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Tutor: Dr. Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos

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Name: Dimitrios Maos

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**“Political Change and Cultural Conflict: A Comparison between Modern Greece
and Modern Turkey.”**

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1. Introduction: From Cultural Dualism to Cultural Conflict?

This dissertation aims to research political and societal developments in Modern Greece and Modern Turkey by employing recent theoretical paradigms coming from the fields of political science (the study of modernization and institutionalism), sociology (the study of nations and nationalism in the long term) and history (reference to important historical events and their role in shaping collective identities). Its starting point will be the re-examination of the famous interpretive scheme “Traditionalists vs. Modernizers” (Weberian ideotypes) developed by several academics¹ who study political developments with regard to the evolving relationship between politics and culture². This scheme applied in the case of Modern Greece concludes that there exists a “cultural dualism”, namely two competing and conflicting cultural traditions, the underdog culture and the modernising culture, which shape the form and substance of the country’s path towards modernization, better defined as political / institutional change. In the case of Modern Turkey, there also exists a “cultural dualism” falling into the same category (Traditionalists vs. Modernizers) and this takes the form of tension between secularism and Islamic tradition, Turkism and Ottoman multiculturalism, centralism and *adem-i merkeziyetçilik*³ and recently between Pro-Europeans and Nationalists.

This study intends to show that both the Greek and Turkish Nations can be better understood, conceptualized and analyzed as “Zones of Cultural Conflict”⁴. Therefore it moves a step further than cultural dualism and explores cultural conflict in its dialectic sense. It posits that both Nations consist of culturally diverse ethnic identities, formed and transformed through conflict, shaken by the unpredictable challenges of modernity, and thus riven by cultural wars (taking the form of crises

¹ E.g. Diamandouros, Mouzelis and others in the Greek case.

² In one word “political culture”.

³ Against the centralisation, it claims de-centralization.

⁴ For a full account of this paradigm see J. Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, Sage Pbs, London- Thousand Oaks- New Delhi, 2005.

within the society and/or the political system) that threaten national cohesion, yet offer multiple opportunities in times of change. National identity is so deeply implicated in our modern consciousness because the collective identities on which it is based are embedded by centuries of cultural conflicts, memories or representations of which are carried into the modern world by several institutions (e.g. public administration, interest groups-social movements and their possible “link” with political parties, political parties, religious institutions, education etc.). Because they are so deeply institutionalized, the rise of the modern nation and processes of modernization are accompanied by struggles of legitimacy with traditional power holders and this conflict is what creates and potentially supersedes the dualism.

This interpretation views the Greek and Turkish Nations not as being “passive” outgrowths of modern forces (modernization, secularism, Europeanization etc.) but as dynamic, long term historical processes that structure the forms of modernity. However, at the same time, it takes into account that collectivities and individuals have multiple and conflicting identities (sometimes transferred into the ideological terrain or civil society organizations) over which there can be no final consensus. Therefore this study aims to analyze and compare the enduring character of the Modern Greek and Modern Turkish Nation(s) with the important role of cultural conflict and contest in their formation (shaping collectivities), and to argue that the preservation of persisting differences and rival cultural repertoires is one of the important reasons for the adaptability of the two nations throughout two centuries of tumultuous (political and economic) change.

Questions this study will attempt to approach include the following:

1. The study of how older ethnic formations which predate the modern world (e.g. arising from religion, imperial expansion, long distance trade, Great Power rivalries) have been crystallized, have survived (in the form of multiple or layered pasts) and then have been embedded by several institutions. Although modernization scholars tend to view nations as products of

modernizing and anti-traditionalist states that erode older identifications, modernization also intensifies the challenges to state autonomy. To secure the survival of the nation and consolidate their rule, political elites must ally with older collective identities (which I have referred to above) in various forms (e.g. populism, moderate Islamic parties, clientelism or informal networks), which then have a directive effect (political or social conflict, economic effects) on modern societies.

2. Owing to their multiple heritages (both were former imperial powers), the Greek and Turkish Nations are riven by long running cultural conflicts that espouse radically different views of the structure of politics, the status of social groups, economic and social policies, foreign policy etc. By relating these rival visions to traumatic or victorious historical events, cleavages or geopolitical ramifications, it explores the functions and consequences of such conflicts in the shaping of these two societies. On the one hand, they institutionalize cultural pluralism, but, on the other, they can lead to polarization (political/electoral competition or elite manipulation/propaganda) that at times erupts into societal crisis. The persistence of these cultural conflicts undermines the modernist assumption that nations demonstrate a trend towards homogenization.
3. A revivalist “cultural” nationalism crystallizes from the conflict between traditionalism and modernization, mentioned above. “Revivalism”, in various senses such as ideological/hegemonic discourses by political parties, religious upsurges (Islamic movement in Turkey, discourse of the Greek Orthodox church), representation of the nations’ position by the Media and the dominant representations in the teaching of history in elementary schools, gains wider resonance when society is faced with external or internal challenges. Then, nations have to innovate and this is done by “cultural borrowing” which in

some cases is derived by re-defining what is authentic tradition whereas in other cases is derived by externally-driven modernization (e.g. Europeanization, conforming to International/EU standards and requirements/obligations). However, this process does not eradicate older identifications and divisions bedevil the core of the Nation.

4. This study will attempt to study the evolving relationship between statism (secular state, democratization, institutionalism) and nationalism which is at the core of the question of nation-state sovereignty. The state-elites ideological orientation towards modernization from above sometimes comes in line and sometimes into conflict with the wider needs and viewpoints of the masses from below. Unpredictable factors such as Economic recessions (low productivity), social inequalities (unemployment), religious conflicts and foreign policy challenges (Kosovo/Iraq war, Cyprus issue, EU conditionality, American involvement in national issues) trigger movements for and against the Greek and Turkish nation-states.

5. Finally, the findings of the previous areas of study will be applied to contemporary debates about subordination of nation-state loyalties to more extensive global, regional (e.g., the EU) and religious identities (e.g. the Huntingtonian “Clash of Civilizations” argument). It will argue that in the long term (*longue duree*) the two nations have been agents of regional, global (e.g. role of merchants- especially maritime transport- and the Ottoman administration in the Balkans and elsewhere, role of Ancient Greek culture and “Ottoman orientalism/despotism” (as otherness) in forming the Western Europe’s ideals) and religious (Orthodoxy, Islam) networks and that the historical process of globalization (World Wars, imperial aftermaths, political divisions at a global scale) is precisely that which has resulted in the crystallization of their ethnic layers. Because their national heritages are

multilayered, and globalization itself is not unitary but multiple, disaggregated and contradictory in its forms, the two nations can select from a range of options by which to preserve their identity and achieve social progress. This process of selection is natural and can bring about cultural conflict, through which social change is structured.

2. Modernity as the Engine of Political Change and Cultural Conflict.

Fixing the origins of modernity is in a sense to answer the question of what one thinks the key defining moments of modernity are. Most accounts of modernity point to significant developments in European culture that took place first during the Italian Renaissance and then were later spread north engendering a second period of change known as the Reformation. No matter where one locates the “causal” rupture with the Medieval or (feudal) past, a common theme is the basic shift in organisational structure from “universalism” of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church, to the “particularism” of the sovereign nation state. Along with this go the familiar stories of the social structural shift underlying and justifying this transference of authority from the “overarching” imperium of the Pope or Emperor throughout Christendom, to the localized territorial prerogative of competing absolutist monarchs self-contained within bounded communities⁵.

Exactly which forces were “driving” this change and the interaction among and between the key social structures identified by Michael Mann as the economy, military, political and ideological⁶ is up to endless contestation, even before one introduces the Marxian objection that Mann’s Weberian inspired analysis “artificially” fragments the “social totality”, thereby by-passing the issue of class struggle as the primary engine of historical change. Whether or not one favours Marx or Weber in social analysis is open to theoretical as much as empirical argument and as such demonstrates the limitations of a strictly “sociological” approach to questions that are also inherently political and cultural-philosophical. Questions about

⁵ K.C. Fitzpatrick, *The Three Waves of Modernity and the devolution of modern political theory*, notes from lecture delivered at the **International Political Theory** Workshop, LSE, **March 1, 2002**.

⁶ See M. Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, Vols. 1&2, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986, 1993.

modernity go straight to questions of political theory, how and why states and societies are organised the way they are, looking to questions of purpose and principles, reflected and embedded in even bigger issues of cosmology and metaphysics that ground and give content to more “practical” and limited questions of social and historical investigation. For this reason, and for the sheer fact that these kinds of questions are increasingly marginalized and ignored in our increasingly functionalist and technological culture, I would like to “revalue these values”, tip the balance, and engage the question on the level of culture and political theory, in an effort to open up an area suffering from intellectual neglect.

State-building and Nationalism are parts of the developmental process of modernity (and perhaps now post-modernity) for a group of people who regard themselves as culturally (which may mean politically or ethnically) homogeneous, exercising this in the form of a nation-state. According to a group of scholars⁷ following the Weberian argument, the modern bureaucratic state is the source and framework of nations and nationalism, and political and military factors are the key to explaining their emergence. In the pre-modern era, the lack of cross-class national consciousness and the existence instead of an elite-based (dynastic) consciousness reflects the existence of what M. Mann calls **proto-nations**. The cross-class nation emerged only towards the end of the 18th century, because of the ongoing fiscal crisis and the ascendance of militarism. The military revolution successively motivated the penetration of the state into civil society: in part to secure funding, in part to mobilize economic resources and military manpower. This distinctively modern penetration of society by the state has proven to be a two-edged sword: it has created national identities and loyalties, but it has also mobilized classes to participate with the full weight of their numbers in an overarching arena and to struggle for political representation and other concessions in response to fiscal demands. Thus, according to the state-centered model, the development of the state through the expansion of its own specific resource, the organization of military power, determines whether classes can be mobilized at all as political and cultural actors. However, the same process of state penetration into society simultaneously mobilizes nationalist movements⁸.

⁷ E.g. M. Mann, M. Howard, C. Tilly and the historian W. H. McNeill.

⁸ R. Collins, *Macrohistory: Essays in Sociology of the Long Run*, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, California, 1999, Introduction.

A focus of this thesis will be on nationalism as not only a stage of development in modernity but an ongoing process of development within modernity⁹. Civic and ethnic nationalism are the classifications to be used in this examination, but they are respectively analogous or highly similar to political, core or Western nationalism, and peripheral, Eastern, or cultural nationalism. The civic model views the nation as a territorial community united by the common political will of its members, the nexus of which is citizenship. Meanwhile, the ethnic model casts the nation as a quasi-kinship group, whose members unite as a community of descent, the core of which is a unique history and culture. In an influential typology, Hans Kohn designated the former as “Western”, democratic and rational, and the latter as an “irrational”, “Eastern” reaction to the West, which culminated in the totalitarian nationalisms of the 20th century¹⁰. In practice, most nations are a combination of civic and ethnic identities. Even France, the classic civic nation, rests on a substratum of medieval myths and memories, and Germany, an archetypical ethnic nation, offers citizenship to categories of non-ethnic “territorial” Germans. The potency of the nation in the modern world derives from its success both as the engine of collective power and progress, and as the source of unique identity and rootedness in a continuously changing world; this is because nations, as many analysts have pointed out¹¹, are janus-faced: on the one hand, oriented to an ancient (often imaginary) ethnic past; on the other, futuristic in mobilizing populations for collective autonomy and progress. My argument is that civic and ethnic nationalism are not, as often presented, part of a dichotomy of nationalism set against one another but are two intermingling components of the one ideology and subjectivity of modern nationalism. The key distinction between the two is their focus, the point around which people (not just elites but also the masses) begin to identify and imagine themselves as a community: that is, the inception of the national community relative to congruent state development and the conception of nationhood.

Closely related to this central distinction between a civic and an ethnic conception of nationality is the division which characterizes the academic study of the origins of nations and nationalism. There are two main schools of thought: the **modernists** and

⁹ Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*, Second Edition, London, New Left Books, 1977, p.334

¹⁰ H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York: Macmillan, 1945.

¹¹ See Nairn 1977...op.cit.

the **ethnicists** (or **ethnosymbolists**). The former acknowledge the fact that the initiative of a nation's creation generally emanates from very small minorities (elites) who frame and diffuse a discourse designated to convince the masses that they belong to a common entity. Hence, this suggests that the nation is an 'imagined community' and that national identities are inventions. The latter emphasize the importance of pre-modern ethnic ties (common myths, memories, symbols and cultures) for modern nationalism and national identity. A certain level of cultural homogeneity, based on ethnic roots, is a prerequisite of a national identity. In short modernists, advocating a civic dimension of nationality, hold that it is through citizenship that communities or identities are constituted, while ethnicists, defending the ethnic dimension maintain that pre-existing identities or communities (ethnies) form the citizenship, or the polity¹².

Modernists reject what they see as the "primordialist" assumptions that have pervaded the scholarship on nationalism: that nations are historical givens, have been a continuous presence in human history and exert some inherent power over both past and present generations. They also reject a more moderate "perennialist" position, that nations can be found in many eras before that modern period. From the modernist perspective, nations are outgrowths of modernization or rationalization as exemplified in the rise of the bureaucratic state, industrial economy and secular concepts of human autonomy. The pre-modern world is one of heterogeneous political formations (of empire, city-state, theocratic territories) legitimated by dynastic and religious principles, marked by linguistic and cultural diversity, fluid or disaggregated territorial boundaries and enduring social and regional stratifications. This putatively disappears in favour of a world of nation-states. Such interpretations emphasize five major aspects of these formations¹³. Nations are:

1. secular political units, infused with ideas of popular sovereignty, which seek realization in the achievement of an independent state, united through universalistic citizenship rights;
2. consolidated territories, that exemplify the new scales of organization brought about by the bureaucratic state and market economy that have eroded regional

¹² Μ. Χατζόπουλος 2002, "Έθνος και Εθνικισμός. Συνοπτική επισκόπηση ενός σύγχρονου επιστημονικού διαλόγου", *Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης*, Τεύχος 19, Μάιος 2002, Σ. 109-127.

¹³ J. Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism*, London: Fontana Press, 1994, pp. 4-6.

and local loyalties and engendered more intensive networks of communication;

3. ethnically and culturally homogeneous compared with earlier polyethnic societies, by virtue of state policies, including the promotion of official languages, the inculcation of a patriotic ethos in education and the expulsion of minorities;
4. high cultural units based on a standard vernacular language, literacy and print capitalism, whose new genres of newspaper and novel provide the necessary basis of an extensive industrial society of strangers;
5. industrial urban societies with a high degree of territorial integration, whose large-scale career pathways create a new mobile middle class that dominates national life.

Yet, the stress on the novelty of nations and their emergence as an outgrowth of “modern” organizational forms, leads to several weaknesses in terms of explanation for several reasons¹⁴:

1. In many periods of history ethnicity provides an important framework of collective identity and of collective political action.
2. Modernists fail to acknowledge the many different sources of dynamism and unpredictability in the pre-modern era that can act as catalysts of ethnic formation.
3. Although many ethnic identities do face erosion, others become embedded in vernacular literatures, religious institutions and legal codes and take on a larger social and political salience, similar, in many aspects, to the modern nation.
4. Because the sources of ethnic formation are multiple, most long-lived ethnic cultures are multilayered, which provides ethnic communities with alternatives at times of crises.
5. An overemphasis on the statist character of the nation fails to acknowledge the vulnerability of the state in the modern world that leads to ethno-communal revivals seeking to restructure the modern political community, redefining its territorial extent, cultural character and conceptions of citizenship. Since these

¹⁴ J. Hutchinson 2005...op.cit...pp. 12-13.

movements may arise within dominant as well as minority nationalities, this means ethnicity cannot be dismissed as a residual or reactive principle. It is an important regulatory principle of contemporary politics, concerned with questions of the moral content and the boundaries of a collectivity over which power is exercised, rather than of power, *per se*.

6. Older ethnic principles define to a considerable degree the nature of such revivals, and hence have a directive effect in the formation of the modern nation.

3. The Role of Ethnicity and Cultural Contestation in National Formation.

Although ethnicity invokes a sense of rootedness, nations display competing conceptions of descent, history, culture and territory. This runs against the modernists' proclivity to view nations as culturally homogeneous, a tendency that arises out of their functional interpretation of culture as "value-empty", the role of which is to provide a communicative field for strangers integrated by citizenship rights. Yet analysts have pointed to the contemporary cultural conflicts visible within many countries¹⁵.

To postmodernists this eruption of difference marks the end of the era of unitary identities that was characteristic of the modern period and the shift to a new postnational world of multiple attachments. But cultural conflicts are not something novel, nor are they the transitional problems of relatively new national projects. Recurring internal differences are a typical feature of nation-formation (as of ethnic groups), for nations are geographically mobile and the balances between regions, between secular and religious institutions and between classes and status groups are continually being upset. The assumption that there is a trend towards homogenization means that the centrality of cultural contestation in nation-formation has been neglected. Even "established" nations are riven by embedded cultural differences that generate rival symbolic and political projects, and that have persisted from the mid-19th century into the contemporary period¹⁶.

¹⁵ see C. Young (ed.), *The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-state at Bay?*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.

¹⁶ E.g. see analyses of A.D. Smith 1984, "National Identity and Myths of Ethnic Descent", *Research in Social Movements, Conflict, Change*, 7, 95-130 and G. Hosking & G. Schopflin (eds.), *Myths and Nationhood*, London: Hurst & Co, 1997.

How does one explain such deep-seated, long-running conflicts, and over what questions do societies polarize? What have been the effects of such conflicts: do they enhance options for society or restrict them by polarizing groups? And what prevents them from leading to social breakdown and civil wars? These are questions which arise over the question of the impact of modernization processes on modern nations which I shall try to address in this and the following sections.

One can try to account for cultural differences reductively by relating the formulation of new symbolic repertoire to class competition in industrializing societies¹⁷. But cultural divisions often predate the modern period and become a matrix for a variety of class constituencies. Often, these divisions reflect a deep attachment to the heritage of a region and its vision of the world. For instance, in Greece, early Greek nationalism, secular and republican, looked to Athens as the capital of a revived Hellas, and was strongest in a mercantile diaspora, influenced by Western European philhellenism. The peasantry, clergy and the notables of the Aegean, however, were gripped by dreams of Orthodoxy: the regaining of Constantinople from the Ottoman Empire and the reconstitution of Byzantium¹⁸. We can explain such recurring divisions as a consequence of the combination of historical regional rivalries, periodic phases of modern state activism, and persisting geo-cultural and geo-political influences. Internal national conflicts often derive from perceptions that the state has historically been the possession of a particular colonizing region which has used it to impose its values, cultural practices and extractive demands on the rest of the population. Such animosities take on a new dimension in the modern world because of the enhanced power of the central state and its tendencies to invade social spheres continually in the name of modernization, which provokes countervailing romantic conceptions of the nation as a site of multiple diversities. Historic differences are thus in part articulated through the competition between cultural agents emphasizing the role of inner traditions, often historically suppressed by an “alien” state, and promoting decentralization or regional liberties, and political nationalists, inspired

¹⁷ E. J. Hobsbawm, “Mass-producing traditions: Europe, 1870-1914” in E. J. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983.

¹⁸ M. Herzfeld, *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology and the Making of Modern Greece*, Austin: Texas Univ. Press, 1982.

often by external (Western) models which seek to modernize the society from a central site.

Competing visions are not always just regionally based. In the case of early 20th century Turkey, the proponents of “Ankara vs Istanbul” division represented radically different views of the structure of politics, the status of social groups, relations between regions, the countryside and the city, economic and social policies and foreign policy. Mustafa Kemal, wishing to build a secular nation-state on the French model, established Ankara as his capital, based in the new heartland area of Turkey-Anatolia- from which he pursued a crusade to undermine the public authority of Islam. He replaced Istanbul, the former capital not only of the failed Ottoman Empire but also of the Caliphate. But a Turkish nationality was thinly based compared to the memories of an Ottoman golden age, and was evoked through concocted ethnic mythologies of the Turks as bearers of the original sun language of humanity. Although today Ankara is the administrative centre, the cultural power still remains with Istanbul. These rival visions have staying power since they reflect the diverse heritages of populations whose geo-political setting continues to expose them to unpredictable impact from several directions. These visions have alternated in power both at the level of state and of “educated society”, with groups, at times switching positions, in part affected by the sense of place and security of the national territory. Therefore, critical historical events may apparently “decide” in favor of a particular vision, as was the case in early 20th century Greece when the intense polarization (*ethnikos dichasmos*) ended in 1922 and the Byzantine dream (*Megale Idea*- Great Idea) was destroyed, after the traumatic defeat at the hands of the Turks, and the territorial settlement and exchange of populations which followed. The division between a European-oriented and insular ethno-religious nationalism muffled by the Great Idea merely took new forms in battles during the interwar period between liberal republicans, monarchists allied to the army and the (populist) socialists. The territorial settlement and exchange of populations after 1922 rendered Greece one of the most (ethno-) religiously homogeneous populations in Europe, with 97% claiming to be Orthodox, which all parties had to acknowledge, but at the same time it brought into the fore new “seeds” of socio-cultural conflict such as the emergence of class consciousness and class parties, recurrent military interventions-coups, the economic and social challenges of assimilating the refugees from Asia Minor, minorities and, in

general, the people from the New Lands and finally intense political-electoral cleavages both at the elite and mass level¹⁹. Therefore, the nation is not simply a space but a geographical milieu and subject to recurring and multiple influences from people, north, south, east and west. It is also situated in time with a layered past, and its different pasts are brought into play to cope with shifting challenges. There can be no final definition of a national identity.

What of the consequences of such divisions? Do such conflicts produce cultural pluralism or rather pathological hostilities that permanently weaken the national community? As several examples indicate (e.g. Russia²⁰), a combination of nationalism and a cult of state-driven modernization has produced a solipsistic extremism. This can be explained in terms of a dangerous mixture of nationalism and older and newer social and political traditions. Cultural conflicts inspired competing investigations to map the national territories, histories and cultural practices, and populations, and such debates served to define, internalize and elaborate a national identity. In spite of intense division, individuals and movements have selected from different camps and shifted from one to the other, at times of crises²¹, recognizing the plural character of the nation's heritage. This implies a recognition that these conflicts are products of a common heritage, but one for which there can be no single definition. Therefore, cultural pluralism is institutionalized through various mechanisms (parties, social groups, church, army, education etc.) but it certainly has limits which, however, remain unclear. As E. Kedourie²² has emphasized, the ambiguity of myths has its own dangers and violence and civil war is a possibility. Such civil wars "within" the family are often marked by greater fanaticism than wars

¹⁹ For a rich and well-referenced account of these challenges and, broadly, of interwar Greek politics and society see the book of G. Th. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1983.

²⁰ See T. McDaniel, *The Agony of the Russian Idea*, Princeton, N.J: Princeton Univ. Press, 1996.

²¹ E.g. see the paradoxical phenomenon of "**Venizelocommunism**" which emerged in interwar Greek politics as a result of the March 1935 military coup and recreated and solidified in a new round of ferocious civil strife the barriers between the two bourgeois blocs...G. Th. Mavrogordatos 1983...op.cit. pp. 345-349.

²² E. Kedourie, *Nationalism*, London: Hutchinson, 1960, Ch. 6.

against a foreign oppressor, and there is also the possibility of separate nations being formed by them²³.

The major difference, however, between modernists and ethnicists arises over the question of the invention or the construction of the nation and the centrality of modern political elites and state institutions in its formation. Ethnicists are critical of what they see as a top-down explanation of culture formation, particularly visible in the interpretations of modernist scholars such as Gellner, Hobsbawm and Kedourie, that conflates nationalism with a political project-mechanism focused on the achievement of legal citizenship and the subversion of traditionalism. The terms “invention” and “construction” have strong connotations not only of novelty but also with intentionality and manipulation. Some modernists have implied that the nation in nation-state is epiphenomenal, a set of rhetorics that accompany what are designated as “modern” social structures. But this raises the problem of **why it seems necessary to invoke ethnic pasts, symbols and cultures in the modern world** (emphasis mine). Unless one assumes that symbols and cultural practices are always epiphenomenal (an extreme materialist position few would defend), it is hard to explain how nationalist ideologies are able to appropriate symbols at will from established cultural systems. As Quentin Skinner has argued²⁴, an account of politics as rational action has to acknowledge that leaders, in order to successfully mobilize populations, must appeal to moral sentiments widely acceptable to the community²⁵, and that elites once they appeal to such sentiments are then constrained in their actions, lest they appear to be opportunistic. It is implausible, therefore, to conceive of modernizing nationalists as outside their society mobilizing it from above. Once invoked, ethnic memories have an independent force with which they have to negotiate. This is to suggest that these agents do not operate within a *tabula rasa*. Hence, what needs to be explored more carefully is the place and utility of complex

²³ See example of Greece during the civil war (1946-9), when the Greek Communist Party (KKE) under the leadership of Zachariadis adopted and supported the creation of an autonomous Macedonia within a (Communist) Balkan Federation.

²⁴ Q. Skinner 1974, “Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action”, *Political Theory*, 2 (3), pp. 277-303.

²⁵ This provided for the genesis of what we term in political-social theory “populism”, a phenomenon which will be examined in the following sections.

symbolic mediations and appropriations by which modernizing nationalists are able to channel the past for their purposes²⁶.

For the reasons I highlighted above we should consider an alternative model of analysis: one that conceives of nations as species of ethnic project, only contingently related to the state, and which recognizes that the power of states to regulate populations is limited and fluctuating. This model should explicitly address:

- The enduring character of nations based on a sense of being embedded in much older communities (*ethnies*) that have survived centuries of vicissitudes;
- The internal cultural revolutions required before nationalists are able to overcome established identities, including ethnic traditions;
- The persistence and functions of cultural difference in nations; and
- The episodic character of nationalist resurgences throughout the modern period.

From this comparative historical perspective we can throw new light on contemporary debates about the future of nationalism, nations and national states in a world marked by globalization, regionalism and religious resurgence. Our analysis in the subsequent sections seeks to combine the study of political modernization in the cases of Modern Greece and Modern Turkey with reference to two apparently antithetical approaches. The first is the *longue durée* “ethnosymbolic” framework developed by such scholars as John Armstrong and Anthony D. Smith, which views nations as dynamic, long term historical processes that structure the forms of modernity. The second is a “postmodernist” framework, which emphasizes that collectivities and individuals have multiple and conflictual identities over which there can be no final consensus. By utilizing these approaches in a comparative manner, I seek to examine whether the modernization process in these two cases has resulted in sovereign and unified societies (unitary sovereign nation-states) as well as to look deeper at the role of contest and conflict in shaping collectivities; in addition, I seek to evaluate the degree of binding power identities exhibit when and once they become institutionalized. Finally, in the last section I seek to explore the impact of contemporary processes of globalization, European integration and religious resurgence on the ability of these

²⁶ J. Hutchinson 2005...op.cit...p. 33.

states to regulate cultural conflict and whether these processes serve as factors empowering or undermining the efforts by national elites to maximize their sovereignty amid globalization (which provokes a restructuring of modern state-ideological-social power).

4. Ethno-genetic Factors as the Roots of Modern Cultural Conflict.

The object of this chapter is to examine the significance of the clear relationship between ethnicity and modern national formation by means of throwing light on three points:

1. ethnic formation is a recurring phenomenon in history, engendered frequently by conflict.
2. ethnic communities have been enduring cultural and political actors in the premodern period, assuming forms often comparable to the modern nation.
3. though nations have novel features, they are products of factors cutting across the premodern-modern divide, and earlier ethnic identities may have a directive effect on nation-formation²⁷

Our purpose will be served by exploring the cases of the Modern Greece's and Modern Turkey's sequences of development, which have a few similarities as well as differences.

In many periods of world history a number of processes have bore responsibility and have acted as catalysts for ethnic formation such as the rise of universalist (scriptural) religions, imperial expansion, warfare, interstate competition and Great Power rivalries, migrations and long distance trade. The intensity and significance of these processes is revealed in their *ethno-genetic* effect, namely the assemblage of myths²⁸, which define for population unique origins (where they come from), location (why they are where they are), a golden age (their unique historical achievements),

²⁷ This is done in two ways: by serving either as a/the basis for new identity-construction or as the significant "other".

²⁸ This is why such processes are characterized as *mythomoteurs*...see J. Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

degeneration (why they have fallen) and regeneration (how they can return to their former glory). They explain the group to itself and fulfil many functions, including the intergenerational reproduction of a sense of group honour that enables survival. Memories are important, especially as portrayed in commemorative rituals of epochal events and heroes that provide role models and lessons for the present. Symbols when encoded in the urban architecture of capital cities, sacred religious texts or sites, legal codes, languages and political charters and constitutions, persist over long expanses of time and space and thereby communicate a sense of group meaning. Finally, a key role is played by social and political institutions such as states, political parties, churches, legal systems, administrations, vernacular languages and literatures whose organisations and communication networks form populations into distinctive cultural communities, which differentiate themselves from others²⁹. In Steven Grosby's terms, a stable ethnicity is dependent on the constitution of a collective imaginative core that, even though it may contain conflicting elements, orients populations through time³⁰.

Although the rise of universalist scriptural religions has been regarded as eroding ethnic affiliations to territory and culture, they have often been catalysts of ethnic and, some would argue, national formation. Despite the prolific literature on nationalism, and the growing literature on religion, there seems to be no general theoretical framework or systematic discussion focusing specifically on the linkage between the two. A framework for differentiating the extent to which religion is a factor in the constitution and continued existence of nationality can be based on the degree to which the this-worldly objects of reference to vitality, lineage (ethnicity) and territory, are incorporated into a particular religion. Put abstractly, where the this-worldly loci of vitality are elements within the religion, then there exists a convergence between religion and nationality. Where they are absent, then there exists a considerable degree of tension between religion and nationality³¹. Religion provides a primordial

²⁹ J. Hutchinson 2005...op.cit...p. 15.

³⁰ S. Grosby, *Biblical Ideas of the Nation: Ancient and Modern*, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2002, p. 244.

³¹ S. Grosby, "Nationality and Religion" in M. Guibernau & J. Hutchinson (eds.), *Understanding Nationalism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, ASEN 2001, p. 109.

line of demarcation, which may be far superior to any other. It is certainly more readily identifiable, clear-cut, exclusive, and impermeable than language, ancestry, or any other relevant criterion. This intrinsic and enduring superiority of religion as a primordial line of national demarcation deserves a far more central place in theories of nationalism. Nationalism has often been compared to a “secular” or “civil” religion. The implication has been that it supersedes religion as such. The reverse side of the same coin, however, is that religion has often provided a ready-made initial core of national identity, which has proved remarkably resilient over the centuries. The weight of religion as an essential core of national identity has often been reinforced by a history of defence against external foes, or else by a history of discrimination and deprivation within multinational states and empires³². Hence, what seems to be the decisive factor which binds religion and ethnic identity together is identification with the land, a territory which delineates the frontier, the shatter zone between two conflicting civilizations such as Christianity and Islam. The global ambitions of rival proselytizing religions brought them (in the form of empires) into military conflict, and states on the fault lines defined themselves as elect polities, destined to be the guards of their civilization. Conflict between Islam and Christianity continued for over one thousand years from the eighth century onwards in two major zones: the Iberian-Mediterranean and Eastern Slav frontiers. The intermittent but recurring conflicts saw several Christian polities, such as Byzantium, define themselves as *antemurale Christianitas*, and Muslim states such as the Ottoman Empire claim *gazi* (“warrior of faith”) status³³.

The universalist thrust in Christianity permitted it to ally with imperial polities (e.g. Roman Empire, Byzantium) and enforce a transethnic high civilization that smothered local ethnic cultures. Nonetheless, Christianity also played a special nationalizing role. The translation of the Bible into different vernacular languages recognized the division of the world into nations, or at least ethnic groups. In the long term, it

³² G. Th. Mavrogordatos, “Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case”, in *West European Politics*, Vol. 26, No 1, January 2003, pp. 117-136...p. 118.

³³ J. Armstrong...1982...op.cit...ch. 3.

allowed cultures to crystallize and promoted national values (development of a vernacular culture)³⁴. Therefore, religion pioneered vernacularisation- the written translation of an oral culture- which enabled what were previously oral cultures to acquire a certain level of fixity, which in turn provided ethnic groups a sense of self-consciousness essential to the creation of nations. Construction of nations in the Christian world was not something independent of Christianity but, rather, something stimulated by the Christian attitude both to language (plurality) and to the state. However, this inevitably created tensions and conflict within Christianity which became all the more clear and important when nations sought their national independence through liberating revolutions (e.g. Balkans). This conflict within Christianity is translated into the following paradox: although Christianity as a religion aspires at universality (illustrated in its ecumenical mission and spirit), its dissemination through national vernacular cultures contributed to the promotion of national values. This argument is contrasted with the Muslim approach; indeed, A. Hastings argues that nations were not constructed by Islam, but deconstructed. For Muslims (at least originally), the Qu’ran cannot be translated. As a consequence, Islam seeks to “*arabise*”, to draw peoples into a single community of language and government.

Islam advocates a clear universalistic vision of the world which aspires at creating a global community with same language and culture. Muslims did not incorporate the Hebrew scriptures into their own as Christians did. They were therefore never affected by the Old Testament state example. Islam offers a political model: the world empire based on the *umma*, a community of faith, but based on the possession of a single, and genuinely sacred, language. Islam was opposed to the idea of a multitude of nation-states, as well as linguistic diversity. Today Muslims are able to accept the structure of the international system, and as argued by Piscatori, there is “an intellectual consensus which sees the nation-state as part of the nature of things and

³⁴ A. Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997.

perhaps as inherently Islamic”³⁵. The main reason for this seems to be that the intellectuals were influenced by Western-style nationalism. This was especially clear in the early 19th century Middle East and became more widespread as European powers competed with one another for influence in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. On the other hand, the Western Presence also led to the development of the concept of “Pan-Islamism” in societies such as Egypt, Syria and India. This concept still offered a territorial separation between “us” and “them” through the idea of an Arab nation. Therefore, as in the case of Christianity that we mentioned above, Islam also developed a tension-conflict between the idea of a unified Muslim community and the unity of a particular and far less inclusive territory. This exhibits a clear conflict between ethics and the logic and the logic of a situation: the ethics demand that pluralism give way to the *umma*, while the logic of events is that in practice, this is impossible. Another group of thought of writers on Islam sees the nation-state as a natural institution which is to be expected in the order of things; this concept is supported by the fact that the reality of ethnic and cultural diversity is actually recognized in the Qu’ran and the divisions between different peoples are seen as “natural”. Finally, a third group advocates the modification of the idea of the nation-state system, and the need for a synthesis which would be both Islamic and modern. In this model, the alternative that emerges is an international system in which the existence of the nation-state is accepted but its power qualified³⁶.

Let us explore now how the tensions among these two religions influenced ethnicity and national formation in the cases of the Greek and Turkish nations. Although the sequences of development portray significant differences, the role of religion has been important in different respects. In the case of Greece, Eastern (Orthodox) Christianity, carried through time by the Greek Church and later on under the guidance of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, had developed and had been preserved in

³⁵ J.P. Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation States*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986, Introduction.

³⁶ Notes taken from the lecture entitled “Religion and Nations”, 23-01-2001, European Institute, Course EU 413- “Warfare, Religion and National Identity”, LSE, Academic year 2000-2001.

the long time by means of the Greek language and/or Greek philosophy. From the old times of the Apostles and the great teachings of Alexandria-based philosophers such as *Clement* and *Origenes* to the times of the great fathers of the Orthodox church such as *Vasileios the Great*, *Cyrillus*, *Gregorius the Theologian* and the philosopher *Pletho* who wrote on Christianity from a Platonic viewpoint, there had been a remarkable fusion between Christianity and Hellenism (in its cultural sense), yet this fusion had occurred under the aegis of Christianity. The heritage of Eastern Christianity which had been preserved thanks to what theologians term the “ecumenical/inclusive” and “missionary” spirit of Orthodox Christianity³⁷, was then transmitted from the Greek church and its apostles to the peoples (mainly Slavs) who migrated to the South and settled in the Balkans from the 6th century onwards. This transmission occurred through the translation of the Holy Scriptures to the languages of the rest of the Orthodox Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula. Orthodoxy played a major culturally unifying role in the region especially after the fall of Constantinople, when the Ecumenical Patriarchate remained the sole heir of the political and spiritual past of the Byzantine Empire. The Patriarchate, in line with the ecumenicity of its mission, had become the mother of all Orthodox churches of the Balkan peoples and their sole refuge against captivity from the Ottoman Empire, at least until the ascendance of nationalist movements at the end of 18th- beginning of 19th century³⁸. In addition, identification on the basis of religion was reinforced from the fact that the Ottoman state recognized one division in society, which was based on religious identity or community (*millet* system). There were four major millets in the Ottoman Empire, and they were the Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Muslims. In essence, the Ottoman “millet system” seemed to have enjoyed widespread legitimacy in the eyes of all communities under the Ottoman jurisdiction until the 19th century. However, the fact that the cultural basis of the Orthodox religion had been the Greek language and the fusion of the culture of Hellenism with Christianity (as reflected in the works of the

³⁷ This is the best translation I can make of the Greek theological terms “Καθολικότητα” and “Αποστολικότητα”.

³⁸ Γ. Ι. Κονιδάρης, *Η Ελληνική Εκκλησία ως Πολιτιστική Δύναμις εν τη Ιστορία της Χερσονήσου του Αίμου*, Εν Αθήναις 1948, Σ. 1-20.

fathers of the church and the decisions of the Ecumenical Synods) provided with the ethnic ingredients that later on (amalgamated with the secular ideas of nationalism and modernization) shaped the, “elusive in content”, Greek nationalism; The author J. Armstrong has pointed to the “precocious nationalism” that took hold of the Greek population of the Byzantine Empire under the last Paleologan emperors and that was directed as much against the Muslim Turks as against the Catholic Latins- an expression of medieval Greek national sentiment as well as a harbinger of later Greek nationalism³⁹.

In the case of Turkey, the Ottoman Sultans were not only the Turkish subjects’ temporal rulers, but also as Caliphs they were spiritual leaders of the Muslim *ömmet* (umma, community), to which they loyally belonged. Most Turks seemed to have believed that they shared the same ethnic origin with the Ottoman dynasty (which after so many years of multiethnic marriages of the Ottoman Sultans was no more than a myth). Moreover, most Turkish subjects of the Empire, and particularly the learned men among them failed to pay any attention to their ethnic origins until the late 19th century⁴⁰. Up until that time, the Ottoman Turks considered the society in which they had been living as the culmination of two processes of development or, in different terms, two historical events: the first had begun with the mission of the Great Prophet, the ascendance of Islam, and the establishment of the Caliphate; the second with the ascendance of the house of *Osman* and the Ottoman Empire. The link between the two had been the raids of the *Seljuk Turks* and the establishment of the *Seljuk Sultanates*, first in Persia and then in Anatolia⁴¹. The identity of a “Turk” was more to do with the nomadic Turks⁴², rather than the gentile power elite of Istanbul, to a certain extent from the same ethnic stock. It was the success of later Turkish nationalism that dramatically transformed such a lowly image of the “Turk” in the Ottoman to an ideal or even an idol of a “Grand Turk” in the eyes of the masses and

³⁹ J. Armstrong...1982...op.cit...pp. 174-181.

⁴⁰ B. Lewis, *Islam in History: Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East*, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1993, pp. 327-328.

⁴¹ B. Lewis, *Η Ανάδυση της Σύγχρονης Τουρκίας*, Τόμος II: Όψεις της Αλλαγής, Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, Αθήνα, 2002, Σ. 22.

⁴² Who were and to a certain extent still are referred to as “Turkmen” in some parts of Turkey.

the elites alike, in a matter of a decade's time. Ethnic or other lineage group identification connoted tribalism, which Islam condemned as a major sin, for such affinities would drive a wedge among Muslim *ümmet* and undermine the solidarity of the Muslims in the world. As the influence in the educational and judicial institutions of the Empire of religion diminished in the latter half of the 19th century many Turkish-Muslim subjects of the Sultan took part in the social and political protests believing that Islam and the traditional order closely intertwined with it were at risk. Modern laws and practices, the legacy of the *Tanzimat reforms* (1839-1877), were introducing Western institutions and morals to an Islamic society and undermining its traditional core. Modern vs. traditional, West vs. Islam, progress vs. going back to the golden ages of the Ottoman grandeur, and other variations of the same theme emerged to divide the Ottoman society into two major *kulturkampfs*⁴³. Those who aspired to be modern and believed in an “Image of Good Society” built around science vs. those who defended the idea of preserving the traditional social order, which inherently possessed an “Image of Good Society” built around religion as tradition gained stability and visibility. Interestingly enough, those on both sides of the divide were still motivated by the goal of rendering the Ottoman political system viable. Neither the modernists, nor the traditionalists seemed to vie for a nationalist solution. Their solutions were more along the lines of manufacturing an Ottoman identity or Ottomanism (*Osmanlıcılık*), or creating or reinforcing Islamic morals and society or Islamism (*İslamcılık*). However, eventually a third way was invented to supplant both of the former two: Turkism (*Türkçülük*)⁴⁴.

Each of the two great universal religions that came to dominate the Mediterranean world by the early Middle Ages provided a legitimizing myth for a distinctive civilization. As the legitimizing developed, the sharply differing identity components derived from the two ways of life (nomadic for Islam, sedentary for Christianity) interacted with doctrinal cleavages between Islam and Christianity to produce two

⁴³ N. Yalman, “Some observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey”, *Daedalus*, 102 (1973), p. 152.

⁴⁴ N. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal: McGill Univ. Press, 1964.

intensely opposed identities. As frequently occurs when different creeds become the legitimizations for societies that are sharply opposed in interests and attitudes, doctrinal cleavages became salient in men's consciousness, whereas shared doctrines were minimized. Indeed, their common origins as well as their geographical proximity made the Islamic and the Christian civilizations the major negative reference points for one another. In this respect, the two civilizations resembled on a grand scale ethnic groups that commonly define themselves by reference to out-groups. All Muslims conceived themselves to be united, at least in contrast to neighbouring Christians. Christians, usually on the defensive, often adopted a similar minimal identity criterion. In this way, the two great religious civilizations interacted over the centuries to perpetuate and to redefine each other's identity in terms that may be characterized as "supra-ethnic". As in the typical ethnic interaction, the exclusionary relationship of Islam and Christianity was not confined to attitudes. Violent conflict was common where the two civilizations, organized in polities, encountered one another physically. Although the course of this conflict was complicated, it tended toward a spiral of intensifying antagonism. This spiral resulted in the creation of a broad frontier zone of insecurity between Islamic civilization and Christendom. The concept of defending this frontier provided an intense legitimizing myth for major polities on both sides. The frontiersmen tended to perceive themselves as "chosen" or superior to other populations of their own faith. Consequently, the frontier groups evolved a precocious national identity within the broader religious identity. At the same time, the region of frontier conflict became a "shatter zone" where populations of diverse religious and cultural backgrounds had been transplanted or realigned politically during the protracted hostilities. Incorporation of diverse, intermixed elements of these types in an empire whose myth they did not fully share produced, in turn, a persisting legacy of interethnic tension within the major polities of East Europe and the Middle East⁴⁵.

⁴⁵ J. Armstrong...1982...op.cit...pp. 90-92.

Empires have been considered as the enemy of a politicised ethnicity. Nonetheless, when viewed in dynamic geopolitical terms, as they undergo patterns of territorial expansion and contraction in rivalry with each other, periodically reinforce an ethnic consciousness. An ethnic consciousness could arise as an unintended consequence of imperial expansions. On the contrary, geopolitical weakness, or the gradual loss of geopolitical power, of the state/empire reduces the prestige of the dominant ethnicity identified with it and threatens the state with a breakup⁴⁶. According to M. Hechter⁴⁷, Empires may consolidate ethnic communities through systems of indirect rule that reinforce indigenous leaderships. Where imperial conquest destroyed political institutions of peoples, churches played important roles as embodiments of ethnic identity and independence. The classic example is the millet system of the Islamic Ottoman Empire, which was a military theocracy that devolved power to religious organisations since it equated people and religion. This could work to reinforce or erode ethnicity. As we mentioned above, the Armenians and Jews were given their separate millets. Since the Orthodox millet was administered by the Greek patriarch of Constantinople, the system reinforced Greek power and identity, but suppressed the ethnicity of other Orthodox peoples including the Bulgars. When the Serbian Orthodox Church was given independent status within the Empire in 1557, it took the functions of a “surrogate ethnic state”⁴⁸. The transcendental myths of ancient and later empires had an extraordinary persistence in time and diffusion in space, providing models for their successors that included not just empires but also territorial states. Symbols and myths from these imperial traditions later on provided the ethnic and cultural repertoires which several national historians (e.g. C. Paparrigopoulos in Greece and Z. Gokalp in Turkey) utilized in order to construct the political ideologies of nationalism which dominated the national elites’ discourse and popular imagery in these two countries in the late 19th and early 20th century.

⁴⁶ R. Collins, “Balkanization or Americanization? : A Geopolitical Theory of Ethnic Change” in *ibid...* **Macrohistory: Essays in Sociology of the Long Run**, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, California, 1999.

⁴⁷ M. Hechter, *Containing Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000, chs. 2 & 3.

⁴⁸ M. B. Petrovich, “Religion and Ethnicity in Eastern Europe” in J. Hutchinson & A. D. Smith (eds.), *Nationalism Vol. IV*, London: Routledge.

Meanwhile, from the early 18th century, military competition between Kingdoms in Western Europe, combined with the rise of new technologies of warfare, created the matrix out of which modern European national states emerged⁴⁹. The Ottoman state attempted to imitate those aspects of European civilization to which it attributed the European successes and conquests; the most visible aspect was military technology and organization. Since 1716, Ottoman civil servants had been making gradual efforts to adapt the Ottoman military units to European standards. Yet, for one century or more, the conservatism of the *Janissaries* and the *Ulemas* leading sometimes to popular revolts rendered these efforts pointless. Even after 1826, when the Sultan used artillery units trained in European military academies to annihilate Janissaries' resistance, reaction to the reforms remained diffused and deeply rooted within the Ottoman Empire. Continuing external challenges combined with internal revolts and defeats in wars against the European powers prevented successive Sultans from reforming the empire's military⁵⁰. The Turkish members of the Ottoman government and central administration when confronted with the challenges of the International system and of nationalist uprisings mainly in the Balkans, rallied around the Sultan. In the aftermath of the French Revolution of 1789, when the existential concerns of the Ottomans became much more critical, the Turkish subjects labored to save the Ottoman state and their own homeland (*vatan*) from the encroachments of their foreign and domestic enemies.

When the empire began declining starting from the 18th century, either the decaying structure of the Ottoman state system or the superiority of the European military technology had to be questioned. From the European perspective, the Ottoman Empire was officially recognized as the first non-European member of the European state system since its independence and integrity was vital to the "Peace of Europe".

⁴⁹ M. Howard, *War in European History*, London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976.

⁵⁰ W.H. McNeill, *Ιστορία της Ανθρώπινης Κοινωνίας*, Εκδόσεις Α. Καραβία, Αθήναι, 1969, Σ. 769 => Τίτλος πρωτοτύπου: *The Rise of the West: A History of Human Community*, University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Reformation or “Modernization as Westernization” attempts commenced, therefore, in the 19th century under Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839). It was the beginning of the decay of a multi-national empire. The irony is that “it was the internal process of nationalizing the dynastic empire that planted the seeds of its own destruction”⁵¹. The gradual loss of the geopolitical power-prestige of the empire together with the advent of the century of national unification⁵² resulted in enormous changes in the political boundaries of several European states. Now the empire realized it had to gain the foreign powers’ support, especially that of Russia, Britain and France. The *Hatti Humayun* of 1839 was a product of this policy and opened a new era in Ottoman history. The period from 1839 to 1876 is known in Turkish historiography as the period of the *Tanzimat* reforms. The *Sublime Porte*, in order to prevent dissolution of the Empire, had to have close economic, political and ideological relationships with the Western powers and also had to unite all the subjects of the empire under the Sultan’s authority. The rights of non-Muslim subjects had to be reformed. Under the *Islahat Fermani* of 1856, the non-Muslim subjects of the empire themselves would determine the internal affairs of every religious community. This policy later became the most distinctive paradox of the Tanzimat era: the idea of unification of the empire had to be in accordance with the necessity for the religious autonomy of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire⁵³.

When the Tanzimat reforms introduced the idea of limited government, adopted the principle of proportionality between crime and punishment, and most important, reformed the Ottoman “slave official system” and introduced the idea of rule in accordance with the law, the proportionality between crime and punishment, and equality before the law for all members of the millets, which meant that the arbitrary rule of the Sultans, and the practice of political executions of the officials would come to an end. These were changes in the rules of the game of government and politics.

⁵¹ Dror Ze’evi, “Kul and Getting Cooler: The Dissolution of Elite Collective Identity and the Formation of Official Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire”, *Mediterranean Historical Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2, December 1996, p. 195.

⁵² E.g. independence of Greece, autonomous Serbia and Egypt.

⁵³ L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, London: Hurst & Co, 1958, pp. 381-392.

They were carried out to render the Ottoman public administration modern and viable. However, other sweeping legal reforms followed soon after. The commercial and the criminal codes, and even the civil code, which has always been under the influence of religion, were all reformed, or, in fact, “imported” from other European countries, with often minor adaptations. The newly established educational institutions started to follow a curriculum that emphasized science and reduced religious education by the latter of the 19th century. The new schools became conveyor belts to prestigious jobs in the government bureaucracy, and acquisition of power and wealth, which due to the primacy of politics always required some government job to marry those two values. The overall impact of those reforms was to diminish the power, wealth and prestige of the religious establishment, though its schools and other institutions were left untouched by the reforms⁵⁴.

The Young Ottomans movement (1865-1876) appeared as an opposition to these reforms. This opposition was an inevitable result of the Tanzimat itself. Instead of raising the empire to the level of European civilization the new reforms- the security of life, honour and property- allowed ministers to share the Sultan’s extensive power. One of the founders of the movement, Namik Kemal, criticized the fact that in Istanbul now there were many Sultans who did not bear the title of Sultan. The criticism of the Young Ottomans focused on both the pioneers of this reform and the ideology of Westernization itself. They believed that the Tanzimat did not have a solid ideological and ethical basis, but instead the solution could be found in Islam. For the first time they emphasized the importance of mobilizing the “Ottomans” as a conscious group⁵⁵. Although they did not know the meaning of modern nation and nationalism they opened the first discussions for this phenomenon which affected the process of nation-creation in four ways:

- for the first time in Ottoman history the concept of *vatan* (homeland/country) was used.

⁵⁴ E. Kalaycioglu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, p. 19.

⁵⁵ E.J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1997.

- They opened the discussion that the empire could be saved by de-linking themselves with the West
- They questioned the extensive authority of the Sultan
- They had an important impact on another, later group, the Young Turks, who were the forefathers of Turkish nationalism.

While in the Ottoman Empire conflicting tendencies rendered the reformation efforts more complex, in the European part of the empire populations mainly composed by shepherds and farmers, organized in villages and with relaxed state control, consciously started to challenge the authority of the Ottoman rulers. Those populations had been willing to involve themselves into robberies and become bandits. These practices were encouraged and legitimized by the emerging hostile climate against the rulers and quickly culminated into revolutionary movements. In the case of the Greek revolution (1821-1830), military leadership and the best fighters came from groups of bandits (*kleftes kai armatoloi*) who organized themselves in order to serve the new ideal of nationalism. A sense of their Greek heritage inspired cooperation among European intellectuals who rallied public opinion in support of the Greek struggle for independence against the Ottoman Empire, depicted as the struggle of European liberty against Oriental despotism. Widespread philhellenic sympathy in Western Europe contributed to the intervention of Britain and France who, with the traditional supporter of the Orthodox cause, Russia, in 1829 compelled the Ottomans to cede independence. The Western-oriented ideal of nationalism in the short-term divided the Greeks (leaders and followers) but, in the long term, its spread to the whole society endowed the national struggle with greater political viability than a devotion to the Orthodox heritage. However, this had not been the only factor provoking the national movement. The geopolitical advent of Russia cultivated hopes for a future redemption among the Orthodox communities of the Balkans. Already from the 18th century, Russian agents reinforced among the ruled dreams for a restoration of a Christian empire in the Balkans under Russian leadership. When a Russian fleet appeared in the Mediterranean in 1770, there was widespread

enthusiasm which led to an unsuccessful revolutionary attempt in Peloponnesos. With the *Kuchuk Kainarji* Treaty of 1774, the Ottoman Turks, for the first time, allowed Russian ships to navigate freely in the Black Sea and to trade in the Ottoman Empire. The lack of Russian ships and crew was counterbalanced by the granting of permission to Greek shipowners to trade under the Russian flag. As a result, sea trade in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea was soon dominated by the Greeks⁵⁶. These merchants, together with a smaller group of professionals, inevitably came in contact with the Western European ideals of the Enlightenment and established a bridge of communication between the Orthodox Balkans and Western Europe. It was them, more than any other group who underpinned the ideals and led the way towards the Greek (and Serbian) revolution⁵⁷.

However, not all Christians of the Ottoman Empire were united against their Turkish rulers. Since the late 17th century, Greek Phanariots had taken important positions in the Ottoman administration, working as interpreters (*dragoumanoi*) and brokers on behalf of the Turks in their exchanges with the European powers and the Christian subjects of the Empire. The power of the Phanariots was in part economic and it allowed them to gain important privileges as a *quid pro quo* for their services to the Turkish *Pashas*. Moreover, Phanariot families had a strong hold of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and in the mid-18th century attempted to extend its jurisdiction upon the once autocephalous churches of Serbia and Bulgaria. Finally, since 1711, the Turks entrusted the Phanariots with the governance of the Romanian regions and they organized their spheres of authority according to the Byzantine formality, dreaming of a final restoration of Greek authority in the Bosphorus. However, the dependence of the Phanariots on the Ottoman status quo divided them over the question of its overthrow. A group among them supported the groups of merchants who were conspiring with the Russians against the Ottomans, played with the ideas of the French Enlightenment and dreamed to bring back to life the glories of Byzantium.

⁵⁶ T. Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant", *Journal of Economic History*, XX (1960), pp. 234-313.

⁵⁷ W.H. McNeill...1969...op.cit...p. 771.

Aware of the humiliating contrasts European philhellenic visitors made between the Hellenic progenitors of Western civilization and the backward peasant subjects of the Ottoman Empire, a national consciousness developed among them. But the majority of them had withdrawn from the cause, only to see their authority disappearing after 1821, when the Greek revolution spread the virus of doubt to the Turks concerning the legitimacy and trustworthiness of all the Greeks⁵⁸. The overthrow of the Phanariots (1821-30), paved the way for a small group of pro-Western Turks to exercise the functions previously exercised by the Greeks. This had two parallel effects: it allowed the Greek Phanariots to fully devote themselves to the Greek national struggle and it prepared the process of later reform and modernization of the Ottoman regime according to the Western standards, since it provided pro-Western Turks with the opportunity to penetrate the depths of the Ottoman state/administration nexus⁵⁹.

5. The Rise of the Nation-States: The Construction of Modern “Identity” and the Institutionalization of Cultural Conflict.

The rise of the modern state and the development of state centralisation since the 18th century made the language of administrations of crucial significance for the lives of their populations. An alliance with industrial capitalism expands the capacities of the state enabling it to penetrate a localised rural and hierarchical society of difference and create a culturally standardised nation of citizens living on a unified territory. Advances in communications, census and cartographic surveys, taxation and policing, the development of territory-wide standardised educational systems promoting novel vernacular high cultures, mass conscription in the military institutions, and the creation of border controls and fortification resulted in distinctive bordered power containers⁶⁰. The rationalist legacy of the Enlightenment shaped, first in France, the ideology of republican (secular) nationalism, according to which traditional forms of

⁵⁸ N. Jorga, “Le Despotisme éclairé dans les pays Roumains au XVIIIe siècle”, *Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences*, IX (1935), pp. 110-115.

⁵⁹ W.H. McNeill...1969...op.cit...p. 772.

⁶⁰ A. Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985, p. 120.

allegiance, including those of “backward” ethnic and regional cultures, were now viewed as part of the savage state from which human communities should progress to urban civility. As the French model proved itself in war so a world interstate system developed in which all populations were gradually caged within new political units. The centralising state is a revolutionary new instrument that destroys systems of indirect rule, and nationalism is essentially civic with its goal the construction of a sovereign and meritocratic society. It represents a repudiation of the ethnic principle of membership by descent (*ius sanguinis*); citizenship is acquired largely by the principle of territorial membership (*ius solis*)⁶¹.

These interpretations, however, fail to take into account two basic factors; the advent of the Modern State brought with it the rise of institutions which carried with them multiple pre-existing ethnic attachments and identities (e.g. church, army, administration, education) whereas the ideology of political nationalism which was adopted by elites also built on pre-existing (ethnic) ingredients or, at least, tried, successfully or unsuccessfully to incorporate seemingly rival conceptions of the nation into one single national identity. Hence, from the very beginning, in most cases of modern nation states, the twin processes of political modernisation⁶² and cultural homogenization carry with them the seeds of a potential future “cultural conflict”. This is because both the ideology of nationalism and the process of state-building do not operate within a *tabula rasa*. Most modernization scholars, adopting an extremely elitist and institutionalist interpretation of the modernization process underestimate the importance of other dynamic and complex (mostly cultural) factors, often predating the era of Modernity, which structure the many forms modernity exhibits in different settings. These factors, once institutionalized or “incorporated” in some way into the dominant national narrative or political discourse, either promote cultural pluralism, which is always a good indicator of how democratic a polity can be, or

⁶¹ J. Hutchinson 2005...op.cit...pp. 31-32.

⁶² Which in our two case studies became synonymous to Westernization.

provoke intense polarisation between rival groups which may result in cultural and social conflict or threaten the level of a society's cohesion.

In the following paragraphs I shall try to provide an overview of the articulation-construction of Modern National Identity as it occurred in Modern Greece and Modern Turkey by referring to the main tool used for its construction, historiography, and to explain how this identity-construction was exploited by the state in order to mobilize support for a the state's irredentist cause or in order to homogenize the diverse populations, and with what consequences. Reference will be made to the two nations' main national historians and theoreticians of nationalism, C. Paparrigopoulos and Z. Gokalp. Then, I shall try to refer to the modernization process and the development of state institutions which constitute potential loci of cultural conflict, since they are based on pre-modern loyalties.

In the case of Greece, the newly established State (1832) has been for quite some time the battleground of the rivalry which described at that time the trends in European historiography between Liberalism and Romanticism, which advocated a "mechanicist" view vs. an "organicist" view of the nation respectively. Born under the spell of *Philhellenism* and carrying an ambiguous allegiance to the liberal principles of the 1821 revolution, the new state sought to promote the liberal agenda of equality and liberty as illustrated in the ideals of the Enlightenment, the French and American Revolutions and as stipulated in the revolutionary constitutions (1820s). At the same time, intellectuals of the first rank cultivated a national mythology that focused obsessively on history and destiny, especially with relation to classical Greece. However, the ideological leaders of the uprising, liberals such as Rigas, Korais and the *Ανώνυμος ο Έλληνας* were critical of all traditional authority and all kinds of irrational despotism, religious or otherwise⁶³. This climate influenced greatly the state of historiographical debate in the modern Greek state until the 1850s. The majority of

⁶³ R. Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986, 43-69.

historians and intellectuals of the early 19th were hostile or at least critical about Byzantine history, perceiving it as a period of decline and moral degradation of the Greeks. The period of Byzantine history represented in the minds of the majority of the intelligentsia a dark period of theological dispute, corruption and hostility towards the Hellenic spirit (classical antiquity) which has developed and taken new form in the West.

A break with this gradually started to emerge since 1850, when the Romanticist ideals started to grow stronger in the Greek intelligentsia. The new ideals came in direct conflict with the hitherto liberal concept which posed a great gap in the continuity of the Greek nation, namely the Middle Ages which were considered, as mentioned, by the majority of intellectuals as not included in the corpus of the Greek nations' history.

The task of outlining the course of Greek history and declaring its meaning for the future fell into the able hands of the historian Constantine Paparrigopoulos. Paparrigopoulos set out to show in detail how the history of Greece from the ancient times to the present demonstrated the unity of "Hellenism" in its three phases: i) Antiquity, ii) Byzantium, iii) Modern period. In his monumental six-volume "History of the Greek Nations" (1860-1877), he exhibited how the three phases show the fundamental unity of the Greek nation. Although the project was scholarly and thorough, it was always animated by the desire to prove that basic unity. Paparrigopoulos explicitly stated that "...what we are looking for in our studies of Greek history is, we confess, the unity of the Greek nationality from ancient to modern times...in this unity lies all the mystery of our future"⁶⁴. That statement portrays that his work was determined towards achieving a certain goal, the discovery of the Greek nation and the disproving of Falmerayer's point that Greeks of his times were not the descendants of Ancient Greeks but a mixture of Slavs and Albanians.

⁶⁴ Κ. Θ. Δημαράς, *Ελληνικός Διαφωτισμός*, 3^η έκδοση, Αθήνα: Ερμής, 1982, Σ. 406.

In stark opposition to Falmerayer's methodology, he uses sources in order to prove that the Slavs who migrated to Greece from the 6th century have neither deserted the country nor exterminated its inhabitants, as the German historian claimed. He presented as basic proof for his statement the preservation of the Greek language even among populations who were not Greek⁶⁵. Language is the linking element between the three periods according to Paparrigopoulos, and throughout the Byzantine period it was enriched by Byzantine literature and religious liturgical pieces such as the *Akathist Hymn*, sung every year during Lent and forming such an intimate component of Orthodox worship. In Paparrigopoulos' work, the anxiety brought by the Enlightenment into Greek thought in relation to the Byzantine dimensions of Greek history and Greek identity was finally settled in the most magnificent and reassuring way. Albeit in the beginning of his path as a historian (1840s), he echoed the negative attitude toward Byzantium that prevailed among latter-day followers of the Enlightenment, the influence of Romanticism and "organicist" conceptions of nation-formation was so profound as to make him state in 1852 : "...to the Byzantine state we owe the conservation of our language, our religion and more generally of our nationality"⁶⁶.

The broad outline of the "History" is set by the narrative of political and military events and struggles, and this endows the work with an epic character that captivates the reader as a story of greatness, high drama and tragedy. In narrating the chronicle of the Byzantine millennium, the author's interest remains focused on depicting the survival and continuous existence of that exceptional historical actor, the Greek nation which, through the millennia of presence on the scene of world history, marches as an immutable and timeless social organism. The work of Paparrigopoulos, despite the reactions it provoked especially in Greek academia, has been influential not only among Greek society of his times but also among Greek politicians. His conception of

⁶⁵ Γ. Βελούδης, *Ο Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer και η Γένεση του Ελληνικού Ιστορισμού*, ΕΜΝΕ-Μνήμων 1982, Θεωρία και Μελέτες Ιστορίας.

⁶⁶ Notes from presentations in classroom, Course: "Southeastern European History and Culture", Winter Semester, Master's Degree in SEE Studies, 2005-2006.

Greek nationalism has been used as the backbone of the development, especially after 1880, of the Great Idea, an ideological product of political manipulation of Paparrigopoulos historical theories. This Great Idea, which existed since 1844, obtained with the Greek historian a new content and constituted a project for the resurrection of the Byzantine Empire in the shape of an expanded Greek state ended in the ashes of the Asia Minor defeat of 1922⁶⁷. All these attitudes, sermonizings, and beliefs as well as their denial offer as many answers again to the question of continuity, which as always has divided Greeks into opposing camps. In progressing from the nationalist concept of the Great Idea to the prudent, bourgeois realistic policy of Venizelos for the modernization of Greece at each stage of its territorial enlargement, to the position taken by the Communist party respecting the role of the “Romaic-Greek populace” (the term employed in the Communist Draft Programme 1954) in the Balkan world we undoubtedly have the whole gamut of solutions put forward by the political parties, each interpreting the past in its own way and in so doing revealing the country’s relationship with the Great Powers of the day and with its neighbouring states for the purpose of promoting their particular approach to the future.

Meanwhile, the Greek state, from a general aim which it had been for the Enlightenment, became the dominant political reality of the nation and the church, autocephalous, detached from the ecumenicity of the Patriarchate, was nationalized. Two major institutional networks of power manifest their symbolic representation of the nation under the scheme presented by Paparrigopoulos. Continuity henceforth is presented as institutional and possibly Orthodox, including in it the imperial institutions of Byzantium and the Patriarchate. The propagation of this view should be related to the prevalence of the strategy of expanding the national territory. The political priorities of the nation-state had changed in relation to the revolutionary period. The forces which constituted the nation had changed, so the dominant

⁶⁷ P. M. Kitromilides, “On the Intellectual content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea” in D. Ricks & P. Magdalino (eds.), *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity*, Centre for Hellenic Studies, King’s College London, 1998.

historical representation had to change too. The new historical symbols of the nation were not longer the groups of bandits, the intelligentsia and the *kodjabashis*, but the warriors of the nation, the national army which was destined to represent the embodiment of national pride, the defender of the national interest and later on (WWII) the defender of the nation's territorial integrity. However, the symbolism of historicism which was expressed by Paparrigopoulos had its limits and was too weak to endure the radical political changes of the early 20th century. This is why in the interwar period this symbolism served only as a subsidiary tool in the hands of the elites in order to mobilize support for the promotion of the national interest⁶⁸.

In the battles over the appropriation of symbolic representations, the (foreign-born) Greek monarchy participated, albeit in a different manner than the advocates of Venizelism⁶⁹, in favor of the nationalist “Great Idea”. This state-based ethnic identity came under attack mainly from figures and forces in the diaspora and from the rise of ethnic nationalisms amongst the other Orthodox peoples (Bulgarians), which threatened the idea of Greek expansion and unification. Greece was dragged into a disastrous war by a revolt in Crete, which dealt a shattering blow to irredentist dreams. A sense of national crisis between 1897 and 1921 evoked a cultural nationalist critique of official Greece that encompassed the monarchy, parliament, army, language (demotic vs. katharevousa) and the educational system. It advocated less reliance on Europe as the standard, and more emphasis on the Greek world⁷⁰.

The tensions between a European-oriented and an ethnoreligious nationalism merely took new forms in 1914 when the king, espousing neutralism, clashed with the liberal and reformist Prime Minister Venizelos, who wished to support the Allies against the Triple Alliance. After defeat against the Turks and a mass transfer of populations in

⁶⁸ Π. Πιζάνιας, “Πώς Διαμορφώθηκε η Εθνική Συνείδηση;”, Το Βήμα, Κυριακή 26 Μαρτίου 2000, Ένθετο «Η Γέννηση ενός Έθνους: Η Υπόσταση των Ελλήνων, το Ιστορικό παρελθόν και η Διεθνής Αναγνώριση».

⁶⁹ See the distinction as to how Venizelists and Monarchists viewed the Asia Minor vicissitude in G. Th. Mavrogordatos 1983...op.cit.

⁷⁰ G. Augustinos, *Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society 1897-1914*, New York: East European Quarterly, 1977, ch. 2.

1922 between Turkey and Greece, the split between republican Venizelists and royalists dominated the interwar period. The monarchy, discredited by 1922, was replaced by a republic from 1924, during which there was an attempt to engineer a shift from an ethnic to a civic nation built on modern political institutions. This, however, was destabilized periodically by military interventions, and in 1935 the monarchy was restored by a military dictatorship under General Metaxas that claimed to embody a third Hellenic Civilization (combining Hellenism and Byzantium). This created intense social divisions, which continued when Greece was invaded and occupied by Germany and into the post-war period, as communist and anti-communist resistance movements clashed with each other and with royalists collaborators. The defeat of the communists led to the triumph of a right-wing authoritarian nationalism that culminated in the dictatorship of the Colonels between 1967 and 1974. This, though claiming to offer a Hellenic-Christian synthesis, isolated Greece from Europe. After its overthrow there was a return to democratic rivalry between pro-Western conservatives, who took Greece into the EU in 1981, and a neutralist socialist party suspicious of NATO, USA and the EU, and oriented to the Balkans. Since then, the socialist PASOK has swung in support of the EU⁷¹.

In the case of Turkey, with the breakdown of the dynastic empire, a necessity occurred that people had to imagine themselves relating to one another. At this point, the dialectical relationship between the mass support for the nationalist imagination and the political project of nationalist elites became visible. The Kemalist project of constructing a Turkish “imagined community” at a later stage of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire is not an exception. The identity of the state was changed from a caliphate-empire to a secular-republic. The identity of the people had to be transformed from an *umma* identity to a secular nation. Mustafa Kemal’s solution was the last, and also the only successful one among others, but it did not start out from a *tabula rasa*. Modernity and Westernization had already emerged as processes since the

⁷¹ N. Koksalakis & I. Psimmenos, “Modern Greece: A Profile of Identity and Nationalism” in B. Strath and A. Triandafyllidou (eds.), *Representations of Europe and the Nation in Current and Prospective Members*, Brussels: European Commission, 2003.

Ottoman times. The relation of the nation to the state via nationalism is in harmony with the logic of modernity. The modern state is usually seen as being part and parcel of the historical processes that created and then defined modernity- the centralisation of power and authority, the emergence of capitalism, processes of reification and rationalization, and so on.

It did not take long for the Ottomans to develop their own brand of pan-Turkism. *Pan-Turkism*, namely the establishment of a political union of a Turkish Nation based on race, emerged as the only viable alternative for the future course of development of the empire, since the other two ways which were suggested, *Ottomanism* (integration of many nations under the Ottoman sovereignty and creation of a single amalgam of “Ottoman nation”) and *Panislamism* (union of all Muslims of the world under the political administration of the Caliph) proved to be impossible to achieve under the present circumstances.

Ironically, it was an ethnic Kurd, Ziya Gokalp who emerged as the most important intellectual champion of pan-Turkism, whose calls for the establishment of a single Turkish empire (*Turan*) across the Ottoman Empire and Central Asia, inspired large numbers of young Turks, politicians, including Mustafa Kemal, the founding President of the Turkish Republic, social and political thinkers in the early 20th century. Gokalp was a prolific social thinker (influenced by E. Durkheim) and nationalist intellectual. He argued that “...Nationalist movements in Turkey started first as movements of religious autonomy, and then as movements of political autonomy and independence. We know that Turkish nationalism started as a cultural movement”⁷². Nationalism grew from a nebulous cultural movement into a mass political ideology and phenomenon in Turkey just as the germination of a seed would. The turbulent times of the 1910s and 1920s were replete with such calamities for the Turkish people, who at a time of disaster were destined to unearth its own nationalism. He thus firmly believed that the time was ripe for the growth of Turkish

⁷² N. Berkes 1964...op.cit...p. 65.

nationalism into a full-fledged political ideology or even the “Ideal” of the state⁷³. Gokalp laboured to prove that Turkish nationalism would not undermine the interests of the Ottoman state and argued that Turkism is the real support of Islam and of the Ottoman state, and it is against cosmopolitanism. Gokalp went on to argue that modernization means to make and use the technological achievements that the Europeans are making and using, but without being like them only in form and living.

Gokalp’s formulations about nation, nationalism, culture and civilization have deeply influenced the establishment and development of the Turkish Republic. He argued that nationalism was a cultural creation. He labored to explain that culture and civilization shared a lot of common features. Both culture and civilization related to religious, moral, legal, economic, linguistic, and similar realms of social life. However, Gokalp built upon his original argument that culture is national and civilization is international. For him civilization was a consciously created artefact of the human reason, whereas “...the elements that constitute a culture, on the other hand, are not creations of conscious individual actions...so the elements of a culture rise and grow spontaneously”⁷⁴. He suggested the example of language. Individuals may propose new terms or even grammatical rules, yet they may or may not be accepted by the people. The changes in language occur spontaneously by themselves, while an individual member of the community watches on. Whereas civilization often hosts such invented terms, as individuals who make up specialized groups often produce invented terminologies which are used internationally. Consequently, Gokalp concluded that “...culture is composed mainly of emotional elements, while civilization is composed of ideas”⁷⁵. So, there is no anomaly in arguing that the Turkish nation simultaneously belongs to the *Ural-Altai* group of peoples, to the Islamic *ummet* and to Western civilization. In short, Turkish nationalism shares the same origin as the Balkan ethnoreligious nationalisms. Ethnic characteristic of Turkish nationalism developed with the advent of secularism. This new breed of

⁷³ N. Berkes 1964...op.cit...p. 67.

⁷⁴ N. Berkes 1964...op.cit...p. 104.

⁷⁵ N. Berkes 1964...op.cit...p. 108.

ethnic-nationalists was able to gain respect and status in Istanbul's intellectual and political circles. Eventually, they were able to find large numbers of Turks ready to be fired up with their pan-Turkic ethnic nationalist ideas and ideologies. Turkish nationalism developed from a religious nationalist model of Balkan origins, adopted a pan-nationalist dimension by the early 20th century, while preserving Turkish-speaking Muslim subjects of the former Ottoman Empire as its core clientele.

Gökalp's ideas were the main factors that influence the foundation of the Turkish Republic and Kemalist principles. This is why, we can say that his ideas were in harmony with the system at the time and it has been legitimised with the official ideology of the state. According to this ideology, individuals were expected to feel that they were a part of the western civilisation while being muslims. As a new nation, a new state was born they had to leave the idea of being in a community and had to see the world like a western individual, independent from the burden of religion. Atatürk believed that the existence of the Turkish Republic was based on "culture". This "culture" was the secular, national, contemporary Turkish culture instead of the Islamic culture harmonized with the Arabic civilisation. However, it wasn't as easy as it seemed then, and it is still not the case today. The process of change from being a community to becoming a nation became a big conflict because the public who was forced to leave the "Ottoman Identity" behind was neither ready nor volunteering to deny the Islamic heritage. This is why, the national movement of the Turkish Revolution, had to use terms that had no connection with Islam such as "secular public" in order to overcome the identity crisis or the historical gap it has created for the people. Since the inception of the republic, Kemalism has comprised its guiding vision. It is in essence a Westernizing/civilizing ideology whose incontrovertible maxims are secularism, understood as the separation of religion from political rule; a modern/Western identity and lifestyle; and the cultural homogeneity and territorial unity of the nation. Because the Kemalist Westernization project has relied more on symbols than substance, it has associated publicly visible instances of Islamic identity with reactionism. The ideology is also marked by a visible distaste for politics as a societal activity, and an ambivalent attitude toward the notion of popular legitimacy. Over time, it has been adjusted, at times stalled, but never abandoned or discontinued. Even if the Turkish Armed Forces have at times deployed the Kemalist doctrine to

suit its own agenda, its basic tenets have not lost their power of appeal and legitimacy both across classes and across the civilian-military divide⁷⁶. Thus, according to official dogma, the nation's trajectory from Islamic traditionalism to Western modernity is to be replicated in the lives of individual Turks who come from rural backgrounds to the big city and aspire to upward mobility. As they move up the class ladder, they are supposed to shed their Islamic cultural traditions and become Westernized.

The Turkish military has acted as custodian of the Kemalist legacy, seeing its mission as not only to defend the territorial integrity of the Turkish state against external threats but also to protect it against internal challenges. The armed forces have intervened in Turkish politics four times in the postwar period when they felt that the Kemalist legacy was under threat. The most recent instance was in 1997 when the military forced the ouster of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, head of the Refah Party, in what was widely interpreted by Turkish and foreign media as a “silent coup.”. From the beginning of Turkish republic, 1923, states elites tried to establish a western oriented country. And the foreign policy was always towards Europe. They ignored the Ottoman and Islamic past. It was an elite project of 1930s(When we consider the, as Germans say ‘Geist Zeit’ –the soul of the time- , the fascist or authoritarian regimes were common in all around Europe. Turkish state was an authoritarian state too with the guaranteeing of the army. The problem lies on unchanged mentality and political structure of Turkey, even in the 2000s.). These elites were mainly military officers. They found this republic and they served as self appointed guardians of the regime. They always saw themselves as the decider of the needs of the society and the definer of “what is bad or good for the country”. They were members of the military and they ruled the country directly or indirectly. Their position had never changed and questioned until the EU accession process started to become reality.

⁷⁶ A. Göç, “The Construction of a Modern Identity: The Turkish “Imagined Community” versus the Ottoman Empire”, 1999, Working Paper, Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Studies, University of Reading, UK.

6. The double-edged Sword of Modernization: internal and external challenges.

The process which always accompanied or followed the advent of secular nationalisms has been that of political/institutional modernization, namely the development and consolidation of political rule and democratic institutions to regulate the relationships between the modern state and society. The term modernization echoes a complex process of changes which are observed in all the institutional spheres of society as a result of the expansion of human knowledge for the human environment and of the increases control which humans exercise on this environment (society). The term “political modernization” refers to these processes of political differentiation and secularization of a society’s political culture which reinforce the ability, namely the effectiveness and efficiency of its political system. The term “political modernization” has been criticized by various schools of political thought. The main charges concern its Western-centric viewpoint and in the lack of historicism the ideotypic dualism “traditional vs. modern” manifests. However, if it is understood as a historical, evolutionary, open, long-term and uncertain process of political change, the term has the basic advantage that it allows for the understanding of complex processes which in their aggregate indicate to the increased ability of the *homo politicus* : i) to create structures that are able to endure or solve problems and absorb (or adapt to) continuous changes and ii) to aim at the fulfilment of new visions for society in a spirit of creativity and innovation⁷⁷.

In the next few paragraphs I shall try to account for the process of political modernization in the cases of Modern Turkey and Modern Greece and its consequences to state-society relations. Political Modernization may on the one hand institutionalize cultural pluralism but, on the other hand the antagonism between political elites for dominance at the level of the political system and the external challenges to state sovereignty by the unpredictable processes of modernity (e.g. European Integration) undermine this process and create the possibility of cultural conflict through which political change is structured.

⁷⁷ N. Διαμαντούρος, *Η Περιπλάνηση της Πολιτικής*, Φάκελος Εκσυγχρονισμός, Το Βήμα, Κυριακή 4 Φεβρουαρίου 2001.

In the case of Turkey, Kemalism is a kind of modernization movement with radical secularism, ethnicity based nationalism and authoritarian centralism. It can be said that cutting-edge comments of Kemalism created an intolerance and oppression to strong identities especially to Kurdish and Islamist. Those identities were main challenges to dominant public sphere constructed by Kemalist ideology. The change and transformation policies of Kemalist civilian and military rulers did not work properly as it is estimated over some identities such Islam and Kurdish identities. Kemalist public sphere excluded Islam because of laicism and excluded Kurdish identity because of homogenous ethnic policies which accepted only Turkish ethnicity⁷⁸.

The main problem of Turkish modernization was actually change and unchangeability. There were elites during the modernization process of Turkish society who tried to apply western values to an Islamic country and homogeneous national identity to multiethnic society. They tried to transform the country from traditional which called as backwardness to modern, western way of life. They were educated mainly in French and got the influence of French enlightenment and modernization. They practiced Jacobenist policies with 'top to down' model. We can mention about the continuity between Ottoman and Turkish modernity process, or we can call this process as "cumulative". Reşat Kasaba summarize the process as such: "...The reformers, in particular Mustafa Kemal, had envisioned for Turkey an organized, well – articulated, linear process of modernization through which to move simultaneously and with uniform experience. At the end of this process, there would emerge a militantly secular, ethnically homogeneous republic well on its way to catching up with the civilized nations of the west". The hegemonic center position of elites who "saw themselves as the most important force for change in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey and they represent themselves as the sole bearers of progress" continued until 1940s, then after that time they lost the dominant position. And the relations with public turned to persuasion from control. With the multi party regime the suppressed parts of society especially the rural periphery with his/her Muslim, ethnic identities became more visible. 'Democratization from above model' which

⁷⁸ Kasaba, Reşat, 'Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities' in S. Bozdoğan & R. Kasaba (eds), *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, WA, and London, 1997

defined by elites started to be questioned then “the story of Turkish democracy since 1950 turns out to be the story of conflict and accommodation between the contrasting imperatives of consolidation and inclusion” *between* secular, homogeneous dominant ideology expressed by republican elites and its counters⁷⁹.

Elites wanted to create a society with their codes like a ‘social engineer’. “The mission of the Kemalist elite was the secularization of state and society... Kemalists conceived socio-economic change as being derivative of cultural transformation. Great emphasis was placed on education, the legal system, changing the Arabic script, the Muslim calendar, and the code of dress, etc.”⁸⁰. The modernization was totally equal being westernized with all expects in the perspective of elites. It can be given as an interesting and extremist example about the policies of Kemalist state in order to construct a western society: *Dini Islah Beyannamesi* (Reforming the Religion declaration). It was an offer to the assembly containing putting Turkish artists’ pictures in mosques, not putting off the shoes before entering the mosque. Kemalism hit to the center of the society as an iron block. It changed the codes of the society but not through the estimation of the elites at least %100. In other words, the Jakobenist policies of elites changed some patterns of the culture and social phenomenon but not totally that was planned. It created new-adopted, hybrid or totally oppositional identities. All those Kemalist oppressions were to create a secular, westernized, progressive and homogeneous public sphere. It was a kind of “authoritarian modernism” without taking its roots from the past. It was questioned so weakly in the early period of republic. The early period of Turkish state was a kind of ‘authoritarian state’. It was interfering to every part of social aspects, from family to music, from mosque to calendar. According to Göle Islamic movement made visible this secular public sphere’s oppressions started in 1980s: “Islam is problematized in the public sphere, we become aware of the unspoken, implicit borders and the stigmatizing, exclusionary power structure of the secular public sphere.”. Before that it was seen as

⁷⁹ I. Sunar, *State, Society, and Democracy in Turkey*, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, p. 145.

⁸⁰ I. Sunar, *State, Society, and Democracy in Turkey*, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, p. 147.

‘taken for granted process’ (westernization, modernization through the prescriptions of elites)⁸¹.

Westernization was the aim of the state. The famous motto of the founder of the Republic, Ataturk summarizes it succinctly: “reaching contemporary level of civilization”, he points out western civilization as aim such as putting out the Islamic symbols in public sphere. And the expected reaction to those arguments came in 1980s with a social movement. Muslim masses began to become Islamists.

According to the historical sources, “Turks” have a history of 5000 years and this political, cultural and social heritage has survived through the centuries by the establishment of the sixteen empires, as Turkish Republic is the last one. After the abolishment of the Ottoman Empire, the new republic has denied this heritage with the purpose of becoming a modern nation state. Today, the term “Turk” has a national aspect rather than ethnic influences and it refers to the citizens of the Turkish Republic.

The debate over Turkish identity on the other hand, has always been an important issue to research and discuss about, not only among the Turkish Academia but also for the foreign scholars who are interested in Eastern world, especially the Middle East. And many of the scholars agree that Turkey can be evaluated as a significant case of “global identity crisis” both on national and religious aspects. Before taking a look at the global picture, one should examine the historical factors that has lead to the identity crisis of Turkey that roots back to the foundation of the republic, or even the modernisation movements in the Ottoman Empire.

In order to analyse these conflicts and understand what lies beneath them, we must concentrate on the social and historical facts that can enlighten the way. As Mustafa Al Faqi emphasizes that “The study of the Turkish phenomenon needs historical awareness and an understanding of the Turkish character and the various factors that form its identity and determine its policies that oscillate between the

⁸¹N. Göle, (2000a), ‘Snapshots of Islamic Modernities’, *Multiple Modernities*, Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 129:1, 2000a, p. 94

historical Ottoman Turkey and the geographical European Turkey.” (Al Faqi)⁸² The key point to be able to analyse the Turkish phenomenon is to go back in the pages of history and try to comprehend what had happened to lead the society to present day conditions.

At this point, the turning point that holds great importance is the establishment of Turkish Republic. With the foundation of the secular and modern Republic, nation state and modernisation phenomena has been legitimised in a political way. Yet, as these reformative acts were taking place in the elite class, the ordinary people were still trying to get over the adaptation process. As it has influenced my dissertation thesis, this adaptation and struggling process is still present both in the national and religious aspects. In the book “Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey” edited by himself and Sibel Bozdoğan, Reşat Kasaba underlines this social dilemma that leads back to the early 1920’s in his article “Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities”:

“The reformists, in particular Mustafa Kemal, had envisioned for Turkey an organized, well-articulated, linear process of modernization through which the whole nation was going to move simultaneously and with uniform experience. At the end of this process, there would emerge a militantly secular, ethnically homogenous republic well on its way to catching up with the civilised nations of the West. Instead, the Turkish experience appeared to be culminating in economic backwardness and social flux, with Muslim and secularist, Turk and Kurd, reason and faith, rural and urban-in short, the old and the new- existing side by side and contending with, but more typically strengthening each other.”⁸³

Since the candidacy of Turkey for the European Union has dominated the political agenda of the Old Continent, new factors such as “being European” or “integration into the European culture” has started questioning Turkey’s sense of self more than ever. As they are having difficulty to identify themselves with Western values as well as the Eastern traditions, the Turkish people have been suffering from this dilemma not only as a society but also as individuals trying to re-define themselves. In

⁸² Al Faqi, M. “Between Islam and The West” *Dar-al Hayat*. 23/03/2004 <http://english.daralhayat.com/opinion/03-2004/Article-20040324-7a58a525-c0a8-01ed-006c-e26e37a2e701/story.html>

⁸³ Kasaba, Reşat, 1997...op.cit.

addition to this, Turkey can be evaluated as a mosaic made of different ethnic groups sharing the same title of being “Turkish” officially but the debate over “Turkish-ness or Turkey-ness” has been one of the leading topics with the candidacy for the EU as well. The report of the Human Rights Advisory Committee of EU was an effective factor for this critical process. In the report, the nationality & minority approach of Kemalism is put forward and criticised since it hasn’t been changed since 1923 and it has been legitimised by the Turkish constitution. The official findings of this report could be carried out the other platforms as well since Kurdish issue still hasn’t been solved and the cases of other minority groups at the European Human Rights Court damage the reputation of Turkey. Finally, it’s not only the external factors that make Turkey suffer from religious fundamentalism. As well as the Turkish fundamentalist groups supporting al Qaeda, Turkey is a strategic center of the terrorist group Hizbollah well. These Islamists have declared jihad against the infidels identifying themselves with Western values and many intellectuals and journalists have been killed by them. Besides these terrorist groups, the political movement by the Islamists have gained power with the millions supporting their ideas.

In the case of Greece, the construction of a modern state in Greece entailed the introduction of a variety of Western institutions and their accompanying logics, and ‘their grafting onto traditional and precapitalist, indigenous structures’, what ensued was a situation of ‘intense social, political, and cultural struggles in which potential beneficiaries and potential losers in the redefinition of power relations within Greece played the central role’⁸⁴. Two distinct cultural camps, two cultures, clearly emerged out of these struggles. The first one, the underdog culture, became particularly entrenched ‘among the very extensive, traditional, more introverted, and least competitive strata and sectors of Greek society and was more fully elaborated by intellectuals adhering to this tradition’. The younger of the twin cultures described by Diamandouros exhibits the opposite characteristics: it ‘draws its intellectual origins from the Enlightenment ...[it is] secular and extrovert in orientation’ and puts forward a modernising project aiming at making Greece a Western polity and society. While the underdog culture stresses tradition and is largely influenced by the Ottoman and Byzantine past, the modernising cultural camp pursues social, political and economic

⁸⁴ N. Diamandouros 1993 ‘Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91’ in **Glogg R.**(ed.) ‘*Greece 1981-89: The Populist Decade*’ London, McMillan Press.

reform in order to promote Greece's integration into the international system and the European family. This general schema has been directly linked to the question of Greek populism, with Diamandouros assigning PASOK's populism a place in the underdog culture. Thus, as Lyrintzis and Spourdalakis⁸⁵ point out, although Diamandouros' work is not primarily focused on populism, it offers an interesting framework on Greek political culture within which populism can be neatly situated. In this framework populism would be associated with the political culture of 'the underdog'.

The same conclusion has been reached by Mouzelis⁸⁶. In his view, like most societies that experienced a delayed development in comparison with the West, Greece is marked by a continuous and diffused division between two antagonistic types of political culture: a traditionally oriented, 'native' type, inward and hostile to Enlightenment ideals and Western institutions, and a 'modernising' type that tries to adopt these institutions and catch-up with the West. Mouzelis also situates populism within the underdog culture by specifying two distinct types of underdog culture: the *clientelist* and the *populist* one. Such a view is also congruent with the signifying realities of populist discourses themselves insofar as in populism the people are often presented as 'the underdog' which is oppressed, exploited or excluded from the *status quo*. On a fairly general level, both Diamandouros and Mouzelis seem to accept that the two different types of political culture correspond to different social identities. Of course, Diamandouros has highlighted the cross-sectional nature of the two cultures, 'the tendency, that is, to cut across Greek institutions, strata, classes, or political parties in Greek society and not to become *exclusively* identified with any such structure across time or even at any given moment'. This qualification is quite important but fails to address the problem at the level of the subject; it stays, so to speak, at the level of 'ideal types' of social identities focusing on the ways in which social strata, institutions, parties and other *collective* entities relate to these ideal types. Indeed there is not much discussion in Diamandouros' text regarding the way cultural dualism is played out within subjective identity apart from very few references to

⁸⁵ C. Lyrintzis, & , M. Spourdalakis 'On Populism: A Synthesis *a propos* of the Greek Bibliography', in *Greek Political Science Review*, no. 1, 1993, pp. 133-162.

⁸⁶ N. Mouzelis, *Nationalism in Late Development*, Athens: Themelio, 1994.

what he calls the ‘adherents’ (*opadoi* in the Greek text) of the underdog culture and to the fact that the underdog culture, ‘despite fluctuations, can be said to claim the allegiance of a majority of the Greek population since independence’. In that sense, though not explicitly stated or analysed, one of the possible conclusions drawn from Diamandouros’ text is that, although allegiances often shift, at any given moment each person can either be a modernist/reformist or a traditionalist, an ‘adherent’ (*opados*) of the one *or* the other culture. We consider such a conclusion justified not only on the basis of a careful reading of Diamandouros’ text, but also based on Diamandouros’ recent introductory comments according to which ‘the heterogeneous social strata and the political alliances linked to them which at any given moment function as bearers and expressions of the two traditions exhibit a remarkable stability as far as their synthesis is concerned’⁸⁷

Modernization as presented in the domestic political debate, is tantamount to *Europeanization*. According to N. Mouzelis “The concept of modernization is ‘polysemic’- that is to say, it has different meanings according to the theoretical contexts within which it functions”. However, this debate has so far developed within a small circle of bureaucratic and party political elites without wider public participation. This reflects the modus operandi of the Greek political system in terms of centralization, hyperpolitisization, absence of rules for the game, virtual non-existence of civic organizations, and a weak but paternalistic state; besides, it represents a blow to the ‘popular’ perception of democracy which emanates from the ancient Greek heritage. From the very beginning, accession to the EU was seen by the then Greek government (N.D) as a means of modernization, namely political stabilization (democratization) social solidarity and development. At the same time, Karamanlis, the architect of Greek accession to the EU, having already withdrawn Greece from the military part of NATO viewed the EU as the best means to overcome the so-called ‘syndrome of foreign protection’ which is endemic to Greek politics since the struggle for independence; this determined his choice when he faced the dilemma to choose between the EC and the EFTA , since it had already become obvious that the EC was more than a simple free trade area and it provided an

⁸⁷ N. Διαμαντούρος: «Πολιτισμικός Διϊσμός και Πολιτική Αλλαγή στην Ελλάδα της Μεταπολίτευσης», εκδ. Αλεξάνδρεια 2000, σ. 13.

opportunity to distance from the American factor⁸⁸. Thus, regime consolidation was thought to be the ultimate outcome of a process of gradual changes, reinforced by accession itself, in the economy and in the political culture of Greek society and polity.

Later on, throughout the 80's and early 90's, the blend of 'negative' (SEA) and 'positive' integration (TEU) measures has imposed new demands on the Greek polity, and these demands have encouraged calls for the reform of the state. This process, according to A. Moschonas consists of three interrelated elements: i) the modernization of markets, ii) the modernization of practices and iii) the modernization of structures⁸⁹. The market modernization, reinforced through the operation of the EU rules, calls for domestic market de-regulation (liberalization) as a means for the enhancement of the competitiveness of the European economy, and with it, the Greek economy. The modernization of practices is a process wherein a Community dimension gradually becomes an integral part of the Greek political culture as a result of membership. The interaction with EU institutions creates conditions of *osmosis* in the sense that Greek participants tend to assimilate Community practices, while at the same time accumulating knowledge, and thus enrich Greek political culture. Modernization of practices, in turn, having the political legitimization derived from the fact of membership irrespective of the level of acceptance or support, tends to create conditions conducive to the enhancement of the modernization of structures. This is the outcome of derived market modernization, refers to concrete state policies in congruence with EU policies and aims at the fulfillment of socio-economic and political objectives. The main tool, through which it is carried out, is the EU Redistributive (mainly Cohesion) policies. In conclusion, we observe that the first element of modernization (negative integration) is dominated by the 'logic of consequentialism', since the driving force behind modernization is the concern about efficiency of the economy, the second one by the 'logic of appropriateness', since the osmosis involves learning processes, whereas the third one by both logics, since on the one hand it entails redistribution of resources and creation

⁸⁸ Responsible according to the Greek sentiment for the 7-year colonel's Junta.

⁸⁹ *Reinforced Modernization*

of Mediating Formal Institutions⁹⁰ while, on the other, structural change cannot happen without an appropriate Political and Organizational culture⁹¹.

As a result, the concept of modernization acquired a ‘technocratic’ aura. The technocratic form of modernization claims that changes are more technical than ideological, thereby giving emphasis to the role of experts and of the state bureaucrats. A new generation of political leaders has appeared proclaiming themselves to be the agents of this process. They follow the neoliberal logic of market modernization and they are brought into the economic equation so as to: i) better define the modernization of structures and ii) minimize the social costs of the full operation of the market⁹². Consequently, elites become ‘Europeanized’ and use the EU to gain a domestic reform not available to them by any other means; since ‘Europeanization’ helps reform to be more attractive, unpopular measures(e.g. taxation) are rendered less subject to resistance. This is in sharp contrast to what happened in Greece in the 80’s, when populist social policy measures served to undermine the very process of economic management and modernization.

7. Conclusions.

The comparative research on developments in Modern Greece and Modern Turkey was done with the purpose to emphasize the important role cultural conflict plays in the formation of modern national states. This point is neglected by most institutionalist analyses which tend to overestimate the role of elites in the modernization process. Cultural factors determine to a great extent the path modernization trends take and may offer unique opportunities for nation-formation through cultural pluralism or pose challenges which threaten sovereignty and cohesion. The comparative study of development in Greece and Turkey allows us to draw the following conclusions:

- Older ethnic formation played a very important role in the formation of both nation’s formation, in the case of Greece by the incorporation of conflicting pre-modern elements into the corpus of the Greek national identity, which later developed into the two cultures Diamandouros describes in his model and

⁹⁰ e.g. OTA(local and regional authorities) and MOΔ in the Greek case

⁹¹ which in the case of Greece is absent(e.g. party-state, clientelism).

⁹² A. Moschonas, “European Integration and Prospects of Modernization in Greece” in *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 15, 2, pp. 325-348.

in the case of Turkey in a different manner. The Turkish nation was basically constructed by reforming its conflicting traditions (religion, education) so as to fit in the reality of a Modern nation-state. The main difference is that so far Turkey has been more successful in fusing conflicting elements into one single identity whereas in the case of Greece the dualism persists and emerges when the Greek state is faced with numerous crises.

- State elites play a very important role in both cases but change towards modernization and developing Western-type modern states and liberal institutions has been very slow. In the case of Greece it has been more successful mainly due to EU membership.
- In both cases the intelligentsia framed the dominant national discourse upon which the political elites built their national(ist) ideologies and political programmes. Even more so in the case of Turkey, where Kemal Atatürk with his charismatic leadership managed to reconcile conflicting ideologies with no dissent whereas in the case of Venizelos, also a charismatic leader the result of his effort had been intense division/polarization (*ethnikos dichasmos*).
- A major difference is that in the case of Turkey a very important factor for the shaping of its identity and the sense of threat to its territorial integrity is the existence of minorities in its territory whereas Greece was, until recently, considered as one of the most homogeneous countries in Europe. Greece managed to absorb the bulk of the population which came from Asia Minor and incorporated them into the society despite class differences (most of them belonged to the bourgeoisie).
- The army is still today in Turkey the guardian of the Kemalist legacy whereas in Greece the army's role has been severely confined due to the abuse of nationalist ideals and its "perceived" connection with Foreign powers.
- Finally, as a result of the quickest rise of the bourgeois state in Greece and the establishment of liberal democratic institutions free of authoritarian control, class consciousness and therefore Socialist and Communist parties flourished in the Greek political scene whereas in Turkey their influence has been almost non-existent.

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