air draught machines for efficient oil combustion, which could not be achieved with "forms of oil conversion of second class".<sup>75</sup> In closing, the report stressed how much the community would benefit from electrification and how the standard of living in Cyprus would be raised

---

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> "The Oil Conversion Committee understands that a practicable and comprehensive project for the electrification of Cyprus has been very carefully prepared but that it has got held up owing to some obstacles or opposition which it is thought should and could be speedily overcome". The report says that there is urgency for plentiful and cheap electric current in Cyprus; it must be implemented as soon as possible. The Committee urges the Government to eliminate the delay at this stage of the process when "it is essential to obtain general sanction and proceed with technical side of application before the hillsides are completely stripped and ruined". *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> British Cyprus was known for her forestry works. By the 1950s the colony had one of the most scientifically industrious Forestry Departments in the British Empire. Cyprus hosted tens of United Nations Food and Agriculture Conferences on forestry in the years between 1948-1960. See Bennett, Brett M, and Hodge. 2011. *Science and Empire: Knowledge and Networks of Science across the British Empire, 1800-1970*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. Cyprus was also a model for other colonial forestation works and forestry departments, like that of Palestine. See Barton, Greg. 2002. *Empire Forestry and the Origins of Environmentalism*, Cambridge University Press

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

while the wood fuel problem would be solved. Thus it combined the environmental urgency with social and economic development. In the end, the report demanded implicitly that the electrification scheme must be realised and current must be supplied by the Government because this was “in line with accepted modern experience that essential public services should all be state controlled”.<sup>76</sup> The Nationalisation Act of the Electricity Supply Industry of Britain was just months away, which clearly had biased the Cypriot officialdom, from the Governor to the Heads of the Departments.

While the Governor was pushing and trying to persuade the Colonial Office for an island-wide publicly owned and managed grid scheme, some industrial and financial giants were seeking a way to get a share of the pie. General Electric Company Ltd was lobbying to undertake the contract itself. The Colonial Secretary, Roland Evelyn Turnbull,<sup>77</sup> was being approached by Barclays Bank as well; it was offering to create finances, thus credit, for a probable project.<sup>78</sup> The Colonial Secretary (or Chief Secretary) was another political factor in the colonial administration, being the second most important official in the Colony, following the Governor. As the second most important man on the island and having direct communication with the Colonial Office, the Chief Secretary was a usual channel for lobbying and exercising pressure. In general lines, the position of Colonial Secretary in the electrification matter was in line with the Government. Turnbull was personally optimistic about the prospects of commercial development in Cyprus. He considered it short-sighted to make calculations only in the light of current power consumption prospects. Turnbull too

---

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> There are some comments about R.E. Turnbull made by Colonial Office officials and others in 1949. Sir John Martin noted that Turnbull had been much more open to Cypriot society than Governor Lord Winster. Turnbull had also served as Acting Governor before and after Winster.” Arthur Dawe, Deputy Under-Secretary of State of Colonial Office and superintendent of Mediterranean Department, described him as a ‘young but very competent man’. He was a career officer in the colonial service who later became the Governor of North Borneo. He possessed a dramatically different temperament from Winster’s.

Roger Louis describes him as follows:

“The clash of personalities caused friction in Nicosia. Turnbull passionately threw himself into the debate about Enosis. He canvassed opinions, Turkish as well as Greek, and reported at great length on the nuances of the political climate in Cyprus as he perceived them in football matches and religious services as well as political assemblies...Winster and Turnbull, whose ideas represented a wide current of post-war British thought on Cyprus, believed that only a minority of Greek Cypriots favoured Enosis.”

Louis, William Roger. 1985. *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism*. Oxford University Press, pp. 217-218

<sup>78</sup> CO 67/325/3, Turnbull to Martin, 18<sup>th</sup> March 1946

had his own ideas for the materialisation and organisation of a grid.<sup>79</sup> For Turnbull, industrial and commercial opportunities of the size appropriate for the island were not few. However, despite its cynicism, his last point was interesting as it expressed something of the spirit of his time. It was the year 1946, a time when the war had recently come to an end. The people of the colonial countries had been promised democracy and freedom, especially with the Atlantic Pact Agreement 1941 and the 68<sup>th</sup> year of colonial rule in the island, and Turnbull was reminding the Colonial Office of the welfare of the Cypriots. He told the Colonial Office that the people of Cyprus had long been neglected by the local people of wealth, “largely because of the suspicion most Cypriots entertain for their own kind”. However, he believed that, with the Government’s support, people would be given encouragement and a cheap electric power would be a very good incentive in this context.<sup>80</sup> His emphasis here on the people of wealth and the benefit of cheap electric power had a specific aim in mind. First of all he implied a duality of rural and urban. Since the crushing majority of ‘people of wealth’ were urban dwellers, they represented the city, which looked with suspicion on the ‘rural’ of his own kind. As I have already noted above, Turnbull was one of those colonial officials who believed in the ‘innocence’ of rural Cyprus in relation to the enosis matter. They considered ‘enosis’ a city aspiration. Thus, as a part of this British official rationale or ideology, the Government could act in favour of the rural people and make things more equitable. Of course, this encouragement would be mostly economical or, to some extent, social but not political.<sup>81</sup> Electrification of rural Cyprus and cheap electric power would mean, economically, power for irrigation and, socially, better means for households. These points would be repeated in the official loan paper of Cyprus for the Grid scheme which will be presented further below.

The Colonial Office seemed to like and consider the idea, that Turnbull supported, of “a scheme [which] could be worked out in collaboration with Barclay’s subsidiary Corporation for Overseas Development and that the Government and the public could take a part in such a scheme”. There had been examples of joint corporations financed by

---

<sup>79</sup>: “I have been playing with the idea of a Trade and Industry Organisation, with an Investment Corporation financed by Government and the public jointly, but I suppose if I put forward any such suggestion I should be told to go and join the Army?” *ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> We should remember that Cyprus had been given a Ten-year development programme but not a constitution. See Chapter 2 for discussions of Advisory Council about Cyprus constitution.

Government and public in colonial development projects like Sudan Plantations Limited, and Native Tobacco Board in Nyasaland. The Colonial Office wanted to hear more about the idea from Turnbull. In fact, the idea about joint corporations was being discussed quite a good deal between the Colonial Office officials, who were more inclined towards a central organisation on the level of all-colonies rather than local colonial organisations. The former must have been another indication of the tendency towards centralised and state-organised development that was occupying the colonial officers, and the greater part of Attlee's Labour Government.

## 2.4 The Grid is shaped: the Preece & Cardew and Taylor reports

For the Cyprus Government, Hall's survey was strategically the first step towards a concrete electrification scheme with maps, design, tenders etc. This was in line with the general procedure of how CE and CA worked in Cyprus from the beginning: a survey on the ground by an engineer accepted by all and a report from Consulting Engineers accompanied by comments from the Crown Agents.<sup>82</sup> The report of the Consulting Engineers was submitted to the Colonial Office in May 1946 and directed to the Cyprus Government for their consideration. The Preece Cardew & Rider report was based on the investigation of Hall and it forwarded a plan with estimates of the capital expenditure, annual costs of operation and also the revenue to be expected. The Consulting Engineers estimated that the mining purposes and public supply services throughout the island would create an estimated 22,000 kW demand at the end of a development period of ten years. They suggested that two plants should be erected, one at Larnaca with three 7,000 kW turbo generators and one at Xeros with two similar generators. The choice of two plants instead of one was justified by a vague argument about averting the black-outs in case of failure at one of the stations. The two sites were consistent with the suggestions of Hall who found them suitable for their access to fresh water and bulk oil supplies.<sup>83</sup> Xeros was also adjacent to

---

<sup>82</sup> Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 confirm this argument. In other words, this procedure was the standard Crown Agents system of which Cyprus was an old and faithful client. See Sunderland, David. 2007. *Managing British Colonial and Post-Colonial Development ; the Crown Agents, 1914-74*. Woodbridge, UK; New York: Boydell & Brewer.

<sup>83</sup> Hall did not have proposals concerning the design of the power station and the system of transmission and distribution. He provided estimates of future supply demand and survey of possible sites for the power station.

Cyprus Mining Company facilities, which were a possible mass consumer. Accordingly, the transmission system was proposed to be entirely overhead and comprise 3-phase 1,100 miles of 33 kV and 11 kV lines with transforming substations and low-voltage overhead lines for supplying the customers. The cost of the proposed system was calculated to be £3,351,000, of which £1,495,000 was for the power stations and £1,856,000 for the transmission and distribution system.<sup>84</sup>

For the progress of the scheme, they suggested proceeding in stages. This would give the opportunity to make alterations as the demand was shaped steadily by the consumers and communities. Alternatively, the scheme could be limited in the early years to supplying the existing consumers in the central part of the island. These were the largest consumers/producers then existing. The rest of the progress, then, would depend on the demand at the given time period. Consequently, the first stage would cost around £1,830,000. On the control of the development of supply, transmission and distribution, it was proposed to establish an Electrical Department, which would ensure that the 'people' were supplied with 'cheap' electricity. This organisation was proposed to be a central authority that would co-ordinate and develop supplies throughout the island, a government department organised as a commercial undertaking selling supply without loss or profit. This was a prototype of the British Electricity Authority. Furthermore, this central authority would acquire the existing undertakings and their networks; it would take the initiative for the electrification of rural areas in the first phase.<sup>85</sup>

For the first stage of the scheme, the report suggested the construction of a generating plant with three turbo generators, three boiler plants and one house oil engine at the site in Larnaca. The plant at Xeros was to be erected in the following stages. As to the transmission and distribution system, the proposed map for the Stage I and the whole scheme are shown in Plan 1 and Plan 2. From the first map we see that Stage I was

---

He estimated maximum demand obtaining from an island-wide distribution scheme after a period of ten years' intensive development as 25.920kW and output over the same period at 97,524,000kWh. This was an expectation of an increase of 18,770 kW in demand and 76,780,000kWh in output from the figures of 1945, which stood at 7.358 kW and 42.438.130kWh. These figures were on the currently electrified regions. Hall's estimate of demand arising from the electrification of new areas over a ten years period was 7.150kW and output 20,744,000kWh. Co 67/325/2, Report on Electrical Distribution Survey in Cyprus by J.O. Hall 25<sup>th</sup> October 1945

<sup>84</sup> CO 67/325/3, Report Messrs. Preece, Cardew & Rider on The Development of Electricity supply Services Throughout the Island of Cyprus, April 1946

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

constructed as a ring network that would connect the station at Larnaca with the main cities, except for Paphos, to supply the existing customers using the municipal and private networks in use. The Stage 1 would carry high-voltage transmission lines to the most densely populated areas of the island. These were the cities of Limassol, Larnaca, Famagusta and the capital. Besides these urban centres, one can also observe a 33,000kV transmission line going over the Troodos Mountain to Morphou district. This line was to supply the mine undertakings around Lefka town and on Mount Troodos (black line crossing the island in the middle). The Platres and Troodos regions on Mount Troodos were places where British communication installations and the Governor's house existed. Pano Platres and Kakopetria had been hosts for summer resorts which had electricity generators. Platres was also known as the summer hideout for the British officialdom and army officers on the island.



Plan 1. Extract from Preece, Cardew & Rider report. This is the proposed Stage 1. See that Grid's first direction of expansion is the load. Besides connecting every big town and city (except mountainous rural areas of Paphos and Karpasia), the transmission line passing over the Troodos Mountain links the Grid with heavy consumers like various mines and hotel resorts. CO 67/325/3

In short, the transmission grid of Stage 1 was designed to tap the existing supply. Stage 1 would simply connect every existing substantial electricity supply point except Ktima

and Stroumpi in the Paphos region. Paphos must have been excluded from the first stage because of the town's isolation by the mountains surrounding it and the town's municipal issue. Thus the objective was to sustain the highest possible load with the lowest amount of infrastructural expenditure, in the shortest time period, to achieve the maximum load to have a certain low production price. The Government had initially based its electrification case on the development and welfare of rural areas. However, the provisions of Stage 1 just showed that the Grid would be going after the already existing load: big towns, cities and mass consumers like mines, Government and military departments and hotels. Whether rural development was the cornerstone of the Government's ideology and scope of colonial development or not, in electrification it had to wait behind the city. Even in Stage 2, the Grid would extend to the villages adjacent to the major consumers, but it would exclude the Paphos and Karpasia regions, which were populated by a substantial number of small villages with agrarian economies. Only in Stage 3, which was projected to be realised in 15 or more years, would the whole of Cyprus be unified under one electricity grid.



Plan 2. Extract from the same report. We see that at Stage 2 the Grid extends to the nearest and most populous villages to the transmission lines. Again Paphos and Karpasia are not connected to the network. CO 67/325/3

The Crown Agents, in their report on the subject, proposed that Callender's could be given the ownership of distribution in some places, but they were very much inclined that

the company could be satisfied if given first the option of supplying equipment like cables, poles etc., which was their real interest.<sup>86</sup> The Colonial Office asked the Cyprus Government to produce thoughts and proposals on the cost of establishing the Electrical Department and finance which would be, in their view, a subject of reference to the Treasury. Additionally, the Colonial Office raised questions on four matters in particular to be answered by Cyprus: the bulk import and storage of oil fuel for the station, gathering up the existing sources of power supply into the grid system, the justification for two stations as recommended by the Consulting Engineers, and invitations to tender for material, with special reference to the position of Callender's.<sup>87</sup> At this point it seems that the Colonial Office had a growing interest in the scheme which was, still, merely an idea captured in a report. Previously, as we have seen, some in the Colonial Office had had doubts, and were even snide about the commercial/industrial opportunities of the island, "half the size of Wales", and the electrification scheme.

The Cyprus Government could observe this change; it acted immediately to definitely engage the Colonial Office in the scheme. Turnbull, coincidentally visiting in London, wrote to the Colonial Office and asked for a meeting in view of this growing interest. He enclosed also the preliminary review of P.P. Taylor, substantive Director of Public Works of the Cyprus Government, who happened to be in London coincidentally (!) like Turnbull.<sup>88</sup> It is important to see Taylor's report which would, as we will see, leave its fingerprints on the progress of the scheme. Taylor's comments on the report were not so positive. First of all, he considered the report disappointing and unable to provide any direction "as to the practical problems" : what was to happen to the existing plants of private companies which could be integrated to the scheme as auxiliary plants – reaching an agreement with the existing companies was a pre-condition of a grid project; no alternative estimates had been done for the capital and recurrent costs of turbo-generators as compared with Diesel generators, nor any satisfactory reason stated as to why the one plant suggested by Hall had been increased to two by the Consulting Engineers.

---


<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, CA to CO, 19th May 1946

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, CO to Cyprus Government, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1946,; *ibid.*, CO to Cyprus Government, 1st June 1946

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, London Office of Cyprus Government to Stockdale, 16th August 1946

Taylor, as a local official, had an insight into the first issue. He suggested negotiations on the legal, financial and technical issues to be left in the hands of one man well qualified and experienced to deal with these issues. Moreover, he accused the report of being a mere theoretical work, 'a text book report' as he named it, with no relation to the island's reality. As the Government's top engineer, he was concerned with emergent issues that lay ahead of him and his Government. The existing power regime was on the brink of collapse due to old machinery; Cyprus needed to manage the power supply in one way or the other till the new power station started feeding the transmission lines. As a man on the ground, he was foreseeing that compulsory acquisition was more than a method proposed in a report. Another point that made categorically against CE was why they had not given any reason for choosing two plants and offering a comparison of costs between Turbo-generators and diesel generators. This all showed him that Preece, Cardew & Rider did not understand either the existing conditions or the financial resources of the island. However Taylor, ironically, noted that despite its lacking, the report still showed that electrification (even under the present conditions), was a practical and economical proposition. The irony was his utilisation of the report. According to him, if the report had served to convince the Secretary of State then it had served its purpose; having served its purpose henceforth it could be disregarded. He suggested that a very experienced first-class engineer, "unbiased" and "commercial minded", having no company relations, prepare a report in one year. He proposed that this engineer must take into consideration all aspects of the scheme – such as technical, financial and legal – but not the construction and operation necessarily. He underlined that the expert would do all of these "in the Island" with the main objective of carrying the negotiations with the existing companies. Besides being practical, Taylor clearly pushed for the control of the decision-making to be transferred to Cyprus, giving him a more influential position in the project as the man on the ground; this fitted also with the policy of putting the stamp of the Cyprus Government on the scheme over and above competing

interest.<sup>89</sup> Hiring Consultant Engineers would render all the freedom in decision-making not only for the Cyprus Government but Taylor as well.<sup>90</sup>



Plan 3. The proposed Transmission and Distribution System for Cyprus after the completion of Stage 3 We see from the maps that Stage 3 was actually the connection of Paphos and Karpasia-North-East Messaoria region of Cyprus. . CO 67/325/3

## 2.6 Sealing off the ‘public monopoly’ deal

Taylor’s role was significant. As the head of the Public Works Department, he had the authority in matters of the infrastructure of the island. His approach and action proved to be those of a policy-maker rather than of an engineer. He proposed a policy for the realisation

<sup>89</sup> He recommended clearly that Government but not the Colonial Office should decide whether the expert’s report was practical or not. *ibid.*. Report of Acting Director of Public Works. 28<sup>th</sup> July 1946

<sup>90</sup> See The Political economy nationalisation: the electricity industry. by Martin Chick Millward, Robert, and John Singleton. 1995. The Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain, 1920-1950. Cambridge University Press.

of the electrification rather than giving technical advice; his main concerns were with management, operation, finance and law.<sup>91</sup>

The Cyprus Government would send its own report shortly and comment on the four questions raised previously by the Colonial Office. The report furnished for the Colonial Office was the result of the Governor's and his head technical staff's meeting: Substantive DPW Taylor, Acting DPW M.L.F. Weldon, The Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Mr A.N. Capner. The composition of the committee tells us a lot about how decisions were taken in Cyprus at a time when the central theme in politics was the constitutional issue – the Cypriot political representation.<sup>92</sup> On the state level Cyprus had a mixed regime of one-man dictatorship (the Governor) and oligarchy (the British Officials at the Heads of Government Departments). The report begins and ends with the same call for immediate action for the advice of a specialist on the scheme and existing reports. It mainly answered the questions directed by the Colonial Office: bulk oil fuel storage, existing sources of power supply, justification of two stations and the position of Callender's. On the first, we learn that the Cyprus Government was in negotiations with Shell Company and Socony Vacuum Company for erecting bulk petroleum installations at Larnaca, for which the former got approval in principle. Bulk storage plants were also an issue in the decision on the abolition of the Cyprus Government Railway. As to the second, which they called the “most important aim”, the Government was in disagreement with the recommendations of the Consulting Engineers, who must have thought that after the scheme was realised these undertakings would prefer to buy power in bulk from the Grid, since their generation would expectedly be expensive.<sup>93</sup> The Government desired to acquire all of the undertakings by compulsory acquisition, so it could apply the policy of having monopoly over the distribution and generation of power supply wherever the grid system was extended. Thus the Cyprus

---

<sup>91</sup> We can argue that Taylor's recommendations had also been influenced by the British Nationalisation Act, which was on its way at that time. The model of organisation and the work of the central authority resembled CEB in the matter of negotiations and legal issues and BEA in the structure and ownership of the production and distribution. This 'modern practice' – full state monopoly over electrification (nationalisation) – had suited perfectly with the developmental policy of the Cyprus Government.

<sup>92</sup> Between 1946 and 1948, there was some kind of a debate around giving Cyprus a constitution. This was a vague proposal from the Administration that resulted in the Consultative Assembly. The attendance to this assembly and the issues of autonomy and self-determination created conflicts within Greek-Cypriot politics. The Consultative Assembly failed to produce any results and failed.

For a detailed account of this history see. Κατσιαούνης, Ροζανδός. 2000. Η διασκεπτική 1946-1948: με ανασκόπηση της περιόδου 1878-1945. Κέντρον Επιστημονικών Ερευνών Κύπρου.

<sup>93</sup> *ibid.*, Woolley to Henry Hall, 15<sup>th</sup> August 1946

Government had in mind a ‘nationalisation’ scheme rather than the pre-nationalisation UK Grid model proposed by the Consulting Engineers. It was believed that the Government had to take ‘measures’, so the reduction in prices would pass to the consumers:

*The history of electricity supply undertakings in Cyprus has been such that it would be over sanguine to expect such action without a measure of coercion, yet the financial success of a central undertaking will depend on its ability to sell a sufficiently large number of units to make large-scale economies possible.*<sup>94</sup>

Rural electrification and cheap current were the two main promises of the Government with regard to electrification. The Government wanted show her subjects it was for their best interests. An absolute monopoly over the production and distribution suited these ends; it also suited the culture of governance. Such a policy required, the Governor claimed, compulsory acquisition of the existing undertakings and compensation for the legal and contractual rights, even at the expense of coercion. They would, then, be incorporated inside the Grid:

*The total amount payable for compensation would be large, but against it would be set off the tangible assets and additional earning power acquired in exchange.*<sup>95</sup>

The position of Callender’s took a small part in the report, where it was proposed that the company could tender for a part of the construction works to compensate their expenses incurred in preparing the past orders. Thus another step to clear away any private involvement in the structure and management would be taken.<sup>96</sup> One of most essential parts of the report is the end, where the Governor notes his intentions as to the nature of the management of the Cyprus Grid. Thus we learn that the Governor favoured “a

---

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> In case this solution was not feasible, it was proposed to give the Company compensation. The comments on plant number are as follows: The advisers of the Governor were not happy with the proposal of two stations since they believed that, firstly, one power plant proposal was sound and, secondly, two stations would have a greater cost. Mr Capner thought that it would be more economical both to install and operate one station; if constructed properly and maintained efficiently it would provide a very reliable supply. They considered that the second plant should be constructed when the load developed sufficiently to warrant the additional cost and operating expense. Capner suggested one plant with an initial equipment of 250kW house diesel set and three main sets of 7,000kW to 10,000kW with provision for extension to five sets as required. By doing this a saving of £35,000 a year from operating costs and £300,000 from the capital cost. In doing so, longer transmission lines would be necessary and consequently 66,000 volts instead if 33,000 would be used for high voltage transmission, transformers and gear. *Ibid.*

controlled public company for operating the grid supply”, which was an idea shaped after his communications with Mr C.J Thomas, The Comptroller of Inland Revenue, and Mr. Monson of the Economic Department of the Colonial Office.<sup>97</sup> According to the Governor, this undertaking must not be hampered by restrictions on management, finance and recruitment of personnel, which were inseparable from the operation of Government Department. Consequently, he suggested the following:

*...the establishment by law of a central authority, adequate power being taken to protect the interests of consumers and provision being made for effective Government intervention necessary. The authority would be empowered to raise the required capital and might well absorb within its framework some employees of those generating and distribution concerns which it would take over.*<sup>98</sup>

In order to make his proposal concrete, the Governor noted that he was ready to pay a salary up to £5,000 a year, an amount monumental for Cyprus, for a “first-class consultant electrical engineer”.<sup>99</sup> He argued that such a person was indispensable because there were conflicts of opinion, such as the number of stations, lack of competent professional advice in Cyprus, and the necessity of absorption of the existing undertakings.<sup>100</sup>

Upon this report, or rather the electrification policy paper, Chief Secretary Turnbull engaged himself actively in the decision shaping once again. In his “rough note on Governor’s despatch”, Turnbull attacked the proposal for a central authority and a monopoly on generation and distribution.<sup>101</sup> Turnbull argued that the arguments for such an establishment were not entirely justified. While agreeing on the protection of interest of consumers for services given and prices charged, he favoured achieving it through legislative means without the acquisition of the existing undertakings. Instead, the Government would

---

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>99</sup> This meant an engineer with firm technological knowledge; legal, financial and managerial mind and experience.

<sup>100</sup> So this engineer with the right background of experience would write a scheme in full detail. This expert he says must also undertake the negotiations with the existing electricity undertakings for their incorporation into the grid, so he had to be also an experienced administrator of electrical undertakings of the first rank. He proposed a one-year contract with option of extension, his duties would be to prepare a complete technical scheme, and conclude agreements with the existing undertakings. The Government would come to a decision on what manner would be the scheme after his report. He would not be needed for the execution since a less competent staff can manage to materialise it, he thinks. *ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, Turnbull to Luke, 31st August 1946,

undertake the distribution itself. In his proposals, Turnbull reveals the two pillars which his ideas were based on: the central authority owning a generating plant would undertake to pay for a guaranteed minimum volume of power from those undertakings which it does not desire to acquire, and, as a result, direct the actual output as required from the existing plants. By doing the latter, the relation between local demand and output of any plant would be cancelled, and the central authority would become the monopoly over the sale of bulk power.<sup>102</sup> Consequently, the existing companies would remain with their owners and no money would be spent on their acquisitions, which would lower the capital needed for the central authority. Lastly, he argued that the individual consumer would deal “directly and finally with a local organisation, and not with a distant impersonal central body”.<sup>103</sup> Turnbull’s model, thus created a pool of supply, which would be owned by the central authority but sourced from private and public plants. An existing plant would produce a certain amount of power for the Government and, in turn, buy power from the Government for the rest of the amount it needed to cover its local need. Turnbull ended his letter by informing that Metropolitan-Vickers<sup>104</sup> had suggested him to undertake the preparation of the technical scheme, which Turnbull regarded as a move to receive orders for plants in the future.<sup>105</sup> This was the second time Turnbull had revealed his possible contacts with industry.

After this flow of reports, proposals and comments over the Cyprus electrification scheme, the Colonial Office made a special meeting, which the Crown Agents attended as well. During this joint meeting some comments were produced on the Governor’s despatch and they were sent to Preece, Cardew & Rider for “taking practical steps to draw up a

---

<sup>102</sup> “The same prices would obtain for bulk power throughout the island, and its supply would be subject to general approval by the central authority of the services rendered and prices charged by the distributors”. *Ibid.*

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> Luke met with Mr Perry, a Director of Metropolitan Vickers who was a member of the Goodwill Trade Mission to Iraq and Cyprus. Perry was concerned with the course of the issue. Most conspicuous on the need of the island’s development was the adequate electricity supply. This view had been urged to him from all quarters especially from director of forests. His second point was the grant of a concession. He said this was wrong, the French in Syria has done it and they were in desperate situation now. An organisation managed either as government department or as an utility board in the lines of Britain. He thought it essential to have bulk oil installations, gather up existing undertakings in the grid, no justification for two plants, he said Vickers are interested in supplying equipment that could cope over the next two years. “On the other hand they were not interested in the possibility of a contract for the supply of plant for Cyprus and they were naturally concerned to know whether there would be scope for them to compete by tender with other firms”.

<sup>105</sup> “We can give them a fee for the report and have our hands free to give the project to other contractors”. He thinks that “whether a man can be found who is so experienced and is yet independent from any commercial organisation, seems to me somewhat doubtful”. *Ibid.*, Minute of E.V.Luke, 11th July 1946

scheme for the electricity supply of the Island”.<sup>106</sup> The Crown Agents were asked to inform Preece, Cardew & Rider that one power plant, as suggested by the Governor, should be considered due to high initial capital costs and doubts over the necessity of having two power stations – some of the existing plants could be utilized as back-up supply stations. In addition, it was agreed to seek an expert as the Governor had asked for. The result of this meeting showed that the Colonial Office favoured the opinion of its colony in a matter in which Cyprus had taken the initiative from the beginning.

In connection with the operation of the grid system, the Colonial Office was in agreement with the Governor on managing it through a non-government-department body. The Colonial Office considered that other alternatives, such as the control of an Electric Light and Power Board employing as its agent a local company subsidiary to a well-known English firm or some other form of central authority should also be considered. Upon the latter, the Crown Agents were asked to evaluate Turnbull’s latest despatch as an alternative reference and comment on it. While the Governor and his technical men, headed by Taylor, were acting on common ground, Turnbull was seen as a separate actor. He had his own ideas, different methods to realise them and personal contacts.<sup>107</sup> In the end, Preece, Cardew & Rider were given the Taylor report, the proposals of the Governor and Chief Secretary, and the results of the Colonial Office meeting. They were asked to express their opinion on each point raised in all of these documents. The outcome of their paper was proposals for alternative frameworks for each proposed grid organisation and management. In the face of a determined Cyprus which wanted to go on its own way, it was wise for them to offer solutions for all ideas. However, they mainly concentrated on a proposal of public monopoly from a legal point of view, such as in the case of Palestine or Northern Ireland. In this model of concessions, the Government granted the concessionaire to build supply, transmission and distribution systems while obeying the legislation and policy of the Government.<sup>108</sup>

In general lines, the Preece, Cardew & Rider paper was more about the legal and organisational dimension of the scheme rather than technical. For example, they suggested

---

<sup>106</sup> *ibid.*, Barton to Crown Agents, 5th September 1946,

<sup>107</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> For the Palestinian case, see Shamir, Ronen. 2013. *Current Flow: The Electrification of Palestine*. Stanford University Press.

several relative Electricity Public Acts for the creation of a public body and public control of electricity supplies in dominions.<sup>109</sup> As far as the Consulting Engineers understood, the main idea was not a full public monopoly from the construction of the Grid system to supply, transmission, distribution and management. Cyprus Government was not so clear about it but had already managed the process to be canalised towards that direction.<sup>110</sup> Preece, Cardew & Rider were offering a new survey if this option was to be chosen. On the subject of the number of power stations, they repeated that the second station had been suggested for avoiding black-outs. They affirmed that one station would be enough for the first years; Nicosia Electric Company's station would be kept as a back-up. The second technical point was the choice of diesel vs. turbo generators; turbo-generators were favoured for reasons of general economy. Diesel generators are more fuel efficient but diesel fuel is more expensive than furnace oil used by turbines. In addition, diesel engines have lower power density which means that they need more space to produce a certain amount of power. This was important for the future expansion of the station and saving capital from the initial and future construction of the power house. They also noted that turbo generators had a lower maintenance cost and a longer useful life than the diesel engines. Moreover, diesel and turbo generator contracts of the same output had proven to cost almost the same in recent years.<sup>111</sup> Today the majority of the power stations are turbine generators, while diesel engines are used as emergency power sources, back-up for sustaining the base load of the network.<sup>112</sup>

The paper of Preece and Cardew mainly commented and suggested a mixed system, as noted above. However, in the end, it presented its opinion and gave the Cyprus Government technocratic ideological support for her case for full public monopoly. They considered the alternative proposal of the Cyprus authorities for an island-monopoly, 'in

---

<sup>109</sup> The creation of a public body as suggested by the Cyprus Government is similar to Electricity Board for Northern Ireland (Electricity Supply Act (Northern Ireland) 1931). Similar instances of public control of electricity supplies in Dominions are Electricity Board of Eire (Electricity Supply Act 1927), the Electricity Supply of Commission for the Union of South Africa (Act No.42 of 1927), and the State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Australia (Act of 1928 and the recent Act No.3 of 1946).

<sup>110</sup> Preece, Cardew & Price had understood a mixed regime was being imagined by these politicians and their engineers. They noted that if existing undertakings were to be allowed to distribute and sell current with a public corporate body having central powers such as buying, closing down inefficient undertakings, and setting up prices, then the Northern Ireland Acts were suggested as a legal framework.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, Preece, Cardew & Rider to Crown Agents, 8th October 1946

<sup>112</sup> Preece, Cardew & Rider had also confirmed that appointing a 'super-engineer' is a common practice in which they can have names to propose. *ibid.*

accordance with the modern ideas' (i.e. UK Nationalisation of Electricity Supply Industry). They noted that this modern idea regarding the public utilities would:

*...without doubt provide more rapid and efficient development. It would also increase the revenue of the Central Authority.*<sup>113</sup>

These communications between the Governor, Taylor, Turnbull, the Crown Agents, the Consulting Engineers and the Colonial Office had pretty much sealed off, in general lines, the possible options for the policy of electrification. However these last comments of the Consulting Engineers on their proposals and other parties were to become decisive for the next step. The Cyprus Government was heading for a complete monopoly.

## 2.7 Municipal undertakings undertake action

The year 1947 was decisive in the course of the Cyprus electrification scheme. In this year, the scheme acquired publicity in London,<sup>114</sup> where it was discussed in Parliament<sup>115</sup> (House of Commons) and was given approval for its materialisation. By the end of 1946, the Cyprus Government (overwhelmingly represented by the Governor) was in a position to consider all the proposals presented to it by the Consulting Engineers, Crown Agents and Colonial Office. Finally, Cyprus reached a conclusion in March 1947. Turnbull, now as the Acting Governor, in his answer to Secretary of State for the Colonies (SoS) Creech Jones, expressed that the technical officers of the Government had decided substantially to adopt the recommendations of the original report of the Consulting Engineers.<sup>116</sup> A memorandum by Taylor was attached to the despatch for the consideration of Colonial Office advisers. The memorandum contained the framework of the scheme and the steps to be taken for action. According to the Acting Governor's despatch and Taylor's memorandum, the scheme was to connect efficient power plants into an island-wide grid system, which would be supplied by

---

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> CO 67/345/1, Financial Times, 8<sup>th</sup> Feb 1947:

"It is reported here that the Colonial Office has approved in principle plans for establishment of a central power station and grid system at a cost of between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000. A company is to be formed, financed chiefly by Cyprus capital. The project will take two years to complete--Reuters". *ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> Dodds-Parker asks Creech Jones (Secretary of State for the Colonies) whether such a plant (as he has been informed by goodwill mission) would be given assurance that due consideration and priority be given to this scheme? Jones answers that "it will be most seriously considered." *Ibid.*, Hansard Extract from Official Report of 5 March 1947

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, Turnbull to Creech Jones, 20th March 1947

a central station located in Larnaca. Legislation would be passed in order to give the Government the right of monopoly on generating power, bulk distribution, and control of the rates and conditions governing retail distribution to the consumers. It was also proposed that the grid be operated by an Authority appointed by the Government, comprised of persons 'competent' to conduct on a 'sound business footing'. The Authority was to be given power by law to raise the necessary capital, either through the mediation of the Government or with the Government's guarantee, though it was proposed, in the initial stages, to finance it from loans raised directly by the Government. For the legislative part, The Electricity (Supply) Act (Northern Ireland) 1931 was regarded as providing suitable model legislation to meet the purposes outlined above. In the light of Cyprus' previous considerations on the organisation of the grid system, it is interesting to see that a "partial monopoly" was being proposed. The Acting Governor noted that:

*...Government is aware that complete monopoly is more modern in conception and might well make for ultimately more rapid and efficient development.*<sup>117</sup>

This choice was justified with two points: a central monopoly organisation might cause prolonged delays in the initial stages, and a greater initial expenditure would be avoided since the existing efficient undertakings were not municipal but private, referring to the cost of compulsory acquisitions.<sup>118</sup> These two points exemplified the Government's desire for rapid progress in the electrification of the island. It was also argued that the incorporation of existing efficient power plants would eliminate the risks indicated by CE, i.e. power shortages, and the proposal for one station was supported more solidly.<sup>119</sup> In relation to the financial implications of the scheme, the Government envisaged a 15 year period for expenditure and not a ten year development programme proposed by CE. The Cyprus Government would undertake the finances through an incoming Government Loan and, in general, Cyprus considered the provisions of the Northern Ireland Act as a suitable guide on the matter. A major development on the side of the Cyprus Government about the scheme

---

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>118</sup> "Moreover, it is likely that the course now proposed would command more general public acceptance. Lastly, by refraining from the immediate assumption of responsibility for meeting demands for power throughout the island, Government will be enabled to proceed at a pace better suited to the equipment, the personnel and the finances at its command." *Ibid.*

<sup>119</sup> Acting Governor demands from CE to redesign the transmission system in these terms and recast the estimates and recurrent expenditure, *ibid.*

was the establishment of the Working Committee. In the same despatch, we learn that the Governor had appointed a committee which would have Taylor as chairman and four unofficial members. The Working Committee<sup>120</sup> would deal with technical, legislative and financial tasks<sup>121</sup> and, later on, it would evolve into the main body for decision-taking.

Turnbull's despatch ended with a clear call for immediate action from the Colonial Office and Crown Agents. He urged that the decisions as to the plant to be installed, the securing of priorities, the lodging of orders and the selection of technical staff should not be permitted to await the completion of all detailed plans and the enactment of the legislation.<sup>122</sup> This call for immediate action can be read as a pressure towards hastening the pace of the developments and getting immediate approval from the Colonial Office for a scheme which would have orders for equipment without securing a budget. The Colonial Office directed the despatch to the Crown Agents to get their advice on Turnbull's letter. The Crown Agents' answer, with reference to the Consulting Engineers' view, confirmed Cyprus's demands. They agreed to the establishment of the Working Committee, for which they proposed that the technical officers should be members, and proposed that the CE should be given authority to prepare designs and place the orders for the plant. The latter was indicated to be decisive as to the time needed for the completion, as Turnbull had pointed out before, since the equipment supplier companies were having difficulties in meeting the post-war demand.

At this point a new issue appeared in the process of establishing the scheme; the problem of municipal power plants. The Colonial Office was delivered several reports<sup>123</sup> on

---

<sup>120</sup> The files of the Working Committee had been removed from the States Archives in Cyprus at an unknown time and place. Unfortunately, together with those of the Working Committee, the main files under the category of "Electrification" are also missing.

<sup>121</sup> i) Study the overall scheme prepared for the provision of electrical power throughout the Island and to prepare detailed proposals for its progressive practical application.

ii) To examine relevant legislation of other territories and to draft, for submission to the Law officers of Government, an enabling law to permit the introduction of the scheme

iii) To take such preliminary action as may be possible to promote the expeditious application of the scheme when the law has been passed

iv) To advise upon such problems regarding the maintenance of existing local supplies as are referred to the Committee by Government. *ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> "I appreciate that the proposed course of action is somewhat unorthodox, but I sincerely trust that you will find it possible to approve. *ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> *ibid.* Reports on the electricity supply of Paphos and Famagusta municipalities: by G. Gabrielides, consulting engineer; *ibid.*, , *Gabrielides to Mayor of Famagusta, 11<sup>th</sup> July 1946* ; *ibid.* , *Gabrielides to Mayor of Paphos, 14<sup>th</sup> January 1947*

the Famagusta and Paphos municipal corporation plants which, as reported, were on the verge of total break-down. Municipalities were warning the Government of possible severe problems in the near future and demanding authorisation to modernise and improve their equipment.<sup>124</sup> It seemed that the issue was not just restricted to the Municipalities of Famagusta and Paphos, but nearly to the rest of the municipal corporations. The municipal issue<sup>125</sup> had been in the knowledge of the Government for some time, but their sudden presentation to the Colonial Office is probably strategic. The situation proved to be a great source of anxiety for the Cyprus Government which, in turn, made it a major issue to be solved parallel to the progress of the scheme.<sup>126</sup> In the meantime, the Colonial Office started the inter-departmental communications on the details of the scheme for issuing an approval – especially of the Treasury. A sum of £5,000 was approved to be given for the expenses of the Working Committee after a Colonial Office despatch to the Treasury.<sup>127</sup> Following this decision, the Colonial Office authorized the Crown Agents to give instructions to the Consulting Engineers for the preparation of designs for the construction of the power station and the specifications of the main turbo and boiler plants. The Crown Agents returned to the Colonial Office with the layout of the building for the proposed power station at Larnaca<sup>128</sup> and a report on the Famagusta and Paphos generators. This power station would have the ultimate capacity of 70,000kW with two 7,000 and four 14,000kW turbo-alternators. Thus with one generator acting as standby, 56,000kW were considered necessary to meet the “requirements of the proposed Island scheme for some years”.<sup>129</sup>

In the meantime, the news of the plant had attracted the attention of other parties, who had their own concerns. A letter raising environmental concerns reached the Colonial Office. It was written by an admirer of Cyprus, Viscount Mersey, who had also been the Chairman of the Cyprus Committee for the Preservation of the Ancient and Medieval

---

<sup>124</sup>*ibid.*, Barton to CA, 12th May 1947

<sup>125</sup> Nearly all municipalities have drawn up schemes to modernize their present systems which were always bad but deteriorated during the war to appoint where complete break-downs are threatening. *ibid.*, Turnbull to Barton, 27th March 1947. The Cyprus Government, pending classification of Government policy, holds up renewals and extensions of these plants; *ibid.*, Lord Winster to SoS, 6<sup>th</sup> May 1947

These municipal systems were using the old British standard of 230/400 AC 50 periods where UK has changed to 240/415 Volts AC 50 periods. Cyprus was asking Crown Agents for its new grid system to be designed in lines with the UK standards. *ibid.*, Capner to Director of Public Works, 8th May 1947

<sup>126</sup>*ibid.*, Winster to SoS, 6th May 1947

<sup>127</sup>, *ibid.*, Barton to Russel Edmunds, 13th May 1947 ;*ibid.*, Edmunds to Barton, 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1947

<sup>128</sup>*ibid.*, Watson to Barton, 29th May 1947

<sup>129</sup> *ibid.*, Preece, Cardew & Rider to Watson , 27th May 1947

Monuments of Cyprus. He was “spelled” by the beauties of Cyprus,<sup>130</sup> and asked the Colonial Office whether the rumours that the generating plant would be “desecrating” a beauty spot, the slopes of the Kyrenia Hills, were true. The Colonial Office assured him that for some time to come those Hills would be free of pylons passing on them.<sup>131</sup> Viscount Mersey would be struck now to see the fuel oil power station smoking on a kilometre-wide sandy beach lying below one of those slopes. He would be more surprised to see many pylons erected around to supply thousands of villas constructed on his Kyrenia Hills during the construction-boom of the 2000s. On the other hand, Callender’s had sent a letter to Turnbull with a concern for their stakes in Cyprus. Callender’s noted that they had expended:

*...a considerable sum in our investigations and negotiations and we consequently trust that our position will receive the sympathetic consideration of your Government.*<sup>132</sup>

There is no reply to the company in the archives of the Colonial Office, but they would be one of the contractors of the scheme later on.

The swift progress of the scheme can be mostly attributed to the pressures and dedication of the Cyprus Government and her top officials, most notably Turnbull and Taylor. Since 1945, when the negotiations began with the Colonial Office, the Cyprus Administration, especially in 1947, had managed to secure partial approvals from the Colonial Office. There was a general plan and consensus on the design and specifications of the grid and the plant. By 1947 the Colonial Office began to take a close interest and initiated inter-departmental/internal discussions over the scheme. However, the Colonial Office was not applying itself very hard to the Administration’s hastiness.

Eventually, new Governor Lord Winster could wait no longer and asked officially for the scheme, “as originally presented”, to receive “early consideration and approval in principle” by the Secretary of State.<sup>133</sup> In his letter, Winster referred to the latest policies decided by the Cyprus Government on the major issues of the scheme. Winster noted that

---

<sup>130</sup> *HL Deb 31 March 1943 vol 126 cc1023-45*

<sup>131</sup> CO 67/345/1, Turnbull to Watson, 28th May 1947

<sup>132</sup> *ibid.*, Callender’s to Colonial Secretary, 18th June 1947

<sup>133</sup> *ibid.*, Winster to Creech Jones, 20th June 1947

by the time of Woolley's despatch in 1945 on electrification, the existing undertakings were already facing the problem of deteriorating equipment, due to import prohibition during the years of war. However, a prohibition of equipment renewal was enacted in face of the pending preliminary examinations for the scheme. Winster complained that if the Government had then foreseen such a protraction of the preliminary phase of the examinations, it would never have issued this prohibition. He drew a picture of a situation on the brink of total failure, responsibility for which originated from delays caused by the Colonial Office. Despite this near-the-brink situation, the Colonial Office could, as Winster suggested, extend its approval in principle into permitting the placing of orders and the institution of negotiations to grant Cyprus some priority in the production line.<sup>134</sup> Supposedly, this would shorten the period of four years which had been estimated for the operation of the grid after the orders had been placed. Winster played on time restrictions and gentle threats.

Winster also had some very distasteful news for the Colonial Office about something which it greatly despised: increases in costs. Winster informed them that the cost reduction by reducing to one power plant had been offset by increases in the costs but this, he warned, must not cause further delays through investigating this increase. He added that:

*...either the scheme must be approved and pursued with all possible speed or it must be straightaway abandoned and responsibility and initiative restored to existing undertakings, with all ...the inevitable and justifiable criticism of Government that such a step would imply.*<sup>135</sup>

To avoid all these complexities, Winster proposed several actions be taken immediately: CE should be asked to prepare designs and call for tenders for the equipment<sup>136</sup> and to employ

---

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>136</sup> Winster wanted to have presence and word in every process. He offered Taylor who would be in London to help CE with the tenders, and recommended himself to be appointed to the committee adjudicating the tender. Moreover Taylor proposed a division of labour between Cyprus Government and Consulting Engineers: electrical matters, expeditious delivery and erection of all electrical plant and equipment to CE and "less specialised spheres of engineering such as are involved in the construction of the power house, offices, workmen's quarters, water supply and the hundred and one details the execution of which presents no difficulty in the Middle East". *ibid.*, Taylor to Colonial Secretary, 13th June 1947.

J.O. Hall as technical officer at the earliest date.<sup>137</sup> In a separate despatch to the Secretary of State, Winster announced the latest policies and the memorandum decided upon the Famagusta and Paphos plants. The main point, besides the technical matters, was the rising costs of plant equipment, since the power undertakings had been prohibited from modernisation. Winster feared that the Municipalities might put the responsibility for the increasing costs and failures on the Government. The article in the 28<sup>th</sup> May 1947 issue of *Cyprus Mail* was indicative. This article was about a communique issued by the Municipality of Famagusta, a town emerging as a tourist and trade centre. The Municipality was announcing to the people that the Government was still refusing to approve their loan request, which was causing delays in renewals and a danger of power cuts. The Municipality Council expressed its disappointment with the Government policy, which incorporated the solution of the Municipality's issue with the general approval of the grid scheme by London. The Council noted that if there existed any legal grounds, then legal steps would be taken against the Government, claiming compensation for the delay.<sup>138</sup>

The Colonial Office now had a concrete demand from Cyprus for the approval of the scheme going forward, thus having a priority. One letter gives us a hint of the general climate between the Officials, such as Juxton Barton, who were involved in the preparations of the scheme. The climate was a form of distaste for being pushed and rushed for a work that must be done on terms decided, mainly, by others. Barton summarised it with the following words:

*It appears from these papers [Winster's despatches and memorandums] that the supply position of electrical machinery in this country [UK] and the claims of industrial undertakings here have not been understood in Cyprus, but we wish to press the claims of Cyprus, where there are political and other considerations of considerable importance.*<sup>139</sup>

---

<sup>137</sup> Winster proposed to employ him for one year optional with a salary of £1,500. The amount of salary, he notes, is indicated to be £1,500 which was high in relation to the salaries currently approved for senior officers of the Government, whose dissatisfaction is unlikely thereby to be lessened. The Cyprus Government considered the situation urgency/non-bargaining, that's why it was willing to pay a higher salary, to the dislike and spite of its officers.

<sup>138</sup> CO 67/345/1, *Cyprus Mail*, 28<sup>th</sup> May 1947

<sup>139</sup> *ibid.*, Barton to Watson, 28<sup>th</sup> June 1947, Watson's view on the matter: it is estimated to take four years to complete the plant unless "of course some measures of priority in obtaining materials can be secured. This will

He added that the Colonial Office would seek, firstly, to obtain Treasury sanction before seeking tenders for the generating plant, since Cyprus' expenditures were still Treasury-controlled. This step, later on, would develop into Cyprus' leave from Treasury control. The Crown Agents started to work on the tenders and sent one of their engineers from Preece and Cardew, Pickworth, to Cyprus to report on, particularly, Municipalities and the general power supply situation. With the visit of Pickworth to Cyprus a new round of flow of reports and people began.

After his visit, Pickworth was very optimistic about the financial and social potentials of a general-grid system in Cyprus. He conducted meetings with town Mayors<sup>140</sup> and Commissioners, and inspected the existing plants. Pickworth's short report contains both technical advice on conditions and actions necessary for the existing plants but he was mainly writing about the social aspects of electrification. The Mayors of Famagusta, Larnaca, Kyrenia and Paphos had expressed to him their great interest in maintaining their towns' power supplies. They also expressed to him that, if an adequate supply of electricity were available, their townspeople would make full use of it.<sup>141</sup> Moreover, he was informed by the Commissioner of Famagusta about 'pressing applications' from many villages in the district for supplies of current for irrigation and for general purposes. He was impressed that such demands for industrial, agricultural and general purposes were general throughout the island. He wrote that:

*... the people looked to Government to promote a scheme for providing adequate supplies of electricity and also expected Government to press forward construction works on it with all possible speed.*<sup>142</sup>

He believed that "the possibilities for electricity development in Cyprus" were very "great". Above all, he was impressed to find that, in his words, the people appreciated the "benefits derived through an electricity supply service", something he attributed to the excellent

---

need exceptionally strong representations as there are at present so many calls on the industry for vital plants required in United Kingdom." *ibid.*, Watson to Barton, 12th July 1947

<sup>140</sup> Mayors gave him the impression that they wish to co-operate "in any scheme approved by Government and looked only to Government for guidance and help". CO 67/345/1., Pickworth to Turnbull, 1<sup>st</sup> August 1947

<sup>141</sup> *ibid.*, Pickworth to Turnbull, 9<sup>th</sup> August 1947

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*

communications existing in the island. Thus, he concluded, it would not be necessary, as in other Colonial Territories, to explain:

*[to people] the many and various uses to which electricity can be put and the consequent advantages".*<sup>143</sup>

While Pickworth was making his visits, the Working Committee had been deciding upon the policy for the Municipal issue. It had been agreed to sanction the Municipalities and Companies to obtain equipment after the tenders recommended had been scrutinised by the Working Committee.<sup>144</sup> The prices of the equipment needed by the Municipalities had been raised since the Government prohibition. This caused the Government some anxiety because the Municipalities, as the Governor noted, would not be "slow to lay [the responsibility] at the door of the Government".<sup>145</sup> The increasing pressure was pushing the Government to make new thoughts on the issue. These included undertaking the whole cost of renewal of Municipal equipment and absolving the Municipal corporations. Such an action would leave the Government free from taking the desired measures for the integration of these undertakings in the grid.<sup>146</sup>

The Committee also decided that a technical officer, most probably J.O. Hall, should be hired with a three-year contract. In the choice of Hall his experience in Nigeria played a serious role. Preece, Cardew & Rider had made a search through advertisements for the higher paid posts of colonial governments. However, the candidates did not match their criterion which was:

*... knowledge of and ability to develop demands in a comparatively backward community so far as electrical services [are] concerned.*<sup>147</sup>

He had to be someone who had been involved in a general electrification project from scratch. This also meant that he would not be from the UK or some western European country but suitably from a colony. The preference was an engineer with experience in "one of the larger Colonial Government Electricity Undertakings" like Malaya (Malaysia), Ceylon

---

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., Watson to Barton, 12th August 1947

<sup>145</sup> SA1: 853/1947, Taylor to Colonial Secretary, 13th June 1947

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., Minute 12 July 1947 at

<sup>147</sup> CO 67/345/1, Preece, Cardew & Rider to Crown Agents, 16<sup>th</sup> April 1947

(Sri Lanka) and Nigeria.<sup>148</sup> Malaysia and Sri Lanka were going through a process of electrification so Hall, with his short experience in Cyprus, stood as an ideal choice. At the time of these discussions, Hall was also considering retirement from his post in Nigeria, but this was not certain. The Crown Agents were in doubt over whether the Nigeria Government would want to second this man but they believed that an intervention by the Colonial Office, in favour of Cyprus, at the Colonial Service Department level would produce positive results.<sup>149</sup> After the Colonial Office's communications with Nigeria and the Crown Agents, Hall agreed to work for Cyprus, where he would be the Chairman and 'super-manager' of the scheme.<sup>150</sup>

Despite the progress on the scheme, the end of 1947 brought bad news for the Cyprus Government. On 17th October Nicosia Electric Company's generating station, the largest electrical undertaking of the island supplying the capital, was almost entirely destroyed by an explosion and the subsequent fire left behind one dead, and the privileged consumers of electricity in the capital with kerosene lamps – to which most of the rural Cypriot population was accustomed.<sup>151</sup> Early 1948 would bring more failures at the stations of Larnaca and Kyrenia.<sup>152</sup> The Municipal question, now an organic part of the grid scheme, would be the first to be solved. The Government took the responsibility of covering the cost of purchasing power plants in the four municipalities (Famagusta, Larnaca, Kyrenia and Paphos).

Amongst other things, this also meant that full state monopoly on supply became increasingly likely. A sum of £40,000 was to be expended, which would be covered from Advances for the Electricity Grid, pending the formation of the Statutory Grid Authority.<sup>153</sup> The decision would also initiate the first round of discussions on the finance of the scheme – an aspect for which neither the British Treasury nor the Colonial Office were known for

---

<sup>148</sup> British Malaya was already going through electrification by 1950. p.196, Harper, T. N.. 2001. *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya*. Cambridge University Press.

<sup>149</sup> . Alternatives to Hall referred are: Col. Brazil of Ceylon and J.H. Angus Public Utilities Branch, Control Commission, Germany. *ibid.*, Watson to Barton, 10<sup>th</sup> September 1947

<sup>150</sup> *ibid.*, Crown Agents to Emanuel and Shute, 24<sup>th</sup> October 1947; *ibid.*, Barton to Turnbull, 3rd November 1947

<sup>151</sup> *ibid.*, Winster To SoS, 18<sup>th</sup> October 1947

<sup>152</sup> SA1: 853/1947, Governor to SoS, 10th February 1948 ; *ibid.*, Governor to SoS, 19th February 1948.

<sup>153</sup> CO 67/345/2 , Winster to Creech Jones, 31<sup>st</sup> October 1947.

generosity.<sup>154</sup> The Colonial Office was not in a position to seek further examination of these numbers and gave authority, with the approval of the Treasury, to the Government to acquire advance for this particular expenditure. However, this did not imply approval of the entire grid scheme.<sup>155</sup>

The Crown Agents' warning was not late in coming. The Crown Agents informed the Colonial Office that they were watching the orders, still waiting to enter the production line, but if the Treasury did not sanction the scheme they would have to cancel the orders to prevent any loss. The electrification scheme (estimated to a total of £3,700,000) was not added in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 10 programme, announced in 1947, for Cyprus, which amounted to £6,000,000 (of which half was to be raised by loan).<sup>156</sup> Cyprus was to raise local loans or go to the London Market.

The Treasury, which still controlled the Cyprus revenue, stated its terms for its approval of the grid scheme: the formation of the statutory grid Authority and detailed proposals for the finance. The former would be a "stumbling block" from the time point of view, as the formation of the Authority awaited Hall's study, who would only begin the job in several months, whereas supplier companies had to be informed soon if they were to continue with Cypriot orders.<sup>157</sup> Cyprus sent yet another, but not last, cry for urgent approval of the scheme, warning that, as the Nicosia Electric disaster showed, the power supply situation was an emergency and a security matter. Cyprus was playing the "political consequences" card. Acting Governor Turnbull warned the Secretary of State Creech Jones that:

*...either the scheme must be approved and pursued with all possible speed or it must straightway be abandoned and responsibility and initiative restored to existing*

---

<sup>154</sup> Barton was "quite hazy" about the finance of the "quite large sums" of tenders for four Municipalities. *ibid.*, Barton to Watson. 18th November 1947

<sup>155</sup> According to the settlement, the Government would pay for the new plants and acquire their ownership. Municipalities would pay a reasonable hire charge to cover wear and tear and interest on the capital cost of the machine until such time as they are taken over by the Grid Authority. Until then they would be responsible for maintaining in good running order and condition. *ibid.*, Barton to Edmunds, 21st November 1947; *ibid.*, SoS to Governor, 30<sup>th</sup> November 1947

<sup>156</sup> *ibid.*, Watson to Barton, 27th November 1947

<sup>157</sup> *ibid.*, Watson to Barton, 9th December 1947

*undertakings with all the inevitable and justifiable critics of Government that such a step would imply.*<sup>158</sup>

The Cyprus Administration sought an effective policy.

## 2.8 Obtaining the approval and money

At this stage of the scheme's course to construction, the essential bottleneck was the full approval of the scheme by the Colonial Office. The Crown Agents had already placed orders to the suppliers for the turbo-sets and boilers, on the grounds that the Colonial Office had given approval in principle. However, the orders, at the beginning of 1948, were still waiting on the production line to be constructed, having only 6 months of extension for their further delay. Beyond this the orders would have to be held in abeyance to avoid any unnecessary compensation payments. The delay of the approval had already caused the Crown Agents to order Metropolitan and Vickers (the turbo-sets contractors) not to proceed to manufacture and incur any expense in connection with the contract until the final authority for the expenditure has been secured. Turnbull warned the Colonial Office, in straight language, that therefore "six months' grace" no longer existed, and Cyprus might lose its place in the production programme of the contractors.<sup>159</sup>

However, Cyprus had already been working on the scheme whether the Colonial Office agreed or not. The Working Committee now proposed to the Secretary of State to order the Crown Agents to give the contract for the entire work of erecting the main network and installing the sub-station, tasks which could not be undertaken by Cypriot contractors. According to the new proposal, the contracts should be given to principal contractors, who would carry out their activities under the control of electrical experts and the newly established electricity board. By doing this, Cyprus regarded that delays would be

---

<sup>158</sup>*ibid.*, Acting Governor to SoS, 13th December 1947

<sup>159</sup>*ibid.*, Turnbull to Bennet, 28 February 1948

avoided, since the control of the scheme through the Consulting Engineers in London would be averted. With its electrical expert, his assistant staff and the already existing technical staff of the Administration (i.e. officials like Taylor and Capner) the Cyprus Government would possess much of the technical, legal and administrative expertise at its direct disposal. This would free the Administration from prolonged communications via the Colonial Office in order to acquire technical, legal or any other advice concerning the scheme. The aim of the Government was to take responsibility for the entire electrification scheme, from the beginning to the end.

The Crown Agents would disagree with this proposal; they did not want to lose their control of the project.<sup>160</sup> The Crown Agents preferred the principal contractors to provide the necessary technical advice, which would be placed before the responsible Board for its approval.<sup>161</sup> However, with the Cyprus proposal, control of the whole construction process would be transferred to Cyprus from the Consulting Engineers, who were only to be doing the quality and price/expenditure control.

The Government had already bought the land for the station and the bulk oil installations. The ground works were ready, and several proposals on the structure of the station building from which a semi-outdoor type, a new American way of building, was being proposed.<sup>162</sup> The final approval of the Colonial Office was authorised in 1949, but its de-facto authorisation came in mid-1948. Nevertheless, in a Colonial Office paper of the Economic Intelligence and Planning Department of November 1948, the “Cyprus Electricity Grid Scheme” was listed and marked as one “priority development project”. Most probably, the breaking point came with the Governor’s long despatch to the Secretary of State in May 1948. In straightforward language, as Turnbull did, the Governor wrote that “the need for a decision is becoming increasingly urgent” in the light of the developments with Metropolitan and Vickers and now the boiler manufacturers.<sup>163</sup> Winster informed the SoS that both companies needed approximately 30 months to deliver their orders. Moreover, Winster added, manufacturers were, supposedly, overwhelmed with work and,

---

<sup>160</sup> *ibid.*, Crown Agents to Fisher, 15th July 1948

<sup>161</sup> CO 67/345/3, Governor to SoS, 20th February 1948

<sup>162</sup> *ibid.*, Governor to SoS, 16th March 1948; *ibid.*, Governor to SoS, 3rd April 1948

<sup>163</sup> *ibid.*, Governor to SoS, 13th May 1948

*...the fact that the existing uncertainty regarding the financing of the contract has been communicated to them must have prejudiced the chances of early delivery of the Cyprus order.*<sup>164</sup>

This letter was also a statement on the importance of the scheme for the general development policy of the island. What Winster did here was to tie up the fate of the whole Cyprus development programme and its separate projects to the materialisation of the electrification scheme. According to him,

*...much of the development programme and much other economic development in the island hang on this scheme; the long delays are inevitably prejudicing economic development of the Island at a time when the need for that economic development is particularly important".*<sup>165</sup>

His emphasis on time was the core of the question. The whole Cyprus development was a package with a certain aim. In this package, the Government was promising cheap energy, firstly for agricultural production and, secondarily, industrial production. In addition to modernisation and the efficiency of rural production, electrification was important for general welfare, in uses like lighting and electrical appliances. A big part of the ten-year development programme had been devoted to welfare issues. Besides, electrification also mattered as an event, its successful completion had the Government's stamp upon it, and they wished to make an impression on the public. Governor Winster was demanding tactfully that his estimates of the financial position be accepted and the Crown Agents be authorised to place the firm orders. He also added that, in the meantime, Cyprus was seeking alternatives as well. She would seek to get a loan from the International Bank and investigate American equipment prices and delivery dates.

The construction of the plant building was progressing with the appointment of the contractor companies and Consulting Engineers. Cyril Kirkpatrick and his company were employed as Civil Consulting Engineers, who were to design a station of a semi-outdoor type. Electrical Consulting Engineers, Preece Cardew & Rider, were also given the task of preparation of plans, specifications and quantities for the entire electrical work and would

---

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*

be responsible also for the submission, adjudication and co-ordination of all electrical and mechanical contracts through the Crown Agents. J.O. Hall had taken his post as Chief Engineer and Manager of the scheme, for which he would assume the full responsibility for supervision, co-ordination and construction in Cyprus.<sup>166</sup> However, at the last minute a Working Committee decision changed the place of the station. Due to unsuitable ground conditions, the Working Committee agreed unanimously that the central power station should be erected at the Dekhelia site, which would be neighbouring the British Dekhelia Base Cantonment by the late 1950s.<sup>167</sup> There are no discussions on this sudden change of such an important aspect of the project. Whether it was a decision affected by the British military and strategic concerns is open to speculation.<sup>168</sup>

The scheme was also in the news of some Cypriot papers, where there were references to Parliament discussions in London. Generally, if we do not count the minimal number of random articles roughly built upon the rhetoric of 'progress', the subject was generally absent in the press. Secretary of State Creech-Jones made a written statement on the Cyprus Electrification Scheme in Parliament and announced that the first stage of the scheme had been approved after a parliamentary question.<sup>169</sup> In the meantime, the Air Ministry was making the first approach about the scheme on behalf of the RAF. In the ministerial despatch to the Colonial Office, the RAF, as potential consumers, was offering its services for the requirements of the scheme.<sup>170</sup> However, any involvement of the Air Ministry or RAF in the scheme is not found in the archives, at least at the first stage of the scheme.

Negotiations over the finance of the scheme had started at the beginning of 1948 and ended with a significant result for the Administration. These negotiations, mainly between the Cyprus Government and the Colonial Office, would lead to the liberation of Cyprus from Treasury control and her subsequent subscription of direct loans from the London market. In the context of the British Empire, this meant that the Colonial Administration could decide upon its finances autonomously. The Cyprus Government had

---

<sup>166</sup> *ibid.*, SoS to Governor, 4th September 1948

<sup>167</sup> CO 67/345/4, Hall to Foxlee, 1st July 1949 ; CO 67/345/6 , Thomas to Fisher, 14th July 1949

<sup>168</sup> By independence in 1960, Dekhelia Station was left outside of the Dekhelia British Sovereign Base Area.

<sup>169</sup> HC Deb 24 September 1948 vol 456 cc178-9W

<sup>170</sup> CO 67/345/3, P.E. Smith to Fisher, 16th November 1948

been considered to have reached her maturity and allowed to manage its economics independently.

In December 1947 Cyprus had tried to issue a public loan locally from Cyprus. There is not a great deal of detail, but we know that the result was a failure. In other words, there was no “public response”, as the Government characterised it, for the loan.<sup>171</sup> Cyprus asked for authorisation to issue a loan for the scheme in the London market. In the first instance, the Colonial Office tried to keep Cyprus away from the London market for the time being.<sup>172</sup> Britain had faced a sterling crisis only in 1947 and there was another one waiting in 1949 (and also in 1951). The huge dollar deficit of Britain to USA, crisis of balance-of-payments, was causing sterling devaluations.<sup>173</sup> In his reply, the Governor gave several explanations with some reference to the island’s finances at the time. In short, he was advised by the Executive Council that it was better not to issue a local loan in the face of certain failure. This was not desirable for a Government which wanted to look strong, able and productive.

The Colonial Office wanted more details about the financing of the scheme and the method for raising a loan. The Colonial Office’s chief concerns were with the priority of the scheme in Cyprus’ development, the Electric Authority and its liabilities on loans, the terms of the loan and the legislative infrastructure of the Authority. The final approval of the scheme would come after the satisfaction of these questions, which would also lift the pressure placed by the Treasury on the Colonial Office.<sup>174</sup> The reply of the Governor gives us hints as to the ideological background of the electrification scheme.

The Governor’s reply contains insights into several aspects of the scheme. The Governor stated that the scheme was not given priority over all development projects, but it ranked with the schemes already placed in order of first priority and, amongst these, concentration should be upon those promising early economic return. Electrification was

---

<sup>171</sup> *ibid.*, SoS to Lord Winster, 12th January 1948

<sup>172</sup> We learn that banks of Cyprus were finding full employment for all available funds, and the advances at banks had risen to £2,5million in 1947. The Governor asserted that the considerable proportion of money in circulation was hoarded to avoid income tax. This meant that the island possessed the amount needed by the Government for the loan. However, the Governor claimed, investment in trade was a very profitable field which was concentrating progressively greater portion of the wealth in the hands of richer merchants who did not “habitually invest in Government securities”. There was also the evacuation of Palestine and the ensuing ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians, which made the financial investors shy from investing in the region. *ibid.*, Lord Winster to SoS for Colonies, 29th January 1948

<sup>173</sup> Heinlein, 2002. *op. cit.*, p. 19, 27, 88

<sup>174</sup> *ibid.*, SoS to Winster, 2nd April 1948

considered a complementary development project which it was hoped would prove lucrative in the short term. We see here that the Government's development policy aimed to get results in the immediate future. Electrification was considered important to gain revenue and help other sectors to increase their production. As to the loan, the Authority which would be established on the model Electricity Supply Act of Northern Ireland would be given full authority to raise funds with prior approval by the Government on the amount and terms. On the amount of the loan, the Governor noted that the estimates of the Consulting Engineers were suggesting an amount of £546,000 to be raised by 1949 for the initial stage of the grid.<sup>175</sup> This general information plus some reference to the island's current revenues formed the details given by the Cyprus Government to the Colonial Office. This was not a detailed reply, a characteristic of his report that Winster had adopted consciously. Cyprus's tactics had wrought progress, and there were now funds and approval from the Colonial Office. There was a strong political will for the scheme's implementation and the Government was building a narrative on it for its own survival. Winster appreciated the Colonial Office's "reluctance" to finally commit itself to the grid scheme, but it was too late politically:

*...in the absence of more specific proposals for its financing, though it is of course the case that this Government is already committed to embarrassing extent to its implementation".<sup>176</sup>*

Winster also gave reference to the proposals and initiatives, previously referred to above, of the Working Committee for the grid scheme and added that since there was a restricted availability of money, he would not go into a precise proposal for the financing of the scheme.

The Governor's last words gave the message to the Colonial Office that Cyprus had reached a point that it would go on with the scheme, either as a solely government enterprise or a private one, without further delay.<sup>177</sup> The Colonial Office would approve the

---

<sup>175</sup> *ibid.*, Winster to SoS, 24th April 1948

<sup>176</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>177</sup> "I have no reason to suppose that the current tightness is other than temporary and the grid scheme has been agreed by all to be thoroughly economic proposition and the provision of power is vital preliminary to any considerable development within the island. In the last resort, necessity for which I do not (repeat not) anticipate, consideration could be given to association with undertakings of one or other of the larger Britain

first stage of the scheme within a month. The reply of the Office was a sign that it regarded the scheme as important enough to devote the Colonial Office's influence to its implementation. The first stage of the scheme was approved, which meant an expenditure of £1.8 million on the initial installation of a power station and the first stage of the distribution system. The Crown Agents were asked to confirm the orders on the production line.

As to the finances, the scheme would not get any advances, either in anticipation of a loan from the CD&W Act funds, nor would the Colonial Office contemplate the use of Cyprus CD&W for financing the electricity scheme. Thus, on the terms of the Colonial Office, the Cyprus Government would have to raise money for future development, including the grid scheme, from local loans and revenue, and not be allowed to finance any new project by advances in anticipation of a loan.

These were the terms of the Colonial Office for the approval of the first stage of the grid scheme. Cyprus would be able to borrow from the UK market, as a Cyprus Government Loan, through the consent of the Treasury and Capital Issue Committee,<sup>178</sup> after exhausting all other possibilities outside the London market. The decision of the Colonial Office was followed by the release of the Cyprus Government from Treasury control. This development meant that the electrification scheme was not just reconfiguring, in theory, the relations of the Government with Cypriots but with the metropole as well. The Treasury was not just allowing Cyprus to get loans either locally or from the London market, but was promising to provide "every facility ...to raise a loan".<sup>179</sup> Cyprus would apply for loans in the London market for each stage separately.<sup>180</sup> The subject of finances of the scheme is important to also show how it revealed and cleared doubts in the Colonial Office. This discussion pushed the Colonial Office to give a final decision on its policy concerning the electrification of Cyprus.

---

and American power companies (e.g. English Electric and Westinghouse) which have already made informal approaches." *ibid.*

<sup>178</sup>*ibid.*, Sos to Winster, 20th May 1948

<sup>179</sup>*ibid.*, Edmunds to Bennet, 23rd November 1948

<sup>180</sup> The total estimated £3.7 million would be split into the following stages:

- i) Stage 1 : erection of a new power station and the establishment of a transmission and distribution system to the existing consumers
- ii) Stage 2 : extension of the power station capacity and the transmission/distribution systems into the central area
- iii) Stage 3: complete connection of the whole island.

While some in the Colonial Office were trying to deal out an approval, there were others, such as H.A. Harding, who were more doubtful and pessimistic about Cyprus' finances. Harding argued that Cyprus, like the rest of the Empire, was having a "period of exceptional financial prosperity", which he believed to be connected with military expenditure due to the troubles in Palestine. According to him, Cyprus also benefited from the currency restrictions, which induced increased tourism in the island. Thus Cyprus' finances were boosted temporarily and would not cover the whole period of the development programme. He advised Cyprus to take care of its balances and not to expect much from a London market loan.<sup>181</sup>

However, optimism and support for Cyprus seemed to prevail in the rest of the Colonial Office. Fisher believed that military expenditure in the island should be expected "by no means to stop with the end of Palestine; on the contrary it will if anything, increase". Furthermore, she pointed out that Cyprus had much to invest in tourism and had proved its financial strength by summing up £1million in her Development Reserve from her two-year revenue surplus. Fisher had a wider view of the scheme than Harding. She said:

*...it is obviously politically important to go ahead with the electricity scheme.*<sup>182</sup>

News of Cyprus's application for raising a London loan came in early 1949.<sup>183</sup> The estimate for the loan required was calculated to be £2 ½ million for Stage I (in years 1950-51-52), making the need for an immediate loan of £1 ½ million in 1950. The figure indicated a substantial increase in comparison with the previous estimates. Cyprus argued that the increase was due to raises in the prices of copper and 'other material'.<sup>184</sup> The increase in the amount provoked reactions inside the Colonial Office. The reaction of Fisher was exemplary:

*This is appalling. An increase of nearly 40% on the estimates and a thin story about devaluation to explain it!*

---

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, Minute Harding to Fisher, 4<sup>th</sup> May 1948

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, Minute Fisher to Martin, 5<sup>th</sup> May 1948

<sup>183</sup> CO 67/345/6, Thomas to Bennet, 10th March 1949

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, Thomas to Bennet, 16th December 1949

She made correlations with the big-budget and failed Gibraltar Housing Scheme.<sup>185</sup> She was annoyed with the application for a London loan from Cyprus immediately after its approval. By 1949, the expectation of rapid development in the colonies was meeting with disappointment. Like the Gibraltar housing scheme, there were also the examples of the failed Gambia egg scheme and costly Tanganyika groundnuts project.<sup>186</sup> She was suspicious of Hall and speculated that he was:

*...rigging-up a silver-plated office for himself at the expense of the London Market and the Cyprus taxpayer.*<sup>187</sup>

Such criticism would echo in the petitions and demonstrations of the anti-colonial Greekcypriot right and the island's communists. Despite these complaints, the official application of the Government of Cyprus for issuing a loan in the London market was approved and designated for early 1950. The amount to be raised from the loan was announced to be £2.5 million. In the application paper, Cyprus gave details on the Colony's Development Funds, the Cyprus Colonial Development and Welfare Act Funds for Cyprus and the island's trade and revenue. Additionally, there was a brief statement on the "advantages derived from the Electrification", which counted three titles. This statement is indispensable for understanding the Cyprus Government's expectations and ideas projected on and through the scheme.

First of all, electrification was expected to create a chain-cycle reaction in increasing industrial productivity. Cyprus stated that the electrification scheme would pull down the price of power to less than half of the current prices offered by the Municipalities and companies. This price fall would, thus, induce reduction in production costs of industrial and mining enterprises and furthermore mechanization would "pave the way for further reductions". New industries, according to Cyprus' estimations, for which there was an "ample supply of urban labour", would likewise be encouraged. Secondly, on the users' end, the fall in the prices would expectedly promote the use of electricity for domestic uses other than lighting. To this end, the Government was expecting an automatic increase in the welfare of all users, but especially in rural Cyprus it expected economic returns as well. The

---

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, Minute Fisher, 31<sup>st</sup> December 1949

<sup>186</sup> <sup>186</sup> Heinlein, 2002.*op. cit.*, p. 30

<sup>187</sup> CO 67/345/6, Minute Fisher, 31<sup>st</sup> December 1949

rural users, nearly three quarters of the population, would be particularly endowed to take advantage of the electricity supply. Cyprus' provisions considered that "cheap current in villages will add greatly to amenities of the rural life". Especially, the use of electricity for irrigation purposes, for which large supplies of underground water had been found to be available, would be expected to "appreciably" increase agricultural production.<sup>188</sup>

Cyprus asked for more than it had estimated before for Stage I.<sup>189</sup> The Colonial Office's response was to send a despatch of approval and full support of Cyprus' demand to the Treasury. Such a loan was not so desirable in the face of elections in the UK, but there were strong arguments to fully support Cyprus' electrification.<sup>190</sup> These women/men in the Colonial Office drew attention to three points: firstly, the Cyprus Government had lent a total of £1.6 million to His Majesty's Government. This dated from the Second World War and represented the local savings lent for war purposes. During 1948 this had been used, by a Colonial Official called Thomas, as an argument against the Treasury's reluctance. He had said that Cyprus,

*...was morally entitled to look for facilities for raising a loan of at least an equivalent amount in the UK. The Treasury at that time was impressed by the argument. But Thomas did not push this short-cut, namely repayment of the loan to Cyprus and Treasury did not favour this alternative.*

The second point was the fact that £2 million out of £2.5 million would be spent in the United Kingdom. Inter-pound area trade was a powerful argument in the conditions of sterling crisis. The last point that was noted in favour of Cyprus was expressed as follows:

*Not only are the economy of the Island and the finances of the Government back on a reasonably even keel with a substantial governmental reserves available, but for an*

---

<sup>188</sup> CO 67/369/1, Application on behalf of the Government of Cyprus for permission to issue on the London market a loan for Two and a Half Million Pounds Sterling.

<sup>189</sup> The Governor justified the increase in reference to the Crown Agents' latest inclusion of items in the project. The remaining amount, the Governor claimed, was due to wrong appreciation, either in London or Cyprus, of the Consultant Engineers who did not include "the entire expenditure required putting Stage I in full operation". This was including the expenses for the construction of quarters for the staff, for which the Governor appreciated that, in the conditions of Cyprus, it was undesirable that the key-men should reside so far away from the station, at Larnaca 8 miles away from Dekhelia. It is not clear whether he had security issues in mind or the Island's infamous desert temperature or transportation difficulties. *ibid.*, Governor to Arthur Creech- Jones, 14th February 1950

<sup>190</sup> *ibid.*, Bennet to Thomas, 4<sup>th</sup> April 1950

*European community of that size, Cyprus has at the moment a remarkably small Public Debt*<sup>191</sup>

Thus, the electrification loan had been supported and justified from moral, colonial and financial aspects too. Consequently, some in the Colonial Office were also drawing attention to Cyprus' substantial investment in the establishment of Cyprus Airways. The official opinion saw no objection to Cyprus going on with "this solid public utility"—i.e. electrification – when it had already invested in a "rather speculative concern"—i.e. Cyprus Airways.<sup>192</sup> Thus, the Cyprus Island-wide grid scheme had been made a solid, criticism-proof official policy supported by the Colonial Office.

## 2.9 The Establishment of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC)

While the first stage was coming to an end, Cyprus was initiating the preparations of the second stage, which would presuppose the establishment of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus and a new loan for its financing. The first step for financing would reveal new ways of financing in the era of the Cold War. The Cold War elements entered for the first time into the agenda of policy in relation to infrastructure development. By the mid-1950s Governor Wright (1949-1954) was approaching the Colonial Office for the new loan, which would be contemplated for the year 1953. Unlike the first loan, which had been presented to the Office in a straightforward way, Cyprus was seeking other means for raising the money. Following the Malta power station and Malaya Connaught Bridge examples, Cyprus sought information about the prospects of raising funds from the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA). ECA, a USA government agency established for administering the Marshall Plan, had funded some part of these projects. Malta, seemingly much better informed than Cyprus, had shown the ECA that they could not obtain the equipment in a reasonable time other than obtaining from firms in the USA, which were now extending the ECA funds to non-dollar expenditure as well. According to Wright, the ECA presented a good opportunity to ease the burden on public debt. The way he defined public was British rather

---

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, Minute 1<sup>st</sup> November 1950

than Cyprus. Cyprus had already proposed to be on the list of Colonial loans in 1953 to raise an amount of £2 million for Stage Two of the Scheme.<sup>193</sup>

Wright warned that increasing costs, which were foreseen, in the way of buying out existing undertakings, and rising costs of equipment and labour, were threatening the objective of supplying cheap power to the consumers. He argued that the costs of distribution and generation might rise above the estimates to “such a level which may retard the time when the majority of the people of Cyprus could expect to enjoy the benefits of cheap electricity”.<sup>194</sup> The realisation of cheap electricity or decreasing the power supply costs for users, as a basic promise charged with many expectations, was the first to prove a failure. However, Cyprus thought that it could obtain a grant that would reduce the capital charges and attract large consumers to get their power from the Government. Wright, in an attempt to solve a foreseeable crisis, realised that the Cold War had brought new actors into the Empire. He proposed that the whole scheme could be brought within the terms of any assistance which may subsequently be granted by the USA to British colonies under President Truman’s “Fourth Point” policy.<sup>195</sup>

The Cyprus Government failed to take the opportunity of the Cold War situation. In the meantime, Cyprus introduced the Bill for the establishment of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus to the scrutiny of the Colonial Office. The Bill did not provoke serious discussion in the Colonial Office, which had sought the assistance of the Ministry of Fuel and Power. The Ministry of Fuel and Power was responsible for the nationalisation of the British electricity supply industry. Cyprus intended to adopt the British model. The Bill was scrutinised in comparison with certain points of the UK Nationalisation Act, which were related to the buying out of the existing undertakings.<sup>196</sup> The Bill, titled the Electricity Development Law 1952, was enacted by the Governor on 27<sup>th</sup> October 1952. The Law established the Electricity Authority of Cyprus, a corporate body which would have a Board of no more than

---

<sup>193</sup> CO 67/369/2, Wright to James Griffiths, 25th May 1951

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.* This is the Point Four Programme announced by Harry Truman which had the objective of offering technical assistance to developing countries. It comprises the fourth objective of US post-war foreign policy where it gets the name.

<sup>196</sup> In spite of the Ministry of Fuel and Power, the Colonial Office considered the provision of consultative machinery unnecessary in the “conditions of Cyprus”. Consultative machinery was a tool for resolving labour issues with the joint presentation of worker and employer representatives. The oppression of AKEL and its unions by the Government at every opportunity was a well-known fixed policy in Cyprus. Also the labour issues had caused lots of discontent during the 1940s, so the Colonial Office’s opinion was not a surprise.

four persons appointed by the Governor.<sup>197</sup> The Bill was mainly based and constructed on comparative provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act (Northern Ireland), 1931; the Malaya Electricity Ordinance, 1949; and the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria Ordinance, 1950, by the Attorney-General of Cyprus and the technical advisors.

Following the Bill, Cyprus applied for the second loan at a time when the first stage was practically completed (a central generating station at Dekhelia, Larnaca and the installation of the main transmission system, consisting of 157 miles of single circuit at 66,000 volts and 61 miles of single circuit at 11,000 volts). The present loan was sought to enable the acquisition of existing undertakings and to finance Stage II of the Scheme, which would provide for the re-construction of the distribution systems of those undertakings, an extension of the main power station (two 90,000lbs/hp boilers with one 14,000kW turbo-alternator) and an extension of the distribution system. The latter would include extending the 66/11kV switching stations, and the completion of a 66kV ring from Famagusta via Lefkoniko (a rural town adjacent to Famagusta) to Nicosia, with a spur line to Kyrenia Pass to provide for mainly tourist developments in the Kyrenia district. It was also planned to erect 240 miles of 11kV secondary transmission lines with associated sub-stations and 400 miles of low-voltage distribution networks in various villages, which would be served by the 11kV extension.<sup>198</sup> By January 1953 Cyprus had raised £1.7 million, a lesser amount than the desired £2 million. The change was contemplated by the Colonial Office, which decided that Cyprus could apply for another loan later since her financial estimates seemed to be sound in 1954.<sup>199</sup>

---

<sup>197</sup> "...one of whom shall be the Chairman; the person for the time being holding the office of the Chief Engineer and Manager will be an ex officio member and shall be the Deputy Chairman. No person who is a member of the Executive Council can be appointed as member of the Authority and the members, other than the ex officio member, shall be appointed for a period not exceeding five years and shall receive such remuneration and allowances as the Governor in Council may determine (clauses 3, 5, 6 and 7)... the main functions of the Authority will be to generate electricity, secure supply of electricity at reasonable prices, promote and encourage the use of electricity and especially the use thereof for agricultural, industrial and manufacturing purposes, promote and encourage the development of the natural resources in the Colony in connection with the generation of electricity and advise the Governor on all matters relating to the generation, transmission, distribution and use of electricity (clause 12)." at *ibid.*, Governor to Lyttelton, 31st October 1952

<sup>198</sup> CO 926/65, Memorandum for the Capital Issue Committee.

<sup>199</sup> Cyprus had a surplus of £3 million in 1951, a large part of it was required for stockpiling of food and commodities which Cyprus was obliged to take. So no surplus money was invested in the scheme. Cyprus either would get short-term loans, to finance the stockpiling or would also be left without a sufficient reserve of cash to meet any future emergency. Such surplus is unlikely to happen in the future since the expenditure is likely to rise as a result of "the rising cost of living, the rising population, the introduction of social insurance,

By 1953 Stage I had been completed at an estimated cost of £2,500,000 and the station started to serve the customers. The works completed included the first part of the power station with 28MW capacity and the erection of 66kV and 11kV transmission lines that connected most of the principal towns, Government installations, hotel resorts and the main mining and industrial areas. In 1955, the works on Stage II were in progress. The first extension to the station with one 14MW turbo-alternator set and two boilers were to be completed in late 1956, and a further extension with a 14MW turbo alternator and a boiler was contemplated to be completed by September 1957. In the meantime, most of the municipal corporations had been absorbed by the Electricity Authority of Cyprus and their customers began to be supplied by the general-grid.<sup>200</sup> The Grid extended to the central part of Cyprus, but it left the two rural areas of Cyprus outside: the most eastern region of Karpasia and the most western region of Paphos.<sup>201</sup>

## **Part 3. The promises that ‘failed’: rural electrification, cheap current and public monopoly on electricity**

### **3.1 The Government skims the cream off the load**

---

and the residual commitments of the Development plan. Mr Thomas believed that the population is increasing at a higher rate than the national income and said that one of the objects of The Electricity Scheme was to counteract this trend by encouraging the establishment of secondary industries through the provision of cheaper power. “ *ibid.*, Minute, 30<sup>th</sup> July 1952.

<sup>200</sup> p.700-701, *The Electrical Journal*, no.9, vol:CLV 26<sup>th</sup> August 1955

<sup>201</sup> As a joint part of the scheme, a diesel electric generating station had been constructed in Paphos and started to generate electricity by 1956. The capacity of Dekhelia station had been increased from 42,750 kW to 56,750kW and the output for 1957 was 146,817,500 units compared with 103,919,400 units in 1956. Over 54,000 tons of fuel oil were used at Dekhelia in 1957. At Paphos the output of 1957 was 1,423,840 units and in 1956 it was 894,590 . SA1:1777/54, Cyprus Five –year Development Programme – Progress Report for the year 1957, p.27. During 1947, the conditions at the Paphos Municipal plant became extremely unhealthy and the machines had become deteriorated. In this situation, the Town’s Mayor demanded consent from the Government to get a loan in order to build a new plant and renew the existing system. To avoid any responsibility arising from a possible failure which the Mayor would put on the Government, Paphos was allowed to make a loan of £13,000 to acquire new plant.

SA1: 555/47/1, Gabrielides to Major of Paphos, 14th January 1947; *ibid.*, Major of Paphos to Commissioner of Paphos, 8th may 1947; *ibid.*, Commissioner of Paphos to Turnbull, 4th November 1947

The majority of the ten-year development schemes were designed to touch upon the everyday life all the island's occupants. Schemes in agriculture, irrigation, education, health services, town planning and social security were claimed to improve the conditions of life, both socially and economically. What is significant in the programme was its emphasis on the development of rural Cyprus. The majority of the islanders of the 1940s and 1950s were living in villages and employed in agriculture. However, this was not the only reason to invest in rural Cyprus. In the British opinion, these people, speaking for the Greek Cypriot population, were not necessarily enthusiastic about enosis, unlike their city-dweller compatriots. Woolley put it plainly:

*For both social and political reasons, I regard it as important that a determined effort should be made during the next few years to tackle the difficult and costly task of raising the living conditions and rendering more attractive life of the village people on whose well-being that of the whole Island ultimately depends.*<sup>202</sup>

According to him, and to his successors, it was especially important to show to the peasantry the benefits for Cyprus' staying in the British Commonwealth.<sup>203</sup> Therefore rural development came forward as a priority target of the development politics. In this framework, electrification was presented as a way to modernize rural Cyprus through electrifying production and domestic life; as a heavy capital investment managed by the Government for her 'discontented' people.

From the beginning, the nature of ownership was put as a "question of principle" for which Government was clearly in favour of public ownership. Public ownership, as argued, would ensure the interests of the rural consumers for their economic advancement. It was to put forward welfare rather than profit. Additionally, it was thought that public enterprise would also guarantee the healthy progress of the development programme in which many schemes' progress would depend on the electricity supply. The long experience of the Grid managed by a central authority and, lastly, the British nationalisation of the electricity supply industry had a profound effect on this belief. It was the 'modern' concept of electrification and efficiency.

---

<sup>202</sup> CO 67/328/12, Woolley to George Hall, 7<sup>th</sup> June 1946

<sup>203</sup> Yiangou, 2012, *op. cit.*, p.139,

Many in the Colonial Office, the Crown Agents and Consulting Engineers were no different in their opinions and agreed that a private company, indifferent towards rural interests, would just take the “cream of the load/skim the cream off” that otherwise could be channelled to the utility’s investments. Woolley was saying that effective government intervention was necessary for protecting the consumers. When O.J. Hall was called to survey the possibilities, he was directed to research the ‘rural potentials’ for lighting and power loads. Hall was to make estimates on the aspects of the island-wide grid scheme on the basis of “attractive rates” for the consumption of “persons with medium and small incomes” and irrigation purposes. The stress point of the report of the Director of Forests Department was that state control in essential public services was in line with ‘modern’ concepts, proved to be British. It was believed that it was the right way to serve and raise the welfare of rural Cyprus. As claimed by the energetic Turnbull, the Government incentive in providing cheap current would encourage people’s economic activity, and a complete monopoly, as a “modern concept”, would ensure an efficient and rapid development. In the loan memorandum, the Cyprus Government again highlighted the benefits to rural users as one of the three advantages of the grid scheme. Electrification, the memorandum claimed, would add greatly to the amenities of the life of ‘three-quarters of the population’. For the Colonial Office, within sight of approving the loan, there was no problem for Cyprus to raise the loan for such a “solid public utility”.

Ultimately the British were not successful in ‘persuading’ the Cypriot villager, and the whole rural electrification by ‘public’ investment and management would prove to be not so rapid. One of the main pillars of the electrification scheme, electrifying rural Cyprus, was to be the last priority of the Grid and a very long-term project. The Government believed that rural Cyprus’ national sentiments were not so strong; welfare and development were ‘anti-colonial’ weapons to gain the ‘heart’ of rural Cyprus. Supposedly, electrification was going to both achieve development in the rural areas and impress Cypriots as a whole with the Government’s capabilities and benefits. By 1956 Stage II was under way which was foreseeing, on its completion, the interconnection of all cities and towns, and military and industrial instalments, together with only ninety villages.<sup>204</sup> By the end of 1959, thus Stage

---

<sup>204</sup> p.4-8, Snelling, C.A., *The Beama Journal*, The development of electricity supply in Cyprus Vol 63, February 1956; pp.700-701 *The Electrical Journal*, Cyprus Power System, no.9, vol:CLV, 26<sup>th</sup> August 1955

II, the Electricity Authority of Cyprus was supplying 94 towns and villages. After twenty years of its establishment, the services of EAC were still unknown to some of the population. While in 1952 15% of the population was supplied by EAC, by 1972 the number had reached 95%. EAC was supplying 5% of the villages in 1952 and in 1972, 92%. Thus the number of villages connected to the grid by 1972 was 512, out of which 429 were connected after independence.<sup>205</sup> Thus the British rural electrification would see only 83 villages supplied by the grid system in the ten years from its start. What was initially feared that the private companies would do, was being done by the Government: it was skimming the cream off the load.

The planned chronology of Cyprus electrification tells us that the British first aimed at tapping the already existing networks; taking the cream off the load. Despite the sudden and abrupt change in the political climate by 1955, the start of guerrilla warfare and the announcement of a state of emergency, the course of the grid's construction was not altered structurally. Small but numerous villages in Paphos, Eastern Messaoria and Karpasia, a large part of rural Cyprus, would have to wait decades, in some cases until the mid-1970s. The village of the present author would wait until 1973 to be connected to the grid system and switch gradually from kerosene lamps to electric lamps.

### **3.2 How to achieve the opposite of the intended: the “senseless” imperialism**

As to the low prices and public monopoly (two features promoted by the Government), public opinion, as expressed in local newspapers, changed position over time. Discussions over Cyprus' electrification would end up in mass demonstrations, mostly thanks to the interventions of municipalities. Charge rates, municipal compensations and the public/private question would be intertwined under the banner of anti-colonial

---

<sup>205</sup>Bilingual (Greek-English) leaflets of 'The first twenty years of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (1972)' and 'The first thirty years (1982)' published by the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (publishing date and place unknown).

discontent. The main publicity in the local press over electrification appeared in the 1950s, when the scheme had taken, more or less, its final shape.

Earlier articles mostly in the 1940s, generally complained about the backwardness of the island in electrical power, which was presented as revolutionizing domestic life in particular. The English-speaking, pro-government, *Cyprus Mail* considered electrification a measure for the emancipation of women and the betterment of rural standards of living.<sup>206</sup> It expressed the official British administration opinion, which claimed that supply from a public-owned station would produce cheaper electricity for the encouragement of the use of electricity in domestic life and agriculture.<sup>207</sup> However, the Cypriot newspapers, mostly belonging to the nationalist Greek Cypriot right, were justly playing the ‘put the blame on the colonialists’ game. The backwardness of Cyprus in the matter was the responsibility of the Government, “absence of state providence” as it was phrased, which was leaving no democratic right to the ‘people’ to have word on matters concerning their lives. It continued that a mere “oligarchy” was deciding for the ‘people’ who were demanding, among many other things, a representative administration, cheap bread, social welfare and, of course, electricity.<sup>208</sup> Furthermore, electrification - in the current “antidemocratic and unpopular conditions” of the ‘people’ - had to become one of the basic demands and claims of the ‘people’. The writer of the article, an electrician himself, defined electrification as a “high-level public interest” which could not be left to big capitalists who would exploit the people.<sup>209</sup>

He suggested the co-operation of municipalities at a pan-Cyprian level to find a solution which would avert the Government’s involvement. Here then was another alternative approach to public ownership which again differed from what was meant by the Colonial Administration. It was an early warning to the Government about the position of the municipalities. They were the only official platform for some kind of political representation; their job also had to do with the daily material issues of the people. British public ownership was the ownership by the state which belonged to the coloniser. In a state

---

<sup>206</sup> p.2, The Way for Cyprus, *Cyprus Mail*, October 18<sup>th</sup> 1946,

<sup>207</sup> p.3, , Electricity Prices to be Reduced, *Cyprus Mail*, November 9<sup>th</sup> 1946,

<sup>208</sup> p.1, ΤΑ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΚΑ ΜΑΣ ΖΗΤΗΜΑΤΑ: ΚΑΘΥΣΤΕΡΑΜΕ ΤΡΟΜΕΡΑ, ΤΙ ΛΕΝΕ ΟΙ ΥΠΕΥΘΥΝΟΙ, Τα Γράμματα, April 7<sup>th</sup> 1946,

<sup>209</sup> p.3, ΓΙΑ ΜΙΑ ΔΗΜΟΤΙΚΗ ΑΝΟΙΚΟΔΟΜΗΣΗ: ΤΑ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΚΑ ΜΑΣ ΖΗΤΗΜΑΤΑ, Τα Γράμματα, December 8<sup>th</sup> 1946,

where the public was excluded from its management, a municipal co-operation would provide a level of public ownership.

Some were discontented because, they claimed, the Government was depriving them of a means of 'economic development' and 'civilisation'.<sup>210</sup> The demand for low prices was also taking its place in the press, from which some pro-government writers were making analogies between Prometheus and Government that was to give 'light' to the people, not for free, but at low prices.<sup>211</sup> By the completion of Stage I in 1952 (the crucial years before the Emergency when social tensions reached their highest peak), municipalities would take the lead in the matters of prices and compensations. The theme of the protests would be British colonialism and self-determination.

In the story of electrification, the integration of existing undertakings, of which the majority were municipal companies, was a significant chapter. The discussions that began on the issues had ended up in favour of their 'nationalisation'. The Government policy was to take the electricity distribution and generation under the control of one government-controlled authority. Municipalities, as the only public bodies in which Cypriots had exercised some level of democratic rights and political expression, seemed silent and cooperative during the initial stage of the scheme. As I have mentioned above, due to old and worn-out machinery, the Municipalities desperately needed to modernise their equipment; the Government had taken the responsibility for its finance, which became the first step towards their 'nationalisation'.<sup>212</sup> Some of the mayors, like the Mayor of Larnaca, were even celebrating the "work of electrification" as "the biggest work done during the English occupation".<sup>213</sup> It is important to note that he was the first Mayor cooperating with the communist AKEL. His remark was to be repeated by others as well.

However, the Law constituting the Electricity Authority of Cyprus was going to give the Government powers to purchase municipal corporations compulsorily without

---

<sup>210</sup> p.1, ΚΙ'ΑΛΛΗ ΠΕΡΙΦΡΟΝΗΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΑΡΧΙΑΣ ΜΑΣ: Υπεύθυνη : Κυβέρνηση και Δήμαρχος, Πάφος, September 9<sup>th</sup> 1948,

<sup>211</sup> p.1 , Ο ΕΞΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΣΜΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΝΗΣΟΥ: ΕΚΤΕΛΕΙΤΑΙ ΕΙΣ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΚΟΝ ΡΥΘΜΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΚΕΝΤΡ. Παρατηρητής, ΗΛΕΚΤΡΟΠΑΡΑΓΩΓΟΥ ΣΤΑΘΜΟΥ, December 21<sup>st</sup> 1950,

<sup>212</sup> See in SA1 : 555/47/1 and SA1:853/1947.

<sup>213</sup> p.4, Η ΣΥΝΕΝΤΕΥΞΙΣ ΜΑΣ, Έθνος,, December 16 1950.

negotiations.<sup>214</sup> Section 29 of the Law foresaw the acquisition of properties belonging to the local authorities without compensation. The enactment of the Law in late 1952 provoked the first reaction from the Mayors. Mayors of affected towns and cities gathered in Nicosia, on November 9<sup>th</sup> 1952, to discuss the matters of “the electrification of the Island, telephone tariffs and the cost of living”.

The president of the sitting, the Mayor of Nicosia, the right-wing nationalist Themistocles Dervis, attacked the Government for the compulsory acquisitions of municipal electricity companies. Dervis was a leading figure of the old conservative Greek Cypriot right. He was also from the class of people who had been appointed to official posts, in his case as Mayor of Nicosia, during the years of Palmerocracy in mid and late 1930s. Before the consolidation of the Greek Orthodox Ethnarchy as the leader of the Greek Cypriot right, and then the Greek Cypriot community, he was the general secretary of the Cypriot National Party (CNP). His co-operation with the Administration had earned him the title of Officer of British Empire.<sup>215</sup>

In his speech, Dervis called the compulsory purchase policy as, quoting from Churchill, “robbery of the worst kind”.<sup>216</sup> He also reminded that the British companies, unlike them, were getting their compensations from the nationalisations of Mosaddegh of Iran.<sup>217</sup> According to him, the Government was protecting the British capitalists in spite of the Cypriot consumer, who lived under a “disguised government dictatorship”.<sup>218</sup> In the coming months, the Council of Mayors, a product of the gathering, prepared a petition to be sent to the Colonial Office which was, at that time, discussing amendments to the Law. They had also decided to establish a deputy to be sent to the Governor and Colonial Office.

Mayors were not alone in the opposition against the Law. Earlier in 1952 the Cyprus Union of Agriculturalists, an extension of AKEL trade unionism with wide support, had issued

---

<sup>214</sup> See in CO 926/63.

<sup>215</sup> This party was for enosis through legal ways. This was representing its synthesis: people of wealth and people like Dervis who acquired authority through their co-operation with the colonial Administration. Κατσιαούνης, Ρολανδος. 2000. Η διασκεπτική 1946-1948: με ανασκόπηση της περιόδου 1878-1945. Κέντρο Επιστημονικών Ερευνών Κύπρου, p.43,47,78.

<sup>216</sup> Dervis was referring to Churchill who had categorised the Labour Government for ‘high-way robbery’ over the nationalisations.

<sup>217</sup> Mohammed Mosaddegh, Prime Minister of Iran 1951-1953. He was brought down by a coup d’état designed by British M19 and CIA for his nationalisation programme of the oil industry.

<sup>218</sup> p.1, Έθνος, 9<sup>th</sup> Nov1952,

a press release – an open letter to the Colonial Secretary – referring only to the electrification scheme. The anti-colonialist language was more explicit. First of all, it demanded a more democratic management of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) which must, according to them, represent municipalities, workers, agriculturalists, businessmen and the ‘minority’ (i.e. Turkishcyriot). This was a proposal of AKEL<sup>219</sup> in the framework of acquiring representation and democratisation in the makings of the island since the 1940s. They also protested against the non-compensation policy to municipalities and the method of financing which, they claimed, was enriching British capitalists through the interest rates. The letter argued that the finance must have been directly from the British Government as an exchange for the sums it gathered from Cyprus as ‘subjection tax’.<sup>220</sup>

The Mayors and Municipal Councils of Famagusta and Larnaca, of which the Mayor had previously celebrated the scheme, had also protested against the Law publicly.<sup>221</sup> They were both from communist AKEL. Here, we must note that the municipalities affected by the Law were cities such as Famagusta, Larnaca, Kyrenia and Paphos, but not Nicosia and Limassol which had private electricity companies. Thus the leadership of Dervis, an active politician, in the municipal opposition was more than an act of solidarity between municipalities. The Left was accepting the leadership of the Right, which had consolidated its place in the Greek Cypriot community under the Ethnarchy.

In the meantime, Stage I had been completed and EAC was announcing the price of electricity for industrial, domestic and public use. The first numbers were indicating a decrease in the prices only in some cases, but the calculation of the total consumption was

---

<sup>219</sup> The history of the left in Cyprus is a theme waiting to be opened to a historiography deep, detailed and neutral from party loyalties. There is no doubt that AKEL will be occupying most of this historiography. By the late 1940s a tendency of alienation of Turkishcyriots from AKEL had been created by the former’s open enosis claim. During the 1940s when it was also trying to lead the anti-colonial movement to an extent through the labour struggles, AKEL was demanding self-government in the short-term. One can see in AKEL’s (and its affiliate organisations PEO and EAK) petitions demand for posts and share in public organisations. The decade of 1950 marked AKEL’s failure and its support for ‘only enosis’ politics. AKEL was patriotic and saw Turkishcyriots as a minority that was politically subordinate to the Greek majority. Most of the Turkishcyriot members of PEO (labour union organically tied to AKEL) kept their memberships until 1958 when they were forced to leave en masse due to Turkish nationalists’ death threats. See Ioannou, Gregoris. 2011. “Labour Relations in Cyprus : Employment, Trade Unionism and Class Composition”. PhD, University of Warwick.

<sup>220</sup> p.1, Ο ΑΓΡΟΤΙΚΟΣ ΚΟΣΜΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΣΧΕΔΙΟ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΟΦΩΤΙΣΜΟΥ, *Ανεξάρτητος*, February 9th 1952,

<sup>221</sup> p.4, ΤΟ ΝΟΜΟΣΧΕΔΙΟΝ ΕΞΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΣΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΔΙΑΚΥΒΕΥΟΜΕΝΑ ΥΨΙΣΤΑ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΔΗΜΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΝΗΣΟΥ, *Ελευθερία*, October 22 1952,

exceptionally complex.<sup>222</sup> The EAC had also started to extend city networks through the existing municipal networks. Mayor of Larnaca, Lisos Santamas of AKEL, who had previously celebrated the scheme, gave the first public reaction to this new development, which also meant the end of municipal taxes collected through the generation and distribution of electricity.<sup>223</sup> The newly appointed President of EAC, H.F. Carpenter, in his written press release, wished to cool tensions – he emphasised that the Authority was a non-profit public utility which existed solely to “serve the people”.<sup>224</sup>

Here it is important to briefly mention the circumstances under which Carpenter was appointed. The procedure that led to his selection was marked with the question of Cypriot representation. The crisis of trust between the administration and the Cypriots can be traced to the appointment of the Chairman to the EAC.<sup>225</sup> Governor Wright did not share the opinion that “among responsible Cypriots” concerned in the arrangements – who must have been few people for the Government – that an expatriate chairman would be a waste of money and there were competent Cypriots for the position. O.J. Hall especially was emphatically against a Cypriot chairman who, according to him, would endanger the developments. Governor Wright stated that the Government supported Hall not just to risk his resignation but the Chairman would be dealing a lot with the question of compensation. It was a work that demanded ‘character’ and ‘experience’, as he put it.<sup>226</sup> Herbert Franklin Carpenter, member of the Organisation Review Committee of the British Electricity Authority proposed by the Colonial Office, was appointed as the Chairman of EAC on 9<sup>th</sup> December 1953. The Chairman would not reside in Cyprus but would pay periodical visits to Cyprus for the purpose of presiding at Board meetings and otherwise as might be required. The Chief Engineer Mr Hall would be ex-officio Vice-Chairman, leaving three vacancies to be filled by local Cypriot appointments.<sup>227</sup> Carpenter’s background at the British Electricity Authority, especially his service at the period of nationalisation was decisive in his selection.

---

<sup>222</sup> pp.1-4, ΠΩΣ ΚΑΘΩΡΙΣΑΝ ΑΙ ΤΙΜΑΙ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΚΟΥ ΡΕΥΜΑΤΟΣ, Έθνος, June 10 1953,

<sup>223</sup> p.6, ΑΙ ΣΟΒΑΡΑΙ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑΙ ΜΕΤΑΞΥ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΧΗΣ ΕΞΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΣΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΔΗΜΟΥ, Κύπρος, July 13 1953,

<sup>224</sup> H.F. Carpenter had served 12 years as the Secretary of Electricity Authority of West Midlands Company. Then he was appointed as the Secretary of British Electricity Authority where he worked from 1947 till 1951. p.1, ΤΙ ΕΔΗΛΩΣΕΝ Ο ΝΕΟΣ ΠΡΟΕΔΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΚΗΣ ΑΡΧΗΣ, Ελευθερία, December 11 1953.

<sup>225</sup> For British confusion in Cyprus policy before the ‘Emergency’, see, ‘A Crisis of Trust 1950- 1April 1955’ in Holland, Robert F. 1998. *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*. Clarendon Press.

<sup>226</sup> SA1 :56/1954, Minute Governor to Colonial Secretary, 4<sup>th</sup> December .

<sup>227</sup> CO 69/70, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting, 14th October 1952.

The 'experience' sought by the Governor was one that was directly related to the British nationalisation, which we observe here to be the general model for Cyprus' electrification.

The appointment of Carpenter and his scheduled visit to Cyprus in late January 1954 had been escorted with a built-up public dissent on the municipal question and the prices. From the summer of 1953, the reactions against the prices and the municipal question were taking more space in the public and political space. The petition of PEO to the Colonial Secretary concentrated nearly all the themes that we have noted up to now: state monopoly in production and management of the grid, cheap prices and rural electrification.

The Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) of AKEL, with wide influence at its substantially large base, protested to the Government against the new tariffs and their disappointment on the missed "chances of expanding and disposal of electric current to the rural areas". PEO, referring to the Governor's speech in Executive Council in 1950, reminded the Government of the promises given about the cheap current that would be provided by the scheme to enrich the country and the opportunities of rural life. However, the result in the eyes of labouring and poor people, PEO claimed, was a scheme providing cheap current for "well-to-do people and only [for] them" and a long-term policy of 12-15 years for rural electrification.

For PEO the tariffs announced on 9<sup>th</sup> June 1953 were "on the same level as that of luxury goods" and not lower than those provided by the Nicosia Electric Company. The prices were not as promised, just as rural electrification was promised but not delivered. PEO asked plainly: how was EAC, with such a modern power station, monopolistic right for the supply, whose aim was not to profit, not in a position to supply cheaper current than supplied by companies which made 40% profit when the consumption was less and equipment was less modern? PEO's answer to its own question was, with a touch of anti-colonial and populist class critics, "...the princely salaries of the Managers, Asst. Managers, sub-Managers and other parasites [i.e. *in majority British*], the squandering and bad management do increase the expenses and payment account of the Scheme". The proposed solution, as repeated by other parties as well, was to give the "true representation of the people" in the management of the scheme.<sup>228</sup> The public monopoly, as an expression of 'the

---

<sup>228</sup> SA1: 417/45/S, Pancyprian Federation of Labour(PEO) to Colonial Secretary, 16th June 1953

Government is doing on its behalf' policy did not just fail to create the intended impression on the people, but contributed to the general discontent and fuel for propaganda of the Government's enemies. The Government had instead created space for criticism and anti-colonial opposition to itself.

The sign of on-coming mass mobilisation came from Famagusta, where an 'All People's Meeting' (Παλλαϊκή Συγκέντρωση) took place in September 1953. Mayor of Famagusta, Andreas Pouyiouros of AKEL, as the representative of the widely attended Meeting, demanded substantial compensations for the Municipal undertakings so that Municipalities could spend money on public works, and a major Cypriot representation in the management of EAC.<sup>229</sup> The meetings of Mayors during the autumn of 1953 would result in popular demonstrations on 31st January 1954.

In the meantime, the Governor took the matter to the Executive Council for advice. The Governor, upon the advice of Council, directed that since Council was of the opinion that if the Authority offered a satisfactory concession to the Municipalities over the matter of payment for street lightning – fixing a lower rate for the Municipalities – it might be unnecessary to pursue the proposals. The Council therefore advised that the chairman of the Authority should be requested to return to Cyprus to consider this important matter and that the Mayors should be informed that he had been asked to visit Cyprus as soon as possible for the further consideration of those representations made by the Municipalities.<sup>230</sup> Carpenter was to arrive on 29<sup>th</sup> January and the municipalities had announced a public demonstration on 31st January. The pressure on the Government was mounting up, and a municipal matter risked being transformed into a discontent over the sovereignty of Cyprus. This was also the pattern of things in the pre-Emergency 1950s. If the newly appointed, just in January, and confused Governor Sir Robert Perceval Armitage would find that it was "expedient" and "practical", he would forbid the meetings by using Carpenter's visit. His general opinion indicated these tensions:

*the Chairman, on arrival should be advised that in Government's view that the Authority could not afford to ignore public opinion and that it would be in the Authority's own interests to settle all outstanding matters with the municipalities*

---

<sup>229</sup> *ibid.*, Mayor Pouyiouros to Colonial Secretary, 20<sup>th</sup> September 1953

<sup>230</sup> CO 69/70, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting, 15th January 1954

*locally, perhaps by offering generous rates for street lightning, rather than that these grievances should be carried elsewhere; and that Government was concerned to ensure that the municipalities' point of view, and the general point of view of the public in Cyprus, had been sufficiently studied and understood by the authority having regard to extensively embarrassing consequences that might follow, as previous experience had shown, if a deadlock was reached [bold added].*<sup>231</sup>

The demonstrations on 31<sup>st</sup> January were to gather Right and Left together in the main towns of Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaca, Paphos and Nicosia. The synthesis of the demonstrations reflected the changes taking place in the Greekcypriot politics. Turkishcypriot presence in central politics was to emerge as a decisive force in the second half of the 1950s. In the demonstration of Nicosia, Mayor Dervis took the lead while the Left was represented by the Secretaries of AKEL and EAK.<sup>232</sup> Dervis' long and caustic speech was on the front pages of the press the next day. The subject was not just a dispute between municipalities and the Government but between colonised and colonisers. Dervis claimed that the "foreign Government" was stealing the rights of people for the sake of British capitalists. He accused the Government of "confiscatory action" which was depriving the vested and future rights, not just of municipalities, but of all Cypriots.

Dervis' theme was electrification, but he was talking about something else. For him, the terms imposed on municipalities were possible only in "non-parliamentarian countries", and the recent change of Governor – referring to the appointment of Armitage – was not a matter for the people, for whom the regime was always "disgusting and totalitarian". He presented electrification, like many other things, as a matter concerning the lives of the people of Cyprus who had no word on it. He shouted in the meeting that the scheme was managed by "British engineers" who could "erect poles" and "measure cables", but they did not master the local knowledge and good manners to exercise with a "spirit of understanding and justice". Cypriots could be justly respected only by Cypriots, which meant Greekcypriots. With the municipal issue and electrification, Dervis alleged that the Government was intending to show people that their own "elected representatives" were

---

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting, 26th January 1954

<sup>232</sup> p.4, ΟΙ ΧΤΕΣΙΝΕΣ ΠΑΛΛΑΪΚΕΣ ΣΥΓΚΕΝΤΡΩΣΕΙΣ ΔΙΑΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΟ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΚΟ ΡΕΥΜΑ February, Ανέξαρητος, 1<sup>st</sup> 1954 ;p.1 ,ΑΙ ΧΤΕΣΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΘ' ΟΛΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΝΗΣΟΝ ΣΥΓΚΕΝΤΡΩΣΕΙΣ ΔΙΑΜΑΡΗΡΙΑΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΧΗΣ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΣΜΟΥ, Αλήθεια, 1<sup>st</sup> February 1954,

not competent to “take care of their house” by putting the municipalities in economic difficulties.<sup>233</sup>

Thus British policy on electrification and its arguments around it backfired. The hyper-politicised life of the 1950s was very opportunistic in using any issue against the Government and the sovereignty of Cyprus. The public monopoly would work to create and concentrate the discontent on the Government. The Government was made solely responsible for the scheme’s faults and failures. The acquisition of municipalities would end up as a tool of opposition and another rallying point (for Nationalists and Communists alike). On the other hand, the promises of the Government to serve the people with a public utility which would enable cheap current and rural electrification, had not been forgotten by the local political and social institutions. When Stage I was completed and Dekhelia Station started to work, the disappointment over the promises evolved into an anti-colonial opposition as well. Now for the opponents of British rule, the status quo was not “welfare imperialism” – ‘antidote’ to national aspirations – but it was “also a senseless imperialism”, as stated in a news article that appeared after the demonstrations. The title of the article was “When Imperialism is also senseless...”. The article was answering the pro-Government *Cyprus Mail* article on Dervis, whom it was charging for opposing the Government instead of thanking it for the electrification scheme. The article touched upon all the themes of prices, public monopoly and municipalities. The writer said ironically that:

*...we are being called to thank those who spend their time and energy to administrate us unselfishly [meaning Governments development policies like non-profit EAC]”.*

On the price tariffs, he said that one must know algebra to prove that the new complicated tariffs were cheaper. They were the same as the previous prices except in a few particular cases. Also, the article continued, the acquisitions had brought loss of income to municipalities which, as in the case of Kyrenia, were charging new taxes to cover their losses. The article ended with what Dervis did not say openly:

---

<sup>233</sup> p.1,4, Η ΟΜΙΛΙΑ-ΚΑΤΑΠΕΛΤΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΔΗΜΑΡΧΟΥ ΛΕΥΚΩΣΙΑΣ κ. ΘΕΜ. ΔΕΡΒΗ ΕΝΩΠΙΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΧΘΕΣΙΝΗΣ ΠΑΛΛΑΪΚΗΣ ΣΥΓΚΕΝΤΡΩΣΕΩΣ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΖΗΤΗΜΑ ΑΡΧΗΣ ΗΛΕΚΤΡΙΣΜΟΥ, Έθνος, 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1954,.

*The matter of Electricity Authority is not a special case. It is one of the expressions of the general policy of British Imperialism which seeks to hold on where its position is staggering...It's always bad, the Imperialism. Especially when it is also senseless...*<sup>234</sup>

## Conclusion

Cyprus electrification was a part of the general imperial policy (i.e. the economic and social development of the island) designated for the prolongation of British rule in the island. However, it was the local Administration that decided on the electrification of the whole island; its politics shaped the main aspects of the Grid. The Cyprus Government did not have a concrete scheme in mind, but it was certain on some aspects. It was trying to show the 'benefits' of British rule in the face of the new realities of the post-war period. The slogan was 'the Government is doing on its behalf'. Government wanted to use electrification as a means for economic development and welfare but also as a tool of propaganda for the 'amenities' of British rule.

For the Government, Cyprus electrification would show the 'capabilities' and 'amenities' of colonial rule; it would contribute substantially to development by supporting other development schemes. It was decided that only by complete monopoly of the state over supply and distribution could this be achieved. The complete 'public' monopoly was also the most 'modern' concept in face of the UK nationalisation of its electricity supply industry. This suited the Cyprus Government politically.

Moreover, the Cyprus Government promised cheap current and rural electrification as the main targets of electrification. Cheap current was to make production cheaper and more efficient by switching from less 'efficient' modes of energy supply. It also had a welfare concern by modernising the households of middle and low income city dwellers with electric lighting and utensils. Rural electrification was the reflection of the Cyprus

---

<sup>234</sup> p.1, ΟΤΑΝ Ο ΙΜΠΕΡΙΑΛΙΣΜΟΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ, Έθνος, 3<sup>rd</sup> February 1954.

officialdom's ideology. Rural Cyprus was considered to have no 'authentic' sentiment for self-determination. The Government hoped to take the rural Cyprus on its side. It was hoped that rural electrification, as in the city, would increase production by giving cheap current for irrigation and modernising the household.

For the British Administration, economic development, creating impressions, rural electrification and cheap current would be perfectly translated into electrification by an island-wide grid constructed and managed by the Government. Unlike a private enterprise, a Government monopoly would have no profit but instead welfare concerns. It would electrify rural Cyprus without being concerned about quick revenue returns. As a non-profit monopoly, the Government could also achieve the supply of cheaper current by making economies of scale. The Government could also impress people by engaging in such an enterprise. These projections would prove not so straightforward in the highly-politicised and anti-British Cyprus of 1950s.

The localisation of this UK model public grid would also not be straightforward. The complete monopoly, like the UK nationalisation, presupposed the compulsory acquisition of the municipal and private undertakings; they would be digested into the Grid, which would be controlled by a board of appointed British officials. The municipalities had elected Cypriot mayors, who acted as the only official space of political representation. Compulsory acquisition and its terms gave the space for united opposition against the Government. Not only compulsory acquisitions and loss of municipal revenue but other aspects of the Grid were utilised in the anti-British Greekcypriot politics. Factions of Greekcypriot right-wing and communists were united against the Government under the umbrella of municipalities.

The arguments and promises of the Government which were to be embodied in the Grid were reversed against it. A public monopoly controlled by an all-British Board and one station supplying a united Grid were the products of the subjugation of the Cypriots by the British, a foreign power: Cypriots would not have no say in the management of the Grid, which they would nevertheless be paying for. The current was not cheap, which was attributed to the high salaries of the British, besides other things. Rural electrification was not a priority but the last target of a lengthy electrification process: the Government itself

was 'skimming off the cream' of the load at the expense of the people. For British colonialism in Cyprus, electrification and its design characteristics became part the same diseases that they had been meant to cure.

Owners	Plant Installed kW's.	No. of Sets	Type of Plant A.C. or D.C.	Output kW. Hrs.		Maximum Load kW's.	Area Supplied	
				Private	Public			
1. Cyprus Mines Corporation.	3,930 600	6 3	A.C. A.C.	24,000,000	29,000	3,400	Mining Leases, Municipality of Lefka and Village of Xeros.	
2. Amiandos Tunnel Cement Co.	2,065	7	A.C.	5,000,000	-	1,500	Mining leases.	
3. Hellenic Company of Chemical Products and Manures.	545	4	A.C.	9,000,000	-	700	Mining Lease within a radius of 1 mile of Power Station and Village of Kalavassos.	
4. Cyprus Chrome Co.	128	3	A.C.	No details of output and load			Mining Lease.	
5. Nicosia Electric Co.	225 2,150	3 4	D.C. A.C.		2,600,000	880	Municipality of Nicosia.	
6. Cyprus Sulphur & Copper Co.			No particulars.				Mining Lease.	
7. Limassol Electric Light Anonyme Co.	455	3	D.C.		396,000	220	Municipality of Limassol.	
8. P.C. Petrides & Co.	48	2	D.C.		48,000	-	Municipality of Lefkara.	
9. Municipal Corporation of Famagusta.	629	5	D.C.		480,000	200	Municipal Area.	
10. Ditto Larnaca	589	5	D.C.		502,250	264	Ditto.	
11. Ditto Ktima (Paphos)	142	3	D.C.		264,000	72	Ditto.	
12. Ditto Kyrenia	150	4	D.C.		49,200	54	Ditto.	
13. Ditto Morphou	60	2	D.C.		16,520	26	Ditto.	
14. Ditto Lefka			Bulk supply from Cyprus Mines Corporation.					Ditto.
15. Pano Platres S.R.D.B.	105	2	D.C.		18,000	60	Pano Platres Summer Resort.	
16. Pedhoulis S.R.D.B.	36	1	D.C.		14,400	-	Pedhoulis Summer Resort.	
17. Mr. Loizos Koullapis	15	1	D.C.		12,000	7	Village of Paralimni	
18. Mr. Chr. Vassiliou	6	1	D.C.		5,760	-	Kakopetria Summer Health Resort.	
19. Messrs. Papastilianou	15	2	D.C.		3,000	2	Village of Stroumbi.	
20. Mr. Costis Demetri			No particulars.				Village of Kambos.	
21. Mr. C. Englezos			Bulk supply from Cyprus Mines Corporation.					Village of Xeros.

Notes

\* Item 1, Steam plant.  
 Item 3, Particulars for plant, output and load are not consistent. We understand from Mr. Hall that he was unable to contact the Manager of the Company and that the figures given were obtained from another source.  
 Item 18, Water turbine plant.

Table 1. Extract from the Hall report. Data gathered by Hall about the existing power plants and generators in Cyprus. CO 67/325/2

# Chapter 6. Post-war colonial port development: Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1945

---

## Introduction

The first ten-year programme of the Cyprus Government colonial development and welfare campaign included minor dredging works for the first years after 1945 (see Table 1 details). By the 1950s improvements at Famagusta Harbour and Limassol Harbour also became part of the Government's agenda. While in Limassol the need for harbour works was oriented around the city's trade and cargo traffic, in Famagusta there were other realities at work. Famagusta Harbour was a primary location in which changes within the Empire could be observed and experienced at first hand. British exodus from Palestine and finally from the Suez Canal went hand in hand with the re-shaping of British strategic positioning in the Middle East, and Cyprus' role within the Empire. The British military traffic starting from 1948 continued until the Emergency years (state of emergency period 1955-1959); it had unofficially turned part of Famagusta Harbour into a military base. With the start of the EOKA armed struggle against British rule, Famagusta Harbour acquired an official military identity by being transformed partially into a naval base. However, the Cyprus Government's main concern in Famagusta was with its development policy: the integration of an extended Famagusta Harbour into Cyprus' economic development and vice versa. Alternatively, the Government and London had in mind a harbour that would embody the mode of Cyprus' development within the Empire.

Department of Service	Estimated cost in 1946 of first priority schemes	Revised estimated cost in 1951 of first priority schemes.	Estimated cost in 1951 of new schemes	Total
	£	£	£	£
1. Agriculture	328,915	428,867	975,400	1,404,267
2. Irrigation	770,617	1,049,500	-	1,049,500
3. Forests	490,360	442,000	181,400	623,400
5. Health	895,822	831,537	592,000	1,423,537
6. Education (excluding probation)	625,502	535,722	85,300	621,022
7. Probation Service	10,000	74,000	-	74,000
8. Co-operation	20,000	2,000	-	2,000
9. Roads	262,000	242,000	130,400	372,400
10. Domestic Water Supplies	398,650	503,000	-	503,000
11. Village Improvement	57,700	10,350	165,000	175,350
12. Harbours and Ports	79,500	33,000	400,000	433,000
13. Holiday Resorts	139,200	115,050	24,500	139,550
14. Town Planning and Housing	56,600	114,600	-	114,600
15. Electrification	-	-	-	-
16. Broadcasting	-	-	253,600	253,600
17. Civil Aviation	-	-	523,050	523,050
18. Staff Training	25,800	150,000	80,000	230,000
19. Geological Survey	-	-	46,000	46,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,160,666</b>	<b>4,531,626</b>	<b>3,456,650</b>	<b>7,988,276</b>

Table 1. Extract from review of Ten-Year Development programme. The list of schemes in the programme. CO 926/116

## Part 1. Cyprus and Famagusta Harbour: synchronously imperial

### 1.1 The initial post-war port development discussions

The improvements to the Famagusta Harbour and, to some extent, to Larnaca and Limassol ports in the 1930s were the last before the Second World War. The war would mark the end of the global crisis of the interwar years, which meant that the British colonial

system, globally and locally, had to face new realities. The new values of the post-war period were the biggest challenge, and saw colonialism increasingly recognized as a thing of the past. The new developments for Cyprus meant recognition of the mass politics of the Cypriots, labour rights, and relative relaxation of the totalitarian tendencies of the interwar period. At the same time, Cyprus was now being included in strategic concerns in British Middle East policy. The evacuation of British forces from Egypt and Palestine would make Cyprus, as a Crown colony, the last British soil in the Middle East.<sup>1</sup>

Chapter 5, on Cyprus' Electrification, elaborates on the post-war Imperial policy and the Colonial Administration's policy. Moreover, it relates to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1945 (CDWA 1945) as the point where the Cyprus Government's, local administration's, the British Empire's, and metropolitan, policies converged and met. The Colonial Administration wanted to show that the "Government is doing on its behalf" and London wanted to keep its "last bastion" in the Middle East and use it for geo-political purposes.

In the first list of Cyprus development and welfare projects submitted to the Colonial Office, we do not see any port improvements or, as discussed in Chapter 5, any major infrastructural development apart from road upkeep.<sup>2</sup> In the coming year, in 1945, a grant for a very small amount was made available for the purchase of a dredger following complaints from the merchants of Limassol. It was decided that every port of the island was in need of improvement, but this was not considered an urgent issue; it was decided to discuss it in five years' time.<sup>3</sup> The second part of the Ten-year Programme of Development for Cyprus, published in 1946, was more comprehensive and inclusive. This part was drafted by the Cyprus Government and all Departments co-operated in its preparation.<sup>4</sup> However, it

---

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter 5 Cyprus: Self-Determination versus Strategic Security in the Eastern Mediterranean in Louis, William Roger. 1985. *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Post-war Imperialism*. Oxford University Press. See also Chapter 9 Mastery and Despair: Cyprus, 1931-1960 in Holland, R. F, and Diana Weston Markides. 2008. *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850-1960*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>2</sup> CO 67/329/7

<sup>3</sup> CO 67/355/6

<sup>4</sup> The Part 1 of the Ten-year development Programme had been compiled by Sir Douglas Harris who had been employed as Deelopment Commissioner for Cyprus by the Colonial Office. The Part II was prepared at the Secretariat, the Office of Colonial Secretary, in Cyprus. It was noted in the report that each section was being subjected to the scrutiny and approval of an informal advisory committee, meeting under the chairmanship of the Colonial Secretary himself. These officers were C. Raeburn (Water Engineer), C.J. Thomas (Comptroller of Inland Revenue), B.J. Weston (Commissioner of Limassol) and A.F.J. Reddaway (Assistant Secretary).

did not foresee large amounts being spent on the harbours of Cyprus. As far as Famagusta was concerned, we learn that just before the Second World War, the Government had decided that the Harbour needed improved accommodation to cope with the increasing trade of the island. It must be noted that the part of the harbour considered for improvements was again the inner harbour. As I have mentioned in Chapter 4, outer harbours were important particularly for naval bases, where numerous navy ships had to be kept stationed at the port. Thus, open naval concerns were out of the agenda.<sup>5</sup> This tells us that Cyprus had not been given a serious naval role. Nevertheless, Cyprus was lucky and stayed out of the war, for reasons that do not concern this study. A scheme of £600,000 had been laid on the table to be discussed but was immediately shelved, as was the electrification scheme, because the war had just broken out.<sup>6</sup>

The Ten-year Development Programme listed five arguments in favour of further extension of the Famagusta Harbour. This list tells us that there were two criteria for its enlargement. Firstly, already existing trade and its increasing trends needed to be satisfied. In addition there were Government expectations over all harbours' additional capabilities and role. We understand that the Harbour was already reaching its maximum traffic capacity and, in light of Government future projections, it was expected to be inconvenient for the island's trade needs. Orange export, one of the main items of the island's trade, was showing a significant growth; carobs and minerals exports were also showing a steady increase. There was also another important consideration regarding size: modern vessels had grown in size since its small enlargement in the 1930s. Vessels of a size above 420 feet with 23 ½ feet draught were more common, but the existing dimensions were too small and shallow. Besides answering the island's export trade needs, enlargement of the harbour and development of its facilities were also considered valuable in attracting tourism, a new sector which the Government started to emphasise. However, tourism<sup>7</sup> was not a primary objective but something additional that could be exploited, if circumstances allowed. That is

---

The Part I consisted of development and welfare schemes concerned in agriculture, irrigation, forests, health and education. The Part II covered schemes regarding Co-operation, roads, village development, harbours, holiday resorts, prisons, municipalities and the training of Cypriot staff. See CO 67/328/12.

<sup>6</sup> CO 67/328/12

<sup>7</sup> Tourism is a new category which starts to appear in the agenda of post-war Government. Besides, the Ten-Year Development Programme had a budget for tourism investments. It is invaluable to study the Harbour's post-colonial history in face of the Famagusta's rise during independence as a major tourism destination in the Eastern Mediterranean.

to stay, Government expected to increase both the trade and passenger traffic in multiple ways, such as attracting large passenger steamers and maintaining regular calls from steamship lines.<sup>8</sup> Briefly, Famagusta Harbour was envisioned to welcome merchant vessels rather than warships, passengers rather than marines.

In the 1946 Programme, there was no naval use enrolled for Famagusta. As far as the naval use was concerned, it was too early to be discussed. For the Government, the most important objective was to bring economic development and social welfare to the island (see Chapter 5). The British naval and geo-strategic policy concerning Cyprus was still in the making and would be decisive in the post-war period. We need to look at the late 1940s and early 1950s in order to understand the connection between harbour building and Cyprus' new role in the British Empire. The report reflects this situation in the last pages of the harbour and ports part:

*In the particular case of Famagusta also, the proposal not to undertake structural improvements should, of course, be regarded as subject to reconsideration at any time within the next five years if the naval authorities show interest in the development of that harbour; the benefits, direct and indirect, which would accrue the port if it were in regular use as a naval base might well be such as to weigh the balance for consulting the naval authorities be overlooked at any time in the future when the development of this harbour again comes forward for consideration.<sup>9</sup>*

The final proposal of the Programme was an expenditure of £83,000 for a period of five years for dredging works in every port of the island. Harbour building was not a priority, either economically, militarily or politically.

## 1.2 The Middle East appears in Famagusta

As early as 1948 things started to change in the region, with a direct consequence on the Famagusta Harbour. British forces had started to evacuate Palestine: the closest and most adequate British-occupied harbour was Famagusta. There was the problem of quay

---

<sup>8</sup> In 1939, 339 steam vessels called with a total tonnage of 488,494. In the same year the total value of imports were £1,052,144 and total value of exports £337,808. The Harbour earned, in the same year, £207,453 from port dues, wharfage and import duty (including goods cleared at Nicosia). CO 67/328/12.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. Woolley to Hall, 7<sup>th</sup> June 1946

space and the prospect of possible increased traffic in the Harbour. There would be many movements of different parties in different directions. The Jewish camp in Famagusta, holding the illegal Jewish immigrants going to Palestine, was to be cleared; there was evacuation from Palestine, which meant arrival of military stores (by February 1948 the amount imported was 4500-5900 tons of military equipment); and possible RAF developments expected to take place on the island.<sup>10</sup> However, the military stores transferred to Cyprus did not mean increased traffic, but the extension of military trade to the Port, and the military staff were shipped either to Port Said or directly to the UK from Larnaca.<sup>11</sup>

The wartime closure of the rest of the ports made Famagusta the only functioning harbour and the central port. It was also served by the railway, which to some extent was an advantage. The problem appearing at Famagusta was mostly of space, not in the sea but on the shore. By 1951, a new factor increased the need for change in the shore facilities of the Famagusta Harbour. The closure of the railway was to change the arrangement of the goods clearance on the quay.<sup>12</sup> The years of 1951-1952 were also significant for British imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean. Aggression had increased in Egypt, which would lead to Britain's evacuation of the Suez Canal starting from 1952. That made Cyprus the last "British soil" in the region, and a re-assessed geostrategic and military position for Cyprus.

However, these developments did not mean a presumable action on developing the infrastructures, such as harbours, for military use. The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, John Dugdale, answering a Parliamentary question on the Famagusta Harbour, stated the following:

*Yes, Sir. My right hon. Friend [Secretary of State for the Colonies] has now been advised by the Governor that the harbour facilities at Famagusta are adequate for civilian needs and that the rate of loading and discharging vessels compares very favourably with that in other ports of similar size in the Eastern Mediterranean. In*

---

<sup>10</sup> SA1 438/1948/1, Minute of the Governor to Colonial Secretary, 24<sup>th</sup> January 1948

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, Lt Col, AA & QMG to Colonial Secretary, 6<sup>th</sup> March 1948; *ibid.*, Lt Col, AA & QMG to Colonial Secretary, 12<sup>th</sup> April

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, Comptroller of Customs to Colonial Secretary, 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1951

*these circumstances my right hon. Friend does not consider any special action necessary.*<sup>13</sup>

Some British shipping circles were also showing interest in Famagusta. In a long article, at the Shipping News Reports, the Cyprus Government was criticised for her “apathy and inattention to the pressing problems facing the port authorities and shipping interests at Famagusta”.<sup>14</sup> The article put the emphasis on the role of the Harbour in the island’s economy and her “primitive port facilities”. According to the article, the harbour was small for ships larger than 425 feet; it lacked adequate water supply, mechanical cranes and night lighting. Refusing any criticism and comparison of Cyprus with her neighbouring countries had been the common practice and policy of Colonial officers, especially regarding subjects of infrastructures and material facilities provided by the Government, and the Comptroller of Customs was no exception. Citing his discussion with “managing Directors of three well known shipping companies of the British Conference lines,” he claimed:

*...if conditions were as good as in ports in neighbouring countries as Famagusta, there would be little to complain about from a ship-owning point of view... “...the discharge and loading conditions of vessels visiting the port of Famagusta compare very favourably with any port of its size in this part of the world which incidentally would be regarded as a definite under-statement by some ship-owners engaged in the Mediterranean trade supported by the facts and wheat ships discharging at the port in Government account may be taken as a typical example.*<sup>15</sup>

This article was followed by others which came, interestingly, from the British, pro-administration press. The article that was published in *Cyprus Mail* resembled the British one in many respects. This article drew the attention of the Government as well.<sup>16</sup> The article had the same criticism of the facilities and under-equipment of the Harbour. However, it noted that Cyprus was becoming a centre in the “Middle East”:

---

<sup>13</sup> CYPRUS (PORTS) (Hansard, 20 June 1951)

<sup>14</sup> SA1/438/1948/1, Press Cutting, Inadequate Port Facilities at Famagusta, Drastic Overhaul is Necessary- Shipping News Reports, Browne to Griffiths 17<sup>th</sup> September 1951

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, Chief of Comptroller of Customs to Colonial Secretary, 16<sup>th</sup> October 1951

<sup>16</sup> Commissioner of Famagusta noted that it was unlikely that the article had local origin because of its resemblance to the British article. *ibid.*, Commissioner of Famagusta to Colonial Secretary, 9<sup>th</sup> November 1951

*And nobody can say what the shipping situation is going to be like during the next few months while Anglo-Egyptian relations remain as tense as they are.*<sup>17</sup>

The article asked readers to imagine if England were thrown out of Egypt what a boom that would be to Cyprus if it had the facilities for passenger lines. The decolonisation of a country would contribute to the consolidation of colonisation of the other. That was the underlying meaning of the article which was representing the local British, not necessarily official, view on the future of Cyprus.<sup>18</sup> For the Government there was no special need for wholesale improvement of the Famagusta Harbour or any other. What it had in mind was to rearrange the dockyard after the abolition of the railway. The Governor had paid a visit to the Harbour at the end of November and concluded on the improvement of the layout, as soon as possible. He wanted immediate action but, after the abolition of the railway, the works had to be much better planned:

*But...It would be most unfortunate if the undertaking should so proceed as to create chaos in the harbour area just at the moment when the railway ceased to function. For this would indicate wrongly that the confusion was due to the loss of the railway.*<sup>19</sup>

It was a time when every action of the Administration was being followed carefully to exercise criticism of it. However, the Governor cared about the opinion of the “shipping interests” and the Commissioner of Famagusta was ordered to keep in close contact with them for their suggestions and proposals.<sup>20</sup> They were not slow to respond. The Secretary of the Famagusta Chamber of Commerce and the Council of the Chamber wrote separately to Reddaway,<sup>21</sup> the new Colonial Secretary. They asked for better stores, a larger port, and improved means of cargo handling.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, Cyprus Needs a Modern Port in *Cyprus Mail*, 7<sup>th</sup> November 1951

<sup>18</sup> Some others thought that Larnaca had to be invested in and converted into the main port. *ibid.*, Letter to the Editor: Cyprus Needs a Modern Port in *Cyprus Mail*, 9<sup>th</sup> November 1951

<sup>19</sup> Minute by the Governor to Chief Secretary, 29<sup>th</sup> November 1951

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Reddaway became an important figure in Cyprus politics within the next few years. Robert Holland describes him as following:

“There was one Greek-speaking British official, however, John Reddaway, whose linguistic facility was a factor in his meteoric rise from what had hitherto been a relatively slow-moving career within the local hierarchy. Reddaway had not previously impressed Consul Courtney as a man of great imagination or ability. He was, in fact, more complex than this suggests...It was his ability at crafting political memoranda which recommended

### 1.3 Famagusta Harbour becoming imperial: military implicitly in economy

Against the background of these local British discussions on the Famagusta Harbour, the Colonial Office started to take a close interest in the matter. The Parliamentary question mentioned above had been influential in drawing the attention of interested parties on the Famagusta Harbour. Initially, for the Colonial Office and, especially, the Governor, the questions around the adequacy of the Cyprus ports had to do with their relation to the healthy handling of the island's increasing post-war trade. The reason behind the works in Limassol port was, as the Governor Andrew Wright claimed, the fact that it was considered as the only port not adequate to respond to the economic requirements. The merchants of Limassol had put the issue on the Government agenda, which decided upon works amounting £200,000.<sup>23</sup> However, as mentioned earlier, Palestine had been evacuated and there was the evacuation of the Suez Canal on the horizon. The British newspaper the *Daily Express* wrote:

---

him to a Governor who did not himself take naturally to composition, but who badly needed a draftsman whose views meshed with his own....Reddaway, though intelligent and equally passionate by disposition, was not such a high-flyer. Arriving in Cyprus in 1938, he had discovered much more than his *metier*, he found a place he loved and to whose interests, as he understood them, he was prepared to devote his life. Not only did he learn Greek, he married one (indeed, he was married in Phaneromeni church in Nicosia, scene of some of Makarios' most fervent speeches after he became Archbishop), In a bitter-sweet reminiscence, Reddaway later recalled the 'distinctive smells, redolent of thyme and goat, of orange blossom, mimosa, pine and eucalyptus, of meat grilling in the open air, of garlic and spiced foods' which distinguished the very air of the island—such a description conveys the manner in which Cyprus, with its exotic Levantine atmosphere, and yet reassuringly colonial status, took a hold on Reddaway's imagination and affections. Later he came bitterly to lament this 'land of lost content', an island 'robbed of its happiness' by the madness of EOKA.<sup>28</sup> Hatred of that organization had deep wells in the Reddaway household; when John Reddaway told his wife of Army intelligence that they were both on Grivas' hit-list, she merely replied 'with it or on it' (the Spartan saying that a warrior would return bearing one's shield, or carried upon it).<sup>29</sup> The depth of these feelings are important to understanding why Reddaway political analysis always took the astringent form it did."

Holland, Robert. 1998. Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959. Clarendon Press, p.99, 221..

<sup>22</sup> SA1/438/1948/1, Reddaway to Smithers 10<sup>th</sup> January 1952

<sup>23</sup> The design was creating an artificial lighter basin surrounded by breakwaters from three sides. Limassol had been, as we will discuss, considered by Consulting Engineers as the complementary port of Famagusta Harbour. CO 67/371/1, The Ports of Limassol and Larnaca, Report by Coode, Vaughan-Lee, Frank & Gwyther.1951

*For years – in fact, ever since we evacuated Palestine, and a possible withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone began to be considered, we have been hearing how Cyprus would be built up into a big base which would replace these bastions.*<sup>24</sup>

The author, an experienced foreign affairs reporter and British propagandist called Sefton Delmer,<sup>25</sup> having interviewed also Archbishop Makarios amongst others, was very pessimistic on the prospect of the island being a British bastion. The reasons were both political – anti-British sentiment running throughout most of the population – and technological, inadequate infrastructures. The author had added that it would take two days to disembark the paratrooper brigade from Britain, to be despatched later to Iran, which was expected in the Famagusta harbour.

We see that strategic and defence concerns were penetrating in the British policy about Cyprus. It was Secretary of State for the Colonies, James Griffiths, who asked Governor Andrew Wright<sup>26</sup> about “adequacy for military needs”.<sup>27</sup> The point of the article on the paratroopers had drawn the attention of Griffiths, who also had to answer a Parliamentary question on the Famagusta Harbour Facilities, and was also expecting comments about its military potential. The fact that the SoS had no idea about the capabilities of the island’s biggest port proves that Cyprus was still not considered a strategic priority until this point. The Governor, in his reply, informed that two Aircraft carriers, *Warrior* and *Triumph*, transporting a Parachute Brigade, could not enter Famagusta Harbour because it was limited in size and depth. The Governor defended that the Harbour was adequate for normal military needs in peacetime, by which he meant the island’s own military requirements, and no complaints had been received from the local military. For the strategic requirements, he forwarded the report of the Admiralty. The local Cyprus Government was concerned only with her economic and security issues; the island’s strategic prospect was not her primary value.

---

<sup>24</sup> CO 67/371/1, Skymen’s Isle Needs Air Boost in *Daily Express*, 11<sup>th</sup> June 1951

<sup>25</sup> Sefton Delmer was a famous British propagandist during the war and the Chief foreign affairs reporter of the *Daily Express*. For 15 years following the war he was the sole reporter who covered every major foreign news story for the newspaper. During the war, he was involved in black propaganda against the Nazis. Callan, Paul. *Express man who duped Hitler*, *Daily Express*, 20<sup>th</sup> September 2008

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, Griffiths to Wright, 16<sup>th</sup> June 1951

<sup>27</sup> This oral Parliament Question on the Famagusta Harbour facilities was on 20<sup>th</sup> June 1951.

In the Colonial Office archives we see that the Shipping News Reports article had been sent to the Office by J.N. Browne,<sup>28</sup> who had asked the Parliamentary question on the Famagusta Harbour, and he wrote directly to Griffiths on his concerns about it. He continued his communications following the government change after the general elections of October 1951 which brought Churchill's Conservatives back to government and Oliver Lyttelton to the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies. The new Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lennox-Boyd, kept Browne informed about the Governor's defence mentioned above, and asked for his comments.<sup>29</sup> The root of Browne's personal interest in the Harbour is unknown but his concerns were imperialistic and strategic:

*The importance of Middle East defence, the difficulties in Egypt, the increasing trade to Cyprus, its telephone communication with the mainland, and the growing population since stamping out of malaria; - all these points make it desirable for Cyprus to be an island which Britain can hold and make prosperous and use as a base. Let us for goodness sake make a proper job of this, it will pay dividends for generations to come.*<sup>30</sup>

In the coming months of 1952, the Cyprus Government was more and more interested in her harbours, which led her to take the known course of action-seeking reports and money. Her interest was in the framework of the Cyprus development policy. The Cyprus Government asked the Crown Agents for a survey of the flow of trade through the ports of Cyprus, and future trade trends. Governor Wright claimed that the need for such a survey had become apparent as a "result of the situation created" by the abolition of the railway, and the periodical complaints and representations from the trade interests in each

---

<sup>28</sup> Jack Nixon Browne, Baron Craigton CBE, PC (3 September 1904 – 28 July 1993) was a Scottish Conservative politician. Browne served in World War II as an Acting Group Captain in Balloon Command of the Royal Air Force. He was awarded the CBE in 1944. He unsuccessfully contested the working class seat of Glasgow Govan in 1945, but was elected as Member of Parliament for the seat in 1950, holding it until 1955. He was then elected as Member for Glasgow Craigton in 1955, holding that seat until September 1959 at which point he joined the Lords. He was Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Scotland from 1952 until April 1955, when he was appointed a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Scotland. In November 1959 he was created a life peer, as Baron Craigton, of Renfield in the County of the City of Glasgow.[2] In October 1959 he was promoted to Minister of State for Scotland, holding that office until October 1964. He was appointed a Privy Counsellor in 1961. He later held a number of important business positions, including chairman of United Biscuits Holdings, and was associated with environmental groups including the World Wildlife Fund. Dalyell, Tam, 1993 Obituary: Lord Craigton, The Independent

<sup>30</sup> CO 926/104, Browne to Lennox-Boyd, 28<sup>th</sup> January 1952

port city of the island.<sup>31</sup> However, the Cyprus Government did not want a report from an engineer, as proposed by the Consulting Engineers Vaughan & Lee, but instead asked for someone called a “port economist”, a speciality that seemed to be known only to the Cyprus Government. For Cyprus it was not just a technical matter but an economic one, which had to be handled by an engineer/economist that could come up with a harbour fitting the future economic needs and trends. The Crown Agents were positive in finding someone with a background in economic aspects of port operation but who was also an engineer. They thought that this was recommended to be adopted “having regard to the local political questions which are linked with this investigation”.<sup>32</sup>

What Cyprus needed was an economic policy that would be printed upon the harbours too. The improvements to her harbours would be the projection of what was needed economically for Cyprus and what was being envisioned by the British Administration for Cyprus. The Colonial Secretary wrote to the Crown Agents that Cyprus needed an expert for:

- Carrying out a survey of the flow of trade through the ports of Famagusta, Larnaca and Limassol, with particular regard to the hinterland served by each port and to report thereon.
- Producing a forecast of the future trend of the flow of trade in light of the results of the surveys and drafting a report with recommendations as to what development, if any, should be undertaken at each port.<sup>33</sup>

The Ministry of Transport was informed that Cyprus needed a “port economist”. The Colonial Office had doubts as to whether such a speciality existed, but looked for persons in charge of large ports such as the London Port Authority. Upon the recommendation of P. Eric Millbourn, the Colonial Office contacted the General Manager of the Port of London Authority Leslie Ford for interview,<sup>34</sup> but he refused the job. In the meantime, Cyprus was pressing for speedier developments while things moved slowly in London. The Colonial Office in its reply, after three months from the last communication on the subject, told

---

<sup>31</sup>*ibid.*, Wright to Lyttleton, 2<sup>nd</sup> September 1952

<sup>32</sup>*ibid.*, Crown Agents to Colonial Office, 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1952

<sup>33</sup>*ibid.*, Colonial secretary to Crown Agents, 24<sup>th</sup> June 1952; *ibid.*, Crown Agents to Coode & Partners, 7<sup>th</sup> July 1952

<sup>34</sup>*ibid.*, Millbourn to Sheffield, 22<sup>nd</sup> October 1952 ; Sheffield to Ford, 30<sup>th</sup> October 1952

Cyprus that there was not “such an animal” called a port economist. It continued that what was needed was a general economic survey of the island in which ports would be a consequential and subordinate part of the survey. For London, the Cyprus Government was the one which should make the survey, and not just on economic questions:

*Such a comprehensive economic survey would, in our estimation, primarily be the function of Government itself rather than an outside expert; and, incidentally, it would appear probable that only Government could suitably take account of strategic requirements and potential military developments which seem likely to affect the port development issues in a large way.*<sup>35</sup>

Cyprus was beginning to have defence and strategic values which were translated and meshed into the developmental concerns of the island. It had not been announced until 1954, but that same year the Headquarters of British Land and Sea Forces in the Middle East had been transferred to Cyprus. The port improvements would not just have to satisfy needed, expected and projected economic demands, but they had to be related to defence/military measures as well. Until Cyprus delivered a complete economic survey, which was to be done by a Greek Cypriot official Lefkos P. Georgiades,<sup>36</sup> the port issue was left in abeyance.

In February 1953 a short report was submitted but it was a brief one. Strategic requirements and possible military developments had not been included in the report and the Government promised to share them with the expert during his visit to Cyprus.<sup>37</sup> A look at the report is helpful for understanding the policy of the Cyprus Government and how it evaluated the situation of the post-war development of Cyprus. The Ten year development programme was defined as a programme with the primary purpose of “development and safeguarding of the economic resources of the Island, and the promotion of welfare”. It was noted that the Programme did not have in mind defence and strategic considerations but some schemes, such as Electrification, had “incidental advantage to defence”.<sup>38</sup> An

---

<sup>35</sup> *ibid.*, Bennet to Fletcher-Cooke, 29<sup>th</sup> September 1952

<sup>36</sup> He would meet Millbourn in London in May 1953 before he prepared the report.

<sup>37</sup> This had been repeated before and after for reasons that remain unknown. I was unable to find any military or navy report concerning Famagusta Harbour or any other port in Cyprus. It is widely known that there are many British archives being kept secret dating from 1950s but especially the Emergency years.

<sup>38</sup> *ibid.*, Governor to Colonial Office, 3<sup>rd</sup> February 1953

interesting point of the paper was its emphasis on the impression given by schemes to the Cypriots:

*It would be much resented in Cyprus if the impression was given that the Development Programme or other development projects (apart of course from specifically military undertakings) were primarily, or even partially, designed to promote the usefulness of Cyprus as a British base.<sup>39</sup>*

Cyprus was in the category of small territories with an increasing prospect of being the last British soil in the Middle East. The Self-determination demand of Greek Cypriots had already become universal in the Greek Cypriot community, and the communists as well, whom the Government despised most<sup>40</sup>:

*Much misleading propaganda has already been made by communists and others in Cyprus about the alleged intention of Her Majesty's Government to turn Cyprus into a military base at the expense of the impoverishment of the inhabitants.<sup>41</sup>*

However, those 'propagandists' were not blind; they could see that the British military reality was becoming visible in the material life. The Governor's point was that any military intention on infrastructures must be very implicit:

*The compulsory acquisition of agricultural land for military purposes has been used to give colour to this propaganda. The effect of the presence of large bodies of troops upon the prices of foodstuff and other things has aroused comment in the past, and it is likely to do so in the future., and, there is also the danger that large defence projects undertaken by Her Majesty's Government may compete for resources which would otherwise go into Government or private development.<sup>42</sup>*

The Government was better to promote the economic aspect of any scheme and its benefit to the island. The design could include defence concerns, but this must be kept implicit

---

<sup>40</sup> See Holland, R. F, and Diana Weston Markides. 2008. *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850-1960*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.p.223 and Heinlein, Frank. 2002. *British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind*. Cass.pp. 123-126

<sup>41</sup> CO 926/104, Governor to Colonial Office, 3<sup>rd</sup> February 1953

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*

rather than explicit. The paper listed four such infrastructures that were on the agenda of Development: Ports and harbours, Roads, Civil Aviation and the Electrification Scheme.

The Colonial Office had been in contact with the Ministry of Transport, specifically with P. Eric Millbourn, about the harbour development in Cyprus. Cyprus was seeking someone with a specialisation in “port economics”, they had even found a person, A.H.J. Bown, writing in a publication called “The Dock and Harbour Authority” series of articles with the title “Port Economics”. The Colonial Office agreed that the specialist had to know both about the island, economics and harbours for military and trade use. From now on, harbour development involved two aspects: trade and the military. Millbourn advised that his Ministry could undertake it and “keep the matter inter-departmental”. We learn that the Ministry had a section known as “Port Emergency Planning Staff”.<sup>43</sup> This staff, the Colonial Office wrote to the Governor, had been carrying out surveys involving the study of the flow of trade through ports (including quite small ones), and this organisation would be able to make a survey of Cyprus. It also had, the despatch added, “the advantage of close liaison with the military authorities and would be able take account of their requirements in making a study of the potential flow of trade through Cyprus ports”. It was decided to carry out the survey by two visits of groups of three and two people respectively with P.E. Millbourn, Ports Adviser to the Ministry of Transport (MOT), visiting in the first group.<sup>44</sup> Georgiades had the report ready by October.

## Part 2. The Millbourn era

The Millbourn report would be the basis of the harbour developments in the years to come. However, they would not materialise in colonial Cyprus but in the post-colonial Cyprus Republic. These projects would be realised in the first years of the Republic, and would be marked by the Cold War and nationalist politics. The historical account of these projects is highly interesting, but the Republic period is beyond the period of this study. I

---

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, Millbourn to Morris, 19<sup>th</sup> May 1953

<sup>44</sup> *ibid.*, Morris to Millbourn, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1953; *ibid.*, Lytellton to the Officer Administering the Government of Cyprus, 14<sup>th</sup> July 1953

Millbourn was a harbour specialist and had reported about harbours in China, Ghana, United Kingdom, Hong Kong etc. for the Ministry of Transport and local Government.

will focus on primarily Famagusta and Limassol, their non-materialisation and their design aspects. The latter would also tell us about the British vision of Cyprus' role in the rapidly decomposing Empire.

## 2.1 Repetition of the colonial mind: Cyprus as commercial centre in the Levant

The policy of the Conservative Government towards Cyprus and other smaller territories in the early 1950s was to keep them under formal empire. In the circumstances of Cyprus, Britain wanted to keep *enosis* out of the discussion. Withdrawal was out of the question, a decision that was expressed publicly in 1954 by the infamous 'never' statement.<sup>45</sup> British strategic arrangements were thought to require the occupation of the whole island, making the whole of Cyprus a 'base' (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 5).<sup>46</sup>

By the end of 1953, an interesting discussion had happened in the Foreign Office on Cyprus. The discussion, of 30<sup>th</sup> December 1953, had been between the Minister of State for the Colonial Affairs Henry Hopkinson, the originator of the 'never' statement, and Douglas Dodds-Parker, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State of the Foreign Office. Dodds-Parker had come with a paper with the Foreign Office's ideas on Cyprus which had now become a matter for urgent discussion.<sup>47</sup> The paper wrote about the methods to appease the nationalist *enosis* movement. It wrote the following as the scope of the 'external' policies to be implemented:

*Possibility of reducing appeal of Enosis by making Cyprus one of the commercial centres of the Levant based on the use of sterling.*<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup> This refers to the official British statement that some territories in the Empire will never be independent due to their strategic importance. Cyprus was one of these territories.

<sup>46</sup> Heinlein, 2002, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-127.

<sup>47</sup> Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker was a colonial administrator, special operations officer and officer. He had wide knowledge of foreign and Commonwealth affairs. He supported an economically self-sustaining Britain. He was one of those officers opposing joint Suez Attack.

David Dilks, 2010, 'Parker, Sir (Arthur) Douglas Dodds- (1909–2006)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, <sup>48</sup>CO 926/223, Points to Discuss with Mr Henry Hopkinson About Cyprus, 30<sup>th</sup> December 1953

The way out of this growing legitimacy crisis of British rule, primarily perceived through the enosis demand, was to make Cyprus a prosperous country. Among six “methods” to be considered for achieving this end, the first two were the “Hong Kong technique and experience” and “a proper port with free port facilities”.<sup>49</sup> These two were connected; Hong Kong technique and experience meant Hong Kong’s becoming the main entrepôt between western and Chinese trade.<sup>50</sup> This was how the free port idea was introduced to the discussion. Dodds-Parker had in mind not a free port for transshipment but a “Middle East central depot for big firms” such as I.C.I. (Imperial Chemical Industries) and Tate and Lyle (a British agribusiness giant). This meant a place to keep large stocks for their shipment to other places. However, besides the ‘bribe’ of a prosperous Cyprus for keeping Cypriots – having mainly Greekcypriots in mind – under the Union Jack, the strategy was also part and parcel of the Cyprus policy. The construction of a free port “in view of the strategic implications of Cyprus” was a common view in the Foreign Office. They proposed a harbour that would meld the British geopolitics (i.e. Middle East defence concerns) with the British colonial anti-nationalist policy (i.e. economic development against any claim of self-determination).

Some considered the free port idea as an unlikely possibility, but agreed on the need of a proper port, preferably at Famagusta.<sup>51</sup> Millbourn was asked to involve the idea of constructing a free port in his survey, which was approved by the Cyprus Administration as well. In the meantime, news from Spain told of a big free port zone at Vigo as counterpart to the free port area of Barcelona. The Colonial Office liked the idea of a free port; it acquired the plans of the scheme from the British Embassy in Madrid and forwarded it to the Foreign Office and the new Governor, Sir Robert Armitage, to get feedback on their thoughts and knowledge on the subject.<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>49</sup> The other ‘methods’ were economically oriented ideas i.e. modernising the fleet of Cyprus Airways; offering tax holidays for hotel construction; sending an official from Board of Trade to Cyprus and Lebanon for studying opportunities arising from the Arab League Boycott of Israel; encouraging British European Airways and British Overseas Airways Corporation. As far as the internal affairs of the island were concerned, their ideas were again generally restricted to making some industries more productive. For the Governance of the island, they could only suggest appointing “first class administrators” to Cyprus “which is a European country with some very agile brains” and breaking the constitutional deadlock. *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> For the long history of British Hong Kong and its becoming of a trade and industrial centre see Tsang, Steve. 2007. *A Modern History of Hong Kong*. I.B.Tauris.

<sup>51</sup> CO 926/223, Minute of Sir T. Lloyd, 5<sup>th</sup> January 1954

<sup>52</sup> *ibid.*, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 29<sup>th</sup> March 1954; *ibid.*, Colonial Office to Governor, 13<sup>th</sup> May 1954

The visit of the survey team<sup>53</sup> of the Ministry of Transportation had created a good deal of public interest in Cyprus. The possibility of port developments inspired caution on the survey. The Cyprus Government even issued a press release informing of the arrival of the team, which would “survey the flow of trade through the Colony’s port” and “advise the Government” on what developments were desirable at each port in view of the probable trade trends.<sup>54</sup> People needed to be assured that this survey was for trade. Governor Armitage wrote to the Colonial Office that the public interest was so great that the advisers must meet the Chamber of Commerce and Federation of Trade and Industry in their visits.<sup>55</sup> Here it is important to see that the list of “public” was just covering the merchants and industrialists who, no doubt, had their interests to represent.

Millbourn’s first remark was on the current situation of the ports. The flow of military shipment – evacuation had not started yet from the Suez Canal – had brought the ports of Cyprus to their present capacity. Governor Armitage wrote that “well-worn” phrase that the move from Fayid, Canal Zone, of Military Services and equipment from Britain to Cyprus which could be used as Military Headquarters and base without any interference or additional demands on the port facilities of the island was unrealistic.<sup>56</sup> By January 1955, Millbourn had submitted the report in a period when the newspapers were writing more frequently about the ports of Cyprus. The vast majority of such news was in the form of complaints over the frequent and prolonged delays occurring due to the congestion in the harbours. These articles restricted themselves to criticism of the Government for not intervening to solve the situation rather than proposing solutions. For example, one article informs us that the Limassol Industrialists and shipping agents of the city had held meetings to decide on action against the increasing unloading times at the Limassol Port. Cyprus Asbestos Mines, K.E.O (Cyprus Wines Company), Cyprus-Palestine Plantations; Lanitis (a significant industrialist) and Mantovani (a major shipping agent) were among the most distinguished and wealthy to complain.<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> The team consisted of two un-named engineers lead by Millbourn.

<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*, Press Communique, 21<sup>st</sup> May 1954

<sup>55</sup> *ibid.*, Armitage to Colonial Office, 26<sup>th</sup> May 1954

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*, Armitage to Morris, 27<sup>th</sup> October 1954

<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*, “Slow Tempo at Limassol Port”, Cyprus Mail, 7<sup>th</sup> November 1954 ; *ibid.*, “Η Καθυστερήσεις της ενάρξεως των λιμενικών έργων Αμμοχώστου”, Κύπρος, 13<sup>th</sup> September 1954

## 2.2 An anatomy of the Millbourn report

Millbourn's report, first of all, chose those harbours that had to be invested in and focused on. According to Millbourn, there had to be two central ports suitable for ocean shipping: one in the East and one in the West of the island, in view of the sources of the principal exported commodities, the shape of the island and the distribution of the population. For the East side, it would be Famagusta as it was already the most central port, and for the West it would be Limassol. He had no recommendations for improvement of the port of Larnaca, though he did have for Paphos and Kyrenia. His comments on the existing facilities were focused around their capacity in making trade without mentioning any defence-related issues. He considered the Far East trade would be attracted to Cyprus ports in the Levant, where the products were shipped to Egypt in small vessels and then transhipped from there.<sup>58</sup> Millbourn must have had in mind the loss of the Suez Canal which, according to him, would profit Cyprus in ocean shipping (i.e. shipping and logistics of mass orders or mercantile between countries).

Millbourn suggested two ports, Famagusta and Limassol, to be improved with ocean-shipping capabilities on the island. The arguments for this choice – two developed ports, one in the East and one in the West – had been different for each port. As far as Famagusta was concerned, the line of thought of the report suggested that it was more economical to develop an existing port than build a new one. Millbourn argued that Famagusta had the natural features to legitimize the project for the further expansion of the harbour as the most viable technical solution. On the other hand, Limassol's developing and established industries (including spirits and beverages industries, foundries, and construction materials) and the recently built lighterage<sup>59</sup> basin were the factors behind this choice. Thus the report considered that in each of these two ports "three new alongside berths capable of handling ocean-shipping" must be provided in view of several points. These points were in general concerned with satisfying the needs of the already existing trade; providing capacity and


---

<sup>58</sup>*ibid.*, Millbourn, P, E, The Ports of Cyprus and Recommendations for Their Improvement 1954, Cyprus Government Printing Office 1955

<sup>59</sup> Lightering or lighterage is the process of transferring cargo between vessels of different sizes. This generally meant the transferring of cargo from large vessels, like massive ocean ships to smaller ones when the port could not accommodate vessels of such size.







Plan 3. Extract of plans for new roads feeding the port. See extensions from the shore to the planned Famagusta-Nicosia road (i.e. the old railway route). CO 926/223

### 2.3 A fatherly bribe

The first official reactions to the report came from the Government, which said that the Executive Council would accept the suggestions of the report and asked the Crown Agents to inform Consulting Engineers Matthew, Coode and Partners.<sup>62</sup> The British Government sought a big public spectacle with the harbour projects. The Colonial Secretary wrote to Morris of the Colonial Office:

<sup>62</sup> This is the same consulting company that had designed Famagusta Harbour in 1900 (See Chapter 4).

*I understood from you that you might wish to concert the publication of this report with some other announcement about Cyprus, but it seems to me that the mere publication of the report needs hardly be linked with anything else.*<sup>63</sup>

The Colonial Secretary, Fletcher-Cooke,<sup>64</sup> would have liked the projects to be announced separately, isolated from any other issue, in order to show the Government's goodwill in the island's welfare and her will to keep her. What Britain could do, according to the Colonial Secretary, was to show her fatherly generosity. This was the British 'bribe' for gaining the long-lost social legitimacy and consent of all Cypriots:

*What might well be linked with another statement about Cyprus would be an indication that H.M.G were prepared to make a substantial contribution by way of a grant to the cost of these port developments.*<sup>65</sup>

The report had one burning point; Larnaca was out of the improvements. Fletcher-Cooke wrote to Millbourn about the "vigorous" protests from Larnacans and asked him to give clear arguments as to why the city was excluded. Indeed the report was not clear on this point.<sup>66</sup>

In the meantime, the Cyprus Administration had been working on a Five-Year Plan "to improve the facilities of the Island". Governor Robert Armitage announced that Cyprus would have "boom conditions" in the next few years, in his address to the Executive council. According to the Governor, the programme for 1955 to 1960 would "place its main emphasis on land use and development and improved communications", in which providing Cyprus with adequate port facilities would be the largest single item.<sup>67</sup>

The Governor made no reference to the island's political situation, while stating that Cyprus was "enjoying a period of full employment and relative prosperity without any high

---

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*, Fletcher-Cooke to Morris, 17<sup>th</sup> January 1955

<sup>64</sup> John Fletcher-Cooke (8 August 1911 – 19 May 1989) was a British Conservative Party politician. Fletcher-Cooke joined the R.A.F. and was captured by the Japanese in Singapore. He was a prisoner for three and a half years, mostly in Japan; he wrote about his experiences in "The Emperor's Guest". He rejoined the colonial service after the war and was posted to Malta and Palestine. From 1948 to 1951 he was a Counsellor in the U.K. Mission to the U.N. in New York, where he met his future wife, Alice Egner. He served five years as Colonial Secretary, Cyprus, and later Deputy Governor, Tanganyika. Meek, C.I., 1989, Obituary: Sir John Fletcher-Cooke, *Tanzanian Affairs*

<sup>65</sup> CO 926/223, Fletcher-Cooke to Morris, 17<sup>th</sup> January 1955

<sup>66</sup> *ibid.*, Fletcher-Cooke to Millbourn, 20<sup>th</sup> January 1955

<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*, Developments at Cyprus: Harbours and Airport in *Manchester Guardian*, 29<sup>th</sup> December 1954

degree inflation".<sup>68</sup> The announcement of the harbour developments, as suggested by the Colonial Secretary, would suit this policy of development programme, which again resembled the long traditional colonial administrative reaction to social-political crisis in Cyprus: to build more/to invest in the material welfare. The Colonial Office wanted to support this policy and lobbied for the British Government to pay for the improvements, in the form of grants to her (soon to be violent) colony. However, the Colonial Office considered this a hard case to make, unless it could be shown that the developments were required to cover increased traffic due to military establishments in Cyprus. Millbourn's report did not specify this and the Colonial Office asked whether they could show this or not. The Colonial Office needed to make a case before going to the Treasury:

*...if you could give me some indication of the extent of H.M.G.'s interest in or requirement of these port developments then this would help us to make up our minds as to how much of a case we have got for going to the Treasury.*<sup>69</sup>

What the Colonial Office was asking for was the transfer of the Middle East Headquarters of Britain to Cyprus, which by early 1954 was an urgent decision, with the imminent evacuation from Suez Canal Base.<sup>70</sup> By August 1954 the British Middle East Headquarters had started to transfer to the island in mass. While Millbourn was in South Africa, another member of the team, J.H.P Draper, had sent a preliminary report. It concerned the military transfers from Egypt to Cyprus and their handling at the ports and possible provision in the improvement works for military use.

Indeed, military loading and unloading was causing delays to the commercial interests but, the report claimed, there was no serious antagonism, rather an anticipation of increased material traffic. The team was strictly against the War Office building its own port on the island. Instead, on a point at the Dekhelia cantonment, a newly designated base area could be built a hard.<sup>71</sup> The estimated evacuation from Egypt base would be 18 months, at a monthly average rate of 3000 tons shipment at Famagusta Harbour per month, with peaks of 6000 to 9000 tons. There were also RAF shipments coming to Cyprus, amounting to at

---

<sup>68</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> *ibid.*, Smith to Millbourn, 28<sup>th</sup> January 1955

<sup>70</sup> Holland, 1998, *op. cit.*, p.35

<sup>71</sup> Hard is a large concrete gently-sloping area that is uncovered at low water, and covered to a sufficient depth at high water that a boat may be launched.

least 2000 per month. So there was no way for Famagusta to handle 12,000 tons, with an average unloading 200 tons per day capacity. The solution proposed was the hard, which would be auxiliary until the improvements were completed.<sup>72</sup>

On first impressions, this information was not sufficient to build a case for a grant. Finance is a key part of any project and the way it is supplied is one of the design characteristics/features of any infrastructural scheme. So far we have seen that financing had always been an uneasy aspect of infrastructural projects, such as the case of the first Famagusta improvements in 1905. In the present 1955 instance, EOKA was two months away from its guerrilla campaign against British colonial rule. Financing was therefore more than merely a state or a loan issue. The terms and conditions of the finance meant different things to different people, differing in class, ethnicity, gender and status, and would have symbolic implications for the undertaker which was a colonial administration with a lethal legitimacy crisis. The Colonial Office could understand that well but there were also bureaucratic traditions, established ways of doing things, vested interests and political agendas, most importantly convincing the Treasury and Parliament. In a Colonial Office a draft letter which for some reason was never sent to the Colonial Secretary, we learn more about the Cyprus and port development policy of the Colonial Office:

*As you know, the prospect of a big port development always been regarded as related to general policy for Cyprus, as manifesting H.M.G's long-term intention to build up the economic strength of the Colony. It has frequently been mentioned in discussion with Foreign Office in this connection.*

The port development, it was hoped, would tell people that their long-term prosperity depended on the continuation of colonial rule. It would show what this Administration was capable of and how it was devoted to the welfare of Cyprus. However, an ad hoc grant was considered difficult and Cyprus was advised not to raise the issue of finance in the publication of the report, in order to avoid a growth in public expectations.<sup>73</sup> Armitage's reply to Lennox-Boyd was immediate. Armitage was thinking in terms of buying Greek Cypriots' enosis sentiments, a bribe to renew the legitimacy of the regime on the ruling

---

<sup>72</sup> CO 926/223, Draper to Smith, 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1955

<sup>73</sup> *ibid.*, Draft Minute 17<sup>th</sup> February 1955; *ibid.*, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Robert Armitage, 19<sup>th</sup> February 1955

chair of which he was sitting. He forwarded two more factors in favour of the grant other than the “great interest” of Lennox-Boyd in the development of Cyprus, financial difficulties and substantial borrowings for the electrification and telecommunication projects:

*The first is that this would afford an opportunity to show that H.M.G not only has the great interest of Cyprus at heart, but also is prepared to demonstrate to the world that it intends to maintain the British connexion with this Island.*

In Cyprus historiography, Robert Armitage was not considered to be the brightest politician, let alone Colonial Governor. Holland considered him the archetypal failed Governor.<sup>74</sup> According to Armitage, relying on a racial stereotype, the average Greek Cypriot had a natural urge towards materiality:

*It is not possible by any dramatic change of policy to attempt suddenly to match the sentimental attraction that the Greek Cypriot has for Greece, but it is most certainly possible to catch the support of his material instincts, which as you know are very highly developed, by a spectacular gift, which this certainly would be. There could be little doubt that a grant of a large sum towards port development, and its very early announcement, could do more to make for moderation in the situation out here than any other action could possibly achieve.<sup>75</sup>*

The second factor, the old issue of the Tribute, was equally interesting. Armitage wanted get beyond the ancient resentments against Britain:

---

<sup>74</sup> “It was the unfortunate fate of Sir Robert Armitage, at that time Chief Secretary in the Gold Coast Colony, to be appointed to succeed Wright as Governor of Cyprus at such a difficult juncture. Armitage was to become almost the archetype of the ‘failed Governor’ in the era of decolonization—a tag confirmed by his later governorship in Nyasaland, which was also marked by disorders and alleged incompetence. He was, in fact, a man of limited ability, modest imagination, and of sincere and well-meaning convictions: the churlish might say the classic colonial administrator. Occasionally in the Colonial Office the possibility had been discussed of succeeding Wright with somebody who had what one official called ‘the Mountbatten touch’ – that is, the panache and iconoclasm to break old taboos and get on the wavelength of potential new allies. The idea had not found much favour. Instead, Armitage, a man whose whole career had been spent in African administration, had risen to the top of the list. Just as striking was the judgement in the Colonial Office that it was not necessary to provide the new Governor with any firm instructions before leaving for his assignment, since there was no ‘seething discontent, chronically threatening internal order’...”

Holland, 1998, *op. cit.*, p.33.

<sup>75</sup> CO 926/223, Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 19<sup>th</sup> February 1955

*It is a charge [that] still rankles and it seems to me that this present occasion presents a perfect opportunity, by making a generous gift, to eliminate that old taint of meanness which still occasionally pollutes the atmosphere.*<sup>76</sup>

The last payment of Tribute had been made in 1926; 29 years had passed since its abolishment. The appearance of Tribute in his account therefore helps to show the Governor's despair. There was little space for him to manoeuvre politically or morally. He was relying on old ghosts to build a dialogue with the people of the island. Armitage wanted to make a big sentimental impression, to show that Britain was a mistaken father but, ultimately, just and generous. He perceived the situation as a loss of confidence in the Administration and loss of prestige for the Government. A father that could pay for harbours:

*To sum up therefore, what I am asking you to consider is whether H.M.G. could not do a great deal to restore the confidence of the Cypriots and the prestige of the present Government by making a generous and dramatic gift to the people of Cyprus of the cost of such harbour extensions as are found, as a result of further surveys, to be essential for the expanding economy of the island. This proposal is not a new one.*<sup>77</sup>

Lennox-Boyd, writing personally to Armitage, gave no promises as far as the grant was concerned, which he thought would be difficult to achieve.<sup>78</sup> For him Cyprus was not likely to be capable of paying it. Cyprus was going to be given an additional £1/2 million from the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, not just for harbours, but for all the ongoing projects. However, Cyprus was already in substantial debt with capital expenditures, including the electrification and internal telecommunications networks. There were building programmes as part of the new welfare state of post-war Cyprus, and a road-building programme. Taxing was not an option, and even the Governor thought that Cyprus was one of the most heavily taxed colonies.<sup>79</sup> The idea of getting an International Bank loan was

---

<sup>76</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>78</sup> *ibid.*, Lennox-Boyd to Armitage, 7<sup>th</sup> March 1955

<sup>79</sup> *ibid.*, Minute, 17<sup>th</sup> March 1955.

being discussed for financing the port projects. These were his views just one month before the first bombs of the EOKA insurrection.

By May 1955, Mr Elliot of Coode and Partners had made a short visit to Cyprus to make contact with the officials. Paul Pavlides, a prominent Greek Cypriot figure of the Executive Council with a special interest in the subject, reported his ideas and informed the Colonial Secretary about his contacts. During Elliot's meetings with the officials it was expressed to him that development of ports at the present time was a "dream". The difficulty was financing, the low amount dedicated to Cyprus from the Colonial Development and Welfare Act and the financial burden of Cyprus' ongoing projects.<sup>80</sup> These arguments suggested the abandoning of the port projects temporarily. Pavlides clearly opposed the idea of not making any progress on the matter. He considered the developments of the utmost importance, a view which he expressed vociferously:

*...I said it in Executive Council when the matter was first discussed, that the Cyprus people are willing and ready to mortgage their very souls for having, at any cost, ports that ought to have been built more than half-a-century earlier.<sup>81</sup>*

The Government was too far from the Cypriots. The few Cypriots whose voices penetrated the discussions were either the industrialists or people like Pavlides, cooperating with the Government.

## **2.4 Famagusta harbour already a military base: not for Middle East defence but for Cyprus**

In the coming days, the Governor decided that Coode and Partner should conduct a comprehensive survey on the lines of the Millbourn Report in order to have a last opinion before going to tenders.<sup>82</sup> It is important to briefly explain the CD&W grant over the next five years, 1955-1960.<sup>83</sup> The policy adopted was outlined in a note for the Secretary of State

---

<sup>80</sup> CO 926/224 , Pavlides to Colonial Secretary, 13<sup>th</sup> May 1955, at

<sup>81</sup> *ibid.*.

<sup>82</sup> *ibid.*, Armitage to Martin, 11<sup>th</sup> June 1955

<sup>83</sup> One noisy reaction to the Millbourn Report would come from Larnaca. However, unlike in the early 1900s, this time the city would not manage to mend the Government politics. Times had changed, like the actors and their relations of power. Even the form of protesting had changed. Petitions had been escorted by mass

for the Colonies. The port development and Colonial Development schemes had been tied to this grant. First of all, Cyprus had applied for a £2 million from the Colonial and Development fund for the years 1955-60, but had finally only been granted half of it. Port developments weren't included either in the application or in the final offer. Cyprus was advised not to be "unduly pessimistic" about her near future finances and to continue with the development programme by using revenue as a source. For the heavy-capital projects, it suggested borrowing, since Cyprus had a "reasonable" revenue to debt ratio, 3 ½:1 (10 million revenue/ 6 million loan). It was a blow for the Cyprus Administration, which reacted with cuts in its development programme.<sup>84</sup>

The Administration was reluctant to get loans because it calculated that in the coming years the revenue would fall since the military/security expenditure would come to an end. Military and security had been a source of increasing revenue and were pulling down the unemployment rates. At its peak, there were 30,000 British soldiers fighting EOKA. For London, the cuts from the development programme were a move contrary to the British policy towards Cyprus. Cutting development would mean undermining the British argument that was the base of Britain's case for staying in Cyprus. Almost the entirety of the Colonial Development and Welfare Funds that had been allocated to Cyprus since Joseph Chamberlain, were, in one way or the other, about buying out the Cypriots. In the CDWA 1945 it was especially about buying out rural Cyprus in order to eradicate the mistrust towards the Colonial establishment. The note of the Colonial Office on this policy could not have been clearer:

*[Referring to the cuts] Politically it seems just as desirable to carry on with the work begun in the 1945-55 plan of seeking to conciliate the peasantry by rural developments. A large part of our political case for Cyprus in the past has rested on the argument of what British administration has done for Cyprus in the development field. It would certainly be most undesirable to publish a*

---

demonstrations and even general strike and closure of shops "against the Millbourn report" had been witnessed. Though it is an interesting history it will not be narrated here.

<sup>84</sup> Three quarters of the amount proposed for agriculture development, the whole amount on irrigation and water supplies, the entire expenditure on technical education and housing.

*truncated development plan, and the aim should be to prepare and publish a striking and acceptable plan.*<sup>85</sup>

Gradually and steadily, military and security traffic was pushing aside the commercial concerns at the ports. The evacuation of British forces had been followed by the Emergency in Cyprus. British military pile-up, a result of the EOKA armed campaign, had severely overloaded the ports of Cyprus, in particular of Famagusta. Development works being still in the discussion phase, Cyprus was seeking out a temporary administrative solution for the regulation and efficiency of port traffic and management.

By this point Famagusta had become a quasi-naval-military base. The Government had made base facilities in Famagusta Harbour available to the British Naval Security Forces. Additional workshops would be erected on the quay while a flotilla of minesweepers would be anchored there when they were not patrolling for EOKA gun smugglers. One-tenth of the quay, 180 feet, would be left for the Navy's use, of which spokesman announced that the fall in commercial capacity of the port due to the presence of warships was the direct result of the present security situation. If Cypriots ended the disturbances, normal conditions would return to Cyprus and her ports.<sup>86</sup> The situation by February 1956 forced the Government to build of a small quay for the discharge of lighters to cope with the flow of cargo at Famagusta.<sup>87</sup> The result was a hybrid: a permanent military base within a trade harbour.

By October 1955, Cyprus had a new Governor, Field Marshall Sir John Harding.<sup>88</sup> He came with orders to suppress EOKA and open the way for self-government. Security and political conciliation were the characteristics of the contradictory policy of the island's Government. Whether Britain would stay in the island or not was under scrutiny.

Despite the ambiguity of Britain's future in the island, harbour development still remained on the agenda. Eric Millbourn and Captain Cavaghan, Senior Assistant Comptroller of Customs of Cyprus, were set to work on the organization and management of the ports

---

<sup>85</sup> *ibid.*, Note for the Secretary of State: Cyprus Development Plan 1955-60

<sup>86</sup> *ibid.*, Harbour with Terrorists Series in Reuters, 25<sup>th</sup> November 1955.

<sup>87</sup> This was to cover the gap of 15,000 tons a month, the gap between the maximum cargo which can be handled by the port proper and the natural flow of imports and exports. The delays in turn-round had caused the freight rates at Famagusta to increase by 25%. *ibid.*, Sinclair to Martin 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1956

<sup>88</sup> He was a military man rather than a politician.

while the survey for the development works was being arranged by Coode and Partners. The Consulting Engineers, Coode and Partners, had the report ready by late April 1956. This was the final report that had been previously asked for by the Governor.


Millbourn was again in Cyprus and conducting meetings with the new Governor, John Harding. The meeting on 6<sup>th</sup> June at the Colonial Office was the sole proof that the port development had become a serious colonial matter. It was attended by Governor Harding, Millbourn from the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation and three other Colonial Office officials. In line with Millbourn's advice, it was decided to start the development at Famagusta port with the shore design proposed by Coode and Partners, and to develop Limassol into another first-class port after Famagusta and establish a port authority.<sup>89</sup> However, they were not put in action, pending further discussion in the Colonial Office and Executive Council in Cyprus.

## 2.5 Government 'against' the Walls

Several meetings took place in the Executive Council in September and October. Unlike usual Executive Council Meetings, all department heads were present to express their opinions on the port development matter. In the first meeting the subject was on the selection of one scheme from the two proposed for Famagusta: shore and reef schemes. What was going to be discussed was neither a security nor a constitutional issue. There was one matter that had caused questions in the minds of the officials both in Cyprus and London: the ancient Venetian walls of the city. The Governor and Millbourn had already discussed this and the latter had comforted the Governor as far as the look of the city was concerned. The harbour lay just on the point where the walls ended into the sea. Further development of the port, if the shore scheme were selected, would be further north where the walls continue along the sea-line and turn slightly westwards after the infamous Othello Castle.

---

<sup>89</sup>*ibid.*, Notes of a meeting in the Governor's room at the Colonial Office, 6<sup>th</sup> June 1956




Plan 4. Extract from the map that shows designs of shore and reef schemes. CO 926/224

The danger, according to the Director of Antiquities, lay at the encirclement of the walls by the port establishment and the possible commercial development following the latter.<sup>90</sup> Thus, he sided with the reef scheme, which would not foresee reclamation of the land towards the north where also the traditional beach of the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of the walled city lay. The Acting Comptroller of Customs and the Director of Public Works were not so much interested in the ancient walls. The shore scheme, for them, meant more space, deep water and a less exposed harbour for the anchoring vessels. Harding liked the arguments of the latter but he expressed his concern on possible damage to the “one of the Island’s greatest archaeological assets”. The last argument echoed the Administration’s increasing tourist industry interests.

The choice between the two schemes would also be decisive for which way the city would enlarge in the future. The enlarged harbour would definitely require larger roads. The shore scheme would be served by a road built towards the north, thus encircling the walls.


<sup>90</sup>*ibid.*, Extract from Minutes of executive Council Meeting, Nicosia, 11<sup>th</sup> September 1956

On the other hand, the reef scheme would mean a more compact harbour, which would have a southern access road. The costs and the so-called engineering advantages favoured the shore scheme, to which all except the Director of Antiquities had objections. It could have been an easy choice but it was not. Each design would have a cost but the shore design would have a political cost as well. The Governor directed his officials to bring him more reports and information in order to find ways of making the shore scheme less damaging, more presentable, and politically more defensible.<sup>91</sup>



Plan 5. Extract from the plans showing the Shore scheme.CO 926/224

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.



Plan 6. Extract from the plans of Reef Scheme. See that this design foresaw reclamation works upon the breakwater to create quay space. CO 926/224.

The Government feared that the adoption of the shore design would provoke criticism towards the Administration as a case of vandalism to the island's archaeological treasures. With the sole exception of the Deputy Governor, all officials were in favour of the shore design. As far as tourism was concerned, the dominating argument was that it was still of marginal importance and Famagusta was still not a steady tourist destination. All were in agreement that the encirclement of the walls by the enlargement of the city towards the north was "inevitable", whether or not the shore design was adopted. Thus the strategy would be to separate and put a zone of protection between the walls and the city.

This apologetic way of justifying the shore design had its roots in the sole political establishment of the island. There was no doubt the project would be a big one and attract wide publicity and public interest. However, the Government was very isolated from the people; it was a colonial dictatorship. This was marked in the minutes of the next Executive Council meeting, which was again attended by all the heads of the state machinery:

*(vii). If there were a Legislative Assembly in Cyprus, it would almost certainly vote for the "Shore" scheme on costs alone, and there was no doubt that the commercial community in Famagusta supported this scheme. Generally speaking, the present generation of the population of Cyprus showed comparatively little genuine interest in the Island's archaeological assets.<sup>92</sup>*

This was the statement of an isolated government that perceived Cyprus through hypothecations and stereotypes. The major difficulty of the Government was a contradiction of which it was itself the source. A public discussion on which design people wanted could not have been isolated from a discussion on the Government's legitimacy on the island. The Government would like to have asked the people, but they would be answering on their terms, which the Government would not feel easy about confronting. The Government would have liked to hear people without actually asking them. Executive council Minutes state:

*(viii) The people of Cyprus had had no opportunity of expressing their opinion on the two schemes, but if invited to do so they would almost certainly be in favour of the "Shore" scheme. To invite public opinion would, however, be an embarrassment for Government if it were decided to proceed with the "Reef scheme" and it would also give the people of Limassol and Larnaca opportunity of working up agitation for major development of their ports. Although it was difficult to reach decision without some expression of public opinion, the disadvantages of inviting the public's views were unfortunately overriding.<sup>93</sup>*

The Council would decide to mitigate the disadvantages and advantages of both designs in order to continue with the Shore scheme and have arguments/tools to support it. The

---

<sup>92</sup> *ibid.*, Extract from Minutes of executive Council Meeting, Nicosia, 18<sup>th</sup> September 1956

<sup>93</sup> *ibid.*

Director of Antiquities prepared a report on methods for the preservation and protection of the ancient walls, the Director of Planning and Housing would submit a report on the healthy future expansion of the city, and the Comptroller of Customs would work on the operating costs of two designs comparatively. Moreover, the Commissioner of Famagusta was directed to give his opinion at the next meeting in the light of “interests of port user’s and local opinion”. These reports would be added to the arsenal of the Government next to the Royal Marines chasing EOKA guerrillas in the Troodos Mountains.

The Commissioner of Famagusta came with the opinions of “both communities”, as he put it. He would put in the category of Turkish Cypriots only the inhabitants of the city inside the Venetian walls. The Commissioner informed that they had been protesting against the shore scheme for losing their only bathing beach. As to the Greek Cypriot category, he meant the merchants and industrialists of the city. They supported the shore scheme on account of lower costs and easiness of handling and transportation of their goods. The Commissioner underlined that “neither community had really considered the matter from the antiquities point of view, and they actuated by material considerations”.<sup>94</sup>

The other Directors came with draft reports that contained legislations, and administrative and financial measures that would be needed in the case of the selection of the shore design. A separate Famagusta city authority responsible for its antiquities and urban planning was one of them. It was decided to announce the in-principle adoption of the shore scheme and to instruct consultants to prepare their plans. The Government policy that it was decided to announce to the public would state that the Government had adopted the shore scheme and proposed to develop the area “to the best advantage in the interests of the port and of the amenities of the old city”. The Government would announce at a later date her decision on the possible measures for preserving the antiquities and the matter of Turkish Cypriots’ “bathing facilities”.<sup>95</sup> The last meeting of the Council would appoint a working party with the head of directors involved to work on city planning and preservation of the amenities, and forward the acquisition of land in the designated area.<sup>96</sup>

---

<sup>94</sup>*ibid.*, Extract from Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, Nicosia, 25<sup>th</sup> September 1956

<sup>95</sup> *ibid.*,.

<sup>96</sup>*ibid.*, Extract from Minutes of executive Council Meeting, Nicosia, 16<sup>th</sup> October 1956

## 2.6 Once promised it is not forgotten: Famagusta Harbour immediately before and after Independence

By 1956 It looked as if the works would start soon, but the late 1950s were times of fast change. While the Consulting Engineers were working on plans, Millbourn and the Governor were discussing the military needs which had far exceeded the former's anticipation in 1954. In 1954 there had been no armed struggle against the British establishment nor a joint invasion of Egypt. What was discussed remains unknown, but the Governor had informed Millbourn that he was in contact with the military authorities on the island and they were considering the details.<sup>97</sup> However, more about the military development cannot be found in the archives. The only reference was a letter written by Harold Watkinson, the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, to whom Millbourn was Adviser on shipping ports. We learn from him that there was an ongoing military survey on the port requirements and Cyprus needed to wait for the results of the survey in order to decide fully the specifications for the extensions at Famagusta Harbour.<sup>98</sup> Besides being the trade port of the island, Famagusta Harbour had been since 1954 a naval and military port as well. In the recent Port Said operation, it had accommodated warships and proved inadequate to cope with the ships involved in the operation.<sup>99</sup>

The port developments disappear from the archives for the years of 1957-58 and appear again in 1959, but this time under the Foreign Office title.<sup>100</sup> We learn that in these two years it was decided and announced that Famagusta harbour would be extended northwards with new harbour equipment, 2100 feet of extra berthage space, a dredged depth of 32 feet, as well as extra anchorage space. This meant that the shore design had been decided upon definitely. Limassol's development, estimated to be £4 million according to Coode and Partners, would be postponed to a later date. The cost of Famagusta was estimated to be £2.5 million excluding the cost of new harbour equipment, purchase of the land and the new access roads. Together with the ancillary works the total cost was

---

<sup>97</sup> *ibid.*, Minutes of the conversation between John Harding and Eric Millbourn, 11<sup>th</sup> December 1956

<sup>98</sup> *ibid.*, Harold Watkinson to Colonial Secretary and Secretary of State for War, 21<sup>st</sup> December 1956

<sup>99</sup> *ibid.*, Millbourn to Morris, 31<sup>st</sup> December 1956

<sup>100</sup> Few Parliamentary questions during 1957 over the progress of the project can be found but they give no detailed answers.

estimated to be £4 million. By March 1959, the plans were ready and the preparation for tender for the Famagusta development was in its final stages.<sup>101</sup>

However, the British Administration would not last to see the works to be commenced. There were already negotiations leading to an independent Cyprus Republic. Consequently Makarios appears up in the archives negotiating with the last Governor, Hugh Foot, for a British promise. Foot expressed to Makarios that a loan reference for Famagusta extensions could be included in a general statement that would be made by the United Kingdom about future aid to the Cyprus Republic. Makarios, thankful for the proposal, noted that the Greek and Turkish Governments were also thinking of a gift to Cyprus in the form of a grant to cover the cost of the Famagusta Harbour extensions. However Makarios, who thought wrongly that the extensions would cost £1.5 million, had no objection to the proposal and agreed that it is “most important to press on with the extension of the Famagusta port in accordance with the plans already prepared”.<sup>102</sup> It must be noted that the Turkish Cypriot counterpart of Makarios, Dr. Kutchuk, was absent from this discussion.

This discussion brought trouble to the United Kingdom in the coming years. The reason would be a short answer of the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Julian Amery, to the parliamentary question on what assistance the United Kingdom would give to the Cyprus Republic in the next few years. Amery would answer that Britain would contribute to the initial development programme of the new Republic. He specified three projects by name for which Britain would offer a grant or a loan. He mentioned a grant for the construction of a new civil air terminal at Nicosia airport and a loan for the “expansion for the service provided” by the Electric Authority. Both of these enterprises, as he added, would be used for British Base Area needs in Cyprus. He also added separately that they were prepared “to consider a loan towards the cost of the scheme for the extension of Famagusta Port”.<sup>103</sup> He and Britain would regret these promises in the coming years. Cypriots had long learned to follow House of Common discussions and the British press concerning them. Makarios eventually used them to extract a loan from Britain for Famagusta Harbour and Electricity Grid, thought now the whole international framework

---

<sup>101</sup> FO 371/144701, Port Development in Cyprus, Colonial Office Mediterranean Department, 26<sup>th</sup> March 1959, at

<sup>102</sup> *ibid.*, Extract of conversation between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1959

<sup>103</sup> Assistance (Hansard, 25 June 1959)

would be different. It could no more be conceptualised as part of a colonial framework, but as Cold War reality. There would be joint Israeli-British co-operation to win the tender of Famagusta works but, as a result of Makarios' so-called neutral alignment policy, it would go to a Polish construction firm.

## Conclusion

The political changes in the Middle East and Cyprus concerning the British Empire during the late 1940s and 1950s can be traced in the discussions on Famagusta Harbour. The general policy for Cyprus was concerned with the economic possibilities of the Harbour, while Middle East defence policy added the military dimension. The improvement of the Harbour would be designed to satisfy both, but Cyprus' political situation demanded that this be done implicitly. The Harbour had to appear to have no military use. The loss of the Government's legitimacy in the island biased the economic side. Making Famagusta Harbour, and consequently Limassol too, a trade harbour with ocean shipping facilities was thought as a way to show Britain's intention to stay in the island: a long-term intention of building the economy of the island. In other words, it was for the prolongation of colonial rule. A developed harbour was to be utilised as a bribe by the colonial power: a policy that was ultimately based on colonial stereotypes.

With no material development, Famagusta Harbour became a de-facto hybrid harbour, trade-military, in the face of the political developments in the Middle East, the Suez Canal and Cyprus' guerrilla warfare. The militarisation of the Cyprus Government against EOKA warfare, consolidated itself with a permanent military base inside the Famagusta Harbour. When it was decided to develop the Harbour, its design indirectly became a political matter. The Colonial Government's isolation from the people translated into the worries of the Government about the features of the design. The Government wanted the shore scheme but it was afraid of being charged with archaeological vandalism. The shore scheme contained in it ideas like the potential free port; it also offered a lower cost. Since public opinion was suppressed, the Government sought to justify its choice of design with technical reports and policies on the urban development of the city of Famagusta.

# Epilogue

---

## Governing Technologies, Networks and Colonies

There are several factors that effect decision-making and these decisions themselves. When the actors under scrutiny are politicians and statesmen, ideology comes forward as a significant factor that shapes perceptions and decisions. Certain established ideas in the minds of those occupying posts high up in the social hierarchy, like Governors, Ministers or their Officials etc., not only define or specify a problem but also its solution as well. This was no different in colonial contexts. Ideologies or well-established ideas were also crucial in policy-making concerning colonies. While these politicians defined the problem in social (e.g. banditry), economic (e.g. inefficient agricultural production) or political (e.g. crisis of governance) terms, their solutions involved material proposals as well. Thus, the solution to a colonial matter that had been defined as having economic roots could be a technological one. There was a close link between the issue of colonial governance and technopolitics, which was organically part and parcel of the making of technological infrastructures. The ideology here worked both in proposing the solution as a policy and technology as well. At the start of Joseph Chamberlain's service as Secretary of State for the Colonies, Cyprus was known as a problematic colony. British rule was being challenged locally by a growing crisis, but it was also being questioned for its legitimacy in the island within the Empire. The situation of the island was defined broadly as neglected in economic and financial terms. Inasmuch as it was considered a matter of economic policy, the ideology of 'constructive imperialism' fitted to Cyprus as well. In other words, the answer to the problem was a policy of colonial development which would be materialised by technological means. Technology became the material expression of a certain policy and ideology. In a colonial context, infrastructures were imagined and promoted as tools for the consolidation and reproduction of colonial rule. In a way, constructing infrastructures was a colonial practice of governance, state management and ruling of the indigenous population. And these

ideologies and policies, like colonial development, shaped the technological policy, the character and the structure of these infrastructures.<sup>1</sup>

Here, I must note that the point is not only that technology was offered as a tool for the consolidation of colonial rule and re-confirmation of its moral and political legitimacy. These colonial policies, originating from a certain ideology, shaped also the technological policies (e.g. one railway-one harbour dogma), and the structure and character of technological networks. That is to say, colonial development policy for the Cyprus of the late 1890s was a model for an economy based on agricultural production and trade. The means to realise this policy were irrigation, railway and harbour projects: the irrigation project was considered as important in order to increase the production and agriculture potential of the island; the railway would carry the products 'efficiently' and cheaply to a harbour which would be designed with a capacity and capability according to the size of the vessels that approached and the trade that was expected. Within this general policy, there were also other ideologies at work, shaping the design and technology policy, particularly the strong belief in the direct positive relation of development to improved means of transport, i.e. railway and harbour. While the policy was framed in technological terms, these terms were shaped by established beliefs too. That was how the dogma of one railway line, Famagusta-Nicosia-Karavostassi, and one harbour, Famagusta Harbour, was created in colonial Cyprus. The result was a railway route that passed through the grain-producing regions of the Messaoria plain, ending inside the Famagusta Harbour and excluding purposely the major port-city of the island, Larnaca. Additionally, as we see in the Pritchard report, which was used extensively by Shelford (see Chapter 3), the designated agricultural policy (i.e. grain production) also had shaped the route. The emphasis on grain production in the Messaoria pulled the east end of the route further north in order to have closer contact with the grain-producing areas. This was in exchange for passing the route further away from more densely populated areas (see maps of competitive roads). Finally, the configuration of the use of the railway (i.e. transport of agricultural products) by this policy also shaped its design as a light

---

<sup>1</sup> These arguments must not be confused with rather old narratives in history of technology. These narratives, mostly diffusionists, portrayed western technology (i.e. colonists' technology) as great powers giving direction to history. This grand narrative generally concluded in telling the story of western civilisations' progress and triumph (see Headrick, Daniel R., 1981. *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*. Oxford University Press). Again, there must not be confusion with narratives which are concerned with ideological uses of imperial technology (see Adas, Michael, 1990. *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press).

narrow-gauge railway. In the same way, Famagusta Harbour was defined as a trade harbour (i.e. focusing only in the inner harbour) with facilities for accommodating railway at the quay and vessels of certain type, such as large ironclads.

The cases of the Cyprus Government Railway and Famagusta Harbour were examples of ideologies and policies developed in the metropole. The case of electrification differed in its origin. It was a policy of the local government again as a means of answering a crisis of legitimacy and consent. The local colonial government too had its own systems of thinking which shaped, reinforced or altered the imperial policy in the metropole. As the representative of the empire on the ground, the local government – the modern colonial state – had to think about its legitimacy and reproduce its legacy. In this case too, initially technology was perceived and utilised as a tool for colonial ends and it resulted from a certain policy developed around certain ideologies. A long-established perception of ‘enosis’ by the British officials on the island as an urban ‘sentiment’ found its expression in the main arguments for the electrification of the island. Consequently, the electrification was designated as another means to gain the consent of the rural Cypriots to the continuation of British rule. Just like the examples in Chapters 3 and 4, the whole project was conceived and conceptualised in the framework of colonial development and welfare. The rural factor, then, shaped the policy on the ownership of the Grid and the mode of its construction (i.e. publicly-owned and constructed).

Ideology and politics did not just affect the choice of the structure and characteristics and future trends of the infrastructures, but they were also embedded in their design purposely. What was desired here was not only to achieve an end (e.g. economic development) by using certain infrastructures, but the way it was done also had importance. The mere design and characteristics of the infrastructure were means themselves; they were expected to express certain politics in material ways. Different designs and structures had different meanings, representations and possibilities for the policy-makers. We see that the Cyprus Government had a certain idea on the organisation, management and extension of the electrification in Cyprus. As a part of the Government’s development policy, it wanted to show the capabilities and ‘benefits’ of British rule. In this view electrification (see Chapter 5) and Famagusta harbour (see Chapter 6) had been thought of as big spectacles with which the Government could create an impression upon

the population. More than this, Government wanted especially to control the extension of the Grid to rural Cyprus and produce cheaper electricity for agricultural and industrial use. This was why the electrification scheme foresaw an island-wide Grid which would monopolise completely the whole electrical power sector and be managed centrally by a board of officials appointed by the Government; a 'complete public monopoly'. Similarly, in Chapter 6 we see that the final decision on the design for enlargement of the Famagusta Harbour was influenced by projected colonial policies for Cyprus. A direct relation was made between the design and future policy. The selected design, the shore scheme, contained the idea or the possibility of a general policy. The shore design provided further expansion of the port space not in the sea but on the land; this was essential if Cyprus was selected to be an 'entrepot' which foresaw a free port area in Famagusta Harbour.

The gap between colonial imagination and reality should also be emphasised. It seems that colonial minds could attach big promises and expectations to infrastructure-building, but in practice they realised nearly the opposite. No doubt, they believed in these promises and expectations because of their stereotypes and ideologies. However, in practice they proved to contradict themselves and gave more evidence for the arguments for anti-colonial opposition. In Chapter 5, besides the two pillars of rural electrification and complete monopoly, the price of the current supplied initially was no cheaper, but was even considered more expensive than before. Similarly, Famagusta Harbour was imagined to be a place of call for vessels and ironclads in the Levant. However, the initial design, which had to be altered during the construction, was only big enough for the manoeuvre of one ironclad of a size expected in the region.

## Enacting The Locality: Appropriation And The Making Of Infrastructures

There is no doubt that colonial/imperial politics and ideologies of different actors high in the hierarchy of decision-making left their fingerprints on infrastructures and technology policy. In the light of the asymmetrical colonial power relations in favour of the coloniser, it would be naïve not to attribute to them a significant and decisive role. However, this does not mean in any way that the 'local' was either passive or non-existent. Large technological systems or technologies in general were not ready-made furniture packed and shipped in the metropole to be assembled in the colony according to universal and imperial guidelines. Nothing was straightforward. The locality acted in several ways and through the performance of different actors had a contributory agency in the making of technologies and infrastructures. Current historiography in history of science and technology has argued that there is always a process of appropriation of scientific and technological knowledge<sup>1</sup> rather than a passive activity of transfer of knowledge and innovation.

Ignoring the local overlooks the complex mechanisms that the colonial governance was based upon.<sup>2</sup> The local networks of power and their vested interests shaped technologies and technology policies either by reacting, opposing, negotiating or collaborating. In many cases, persons and institutions of colonial rule were forced to enter into some kind of a bargain. People located in the local networks of power could utilise technologies and their design for their political, economic or ideological ends. Technologies, their design, characteristics and structures were negotiated and, many times, they were utilised as mediums of local politics and micro-politics.

That happens exactly in Chapters 3 and 4. The construction of the Famagusta-Nicosia railway and Famagusta Harbour was negotiated in reference to Larnaca. Larnaca city represented nearly the whole of the local establishment of wealth and power that traversed

---

<sup>1</sup> Gavroglu, K., Patiniotis, M., Papanelopoulou, F., Simoes, A., Caneiro, A., Diogo, M.P., Bertomeu-Sanchez, R., Garcia-Belmar, A., Nieto-Galan, A. 2008. "Science and Technology in the European Periphery. Some Historiography Reflections". *History of Science*, 46 (1): 53-175.

<sup>2</sup> Sheila Jasanoff. 2006. "Biotechnology and Empire". *Osiris*, 21: 273-292

categories of religion, ethnicity and localism. When the Elected Members reacted against the construction of the railway, they did not oppose the whole project. They opposed a railway that would not just serve Larnaca but create a competition. Their interests were threatened by the colonial intervention and intention in the material infrastructural order of things. When the demand for a railway was opposed strictly by Joseph Chamberlain, who was thinking in his dogma of one harbour-one railway, they simply transformed their demand and found a good ally, the Governor. Here, we see that colonial policy could be changed and negotiated by the local reaction. In the case of Larnaca there was also a clear advantage for local interests: the colonial development projects were targeted to answer and avert the crisis in Cyprus. They could threaten and gain a better negotiating position through sharpening the existing crisis or creating a new one. In the meantime, the political arguments of the Elected Members did not involve nationalism except in one case – the case of Zannetos. Zannetos applied nationalist argumentations in his critique against the design of Famagusta, but it became clear that nationalism had been utilised in threatening the colonial administration in the framework of Larnaca interests.

Chapter 5 sheds a different light on the conclusion above: technologies and their designs could have different meanings in the locality, something that might trigger resistance and serve in the creation of spaces of contestation to the colonial rule. The colonial mind could fail totally in this dimension. Different meanings attached to technologies and their specifications could become a matter of mass anti-colonial politics. Colonial rule was contested through technologies not for what it was making/constructing but how it was designing and pursuing them. When the Government followed a technical and legal path towards an island-wide grid and a complete monopoly over production, transmission and distribution, it created and defined a certain structure: it was public in a sense that everything was owned and managed by the Administration. When the municipalities, the only public post with Cypriot electoral representation, were faced with compulsory acquisition of their machinery and networks without compensation, they reacted and re-defined the 'public'. The island-wide grid with one station and one body of management directed by the Government meant a colonial arbitrariness and an attack on the local institutions, i.e. municipalities. In the case of the railway and Famagusta Harbour in Chapters 3 and 4, again, we see that meanings attributed to technologies by the colonists

were not universal. When the Elected Members saw these two projects by-passing their city, Larnaca, where they had direct or indirect interests, they named it a 'catastrophe' instead of development. From the same point of view, the so-called notorious Greek nationalist Zannetos, when he looked at the Famagusta Harbour design, saw the monies of the people buried in a 'sea-tank' and not an 'entrepot' of the Levant.

## Expertizing Cyprus: Networks, Experts and Governance

In colonial infrastructure projects, engineers and experts played two major roles. Firstly, they influenced and shaped the design of infrastructures by framing in technical ways the solutions to the problems of the politicians.<sup>3</sup> In the case of Cyprus where the decisions were taken in a one-man regime, engineers were generally called upon to translate the solution of an economic or political problem into infrastructures. This was not a passive role but a very drastic one. Engineering surveys and reports changed opinions and technical choice shaping the technology policy. Samuel Brown's railway and Famagusta Harbour report created the basic reference both for politicians and successive generations of engineers. In the end, the west part of the Cyprus Government railway – the Nicosia-Karavostassi line – followed his route; the supposed necessity of the connection of Famagusta Harbour with a railway became a fixed policy and materialised. Frederic Shelford's final route was the mixture of two previous surveys: Brown for the west part and Pritchard for the east. One way these engineers left their fingerprints on the structure and design of infrastructures was their colonial practice in colonies that were considered to be similar geographically, culturally and economically. Frederic Shelford and Matthew, Coode & Partners had been working in West Africa during the late 1890s. They were building narrow-gauge, low-gradient railways which connected agricultural regions with harbours. Matthew, Coode & Partners had forwarded the idea that the 'success' of Famagusta relied completely on its connection with a railway; Shelford, in addition to his experience in West Africa,

---

<sup>3</sup> For the role of experts in framing techno-scientific problems and relevant solutions see Wynne, B.E., 2004, 'May the sheep safely graze? A reflexive view of the expert-lay knowledge divide' in Risk, environment and modernity: towards a new ecology, Lash, S., Szerszynski, B. and Wynne, B. eds. Sage: London. 44-83

based his estimates of traffic in comparison with culturally and geographically 'close' Egypt. In Chapter 5, we see that engineers shaped totally the technology policy and the structure. This practice was also a major cause of the 'failure' of the electrification project's expectations and impression. To achieve an island-wide grid with a complete Government monopoly over production, transmission and distribution, they made two crucial choices. They broke up the electrification into three stages, in which the rural electrification was left until the final stage. The first stage aimed to acquire the mass of the load for economic purposes: the promise of cheap current and a financially self-sufficient grid. However, there was also a security concern arising from the technical problems of the existing supply sources (i.e. the old and failing machinery of the Corporations). This was combined with the choice of compulsory acquisitions of private and municipal corporations for creating an absolute public monopoly. The end result was perceived as the Government going after the load, purposely weakening the municipalities and leaving the rural electrification as a very long-term project. In Chapter 6, we see that Eric Millbourn's free port idea and experience (probably from the previously surveyed Hong Kong) was printed upon the 'shore design' as a future possibility and influenced its choice.

Local engineers, whether from the coloniser or the local population, had different insight from the engineers coming from the metropole for surveys and consultation. These local engineers acting for their local Governments and interests may have had different opinions from their metropolitan counterparts. The practice of the Crown Agents system and Consulting Engineers in the Cyprus case that visited on the ground, held interviews with local factors such as Governors, Mayors, local people of wealth and power and local engineers, who were considered essential in the preparation of final designs and estimates.<sup>4</sup> However, these local engineers were more able to situate technologies and technology policies into their localities. In Chapter 5, I show that Head of the Public Works Department (i.e. the chief engineer of the island) was very active in shaping the electrification policy, the mode of construction and management of the first stages and the Preece, Cardew & Rider

---

<sup>4</sup> For example Preece, Cardew & Rider were known to value the local knowledge and conditions. During the electrification of Palestine, Preece, Cardew & Rider were openly not favouring the imposition of British standards and practices to the local reality. See Shamir, Ronen. 2013. *Current Flow: The Electrification of Palestine*. Stanford University Press.

For the establishment of the company and its opinion about local knowledge and conditions see Chapter 3 in Arapostathis, Efsthathios. 2006. *Consulting engineers in the British electric light and power industry, c. 1880-1914*. PhD, University of Oxford

proposals. His insistence on localising the decision-making, i.e. the establishment of a Working Committee, and acquiring a 'super-engineer', convinced all parties. His emphasis on having the services of a man specialised especially in the legal and management matters proved his local insight in face of the municipal question. The first Chairman of the EAC, Carpenter, in his first year had to deal with municipalities in a climate of mass anti-colonial politics. Last, Taylor was the one that criticised two power station proposals and suggested using the NEC power station for security integrating the old into the new. In the Larnaca Harbour improvements, the Government engineer worked in a way that mediated the negotiations between Larnaca interests, Government and Colonial Office through his report. He could translate the demands of all in harbour designs to satisfy different needs in one design.

## **Cyprus historiography and the history of technology lenses**

The history of technology should direct itself more into the critical exploration of themes and facts in other branches of history. This is a monumental task which deserves a substantial amount of energy, time, sources and a considerable devotion, such as the programme of Tensions of Europe (TOE). TOE can be presented as the most recent and industrious example. In the Cyprus historiography, one can observe a dominant element that runs through many narratives: nationalism. Until the emergence of new historians and approaches (e.g. Andrekos Varnava and Alexis Rappas), many historians when they looked at Cyprus history saw mostly either Turkish or Greek nationalism. Nationalism remained in a way the subject and propeller of Cyprus history. However, when looked at through infrastructure-building, nationalism becomes a category and even more of a rhetorical factor. Firstly, famous historical nationalist figures did not always talk in terms of nationalism. In Chapters 3 and 4 we see that nationalism, when it appears in the narrative, appears as a tool of pressure for the satisfaction of class interests of the influential Larnacans. Zannetos is the perfect example of this. Anti-colonial rhetoric was not always motivated by nationalist sentiments but personal and class interests. I think there is a need in political history to adopt a broader perspective and focus on power relations rather than

singular ideas. For example, Chapters 5 and 6 focus on a particular period of Cyprus history. The mainstream historiography of the period is dominated by nationalist leaders / British Ministers (i.e. Makarios, Grivas, Kucuk or Denktas, Macmillan etc.), nationalist organisations and their actions (i.e. EOKA or TMT), and Cold War Greek-Turkish-NATO relations. Yet in these two chapters, there are references to any of these figures. Moreover, we observe that the political life of the period was not contained in the framework of inter-relationships between these names and categories. The electrification issue was also produced as a space for mass anti-colonial, mainly, dominant Greek Cypriot politics, bringing together not just Mayors and their supporters but representatives of Greek Cypriot Left and Right.

The most important outcome of this study for the Cyprus historiography has been to identify/demonstrate the value of colonial development and infrastructure building for the British rule. Whenever the British rule was faced with socio-political or moral crisis for its legitimacy, it sought a solution by constructing infrastructures. Following the Second World War, welfare concerns were also added to this agenda. In Chapters 3 and 4, we've seen that colonial development was designed to bring a solution to the contestation of the British rule in Cyprus following the lingering socio-economic crisis in late 1880s and early 1890s. At the same time the British rule was also being challenged in London, mostly in moral terms. Joseph Chamberlain's devotion and close interest in the irrigation, railway and harbour projects of Cyprus targeted to refute the dissenting voices in the Island and Britain. A similar pattern is observed during the period leading to the 1931 riot. Although this period has not been studied in this thesis, existing archival material at hand is sufficient to elaborate on some facts. One can observe that Cyprus Government had applied for colonial development funds in order to carry out extension works in Famagusta Harbour (see last part of Chapter 4) and extensive road construction. The parallel debate on modernisation of the Cyprus Government Railway can also be incidental since there had been numerous attempts at changing railway policy and infrastructure. Amongst all colonial development attempts for Cyprus, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1945 and the Cyprus Ten-Year Development Programme were undoubtedly the most extensive, detailed and ambitious. This episode has been deeply neglected in the Cyprus historiography. Chapters 5 and 6 show us how colonial development and welfare projects compromised a substantial part of the British post-war policy for Cyprus. The Administration invested a substantial

amount of effort and expectation in these infrastructure constructions, social welfare and economic development projects. In a historiography in which British rule of the period is referred constantly with 'negative' politics (like mass detentions, martial law, diplomatic cunning, 'divide and rule', executions etc.), it is invaluable to see that there was also a 'constructive' policy working for similar ends. In this framework, we can see that the enosis movement was not being fought only by methods of counter-insurgency/oppression such as deportation of Makarios and counter-guerrilla insurgency; but also by 'constructive' policies such as housing schemes, rural electrification, port extensions etc.

## **History and Infrastructures: Some thoughts for Future research**

Post-independence Cyprus presents invaluable opportunities for post-colonial and techno-politics, and Cold War oriented technology studies.<sup>5</sup> In Cyprus, the material legacy of the colonial period (i.e. tools, knowledge and practices of the colonial state) passed into the hands of a new-born state that differed from most of the post-colonial nation-states. The new state, the so-called Cyprus Republic, was a unitary state with 70% Greekcypriot and 30% Turkishcypriot representation at all levels – from public departments and police to the cabinet. At the top of the state structure there were a Greekcypriot president and a Turkishcypriot vice-president, both having veto powers on decisions of the Council of Ministers in matters of foreign affairs, defence and security. This state organisation fell apart in 1963, marking the start of the civil war and Turkishcypriot ghettoization. This period ended definitely in 1974 with the Turkish invasion, which altered completely the status quo in the island.

The study of the electricity network of the island in the post-independence period is the most interesting and promising one. The electrification of the whole island was completed in a time period of a civil war based- between 1963 and 1974. This conflict was not just fought by arms but also in social and economic methods. In the face of the close American-Turkish-Greek-NATO relations, the Cold War was another reality in this case.

---

<sup>5</sup> In addition to the possible future subjects and approaches I discuss here, post-colonial technoscience literature provides an ample source of inspiration for further research. Periods and processes like decolonisation, and transition from colonial to post-colonial have attracted genuine academic interest especially within this literature. See the relevant part of Chapter 1.

Especially during the eleven years of 1963-1974, the historian of technology must trace the Grid expanding, connecting or disconnecting certain points on the map. The significance of the period originates from the fact that the management of state and its apparatus had been abandoned by the Turkishcyprriot side in 1963. This was followed by the ghettoization of the Turkishcyprriot community and its almost monolithic self-organisation around nationalist institutions and leaders.

One can try to answer questions like how or whether the electrification served, produced or was shaped by the division and inter-communal conflict; whether/how electrification was subject to Cold War politics; or how/whether the Cold War was the subject of the electrification itself. The questions put forward in the book *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War*, edited by Gabrielle Hecht, fit perfectly not just with the case of electrification:

*“... did Cold War and postcolonial imaginaries... shape material assemblages? How did such assemblages fuse technology and politics? What strategic – and what unexpected – forms of power did they enact?”<sup>6</sup>*

It is known from the archives that just before the independence there had been a quasi-official promise announced in the House of Commons. The British Government informally promised to give financial aid to Cyprus for the development of Famagusta Harbour and electricity production. These two items had been subject to a separate agreement that gave Britain certain rights to use them. Referring to this promise, Cyprus Republic, headed by Archbishop Makarios, applied for funds from the United Kingdom in order to develop the electricity network and Famagusta Harbour. However, in the context of Cold War power relations, Famagusta Harbour works' tender ended up to be given to a Polish construction firm.

Another possible future research topic is Cyprus Government Railway's (CGR) abolition. There is ample archival material on the subject; a careful eye will catch some themes repeatedly appearing: class conflicts, competition from road transportation and relations with mining companies. When one considers that the renovation of the railway

---

<sup>6</sup> Hecht, Gabrielle, ed. 2011. *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War*. 1st ed. The MIT Press, p.3.

was present, as an idea, in the first 10-year development programme of the post-war period, it seems too superficial to attribute the abolition to pure economics of income-outcome balances, as is generally claimed. First of all, CGR was a work place for strong and organised trade unionism with continuous strikes and labour struggles. This fact made CGR a source of disturbance and instability for the Government. Besides the politics of the abolition, one can also make few observations from the view point of technopolitics: the decision to dissolve the CGR came at a time when railways in Britain were being nationalised; the CGR's material legacy continued to be a factor in the shaping of the road network of the island in the late colonial period.

In the post-invasion period, when the island was separated into two regions, it will be insightful to see the constitution and organisation of the societies under new states, especially in the case of Turkish Cypriots. The researcher should seek to uncover the relations between the organisation of the state (both on the north and south parts of the Island) and the connections/disconnections with the existing networks. Subsequent to separation the electricity grid remained, in a way, as a single network until 1995 when- 21 years after its separation- the Turkish Cypriot state constructed its own power station. In a surprisingly manner, Cyprus Republic (governing the south part of the Island) supplied the north part and the Turkish army for decades with electricity. At the first instance although this may seem as a contradictory policy for both parties there were various logics working on the background. Besides the electricity networks on the island, the separation also changed the connections of the islanders with other parts of the world. While south-bound flights do not fly over Turkey and the north of the island, northbound flights have to connect through a stop in Turkey. The same applied to shipping, with additional tensions and changing relations between North Cyprus and Turkey. There was also the common and repetitive theme of establishing electricity and water supply connections with the 'motherlands' of Turkey and Greece. Thus for the historian of technology, connectivity/disconnectivity comes out as a main theme, a fact and a concept for the study of the post-1974 period.

These points above represent only the first thoughts on future research possibilities based on and inspired by the current study. A careful eye with an elementary knowledge of the literatures and categories referred above can see that there are diverse research

opportunities in the suggested fields. That's why the ultimate importance of this study is the fact that it opens the gate for further research in multiple directions, themes, periods and artefacts. This study claims to be a guide, a point of reference for future researchers and, especially, for its own writer.

## **Discussion**

This study was engaged in a tough task when one considers its choice of multiple infrastructures, periods of study and literatures it derived from. On the one hand, these choices are essential for the scope and vision of this study; they profoundly render this study unique. However, the choice of studying multiple numbers of infrastructures and periods also carry certain disadvantages, which must be compensated by future research. However, this choice was determined mainly by the state of the archives and existing bibliography. The study used mostly primary sources which in their majority have been for the first time brought under academic scrutiny. The use of genuine archival material, in combination with the lack of secondary sources on the subjects of the study, and the practical difficulty in accessing archives, demands the researcher to make a decision. Consequently, the researcher can ascertain to have a beneficial and integral research by keeping the number of infrastructures plural and the range of period wide. The cost of this option is to write short case studies rather than one complete story of one infrastructure extending in time and different phases or one story extending in deeper detail within a shorter period of time

## Bibliography

### Primary Sources

*National Archives, Kew Gardens, London*

Colonial Office (CO), Foreign Office (FO), Board of Trade (BT), Treasury (T) CAOG (Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and Administrations), Admiralty (ADM), Cabinet (CAB),

*Secretariat Archive (SA1), State Archives Nicosia*

SA1:1458/36, SA1:1040/36, SA1:1283/38, SA1: 1318/29, SA1: 509/32, SA1:S3/1/1944, SA1:668/45/2 A, SA1: 853/1947, SA1:1777/54, SA1: 555/47/1, SA1:56/1954, SA1: 417/45/S, SA1 438/1948/1

*Parliamentary Archives, London*

Hansard, House of Commons Debates (HC Deb)

*Press Information Office, Nicosia*

Έθνος, Αλήθεια, Παρατηρητής, Ελευθερία, Κύπρος, Πάφος, Ανεξάρτητος,

Τα Γράμματα, Cyprus Mail

*Institute of Electrical Engineers, London*

Obituaries, Electrician, Engineer and Beama Journals, The Electrical Journal

*Institute of Civil Engineers, London*

Obituaries, Minutes of the Proceedings ICE

### Secondary Sources

Adas, Michael. 1990. *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

Agamben, Giorgio. 2008. *State of Exception*. University of Chicago Press

Andersen, Casper. 2011. *British Engineers and Africa, 1875-1914*. London: Pickering & Chatto

- Anderson, D. M. 1993. "Policing and communal conflict: The Cyprus emergency, 1954-60". *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*. 21 (3): 177-207
- Anderson, Warwick. 2002. "Introduction: Postcolonial Technoscience." *Social Studies of Science* 32 (5/6): 643-58.
- Anderson, Warwick. 2009. "From Subjugated Knowledge to Conjugated Subjects: Science and Globalisation, or Postcolonial Studies of Science?" *Postcolonial Studies* 12 (4): 389-400
- Arapostathis, Stathis. 2008. "'Morality, Locality and 'Standardization' in the work of British consulting electrical engineers, 1880-1914". *History of Technology*. 28: 53-74
- Arapostathis, Efstathios. 2006. *Consulting engineers in the British electric light and power industry, c. 1880-1914*. PhD, University of Oxford
- Arnold, David. 2005. 'Europe, Technology, and Colonialism in the 20th Century.' *History and Technology*, 21 (1): 85-106
- Attalides, Michael. 1979. *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, Edinburgh, Q Press
- Baker, Samuel White. 2007. *Cyprus, as I Saw It in 1879*. Echo Library
- Ballantyne, Hugh. 2007. *Cyprus Narrow Gauge*. Midhurst: Middleton Press
- Barton, Greg. 2002. *Empire Forestry and the Origins of Environmentalism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bennett, Brett and Hodge, M. 2011. *Science and Empire: Knowledge and Networks of Science across the British Empire, 1800-1970*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Bryant, Rebecca. 2004. *Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*. I.B.Tauris
- Callan, Paul. *Express man who duped Hitler*, *Daily Express*, 20<sup>th</sup> September 2008
- Cassia, Paul Sant. 1993. "Banditry, Myth, and Terror in Cyprus and Other Mediterranean Societies." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (4): 773-95
- Christodoulou, D. 1992, *Inside the Cyprus Miracle: The Labours of an Embattled Mini-Economy*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota
- Clarke, Sabine. 2007. "A Technocratic Imperial State? The Colonial Office and Scientific Research, 1940-1960." *Twentieth Century British History* 18 (4): 453-80
- Coronil, Fernando, and Julie Skurski. 2005. *States of Violence*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Crosby, Travis L. 2011. *Joseph Chamberlain: A Most Radical Imperialist*. I.B.Tauris
- Dalyell, Tam. 1993. Obituary: Lord Craigton, *The Independent*
- Darwin, John. 2006. *The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate*. 1<sup>st</sup> edition. Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Wiley-Blackwell

- David Dilks. 2010. 'Parker, Sir (Arthur) Douglas Dodds- (1909–2006)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,
- Dumett, R. E. 1975. "Joseph Chamberlain, Imperial Finance and Railway Policy in British West Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century." *English Historical Review*. (90): 287-321
- Dutfield, Graham and Arapostathis, Stathis. 2013. *Knowledge Management and Intellectual Property: Concepts, Actors and Practices from the Past to the Present*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
- Freed, Libbie, 2010. "Networks of (colonial) Power: Roads in French Central Africa after World War I." *History and Technology* 26 (3): 203–23
- Gavroglu, Kostas. 2012. "The STEP (Science and Technology in the European Periphery) Initiative: Attempting to Historicize the Notion of European Science." *Centaurus* 54 (4): 311–27
- Gavroglu, K., Patiniotis, M., Papanelopoulou, F., Simoes, A., Caneiro, A., Diogo, M.P., Bertomeu-Sanchez, R., Garcia-Belmar, A., Nieto-Galan, A. 2008. "Science and Technology in the European Periphery. Some Historiography Reflections". *History of Science*, 46 (1): 53-175
- Georghallides, G. S. & Markides, D. 1995, "British Attitudes to Constitution-Making in Post-1931 Cyprus", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 13(1): 63-81
- Georghallides, G. S. 1979. *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926 with a Survey of the foundations of British Rule*. Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre
- Grant, H. Roger. 2005. *The Railroad: The Life Story of a Technology*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood.
- Hackett, Edward J. 2007. *The New Handbook of Science and Technology Studies*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press : Published in cooperation with the Society for the Social Studies of Science
- Harding, Sandra, 2011. *The Postcolonial Science and Technology Studies Reader*. Duke University Press
- Harper, T. N. 2001. *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya*. Cambridge University Press
- Havinden, Michael Ashley. 1993. *Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960*. Routledge
- Hecht, Gabrielle, 2009. *The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II*. New edition. The MIT Press
- Hecht, Gabrielle, ed. 2011. *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. The MIT Press
- Hecht, Gabrielle. 2002. "Rupture-Talk in the Nuclear Age: Conjugating Colonial Power in Africa." *Social Studies of Science* 32 (5-6): 691–727

- Hecht, Gabrielle. 2010. "The Power of Nuclear Things." *Technology and Culture* 51 (1): 1–30
- Hecht, Gabrielle. 2012. *Being Nuclear Africans and the Global Uranium Trade*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
- Headrick, Daniel R. 1981. *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*. Oxford University Press
- Heinlein, Frank. 2002. *British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind*. London/ Portland: Frank Cass
- Hill, George. 2010. *A History of Cyprus vol.IV*. Cambridge University Press.
- Holland, Robert. and Markides, Diana. 2006. *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960*, New York, Oxford University Press Inc.
- Holland, Robert. 1998. *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*. Clarendon Press
- Hughes, Agatha C., Michael Thad Allen, and Gabrielle Hecht. 2001. *Technologies of Power: Essays in Honour of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes*. MIT Press
- Hughes, Thomas Parke. 1983. *Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
- Hyam, Roland. 2006. *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 1918-1968*. New York, Cambridge University Press
- Ioannou, Gregoris. 2008. 'Η εργατική τάξη και το συνδικαλιστικό κίνημα στην Κύπρο 1920 – 1960', Χρονικό του "Πολίτη", τεύχος 37, Λευκωσία, Εφημερίδα "Πολίτης"
- Ioannou, Gregoris. 2011. "Labour Relations in Cyprus : Employment, Trade Unionism and Class Composition". PhD, University of Warwick
- Irakleidis, A. 2006, 'Κυπριακό Πρόβλημα 1947-2004: Από την Ένωση στη Διχοτόμηση;' Αθήνα, Εκδόσεις 'Ι. Σιδεράς'
- Jasanoff, Sheila. 2006. "Biotechnology and Empire". *Osiris*, 21: 273-292
- Jenness, Diamond. 1962. *The Economics of Cyprus: A Survey to 1914*. McGill University Press
- Jeyes, Samuel Henry. 1896. *The Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain*. London, Bliss, Sands and Foster
- Judd, Denis. 2004. *The Lion and the Tiger: The Rise and Fall of the British Raj, 1600-1947*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press
- Kaijser, Arne and Hedin, M. , eds. 1995. *Nordic Energy Systems: Historical Perspectives and Current Issues*. Canton, Mass., Science History Publications,
- Katsiaounis, Rolandos. 1996. *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the second half of the nineteenth century*. PhD, University of London

- Κατσιαούνης, Ρολάνδος. 2008. *‘Η Διασκεπτική 1946-1948 με Ανασκόπηση της Περιόδου 1878-1945’*. Λευκωσία, Κέντρο Επιστημονικών Ερευνών Κύπρου
- Κατσιαούνης, Ρολάνδος. 1996. *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century*. Nicosia: Κέντρο Επιστημονικών Ερευνών Κύπρου

Kızılyürek, N. 1988. ‘Paşalar Papazlar’, Kıbrıs Defterleri Kitap Dizisi I, Londra

Kızılyürek, N. 2002. *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs*. Istanbul, İletişim Yayıncılık A.Ş

Kusiak, Pauline. 2010. “‘Tubab’ Technologies and ‘African’ Ways of Knowing: Nationalist Techno-politics in Senegal.” *History and Technology* 26 (3): 225–49

Laborie, Léonard. 2011. “Fragile Links, Frozen Identities: The Governance of Telecommunication Networks and Europe (1944–53).” *History and Technology* 27 (3): 311–30

Legendijk, Vincent. 2011. “‘An Experience Forgotten Today’: Examining Two Rounds of European Electricity Liberalization.” *History and Technology* 27 (3): 291–310

Legendijk, Vincent. 2014. *Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks*. 1<sup>st</sup> edition. Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers

Louis, William Roger. 1985. *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism*. Oxford University Press

Mallinson, W. 2005. *A Modern History of Cyprus*. London, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd

Malmsten, Neal R. 1977. “British Government Policy toward Colonial Development, 1919-39.” *The Journal of Modern History* 49 (2): 1249–1287

Marankou, Anna. 2002. *The Harbours and Ports of Cyprus*. Laiki Group Cultural Centre.

Markides, D. W. 1995. “Britain's 'new look' policy for Cyprus and the Makarios-Harding talks, January 1955-March 1956”. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 23: (3): 479-502

Martin Chick Millward, Robert and Singleton, John. 1995. *The Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain, 1920-1950*. Cambridge University Press

Matthew, H. C. G. , 2004, ‘Lyttelton, Alfred (1857–1913)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press

McNeil, Maureen. 2005. “Introduction: Postcolonial Technoscience.” *Science as Culture* 14 (2): 105–12

Meek, C.I., 1989, *Obituary: Sir John Fletcher-Cooke, Tanzanian Affairs*

Misa, Thomas J. and Johan, Schot. 2005. “Introduction.” *History and Technology* 21 (1): 1–19

Mitchell, Timothy. 2002. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. 1st ed. University of California Press

- Moon, Suzanne. 2010. "Place, Voice, Interdisciplinarity: Understanding Technology in the Colony and Postcolony." *History and Technology* 26 (3): 189–201
- Morgan, Tabitha. 2010. *Sweet and Bitter Island: A History of the British in Cyprus*. London : I. B. Tauris
- Nevzat, Altay. 2005. *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*. Oulu University Press,
- Nye, David E. 1992. *Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press,
- Oakden, Sir Ralph. 1935. *Report on the Finances and Economic Resources of Cyprus*, Nicosia
- Orr, Sir Charles William James. 1972. *Cyprus under British Rule*. Zeno.
- Papapoliviou, P. 2004. *Κύπρος 1940-1950: Ίδιες προσδοκίες, Νέες Αντιπαραθέσεις*. Βασιλίας
- Porter, Bernard. 2004. *The Lion's Share*. 4<sup>th</sup> edition. Harlow, Essex, England: Pearson
- Provand, Andrew Dryburgh. 1901. *Chignecto Ship Railway Case: Mr. Provand Addresses a Meeting of Senators : He Explains the Position of British Investors in the Chignecto Ship Railway Project and Claims the Moral Obligation of the Government*. Ottawa
- Radford, Michael. 2003. *The Railways of Cyprus*. Nicosia: Laiki Group Cultural Centre
- Rappas, Alexis. 2009. 'The Labour Question in Colonial Cyprus, 1936-1941: Political Stakes in a Battle of Denominations', *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 76: 4, 194-216
- Rappas, Alexis. 2008. "The Elusive Polity: Imagining and Contesting Colonial Authority in Cyprus during the 1930s". *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 26 (1): 363–397
- Rizas, S. & Stefanides, I. 2004. *Το Κυπριακό Ζήτημα: Ο Αγώνας για ένωση, η Ανεξαρτησία, η Τουρκική εισβολή*. Βασιλίας Παναγιωτόπουλος (επιμ.) Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού 1770-2000, τόμ.9, σ. 97-110, Αθήνα: Ελληνικά Γράμματα
- Robert Hamilton Vetch, in Lee, Sir Sidney. 1895. *The Dictionary of National Biography*. Volume 43,. Macmillan.
- Schipper, Frank, and Schot, Johan. 2011. "Infrastructural Europeanism, or the Project of Building Europe on Infrastructures: An Introduction." *History and Technology* 27 (3): 245–64;
- Shamir, Ronen. 2013. *Current Flow: The Electrification of Palestine*. Stanford University Press
- Smith, Laurel C. 2010. "Locating Post-colonial Technoscience: Through the Lens of Indigenous Video." *History and Technology* 26 (3): 251–80
- Strong, Paul. 1999. *An Economic History of Divided Cyprus: The Economic Consequences of Ethno-national conflict and the Development of two Siege Economies after 1963 & 1974*. PhD, University of London, London School of Economics
- Stubbs, Reginald, 1933, *Memorandum*, Cyprus Government Publishing House

- Sunderland, David, 2004. *Managing the British Empire: The Crown Agents, 1833-1914* Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK; Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society ; Boydell Press.
- Sunderland, David. 2007. *Managing British Colonial and Post-Colonial Development ; the Crown Agents, 1914-74*. Woodbridge, UK; New York: Boydell & Brewer.
- Surridge, Brewster Joseph. 1930. *A Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus. Based on Reports of Investigators Who Visited Villages throughout the Colony during 1927 and 1928, and Amplified by Statistical and Other Information from the Records of Government, Crown Agents for the Colonies*
- Tsang, Steve. 2007. *A Modern History of Hong Kong*. I.B.Tauris
- Turner, B. S. 1979. *The Story of the Cyprus Government Railway*. London: Mechanical Engineering Publications
- Ure, Gavin. 2012. *Governors, Politics and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918-58*. Hong Kong University Press
- Varnava, Andrekos. 2012. *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The Inconsequential Possession*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Vleuten, Erik van der, and Kaijser, Arne , eds. 2006. *Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000*. USA, Science History Publications
- Vleuten, Erik van der. 2008. "Toward a Transnational History of Technology: Meanings, Promises, Pitfalls." *Technology and Culture* 49 (4): 974–94
- Will, H. A. 1970. "Colonial Policy and Economic Development in the British West Indies, 1895-1903." *The Economic History Review, New Series*, 23 (1): 129–47;
- Worboys, Michael. 1979, *Science and British Colonial Imperialism, 1895-1940*, PhD, University of Sussex
- Wynne, B.E. 2004. 'May the sheep safely graze? A reflexive view of the expert-lay knowledge divide' in *Risk, environment and modernity: towards a new ecology*, Lash, S., Szerszynski, B. and Wynne, B. ed. Sage: London. 44-83
- Yiangou, Anastasia. 2012. *Cyprus in World War II: Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean*. London: I. B. Tauris
- Καβάφης Κ.Π. 2003. *Το Κυπριακόν ζήτημα, Τα πεζά (1882;-1931)*, Ίκαρος Εκδοτική Εταιρία
- Παναγιωτόπουλος (επιμ.) *Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού 1770-2000*, τόμ.8, σ. 363-372, Αθήνα: Ελληνικά Γράμματα
- Παπαπολυβίου, Πέτρος, Φίλιος Ζαννέτος (1863-1933), *Ο Φιλελεύθερος*, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2013

