2026-10-08T22:59:19Zhttps://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/frontend/oaipmh

oai:lib.uoa.gr:uoadl:5363160 2026-03-24T07:51:39.456Z born_digital_postgraduate_thesis

uoadl:5363160 https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/object/5363160 born_digital_postgraduate_thesis Διπλωματική Εργασία Postgraduate Thesis Plato’s Lysis and Aristotle’s Notion of Friendship 2026 English XIE YANAN XIE YANAN Plato’s Lysis forms the background for Aristotle’s analysis of friendship (philia, φιλία). The dialogue raises four central questions: who is the friend—the lover or the beloved? Are friends alike or unlike? Are friends good or bad people? And what is the deep ground of loving friends? Although Socrates leaves each of these issues in aporia, Aristotle’s account of friendship offers systematic and philosophically illuminating responses. These responses together yield a comprehensive picture of Aristotelian friendship. Friendship is grounded more in loving than in being loved; both similarity and difference can give rise to friendship, though in distinct forms; and while bad people may be friends only in a qualified sense, good people—despite their self-sufficiency—still require friends. The account culminates in Aristotle’s claim that friends are “another self,” a claim that explains why friendship is necessary for decent people without reducing friendship simply to self-love. Plato’s Lysis forms the background for Aristotle’s analysis of friendship (philia, φιλία). The dialogue raises four central questions: who is the friend—the lover or the beloved? Are friends alike or unlike? Are friends good or bad people? And what is the deep ground of loving friends? Although Socrates leaves each of these issues in aporia, Aristotle’s account of friendship offers systematic and philosophically illuminating responses. These responses together yield a comprehensive picture of Aristotelian friendship. Friendship is grounded more in loving than in being loved; both similarity and difference can give rise to friendship, though in distinct forms; and while bad people may be friends only in a qualified sense, good people—despite their self-sufficiency—still require friends. The account culminates in Aristotle’s claim that friends are “another self,” a claim that explains why friendship is necessary for decent people without reducing friendship simply to self-love. Θετικές Επιστήμες Science