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**VERBAL IRONY AND EMOTIONAL
REACTIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL
STUDY IN GREEK AND SPANISH**

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Declaration page

Declaration

This submission is my own work. Any quotation from, or description of, work of others is acknowledged herein by reference to the sources, whether published or unpublished.

Marianna Tritou

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Abstract

Over the years, verbal irony has been the center of attention for many linguists, who tried to decode the process of producing an ironic remark and examine the speaker's attitude that accompanies such utterances (Grice, 1975/1978/1989; Sperber and Wilson 1981/2012; Kreuz and Gluckberg, 1989; Clark and Gerrig, 1984; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg and Brown, 1995; Walton, 1990). However, until today, little is known about the addressee and his emotional reactions to verbal irony, an issue that should be further analyzed, as the main goal of producing an ironic utterance is to provoke emotional responses (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000). This research therefore, aims at establishing connections between different types of verbal irony (sarcasm, satire, overstatements, understatements and rhetorical questions) and emotional responses (joy, sadness, warmth, fear, anger, anxiety, disgust, contempt) but also at discovering cross-cultural similarities and differences in the way two cultures react to verbal irony. In order to provide answers to the questions above, 16 Spanish (University of Vic, Barcelona) and 16 Greek (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens) post-graduate students were asked to complete a questionnaire and evaluate their perceived emotional state and intensity of emotion after being exposed to different types of verbal irony. The questionnaire that was distributed contained three different scenarios covering three main social encounters (workplace/friendly/semi-formal). In each scenario, the ironist made five different ironic remarks as a final comment and the subjects were asked to evaluate in each case their perceived emotional state, as well as the intensity of the emotion experienced. Quantitative methods were employed in order to analyze the data, while the notions of 'emotional communication' (Wharton and Strey, 2019) and 'emotional contagion' (Hatfield et al., 1994) were implemented in the process of interpreting the findings. Results indicated that sarcasm, overstatements and rhetorical questions were able to elicit mostly negative reactions, whereas satire and understatements tended to arouse positive reactions in both cases (Spanish and Greek participants). Notable differences however, were observed between the two ethnic groups with regards to intensities of emotions, as Greeks attributed greater intensities in transactions including verbal irony, with the most evident case being the largely greater intensities that appeared (compared to

Spanish responses) when anger was elicited, as a response to verbal irony. Findings therefore suggest that there are both similarities as well as differences regarding cross-cultural reactions to irony. Nevertheless, further research is needed on the topic in order to be able to reach credible conclusions.

Key words: Verbal irony, emotional responses, emotional communication, emotional contagion, cross-cultural studies.

Σύνοψη

Η λεκτική ειρωνεία έχει απασχολήσει ανά τα χρόνια αρκετούς γλωσσολόγους, οι οποίοι προσπάθησαν να αποκωδικοποιήσουν τη διαδικασία παραγωγής ενός ειρωνικού σχολίου και να εξετάσουν το ύφος του ομιλητή, το οποίο συνοδεύει τέτοιου είδους σχόλια. (Grice, 1967/1989; Sperber and Wilson 1981/2012; Kreuz and Gluckberg, 1989; Clark and Gerrig, 1984; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg and Brown, 1995; Walton, 1990). Ωστόσο, μέχρι σήμερα, γνωρίζουμε λίγα όσον αφορά τον αποδέκτη και τη συναισθηματική κατάσταση στην οποία εμπίπτει όταν βρίσκεται αντιμέτωπος με ειρωνικά σχόλια, ένα θέμα το οποίο πρέπει να εξεταστεί περαιτέρω, εφόσον η ειρωνεία παράγεται με κύριο μέλημα να προκαλέσει συναισθηματικές αντιδράσεις (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000). Η παρακάτω έρευνα αποσκοπεί στο συσχετισμό μεταξύ διαφορετικών ειδών ειρωνείας (σαρκασμός, σάτιρα, υπερβολή, ωραιοποίηση/υποβάθμιση, ρητορικές ερωτήσεις) και συγκεκριμένων συναισθηματικών αντιδράσεων (χαρά, λύπη, ζεστασιά, φόβος, θυμός, άγχος, απέχθεια, περιφρόνηση) καθώς επίσης στην ανακάλυψη ομοιοτήτων και διαφορών όσον αφορά τον τρόπο που δύο διαφορετικές κουλτούρες αντιδρούν στα προαναφερθέντα είδη ειρωνείας. Με σκοπό την εύρεση απαντήσεων στις παραπάνω ερωτήσεις, 16 Ισπανοί (Πανεπιστήμιο του Βικ, Βαρκελώνη) και 16 Έλληνες (Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών) μεταπτυχιακοί φοιτητές κλήθηκαν να συμπληρώσουν ένα ερωτηματολόγιο, στο οποίο αξιολόγησαν την εκτιμώμενη συναισθηματική τους κατάσταση καθώς και την ένταση του συγκεκριμένου συναισθήματος, αφού είχαν έρθει σε επαφή με διαφορετικά είδη ειρωνείας. Το ερωτηματολόγιο που μοιράστηκε περιελάμβανε τρία διαφορετικά σενάρια που καλύπτουν τρεις βασικές κοινωνικές συναλλαγές (εργασιακή/φιλική/ημί-επίσημη). Σε κάθε σενάριο, ο ειρωνευόμενος έκανε πέντε διαφορετικά ειρωνικά σχόλια και οι συμμετέχοντες στην έρευνα καλούνταν να αξιολογήσουν σε κάθε μία περίπτωση την εκτιμώμενη συναισθηματική τους κατάσταση, καθώς επίσης και την ένταση του συναισθήματος που βίωσαν. Ποσοτικές μέθοδοι χρησιμοποιήθηκαν για την ανάλυση των δεδομένων, ενώ θεωρίες περί συναισθηματικής επικοινωνίας (Wharton and Strey, 2019) και μετάδοσης του συναισθήματος (Hatfield et al., 1994) συνέβαλαν στην ερμηνεία των δεδομένων. Τα αποτελέσματα υπέδειξαν πως ο σαρκασμός, η υπερβολή και οι ρητορικές ερωτήσεις, προκαλούν κατά κύριο λόγο αρνητικά συναισθήματα

στον ακροατή, ενώ η σάτιρα και η ωραιοποίηση/υποβάθμιση συνήθως φέρνουν στην επιφάνεια θετικά συναισθήματα και στις δύο περιπτώσεις (Ισπανούς και Έλληνες συμμετέχοντες). Αξιοσημείωτες διαφορές ωστόσο παρατηρήθηκαν στην ένταση των συναισθημάτων, καθώς οι Έλληνες συμμετέχοντες απέδιδαν περισσότερη ένταση στις συναλλαγές που περιελάμβαναν ειρωνικά σχόλια, ανεξαρτήτως του συγκεκριμένου είδους ειρωνείας, με τη πιο εμφανή διαφορά (σε σχέση με το Ισπανικό σύνολο) να αποτελούν οι κατά πολύ μεγαλύτερες εντάσεις που εμφανίζονταν κάθε φορά που οι άνθρωποι βίωναν θυμό, ως αντίδραση στη λεκτική ειρωνεία. Επομένως, τα αποτελέσματα φανερώουν ότι υπάρχουν ομοιότητες καθώς και διαφορές όσον αφορά το τρόπο αντιμετώπισης της λεκτικής ειρωνείας από τις δύο κουλτούρες. Παρ'όλα αυτά, απαραίτητη κρίνεται περισσότερη έρευνα στο θέμα για να είναι δυνατή η λήψη αξιόπιστων συμπερασμάτων.

Λέξεις κλειδιά: Λεκτική ειρωνεία, συναισθηματικές αντιδράσεις, συναισθηματική επικοινωνία, μετάδοση συναισθήματος, διαπολιτισμική έρευνα.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Over the last four decades, a great number of researchers have tried to explain how irony functions and what is the purpose of its usage (Grice, 1967/1989, Sperber and Wilson 1981/2012, Kreuz and Gluckberg, 1989, Clark and Gerrig, 1984, Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg and Brown, 1995, Walton, 1990).

The term originates from the Greek word ‘εἰρωνεία’, meaning “dissimulation” or “ignorance purposely affected” (Liddel, Scott and Jones, 1846). It has its roots in the Greek comic character Eiron who used his wit in order to debunk the arguments of another comic character, Alazon, who thought of himself to be greater than the rest (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). Socratic irony also derives from the above mentioned origin of the term, as Socrates was trying to combat his opponents by dissimulating ignorance and forcing them to realize on their own the absurdity of their statements.

As the term evolved, definitions of irony focused more on insincerity rather than on purposeful ignorance and dissimulation. In the early 20th century, Fowler (1906) claimed that "any definition of irony—though hundreds might be given, and very few of them would be accepted—must include this, that the surface meaning and the underlying meaning of what is said are not the same." Later on, Partridge (1997) reported that "Irony consists in stating the contrary of what is meant", following the classical perspective of how to perceive ironic utterances.

In contemporary literary work, irony is distinguished in verbal, situational and dramatic. Verbal irony which constitutes the primary focus of this research is “a statement in which the meaning that a speaker employs is sharply different from the meaning that is ostensibly expressed. An ironic statement usually involves the explicit expression of one attitude or evaluation, but with indications in the overall speech

situation that the speaker intends a very different, and often opposite, attitude or evaluation” (Abrams and Harpham, 2009).

So far, most of the studies conducted on verbal irony (Grice, 1978/1989, Clark and Gerrid, 1984, Kreuz and Glucksberg, 1989, Kumon-Nakamura et al. 1995, Sperber and Wilson, 1981, 2007, 2012), have paid greater attention to the speaker rather than the addressee. However, the emotional responses of the addressee are an issue that should be considered of great importance, as almost all social and communicative goals of speaking ironically are closely related to triggering emotional responses (e.g. achieving emotional control or provoking reactions) (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000).

This study aims at examining emotional responses to verbal irony cross-culturally. Do groups of different nationality report different emotional reactions to verbal irony? Taking into consideration the question raised above, I will address two main issues;

1. Which emotional responses are triggered by different types of verbal irony (overstatements, understatements, sarcasm, satire, rhetorical questions) in Greek and Spanish audiences?
2. Are there similarities/differences between the emotional responses of Greek and Spanish audiences?

While examining aspects of speaker’s meaning, Sperber and Wilson referred to the notion of ‘metacognitive acquaintance’, suggesting that a speaker’s utterance/behavior, influences the cognitive environment of the addressee. What a speaker does therefore when he/she communicates is to “overtly reveal something of their own mind in order to bring about changes of mind in their audience” (Sperber and Wilson, 2015: 140). Determinate or indeterminate import which has been purposely released by the speaker, interacts with the addressees’ inferential abilities, alters each time their cognitive environment and enables them to experience memories, thoughts or feelings similar to the ones experienced by the speaker at the time of producing the utterance (Wharton and Strey, 2019). Speakers purposely revealing their attitude in order to achieve emotional control and provoke emotional reactions (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000) is a strategy constructed on the basis of ‘emotional contagion’, a notion which has been previously introduced by Hatfield et al. (1994).

I expect the same process to occur in verbal irony. Pragmatic accounts of irony (Grice, 1978/1989, Clark and Gerrid, 1984, Kreuz and Glucksberg, 1989, Kumon-Nakamura et al. 1995, Sperber and Wilson, 1981, 2007, 2012) suggest that ironic utterances are escorted each time by a specific attitude which is most of the times negative, but it can be positive, too. More specifically, studies have shown (Beckson and Ganz, 1989, Berntsen and Kennedy, 1996, Lee and Katz, 1998, Toplak and Katz, 2000, Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000, Kreuz and Roberts, 2009) that the speakers' attitude when expressing overstatements, sarcasm and rhetorical questions is strongly negative, whereas when expressing satire and understatements their attitude is positive instead.

Regarding the first question, it is expected that the attitudes conveyed by different types of irony will alter the addressees' cognitive environment and inferential processing, enabling them to experience emotions similar to the ones experienced by the speaker at the time of producing the ironic remark. Hence, I hypothesize that with overstatements, sarcasm and rhetorical questions the emotions of Greek and Spanish university students will be negative, whereas with understatements and satire they will be positive instead.

Regarding the second question, the different attitudes of the speaker's while uttering different types of verbal irony, do not change cross-culturally (i.e. there is always a hostile attitude in ironic overstatements, whereas there is always a sympathetic one in ironic understatements) (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000). Therefore, I expect that there will be substantial similarities in the way the two cultures will emotionally respond to different types of verbal irony, as emotional communication and emotional contagion are expected to work in a similar way in both cases, resulting in similar emotional responses. However, because of different sociocultural norms and values, differences may be observed between the two cultures in the intensity of emotions perceived by participants.

In the following chapter, I start by exploring the nature of emotions and some of the most prominent theories that have shaped existing accounts of how people perceive them (2.1). In the second section, I proceed to the relation of emotions to ironic utterances, by reviewing pragmatic theories of irony and their analyses of attitudes, since attitudes have been treated by Deonna and Teroni (2012/2015) as bodily

manifestations of emotions (2.2). In section 2.3, I focus on five different types of ironic utterances (overstatements, understatement, satire, sarcasm, rhetorical questions) and explore the distinct attitudes which accompany each type, while in 2.4 I present a prior research on the issue of emotional responses to verbal irony. Finally, in section 2.5, I review studies which address the issue of cross-cultural emotional responses on a wider scale. In the remaining chapters, I focus on the current study, by presenting the methods employed (Chapter 3) and the results obtained (Chapter 4). In the two final chapters, I interpret the results (Chapter 5) and I conclude by suggesting future areas of research which could prove beneficial in the field of pragmatics (Chapter 6).

Chapter 2

Theoretical Accounts: Emotions and Irony

2.1 Emotions

As previously mentioned, in my research I try to investigate cross-cultural emotional reactions to different types of verbal irony. But what are emotions exactly? How do people come to experience emotions? In the next section, emotion is defined, and some of the most prominent theories regarding its nature are presented. Finally, I consider the connection of emotion to communication, as well as the notion of ‘positive emotional effects’ (Wharton and Strey, 2019).

Emotions are defined as “complex, organized states...consisting of cognitive appraisals, action impulses, and patterned somatic reactions” (Lazarus, 1980: 198). Ekman (1992) has provided a list of characteristics (including rapid onset, short duration, unbidden occurrence, automatic appraisal and coherence among responses) that separates emotions from other affective states (moods, feelings).

Besides the separation of emotions from other affective states, basic emotion theorists (Ekman, 1992/1999, Darwin, 1998, Ortony and Turner, 1990) claim that there is a special category of emotions, from which all others emerge. These basic emotions are considered to be “innate, universal, and distinct affective states which evolved to serve adaptive functions” (Kowalska, Wróbel, 2017: 1). In other words, they are emotions that have persisted and evolved through time because of their ability to deal effectively with “fundamental life-tasks” (Ekman, 1992:169). Even though there is no definite list to refer to when discussing basic emotions, researchers seem to agree on the inclusion of happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, anger and disgust, while later on Ekman (1999) added contempt to the list. On the basis of these emotions, participants

of the current study conducted on cross cultural emotional reactions to verbal irony, are called to describe how they would feel under different circumstances.

Over the years, multiple theories of emotion have been produced (Lazarus,1980; Roseman, 1984, Scherer, 1984a, Smith and Ellsworth, 1985, Frijda, 1989/2007, Deonna and Teroni, 2012/2015). One of the oldest and most influential theories of emotion is interested in its correlation to cognitive appraisal. Cognitive appraisal refers to the process in which a person evaluates stimulus situations or circumstances based on specific criteria, which are called cognitive dimensions. Therefore, cognitive theorists (Frijda, 1989, Lazarus,1980, Roseman, 1984, Scherer, 1984a, Smith and Ellsworth, 1985, Weiner, 1986) claim that a person is able to experience a specific emotion after the evaluation of these dimensions.

Cognitive appraisal theories agree on certain dimensions which are considered to be appraised by people, on the way to producing an emotional response. These dimensions refer to pleasantness, expectedness/certainty, causality, coping potentials and importance. Other dimensions that might contribute to the elicitation of emotion and have been the center of debates among cognitive scientists are : norm/self-compatibility, motivational state, attentional activity, time of event, interestingness, focus of event, and quality of social relationship (Karasawa, 1995).

Deonna and Teroni (2015), too, regard emotions as evaluations. However, as opposed to previous accounts of emotion (i.e. cognitive appraisal theories), they claim that the evaluation does not rely on content but on attitudes/modes. Attitudinal theory therefore suggests that emotions are evaluative attitudes, in the sense that emotions lend themselves not to what the mind is occupied with but instead the way in which the mind deals with content. Therefore, there are as many attitudes as emotions, since the distinction between fear, anger, joy etc. lies on the attitude held towards objects or events. Deonna and Teroni (ibid) use an example to support this claim. Say that a person (Maurice) has heard a funny joke a million times. The first time he heard it, he was amused by it but now he is not. This means that the elicitation of a different emotion, does not depend on content or individual representation, but on the way the mind is occupied with it each time.

An attitudinal theory of emotion provides also an explanation regarding correctness conditions. An emotional response is considered correct based on two interconnected

clues: the content and the specific psychological attitude accompanying that content. For instance, Deonna and Teroni (ibid) support that an emotion should be considered correct not because an object or an event is represented as dangerous or offensive, but simply because one has an attitude of fear or anger towards it.

Another issue that Deonna and Teroni (2012/2015) address concerns the phenomenology of emotions. They claim that bodily changes escorting emotions relate to how the person feels in taking a stance, posture or attitude towards something external. Emotions are therefore seen as felt bodily attitudes closely related to the notion of ‘action readiness’ (Frijda 2007). Anger for example, is simply a felt bodily attitude towards an object or event, which allows one to be aware of his preparedness to confront someone or something in an aggressive way.

Even though lots of theories have dealt with the distinct nature of emotions, it is evident that emotions have consistently been ignored when it comes to meaning interpretation and communication (Wharton and Strey, 2019). It should be considered very important though to take emotions into consideration, as they play a crucial role in the process of interpreting an utterance, guiding the inference process and subsequently leading to the production of different cognitive effects (Hume, 1739/1740, Ifantidou and Hatzidaki, 2019).

In their work, Wharton and Strey (2019) address the issue of emotional communication. People can usually transmit knowledge concerning their emotional state either consciously or subconsciously. Emotional communication usually involves non-verbal behaviors (natural codes), but it can also be construed via language. One way or another, emotional communication is considered to be non-truth conditional and it contributes largely to meaning retrieval, as it prompts multiple weakly manifest assumptions, which have the ability to make the communicator’s and audience’s cognitive environments quite similar (Wharton and Strey, ibid).

It is evident therefore that a natural code (i.e. affective tone of voice) or a specific piece of language, encode procedural information which activate emotional procedures and cause effects on the interlocutors. Wharton and Strey (ibid) refer to these effects as *positive emotional effects* (connecting feelings and sensations to cognition). Positive emotional effects not only influence inferential processing but

remain present afterwards, in order to interact with the course of reasoning they have triggered (Wharton and Strey, *ibid*).

Besides passing information about emotional states through, natural codes or pieces of language, can also assist in transmitting the emotional state itself to the interlocutor, activating a process called *emotional contagion*, in which the addressee not only becomes aware of the emotional state of the speaker, but he is able to experience similar emotions as well (Hatfield et al. 1994). In support of this statement, neuroscientists (Iacoboni, 2005, Rizzolatti, 2005, Wild, et al., 2001) have discovered that specific brain neurons (canonical), link perception to action. Therefore, people can not only trace the intentions and emotions of another person, but they can also “feel themselves into the emotional lives of others” as a result of the process of perception (Hatfield et al. 1994: 13). Hatfield et al. (*ibid*), state that emotional contagion is a very powerful phenomenon that does not only affect certain humans and societies, but is able to influence interlocutors all over the world.

After having discussed emotions and prominent theories concerning their nature and their relation to communication, I will now proceed to their connection to irony. For this purpose in the next section, pragmatic accounts of irony will be discussed, in order to examine how they connect irony to the speaker’s attitudes (i.e. bodily manifestations of emotions) (Deonna and Teroni, 2012/2015).

2.2 Pragmatic accounts of irony: the role of attitudes

The aim of this chapter is to discuss how several pragmatic accounts treat ironic remarks, by focusing mostly on the attitudes conveyed by the ironist. Attitudes which accompany ironic remarks are crucial in the investigation of the speaker’s emotions at the time of producing an utterance, since latest theories claim that emotions are nothing but felt bodily attitudes geared towards a situation or a person.

One of the first linguists who examined irony and acknowledged its connection to attitudes was Grice (1978/1989). Grice treats irony similarly to metaphor. He reports that figurative speech consists of conversational implicatures that violate the maxim of quality on the level of what is said, as the speaker does not say what he/she believes to be true, but rather, concerning irony specifically, aims at implicating the

exact opposite. Most of the times, a hearer has the ability to understand that the maxim of quality is flouted only at the level of what is said and not on the level of what is implicated, as he/she is taking for granted that the speaker's intention within the conversation is not to be nonsensical but rather cooperative instead. In other words, it is evident to the hearer that the speaker is exploiting the maxim of quality, in the sense that he is purposely defying it on the level of what is said, in order to convey the desirable meaning through a conversational implicature (by means of a figure of speech).

For Grice, the hearer first examines the literal meaning of the utterance and if that proves not to be satisfactory (always having in mind apparent contextual clues), then he/she proceeds to the figurative one. In his theory, he recognizes the fact that irony is closely related to the expression of feelings, attitudes and evaluations. Consequently, the recognition of an ironic utterance as such, does not only depend on context, but also on the ironic tone entailed in the utterance in question. Grice does not suggest however that there is a particular ironic tone. On the contrary, he claims that a tone revealing a specific feeling or attitude can serve as ironic when combined with a corresponding remark. As Grice states, "an ironical tone is always a contemptuous tone, or an amused tone or some other tone connected with one or more particular feelings or attitudes... what qualifies such a tone as ironical is that it appears, on this and other occasions, when an ironical remark is made" (1989:54).

Therefore, in Grice's account (1978/1989), irony entails the notion of 'making as if to say', or otherwise pretending to say the opposite of what is meant, while also expressing an attitude towards that thought. Most of the times, irony is used in order to express scorn/disdain, derogatory comments or criticism.

An issue that has not been fully resolved, concerns the realm of attitudes and feelings. Even though Grice claims that "I cannot say something ironically unless what I say is intended to reflect a hostile or derogatory judgment or a feeling such as indignation or contempt" (1989:54), he does not explicitly mention the role of attitudes and does not provide a solid account of why irony entails an attitude while metaphor does not, as they both fall under the category of figurative speech. A reply is provided by Sperber and Wilson (2015), who claim that the retrieval of attitudes in verbal irony depends

on the victims towards which these attitude are geared, a condition which does not hold in the case of metaphors.

Expanding the notion of ‘making as if to say’, Clark and Gerrid (1984) introduced the ‘pretense theory of irony’. The theory suggests that a speaker pretends to be an unreasonable person who adheres to positive cultural norms and expectations, and addresses an unknowing audience, which may adopt his absurd claims. The ironist intends for a second/reasonable audience to discover the pretense and trace the attitude of ridicule, scorn or disdain of the real speaker towards the absurd one he’s pretending to be, the audience that embraces blatantly false utterances and the utterance itself. As Fowler claims (1926), the existence of two audiences is necessary for irony to be successful. The first audience, real or imaginative, is expected to regard the utterance as sincere, whereas the second one is expected to understand what lies underneath it. Clark and Gerrid support that Grice’s theory (1978) can be seen as an early version of the pretense theory, as Grice did not intend to say that an ironist is using an utterance as Sperber and Wilson (1981) claim, but rather pretending to use an utterance, as a medium to express dissociative feelings and attitudes towards the specific thought.

As mentioned above, pretense theory recognizes two victims. The first one refers to the absurd person or type of person that would make such a claim and the second one refers to the unknowing audience that espouses such utterances, expressing an attitude of ridicule/disapproval towards both of them. For such an attitude to be recognized, the tone of voice of the ironist is crucial. Most of the times, the real speaker exaggerates or caricatures the imaginative speaker, depending on how he imagines that injudicious person to be like. Thus, for Clark and Gerrid (1984) all ironic mentions should be thought of as ironic pretenses, as the speaker is not simply mentioning/echoing another person’s claims, but rather pretends to be him in order to express an attitude of ridicule.

An ironist wishes for the pretense to be recognized, but does not explicitly reveal it. This would spoil the effect of irony, which relates partly to the delight one takes in being a member of the inner cycle which allows its members to see through the pretense and share the mocking attitude towards outsiders (Clark and Gerrid, *ibid*).

It seems that Clark and Gerrid recognize the existence of dissociative attitudes which accompany ironic utterances, but do not investigate what the speaker is trying to achieve through the intentional expression of such attitudes.

Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) proposed a different theory, by examining mainly sarcastic comments. They supported that an 'echoic reminder theory' might be a more appropriate approach to irony, as it highlights the communicative function of irony, which is to remind the listener of what might have been expected or to remind him of a previous remark attributed to someone else, while also expressing a negative attitude, such as scorn or ridicule, towards the specific expectation that was overturned. Furthermore, the 'echoic reminder theory', suggests that not all ironic comments are echoic, as some simply allude to a generalized positive norm (i.e. expectation of success or desire for a positive outcome) that was confounded.

Notice that for a sarcastic comment to be considered successful, a specific expectation must be debunked in order to be subsequently mocked. It is clear therefore, that the most important purpose of irony is to express a mocking attitude towards thoughts that were violated and towards people who supported them. A question that still remains to be answered though is why? Why does an ironist wish to express these dissociative attitudes? What does he wish to achieve by making them easily detectable? Kreuz and Glucksberg's experiments showed that 53% of the sarcastic comments were perceived by participants as aiming to hurt a victim or a target. Hence, Kreuz and Glucksberg (1984) support that by expressing dissociative attitudes, speakers intend to emotionally hurt or wound the addressees, supporting the claim that sarcasm is "a sharp and often satirical or ironic utterance designed to cut or give pain" (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1988: 1043).

A number of researchers combined theories of 'echoing interpretations' and 'pretense'. Kumon-Nakamura et al. (1995), proposed the 'allusional pretense theory of discourse irony'. This theory recognizes two main principles as necessary conditions for ironic utterances to exist. The first principle relates to allusion. An ironist is alluding to a failed norm or expectation and therefore draws attention to the discrepancy between how things are and how they should have been, without necessarily echoing an explicitly or implicitly attributed thought as Sperber and Wilson claim (1981). The second principle refers to insincerity. Grice (1978/1989)

did mention insincerity with regards to declarative assertions, suggesting that an ironist implies the opposite of what is said. However, this view seems too restrictive, since not all types of ironic utterances have truth conditions, and therefore not all of them can imply the opposite of what is mentioned.

A solution would be to refer to 'insincerity' rather than to a mere reversal of meaning, since all types of irony can be considered insincere (i.e. requests, questions), as an ironist violates the felicity conditions of a proposed utterance. For instance, the use of a rhetorical question within an ironic context, fails to meet the goal of asking a question only when there is a sincere desire for an answer. Thus, an ironist fails to meet the conditions for well-formed speech acts, while simultaneously expresses an attitude (most of the times a dissociative one but not exclusively so). It is evident therefore that a speaker chooses to employ irony, only when he is not 'affectively neutral about a topic' and wishes to make his own attitude transparent to the listener(s) (Kumon-Nakamura et al., 1995).

More specifically, regarding the attitudes expressed by the ironists, experiments held by Kumon-Nakamura et al (ibid), showed that even though people use irony mostly as a vehicle to express negative attitudes, sometimes they use it as a means to communicate positive attitudes towards an awry situation or a victim, suggesting that negativity is not a definite predictor of irony, as is allusion and pragmatic insincerity. For instance, when participants were asked to describe the attitude of the ironist, even though most of the times the descriptions were negative (e.g. annoyed, irritated), other times they were positive instead (e.g. light-hearted, witty, funny). These results confirm the fact that irony is used when a speaker is not 'affectively neutral' over a situation (possesses a positive or negative attitude). Nevertheless, this study also shows that pragmatic accounts of irony should not omit positive attitudes when discussing irony and its effects.

Finally, Sperber and Wilson (1981/2007/2012) proposed a different approach to irony than the traditional/Gricean one that refers to a mere reversal of meaning. In order to expose the shallowness of the specific definition, they analyzed counter-examples that do not conform to the claim that irony simply communicates the opposite of what is said. Understatements for instance, are not thought to proclaim the opposite of what is said, but rather express less than what is meant.

Therefore, as an alternative approach to irony, Sperber and Wilson (1981) introduced the use-mention distinction as a key element, suggesting that irony involves the mention of a proposition and more specifically the echoing of an utterance attributed to another person or the echoing of an utterance which refers to a cultural aspiration or a norm, entailing an expression of attitude towards the specific utterance. In later work however, they replaced the term ‘mention’ with the term ‘interpretive resemblance’, as they realized that an ironic remark is not always an exact replica of the initial utterance, but it could also possess a more general resemblance to it, or refer to its contextual implications (Sperber and Wilson, 2007).

The main goal of an ironist however, is neither to express a proposition nor the opposite of that proposition, but to express his attitude towards that thought. The attitudes expressed in verbal irony are dissociative ones, as a person rejects the thought that he is choosing to echo. Nevertheless, the dissociative attitudes that are expressed through ironic remarks may vary, as they are “falling anywhere on a spectrum of amused tolerance through various shades of resignation to disappointment or contempt, disgust, outrage or scorn” (Sperber and Wilson, 2012:130).

Finally, when it comes to the recognition of an ironic utterance, Sperber and Wilson claim that it depends on the connection between “the linguistic form of the utterance, the shared cognitive environment of communicator and audience, and the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance” (2007:54). In other words, irony recognition is highly dependent on the assurance that the available ironic interpretation is able to achieve adequate contextual effects for the minimum processing effort and therefore is fairly chosen by the hearer as the intended interpretation. Needless to say, the speaker intentionally releases indeterminate import (i.e. the attitude he makes manifest) through the linguistic form of the utterance with a purpose to alter the shared cognitive environment, guiding the hearer towards contextual implications that he wishes to communicate.

The pragmatic accounts of irony discussed above espouse different views when it comes to the nature of ironic remarks. However, they all seem to recognize as the main goal of irony, the wish of the speaker to communicate the attitude/ emotion that he/she entertained at the time of producing the utterance. Even though most theories

focus on the negative attitude expressed towards a person or an utterance (Grice, 1978/1989, Clark and Gerrid, 1984, Kreuz and Glucksberg, 1989), some claim that negativity is not always a predictor of irony, as even though a person dissociates himself from the utterance he expresses, positive attitudes can also emerge in some cases, ensuring a more playful atmosphere in the context of irony (Kumon-Nakamura et al. 1995, Sperber and Wilson, 1981/2007/2012). In the next section, I will address this conflict (positive vs negative attitudes), by examining the most common types of ironic remarks and the attitudes communicated by the ironist.

2.3 Different types of ironic remarks and attitudes

As previously stated, irony can be elicited whenever there is a discrepancy between the propositional meaning of a statement (representing violated expectations) and reality. At this point, it is crucial to acknowledge the fact that in principle, every piece of language could be used ironically. Nevertheless, in the next section, I analyze five linguistic devices that people employ more frequently in their effort to speak ironically (overstatements, understatements, sarcasm, satire, rhetorical questions) (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000). A reasonable question that may arise though is, why does a speaker employ satire instead of an overstatement when he wishes to highlight the discrepancy between how things are and how they should have been? Do different types of irony accommodate different effects that the speaker wishes to convey along with the ironic remark? In order to examine the questions above, we need to analyze the above mentioned types of verbal irony and investigate the differences they may entail.

First of all, let us look at *overstatements*. It is evident that an element that can be manipulated by the ironist is the extent to which the actual utterance deviates from the existing state of affairs (Kreuz and Roberts, 2009). If the ironist wishes to strongly criticize the discrepancy between the existing state of affairs and how things should have been, he is able to achieve his goal through exaggeration/ hyperbole. As Walton claims, “in overstatements generally...the explicit content is larger than the assertive content. To overstate is to represent, by what one says, a quantity as being larger than one means to assert it to be” (2017: 4). For instance, let us look at an example

proposed by Kreuz and Roberts (2009) and think of a person complaining about the delay at a cafeteria.

(1) The line for sandwiches was a million . . . miles. . . long!

In this case, the ironist aims at criticizing the delay that happened at the café, by exaggerating, as his claim clearly presents a larger content than the assertive one.

In order for overstatements to achieve their initial goal, mutual knowledge between the ironist and the addressee is necessary, as ironists “intend to elicit ‘correcting responses’ or ‘adjustments’ from hearers, in thought at least, and intend hearers to recognize this intention” (Fogelin, 2011:16). In other words, overstaters wish for the listeners to be able to see through the exaggeration and grasp their scornful attitude towards the discrepancy between how things are and how they should have been. Regarding the recognition of the ironic intention, research indicates that overstatements are usually accompanied by a specific tone of voice that is characterized by a slow pace and heavy stress (Kreuz and Roberts, 2009).

Understatements on the other hand, are seen as utterances whose “explicit content is less than, smaller than, the assertive content” (Walton, 2017: 4). Therefore, they constitute remarks that explicitly state less than what the speaker means to communicate. In other words, as Berntsen and Kennedy claim, an understatement “contradictorily diminishes the importance or magnitude of the subject matter” (1996: 20).

Consider the following example proposed by Leggitt and Gibbs (2000). Imagine that while a man is trying to park his car he splashes mud on Christine who says:

(2) You might want to drive a bit slower!

In this case, Christine decides to downplay the intensity of the incident, since she expresses herself as if she wishes to propose a suggestion (for him to drive more carefully), rather than a definite instruction, as would be expected based on the situation. Hence, she decides to mute the criticism and to avoid expressing a hostile attitude towards the addressee (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000). It is evident therefore that understatements constitute a type of irony that can serve politeness considerations (Brown and Levinson, 1987), as the ‘contradictory reduction’ that exists between

what the speaker wished to convey and what was literally stated, elicits attitudes of indignation and sympathy (Berntsen and Kennedy, 1996). The choice of the specific type of verbal irony perhaps suggests that Christine considered the incident as unintentional (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000). Therefore, even though the situation could trigger an ironic remark (as there was a deviation between reality and expectations), it was expressed in a playful manner.

Hence, in the case of understatements, speakers tend to camouflage the unpleasant event's importance, as they usually mean something worse than what is explicitly stated (Berntsen and Kennedy, 1996). Finally, regarding the recognition of the ironic intention, it very much lies on the gap that exists between what was explicitly stated and what the hearer perceives to be the speaker's intended meaning (Berntsen and Kennedy, 1996), suggesting that once again, mutual knowledge between the ironist and the addressee is necessary, in order for the utterance to be recognized as intended.

Sarcasm, on the other hand, is frequently employed in contexts where both speaker and listener, are able to recognize the falseness of the explicitly uttered remark based on the mutual knowledge they share (Toplak and Katz, 2000). Let us borrow an example proposed by Toplak and Katz (*ibid*). Imagine that a person utters the statement below in a context where all interlocutors comprehend that it can't be truly perceived as a positive comment, but only as a form of indirect criticism aimed at the addressee.

(3) You are a fine friend!

Kumon-Nakamura et al. refer to the falseness of utterances as in (3), as "pragmatic insincerity" (1995), since on a surface level, the speaker does not say what he/she believes to be true. Notice that pragmatic insincerity here is not used to criticize alone, as in that case it would be easier to simply utter the phrase "You are not a good friend" (Toplak and Katz, 2000). Therefore, an ironist choosing to employ sarcasm aims at achieving another effect, which he/she wishes to be grasped by the listener. Studies performed by Toplak and Katz (*ibid*) have shown that speakers feel more pleased with themselves when indirectly criticizing another person and victims perceive these types of utterances to be more "insincere, impolite, humorous, mocking, offensive, aggressive, anger-provoking, non-instructional, unclear" than

their factual counterparts (Toplak and Katz, 2000: 1481). Hence, sarcastic comments do not simply function as reminders of the victim's misdeed, but also ridicule him and convey a hostile attitude that is able to provoke intense emotional reactions (Lee and Katz, 1998, Leggit and Gibbs, 2000).

On the contrary, *rhetorical questions* are considered to be declarative statements disguised in the form of interrogatives (Black, 1992; see also Sadock, 1971, 1974, Han, 2002). More specifically, as Sadock (1971,1974) claims, a rhetorical question, "is semantically equivalent to an assertion of the opposite polarity from what is apparently asked" (as cited in Han, 2002: 202).

For instance, let us examine an example provided by Leggitt and Gibbs (2000). Consider two people working together in a small office and sharing things. When Bob asks his colleague for a pencil, he doesn't seem to have one and therefore gives him a pen instead. At that moment Bob says;

(4) Do you have anything at all?

It appears that answering such a question is unnecessary, as both interlocutors are obviously familiar with the answer. However, the speaker chose to utter a positive rhetorical question instead of uttering the negative declarative "You don't have anything", in order to indirectly criticize his colleague's shortage of equipment. Therefore, by flouting the sincerity condition of interrogatives, the speaker gets the opportunity to implicitly mock and ridicule the addressee and his failings (Brown and Levinson 1987, Frank, 1990). Brown and Levinson support that RQs are employed in order to minimize the face risk in the context of face-threatening acts (1978). Frank on the other hand, claims that one of the most important functions of rhetorical questions lies on the fact that they "enable speakers to make stronger statements, with greater implications, than would be possible if they had made straightforward assertions" (1990:726).

Studies performed by Leggitt and Gibbs (2000) support Frank's claims, as they revealed that in the presence of rhetorical questions, addressees felt like they were personally attacked and that the speaker seemed like he was in a condition of extreme rage at the time. It is clear therefore that rhetorical questions are not used to soften the effect of criticism/ mockery, but more likely to enhance it.

Finally, *satire* refers to the use of outrageous statements, which are employed by the speaker in order to ridicule a person and highlight his misdeeds. As Johnson states, “satire is a poem in which wickedness or folly is censured” (A Dictionary of the English Language, 1775). Nevertheless, satirical irony is considered to disparage the victim by maximizing humor, an effect which appears to be less hostile compared to the use of sarcasm or rhetorical questions (Beckson and Ganz, 1989, Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000). Therefore, on the surface, the speaker appears to be humorous and in a way compassionate towards the addressee, but deep down there is actual disagreement and mockery of the victim’s actions.

Consider the following example proposed by Leggitt and Gibbs (2000). Let us say that you and your friends wish to go to the movies and you are the only one who refuses to go, unless they change their mind on the film they decided to watch. At that moment, one of your friends says:

(5) You will want to see a cartoon.

As Polard claims, “The satirist is not an easy man to live with. He is more than usually conscious of the follies and vices of his fellows and he cannot stop himself from showing that he is” (2018:1). In the above mentioned scenario, it is obvious that the final comment is an outrageous statement that does not correspond to the truth. However, the speaker employs satire in order to highlight the childish behavior, as children are the ones who frequently watch cartoons. Meanwhile, he gets the desired message across by being humorous, as he does not wish to sound hostile. Deep down however, the speaker actually mocks and ridicules the victim’s behavior.

As in previous types of irony, satire is mostly used to comment on a state of the world and the various expectations that are overthrown. However, commenting is done implicitly, and that is the reason why satire was widely used in literary works in times of censorship, as authors wished to mask their criticism and to not directly state opposing views on controversial matters (Elliott, 1962).

Overall, by choosing to employ satire, the ironist pretends “ignorance to enlighten” the audience. The true intentions of the speaker are revealed only when the audience sees through the pretense, after considering external contextual clues (Kreuz and Roberts, 1993: 101).

In sum, in this section we examined five ways in which verbal irony can be realized, in order to identify differences between types and trace the reasons lying behind the choice of a specific type of verbal irony over another. It is clear that what differentiates the specific types of verbal irony is attitude. A speaker who wishes to strongly criticize the addressee and his probable failings is more likely to employ an overstatement, as through the exaggerated interpretation of a situation, he reveals a scornful attitude towards the addressee and the existing state of affairs. Meanwhile, a speaker who is largely critical of the addressee and intends to evoke negative emotions may choose to employ sarcasm, as through pragmatic insincerity, sarcasm expresses a mocking or even hostile attitude towards the addressee (Lee and Katz, 1998). Finally, a speaker who wishes to personally attack the addressee is more likely to choose rhetorical questions, as through the violation of the interrogative's sincerity conditions, rhetorical questions reveal an attitude of intense mockery towards the victim.

On the other hand, a speaker who wishes to mute the criticism and minimize the effect of the existing situation is more likely to employ an understatement, as understatements are usually accompanied by a sympathetic/compassionate attitude (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000). Lastly, a speaker who wishes to harmlessly "tease" the addressee may choose to employ satire, as on the surface level at least, satire uses humor to innocently mock the addressee and his probable failings (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000).

Hence, it would be interesting to find out whether the attitudes conveyed through different types of verbal irony, mirror the emotional reactions of our Greek and Spanish audiences. In the next section, I consider prior research on the connection of irony to the addressee's emotions.

2.4 Irony and the addressee's emotions

Whereas several studies have dealt with the comparison of ironic vs literal language regarding emotional responses (see Thomson et al, 2016, Filik et al, 2017), less studies have examined different types of verbal irony and emotional reactions (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000).

Leggitt and Gibbs (2000) made an attempt to address the emotional responses of American undergraduate students of psychology towards different types of verbal irony (irony, sarcasm, overstatements, understatements, satire, non-ironic utterances), by performing three different studies. Participants were asked to describe their own emotional state, the emotional state of the speaker based on the utterance produced and finally how the speaker wished them to feel by producing different types of verbal irony.

In the first study, participants evaluated their emotional state and the intensity of that emotion, after being exposed to different types of irony. Results showed that people responded quite differently to non-directly critical irony (i.e. “This office is well-equipped” in the context of someone not being able to provide a pencil to his colleague), understatements and satire than to sarcasm, overstatements and rhetorical questions, as the first category was associated with a reduced degree of negative emotions, whereas the second category was associated with a much more elevated degree of negative emotions.

In the second study, Leggitt and Gibbs (*ibid*) examined whether the addressees’ impressions on how the speaker must have felt at the time of producing the utterance corresponded to their own emotional response. Results revealed a great correspondence between how the addressee reported feeling and how he perceived the speaker to have felt, as speakers were perceived to have felt positive emotions in the cases of satire and understatement but not in the cases of sarcasm and rhetorical questions, where they were perceived to have experienced negative emotions instead.

Finally, in the third study Leggitt and Gibbs investigated whether the addressees’ recognition of the speakers’ intentions (regarding how the ironists wished them to feel) matches the addressees’ emotional reactions. For instance, they investigated whether the fact that an addressee thinks an ironist wishes to trigger a negative reaction, has an impact on the addressee’s actual reaction. Once again, non-personal irony, understatement and satire were regarded as intending to cause positive emotions to the hearer, whereas sarcasm and rhetorical questions were regarded as intending to cause negative emotions instead.

Overall, the data collected from the three studies showed that American students’ reported emotional reactions were similar to the perceived emotional states of the

speaker at the time of producing the ironic remark. Meanwhile, American students seem to have emotionally reacted in the same way they thought the speaker intended them to react.

In another study on the emotional impact of ironic language, Thomson et al. (2016) compared irony to literal language. Participants of this study were exposed to different online texts which reflected the variables of literality (literal vs ironic), polarity (praise or criticism) and emoticons (present or absent). Psychophysiological measures were occupied in order to investigate participants' immediate emotional responses and capture probable social or emotional functions of ironic vs literal language. Overall, it was observed that ironic remarks expressing criticism reduce the strength of the message, as there was decreased frowning and enhanced smiling compared to literal criticism. Moreover, in the context of praise expressed through irony, there was reduced smiling and heightened frowning compared to literal praise. Finally, regarding emoticons, it was noticed that they serve as elements which are able to elicit positive emotions and increase arousal. Overall, results of this study indicated that irony reduces the strength of emotional reactions (both positive and negative) compared to literal language, a claim that needs to be cautiously processed, as results proved to be marginally significant, when submitted to statistical analysis.

In a similar study, Filik et al. (2017) performed several eye-tracking experiments, in order to investigate the socio-emotional functions of verbal irony. In their research, they assessed participants' processing while reading a series of short stories, in which one person criticizes another, in an ironic or literal way. Some of the scenarios participants read included also information on the emotional reaction of the victim of criticism, whether that was an amused or a hurt response (victim's perspective), while others included information on the intent of the character who criticized, whether that was to amuse or to wound the addressee (protagonist's perspective). The researchers aim was to examine whether irony triggers negative responses to a greater extent than literal criticism, but also to investigate whether criticism is viewed as more negative from the victim's perspective rather than the protagonist's. If ironic criticism proved to be more hurtful than literal criticism, shorter reading times would be expected whenever there was a description of a negative response in a scenario including irony. If the opposite were true, participants would face less difficulty in integrating victims' amused responses compared to scenarios including literal criticism. Following the

eye-movements of the participants while reading, it was evident that readers integrated positive responses more easily in irony rather than literal criticism from the perspective of both the victim and the protagonist, suggesting that ironic criticism does not have such a negative impact on the addressee as does literal criticism.

An issue that should be considered though, regarding the two previous studies is the fact that they address only the most basic type of verbal irony (sarcastic) and fail to consider others (i.e. hyperbole, understatements etc.). Inspired by the studies performed by Leggitt and Gibbs (2000), in this study I attempt to address the issue of cross-cultural emotional reactions to different types of verbal irony by examining Greek and Spanish postgraduate university students. In this way, the aim is not only to investigate whether similar connections between types of ironic remarks and emotional responses exist, but also to examine whether two cultures present differences in the way they react to the exact same types of ironic remarks. For this purpose, before I proceed with my research, I will first consider a study held with a view to examining differences in cross-cultural emotional responses.

2.5 Cross-cultural emotional responses

As mentioned above, in order to examine differences between Greece and Spain concerning emotional responses to verbal irony, it is crucial to first address the issue of cross-cultural emotional responses in a wider scale and analyze similarities and differences that exist between countries concerning emotional reactions in general.

Scherer (1997) performed a study in which he examined how different cultures appraise emotion which emanates from antecedent events. Seven basic emotions (joy, sadness, disgust, fear, anger, shame and guilt) and the evaluation of their antecedent events were compared in thirty-seven different countries, among which Greece and Spain were included. In order to identify possible differences among cultures and attribute them to a specific cause, Scherer categorized the countries with respect to their individual characteristics (i.e. geopolitical region, urbanism, individualism, masculinity).

Results showed that among the thirty-seven participating countries there was a high degree of convergence in the evaluation of antecedent events and the emotions that

were to be experienced each time, suggesting that there is universality in the appraisal mechanisms between different cultures (at least regarding basic emotions). Nevertheless, a notable difference was observed regarding the evaluation of antecedent events in relation to immorality. It was noticed that participants of highly urbanized countries (i.e. Israel) attributed lower immorality to emotion-eliciting behaviors than less urbanized countries (i.e. Yugoslavia), a fact that did not however influence the emotion experienced in each case. Scherer attributes this result to the different moral codes entailed in each society. As he claims,

One might assume that less urbanized, that is, largely rural societies, are generally more traditional, reserving a more important place to the moral fabric of society and established norms and values. As a consequence, they might apply a more severe moral standard to human behavior and other emotion-eliciting events. Highly urbanized societies, on the other hand, might be characterized by the influx of diverse groups into big cities of urban agglomerations, abandoning their traditional values and norms in the process and adopting more secular views. Their evaluation of behavior or situations might be less flavored by internalized moral beliefs or norms. Rather, they might base their evaluation more on a strictly legal perspective (“what is not forbidden by the law is allowed”) (1997,918).

Therefore, it would be interesting to explore possible cross-cultural differences, between Greek and Spanish participants in terms of their emotional reactions to verbal irony. In the following chapter, I proceed to presenting the methods I used while designing and implementing the current study.

Chapter 3

Methodology

3.1 Participants

The main aim of this study is to examine cross-cultural similarities and differences in the emotional responses elicited by different types of verbal irony. To implement this goal, 32 university students (16 Spanish and 16 Greek) were the participants of this research. Spanish participants study in the University of Vic (Barcelona), while Greek ones study in the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. Their age ranges from twenty-two to sixty years old.

3.2 Rationale

For the purposes of this study, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed with a view to providing answers to the two main research questions mentioned below;

1. Do different types of verbal irony (sarcasm, overstatements, understatements, satire, rhetorical question) influence the emotional reaction of the addressee?
2. Do Greek and Spanish people react similarly or differently to the same instances of verbal irony?

In order to address the first question, five different types of ironic remarks (sarcasm, overstatements, understatements, satire, rhetorical question) were presented to the participants as final comments in the exact same scenario, (i.e. accidentally breaking your neighbor's window/ losing at a tennis match/ running late for a work meeting), altering slightly the imaginary transaction between the speaker and the participant. In this way, we can obtain evidence on whether different attitudes of the speaker's while

uttering each type of ironic remark, influence the addressees' reported emotional reaction.

The emotions participants used to describe their perceived emotional state were selected based on Ekman's distinction of 'basic emotions' (1992), as those emotions are considered to be universal.

Regarding the second question, Greek and Spanish participants were recruited in order to explore possible differences presumably attributed to their sociocultural norms and values. For this purpose, the questionnaire was originally created in English and translated in the native languages of the participants by locals, in order for the scenarios to be accurately communicated and for the information to be properly conveyed. Locals received guidance on how to proceed with the translation process and more specifically they were asked to preserve the type of ironic remark while translating.

3.3 Materials

As mentioned above, the questionnaire was distributed online, in the native language of the participants (Spanish and Greek) in order to examine emotional responses to different types of verbal irony and identify any differences between the two ethnic groups. The questionnaire contained three different scenarios (covering three types of social encounter: workplace/ friendly/ semi-formal). Each scenario included five instances of the five types of ironic utterances (sarcasm, overstatement, understatement, satire, rhetoric question) as possible responses to each scenario. Under each item there were two multiple choice questions (MCQs) as shown in Figure 1 below. The first MCQ referred to the emotions of the participant (amused, warmhearted, sad, angry, fearful, anxious, disgusted, contemptuous) after being exposed to each type of verbal irony, and the second one referred to the intensity of the selected emotion on a scale of 1 to 5.

Figure 1.

Scenario no.2

You've just lost a tennis match and your opponent was way better than you. Your sister says:

1. You are a real professional!

Circle. How do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

3.4 Procedure

Participants first read the instructions on the first page of the questionnaire (see Appendix), in their native language.

Upon receiving the questionnaires, participants were also advised to read through all five ironic utterances and three scenarios to familiarize themselves with the structure of the questionnaire and the format of questions-answers.

After closely examining each type of ironic utterance as a response to each scenario, participants reported their emotional state, as well as the rate of intensity of their perceived emotional state, towards each type of ironic remark (understatements, overstatements, sarcasm, satire, rhetorical questions).

3.5 Data Analysis

After collecting the results, I performed a Chi-square statistical analysis of the findings in order to establish connections between emotions and different types of verbal irony. Chi-square testing was chosen over other types of statistical tests, as the focus here was on two categorical variables (negative vs positive emotions) and the relation between them in different types of verbal irony. The exact procedure is presented below.

I first calculated how many times each emotion appears in these five different types of verbal irony. After that, I grouped together the negative emotions (sad/ anxious/ angry/ contemptuous/ disgusted/ fearful) and the positive ones (amused/ warmhearted) to calculate overall how many negative and positive emotions appear in each type of verbal irony. Next, I calculated the expected numbers based on the total occurrences of the positive and negative emotions, in order to estimate how emotions would be distributed if there was not any difference between these five types of irony. For instance, in Greece there were 167 negative reactions overall, a sum that would correspond to 33.4 negative reactions in each type of ironic remark, assuming an equal distribution among these five different types of irony. Having calculated the observed and the expected values for each type of irony, I performed a Chi-square test, to see the exact deviation between the observed and the expected values in both negative and positive emotions in each type of irony. Finally, the two Chi-square values (one for negative emotions and one for positive) were added in each type of irony and p-values were obtained. P-values showed whether the difference between negative and positive emotions was statistically significant in each type of irony. Any p-value that was higher than 0.05 showed that the result was non-significant, whereas any p-value that was lower than 0.05 indicated that the result was significant. The above mentioned procedure was repeated for both ethnic groups, which were subsequently compared.

Regarding intensities, I compared the results between Spanish and Greek university students to examine the cross-cultural similarities and differences in their evaluation of verbal irony. More specifically, the intensities of each of the eight emotions that were examined as probable responses to verbal irony (amused, warmhearted, sad, angry, fearful, anxious, disgusted, contemptuous) were compared in the Greek case and the Spanish one through a T-test statistical analysis, which was chosen over other statistical tests, as the goal in this case was to compare the responses of two different populations. The first step was to group together the intensities of the specific emotion (i.e. anger) in Greek participants and in Spanish participants. The total number of occurrences was calculated in each case (how many times this emotion appeared as a response to verbal irony in Greek and Spanish participants) and the average intensity for both countries was determined. Before proceeding to the T-test statistical analysis, the standard deviation between the intensities of the specific emotion within one country was also calculated (i.e. standard deviation between the intensities of anger in Greece). Finally, through the T-test statistical analysis, a p-value was obtained, which indicated whether the differences between Greece and Spain, regarding the intensities of a specific emotion that was experienced as a response to verbal irony, were significant or not.

Finally, a qualitative analysis was performed, by drawing on pragmatic theories of irony (Grice, 1978/1989, Clark and Gerrid, 1984, Kreuz and Glucksberg, 1989, Kumon-Nakamura et al. 1995, Sperber and Wilson, 1981/2007/2012), and the connection of ironic utterances with specific attitudes, and on the notions of emotional communication (Wharton and Strey, 2019) and emotional contagion (Hatfield et al. 1994), too.

Chapter 4 Results

4.1 Emotional responses

In this section, I present the results concerning participants' reported emotional responses to different types of verbal irony. Table 1.1 shows the observed values of the eight emotions examined in each of the five different types of irony for Greek participants, whereas table 1.2 shows the corresponding values for Spanish participants.

Table 1.1 Observed distribution of emotions per type of irony/ Greece

	Sad	Anxious	Angry	Warmhearted	Amused	Contemptuous	Disgusted	Fearful	Totals
Overstatement	7	20	10	2	3	6	0	0	48
Sarcasm	8	6	15	5	8	5	1	0	48
Satire	2	2	8	1	24	8	2	1	48
Understatement	7	10	2	21	7	1	0	0	48
Rhetorical question	6	4	22	0	2	11	1	2	48
Totals	30	42	57	29	44	31	4	3	240

Table 1.2 Observed distribution of emotions per type of irony/Spain

	Sad	Anxious	Angry	Warmhearted	Amused	Contemptuous	Disgusted	Fearful	Totals
Overstatement	9	2	7	0	9	5	14	2	48
Sarcasm	5	1	18	0	8	3	11	2	48
Satire	3	0	8	5	23	5	4	0	48
Understatement	5	3	4	19	10	1	6	0	48
Rhetorical question	1	4	25	0	6	1	11	0	48
Totals	23	10	62	24	56	15	46	4	240

In the next two Tables, the observed negative (sad/ anxious/ angry/ contemptuous/ disgusted/ fearful) and positive (amused/ warmhearted) emotions are grouped together and presented in each of the five different types of irony examined. The results of the Greek participants are presented first (Table 1.2) and the results of the Spanish participants next (Table 1.3).

Table 1.2 Observed distribution of negative and positive emotions per type of irony/Greece

	Negative	Positive	Totals
Overstatement	43	5	48
Sarcasm	35	13	48
Satire	23	25	48
Understatement	20	28	48
Rhetorical questions	46	2	48
Totals	167	73	240

Table 1.3 Observed distribution of negative and positive emotions per type of irony/ Spain

	Negative	Positive	Totals
Overstatement	39	9	48
Sarcasm	40	8	48
Satire	20	28	48
Understatement	19	29	48
Rhetorical question	42	6	48
Totals	160	80	240

The following Tables present the expected distribution of emotions in different types of irony (if there wasn't any difference between them -null hypothesis-). Tables 1.4 and 1.5 refer to Greek expectancies, whereas tables 1.6 and 1.7 refer to Spanish expectancies.

Table 1.4 Expected distribution of emotions per type of irony/ Greece

	Sad	Anxious	Angry	Warmhearted	Amused	Contemptuous	Disgusted	Fearful	Totals
Overstatement	6	8,4	11,4	5,8	8,8	6,2	0,8	0,6	48
Sarcasm	6	8,4	11,4	5,8	8,8	6,2	0,8	0,6	48
Satire	6	8,4	11,4	5,8	8,8	6,2	0,8	0,6	48
Understatement	6	8,4	11,4	5,8	8,8	6,2	0,8	0,6	48
Rhetorical questions	6	8,4	11,4	5,8	8,8	6,2	0,8	0,6	48
Totals	30	42	57	29	44	31	4	3	240

Table 1.5 Expected distribution of negative vs positive emotions per type of irony/ Greece

	Negative	Positive
Overstatement	33,4	14,6
Sarcasm	33,4	14,6
Satire	33,4	14,6
Understatement	33,4	14,6
Rhetorical question	33,4	14,6

Table 1.6 Expected distribution of emotions per type of irony/ Spain

	Sad	Anxious	Angry	Warmhearted	Amused	Contemptuous	Disgusted	Fearful	Totals
Overstatement	4,6	2	12,4	4,8	11,2	3	9,2	0,8	48
Sarcasm	4,6	2	12,4	4,8	11,2	3	9,2	0,8	48
Satire	4,6	2	12,4	4,8	11,2	3	9,2	0,8	48
Understatement	4,6	2	12,4	4,8	11,2	3	9,2	0,8	48
Rhetorical question	4,6	2	12,4	4,8	11,2	3	9,2	0,8	48
Totals	23	10	62	24	56	15	46	4	240

Table 1.7 Expected distribution of negative vs positive emotions per type of irony/ Spain

	Negative	Positive
Overstatement	32	16
Sarcasm	32	16
Satire	32	16
Understatement	32	16
Rhetorical question	32	16

Tables 1.8 and 1.9 below, show the Chi-square figures which reveal the deviation that exists between the observed and expected values of negative emotions and positive ones in each type of irony. Table 1.8 shows the Greek findings and table 1.9 the corresponding Spanish ones.

Table 1.8 Chi-square values for negative and positive emotions per type of irony/ Greece

	Negative	Positive
Overstatement	2,759281437	6,312328767
Sarcasm	0,076646707	0,175342466
Satire	3,238323353	7,408219178
Understatement	5,376047904	12,29863014
Rhetorical	4,753293413	10,8739726

Table 1.9 Chi-square values for negative and positive emotions per type of irony/ Spain

	Negative	Positive
Overstatement	1,53125	3,0625
Sarcasm	2	4
Satire	4,5	9
Understatement	5,28125	10,5625
Rhetorical question	3,125	6,25

Finally, the last two tables show the p-values that were obtained after the Chi-square testing. P-values reveal whether the overall deviation that exists between the observed

and expected values per each type of irony is statistically significant. Table 1.10 deals with the results of Greek participants, whereas table 1.11 deals with the Spanish results.

Table 1.10 Overall Chi-square value and p-values per type of irony/ Greece

	Chi-square	p-value
Overstatement	9,071610204	0,002596084
Sarcasm	0,251989172	0,61567791
Satire	10,64654253	0,001102769
Understatement	17,67467804	0,00002621
Rhetorical questions	15,62726602	0,00007713

Table 1.11 Overall Chi-square value and p-value per type of irony/ Spain

	Chi-square	p-values
Overstatement	4,59375	0,032088734
Sarcasm	6	0,014305878
Satire	13,5	0,000238563
Understatement	15,84375	0,00006879
Rhetorical question	9,375	0,002199647

Let us now proceed to how Greek and Spanish participants reported to have emotionally reacted to each type of verbal irony, based on the Chi-square statistical analysis presented above and the p-values obtained.

The first type of irony we examine refers to overstatements. Let us borrow the second scenario presented in the questionnaire. Imagine that you have just lost at a tennis match and that your opponent was way better than you. At that moment, your sister tells you ‘Even mum could play better than you’. In the specific transaction, how would that overstatement influence the overall experience and affect the reported emotions?

Analysis showed that Greek and Spanish participants reported experiencing negative emotions to a greater extent than positive ones, whenever overstatements were

addressed to them. More specifically, the p-value was lower than 0.05 in both cases (Greece; p-value= 0.002596084 < 0.05/ Spain; p-value= 0.032088734 < 0.05), indicating that the choice of negative emotions over positive ones was statistically significant in the case of overstatements in both ethnic groups.

The second type of irony we examined refers to sarcasm. Imagine that in the above mentioned scenario (losing at a tennis match), your sister tells you 'You are a real professional' instead. In this case, how would that sarcastic comment influence the reported emotions?

Results showed that once again, Greek and Spanish participants reported experiencing negative emotions more than positive ones, whenever sarcastic comments were addressed to them. However, the p-value for the Greek participants was higher than 0.05 (p-value= 0.61567791 >0.05), suggesting that the choice of negative emotions over positive ones was not statistically significant in the case of sarcasm. Nevertheless, for Spanish participants, the p-value was lower than 0.05 (p-value= 0.014305878), indicating that the choice of negative emotions over positive ones was statistically significant concerning sarcastic comments.

Moving on, the third type of irony we examine refers to satire. Imagine that after your defeat, your sister tells you 'Rafael Nadal applauds you!'. Is the specific satirical comment going to alter the reported emotions of the participants in the exact same situation?

It is evident that in the case of satirical comments, Greek and Spanish participants reported experiencing positive emotions more than negative ones. Furthermore, the p-value was lower than 0.05 in both cases (Greece; p-value= 0.001102769 < 0.05/ Spain; p-value= 0.000238563 < 0.05), a fact that shows that the choice of positive emotions over negative ones was statistically significant in the case of satire in both ethnic groups.

The fourth type of irony refers to understatements. Let us say that after your loss, your sister told you 'You might need a bit more practice'. How would that understatement affect the overall experience and the reported emotions?

Results showed that Greek and Spanish participants reported experiencing positive emotions to a greater extent than negative ones. More specifically, the p-value was

lower than 0.05 in both cases (Greece; $p\text{-value} = 0.000002621 < 0.05$ / Spain; $p\text{-value} = 0.00006879 < 0.05$), indicating that once again, the choice of positive emotions over negative ones was statistically significant in the case of understatements in both ethnic groups.

Finally, the last type of irony we examine refers to rhetorical questions. Imagine that after your loss, your sister tells you ‘You know that the aim is to hit the ball, right?’. Let us see how the specific rhetorical question influenced the reported emotions of the participants.

It is clear that Greek and Spanish participants opted for negative emotions to a greater extent than positive ones, when encountering rhetorical questions. More specifically, the $p\text{-value}$ was once again much lower than 0.05 in both cases (Greece; $p\text{-value} = 0.00007713 < 0.05$ / Spain; $p\text{-value} = 0.002199647 < 0.05$), suggesting that in the case of rhetorical questions the choice of negative emotions over positive ones was statistically significant in both groups.

Overall, it seems that Greek and Spanish participants reported experiencing similar emotions (positive or negative ones) within the exact same scenarios (breaking your neighbor’s window/losing at a tennis match/running late for a work meeting), depending on the type of irony that was addressed to them as a final comment. When encountering overstatements, sarcasm and rhetorical questions, they reported experiencing mostly negative emotions. However, whenever satirical comments and understatements were addressed to them, they reported experiencing positive emotions instead. Results showed that there was statistical significance in the choice of one category of emotions over the other (positive vs negative) in all types of irony except for sarcasm in the Greek case, where even though more negative emotions appeared, the result proved to be non-significant.

4.2 Intensities of emotional responses

After having examined Greek and Spanish participants’ emotional responses to verbal irony, I will address the issue of intensities next. In the following section therefore, I compare the intensities of each of the eight emotions examined in Greek and Spanish participants.

The first emotion examined refers to sadness. In the next Table, the intensities of sadness in Greek and Spanish participants are compared through a T-test statistical analysis. The p-value that was obtained, indicated that whenever sadness occurred as an emotional response to verbal irony, the reported intensities of the Spanish participants were significantly lower than those of Greek participants (p-value= 0.00000308570<0.05).

Table 2.1 Intensities sadness

	Sadness/Spain	Sadness/Greece
	3	5
	3	4
	2	3
	2	4
	2	3
	3	4
	2	3
	3	4
	4	3
	3	3
	3	5
	1	4
	4	4
	3	5
	2	4
	2	4
	2	4
	4	4
	3	4
	2	3
	2	4
	2	4
	3	2
		3
		4
		4
		5
		3
		3
		3
N=	23	30
AVERAGE=	2,608695652	3,733333
STDEV=	0,782718482	0,73968
P-value=	0,00000308570	

Moving on, the next emotion examined refers to anxiety. Once again, whenever anxiety occurred as a response to verbal irony, the intensities of Spanish participants were significantly lower than the corresponding Greek ones (p-value= 0,000004208438< 0.05).

Table 2.2 Intensities anxiety

	Anxious/Spain	Anxious/Greece
	2	4
	2	3
	2	4
	1	4
	1	4
	1	5
	3	4
	2	5
	3	3
	3	3
		4
		5
		5
		5
		5
		4
		5
		4
		5
		5
		4
		5
		5
		4
		5
		3
		3
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		5
		4
		4
		5
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		4
		4
		3
		4
		4
		3
		4
		5
		4
		4
		3
		4
N=	10	43
AVERAGE=	2	4,139535
STDEV=	0,816496581	0,774025
p-value=	0,000004208438	

The third emotion examined refers to anger. In this case, we can observe the greatest deviation between Greek and Spanish subjects regarding reported intensities, as the p-value is smaller than any other (p-value= 0.0000000000016049523146379<0.05), indicating that whenever anger occurred as a response to verbal irony, Greek subjects reported experiencing much greater intensities than Spanish subjects.

Table 2.3 Intensities anger

	Angry/Spain	Angry/Greece
	2	5
	3	5
	2	4
	1	3
	2	4
	2	4
	2	5
	2	4
	1	3
	1	5
	3	3
	1	5
	3	5
	3	4
	3	5
	2	4
	2	4
	1	5
	3	3
	4	4
	3	5
	4	5
	3	3
	4	5
	4	4
	3	5
	4	4
	4	4
	5	4
	3	5
	2	5
	1	5
	2	4
	1	4
	1	5
	1	4
	1	4
	4	5
	5	3
	4	4
	3	3
	4	4
	4	5
	2	4
	1	5
	1	5
	1	5
	3	5
	5	5
	5	5
	5	5
	4	5
	3	4
	3	5
	3	4
	4	5
	4	5
	2	5
	5	
	4	
	3	
	5	
	5	
N=	62	57
AVERAGE=	2,838709677	4,385965
STDEV=	1,308152851	0,700877
p-value=	0,0000000000016049523146379	

The fourth emotion examined refers to warmth/elation. Once again, the p-value is lower than 0.05 (p-value= 0.0000249 < 0.05), suggesting that whenever warmth/elation occurred as a result of verbal irony, Spanish participants reported experiencing significantly lower intensities than Greek participants.

Table 2.4 Intensities warmth/elation

	Warmth/Spai	Warmth/Greece
	4	4
	3	5
	1	5
	1	5
	2	4
	4	2
	4	4
	3	4
	2	4
	1	3
	4	3
	4	3
	3	2
	2	1
	3	4
	2	5
	3	5
	2	5
	1	4
	1	5
	2	3
	2	5
	3	4
	2	3
		5
		3
		3
		4
		4
N=	24	29
AVERAGE	2,4583333333	3,827586
STDEV=	1,062366786	1,071346
p-value=	0,000024903	

The fifth emotion examined refers to amusement/glee. For one more time, Greek participants reported greater intensities than Spanish participants, whenever amusement occurred as a result of verbal irony. More specifically, the p-value ($0.00015 < 0.05$) showed that the difference between the two countries was statistically significant.

Table 2.5 Intensities amusement/glee

	Amused/	Amused/Greece
	4	5
	3	4
	1	4
	3	4
	2	2
	3	2
	2	4
	2	3
	4	5
	4	4
	4	4
	2	4
	2	3
	3	2
	4	3
	3	4
	2	5
	1	4
	2	4
	3	4
	1	5
	1	4
	2	3
	3	3
	2	3
	2	4
	4	5
	3	5
	2	5
	3	4
	3	3
	3	3
	4	2
	2	5
	2	4
	3	2
	3	2
	3	1
	3	1
	2	1
	1	4
	1	
	2	
	3	
	2	
	2	
	4	
	3	
	4	
	3	
	3	
	3	
N=	56	44
AVERAGE	2,625	3,5
STDEV=	1,019135	1,151339
p-value=	0,00015	

The next emotion examined refers to contempt. Even though, the average intensity of Greek participants was higher than the one of Spanish participants (3.7/ 3.3), in this case the p-value ($0.15453 > 0.05$) showed that there was no statistical significance between the reported intensities of the two ethnic groups.

Table 2.6 Intensities contempt

	Contempt	Contempt/Greece
	3	2
	4	3
	4	3
	4	4
	4	3
	4	5
	2	5
	3	3
	4	2
	4	4
	2	4
	3	5
	3	4
	2	4
	4	4
		5
		3
		3
		2
		2
		5
		4
		3
		3
		3
		5
		5
		5
		4
		4
		5
N=	15	31
AVERAGE=	3,333333	3,741935
STDEV=	0,816497	1,031754
p-value=	0,15453	

The seventh emotion examined refers to disgust. As in the previous case, even though the average Greek intensities were higher than the Spanish ones (3.75/ 3), the p-value (0.22141 > 0.05) indicated that the difference between the two ethnic groups was not statistically significant.

Table 1.7 Intensities disgust

	Disgusted/Spain	Disgusted/Greece
	3	3
	4	3
	3	4
	3	5
	3	
	2	
	4	
	4	
	3	
	2	
	2	
	3	
N=	12	4
AVERAGE=	3	3,75
STDEV=	0,738549	0,957427
P-value=	0,221413	

Finally, the last emotion examined refers to fear. As previously observed, the average intensities were once again higher in the case of Greek participants (3.3/3), but the p-value ($0.554878 > 0.05$) showed that there was not a significant difference between the two groups.

Table 2.8 Intensities fear

	Fear/Spai	Fear/Greece
	3	3
	4	3
	3	4
	2	
N=	4	3
AVERAGE=	3	3,333333
STDEV=	0,816497	0,57735
p-value=	0,554878	

Overall, regarding intensities, it is clear that in most of the emotions examined (sadness, anxiety, anger, warmth/elation, amusement/glee) there was a significant difference between Greek and Spanish subjects, as Greek subjects reported experiencing emotions more intensely, as a response to verbal irony. The most striking deviation between the two ethnic groups however, was observed in the emotion of anger, as the obtained p-value was far smaller than any other, indicating that the two groups differed the most in their perceived intensities regarding the specific emotion.

Chapter 5

Discussion

Results showed that both countries' participants reported experiencing similar emotional responses within the same negative face scenario (accidentally breaking your neighbor's window/ losing at a tennis match/ running late for a work meeting). In each scenario, participants were presented with five plausible ironic remarks. Therefore, it is evident that different types of verbal irony (sarcasm, satire, rhetorical questions, overstatements, understatements) are able to trigger similar emotional reactions in both ethnic groups.

Based on the results, the different types of verbal irony examined can be placed in two main categories. The first category seems to elicit positive emotions, while the second category seems to elicit negative ones. Satire (i.e. "If it were up to you, you would have missed your own birth") and understatements (i.e. "You might need a bit more practice") belong to the first category, as they commonly trigger positive reactions. More specifically, statistical analysis showed that the choice of positive over negative emotions was significant in the cases of satire and understatements in both Greek and Spanish participants. This result may be attributed to the fact that with satire and understatements the speaker employs humor in order to draw attention to the discrepancy between how things are and how they should have been, without directly challenging the addressee's interpersonal behavior (Leggit and Gibbs, 2000). Instead, the speaker downplays or mutes the criticism that derives from the immediate problematic situation for which the addressee is highly responsible.

Sarcasm ("You are a real professional"), overstatements ("God, this is literally the only thing I needed right now") and rhetorical questions ("You know that the aim is to hit the ball right?") belong to the second category, as they trigger negative reactions instead. More specifically, in the cases of overstatements and rhetorical questions, both countries' choice of negative emotions over positive ones was statistically significant. As far as sarcasm is concerned, even though Greek participants chose negative emotions more often than positive ones, the difference was not statistically

significant, as opposed to Spanish subjects whose choice of negative emotions over positive ones proved to be significant instead. These results may derive from the fact that sarcasm, overstatements and rhetorical questions are considered to be quite aggressive towards the addressee, as they directly challenge his/her abilities and interpersonal behavior (Lee and Katz, 1998, Leggit and Gibbs, 2000). Overall, rhetorical statements seem to be hostile statements which are incongruent with the wish to be liked and appreciated by others.

Hence, one can understand that the attitude the speaker possesses while uttering different types of verbal irony, mirrors the addressee's emotional responses. For example, in satire and understatements the speaker's positive attitude is conveyed to the addressee who seems to experience positive emotions as well. Similarly, the negative attitude of the speaker's while uttering overstatements, sarcasm and rhetorical questions is made manifest to the addressee, causing him to experience similar emotions. Therefore, it is clear that the first hypothesis was confirmed, as ironists seem to not only communicate their emotions to the addressees through the different types of ironic remarks (emotional communication), but also to convey their emotional state to the listener (emotional contagion) (Wharton and Strey, 2019, Hatfield et al. 1994).

Moving on to the second question that raises the issue of cross-cultural responses to verbal irony, it is evident that there are both similarities as well as differences in the way the two groups (Spain and Greece) emotionally react to different types of ironic remarks. First of all, both ethnic groups reported experiencing positive emotions when coming across satire and understatements, whereas both Greek and Spanish participants reported experiencing negative emotions, whenever overstatements and rhetorical questions were addressed to them. Concerning sarcasm, even though both of them reported experiencing negative emotions over positive ones, the result was non-significant in the case of Greek participants.

Results therefore confirmed the first part of our second hypothesis, concerning the existence of substantial cross-cultural similarities in the reported emotional responses of Greek and Spanish university students. The fact that there are similarities between Greek and Spanish reported emotional responses to different types of verbal irony, is highly likely to be attributed to the distinct attitude/emotion that the speaker possesses

while uttering each type of verbal irony, an attitude which does not change cross-culturally (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000) and therefore is communicated and transmitted in the same way in both Greek and Spanish subjects.

Nevertheless, it is clear that even though the dominant emotional experiences are similar in both countries, one should not disregard the fact that the reported emotional reactions of the participants were also influenced by their distinct personality traits, beliefs and values (Lazarus, 1980) that worked as background knowledge influencing evaluations and ultimately altering an individual's emotional reaction. For instance, in the case of satire, even though 24 Greek participants reported experiencing amusement/glee, others experienced anger (8), contempt (8), disgust (2), anxiety (2), sadness (2), joy (1) or even fear (1), when faced with satirical comments. It is important therefore to take into consideration the factor of distinct personality traits, beliefs and values in our analysis as well, as it may also influence the emotional response of a person towards different types of verbal irony.

Moving on, the second part of our second hypothesis was also confirmed, as a remarkable difference that can be observed between the two groups of participants refers to the intensities of their perceived emotional states. Greek university students ascribed greater intensities in their perceived emotional states when faced with verbal irony. More specifically, the most striking deviation in the intensities of Greek and Spanish participants was observed in the emotion of anger ($p\text{-value}=0.0000000000016049523146379 < 0.05$). Why is that the case though?

In the previously discussed research on the role of culture in emotion-antecedent appraisals, Scherer (1997) points out that Spain is considered to be a more urbanized country (level 2/middle level), than Greece (level 1/low level). In the same research, he also found that "respondents in highly urbanized countries tended to attribute generally lower immorality to emotion-eliciting behaviors or events than was the case in less urbanized countries" (Scherer, 1997: 915).

Results of the current research confirm Scherer's findings, as it is clear that a less urbanized country (Greece) ascribed far greater intensities in an emotion that is connected to perceived immorality (anger). Hence, it seems like the different levels of a sociological characteristic (urbanism) that exist between the two countries, are able

to influence the reported intensities of emotions of Greek and Spanish subjects in the expression of verbal irony as well.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

Researchers interested in verbal irony would probably debate on whether the utterance “You sure made my day” (in the context of accidentally breaking your neighbor’s window), purposely violates the maxim of quality to implicate a disdainful attitude towards the thought expressed, or an echoic interpretation attributed to someone else with a mocking attitude. Meanwhile, some would claim that the speaker is pretending to be an unknowing person who adheres to cultural norms and expectations even when those are violated, while addressing an unknowing audience that espouses such thoughts, always expressing an attitude of scorn/ridicule towards both the utterance itself and the unknowing audience.

Nevertheless, the focus of this study is not on the ironist and the process of producing an ironic remark, but on the recipient of such an utterance and his/her emotional reaction to it. In order to establish connections between different types of verbal irony and emotional responses, but also to explore cross-cultural emotional responses to different types of verbal irony, I first examined the speaker’s attitude and how different pragmatic theories approach this issue. Moreover, the notions of emotional communication (Wharton and Strey, 2019) and emotional contagion (Hatfield et al. 1994) were employed, providing valuable insights to the reasons lying behind similarities and differences.

Results confirmed the first hypothesis regarding the presumed connection that exists between positive emotions, understatements and satire, but also the connection between negative emotions, rhetorical questions, overstatements and sarcasm. It is evident that within the exact same scenario, the perceived emotion as reported by the participants is modified, depending on the type of final ironic remark. Hence, it seems that the different attitudes accompanying different types of verbal irony (positive in satire/understatements; negative in sarcasm/overstatements/rhetorical questions) influence the addressee, as the speaker transmits knowledge concerning his emotional state and the addressee seems to not only grasp his interlocutor’s attitude (emotional

communication), but to also experience similar emotions (emotional contagion) as a response (Wharton and Strey, 2019, Hatfield et al. 1994).

With regards to the second question that concerns the similarities and differences in the emotional responses of Spanish and Greek participants, both hypotheses were verified. Firstly, it is clear that the reported emotional responses were similar. With satire and understatements, both groups reported positive emotions, whereas with overstatements, sarcasm and rhetorical questions both Greek and Spanish subjects reported negative emotions instead. These similarities can be attributed to the speaker's own attitude while uttering each type of verbal irony, an attitude that seems to remain constant cross-culturally (i.e. hostile attitude in rhetorical questions/humorous attitude in satire) (Leggitt and Gibbs, 2000). It is natural therefore that starting with the same import (speaker's attitude/emotion), emotional communication and emotional contagion will work in a similar way for ethnic groups, resulting in similar reported emotional responses in both Greek and Spanish settings.

The second hypothesis suggesting that there would be differences in intensities due to divergent sociocultural norms and values was also verified, as overall, Greeks attributed greater intensities in the emotions experienced, in the context of verbal irony. More specifically, the most evident difference between the two cultures was traced in the intensities regarding the emotion of anger. Whenever anger was experienced as a result of verbal irony, Greek students attributed much higher intensities, a fact that can be explained, if one considers Scherer's claims according to which Greece is considered to be a less urbanized country than Spain and in general less urbanized countries seem to attribute higher levels of immorality in emotion-eliciting events/behaviors, than more urbanized ones. Hence, an emotion that is clearly experienced as a result of perceived immorality (anger) would have a greater impact on Greek participants than Spanish, a claim that certainly needs to be further researched and supported by a larger amount of experimental data.

At this point, it should be noted that the results of this research were based on participants' perceived emotional responses and intensities of emotions and not actual ones. Greek and Spanish subjects reported how they imagined they would have reacted under specific circumstances. It is possible therefore, that a person may have reacted slightly differently to the specific scenarios in real life, an assumption that

does not however cancel the findings of this study, with strong indications for the connection of different types of verbal irony to specific emotional reactions cross-culturally.

Future research on the topic could bear a wider cross-cultural character, including participants of more countries. Such a study would provide even stronger evidence on the fact that a speaker's attitude plays a crucial role in meaning interpretation and therefore should be given more attention in the field of pragmatics in the future. Besides, as Sperber and Wilson claim, being aware of what others have in mind "makes us see things in a new light, makes us like or dislike things, makes us rethink the past and anticipate the future differently" (Sperber and Wilson, 2015: 140).

Appendix 1

ENGLISH QUESTIONNAIRE

This research is held with a view to completing my post-graduate thesis on “Linguistics: Theory and Applications” in the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. I am interested in cross-cultural differences in terms of how Greek and Spanish people emotionally react to different types of verbal irony. You are kindly asked to read carefully three different scenarios with five possible responses to each scenario. For each response, please circle how you would feel and how intensely you would feel this emotion under the specific circumstances.

This research is anonymous. Your answers will be used only for the above mentioned purpose. The questionnaire lasts about 15 minutes. In case of any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact me: mariannatritou@yahoo.com

Thank you in advance,

Marianna Tritou.

Scenario no.1

You accidentally break your neighbor’s window while playing basketball. Your neighbor says:

1. You ruined my house!

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

2. You sure made my day!

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

3. Dear, please be a bit more careful in the future.

Circle how do you feel?

- (i) amused, gleeful, merry
- (j) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (k) sad, downhearted and blue
- (l) angry, irritated and mad
- (m) fearful, scared and afraid
- (n) anxious, tense and nervous
- (o) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (p) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

4. They should make you play professionally!

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed

(h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

5. Don't you know that glass breaks?

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

Scenario no.2

You've just lost a tennis match and your opponent was way better than you. Your sister says:

2. You are a real professional!

Circle how do you feel?

- (i) amused, gleeful, merry
- (j) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (k) sad, downhearted and blue
- (l) angry, irritated and mad
- (m) fearful, scared and afraid
- (n) anxious, tense and nervous
- (o) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (p) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

3. Even mum could play better than you!

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

4. You might need a bit more practice.

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

4.Rafael Nadal applauds you!

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

5. You know that the aim is to hit the ball right?

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

Scenario no. 3

You are running late for a meeting at work and you ask a colleague to cover for you. He says:

1. You are always so responsible!

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

2. God, this is literally the only thing I needed right now!

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

3.If it were up to you, you'd miss your own birth!

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

4. You might need to hurry up a bit.

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

5. Don't you know that there are rules here?

Circle how do you feel?

- (a) amused, gleeful, merry
- (b) warmhearted, joyful and elated
- (c) sad, downhearted and blue
- (d) angry, irritated and mad
- (e) fearful, scared and afraid
- (f) anxious, tense and nervous
- (g) disgusted, turned off and repulsed
- (h) scornful, disdainful and contemptuous

On a scale of 1 to 5, circle how intensely you feel this emotion.

1.(not at all) 2. (Only a little) 3. (To some extent) 4. (rather much) 5. (very much)

APPENDIX 2

GREEK QUESTIONNAIRE

Η παρούσα έρευνα διεξάγεται με σκοπό τη διεκπεραίωση διπλωματικής εργασίας που αφορά το μεταπτυχιακό « Γλωσσολογία: Θεωρία και εφαρμογές» του Εθνικού και Καποδιστριακού Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών. Το ενδιαφέρον μου στρέφεται στις διαπολιτισμικές διαφορές μεταξύ Ελλήνων και Ισπανών όσον αφορά την αντιμετώπιση διαφόρων ειδών ειρωνίας. Καλείστε να διαβάσετε με προσοχή τρία σενάρια με πέντε διαφορετικές απαντήσεις. Για κάθε απάντηση επιλέγετε πως θα νιώθατε και σε τι βαθμό στη συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση.

Η συγκεκριμένη έρευνα είναι ανώνυμη. Τα στοιχεία σας θα χρησιμοποιηθούν μόνο για το παραπάνω σκοπό. Η συμπλήρωση του ερωτηματολογίου διαρκεί περίπου 15 λεπτά. Σε περίπτωση οποιασδήποτε απορίας επικοινωνήστε μαζί μου: mariannatritou@yahoo.com

Ευχαριστώ εκ των προτέρων για τη συμμετοχή σας,

Μαριάννα Τρίτου.

Σενάριο No.1

*Σπας καταλάθος το παράθυρο του γείτονά σου παίζοντας μπάσκετ.
Ο γείτονάς σου λέει:*

1. Μου κατέστρεψες το σπίτι!

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3. Έτσι και έτσι 4. Πολύ 5. Πάρα πολύ

2. Σίγουρα μου έφτιαξες τη μέρα.

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3. Έτσι και έτσι 4. Πολύ 5. Πάρα πολύ

3. Αγάπη μου, να είσαι λίγο πιο προσεκτικός/-ή στο μέλλον.

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3. Έτσι και έτσι 4. Πολύ 5. Πάρα πολύ

4. Πρέπει να σε βάλουν να παίξεις επαγγελματικά ε?

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3.Έτσι και έτσι 4.Πολύ 5.Πάρα πολύ

5. Δεν ξέρεις ότι το γιαλί σπάει?

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικήτητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3.Έτσι και έτσι 4.Πολύ 5.Πάρα πολύ

Σενάριο No.2

Έχεις μόλις ηττηθεί σε έναν αγώνα τέννις και ο/η αντίπαλός σου ήταν πολύ καλύτερος/η από εσένα. Η αδερφή σου λέει:

1. Είσαι πραγματικός/ή επαγγελματίας!

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικήτητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3.Έτσι και έτσι 4.Πολύ 5.Πάρα πολύ

2. Μέχρι και η μαμά θα έπαιζε καλύτερα από εσένα!

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3.Έτσι και έτσι 4.Πολύ 5.Πάρα πολύ

3. Μάλλον χρειάζεσαι λίγη ακόμα προπόνηση.

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3.Έτσι και έτσι 4.Πολύ 5.Πάρα πολύ

4. Ο Ραφαέλ Ναδάλ σε χειροκροτεί!

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3. Έτσι και έτσι 4. Πολύ 5. Πάρα πολύ

5. Ξέρεις ότι σκοπός είναι να χτυπήσεις τη μπάλα έτσι?

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3. Έτσι και έτσι 4. Πολύ 5. Πάρα πολύ

Σενάριο No. 3

Έχεις αργήσει για ένα meeting και ζητάς από έναν συνάδελφό σου να σε καλύψει. Εκείνος σου λέει:

1. Πάντα είσαι τόσο υπεύθυνος!

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3. Έτσι και έτσι 4. Πολύ 5. Πάρα πολύ

2. Θεέ μου, αυτό ήταν κυριολεκτικά το μόνο πράγμα που μου έλειπε αυτή τη στιγμή!

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3. Έτσι και έτσι 4. Πολύ 5. Πάρα πολύ

3. Εάν ήταν στο χέρι σου, θα έχανες την ίδια σου τη γέννηση!

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ) θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό

- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3.Έτσι και έτσι 4.Πολύ 5.Πάρα πολύ

4. Μάλλον πρέπει να βιαστείς λιγάκι.

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ)θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3.Έτσι και έτσι 4.Πολύ 5.Πάρα πολύ

5. Δεν το ξέρεις ότι υπάρχουν κανόνες εδώ μέσα?

Τι νιώθεις? Κύκλωσε.

- (α) διασκέδαση, ευδιαθεσία, χαρά
- (β) ζεστασιά, συμπόνια, χαρά
- (γ) θλίψη, απογοήτευση, μελαγχολία
- (δ)θυμό, ενόχληση, οργή
- (ε) φόβο, τρόμο, εκφοβισμό
- (ζ) άγχος, ένταση, νευρικότητα
- (η) αηδία, απέχθεια, απώθηση
- (θ) περιφρόνηση, υποτίμηση, καταφρόνηση

Από το 1(καθόλου) έως το 5 (πάρα πολύ) πόσο έντονα νιώθεις αυτό το συναίσθημα? Κύκλωσε.

1. Καθόλου 2. Λίγο 3.Έτσι και έτσι 4.Πολύ 5.Πάρα πολύ

APPENDIX 3

SPANISH QUESTIONNAIRE

Esta investigación se lleva a cabo con el objetivo de completar la tesis del posgrado de “Lingüística: teoría y aplicaciones” en la Universidad Nacional y Kapodistria de Atenas. El presente estudio se focaliza en las diferencias interculturales, en concreto, de cómo reaccionan emocionalmente los griegos y los españoles a diferentes tipos de ironía verbal. A los participantes, se les pide que lean atentamente tres escenarios diferentes con cinco posibles respuestas a cada escenario. Para cada respuesta, el participante debe marcar con un círculo cómo se sentiría y con qué intensidad sentiría esta emoción en las circunstancias específicas descritas.

Esta investigación es anónima. Sus respuestas se utilizarán únicamente para el propósito mencionado anteriormente. El cuestionario dura aproximadamente 15 minutos. En caso de cualquier pregunta contacte a: mariannatritou@yahoo.com

Gracias de antemano por su participación,

Marianna Tritou.

Escenario num. 1

Accidentalmente rompes la ventana de la casa de tu vecino mientras estás jugando a baloncesto. Tu vecino dice:

1. ¡Has destrozado mi casa!

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdeñoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

2. ¡Seguro que me has alegrado el día!

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdenoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

3. Querido, tenga un poco más de cuidado en el futuro.

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdenoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

4. Deberían hacerte jugar profesionalmente!

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdenoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

5. ¿No sabes que el cristal se rompe?

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdeñoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

a. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

Escenario num. 2

Acabas de perder un partido de tenis y tu oponente era mucho mejor que tú. Tu hermana dice:

1. ¡Eres un verdadero profesional!

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdeñoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

2. ¡Nuestra madre podría jugar mejor que tú!

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdenoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

3. Es posible que necesites un poco más de práctica.

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdenoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

4. ¡Rafael Nadal te aplaude!

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdenoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

5. ¿Sabes que el objetivo es darle a la pelota?

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdeñoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

Escenario num. 3

Llegas tarde a una reunión y le pides a un colega que te cubra. Tu colega dice:

1. ¡Estás siendo muy responsable!

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdeñoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

2. ¡Dios mío, esto es literalmente lo único que necesitaba en este momento!

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdeñoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

3. Es posible que quieras darte un poco de prisa.

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdeñoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

4. Si fuera por ti, ¿te perderías tu propio nacimiento!

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdeñoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

5. ¿No sabes que hay reglas aquí?

¿Cómo te sientes? Haz un círculo.

- (a) divertido, contento, feliz
- (b) afectuoso, alegre, entusiasmado
- (c) triste, desanimado, triste
- (d) enojado, irritado, furioso
- (e) con miedo, asustado, preocupado
- (f) ansioso, tenso, nervioso
- (g) disgustado, apagado, rechazado
- (h) despreciado, desdeñoso, rechazado

En una escala del 1 al 5, ¿con qué intensidad siente esta emoción? Haz un círculo.

1. (nada) 2. (sólo un poco) 3. (hasta cierto punto) 4. (bastante) 5. (mucho)

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