

*Greece and the Great Powers (1833-1862): The diplomacy of National Integration.*

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MASTER'S DEGREE THESIS  
***GREECE AND THE GREAT POWERS (1833-1862): THE  
DIPLOMACY OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION***

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of this thesis is to see the effort of the Greek Kingdom during the years between 1833-1862 firstly to get organized and secondly to fulfill the dreams of expansion of its borders in order to gain its national integration. From the beginning this effort was not an easy task because with the London Treaty of 1833 the Greek Kingdom was founded under the protection and supervision of the three Protector Powers what in real sense meant that the Greek Kingdom was the protectorate of these three protector powers, which were to have an important role in the domestic as well as in the foreign affairs of the Greek Kingdom throughout Otto's reign.

This thesis is divided in three main parts. The first part is a presentation of the general historical framework in which the Greek populations tried to create an independent Greek state. The Greek independence from the beginning became an essential matter of the so called Eastern Question and that was the reason why the Three Great Powers, France, Britain and the Russian Empire were involved in order to preserve their vested interests in the East and in the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Their intervention in the Greek struggle of independence may have given the Greek people their freedom from the Ottoman rule but also created their dependence from the three protector powers, which formed the new Kingdom not as the Greek people wished to but as they wished to in order to preserve the status quo in the region.

The second part presents the effort of the Greek monarchical authorities to organize the state and moreover to gain the independence of the Greek state from the disturbing intervention of the Three Allied Powers and from the several political elites which in a sense were their instruments in Kingdom's domestic affairs. Every political development inside the Greek Kingdom was considered from these three powers as a development inside the general framework of the Eastern idea and this was what caused their continual intervention. Moreover these Powers had several interests of their own to protect and the Greek Kingdom became more than one time the center of their conflict in order to preserve these interests.

The third part presents the foreign policy of the Greek Kingdom from 1833 to 1862. The first ten years the Royal authorities concentrated their efforts to organize the state but this was a very difficult task because of the financial difficulties that it was faced from the beginning and the financial dependence from the three allied powers, which became, with the Treaty of 1832, the basic sources of financial support of the Greek Kingdom. This three powers had used several times this dependence in order to intervene in the Kingdom's both internal and external affairs according to their interests in the Eastern Question. From 1840 until the end when the state organization was in a mean over the Greek Kingdom had started to exploit the Eastern Question crises in order to secure territorial gains. The motive power toward this effort was the rebirth of Greek nationalism with the creation of the Great Idea. Otto became a great supporter of Great Idea and this eventually cost him his dethroning in 1862. The Great Powers were from the beginning against the Greek visions for territorial expansion because their main objective in general was the preservation of the status quo in the region translated as the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. This meant the preservation of their own interests in the region and moreover the avoidance of the conflicts between them. Because of this developments the Greek Kingdom would have a road of fifteen more years to secure its territorial expansion. The course of national integration during the reign of King Otto hadn't succeeded.

In order to write this thesis I had used a certain number of bibliographies which were embodies several themes that considers the three main parts of this research. I had used general histories of this period too. Moreover in the third part I had consult a big amount of archives that I was found during my research in the General State Archives, in the Ottonian files. These archives are concern the work of the Greek diplomatic services during the reign of King Otto and contains several information for all the steps of the Greek foreign policy during this period. In order to understand the developments that were described in these archives I had used several books as a guideline but especially the book of Pipinelis T. N., *Monarchy in Greece, 1833-1843*, which compose a very good research of the diplomacy during the first ten years of the creation of the Greek Kingdom.

## **II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

### **1. Great Powers and the Eastern Question**

Before we proceed to examine the relationships between the great powers as formed during the nineteenth century and their stance towards the Eastern Question, it is significant to discuss in short terms what we mean by the world's "Eastern Question". This term examines the relations between the East and the West ever since the Ottoman Turks appeared in the historical scene as an Empire and changed the history of the East. The Eastern Question during the years, in accordance with the historical conditions had gone through a lot of phases. Each phase can be characterized by the actions of one or more foreign Powers, which played an equal important role as the Ottomans had in the East. The purpose of the involvement of each power in the East had been the imposition of their influence on the affairs of the Middle East and Turkish Straits.<sup>1</sup>

From the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, in the mid-sixteenth century, each imperial power in Central Europe tried to expand its influence on the territory not only by bloody conflicts but also by diplomatic and political means. During the Eighteenth century each of the Great Powers had vested political and economic interests in the strategic lands of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian and the Habsburg Empire, which were usually in alliance, started to exploit the increasing weakness of the Ottoman Empire in order to protect and expand their interests on the sensitive Balkan borders. By the end of the eighteenth century both powers had obtained significant territorial gains from the Ottoman Empire. In 1775 the Habsburg Empire acquired Bukovina; in 1797 it gained Delmatia and Istria, annexations that were confirmed in the Vienna settlement in 1815.<sup>2</sup> Russia after its victory against the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Kioutsouk Kainarji (1774) by

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<sup>1</sup>Driault Eduard, *The Eastern question from its beginning to the Treaty of Sevres*, vol. 1, Athens: Istoritis publications, 1997, pp. 17-18.

<sup>2</sup>Jelavich Barbara, *History of the Balkans*, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp.2.

which it gained a lot of privileges in Black Sea and acquired protective rights on the Christian populations inside the limits of the Ottoman province.<sup>3</sup>

At the time Britain viewed the Russian advantage in the region with composure due to certain political and financial factors. The political reason was the extended struggle between Britain and France that had turned the British attention away from the possible implications of Russian expansion. On the other hand, Britain had vested commercial interests in Russia because of the 1734 Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty. France was also vitally interested in the Balkan and Near East affairs. During Napoleon's time France had sought a strong alliance with the Ottoman Empire because of her struggle with Austria but this was not feasible.<sup>4</sup>

Throughout the nineteenth century the chief center of European diplomatic activity had been the Near East and the Turkish Straits. This attention was a product of many historical coincidences. The evident fatal weakness of the Ottoman Empire by the end of the eighteenth century made apparent that the disposition of its ill-managed territories would soon be brought into question.<sup>5</sup> The big concern of the Great powers of the time was the crucial question that the event of the Ottoman decline arose; who would fulfil the political vacuum that the end of the Ottoman rule would bring about in a territory with this highly strategic importance for the world affairs. This question had dominated the European diplomacy until the end of the First World War and was the cause of antagonism between them.

The French Revolution in 1789 influenced the Eastern Question by accelerating the events of the birth of Nationalism in the Balkans by unleashing two gigantic powers, nationalism and liberalism, which would shape the future course of the European history.<sup>6</sup> In the Vienna Congress of June, 9 1815, the Great Powers, after the defeat of France, incarnated the

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<sup>3</sup> Driault Eduard, "op.cit", pp. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Stavrianos L. S., *The Balkans since 1453*, London: Hurst & Company publication, 2002, pp. 227.

<sup>55</sup> Jelavich Barbara, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914*, Philadelphia & New York: J. B. Lippincott Company publications, 1964, pp. 53.

<sup>6</sup> Christodoulidis Theodoros, *Three Centuries of Diplomatic History*, vol. 2, Athens: Sideris publications, 1997, pp.28.

predominance of monarchies over national movements and they restored the status quo of the European system.<sup>7</sup>

Each of these powers was against the idea of a rearrangement in the world affairs caused by the nationalistic ideas, which the French Revolution propagated. Each one of them had significant internal and external interests to preserve the status quo as it was formed in the Vienna Conference in order to preserve their integrity and their foreign interests.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, all great powers had vested interest and historical transitions had made the fate of the Ottoman territories of grave concern to them and rouse their intervention to the East, which will be the center of their antagonism for imposing their influence. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the chief antagonistic powers were Russia and Britain. The causes of this antagonism were both political and economical. In an economic point of view, the expansion of Britain's commercial activities in the Near East and especially in the Ottoman Empire resulted in the decline of the Anglo-Russian commerce. On the other hand, political relations between these two countries had increasingly strained. The most serious conflicts were about Russia's considerations for Turkey, Persia and India, territories that had a vital role in the economic and political interests of Britain. Britain considered that further Russian expansion in these territories would endanger the British naval power in the Mediterranean, her commerce with the Ottoman Empire and her position in India, especially after Britain's loss of the North American colonies.<sup>9</sup> Because of these fears the British diplomacy throughout the Nineteenth century worked intensely to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire by following the policy of *status quo*. This policy often conflicted with the most dynamic goals of the other three great powers that were vigorously involved to the East.<sup>10</sup> Her greatest fear was that the entire Ottoman Empire, because of its military weakness and the claims that Russia had on the Orthodox Christians, would simply fall into the hands of Russia. As a result of

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<sup>7</sup> Christodoulidis Th., "op.cit", pp. 24-25.

<sup>8</sup> Christoloulidis Th., "ibid", pp. 29-30.

<sup>9</sup> Jelavich Barbara, "op.cit", pp. 53-55.

<sup>10</sup> Stavrianos L. S., "op.cit", pp.226-227.

this fear, every attempt that was made towards the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was met with powerful British reaction.<sup>11</sup>

Russia on the other hand, although quite willing to make some small gains at the Ottoman expense, realized that the occupation of the entire Empire would not be an element of strength for her because it would form a hostile coalition directly against her. Despite this general attitude, Russia after the Congress of Vienna gained the title of the “natural protector of the Orthodox Christians under Ottoman domination” which gave her a diplomatic advantage to increase her influence over the Christian population of the Ottoman empire and use it in order to promote her own interests in the region by supporting national movements as the Greek or the Serbian dispute Tsar’s concentration to the monarchical principles.<sup>12</sup>

Austria and France, as well as Britain and Russia, had also important interests in the area, although French influence declined restively after the defeat of Napoleon, when France was forced to yield both Malta and the Ionian Islands to Britain. But after her occupation of Algeria in 1830, she had seen the crisis in Egypt during 1839 an opportunity to expand her influence in the Near East but found the reaction of the other three powers, Britain, Russia and Austria, which wanted to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in order to secure their own interests. But, except some events, in a general point of view France during the nineteenth century used to cooperate with Britain in the Balkans and the Near East because they shared the same goal to blockade Russia’s influence and expansion in the territory.<sup>13</sup>

The last power that dominated the Eastern affairs during the Nineteenth century was Austria especially after her territorial gains in 1815 with which she became the dominant power in the Adriatic sea and in the Balkan Peninsula.<sup>14</sup> Although a natural ally of Russia in Central Europe affairs, in Eastern affairs she had the same attitude with the other two powers. In one hand, she needed Russian support to maintain her influence in Italy and Germany but on the other hand, she didn’t wish a growth of Russian influence in the East and especially in the Orthodox community because a big rearrangement in the

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<sup>11</sup> Jelavich B., “op.cit”, pp. 53-55.

<sup>12</sup> Jelavich B., “ibid”, pp. 55.

<sup>13</sup> Jelavich B., “ibid”, pp. 56.

<sup>14</sup> Stavrianos L. S., “op.cit”, pp. 228.

balance of powers would give an opportunity to the numerous Slavic populations, living within her borders to rise with the Russian help.<sup>15</sup>

These four powers dominated the Eastern affairs during the nineteenth century. With their intervention on the behalf of their national interests determent the events in Near East. Their conflicting interests and policies explain why the Ottoman Empire succeeded to survive until World War 1 despite its long-lasting decline for over three centuries.<sup>16</sup>

## **2. The case of Greece- the diplomatic events towards Independence**

The Greek revolutionary movement was a consequence of the general raise of nationalism in the beginning of the nineteenth century, as an outcome of the European Enlightenment. The nation as a notion it is a part of general history, it hasn't existed forever. The coiling around of a national body is the answer in the problems that are been set by specific historical and social junctures. The same applies for the national conscience.<sup>17</sup> The creation of the Greek common national conscience and national ideology is a result of several factors that were created in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. A significant factor was the economic revival that the Greek communities had phased as a result of a fortunate combination of circumstances. This economic revival created a new intellectual atmosphere and it generated new political forces that were to lead directly to the revolutionary outbreak of 1821. The political force that being the carrier of the revolutionary ideology, was a new Greek middle class which rouse under the general economic revival. This class, because of its incapability of extend its financial activities under the Ottoman Empire, wanted to create an independent Greek State.<sup>18</sup>

The Greek Revolution was put to action by a clandestine political organization under the name "Philiki Etairia" formed in Odessa in 1814 by Greek merchants. In a few years they managed to increase substantially the

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<sup>15</sup> Christodolidis H., "op.cit", pp. 30-31.

<sup>16</sup> Stavrianos L. S., "op.cit", pp. 229.

<sup>17</sup> Politis Alexis, *The Romantic Years, Ideologies and Mentalities in Greece of 1830-1880*, Athens: E.M.N.E-Mnimon publications, 1993, pp. 31.

<sup>18</sup> Svoronos N., «The consequences of the Financial Activity of the Greeks in Balkan Peninsula during the Eighteenth Century», in Dertilis J. - Kostis K, "eds"., *Issues from the Contemporary Greek History*, Athens: Sakoulas publications, 1991, pp. 80-85.

number of their members and under the leadership of Ypsilandis<sup>19</sup> they began revolting against the Ottoman Empire. Their main aim was the liberation of all Greeks under Ottoman occupation<sup>20</sup>. The war against the Ottoman Empire broke out in March 1821 almost simultaneous in the Danubian Principalities of Romania under Ypsilantis and in the Peloponnese in Southern Greece. The uprising in Peloponnese was the result of the Greek national aspirations and of the revival of Hellenism in its birthplace.<sup>21</sup>

The Greek revolt coincided with the culmination of the reactionary policy of the holy alliance against the revolutionary principles of the European enlightenment and those of the French revolution<sup>22</sup>. The timing of the Greek revolt was extremely bad since the Greek case was part of the Eastern Question, due to the strategic location of Greece and the fact that eminent Greeks held high places in the Ottoman administration as well as in the eastern trade.<sup>23</sup> The Eastern Question was a very delicate issue for the European diplomacy of the time as I have already mentioned in the previous chapter of this paper since it was directly related to the struggle for power in this area. Britain, focused on maintaining the status quo, feared that if the Greek revolt prevailed that would expand the Russian influence in the east especially since Russia has declared herself the natural guardian of the orthodox populations in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>24</sup>

France, on the other hand, was following suit with the British for fear of the Russians, but in fact France considered that the dismemberment of the empire would bring back many of the privileges she held in the area before the Treaty of Vienna (1815). Austria was totally against the Greek revolution as her foreign policy was focused on the principle of legitimacy. At the same

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<sup>19</sup> He was a member of a well-known Phanariote family, who entered the Russian service and risen to the position of foreign minister.

<sup>20</sup> This was the basic aim of the Greek revolution in general. The connection of the new Greek nation with the ancient Greek world was the basic element of the new national ideology. This connection was a product of the general European ideological stream (the ideas of the European Enlightenment). See: Svoronos Nikos, *The Greek nation, the Birth and the Formation of the New Hellenism*, Athens: Polis publications, 2004, pp. 96-109.

<sup>21</sup> Koliopoulos J. – Veremis Th., *Greece, the Modern Sequel*, London: Hurst & Company publications, 2004, pp.12.

<sup>22</sup> Christodoulidis Th, "op.cit", pp. 61.

<sup>23</sup> Stavrianos L. S. , "op.cit", pp. 269.

<sup>24</sup> Christodoulidis Th, "ibid", pp. 61.

time she thought that that was a great chance for the Russians to expand their influence on the Balkans, an area of vital interest for Austria.<sup>25</sup>

Finally, Russia was the one to gain the most of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The creation of Christian states under Russian influence within the borders of the Ottoman Empire would guarantee the Russian dominion over the area. However, during the first years of the Greek revolution, the Tsar in accordance to the recent arrangement between the great powers and being an avid supporter of the ideals of monarchy, which went against the principles of the French revolution, opposed the revolutionary efforts of the Greeks.<sup>26</sup>

The uprising in the Principalities failed from its beginning because the hopes of Ypsilandis for Russian assistance were futile, but the war in Peloponnesus and in its neighboring islands of strong commercial tradition was successful. The greatest Greek success was that, since the revolting Greeks failed to convince the great powers to be on their side in their struggle for independence, they managed not to become involved in the BEHALF OF the Ottoman Empire. The great powers decided on keeping a neutral stance to the Greek revolt until 1823.<sup>27</sup>

In 1822 there is a gradual change in the Russian attitude towards the Greeks. The assassination of patriarch Gregory v as well as of many other Phanariots as retaliation consisted a direct challenge to the Russian position regarding the protection of the Balkan Christians.<sup>28</sup> In a strong note the Russian government warned the Porte not to take advantage the occasion of the suppression of a political rebellion to wage a religious war against its Christian subjects. Although the Turkish actions brought about a real Russo-Turkish crisis, culminating in recalling the Russian ambassador from Constantinople in June 1822, Tsar Alexander didn't resort to war.<sup>29</sup> Under the Austrian influence, the Tsar preferred to regard the revolution as the revolt of people against their legitimate ruler and not as a conflict between Christians

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<sup>25</sup> Christodoulidis Th, "op.cit", pp. 62.

<sup>26</sup> Jelavich B., "op.cit", 1964, pp. 67.

<sup>27</sup> Koliopoulos J. – Veremis Th., "op. cit", pp. 12.

<sup>28</sup> Jelavich B., "ibid", pp. 67.

<sup>29</sup> *The history of the Greek Nation, The Greek Revolution*, vol. 12, Athens: Athinon publications, 1997, pp. 206- 209.

and Moslems.<sup>30</sup> The Russian policy waned under the pressure of the other great powers and resulted in the Verona Conference, according to which she had to reestablish diplomatic relations with Constantinople and to meet the demands of Turkey of no further involvement in their domestic affairs.<sup>31</sup>

In 1823, the British stance on the Greek case changes. The secretary of state, Canning, realized that the controversial policy of the Tsar offered a unique opportunity to his country to widen and solidify its influence in the Mediterranean Sea and, at the same time, recruiting the Greeks would enable them to play the most important role in the resolution of the Eastern Question.<sup>32</sup> All these factors resulted in the recognition of Greece as a nation at war in March 23, 1823.<sup>33</sup>

Another fact that marked the change in the policy of the great powers and especially that of Britain was the increasing empathy for the Greek cause of the European public opinion, which had a great appeal to a lot of people.<sup>34</sup> This was because of the idea the educated public of Europe had of Greece. In the west, the identification of classical Greece with the Greece of 1820 and the general association of that land with the idea of human liberty created the great movement of Philhellenism.<sup>35</sup>

This British attitude attracts all the Great Powers in favor of the Greek case. Russia in order to deal with the foreseeable increase in British influence, on January 9 1824, presents them with the plan of "Three Divisions". According to this plan Russia proposed the division of Greece in three Principalities under the power of the Porte. This plan acknowledged that the Greek struggle for independence was not simply a revolt and that the Greeks would never accept to live under Ottoman occupation. At the same time this plan ensured the primary importance of the Russian influence on the Greek case and would provide the other powers with the possibility to intervene in the Greek affairs, in the Ottoman Empire and in the Eastern Mediterranean. France and Austria accepted the plan, which, on the other

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<sup>30</sup> Driault Eduard, "op.cit", pp.287

<sup>31</sup> *The history of the Greek Nation, The Greek Revolution*, "op.cit", pp. 287.

<sup>32</sup> Christodoulidis Th, vol.2, "op.cit", pp. 68.

<sup>33</sup> Driault Eduard, "ibid", vol. 1, pp. 287.

<sup>34</sup> Clogg Richard, *A Short History of Modern Greece*, Athens: Kardamitsas Publications, 1999, pp. 87.

<sup>35</sup> Jelavich Barbara, "op. cit", pp. 66.

hand, was rejected by Britain since the Greeks had already rejected it and were resorted to them as a counterbalance to the Russian policy. Britain, taking advantage of the occasion offered by the Greeks, declared that the best solution to the Greek case would be an independent state, which could apply its influence much better without Russian involvement.<sup>36</sup>

During the end of the 1824 the Greek civil war between the several political elites, which existed or were created during the war, decreased the dynamic of the Greek fight. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire because of her internal problems proved incapable of confronting the Greek revolution. These factors created a balance between the two conflicting parts. This balance ended in 1825 by the intervention of Mehemet Ali of Egypt in favor of the Ottoman Empire. The powerful surge of the Egyptian army caused severe damage to the Greeks until 1827. During that period the three Great powers that would be played a predominant role in the Greek case started to intervene in a more dynamic way in order to protect their own interests.<sup>37</sup>

When Tsar Alexander died and his brother succeeded him to the Russian throne, the Russian policy towards the Ottoman Empire changed. On March 17, 1826 Tsar Nicolas with an ultimatum send to the Porte, demanded that the Ottoman Empire reinstate the former regime that existed in the Danubian Principalities before 1821.<sup>38</sup> Even though the ultimatum did not pertain to the Greek case, Britain feared an impending Russian-Turkish war, harmful for her interests. The Greeks, under the pressure in the battlefield, made known to the British that they were willing to accept autonomy as a solution even if their country remained tributary to the Sultan.<sup>39</sup> This limitation of the Greek demands helped Anglo-Russian negotiations to result in signing a secret Protocol on June, 4 1826. The protocol of Petersburg- the first international act that referred to the instauration of a Greek state- stipulated the terms according to which Britain and Russia would strive to resolve the Greek case. According to it the two Powers would intervene to achieve a ceasefire between the warring forces. The suggested solution to the Greek case was the instauration of an autonomous Greek state, which would remain

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<sup>36</sup> *The history of the Greek Nation, The Greek Revolution*, vol. 12, "op. cit", pp. 436-437.

<sup>37</sup> Stavrianos L. "op. cit", pp. 285-286.

<sup>38</sup> Driault Eduard, "op. cit", vol. 1, pp. 301.

<sup>39</sup> *The history of the Greek Nation, The Greek Revolution*, vol. 12, "ibid", pp. 436.

tributary to the Sultan. The Protocol foresaw that in case of rejection by the Sultan, one of the two Powers had the right to intervene.<sup>40</sup> In this way, Britain had succeeded in isolating the Greek case and in preventing Russia from dismembering the Ottoman Empire to her advantage when a Russian-Turkish war broke out due to the crisis in the East. On the other hand, Russia was given the opportunity to declare war on Turkey, without the fear of a Russian reaction to it, and therefore she could negotiate harder the issues mentioned in the 1826 ultimatum. This time the Porte gave in to the Russian ultimatum and granted considerable privileges to Russia.<sup>41</sup>

On November 22, 1826, Britain presented the other Powers with this Protocol and invited them to participate in the signing of a Treaty which was to replace the Anglo-Russian agreement. Austria refused to participate on the grounds that this would be an intervention in the Ottoman domestic affairs.<sup>42</sup> France realized that if they didn't sign the Protocol, it would mean the exclusion from any attempt to resolve the Greek case, in which case their influence over the Balkans and the Mediterranean would be substantially limited.<sup>43</sup>

The three-party negotiations took place during the London Conference (July, 6 1827) which contained the terms of the Protocol. The Greeks accepted the terms whereas the Turkish did not. As a result of this rejection the Great Powers took action to resolve the Greek case. The ally fleet sailed to Navarino where the Turkish-Egyptian fleet was moored in order to impose harbor blockade to achieve a ceasefire. When the Ottoman fleet refused to ceasefire the ally fleet contrary to the orders given attacked and destroyed the hostile fleet.<sup>44</sup> The naval engagement in Navarino was not preplanned and came as a surprise to the Great Powers. The outcome of this sea battle put the system which was created in 1815 in trial and made those engaged in it redefine their relationship to each other based on the new facts. The outcome

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<sup>40</sup> Driault Eduard, "op.cit", pp. 302.

<sup>41</sup> Christodoulidis Th, "op.cit", pp. 75-76.

<sup>42</sup> *The history of the Greek Nation, The Greek Revolution*, vol. 12, "op.cit", pp. 461.

<sup>43</sup> Christodoulidis Th, "ibid", pp. 77.

<sup>44</sup> Clogg Richard, "op.cit", pp. 101.

of the naval engagement in Navarino was not whether the Greeks would be independent, but what the terms of being independent would be.<sup>45</sup>

After Navarino the British policy towards the Greek case was determined by their desire to maintain the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. They encouraged the Sultan to continue the hostilities in Greece and even to provoke Russia by denouncing the former concessions over the Danubian Principalities. Russian response came in April 1828 with the declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire. The end of the war was instrumental to the resolution of the Greek case.<sup>46</sup>

During the Russo- Turkish war Britain and France found the opportunity to come to an agreement with Mehemet Ali towards the solution of the Greek Question. This agreement allowed the evacuation of the Egyptian forces from Greece. This was carried out by a French expeditionary force during the winter 1828-1829.<sup>47</sup> This agreement is representative of the competition between the Three Powers in order to preserve their own interests. With France decision to send an expeditionary force these two powers pursued to exclude Russian territorial demands from Turkey as a consequence of a Turkish defeat in the Russo-Turkish war.<sup>48</sup> The next year the three Allied Powers concluded the London Protocol by which Greece was to be an autonomous but tributary state, governed by a prince selected by the Allies.<sup>49</sup>

The actual settlement of the Greek affairs was relegated after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish war. The London Conference, which had been the regular Conference of the Three Allied Powers for the solution of the Greek problem, concluded to a new Protocol (February 1830), which declared that Greece would be an independent and Monarchical State under the Guarantee of the three Allied Powers.<sup>50</sup> Britain policy towards the Greek issue at that time was to protect the Ottoman Empire by restricting the area of the New Greek state as much as possible. Its

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<sup>45</sup> Margaritis G. – Anastasiadis G., *History of Greeks, Modern Hellenism, 1827-1862*, vol. 12, Athens: Domi publications, 2006, pp. 33.

<sup>46</sup> Stavrianos L. "op. cit", pp. 289.

<sup>47</sup> Stavrianos L. "ibid", pp. 290.

<sup>48</sup> Margaritis G. – Anastasiadis G., "ibid", pp.30.

<sup>49</sup> Driault Eduard, "op. cit", vol. 1, pp. 313.

<sup>50</sup> Christodoulidis Th, "op.cit", pp. 86.

southern frontier was pushed back almost to the Gulf of Corinth, leaving the Greek State with the territories of Peloponnesus and the Cycladic Islands.<sup>51</sup> The same attitude had Russia too.<sup>52</sup> The three Allied Powers offered the throne to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, but he declined it because the frontiers of the new state were inadequate. The Greeks also rejected the Protocol on the same grounds.<sup>53</sup>

### **3. The Greek Foreign policy after 1828**

The Greek foreign policy at that time was predominated by the effort of the Greek governor Kapodistrias to gain a more favorable settlement in the frontier issue. Since his first year in office in 1828 he strove to achieve the expansion of the Greek borders, which he considered should include Thessalonica as well.<sup>54</sup> From the early beginning of his term in office he believed that the decisions taken by the Great Powers on the issue of the Greek borders should be shaped according to the number of territories under actual Greek dominion. Therefore with the help of the Greek military forces he tried to increase the number of territories under Greek control in Western and Eastern Greece. At the same time, he asked the unofficial Conference of the ambassadors of the Great Powers who were in conference in Poros take into consideration his proposals pertaining to the issue of the borders. The conference concluded that the borderline should be between Arta and Volos, which was accepted as the best solution by both the Great Powers and the Greek Governor.<sup>55</sup>

Britain, however, opposing the Greek demands to expand beyond Peloponnesus and the Cycladic Islands, signed the 1828 Protocol with France before the end of the Conference. From now on Kapodistrias' aim was to reverse the unpleasant turn the border issue had taken. The end of the Russian-Turkish war, resulting in the defeat of Turkey, and the commence of the work of the London Conference were taken by Kapodistrias as an

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<sup>51</sup> Stavrianos L. "op.cit", pp. 291.

<sup>52</sup> Jelavich Barbara, "op. cit", pp. 78.

<sup>53</sup> Stavrianos L. "ibid", pp. 291.

<sup>54</sup> Skopetea Elli, *The Model Kingdom and the Great Idea, Options of the National Problem in Greece, 1830-1880*, Athens: Politipo Publications, 1998, pp.22.

<sup>55</sup> Margaritis G. – Anastasiadis G., "op.cit", pp.61-63.

auspicious start for the determination of the borders.<sup>56</sup> The Governor's attempts were opposed by the British government and so the Greek Kingdom with the London Protocol of 1830 independent but with limited borderline.

After the declination of the Greek throne by Prince Leopold, the Greeks were focused on obtaining an expansion of the borders and the Great Powers were focused on making amendments to the Protocol as far as the border issue was concerned. At this time the rebellion in Poland and Belgium monopolized the interest of the Great powers, which gave an advantage to Greece. Kapodistrias was assassinated on October 9 1831 by members of the opposition and the country found itself in a state of anarchy. Because of all these events it became imperative that the Greek issue be immediately resolved.

The Great Powers in an attempt to do so, through a Protocol they signed on September 26 1831, offered the Greek throne to Otto, the King of Bavaria's King younger son, who accepted it and they decided to re-examine the border issue.<sup>57</sup> The final settlement of the Greek issue came with the signing of the London Treaty on May 7, 1832. The Great Powers, troubled by the condition of Greece after Kapodistrias' assassination, countersigned with Bavaria the treaty, which brought Otto to the Greek throne.<sup>58</sup> With the treaty of a "final settlement" the Greek borders are clearly defined and the Greek state expands up to the borderline between Arta and Volos. This Treaty put an end to a big number of protocols with which the Great Powers tried to give a solution to the Greek case and restore peace and stability in the East.<sup>59</sup> In July 1832, the sultan recognized the independence of Greece in return of a cash indemnity.

The Greek borders as they were defined in the London Protocols and the offered independence was the product of the European diplomacy and that of the Great Powers and not according to the Greek aspirations. The Greek form of government was founded under the protection and supervision of the three Protector Powers, which were to have an important role in the domestic as well as in the foreign affairs of the Greek Kingdom throughout

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<sup>56</sup> *The history of the Greek Nation, The Greek Revolution*, vol. 12, "op.cit", pp. 322-323.

<sup>57</sup> Christodoulidis Th, "op.cit", pp. 91.

<sup>58</sup> Stavrianos L. "op. cit", pp. 291.

<sup>59</sup> Margaritis G. – Anastasiadis G., "op.cit", pp. 31.

Otto's reign. Striving for the expansion of the borderline and the living legend of the decline of the Ottoman Empire was what shaped the Greek domestic and foreign policy as well as the national ideology.<sup>60</sup>

### **III. STATE-BUILDING AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION UNDER KING OTTO**

When Otto came to Greece on February, 6<sup>th</sup> 1833, he was faced with serious financial and political problems. The war against the Ottoman Empire and the civil conflict between the Greek oligarchies had brought the State into full anarchy. The foremost problem in the popular mind was irredentism. The northern frontier ran from the gulf of Arta in the West up to the Gulf of Volos in the East. The population within the borders of the new Kingdom was 800.000 in comparison to the three times bigger Greek population that was still living in the Turkish Provinces and in the British- held Ionian Islands. During the following century the Greeks went to great lengths in pursuit of the Great Idea, the liberation of the enslaved compatriots abroad. Another problem was the disruptive influence of the great powers in political matters and matters of foreign affairs.<sup>61</sup> The last problem that Otto had to face was the country's traditional political powers that were after a place in the official governmental procedures (the three political parties and the traditional local oligarchies that had been in existence during the 400 years of the Ottoman's Rule).

#### **1. Centralization Vs political elites**

The several political elites that the new monarchical power of Greece had to deal with during the first years of the regency in order to exercise its authority were the three Greek political parties, the military elite that developed during the revolutionary years and the members of the Orthodox Greek church. These political elites, because of their conflicting interests, in one way or another came in open conflict with the central monarchical

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<sup>60</sup>Skopetea Elli, "op.cit", pp. 21.

<sup>61</sup> Stavrianos L, "op.cit", pp. 292-293.

authority of the Greek Kingdom in the early years of their regency because of their fundamental ideas about state administration. Before we examine the first measures taken by the Greek regency against these political elites, it is essential to present in a nutshell which these political elites were and what their basic interests were.

First of all, the three political parties, formed when the revolution was already half way through, achieved their final form during the first period of Kapodistrias' term in office and reached the peak of their power during Otto's reign. These political parties were the result of the merger of the traditional political Greek elites, formed during the Ottoman rule, the military elites, formed during the struggle for the liberation of Greece, and the eterochthones (mostly conservative elements) who had arrived in Greece during the revolution.<sup>62</sup>

The political action of these elites over a decade of war had created a strong constitutional tradition. Between 1821 and 1832, three National Assemblies had taken place and three Constitutions had been drawn. For the Greek political leaders believed that the representative system was the ideal system of government to the minds of the vast majority and it ensured the participation of the political elites in the government as it can be seen by the representative tradition of the revolutionary years. But this tradition was not democratic and the creation of representative systems was only in the sense of covering the several local political interests by ensuring a balance of power between the numerous political elites that was no democratic.<sup>63</sup>

Despite these developments, after the domestic conflict that broke out following Kapodistrias' assassination, the political elites believed that a monarchical regime was the only regime that would provide unity and stability in Greece and that a foreign Monarch would act as an intermediary between the conflicting interests of the Greek political formations.<sup>64</sup> After the end of 1826 the political parties had turned themselves into, the British party (under Mavrokordatos' leadership and with Trikoupis second in command), the

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<sup>62</sup>Liritzis H, «Politics and system of clientele in Greece during the 19<sup>th</sup> Century», in Dertilis J. - Kostis K, «eds»., "op.cit", pp. 255.

<sup>63</sup> Koliopoulos John - Veremis Thanos, «op.cit», pp. 15.

<sup>64</sup> Petropoulos John A., *Politics and statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843*, vol. A, Athens: Educational Foundation of National Bank publications, 1997, pp. 62.

French party (under Kolletis' leadership) and the Russian party (under Kolokotronis' leadership and later under Metaxas'). The best governmental system for these parties was the constitutional monarchy, which would ensure their participation in the Greek political life.<sup>65</sup> The Greek Monarch in their mind should plead faith to the Constitution of Epidavros, which could be revised only in order to include the establishment of the monarchical regime, but it would not allow any amendments to the representative system stipulated by it and which was the foundation stone of the royal rights limitations. Moreover, the predominant view was that the future Monarch of Greece should be baptized Orthodox, demand expressed by all political parties, in a way.<sup>66</sup>

The three political parties took their name according to the appeal the three Great Powers involved in the Greek case had had to them. Each one of them, owing to the bad turn the revolution had taken in 1826, clung to the one or the other Great Power, depending on which one they considered it had the political means to ensure the Greek independence. When the revolution was over, these three parties were still clung to the Great Powers for a different reason this time: they believed that the Great Power each one of them supported was the most appropriate to protect in the long term the new Greek state, the borders of which were determined in the International Agreement in 1832, that they would have a strong ally in their struggle to liberate all the Greeks under Turkish domination and that the Great Powers would help financially the ruined by the so many wars Greek economy<sup>67</sup>.

As it will be shown later on in this paper when we examine the composition of the Greek state under Otto's reign, the hope of the three parties of being granted a Constitution and Otto's Orthodox christening was just wishful thinking. When the three Allied Powers, France, Britain and Russia decided that Greece would be an independent state under a hereditary monarchy and stipulated in the treaty of London, after a collusion

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<sup>65</sup> Petropoulos John A., "op.cit", pp. 60-65.

<sup>66</sup> Petrakakos D. A., *The parliamentary History of Greece, Historical and Critical Research from the unpublished National Archives*, vol. 1, Athens: "w.p", 1935-1946, pp. 352-354.

<sup>67</sup> Hering Gunnar, *The political parties in Greece, 1821-1936*, vol. 1, Athens: Morfotiko Idryma Ethikis Trapezas publications, 2004, pp. 188.

with the King of Bavaria, that the first King of Greece would be his son Otto, they left the issue of the Constitution unresolved.<sup>68</sup>

The final plan for the establishment of the Greek Kingdom did not make any relevant provision for it and so Ludwig (Otto's father), following his personal beliefs, took advantage of it and defined the regime of the first Regency as Absolute Monarchy.<sup>69</sup> Otto throughout his personal reign also followed this and furthermore he was never baptized Orthodox. The basic principles that the first two regencies and later King Otto followed were the accumulation of all political powers in the hands of the King, the creation of a fully centralized western bureaucracy, the occupation of the high state administration posts by foreigners (especially Bavarians) and the distancing of the state from every disturbing and disrupting political or religious elites. Their main opinion was that the Greeks hadn't the maturity to govern themselves and that the political parties were only following their own interests or the interests of the Protector Powers. By eliminating the powers of the political elites and creating an absolutely monarchical regime it was the best way to organise the Greek Kingdom.

As far as the army was concerned, the Regents decided that the immediate dissolution of the irregular bands of army, the leftovers of the Greek army, was a necessary solution in order to avoid their use by their military leader against the monarchical powers.<sup>70</sup> At the same time they put together a standing army, which comprised all the Bavarian soldiers excluding the Greek warlords. The Regency, bearing in mind that these irregular bands of army were part of a special elite (which was in favor of the French party) and a destabilization element in the newfangled Greek State causing great pains to Monarchy, believed by dissolving them would rid themselves of the danger of a rebellion against their authority.<sup>71</sup> The formation of a standing army, a constitution non-existent in the Greek tradition, was met with great

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<sup>68</sup> Fotiadis Dimitris, "Otto, the dethroning", History vol. 6, Athens: S. Z. Zaharopoulos publications, 1998, pp.220.

<sup>69</sup> Ludwig gave personal instructions to the first regency about the organisation of the state. See: Petropoulos John, "op.cit", pp. 187.

<sup>70</sup> Woodhouse C. M, *Modern Greece, A Short History*, London: Faber and Faber publications, 1991, pp. 159.

<sup>71</sup> Mauer G., *The Greek people*, Athens: Tolidis Publications, 1976, pp. 9.

opposition since the political and social status of the military elite with that kind of reform was at stake<sup>72</sup>.

Another important issue that the first Regency had to deal with was the religious one. It was considered extremely inappropriate for the church to remain under the influence of the Patriarchate since this meant that the dependence of the Kingdom on the Great powers (and especially on Russia) would become much greater, fact that would lead to greater dependence on the religious elites that existed within the Russian Political Party<sup>73</sup> and on the Ottoman Empire because the Greek Patriarchate was under its rule. This is why the Greek Church became independent and Otto the Head of the church.<sup>74</sup> The authority on administration and discipline issues, but not on dogmatic ones, was given to a council of five Bishops. Their decisions needed the approval of a governmental representative. At the same time, 412 monasteries out of a total of 500 had been closed down and their property was given to the Crown.<sup>75</sup> The dependence of the Church on the State was very disappointing for the supporters of the Russian Party, which concerned Russia as the best foreign supporter and the dwindling of the Church property diminished the power of the religious elite.<sup>76</sup> This situation was a source of friction with Russia and it was to become the main concern of the foreign policy and of the Greek diplomacy in the early years of the Greek Kingdom.<sup>77</sup>

Another issue which demanded the attention of the newfangled Greek Kingdom was the increasing involvement of the three Guardian powers in the Greek affairs. France and Britain in the Convention of May 7, 1832 not only did they choose a ruler for Greece but also a special regime for Greece, a kind of European Dominion exercised by these three Powers which was disguised as the less appalling statement “under the guarantee of the Three Powers”. Independence meant to Greece independence from Turkey and no

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<sup>72</sup>Petropoulos J, «Politics and State Organization in the Greek Kingdom (1833-1843)», in Dertilis- Kostis, «eds»., “op.cit”, pp. 128.

<sup>73</sup>Hering Gunnar, “op.cit”, pp. 225.

<sup>74</sup> The declaration for the independence of the Greek Church published in 28 July 1833, see: Pipinelis T. N., *Monarchy in Greece, 1833-1843*, I. Vartsos, Athens, 1932, pp. 78.

<sup>75</sup> Belia Eleni D., *The Report of Spiridon Trikoupis for the first measures of the regency in Greece*, Athens: Mirtidis Publications, 1973, pp. 158-160.

<sup>76</sup> Clogg Richard, “op.cit”, pp. 111.

<sup>77</sup> Jelavich Barbara, *Russia and Greece during the regency of King Otto, 1832-1835*, Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1962, pp. 29.

control by each of these Powers separately but not independence from the simultaneous control of all three of them.<sup>78</sup> During his reign Otto made several efforts to gain the independence of the Greek state and eliminate the interventionism of the three Great Powers towards the State's both internal and external affairs.

## **2. Interventionism of the Great Powers in the Greek politics**

The Greek Kingdom was established in 1833 under these circumstances and so it became a protectorate of the Great Powers, which helped it to gain independence. More often than not their involvement in the domestic affairs was so obvious that reminded most Greeks that the path that leads to actual independence is a very long one. The embassies of the Powers in Greece which were already established during the first year of the Kingdom became nests of political intrigue and in many cases the ambassadors themselves decided on issues pertaining to the state. Their connections with the Greek political parties enabled them to become involved in the domestic affairs of the Greek state serving their own interests. At the same time these diplomatic delegates were an invaluable organizational instrument for the Greek parties on national level. By means of their intervention to the Crown had the ability to offer official posts or other privileges to their clients and in periods of royal disfavor acted as intermediaries between them and the throne.<sup>79</sup>

Through these practices, in times when the political party under their influence won the elections, they managed to have an important role in the governing of Greece.<sup>80</sup> Many times against their will, the two regencies and later on Otto himself in their effort to create an independent state from the influence of one Power asked the help of another, tactic that lead to a vice circle.

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<sup>78</sup> Petropoulos John A., vol. 1, "op.cit", pp.60.

<sup>79</sup> Petropoulos J. «Politics and State Organization in the Greek Kingdom, 1833-1843», in Dertilis- Kostis, "eds"., "op.cit", pp. 198.

<sup>80</sup> As in the case of Lyons, British ambassador in Greece, during Armand's reign, see: Petropoulos John A., "ibid", pp. 278-280 and in the case of Thouvenel, France ambassador in Greece who during the Kolleti's government had great influence in State affairs, see: Dimitris Fotiadis, "op.cit", pp 55.

A great instrument in the hands of the Powers became the loan the Greek State had to take out due to the dire condition of the Greek economy after the war against the Ottoman Empire. This loan was not the first one the Greek State had taken. During the war for independence the revolutionary governments were obliged to ask for a loan the International Stoke markets in 1825. Two years later they announced that they were unable to pay the compound interest for the loan and this resulted in Greece being excluded from the Western Stoke markets for the first time.<sup>81</sup>

When later on Greece was liberated, the Great Powers served as sureties for a new loan that was agreed in the London Treaty in 1832<sup>82</sup>. A few years later the Greek government suspended the payments three times. The first time was in 1825, the second in 1837 and the third, which was the one that actually put an end to all payments, in 1843.<sup>83</sup> From then on, the sole lender to the Greek State was the National Bank of Greece, established in May 1841, and through it, several individuals.<sup>84</sup>

The inability of the Greek State to repay the loan forced the Great Powers to pay since they were sureties for the loan. They were thus given the opportunity to use it as a means of exerting political control over the Greek government and especially a means of implementation of a foreign policy, which served their needs (especially Britain). The Great Powers had two strategic goals pertaining to the Greek Kingdom. The first one was the organization of the Kingdom and at a political level was to strengthen the central power, which should always be under their control, to develop a rudimentary economy and to eradicate thievery and piracy. However, at foreign policy level, each Power took advantage of the loan issue and forced Greece to have a foreign policy that should serve their interests in the East. We will refer to the loan issue after we have examined the Kingdom's foreign policy.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Dertilis J., «International Economic Relations and political dependence, the case of Greece, 1824- 1878», in Dertilis J. - Kostis K, "eds"., "op.cit", pp. 166- 169.

<sup>82</sup> Levantis John, *The Greek Foreign Dept and the Great Powers 1821-1898*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. 35.

<sup>83</sup> Dertilis J, *The history of the Greek State, 1830-1920*, vol. A, Athens: Estia Publications, 2005, pp. 117-121.

<sup>84</sup> Metaxas-Messinizis Nisis, *Otto and the friendship between Greece and Bavaria*, Athens: 1975, pp. 46-47.

<sup>85</sup> Dertilis J, "ibid", pp. 112.

### **3. State organization during the two regencies and the absolute Monarchy.**

When Otto became King of Greece was only seventeen years old and a council of three Bavarian regents (Armansberg, Maurer, Heideck) was established in order to help him until he became an adult. The collective character of the regency was created in order to prevent the accumulation of all powers under one person's authority<sup>86</sup>. But soon Mauer and Heidek were in conflict with Armansberg, who at the end managed to dethrone the other two in 1834 and the time of the second regency started.<sup>87</sup> After 1837 the King himself managed to abolish it and the years of the personal Monarchy started.<sup>88</sup>

Both the regencies and the King were opposed to the existence of the three political parties. The official approach to this matter was on the one hand to root out all the conditions which would help the parties to flourish by creating strong institutions which would gather all the fundamental powers of the state, and, on the other hand, by subverting the basic actions of these parties by creating a system of appointing in the diplomatic services, their leaders. The first regency (1833-1834) had organized the State in such a way to confront the situations that had been created in the past. It created a system of institutions that could function properly while Greece would attempt to expand in all the territories that included Greek populations. On the other hand, it had adopted western models in the creation of the political organization because they believed they were the only political models which could ensure greater progress. Their objective was to limit the influence of the three political parties, which were disruptive powers because of their personal interests and their relationship with the Great Powers. The regency under the instructions of the King of Bavaria was against the adoption of a Constitution, at least before Otto became an adult and took his position in the State. Neither the Bavarian King, nor the regency believed that the Nation was the

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<sup>86</sup>Ludwig gave personal instructions to the first regency about the organisation of the state. Petropoulos John, vol.1, "op.cit", 1997, pp. 187.

<sup>87</sup> Petropoulos John, vol 1, "ibid", pp. 189.

<sup>88</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon publications, 1997-2000, pp. 67.

source of royal authority.<sup>89</sup> Otto himself had never granted a constitution, before 1843 when he was forced by a bloodless revolution to do so, for the same reason the first two regencies hadn't.<sup>90</sup>

The first two regencies had the same goal which was to gather all the powers of the State under the royal authority. They tried to create a Monarchical regime based on the western monarchical models. All the institutions which had been created as consultative bodies had eventually no powers: For example, The Council of Secretariats (υπουργικό Συμβούλιο), that was established by the first regency as a consultative body, acted only as an executive body and all decisions were taken by the King with advice from the regency, without its contribution.<sup>91</sup> The members of the Secretariat were appointed by the regency, except for the President, who was appointed by the King. The secretaries (Ministries) were seven.<sup>92</sup>

During Armansberg's regency, after 1834, this council turned into a Camarilla. Armansberg became Arch-Chancellor and gathered all governmental powers under his authority. The English Ambassador in Greece obtained an important post in this body because of Armansberg's ambition to return in Power. In order to gain this, he would need a strong ally when King Otto became ready to take over his duties after his coming of age.<sup>93</sup> When King Otto sent Armansberg away and established his personal Monarchy until 1843 (when after a revolt the political system turned into constitutional monarchy), he had recreated this body under his authority. He was the president of the Council of Secretariats (the same post that Armansberg held, but Otto called it the chief Secretary), he took all basic political decisions and most of the times he didn't asked for the contribution of its members.<sup>94</sup>

Moreover, a highly centralised western bureaucracy was established in the place of the ancient local institutions that had flourished under Ottoman rule. The Kingdom was divided into ten Provinces (or Nomarchies) and 47

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<sup>89</sup> Petropoulos J., vol. 1, "op.cit", pp.185-192.

<sup>90</sup> Metaxas Messinizis Nisis, "op.cit", pp. 63.

<sup>91</sup> Petropoulos J., "ibid", pp.193.

<sup>92</sup> Margaritis G. - Anastasiadis G., "op.cit", pp.137.

<sup>93</sup> Petropoulos J., "ibid", pp. 278-280.

<sup>94</sup> Margaritis G. - Anastasiadis G., "ibid", pp.158-159.

Eparchies, which were under the King's absolute power.<sup>95</sup> The local authorities were appointed by the King, who had the right to dismiss the Mare or the local councils whenever he wished to.<sup>96</sup> Local autonomy in the history of Greeks rarely meant democracy. The new system did not intend to harm people. On the contrary, it was an instrument for their independence from the local oligarchy.<sup>97</sup>

Moreover, a big number of Bavarian officers were appointed in vital posts in the administration and in the army, mainly for two reasons: First of all, because Otto had a strong belief that the Greeks were, for the moment, incapable of governing themselves as they didn't possess the necessary knowledge. Therefore, they needed the technical and administrative help of the West (This was also a main reason for not granting them a Constitution). Secondly, by using Bavarians and not Greeks, he could restrict the conflicts between the three major parties (which represented the Greek oligarchy) in favour of the people.<sup>98</sup> The bavarocracy in the constitutions and the military official posts provisionally ended after the adoption of the constitution.<sup>99</sup> Only a small part of the army remained Bavarian and that constituted King's personal garrison.

The abolishment of the Bavarian political and military officials was fundamental for the political parties and the political oligarchies. Getting a job in the administration was the objective of most of the people during these years and it was one of the most highly respected careers to follow. This was because of the traditional view of the political elites, which was created during the years of the Ottoman occupation. The local Greek oligarchies of this period considered politics as a financial activity. This point of view remained to the people's mind after the establishment of the New Greek State as well. The political elites' concept that the state is not dangerous only when they can

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<sup>95</sup> Karolidis Pavlos, *The History of the Greek Nation*, Athens: Eleftheroudakis publications, 1925, pp. 224.

<sup>96</sup> Margaritis G. - Anastasiadis G. "op.cit", pp.137. See also: Tsaparos Stefanos, *The political leadership in the Contemporary Greek History*, vol. A, Athens: Nea Synora publications, 1988, pp. 147.

<sup>97</sup> Petropoulos John A., vol. 1, "op.cit", Athens 1997, pp. 208.

<sup>98</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "op.cit", pp. 36-37.

<sup>99</sup> Tsaparos Stefanos, "ibid", pp. 147.

control it by taking part in the state affairs, explains why during Otto's reign the members of the political parties vied for a place in the administration.<sup>100</sup>

Otto's main aim, and of the Regency as well, was to ensure state independence, as it is already mentioned in previous chapters and for this reason he intended to reform the status quo of the Greek Church and to create a standing national army. Moreover, King Otto didn't like the interference of the Great Powers in the affairs of the Greek Kingdom. He made some efforts in order to be independent from the influence of the Great Powers as far as domestic and Foreign affairs were concerned.

These efforts couldn't be successful because the newly established Kingdom had huge economic problems and its survival depended on the financial help the Great Powers provided to Greece. Otto was aware of this situation but he tried to make some steps toward the national independence of his Kingdom. He tried to eliminate the power of the political parties which were under the influence of the Great Powers by filling official posts with Bavarians or by appointing the leaders of the political parties to administration posts or by making them ambassadors in order to weaken the position of the parties,<sup>101</sup> or by having good relations with the one or the other party in order to limit the influence of the other two Great Powers in the domestic political affairs.<sup>102</sup> Moreover, Otto's main objective was the creation of a new national party, which would be his popular base.<sup>103</sup>

Important reforms took place in the educational field. The efforts to create a national education system were based on the idea that the educational system in Greece should have some basic characteristics of the Bavarian educational system and of the Western Enlightenment. The basic

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<sup>100</sup> Petropoulos J, «The pro- revolutionary political tradition», in Dertilis- Kostis, "eds"., "op.cit", pp. 117.

<sup>101</sup> Dimitris Fotiadis, "Otto, the Monarchy", History vol. 5, Athens: S. Z. Zaharopoulos publications, 1998, pp. 235-236.

<sup>102</sup> The Regencies as the King himself were against the existence of the parties, see: Maurer G., «op.cit», pp. 9-11, and 19-21. But the First regency concluded to depend on the France party in order to avoid the Russian party after the organization of a conspiracy against the regency, from its members in 1834, see: Petropoulos John A., "op.cit", pp. 238-240. Armansberg, during the second regency became the protector of the English party in order to preserve his powers and after of the France as well because he was also feared the intervention of the Russian party as well as the first regency, see: J. Petropoulos, "ibid", pp. 251-253. Otto followed the policy of Armansberg tried to live with the parties but didn't stop to undermined them. *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "op.cit", pp. 72-73.

<sup>103</sup> Pipinelis T. N., "op.cit", pp. 180.

knowledge that the system should provide was Knowledge of the Classic Greece and practical knowledge. The first regency had devised an elaborate national system of education practicable only on papers. The clergy in Phanary<sup>104</sup>, the only mechanism that could impose a different orientation on the Greek educational system, was found neutralised from the beginning, for fear that the Patriarchate would find an opportunity to interfere in the Kingdom's domestic affairs.<sup>105</sup> Several decrees were produced in order to establish the different levels of education. Maurer said in his book that their main care was to establish four levels of education.<sup>106</sup> In 1837 they produced a decree on the establishment of the National University, which until 1862 was called Ottonian University.<sup>107</sup>

The National University of Greece was the first National University in the Balkan Peninsula and became the philosophical centre from which new generations of political men came out. These men had been provisioned with new political ideas for independence and National identity. With the contribution of these people the revolution of 1843 took place for the establishment of the Constitutional Monarchy in Greece. People from other nationalities of the Balkan Peninsula studied in this University, people that became members of intellectual movements for National Independence in their own countries. Otto, along with the Bavarian Minister for Education in Munich, were the two men who made efforts for the establishment of the new University. The first four Schools that operated in the University were the Philosophy School, the Theological School, the Law School and the Medicine School.<sup>108</sup> It was the University that provided the ideological background for the new generation which succeeded in dethroning Otto in 1862, fact which had been predicted by Kolokotronis during its first years when he said that « this house (the university) will eat that house (the palace)».<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Phanariotes were the basic carrier of the education of the Greek nation during the first phase of the Greek Enlightenment, for further informations see: Dimaras K. «The Greek Enlightenment» in Dertilis- Kostis, "eds"., "op.cit", pp. 25-44, and Svoronos N., "op.cit", pp. 96-109.

<sup>105</sup> Tsoukalas K., *Dependence and Reproduction the Social Role of the Educational Mechanism in Greece (1830-1922)*, Athens: Themelio Publications, 1992, pp.79.

<sup>106</sup> Mauer G., "op.cit", pp. 66-67.

<sup>107</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "op. cit", pp. 69-70.

<sup>108</sup> Fotiadis Dimitris, vol. 5, "op.cit", pp. 326.

<sup>109</sup> Woodhouse C. M, "op.cit", pp. 159.

During the first Regency, because of a conspiracy against the Crown, which was finally avoided (in 1834), a decree was issued which imposed many restrictions on the publication of newspapers in the Kingdom and therefore Freedom of Press was abolished. In this way the Regency believed that they would be able to suppress any reaction coming from the elites, who had been very disappointed- for reasons already mentioned -by these first measures taken by the Regency.<sup>110</sup> At the same time, during the first regency an improved system of justice was introduced by Maurer, who laid a long-lasting foundation for the Greek legal code.<sup>111</sup>

In 1836 King Otto became of age and went to Germany in order to get married. He managed to convince his father to dethrone Armansberg and to become the only ruler of Greece. In 1837, he returned to Greece with his wife, Amalia, and a new Prime Minister, the Bavarian Rudhart. Armansberg was recalled and the post of Arch-Chancellor was abolished.<sup>112</sup> This trip created two problems. The first one was related to his marriage to Amalia, a Bavarian duchess and a Protestant. Her religion caused a lot of reaction to the Greek people as well as to Russia.<sup>113</sup>

The second problem was that Bavarian Armansberg, who had been the cause of conflict between not only the Throne and the people but also the Throne and the political elites, was replaced by another Bavarian, who held a vital post in the Greek State.<sup>114</sup> This was a deliberate move made by Otto to prove that Bavarocracy, which had deprived the members of the political parties from important posts in the administration, was not over. Rudhart 's appointment was a cause of discontent for Britain since, until then, with Armansberg's help she played an important role in the Greek State affairs. Lyons' post during Armansberg's regency now was in theory given to the Austrian ambassador, Prokes Osten.<sup>115</sup> Moreover during his personal

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<sup>110</sup> Belia E., "op.cit", pp. 151-152. This report had been created for the information of the three protector powers in 1834. The Regency's purpose was to show to these powers that with the reforms it had been passed, the Greek Kingdom had started to fulfill its obligations about the organization of the State.

<sup>111</sup> Woodhouse C. M, "op.cit", pp. 159.

<sup>112</sup> Woodhouse C. M, "ibid", pp. 160.

<sup>113</sup> Fotiadis Dimitris, vol. 5, "op.cit", pp. 275- 289.

<sup>114</sup> Clogg, Richard, "op.cit", pp. 113.

<sup>115</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "op. cit", pp. 67.

Monarchy Otto turned to the Russian party to found support for his authority.<sup>116</sup>

Britain, very disappointed with this turn of events, took all the necessary steps in order to get the Bavarian Prime Minister out of the picture and managed became himself the president of the ministerial council.<sup>117</sup> Moreover because of Otto's turning to the Russian party for popular support Britain started to ask Otto to change the composition of the governmental institutions.<sup>118</sup> During a conversation between the ambassadors of Britain and Austria in 1839 in Greece, it was stated that "A truly independent Greece is nonsense. Greece has to be either British or Russian and since it is impossible for it to be Russian then it has to be British!".<sup>119</sup> This statement expressed in a nutshell the British intentions about Greece.

During this period, between 1834 and 1839, five coups d'etat against the Bavarian Reign took place, but they were of limited range since they were the result of the reaction of the political elites to the totalitarian tendencies of the Regency and the King as well as against the Bavarocracy in public office. Otto's and his father's obsession not to grant a Constitution and not to resolve the religious issue remained a main source of conflict.<sup>120</sup>

In a final attempt to suppress domestic upheaval and to appease the Great Powers (especially Britain), which began seriously to consider that they could control the Greek Kingdom when they managed to diminish the King's powers by granting the Greek people a Constitution, Otto turned to France for help. The French Prime Minister, Guizot, advised Otto to recall Mavrokordatos (the leader of the British Party) from London where he acted as Greek ambassador and to appoint him Prime Minister. Mavrokordatos, accepting this post, tried to convince Otto to grant gradually extended powers to the Council of Secretariats. He didn't succeed and so he stepped down from his post in his first year in office.<sup>121</sup> Otto's reactionary policy towards the political elites'

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<sup>116</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "ibid", pp. 74.

<sup>117</sup> Woodhouse C.M, "op. cit", pp. 160.

<sup>118</sup> With numerous letters, P. Soutsos, a member of the Greek government, informed Otto that Britain wanted the change of the composition of the Greek government. General State Archives, Ottonian Files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 38, Documents with the dates, 10 August 1840, 21 August 1840, 24 August 1840.

<sup>119</sup> Fotiadis Dimitris, vol. 5, "op. cit", pp. 308.

<sup>120</sup> Papadoniou Zaharias, *Otto*, Athens: Estia Publications, 1997, pp. 48-51.

<sup>121</sup> Th. Theodorou, *Otto and Mavrokordatos*, Athens: 1970, pp. 8-12 and 18-19.

demands and his refusal to grant a Constitution lead to the bloodless revolt of 1843 which was supported by all the political and military elements of the Greek society.<sup>122</sup>

The excuse for this revolt was the announcement by the secretary of the State Department, Rizos Neroulos, that Greece was unable to pay the installment for the loan and also the denial of the powers to give Greece the third dose of the loan in order to help. These factors were expedient to the revolt by putting aside all the obstacles for the three parties to agree on immediate action against Otto.<sup>123</sup> This revolt made the King grant the so-much-wanted Constitution on September, 3 1843. This is how the transition from Absolute Monarchy to Constitutional Monarchy took place. Typically, it took place on March 18 1844, when Otto vowed to respect and keep the Constitution.<sup>124</sup>

#### **4. The constitutional Monarchy**

##### *i. Granting a constitution*

After the revolt of September 3, Otto agreed to appoint a caretaker government consisting of an equal number of members from all three Parties and to call the National Assembly in order to make the first draft of the Greek Constitution, the preparation of which he entrusted to a committee of twenty people.<sup>125</sup> Before we refer to the outcome of the talks of the Assembly, it is important to examine the reaction of the Great Powers, as well that of their ambassadors during the revolt, ambassadors who, as it was mentioned before, played an important part in the Greek affairs, due to the strange state of independence which was given to the Greek Kingdom which was actually a protectorate of the Great Powers.

The powers, including Bavaria, agreed that the Wittelsbach dynasty and King Otto in particular, should continue to hold the throne. They also wished any constitution to be as monarchical in character as possible, because they did not wish Athens to become the center of a national or democratic revolution in the Near East. In the talks between the Great Powers it was

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<sup>122</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "op.cit", pp. 90-92

<sup>123</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, Vol. 13, "ibid", pp. 89-90

<sup>124</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, Vol. 13, "ibid", pp. 105.

<sup>125</sup> Clogg Richard, "op.cit", pp. 115.

decided that they would not try to stop the introduction of a constitution, which would be granted to Greece, but this constitution must be granted with the concurrence of and under the guarantee of the powers. Up to this point the Powers, by their diplomatic representatives, agreed to supervise the talks in the assembly and interfere whenever was necessary.<sup>126</sup>

Within this general framework, however, the reaction of the powers differed and especially the Russian reaction. The Russian reaction to the Greek revolt was to be against it. This happened mainly because Russia insisted on the status quo defined by the Vienna Treaty of 1815. As soon as the Tsar learned about the revolt, he denounced it and, moreover, he recalled Catacazy, his ambassador in Greece, because it was said that he tried to make Otto resign from the Throne with the hope that an Orthodox prince would take his place.<sup>127</sup> The denouncement of the revolt came naturally from the Russian part as the Russian government could accept a constitutional government but it could not recognize the principle of revolutionary change<sup>128</sup>. Moreover, during the talks of the constitutional assembly, the Russian Government announced that the Tsar would not intervene in the Greek affairs and that he would keep a policy of expectancy in contrast to the other Powers. Because of this attitude on the Russian part, before and during the discussions of the Constitutional assembly, the representatives of the Russian party rapidly lost the commanding position they had enjoyed at the beginning of the revolt.<sup>129</sup>

There were two issues that monopolized the talks about the Constitution. The first one was about the conflict between autochtones and heterochtones. Heterochtones, were the Greek populations, which had been torturing the Greek society since the years of the war for independence. This issue was closely related with the outcome of the struggle for independence. The Greek state, in its final form after the Convention/Treaty of 1832, did not comprise all the territories where rebellions of the Greek element had taken place. Many of the warlords of these territories, during the Greek revolution,

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<sup>126</sup> Jelavich Barbara, *Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843*, Munich: Verlag R. Oldenbourg publications, 1966, pp. 27-28.

<sup>127</sup> Margaritis G. - Anastasiadis-G., "op.cit", pp. 266-271.

<sup>128</sup> Jelavich B., "ibid", pp. 30-35.

<sup>129</sup> Jelavich B., "ibid", pp. 38-41.

participated in battles in territories now outside the Greek borders and they either remained in these territories or returned in Greece after the foundation of the New Greek State. Also, many Greeks for fear of Turkish retaliation sought shelter in Greek territories. Among those who came either to fight or to escape Turkish retaliation there were intellectuals and other educated people who later held important educational and administrative posts.<sup>130</sup>

During the first decade under Otto's reign, this conflict took large proportions, especially after bureaucracy developed, a large part of which was manned by heterochtones and caused a lot of reaction from the other social groups who considered themselves excluded from official posts.<sup>131</sup> Talks on this issue got out of hand during the proceedings of the Constitutional Assembly and was the source of great opposition to both parts, which became even greater because it became a cover story in the Press.<sup>132</sup>

The issue of heterochtones had an impact on Greek international relations as well. On the one hand, it attracted the attention of the Powers who kept track of all aspects of Greek life. On the other hand, it was met with a lot of reaction from the Ottoman Empire because, in placing the heterochtones in communities according to the province of their origin and granting them political rights, as it was proposed during the talks over this issue, they saw more territorial demands from Greece. Ottoman reactions and their consequences for the Greek case made the Great Powers intervene through their ambassadors in the talks in order to avoid a possible crisis.<sup>133</sup> The final settlement of the Constitution proved a satisfactory solution for both sides and it was the product of mutual compromise.

The second issue that was examined by the Constitutional Assembly was the religious one. The Great Powers intervened again in the talks about the King's denomination and the relationship between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Patriarchate. Despite the joint efforts of Britain and France to exclude this issue from the discussions, Article 39 of the draft of the Constitution stated: "Every successor to the Hellenic Throne must fully

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<sup>130</sup> Gunnar Hering, "op.cit", pp. 256.

<sup>131</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "op.cit", pp. 104.

<sup>132</sup> For further information See: Dimakis Ioannis, *The institutional Change of 1843, the question of Autochtones and Heterochtones*, Athens: Themelio Publications, 1991, pp.26-88.

<sup>133</sup> Dimakis Ioannis, "ibid", pp. 181-182.

embrace the Orthodox religion of Christ.”<sup>134</sup> This statement addressed not only the question of faith, but also the right of the assembly to amend in its Articles issues which had been determined from the three Protector powers by an international treaty without their contribution.<sup>135</sup>

This article became the most important and controversial issue between the powers during the final drawing up of the Constitution. The successor to King Otto's throne was determined by the Three Protector Powers in the Treaty of 1832, which made clear that the successor to the Greek throne was the King's brother. But it did not make any references to his religious denomination. Although Otto had given insurances that his children would be brought up in the Orthodox Dogma, he had no children after six years of marriage. Thus, after his death the succession would pass to his brother, Luitpold, who he was also a Catholic. It was therefore clear that, should Otto suddenly die, his successors as determined by the international agreements were and would probably remain Catholic. The Two Great Powers didn't want this issue brought forward to the Constitutional debate and they used all their influence to prevent its inclusion in the draft. Their efforts were directed towards protecting King Otto. They didn't wish to see the Wittelsbach dynasty in danger. The preference of a Bavarian dynasty for the Greek Throne from the beginning was the safest one because Bavaria was a Monarchical Power that had not vested interests in the East and also because a Bavarian King in Greece would be the source of stability for the three conflicting Powers. If this article appeared in the Constitution, the next Greek King would be either a Russian Prince or one under Russian influence and their role in the East would be limited.<sup>136</sup> Russia, of course, was in favor of this article because it was going to resolve the biggest issue of disagreement with the Greek Kingdom. Moreover, the adoption of this article would expand Russian influence in the Greek Kingdom. The issue of the religion of the Greek Monarch was arranged after the discussion of the Constitution at diplomatic level.

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<sup>134</sup> Margaritis G. - Anastasiadis G., "op.cit", pp. 323.

<sup>135</sup> Barbara Jelavich, "op.cit", pp. 41.

<sup>136</sup> Barbara Jelavich, "ibid", pp. 41-45.

Further arrangements about the relationship between the Greek Church and the Patriarchate in Constantinople were made in the Constitution. The members of the First Regency, in order to ensure the independence of the Greek Kingdom, had separated the Greek Church from the Patriarchate and had placed the church under the secular power of the State. This was the cause of great trouble, especially to the Russian Party and to the Greek society. Article 2 of the Constitution offered two solutions. First of all, the Greek Church remained an autocephalous administration, but as far as dogma was concerned, the Church was accountable to the Patriarchate. Secondly, the Greek Church was run by a synod of high priests, fact that consolidated the independence of the Church from the State.<sup>137</sup>

ii. *The political developments after the adoption of the Constitution*

The Constitution that was issued in March 1844, was not very liberal and had as a model the France one<sup>138</sup>. It made provision for two Assemblies: the Parliament, the members of which were elected, and the Senate, consisting of at least 21 lifelong members appointed by the King. The Legislative power was given to the King, the Parliament and the Senate. However, only the king had the power to appoint or fire the Ministers and to dissolve the Parliament. Justice was also in King's hands.<sup>139</sup>

Since Otto had not granted the Constitution willingly, throughout his Constitutional Monarchy he felt that he was under no obligation. This is why, from 1844 until his deposition, Otto showed disrespect and contempt for the Constitution and the Institutions. When it came to his royal rights, Otto proved to be totalitarian despite the extended powers given to him by the Constitution and he tried to have all powers under his control.<sup>140</sup> In his attempt to do so, he found in 1844 a friend and a mentor in Kollettis, who maintained his term in the government until his death in 1847. Kollettis paid no respect to the parliamentary bodies provided by the Constitution, and through juggling and scheming he managed to win the elections and to dissolve the legislative

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<sup>137</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "op.cit", pp. 110.

<sup>138</sup> Tsaparas St., "op.cit", pp. 147.

<sup>139</sup> Clogg Richard, "op.cit", pp.115.

<sup>140</sup> Petrakakos D. A., *The parliamentary History of Greece, Historical and Critical Research from the unpublished National Archives*, vol. 2, Athens: 1935-1946, pp. 188-189.

bodies whenever it served his goals. Otto held him in high esteem, considered him as a pillar of his throne, since his control over the Parliament and the Senate helped Otto to extend his powers even more.<sup>141</sup> After Kollettis' death, Otto appointed short-term governments with Prime Ministers under his control.

Despite his continual disrespect to the Constitution, Otto preserved his power for two main reasons. Firstly, due to the depreciation of the political parties and of their leaders. These leaders, who won the elections in turns, were the targets of the dislike of the people, and that helped Otto to appear as if he had nothing to do with the conflict among the parties and as the only one who cared about national unity.

The second and probably the most important reason was Otto's endorsement of the Great Idea. Especially during the Crimean war, encouraged by the revolts in Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia, Otto personified the great national desires and he managed to unify the Greeks and save face by reacting to the practices of the Great Powers. This is how he managed to earn public support, mainly by distracting the public from the more serious and long-lasting political and social problems. What had helped him to remain in power was also what made him fall. His irredentism led to friction with the Great Powers, which had supported and allowed his term in office. On the other hand, the naval blockade, which was the result of the Greek participation in the Crimean War, was a huge wound to the national pride and public dislike was aimed at Otto this time.<sup>142</sup>

Between the years 1859-1862, when the Crimean War and foreign occupation were over, opposition to the throne became greater. This opposition was expressed through a new political elite that replaced the three parties. The power of these parties had already started to decrease in the second half of 1850 due to a change in the domestic and foreign affairs which gave them no reason to exist any longer. Their decadence coincided with the appearance of a new generation of politicians who was brought up with liberal ideas and studied at University. The changes in the international system and the beginning of the decline of the old kind of society, which had formed the

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<sup>141</sup> Fotiadis Dimitris, vol. 6, "op.cit", pp. 95- 106.

<sup>142</sup> Margaritis G. - Anastasiadis G., "op.cit", pp. 356- 362.

experience of the older elites, created new political mentalities in the new generation of politicians.<sup>143</sup> This was the generation that dethroned Otto in 1862.

#### **IV. GREEK FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION UNDER KING OTTO**

##### **1. Re- shaping the Great Idea**

The independent Greek State, founded in 1833, was the least of what the revolutionary ideology hoped to achieve. The borders of the State were the creation of the Great Powers, who did not want the creation of a big, strong Greek State within the Ottoman Empire for which they had fought so hard to preserve. What they really wanted was to create a Greek State which would be under their influence and which would protect their interests in the Mediterranean and in the East in general.

The Greek borders, ever since the foundation of the Greek Kingdom, had not been a constant worry for the Greek people and the Monarchical authorities. The borders, as determined by the treaty of 1832, were considered as temporary and limited. This limitation was believed to be the main reason for the adverse fortune of Greece. The Great Idea was formed to compensate for the setbacks, the inability and the reality in which the Greek kingdom found itself during the constant intervention of the Great Powers.<sup>144</sup>

From the early years of the Greek Kingdom, the hope to extend of the borders in order to comprise the Greek populations living in Ottoman territories and to revive the Greek Empire was predominant in Greece. Otto had already started, since 1833, the “campaign” in Smyrna and stirred the emotions of the Greek populations still living there. In 1834, Kolletis put forward the idea that Greece should not have a capital city to Armansberg, since the actual capital of Greece was Constantinople. When Otto learned about the death of the Sultán in 1839 he wanted to go to Constantinople in order to be made King of the East.<sup>145</sup> However, despite the desire to expand

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<sup>143</sup> Hering Gunnar, “op.cit”, pp. 320-321.

<sup>144</sup> Politis Alexis, “op.cit”, pp. 61.

<sup>145</sup> Skopetea Elli, “op.cit”, pp. 274

the borders, all Greek efforts, during the first decade of the existence of the Greek Kingdom, were focused on organizing the Kingdom.

On the other hand, the revolutionary ideology, the basic principles of which had been created under the influence of the European Illumination and included the association of the new Hellenism with antiquity and its harmonization with the European culture, after the foundation of the Greek State began to change. This happened because of the increasing domination of Neoclassicism with great respect for the religious traditions at the expense of another element of the Illumination, the Western Influence. Over the next fifty years, Romanticism prevailed, an ideology, which was the exact opposite of Enlightenment. Romanticism focused on History and Folklore, the main expressions of a strong yearning for the past.<sup>146</sup>

With the eastern crisis between 1839 and 1841, the Greeks, who had found the task of getting organized for more than a decade extremely hard, focused their efforts on the expansion of their borders considering it as the only solution in order to overcome all the domestic problems of their Kingdom. The end of the war between Turkey and Egypt was very promising for the Greek hopes to find a solution to the Greek issue and at the same time it became the start of the national endeavor to unite all the Greek populations and to expand the borders of Greece.<sup>147</sup>

During the decade 1840-1850, together with Romanticism there was a religious revival and a change in the public feelings for the Byzantine Empire, which during the revolutionary years had been dissociated from the national ideology as it was contrary to the principles of Enlightenment and because of the stance of the Patriarchate towards the Greek Rebellion.<sup>148</sup>

At the same time, the Monarchy, with the revival of the Byzantine Empire in the frame of the National Ideology, became of extreme importance. The destiny of the Greek nation, the destiny of the Greek State and the destiny of the Greek throne had become the same thing. The throne became the symbol of national unity and much more the symbol of whom the Greeks

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<sup>146</sup> Dimaras K., « *The Greek Enlightenment*», in Dertilis- Kostis, “eds”., “op.cit” , pp. 43-44.

<sup>147</sup> Skopetea Elli, “op.cit”, pp. 274.

<sup>148</sup> Kitromilidis P., «Ideological Streams and Political Requests during the Greek Nineteenth Century», in Dertilis- Kostis, “eds”., “ibid”, pp. 64-65.

had trusted to achieve the goals set in 1821. Otto, which had only to gain from it, followed the Greek nationalism and subscribed to Kollettis' "Great Idea".<sup>149</sup>

In 1844, with Kollettis' speech in the National Assembly on the issue over the autochthones and eterochthones, we have the birth of the term "Great Idea", which represented the desires and the irredentism of the Greeks. Kollettis, in his speech, using examples from history, showed that it was the duty of all Greeks to be united with their brothers still under Ottoman domination or their expatriates who lived outside Greece. According to his speech, Greece was the historical and strategic center of the Eastern and the Western world and because of its position it should bring the Greek culture from the West to the east. In Kollettis' speech we can see three main points: the first one has to do with the Greek culture, the second one has to do with the union of all the Greeks and the third with the political materialization of this union.<sup>150</sup>

The vagueness of the definition of the notion of the Great Idea, as it had been expressed by Kollettis, was instrumental for its survival since its meaning, without diverting from its basic goal (the liberation of all Greeks), could be adapted to suit the needs and the mentality of different people and even of different generations. The Great Idea was to live on, rarely as it was meant by its creator, but often as it was interpreted or misunderstood by those who got involved in it.<sup>151</sup>

After Kollettis' speech and even later with the increase of the romantic nationalism, the prevailing nationalism during the years of the Greek rebellion, not without variations, as the desire to revive the Greek Byzantium, became the Greek national ideology. Its culmination took place during the period between 1850 and 1860 and especially with the Crimean war, the main goal of which was the revival of the Byzantine Empire. Greece took sides with Russia, in order to achieve its national goals, with the well known in the diplomatic history results of the naval blockade and of the general disappointment.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Skopetea Elli, "op.cit", pp. 276- 277.

<sup>150</sup> Dimaras K., «The Great Idea», in Dertilis- Kostis, "eds"., "op.cit", pp. 45- 51.

<sup>151</sup> Dimaras K., «The Great Idea», in Dertilis- Kostis, "eds"., "ibid", pp. 52-53.

<sup>152</sup> Kitromilidis P., «Ideological Streams and Political Requests during the Greek Nineteenth Century», in Dertilis J. - Kostis K., "eds"., "ibid", pp. 67 –68.

The Great Idea and Otto went through a difficult period caused by the disappointment in the outcome of the Greek struggle in the frame of the Crimean war. Otto's transient popularity during the naval blockade would not last for long since the royal couple was blamed by the opposition to have betrayed the national goals. Otto, abandoned by the Great Powers, which for the first time considered his irredentism as a greater factor of instability than his overthrow, and also caught in the vortex of the ideology against monarchy of the new generation of politicians, despite the violent measures he took, was unable to keep his throne.<sup>153</sup>

The humiliation of Greece in the Crimean war took away the truthfulness of Otto's role as the would-be liberator of the Eastern peoples, while the union of the Ionian Islands with Greece, which coincided with the establishment of a new dynasty in Athens, threw a lifeline to the less popular option of the gradual achievement of the national goals. This option provided a solution to the problem of the development of the State and the aim to liberate all Greeks simultaneously, something that Otto had failed to do.<sup>154</sup>

## **2. The Greek Diplomatic Service as an instrument of foreign policy**

In order to write about the Foreign policy in the Ottonian years, I had to do research in the Ottonian official Records in the General State archives. During my research, I studied the official documents of the Ministry of foreign Affairs towards the Greek Embassies and the Greek consulates that were established by the Kingdom of Greece in its early years of formation. These documents are kept in files, which contain the official communication between the ambassadors and consuls with the King himself and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Each file contains the formal communication between the Greek authorities and the ambassadors or the consulates of an Embassy or consulate. For example, file 31 includes the documents that concern the Greek Embassy in Constantinople. The communication between the Greek government and the embassy in Constantinople has to do with several issues, such as the religious issue, or the course of the Crimean war. Some of these

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<sup>153</sup> Skopetea Elli, "op.cit", pp. 287-288.

<sup>154</sup> Skopetea Elli, "ibid", pp. 289- 290.

documents are about the financing of the work of these embassies or Consulates, about the behavior of these authorities towards the Greek subjects<sup>155</sup> who were still under the Ottoman Rule, about Commercial Agreements, about official issues, about staffing the diplomatic services, the definition of their work etc.

Ever since its existence, the Monarchy had created a network of Greek embassies in the Western Europe, in the Russian Empire and in the Ottoman Empire (in areas where Greek populations existed). Illustrious Greek personalities became diplomats for two reasons: The first reason was that King Otto wanted to remove the popular leaders of the 3 major parties, in order to make them weaker. Spyridon Trikoupis, the leader of the British party, was sent to London as ambassador; Alexandros Mavrokordatos was appointed to the embassies of Munich and Berlin, the former ruler of Moldova, Michail Soutsos, was sent to Saint Petersburg in 1833 and Kolletis to Paris in 1835.<sup>156</sup>

Otto took advantage of these personalities, who were the only educated ones, knew about politics and had ties with the European powers because of the connection of their parties with one or the other Protector Power of the Greek Kingdom. This can be understood by the appointment of these personalities to different embassies, depending on the needs of the Greek Kingdom. The only person to remain in his post was Kolletis, who became Prime Minister after 1844 until his death. On the other hand, these personalities took advantage of their position to broaden their knowledge and acquire political experience in order to achieve a future reform of the Greek political system. It was no secret that most of them wanted a Constitution and more democratic procedures (as Mavrokordatos). And many of them (as

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<sup>155</sup> General state Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 33, document 028, from Mavrokordatos to Otto about financial assistance of the Greek populations in the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>155</sup> Skopetea Elli, "op.cit", pp. 289- 290.

<sup>155</sup> Skopetea Elli, "ibid", pp. 287.

<sup>155</sup> Skopetea Elli, "ibid", pp. 282.

<sup>156</sup> Laskaris S. Th., *The Diplomatic History of Greece, 1821-1914*, Athens: D. N Tzakas- St. Delagrammatikas publications, 1947, pp. 53.

Kolletis), taking advantage of their position, tried to achieve the consensus of the G. Powers on border issues.<sup>157</sup>

The work of the Greek diplomats helped Greece in many ways. They transferred the political climate from the Western countries (and especially from the three Protector Powers, Bavaria and the Ottoman Empire) about the Greek demands in several matters or about the decisions and the attitude of these powers toward several matters of Greek domestic and foreign affairs. This was achieved by direct discussions with the authorities and the political leaders of each country or by indirect discussions with the diplomatic representatives of these countries in other countries. Most of the times, they tried to change this climate (and they even cooperated with each other- Kolletes, Mavrokordatos- Mavrokordatos, Soutsos) in favour of Greece and they succeeded. They took place in the most crucial negotiations with Turkey and the Great Powers on behalf of the Greek Kingdom as representatives of the Royal authority. Their work at that time was vital because of the political leaders' difficulty to communicate with each other either through direct talks (the trips took a lot of time and they could not be away for long because it was a matter of internal security), or through mail (the only means of communication in those times), which was an extremely time-consuming procedure. Therefore, taking initiative in order to address issues of domestic or foreign affairs was vital, especially for Greece since problems related to the Greek Kingdom were taken care of by the Great Powers in diplomatic centers throughout Europe.

At the same time, from the early years of the Kingdom, a large number of consulates were founded in all European countries, especially in those where Greeks flourished and the Greek trade reached its peak.<sup>158</sup> Many of the Greek consulates had limited authority and in many cases these consulates either ceased to exist after a very short time or they closed down after having served their purpose, after the signing of commercial treaties, for example. It was of utmost importance for the Regency, and later for Otto as well, that Greece should have consulates in the Ottoman and Russian Empires. The

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<sup>157</sup> Pipinelis T. N., "op.cit", pp. 186-188.

<sup>158</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consulates, Folder 40, document 065. A catalogue of the Greek consulates in the West and East.

consulates, which were founded in places where Greeks and the Greek trade flourished (places like Odessa and Thessalonica), protected the Greek trade, which was very important for the Greek economy, and kept the bonds between these Greek populations and Greece, which tried to become their protector and to be considered a National center. In this way, Greece thought that, when they were ready to bring forward the issue of the borders, they would have these populations on their side. How important that was to Greece can be easily understood if we compare the large number of consulates in these places to the extremely small size of the Greek Kingdom.

### **3. The work of the Greek embassies towards basic issues of Foreign policy:**

#### **i. The Greek foreign dept**

The financial dependence of Greece on the three Great Powers, Britain-France-Russia, who stood surety for Greece, in its early years, to take out the loan from the international stoke markets, was one of the most important issues that the Greek diplomacy had to deal with, and one of the most important means for the Great Powers, and especially for Britain, to exert great pressure on domestic and foreign policy issues to Greece, always in tune with the stance of each of these Powers to the Eastern Question.<sup>159</sup>

The arrangements for this loan were made during the London Treaty of 1832. The loan was taken in order to help the Greek state to survive after its independence under the new monarchical regime. The Greek Monarchy was under the obligation to provide State revenue in order to pay the interest for this loan. In case they did not do so, according to Article 12 of the Treaty, the three sureties had the right to exert international financial control to Greece, in other words they had the right to control the Greek Customs Office revenue. This also gave them the right of a military intervention- at least this is how they interpreted the Treaty and this is what Britain and France did during the Crimean war.<sup>160</sup>

The loan was to be given in three installments. The three Powers guaranteed only for the two installments (20.000.000 drachmas each), which

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<sup>159</sup> Dertilis G. B., "op.cit", pp. 112-113.

<sup>160</sup> Andreadis, *The History of the National loans*, Athens: «wp», 1925, pp.44.

were immediately spent for the first expenses of the Greek state <sup>161</sup> and in compensation to Turkey (11.000.000 drachmas) for Euboea, Fthiotida and Fokida.<sup>162</sup> Because of this, the issue of the third installment was the main request of the Greek government after 1835. In response to this appeal, the Powers began to resort to dilatory tactics and petty rivalries, thereby preventing the essential to the third installment unanimity. The Powers stood ready to acquiesce assistance whenever their favorite political leaders in Athens were in power. In 1832, Russia was willing to offer guarantee even without British participation, but after 1835, because of Britain's predominance in the Greek domestic affairs (thanks to Armansberg). The Russian government refused to reach a consensus over the guarantee of the third installment and France followed suit.<sup>163</sup>

The Great powers, in order to find a solution to the Greek inability to pay the interest of the first two installments in 1835, took part in the London Treaty of 1836 when Britain tried to obtain the approval of the other two Powers to give Greece the third installment in order to be able to pay the interest of the first two. The Greek government, one year earlier, had appointed Trikoupis, Greek ambassador in London, to take the necessary actions in order the talks for the Treaty could take place. <sup>164</sup>The French demanded the immediate dismissal of all Bavarians from official Greek posts as a countermeasure to the British influence on Greek matters, which was ensured by Armansberg.<sup>165</sup>

However, France signed the Protocol of April 16, 1836, which recorded the Great Powers' approval of the third installment of the loan. But Russia refused to sign it since Greece and Russia had not come to an agreement on the religion issue and therefore the 1836 Protocol was not brought into effect regardless of British reactions. In order to overcome this difficult problem, Otto asked for his father's help .On 30/ 12 June, 1835 a treaty for a loan was

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<sup>162</sup> Dertilis G. B., "op.cit", pp. 123.

<sup>163</sup> Levantis John, "op.cit", pp. 41-43.

<sup>164</sup> Pipinelis T. N., "op.cit", pp. 194.

<sup>165</sup> General State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 30, Report No 29. Trikoupis' report to Otto 30 June 1835.

signed by the Greek ambassador in Bavaria, Mavrokordatos, and the Bavarian foreign minister.<sup>166</sup>

After 1837, the issue over the settlement of the first two installments of the Greek loan rose again and that was because in 1837 Greece was, for the second time after 1835, unable to pay the interest of the loan and the three Powers were asked to pay as being sureties. In the ambassadors' Conference that followed, in London, France through its ambassador opposed the approval of the third installment and demanded that the Greeks fulfill their obligations, otherwise France would intervene, making use of their right of international financial control.<sup>167</sup> Britain once again followed suit.

In 1838, the Three Allied Powers did not make the necessary moves towards the third installment of the loan, and Mavrokordatos in his report, on December 7, 1838, said that the Bavarian government pushed the Three Allied Powers towards this direction. In 1838, Soutsos, the Greek representative in London for this issue, presented the conference of the ambassadors of the Three Allied Powers with a new application for the payment of the third installment of the loan, accompanied by a long memo on the financial condition of Greece.<sup>168</sup> In his report on 3/15 May 1838, Soutsos informed the King that the talks in the Conference about the loan had stopped and no one could predict the future.<sup>169</sup>

The main obstacle in the payment of the Third installment of the loan was Britain now. After Armansberg's dismissal, relations with the Greek Kingdom became worse. Britain felt that they had lost their great supporter and wanted to make the Greek King understand that he should first meet the Britain demands if he wanted to take the loan from the Great Powers. France also wanted the dismissal of the Bavarian officials from the Greek administration and the army. This was the French basic objective for moving forward to the guarantee of the third installment.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> T. N. Pipinelis, "op.cit", pp. 197.

<sup>168</sup> A letter from Soutsos to Kolletis, the Greek Ambassador in Paris over this issue, Ministry of Foreign Affairs file 30, General State Archives, 11/23 February 1838.

<sup>169</sup> Soutsos Report in 3/15 May 1838 to Otto. General State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 30, document without number.

<sup>170</sup> T. N. Pipinelis, "ibid", pp. 199.

In 1843, as the result of a general economic recession, Greece was unable to pay for the third time. The Greek government, in an attempt to deal with the recession, decided to cut down on expenses and ordered the embassies to close down, even those in Paris, London and St. Petersburg<sup>171</sup>. The other governments, in the London Conference of May, 19/1 1843, decided that the Greek government had to pay according to the 1832 Treaty and, in order to do so, they demanded a substantial cut down on state expenses, especially on those made for the army.<sup>172</sup> Their ambassadors would supervise all Greek actions to resolve the matter.<sup>173</sup> Trikoupis, the Greek ambassador in London, sent the protocol of this agreement to Otto and, in a report, informed the King that it was Britain's intention to benumb the Greek Kingdom by having irrational demands and to make it unable to act against the British interests. He also advised the King not to give in to these demands but to seek the help of the other Powers during the conference.<sup>174</sup> Meanwhile, the minister of foreign policy, Rizos, in one of his letters to Trikoupis, mentioned that the demands raised by the Great Powers, and mainly by Britain, aimed at the disorganization of the Greek Army and Navy, which were considered as a threat to their interests.<sup>175</sup> Otto was unable to avoid all this. The Protocol of the agreements of the Great Powers, sent to him by Trikoupis, was the basis for the agreement that Greece was made to sign on September 2/14, by which the Great Powers annulled the Greek financial autonomy.<sup>176</sup>

This destructive usage of the Loan as a means of pressure by the Great Powers took place during the Crimean war. Greece sided with Russia and fought against the Ottoman Empire, trying to make the dream of the Great Idea come true and thus to expand the borders. Britain and France failed, after several negotiations with Greece, to dissuade Greece from entering the

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<sup>171</sup> Order From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2/14 June 1843, General State Archives, Ottonian Files, Ministry of foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 38, document 1151.

<sup>172</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "op.cit", pp. 89-90.

<sup>173</sup> Report of Trikoupis to Otto in 1/13 July, General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign affairs, Embassies, Folder 30, document 594.

<sup>174</sup> Reports of Trikoupis to Otto, General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign affairs, Embassies, Folder 30, documents 9 and 11.

<sup>175</sup> Letter from Rizos to Trikoupis, 28 May 1843, General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign affairs, Embassies, Folder 30, document 46.

<sup>176</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "ibid", pp. 89-90.

war and decided to use coercion. They reminded Greece of the unpaid debts and warned that they were going to use their right to intervene if Otto didn't stop pursuing his annoying policy. But Otto didn't keep Greece out of the Crimean war and in the end of May 1854, Anglo- French military forces occupied the port of Piraeus and put Greece under an International Financial control until 1857.<sup>177</sup>

## **ii. The religious issue**

The religious issue was what actually influenced the relations between Greece and Russia, from the early years of the Greek Kingdom until the end of Otto's reign. The religious issue, as already mentioned in this paper, included the separation of the Greek Church from the Patriarchate, the King's denomination, and Otto's successor to the throne. Otto still didn't have any children, which made it a problem for the Great Powers, and especially Russia.

Since the revolutionary years, after the assassination of the Greek governor, Kapodistrias, Russia knew that they would not be the predominant Power in the Greek Kingdom, because of the involvement of the other two protector powers. But, throughout this period, Greece and Greek affairs remained a side issue in the general Russian policy. In their relations with the Greek governments, Russia followed certain policies in accordance with their national interests in the Near East and their role as the most powerful of the conservative powers. For this reason, the main Russian concern was, as well as of the other two Protector Powers, the foundation of a monarchical regime in Greece, which would keep everything under control and they succeeded in doing so with the Treaty of 1832. But Russia's most strong objective in Greece was the protection of the interests of Orthodoxy in general. Russia was the natural protector of the Christian Orthodoxy and because of this they believed that under certain conditions Greece should be under their influence.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>177</sup>Levantis John, "op.cit ", pp. 49-52.

<sup>178</sup>Jelavich Barbara, *Russia and Greece during the regency of King Otto, 1832-1835*, «op.cit», pp. 25-27.

The first problem between the Greek Kingdom and the Russian government was the religion of the King, who was a Catholic. This question of faith became and remained the chief point of conflict between Greece and Russia until the time of Otto's overthrow in 1863.<sup>179</sup> The Russian government would prefer the conversion of Otto to orthodox before his arrival in Athens. When this proved impossible, they hoped that he would announce a change of faith before coming of age in 1835. In these endeavors Russia ran against the firm convictions of both the King and his father.<sup>180</sup> Ludwig continually refused to exert any pressure on his son in matters of conscience, although he appeared more conciliatory on the question of the faith of the heir.<sup>181</sup>

On the Russian side, the seriousness of the situation increased considerably when, in August 1833, the Greek Church was separated from the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Russia saw that move as a weakening of the Orthodoxy in general and this was extremely distasteful to the Tsar. After this, the relations between Russia and the first regency were extremely strained.<sup>182</sup> For this reason, the first regency appointed Michail Soutsos as a special delegate to St. Petersburg in order to discuss the relations of the two countries. Taking advantage of this, Messelrod sent a letter to count Armandsberg in which he stated the Tsar wish to create a Greek State under the protection of the Russian Empire because this was the best way to organize the new Kingdom. In this letter, it is also mentioned the relation of the Russian Party with the Russian Court. Messelrod insisted that this Party is loyal to the Czar. He also mentioned that Russia guaranteed the safety of the Greek Kingdom.<sup>183</sup> In this letter, it is also made clear that Russia wanted a Greek Kingdom under their total control and that they wanted to intervene in the domestic and foreign affairs of Greece. This explains why the King of Greece wanted national independence and also to limit the power of the

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<sup>179</sup> For more information see: Jelavich Barbara, *Russia, Bavaria and the Greek Revolution of 1862-63*, Balkan Studies, vol. 2, (1961), pp. 125-150.

<sup>180</sup> Jelavich Barbara, *Russia and Greece during the regency of King Otto, 1832-1835*, «op. cit», pp. 29.

<sup>181</sup> Mavrokordatos Report to Otto about the negotiations between the Russian and Bavarian side towards the religious issue, General State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, file 37, Report number 10.

<sup>182</sup> Jelavich Barbara, "ibid", pp. 30-31.

<sup>183</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 29, document 026.

parties, which did not only serve the interests of the local oligarchies, but also the interests of each Power they considered as the best protector for Greece.

During the negotiations, Soutsos gave a full report of the talks to the Russians. In this report, the Russian point of view on the separation of the Greek Church from the Patriarchate and on the King's denomination was clearly stated. Russia was against this separation and asked for a better understanding between Greece and the Tsar as far as the religious issue was concerned. It was feared that, if the King did not become an Orthodox, the Greek kingdom would be under the influence of the Catholics and then Russia would cease to influence this area.<sup>184</sup> What really annoyed Russia was not the separation, but the fact that Russia was by-passed in such an important, for the Russian interests, issue. Taking measures regarding Orthodoxy without Russian consent was considered as an insult, since Russia was the protector of Orthodoxy, and this was not going to happen, especially since it was instigated by Greece, the protectorate of the Great Powers.

In 1835, after Otto's coming of age, Russia resumed talks with the King of Bavaria and asked him to convince his son and King of Greece to find a solution to the religious issue. This is revealed in a full report to King Otto by Mavrokordatos, the Greek ambassador in Munich, on February 16/28. Soutsos, who- as we have already seen- was appointed as a special delegate to St. Petersburg, asked for Mavrokordatos' help in the Greek-Russian negotiations on the religious issue because of his excellent relationship with the Russian side and especially with Prince Gagarin, the Russian ambassador in Munich.

In his letter to Otto, Mavrokordatos said that in these talks between Russia and Bavaria both sides agreed on that there should be a solution to the religious issue, but they disagreed on the nature of the problem. Ludwig thought that the problem was political whereas Tsar Nicolas did not, because he didn't want to reveal his true motives for his demands. Mavrokordatos also mentioned that during a private meeting he had with Prince Gagarin he was given some confidential documents, pertaining to the understanding between Russia and Bavaria, which showed that Ludwig refused to talk to his son

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<sup>184</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 29, document 016, in 29 November/ 11 December in 1853, Soutsos to Armansberg.

because he believed that he should be independent and he should make his own decisions. This was exactly what Mavrokordatos supported during his direct talks with Prince Gagarin.<sup>185</sup>

The religious issue would continue to be a thorn to the relationships between the Greek Kingdom and Russia, but not the top priority of the Russian foreign policy. After the war between Russia and Turkey in 1828, Russia exerted substantial influence on the Danubian Hegemonies and with the Treaty of Unkiar Skellesi (one year later) they had important influence over Constantinople.<sup>186</sup>

The religious issue was re-opened in 1843 with the discussions on Article 40 of the Constitution about the denomination of the successor to the Greek throne. The voting of this Article was a victory for Russia over the Constitutional issue. During the talks in the constitutional assembly, Russia, unlike the other two Powers, kept a neutral position. But they abandoned this attitude to the extent of actively supporting the adoption of the clause on the religion of the heir in they negotiations in Munich, Paris and London.<sup>187</sup>

The final settlement of the succession issue took place in 1852. Russia agreed with Bavaria and with the French and British help they came to a final settlement of the issue in the Conference of the Allies which was put together for this reason. These agreements allowed Greece to still have Constitutional Monarchy and that the successor to the throne should endorse the Eastern Dogma. Otto's successor was his younger brother Aldaviras because Otto didn't have any children. He agreed to endorse the Eastern Dogma after his brother, Leopold, resignation from this right and he also resign from his right to the Bavarian throne.<sup>188</sup>

In this conference, the Great Powers wished that Otto remained King of Greece and they expressed their support to him. However, despite these resolutions, as it can be seen in a letter by Zographos, Greek ambassador in

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<sup>185</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian Files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 37, Report no. 10.

<sup>186</sup> Jelavich Barbara, " Russia and Greece during the regency of King Otto, 1832-1835", "op.cit", pp 32-33.

<sup>187</sup> Jelavich Barbara, " Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843", "op.cit", pp. 42.

<sup>188</sup> Trikoupis', Greek ambassador in London, reports to Otto in 4/16 August, 5/17 August, 28 July/ 9 August 1852, 11/23 September 1852, 6/18 October 1852, General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 30, documents 218, 223, 224, 225.

St. Petersburg, to Otto with the date of April 29, 1852, Russia wanted to readdress the succession issue, as Mavrokordatos had already made known to Greece that Russia was against the Salikos Law and the Bavarian right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Greek Kingdom, especially those referring to the successor issue and to the Russian demands about the denomination of the successor to the Greek throne.<sup>189</sup> The religious issue preoccupied the Greek foreign policy and the relationships with Russia for another decade, until Otto's overthrow.

### **iii. The relations with the Ottoman Empire**

The rapprochement between Greece and the Ottoman Empire and the resolution of their problems, which impeded relationships between the two countries, were of top priority for the Greek kingdom in order to keep their relationship with the Greeks still living in the Ottoman Empire and the protection of the Greek trade and shipping which would be ensured by signing a commercial treaty between the two countries.

Without any delay, the first Regency appointed K. Zografos ambassador in Constantinople to begin negotiations with the Ottoman Empire in order to sign an agreement with Greece. Zografos came to Constantinople in April, 1834. In the same year, Otto went on a trip to Smyrna without the Sultan's consent, but his trip took big proportions due to the celebrations and the emotional upheaval of the Greek population there.<sup>190</sup> The Sultan, because of this event, repeatedly refused to meet the Greek delegate until August, 11. When negotiations finally started, Zografos wanted to settle two issues. First of all, he wanted to secure the property of the Greeks in Ottoman territories and, secondly, to sign a commercial Treaty with Turkey. The first problem he was faced with was the definition of what nationality/ citizenship is. In other words, which of their subjects would be considered as Greeks and who as Turks, an issue not determined by any Agreement on the independence of Greece. Both sides were unable to find a solution and the presence of an

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<sup>189</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 29, document 052.

<sup>190</sup> Laskaris S. Th., "op.cit", pp. 164.

ambassador from a warring Ottoman province caused a lot of reaction on the Turkish part because they didn't want to make any compromise.<sup>191</sup>

In order to find a solution, Greece turned to the governments of the three Protector Powers and Trikoupis was ordered to ask for the intervention of the London Conference.<sup>192</sup> The year 1834 went by without resolving the issue of nationality/ citizenship and Zografos succeeded only in getting the green light from the Porte to found embassies and consulates in territories under Ottoman control.<sup>193</sup>

With a coordinated move the Greek ambassadors in the Great Powers (Soutsos in St. Petersburg, Trikoupis in London and Karatzas in Paris) succeeded in holding the London Conference on September 11, 1835.<sup>194</sup> Turkey did not wait for the Great Powers to reach an agreement and started to put in action their views, giving Greeks, who didn't wish to stay in Ottoman territories, three months' time to leave Turkey. This had as a result the abuse of the Greeks in some territories of the Empire.<sup>195</sup> Then Trikoupis asked for Palmerston's help and Zografos asked for Russian help to ask Turkey to extend their three-month-deadline for those Greeks who wanted to come to Greece to one year.<sup>196</sup> The issue of nationality/ citizenship was finally resolved in the London Conference with the protocol of January, 30 1836 and Turkey was made to accept it.<sup>197</sup>

The problem that surfaced after the resolution of the issue of nationality/ citizenship was the issue of compensation to those Turks that had left their property behind when they left Greece. This issue was resolved in the Agreement of 1837, which was signed by the minister of Foreign affairs, Rizos, and the Turk delegate for the resolution of this issue in Greece.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> T. N. Pipinelis, "op.cit", pp. 165-166.

<sup>192</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian files, Embassies, Folder 37, file with the date 19/3 May 1834

<sup>193</sup> T. N. Pipinelis, "ibid", pp. 167.

<sup>194</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian files, Embassies, Folder 30, document from Trikoupis to Karatzas on 5/ 11 January 1835.

<sup>195</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian files, Embassies, Folder 37, Report from Zographos to Otto with the date 21/3 July 1835.

<sup>196</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian files, Embassies, Folder 37, Document No. 79, (33/4 November 1835) and document with the date 29/11 December 1835

<sup>197</sup> T. N. Pipinelis, "ibid", pp. 170, 206.

<sup>198</sup> T. N. Pipinelis, "ibid", pp 208.

In 1838, Zografos, having understood the importance of the Eastern World for the Greek Kingdom and being State Department Secretary, wished to found, through a royal decree, a School of Asian Studies so as to train the members of the Greek consulates and embassies. However, this decree was never brought into effect.<sup>199</sup>

In 1839 Sultan Mahomet B' died and Abdul Mejit became the head of the Ottoman Empire in his place. The great Powers showed their satisfaction about the maintenance of the political situation in the Ottoman Empire with a letter to the new Ottoman Authority, reassuring them that they would offer their assistance if necessary in order to preserve the status quo. On the Greek side, Otto believed that the relations with the new Sultan would be better because Abdul Mejit's stance towards Greece wasn't the same with that of the previous Sultan. Zografos was sent to the Ottoman Empire to congratulate the new Sultan and reopen negotiations for the commercial treaty, which had stopped the previous years because of the disagreement of the Greek government over the issue of the national estates.<sup>200</sup>

Otto hoped that by signing a commercial treaty the Greek Kingdom would improve their relations with the Greeks still living in Ottoman territories. The Ottoman authorities made a lot of demands during the talks with Zografos, one of which was the resolution of the issue of the Turkish estates in the Greek Kingdom. Finally, after long talks, they agreed on the terms of a commercial treaty which was signed by Zografos (on March, 3 1840), who believed that in this way he could protect the Greek interests. After a short period of time, the Porte decided to appoint Mousouro ambassador in Greece, and thus they reestablished diplomacy with Greece. Otto's decision to reject this treaty caused great reaction from the Turks.<sup>201</sup> In 1843, Mavrokordatos went to Constantinople, as Greek ambassador, to renegotiate a commercial

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<sup>199</sup> T. N. Pipinelis, "ibid", pp. 253-254.

<sup>200</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies, Folder 31, documents 033 and 104

<sup>201</sup> A note to the Great Powers about the annulment of the commercial treaty that Zografos signed in 28/9 April 1840, General State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commercial Treaties, Folder 21, document 2549.

treaty but without any luck. Greece finally succeeded in signing this treaty after a very long time, in 1855.<sup>202</sup>

#### **iv. The Egyptian- Turkish war**

The Eastern Question crisis of 1839-41 began in 1839 with Egypt declaring war in the Ottoman Empire and ended in 1841 when the Cretan revolt was suppressed by the Ottoman Empire, who had been victorious in the Egypt-Turkish war thanks to the intervention of the Great Powers.<sup>203</sup> The irredentism, which had been the basis of the national ideology since the early years of the Greek Kingdom, together with the expansion of the borders, which had been strengthened by the increasing Ottoman weakness and by the belief that the Empire was close to collapsing, inspired the Greeks during the Eastern Question crisis over the years 1839-1841. Between 1833 and 1839, all Greek efforts were focused on reorganizing the State while the situation in the East remained stable. However, in 1839 these things changed. Many Greeks, who considered the task of reorganizing the State extremely difficult, believed that the expansion of the borders and the inclusion of richer and far more developed Greek populations would resolve all the problems of the State.<sup>204</sup>

In 1839, Greece decided not to participate in the Egypt-Turkish war,<sup>205</sup> but on the other hand they decided, through diplomacy, to ask the governments of the Great Powers for help in order to resolve the territorial issues, which were of Greek interest. The Greek Kingdom repeatedly asked

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<sup>202</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian Files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commercial Treaties, folder 21, document without number.

<sup>203</sup> In the 27 July of 1839, the five Greatest powers, France, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia with a Memorandum decided to intervene in order to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire but because of the attitude of France in favor of Egypt the other four powers signed the treaty of London to intervene against Egypt with military means if necessary, if Mehemet Ali didn't follow the provisions of the treaty. France managed to cooperate with other four powers between November 1840 and July 1841. National state Archives, Ottonian Files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 34, Memorandum, 27 July 1839, treaty, 15 July 1840. For the attitude of France **see**: Petropoulos John A., *Politics and statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833-1843*, vol. B, Athens: Educational Foundation of National Bank, 1997, pp. 490-491.

<sup>204</sup> Petropoulos John A., vol. 2, "ibid", pp. 491-504.

<sup>205</sup> Zographos, the Greek minister of Foreign affairs sent a circular, on 23 July 1839, to the Greek Ambassadors in the Great Powers that Greece would stay out from the Turkish-Egyptian war and that the only thing he wanted was the preservation of the European peace. General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 38, Document No 23.

for the annexation of Thessaly, Epirus and Crete without having to fight for this, and they believed that this could only happen through the intervention of France and Britain. However, Mavrokordatos in London and Kolletis in Paris realize that the Great Powers wanted the Ottoman Empire to remain intact and therefore they were not willing to satisfy the Greek demands.<sup>206</sup>

On August 10 1839, the Cretan prelates wrote a declaration addressed to the Great Powers expressing their wish to be united with Greece and not to be under Turkish domination any longer.<sup>207</sup> This time, on March 20 1840, Zografos returned from the Ottoman Empire with the commercial treaty, which caused a lot of public reaction because it was taken as a national humiliation. The treaty was annulled and that gave the Porte the opportunity to recall all the concessions they had made for the Greek populations. On October 1, 1840, the Greek ships were forbidden to approach all Turkish ports, the Greek consulates and embassies had no authority over the Greek populations still living in Ottoman territories and Christidis was not accepted as ambassador of Greece in Constantinople.<sup>208</sup> At that time, the Greek envoy in Chania, Peroglou, is believed to be instigating the revolt in Crete, which made the Turkish sense of unease escalate.<sup>209</sup> The Secretary of the Turkish State Department officially announced in writing to the Great Powers that they were ready to invade Greece.<sup>210</sup>

Otto realized that through diplomacy he would be unable to succeed in annexing Crete and he reconsidered his policy by encouraging the Cretan revolt now. He hoped to make the fate of Crete the most important issue in the News, taking advantage of the Great Powers' worries about the revolt and

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<sup>206</sup> Mavrokordatos had send a letter to Kolletis in Paris in order to begin negotiations with the British government over this issue with the date 5/7 April 1839, General State Archives, Folder 34, Report No 23, Mavrokordatos informed Otto about his negotiations with Sebastiani in London about Crete, General State Archives, Folder 38, Report with date 26/ 7 September 1839.

<sup>207</sup> Pipinelis T. N., "op.cit", pp. 292.

<sup>208</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian Files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 37, Argyropoulos report to Otto, 8/20 July 1840.

<sup>209</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian Files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 37, Argyropoulos Report to Otto, 7/19 September 1841

<sup>210</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian Files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 37, Argyropoulos Report to Otto, 3/15 November 1841.

so hoping for a resolution through diplomacy of the Cretan issue.<sup>211</sup> On the other hand, Otto, wishing to dispel the fears of the European diplomacy and to find a resolution through diplomacy, replaced the Greek envoy in Chania, Peroglou, with Skoufos.<sup>212</sup> In her attempts Greece had France as an ally since France had been on Egypt's side immediately after they had been forced to leave the European Alliance with the Convention of 1840. However, despite the French attempts to return to the Alliance, they were unable to be of much help to Greece.

With the London Protocol of July 10, 1841 the Great Powers put an end to the war between Egypt and Turkey, making a lot of concessions to the Mehemet Ali and none to Greece.<sup>213</sup> That was the result of the British interests because Crete was of vital importance for the British domination over the Aegean Sea and so they would never allow Crete to be united with Greece. What the British really desired was to establish a status quo similar to the one of the Ionian Islands, which were already under British domination.<sup>214</sup> The suppression of the Cretan revolt took place in March 1841 with the Ottoman invasion of the island.<sup>215</sup>

Under these circumstances Otto had also to deal with domestic unease and, as we have seen, he called Mavrokordatos to make all the necessary reforms, action that can be taken as an attempt to appease the British.<sup>216</sup> The disappointment, however, caused by Otto's persistence to find a solution through diplomacy (which didn't help Greece to expand the national borders), led to further discontent. Greece, realizing that they had nothing to expect from the Great Powers, took advantage of the next Eastern crisis to fulfill the

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<sup>211</sup> This policy of Otto's clearly appears in two letters from Paikos, the Greek minister of Foreign affairs, to Hristidis in Constantinople, in 18/ 30 April 1841 and 18/30 September 1840, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 31, reports No 164 and No 80.

<sup>212</sup> Pipinelis T. N., "op.cit", pp. 303

<sup>213</sup> National state Archives, Ottonian Files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 34, Protocol between the Great Powers, document without number.

<sup>214</sup> Laskaris S. Th., "op.cit", pp. 58-59.

<sup>215</sup> Pipinelis T. N., "ibid", pp. 307.

<sup>216</sup> With numerous letters, P. Soutsos, informed Otto that Britain wanted the change of the composition of the Greek government and especially of the ministry of foreign affairs, which, in her point of view, was against her interests and also requested Otto not to intervene in the Eastern crisis by declaring war to the Ottoman Empire. If Greece kept herself out of this war, Britain would help her with her relations with the Ottoman Empire. General State Archives, Ottonian Files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 38, Documents with the dates, 10 August 1840, 21 August 1840, 24 August 1840.

dream of the Great Idea by taking the Russian side in the war against the Ottoman Empire.

#### **v. The Crimean war**

The Crimean war, which started in October 1853 and ended in March 1856 with the Paris Convention, was of utmost importance for the European history as well as for the Greek foreign policy as a chance for national claims. The Crimean war was the result of the hostility in the competition among the Great Powers as well in many provinces by populations who, later, wanted independence.<sup>217</sup>

The excuse for this war had been Sultan's concession of many rights in the Holy Land to the Catholic Clergy. Russia believed that in this way Orthodoxy was undermined and by extension the Russian influence on the Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian Emperor demanded that the Sultan increase the rights of the Orthodox Clergy in a written Treaty and acknowledge the Russian right to protect all the Orthodox populations in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>218</sup> The diplomatic procedures that resulted in the war, as it can be seen in A. Metaxas' letters to the Greek King, can be divided in to two phases. The first one refers to the talks between the Russian delegate in the Porte, Prince Menshikov, and the Ottoman Authorities. The Prince's demands have already been mentioned.

These talks failed and Russia, in order to exert greater pressure on the Sultan and make him satisfy their demands, occupied an area of the Danubean Hegemonies in July 1853.<sup>219</sup> With this we came to the second phase of the talks in a hectic period of preparation for war and the efforts of the European diplomacy to find a peaceful solution. The British and French reaction was immediate and their fleet blocked the entrance to the Dardanelle so as to be ready to help Turkey in case of war.<sup>220</sup>

After the failure of the talks between Prince Menshikov and the Ottoman Authorities, Russia occupied an area of the Danubean Prinicipalities

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<sup>217</sup> Koliopoulos John, *The History of Greece from 1800. The Formation and the performance of the National Policy*, vol. 2, Thessalonica: Vaniass Publications, 2002, pp. 83-84.

<sup>218</sup> Stavrianos L. S., "op.cit", pp. 324-326.

<sup>219</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 33, documents 125, 126, 127, 128 and 142.

<sup>220</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "op.cit", pp. 143.

and the sultan issued a firman which certified the preservation of the Orthodox Clergy's rights in the Ottoman Empire and more precisely in the Holy Land although he refused to agree with the Russian demand to sign a Treaty which would include the aforementioned rights as well as the acknowledgement of the Russian right to protect all the Orthodox populations in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>221</sup> The Russians kept asking the Turks to meet all their demands and the Great Powers intervened in order a peaceful solution to be found. In their plan, which was sent to both Russia and Turkey, the Great Powers were in favor of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and against the war.<sup>222</sup> The Western diplomacy did their best to prevent the war but to no avail. On October 4 1854, they declared war on Russia, supporting the preservation of the Ottoman Empire.

After Menshikov's failure and the breach of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey, the Greeks no matter whether they were free or still under domination began to prepare for war since they believed that the time had come to fulfill their national dreams and to achieve the goal of the Great Idea. Otto then declared war encouraged by the people<sup>223</sup> and carried away by the Russian victories as well as by Tsar Nicholas II, who through the Manifest of February 9/12 1854 declared that his war against the Ottoman Empire was for the sake of all the oppressed Christian populations under Turkish domination. Despite the reactions of the Greek government, which due to the French and British reactions could understand that the Greek efforts would result in their intervention, and despite the persistent British demand to remain neutral<sup>224</sup>, Otto supported the actions of guerilla bands, which invaded the Turkish provinces of Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia.<sup>225</sup>

During the Crimean war, we have the culmination of the wish for national integration, at such an extent that it awakened the desire for the

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<sup>221</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 33, documents 167 and 132.

<sup>222</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 33, documents 166, 137, 138 and 143.

<sup>223</sup> Koutroubas D., *The Great Idea during the Crimean War*, Athens: Etairia Stereoelladitykon Meleton publications, 1974-1975, pp. 205.

<sup>224</sup> Letter from Trikoupis to Otto about the position of Britain towards the Crimean war, General State Archives, Ottonian Files, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies, Folder 30, Document 230.

<sup>225</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "op.cit", pp. 148- 164.

revival of the Eastern and Greek Empire. This was the ideal solution to the Eastern Question in the Greeks' mind, but the Great Powers never approved it.<sup>226</sup> Greece felt for the first time ready to fulfill the national dreams by means of armed warfare in the frame of the Crimean war.

Russia to her advantage encouraged the Greeks in order to create a diversion.<sup>227</sup> The Russian declarations about the protection of the Greek populations addressed to Greece were part of the Russian propaganda and did not reflect their real intentions, which was revealed in a letter sent by the British ambassador in St. Petersburg to the British Secretary of the State Department. In this letter, the ambassador said that the Tsar had reassured him that the Greek plans to revive the Byzantine Empire were against his interests and he did not wish Greece to become strong enough to destroy the Ottoman Empire.<sup>228</sup>

Britain and France, on the other hand, which were from the beginning against the Greek effort, in order to stop the Greek revolt sent a fleet, which occupied Piraeus from 1854 until 1857. They also established a "domination government" which managed to repatriate most of the military men from Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia. Otto had no other choice but to abide by their wish.<sup>229</sup>

With the occupation of the port of Piraeus, the Greek disobedience was severely punished. It was made clear that in the fight between the Great Powers and Russia, Greeks had made a big mistake when they sided with the Russians. The Paris Conference, which put an end to this war with the signing of the Paris Treaty, consummated the belief that the Ottoman Empire should remain intact. The occupation of Greek territories was prolonged for another year, until February 1857, when the foreign troops were withdrawn.<sup>230</sup>

Otto's policy of "Secretism" during the Crimean war, which allowed the secret instigation of the rebellions in order not to endanger the Greek State in

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<sup>226</sup> Skopetea Elli, "op.cit", pp. 277.

<sup>227</sup> The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to his letter to Shinas, the Greek ambassador in Vienna, on 2/14 March 1854, wrote that Russia saw with sympathy the fight of the Greek troops. The Tsar wouldn't leave the Greeks to fall again under Turkish domination. See: Koutroubas D., "op.cit", pp. 206.

<sup>228</sup> Koutroubas D., "ibid", pp. 209.

<sup>229</sup> *The History of the Greek Nation*, vol. 13, "op.cit", pp. 165.

<sup>230</sup> Skopetea Elli, "ibid", pp. 287.

the eyes of the Great Powers, was the start of the severe criticism that followed of the Great Idea.<sup>231</sup>

#### **4. The activity of the Greek consulates**

The main goal of the Greek consulates was the protection of the Greek trade and the promotion of the interests of those Greeks still living in foreign territories. The need to protect the Greek trade that was created and flourished in the 18<sup>th</sup> century was of utmost importance for the Greek Kingdom. Greek consulates were founded in the Euxine Sea in order to protect the Greek trade that had been developed by the Greeks in the Black Sea. At the same time, Greek consulates were also founded in territories occupied by the French in the East and more specifically in the Dardanelles (where Xenos was the Greek consul). Of equal importance due to the trade in the area were the consulates in Macedonia and in Thessaly, which was situated in Thessalonica with Th. Vallianos as consul. His vice consuls resided in Volos and Kassandra to safeguard the Greek interests in these territories.

In the area of Epirus and Albania, a Greek consulate was founded in Preveza with Michail Soutsos as consul. His vice consuls resided in three other places where a lot of Greeks were living. In Asia Minor, there was in Smyrna and the vice consuls resided in Mytiline, in Efessos, in Chios, in Rhodes, in Kos and many other places. In Cyprus a Greek consulate was founded in Larnaca. In Syria and in Alexandria in Egypt two Greek consulates were founded. In the Danubian Principalities a Greek consulate was founded in Bucharest and a great number of them in Russia, in the Russian province of Bessarabia, in Israel- where the Greek trade was not very much developed and so the consulate had limited activities-, in Odessa and in Taganrog - important Greek ports- with L. Manos as consul. In the Ionian Islands, still under British domination, a Greek consulate was founded in Corfu but the vice consuls resided in Chefalonia. Numerous Greek consulates were founded in Rome, in Austria, in France, in Spain, in Belgium, in the Netherlands and in

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<sup>231</sup> Skopetea Elli, "ibid", pp. 282.

Great Britain with many distinguished Greeks were employed in them. The Greek consulates cooperated with the Greek embassies and their role was supplementary to the one of the embassies.<sup>232</sup>

A consul did not have the same jurisdiction as an ambassador did. The consuls were not the envoys of a country as it was with the case of the Greek ambassadors and Ministers, having been given the necessary credentials of course. The consuls were the political representatives of Greece and they come into existence only after they had been acknowledged by the sovereign of a country, who accepts them as servants of the Greek sovereign. The consuls were not beyond the local laws, as were the ambassadors, but they could not be arrested by the authorities and they could not be forbidden to communicate with their consulate. Their jurisdiction differed from country to country. Wherever this was determined by the laws of a country, the Greek consulates operated according to them.

In case that their jurisdiction is not determined by the local laws, they had to act according to the European laws (French trade Code, commercial treaties between the Great powers and Turkey or between the Great Powers and Greece). Their jurisdiction in Europe is limited in strategic issues of the Greek trade and shipping and they could exercise it on the Greek wholesale dealers and other Greeks. They had the right to inspect the Greek sailors and whenever it was necessary they asked for the help of the local authorities. They had the right, after the approval of the Greek State, to appoint clerks according to their judgment or the present needs.

The purpose of the foundation of Greek consulates in other countries was to take care of and support the Greeks abroad as well as to protect their rights and privileges, which had been determined by international treaties and agreements. Another important concern of the Greek consulates was the implementation of the agreements between Greece and other countries, especially of those related with the trade and sailing depending of the position of the Greeks in those countries. In case the Greek State interests, which had been determined by international treaties and agreements, as well as in case the living conditions under which these Greeks were living in territories under

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<sup>232</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian Archives, Ministry of Foreign affairs, Consulates, Folder 40, Document 065, for the establishment of Greek consulates abroad.

their jurisdiction were threatened, the Greek consuls had the right to intercede with the authorities on their behalf, and sent an expostulation asking them to settle that problem. When this was not possible, they had to communicate with the Secretariat or the Greek State Department and inform them about the impingement of the Greek interests. The settling of problems related to the Greek populations under their jurisdiction was left to their judgment. In any case they should act according to the local laws and within the jurisdiction given to them by that country and Greece. The consular authorities should be responsible for the Greek Kingdom's subjects while they were abroad and to provide all the documents of the countries where consulates were founded and safeguarded the trade and the Greek shipping.

It was also the consuls' responsibility to investigate and gather information related with the Greek national affairs and they had to communicate with the State Department to report any strange incidents. Under no circumstances should they act without the consent and directions of the Greek government or act outside the limits of their jurisdiction. They informed the State Department about the movements of navy forces of foreign countries and they liaise with the other consulates.

The Greek consulates were under the obligation to protect the rights of the Greeks who lived abroad. However, they were unable to support any claims, which were not according to the Greek orders and interests. They had the duty to supervise the Greeks abroad in a paternalistic way and to intervene by consulting and compromising their affairs with the local authorities. They should take care of the Greek shipwrecked sailors and of the sick by doing everything that was necessary. They did not have any judicial jurisdiction as far trade was concerned and in every case of breach of the law they had to inform the local authorities. Finally, they had to supervise all the transactions between Greeks and foreigners. They were responsible to issue passports and death certificates for Greek subjects.<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> General State Archives, Ottonian archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consulates, Folder 40, Document 025, for the work and the activity of the Greek consulates.

## **V. CONCLUSIONS**

In 1833 Greece gained her independence from the four hundred years of the Ottoman rule but became dependent from the three protector powers of the Greek Kingdom, Britain, France and Russia. These powers had a several and in the most cases conflict interests in the Greek Kingdom, interests that was connected with the general framework of the Eastern Question and that was the basic factor of their continually and aggressive intervention in the Kingdoms domestic and foreign affairs. The effort of King Otto for internal organization and national integration was because of these factors from the beginning a very difficult task.

During his reign he had made several efforts in order to secure the Kingdom' s independence from these three powers but these was never happened because the State itself couldn't succeed an efficient organization without the economic assistance from these three powers. From the other hand he tried to eliminate the power of the Greek political elites which were for him because of their past a factor of instability an moreover an instrument of the Great Powers toward their course of intervention in the Kingdoms affairs and in one point especially after the establishment of the constitutional monarchy he had succeeded it. It was the new generation of politicians that eventually caused his dethroning in 1862, development that could not avoid because in that time he had also lost the support from the three Protector powers too because of his personal handlings towards Kingdom's foreign affairs.

Moreover, as concern as the foreign affairs, the basic element of the shaping of the Greek foreign policy was irredentism. Otto became one of the great supporters of the Great idea, the vision that most Greeks had for expanding their borders with the areas that Greek populations existed and were still under the rule of the Ottoman Empire (Thessaly, Epirus, Crete, Asia Minor, Constantinople). Otto's wish to expand the borders of the Greek Kingdom, which were not a product of the Greeks desires but a product of the European diplomacy and of the desires of the Three Protector powers towards the Eastern Question, was never established during his reign. The

Three protector powers had intervene in every Greek attempt to exploit an Eastern crises and especially during the Crimean war sawed in the more aggressive way their intention to stop every effort of the Greek Kingdom to expand.

All of them and especially England were very annoyed by the several moves of King Otto to exploit the crises in the Ottoman empire in order to fulfil the several national desires but they never until 1962 had concern to change the political situation in Greece by changing Otto because they believed that this would destroy the internal balance in the Kingdom (fears that the political parties would began a civil war in order to gain the power) and the balance between the Great Powers (because its of them would try to gain the political influence toward Greece).

In 1862 this factors had been changed. The King had lost his support from the Great Powers after the involvement of Greece in the Crimean war. During the developments of the Italian unification, Otto's (understandings with the Italian side and efforts for a Balkan cooperation against the Ottoman Empire) moves had sawed to the Great Powers that Greece was ready to exploit another crises in order to declare a war to the Ottoman Empire. Britain especially was very annoyed from this developments and the British ambassador in Constantinople stated to the Greek ambassador, Dragoumis that if Otto did a farther move against the Ottoman Empire would loose his throne.<sup>234</sup> The internal developments in 10 October 1862, with the revolt of several political and military elements produced the dethroning of the King Otto, developments that were very welcome from the three protector powers.

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<sup>234</sup> Liakos Antonis, *The Italian Unification and the Great Idea, 1859-1862*, Athens: Themelio publications, 2000, pp. 191-192.

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