

**DISSERTATION**

*'The EU's role in catalyzing a settlement in Cyprus: Providing incentives and imposing conditionality in the Cyprus conflict.'*

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**ACADEMIC YEAR:** 2016-2017



**Hellenic Republic**  
**National and Kapodistrian**

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## Introduction

The aim of this research is to understand the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict in the context of European Union accession. In 2004, 65% of Turkish-Cypriots voted in favor of the Annan Plan, while 75% of the Greek-Cypriot population rejected it. Turkey supported the Plan, while encouraging the people of northern Cyprus to accept it. The EU's role in convincing the three main actors of the conflict to reach a settlement was decisive, therefore why did it fail to catalyze a settlement? How did it manage to motivate the other two players of the conflict to adopt the UN-led resolution and what went wrong in the case of the Greek-Cypriots? The examination of the above-mentioned questions is essential in order to understand the events that took place in Cyprus these last two decades. It will also contribute to the better understanding of the conflict and provide further insight on the dynamics that influenced the conflict, in relation to the EU.

The EU's effort to support the peace-making process and catalyze the reunification of the island is a duty given to the organization by its founding members and it is part of its fundamental principles. Therefore, the first chapter of the dissertation will be dedicated to the creation of the EU and its original goal, bringing peace to a continent, which had suffered severely from two world wars. We will proceed with a brief description of the 1974 events, the Turkish invasion in Cyprus and the illegal occupation of almost 38% of the island. This will help the reader understand the status quo that was established and the issues that occurred between the two communities. After that, we will focus on the goals of each community, the efforts made by the United Nations and the inter-communal negotiations during the 1980's. Maintaining the chronological order, the last period of examination will be between 1990 and 2004. Our starting point will be Turkey's and the Republic of Cyprus' European Community application in 1987 and 1990, respectively. The chapter ends in 2004, when the two communities of the island decided through separate referenda, whether they voted in favor or against the new Cypriot state proposed by the Annan Plan.

Once we have mentioned, in detail, all the catalytic events that influenced the development of the conflict, we will be able to analyze the behavior of the main players: Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots, Greece and Turkey. Moreover, we will focus on our main subject which is the European Union and its interaction with the three main players (Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey). Combining both the goals of the main players and the accomplishments of the EU, we will be able to answer the questions asked above and evaluate the EU's failure qualitatively. Finally, we will study certain provision of the Annan Plan and compare them to the Greek-Cypriot goals, in order to conclude whether the EU is entirely responsible for the failure to reach a settlement in Cyprus.

This research is based on articles and books of specialists, academic studies, original documents of the EU institutions (specifically the European Commission, the European parliament and the European Council) and documents of other international institutions, notably the United Nations.

## The European Union as a peace project

The Cyprus conflict is a case study that needs to be addressed in the framework of the wider EU peacemaking process. After World War II, peace and security became an urgency that motivated European integration, in a war-stricken continent that suffered heavily, in terms of human losses, economic depression and destruction of property and infrastructure.

The Schumann declaration in 1950 and the Paris Treaty in 1951 signed by France, (Western) Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium guaranteed coordination of the European coal and steel production. This would be achieved through the creation of a supranational international organization, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) managing the common market. At this point, a significant step towards peace was made. Six countries, all participants in World War II- four of them siding with the Coalition Forces and the other two with the Axis Forces- agreed to transfer powers to an international organization, in a sector of strategic national importance, for the sake of peace and prosperity.

Nowadays, EU mediation can be observed in many forms. For instance, the EU's effort to resolve the Cyprus conflict was a manipulative but indirect one. The EU used its position to attract the players of the conflict by projecting the incentive of EU membership, although the organization did not participate directly in the UN-led talks. In contrast, the Kosovo-Serbia agreement in 2013 was catalyzed by the EU. The basic point of the agreement was that the police and security structures in the northern parts of Kosovo, where the majority is Serbs, would be integrated in the Kosovo security system. Furthermore, both Serbia and Kosovo committed not to block each other's EU accession course. In the case of Serbia and Kosovo the EU's main incentive was once more EU accession, while Kosovo was also interested to gain access to the EU-free travel visa. The EU directly brokered the agreement between the two parties. Its third-party mediation was considered of medium success, since there are still many unresolved issues between Serbia and Kosovo<sup>1</sup>. However, peace-making had become one of the EU's main goals and the Helsinki Council in 1999 conclusions specified this goal by urging all candidate states to resolve territorial disputes or other types of conflict peacefully, in order to be included in the enlargement process. In this sense, the EU would not tolerate interstate or intrastate violence within its borders.

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<sup>1</sup> Bergmann J., Niemann A.(2015), *'Mediating International Conflicts: The European Union as an Effective Peacemaker?'*. Journal of Common Market Studies. 53:5. John Wiley & Sons Ltd., pp. 965-968

In 1999, the EU introduced the Stability and Association Process (SAP). This strategy pertained to the former-Yugoslavian countries and Albania. Since, the EU failed to resolve the Yugoslavian-war conflicts in the 1990's, its efforts focused on state-rebuilding and post-conflict management. The main incentive for the democratization and economic stabilization of the states of the Western Balkans was EU membership. With the exception of Croatia, which signed a Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2001, opened accession negotiations in 2005 and eventually became an EU member-state in 2013, the other states were not as successful. In 2008 most SAP countries were rated as **semi-consolidated democracies** by the Freedom House *Nations in Transit* report<sup>2</sup>. Despite this fact, the SAP countries have shown political, economic and social progress and the possibility of violent clashes reoccurring has decreased severely. The incentive of EU accession was the main motivating factor for this development<sup>3</sup>.

The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia's case, however, is not very similar to the other Western Balkan states. The intra-state conflict of the Slav majority and the Albanian minority ended with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001. The EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana along with delegates of NATO and OSCE provided the right incentives accompanied by a set of conditional pre-requisites and catalyzed a settlement that would bring mid-term political stability to the country. The cessation of hostilities and an inclusive government coalition were the key-goals achieved by the agreement, while EU and NATO membership worked as crucial incentives<sup>4</sup>. The Agreement was indeed successful and the FYROM was granted EU candidate status in 2005. Two years earlier, in 2003, the EU initiated its first Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) operation in FYROM. The operation was called Concordia, it was authorized by the UN and NATO and its goal was to ensure a certain level of security to facilitate the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement.

In Northern Ireland, the EU's effort was coordinated and accurate. Following the Anglo-Irish agreement in 1985 and the first IRA (Irish Republican Army) ceasefire, the Commission

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<sup>2</sup> Gordon C. (2009), '*The Stabilization and Association Process in the Western Balkans: An Effective Instrument of Post-conflict Management?*'. *Ethnopolitics: Former Global Review of Ethnopolitics*. 8:3-4. Routledge Ltd., pp.334

<sup>3</sup> Rodt. P, Wolff S. (2012), '*European Union Conflict Management in the Western Balkans*'. *Civil Wars*.14:3. Routledge Ltd. Pp. 424

<sup>4</sup> Ilievski Z. & Taleski D. (2010), '*Was the EU's role in Conflict Management in Macedonia a Success?*'. *Ethnopolitics: Former Global Review of Ethnopolitics*. 8:3-4. Routledge Ltd., pp.354-357

initiated a fund for Northern Ireland in 1995. Even though, two EU states (United Kingdom and Ireland) were already involved in the conflict and had already shown the political will to make substantial progress, the EU promised almost 18 years of funding for Northern Ireland, dividing the financial aid into three periods: PEACE I (1995-1999), PEACE II (2000-2004) and PEACE II extension (2005-2006) and PEACE III (2007-2013)<sup>5</sup>. The total sum of the EU's contribution through the PEACE programs was estimate around 2.2 bil Euros. The PEACE I package was directed to promote the post-Maastricht EU social partnership model. Most funds were managed by local communities and NGO's. This development upset state representatives and the PEACE I project was considered controversial as it created a conflict of interests between civil society and state actors. The PEACE II and III programs were much more concentrated and included cooperation in managing the financial aid by the state and both communities involved in the conflict, Catholic Irish nationalists and Protestant Unionists<sup>6</sup>. It is important to notice that in this particular occasion the EU had to discover other tools to contribute in the peace-making process apart from EU membership.

The EU remains the main source of aid for Kosovo, as well. In 2009, external aid to Kosovo had reached almost 1.8 bil euros. The difference between Kosovo and Northern Ireland is that the funds directed to Kosovo's aid were not thematically targeted but instead given to the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and non-EU actors such as American consultants. The EU's strategy for Kosovo aimed at creating a 'multi-ethnic' state by supporting the 'Ahtisaari Plan', which included special protection and provision for the Serbian and other minorities. The EU's contribution to the Plan was realized primarily through its funding and the vital contribution of its member-states in the military intervention in Kosovo. However, it is highly unlikely that the idea of a 'multi-ethnic' Kosovo will ever be accomplished, given the expulsion of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo (almost 250,000) in the late 1990's and their unwillingness to return<sup>7</sup>. Therefore, the country's population consists almost exclusively of Albanian Kosovars. As we mentioned earlier, the Serbia-Kosovo Agreement in 2013 constituted a step towards integration, although phenomena of segregation have often been observed in the country.

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<sup>5</sup> Hughes J. (2009), *Paying for Peace: 'Comparing the EU's Role in the Conflicts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo'*, *Ethnopolitics: Former Global Review of Ethnopolitics*. 8:3-4. Routledge Ltd., pp. 292-293

<sup>6</sup> Hughes J. (2009), *Paying for Peace: 'Comparing the EU's Role in the Conflicts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo'*, *Ethnopolitics: Former Global Review of Ethnopolitics*. 8:3-4. Routledge Ltd., pp. 294-296

<sup>7</sup> Hughes J. (2009), *Paying for Peace: 'Comparing the EU's Role in the Conflicts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo'*, *Ethnopolitics: Former Global Review of Ethnopolitics*. 8:3-4. Routledge Ltd., pp. 297-299

Our study of EU's commitment towards the peace-making process has proved extremely important before analyzing the Cyprus conflict. The creation of the European Steel & Coal Market had elements of peace-building accompanied by economic incentives. The development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy during the mid-1990s gave the legal leverage to the EU to play a more active role in the conflict resolution in Northern Ireland and Cyprus while using its resources in the post-conflict management and development of the Western Balkans, in an effort to make up for the mismanagement and indecisiveness while the violence was spreading throughout the former Yugoslavian states. The EU utilized its position and the incentive of EU membership to motivate states to make concessions and implement political, social and economic reform programs often with medium success. The case of Croatia and FYROM constitute a more optimistic outcome of EU's policy. EU's funding programs have been proven irreplaceable, especially in the case of Northern Ireland, while the EU's military presence in FYROM and operation Concordia as well as the presence of EU member-states' troops in Kosovo guaranteed security and a decrease in violent tensions.



## Developments in Cyprus until 1990 and UN-led negotiations

### From the Zurich and London Treaties to the 1974 Turkish invasion

In 1959 in Lancaster, United Kingdom the leader of Greece, Konstantinos Karamanlis , the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes, the United Kingdom and the leaders of the two communities of Cyprus, the Greek-Cypriot Archi-bishop Makarios and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Dr. Fazil Kucuk signed the London and Zurich Treaties accompanied by two Treaties of Alliances and Guarantees.

The Cypriot state gained its independence from the British Empire on 16 August 1960, while the new constitution of the Cypriot federal state was included in the Treaty. The United Kingdom maintained its military bases in Dekeleia and Akrotiri. The Treaty of Guarantees gave the right to Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to intervene in Cyprus in case political or military actions violated the constitution.

In 1963, Archbishop Makarios submitted thirteen proposals regarding the amendment of the constitution claiming that some provisions were dysfunctional. Ankara responded first by condemning the report by Makarios and tensions rose in the island with military and para-military activity signaling a new series of conflict. The British intervention and the green line in the middle of Nicosia prevented momentarily a potential clash. However, it could not prevent the de facto division of the island. After specific orders by Ankara and the Turkish-Cypriot administration, many thousands Turkish-Cypriots moved to enclaves in order to isolate themselves from the Greek-Cypriots and highlight the division of the island and the constitutional breakdown. In 1964 the UN sent a peace-keeping team in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in order to report and maintain the stability of the island<sup>8</sup>.

Cyprus' division remained stable while the tension escalated in a few occasions but a continuation of the crisis was deterred either by the US and UK interventions or by the UN. In a parallel manner, the Greek-Cypriot *enosis* demand (*enosis*= the nationalistic idea of

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<sup>8</sup> Syrigos A. (2011), *Ellinoturkikes Sheseis (Greek-Turkish relations)*, Athens: Patakis, pp. 150-157

Cyprus' reunification with Greece) re-emerged and was endorsed by the military junta in Greece, which had exploited the political instability in the country and organized a coup in 1967. After the fall of the military junta governed by Papadopoulos, the Ioannidis dictatorship took power in 1974. Ioannidis was in close cooperation with the EOKA B' militia in Cyprus many members of which were held in prison at the request of Archbishop Makarios. The Greek regime's discontent towards Makarios led Ioannidis to plan a coup in Cyprus, in order to overthrow Makarios on 15<sup>th</sup> of July 1974 but he eventually escaped through the British airbase to New York<sup>9</sup>.

However, the coup against Makarios gave the opportunity to the Turkish military and political establishment to attack Cyprus. Five days later, on 20<sup>th</sup> July 1974 Turkish troops invaded Cyprus (the code name of the operation being "Attila I"), occupied Kyrenia and established their presence on the island. The developments after the invasion were critical. Three days later, Konstantinos Karamanlis returned from Paris, where he was exiled and became Prime Minister of Greece. The junta's failure in Cyprus provoked great resentment to the Greek public opinion and led to their resignation. For the weeks to follow the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, James Callaghan negotiated with the leaders of Turkey and Greece until 30<sup>th</sup> July and later on with the representative of the Greek-Cypriots, Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktaş.

The negotiations in Geneva were at a stalemate and on 15<sup>th</sup> August the Turkish army carried out a second attack in Cyprus named "Attila II". By utilizing their bridgehead in Kyrenia they penetrated further into Cypriot territory and captured important cities like Morphou, Karpas and Famagusta. The clashes between the Turkish armed forces and the Greek units stationed in Cyprus prevented the Turkish army from reaching further into Nicosia. Almost 2.000 Greek-Cypriots were killed and 1.500 remained missing.

The "Attila I" and "Attila II" invasions resulted to Turkey occupying almost 37% of Cyprus' territory. Furthermore, a large wave of Greek-Cypriots had to leave their properties and move to southern Cyprus. Turkish citizens were transferred from mainland Turkey to northern Cyprus and settled in the properties of the Greek-Cypriots. Turkey's military presence in Cyprus was established in the occupied areas and the de facto division of the island increased the sentiment of hostility and mistrust between the two communities<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Syrigos A. (2011), *Ellinoturkikes Sheseis (Greek-Turkish relations)*, Athens: Patakis, pp. 220-221

## Goals of each community

In order to perceive the developments that followed regarding the course of the negotiations and the EU's interaction with the communities of Cyprus and the other major players of the conflict, Greece and Turkey, we first have to examine the goals and aims of the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots. After years of negotiations many of these goals have been modified to facilitate the peace-building process. The gradual concessions made by the leaderships (and sometimes the people) of each community can be observed in the following chapters. In this chapter we will examine the original position of each side of the conflict.

**Form of the new state:** Starting from the form of a reunified Cyprus, the Greek-Cypriots had promoted a unitary state, however, since the Turkish-Cypriots considered the proposal as non-negotiable they compromised for a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal state with extensive powers. This entailed that the two constituent-Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot-states would exercise limited powers. As for the issue of representation in public affairs, the Greek-Cypriots proposed the number to be defined proportionally to the pre-1974 populations of the two communities, when the Greek-Cypriots were the overwhelming majority on the island<sup>11</sup>.

On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriots traditionally opted for as much autonomy as they could. The ideal scenario consists of two separate Cypriot states, a proposal that was explicitly rejected by the Greek-Cypriots during the negotiations. A Cypriot confederation was also proposed by Denktash in 1999 and was also rejected by the Greek-Cypriots and the UN<sup>12</sup>. The bi-zonal, bi-communal model became the basis for a future settlement, even

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<sup>10</sup> Syrigos A. (2011), *Ellinoturkikes Sheseis (Greek-Turkish relations)*, Athens: Patakis, pp. 222-232

<sup>11</sup> Sozen, Ahmet (2002), *The Role of the European Union as a Third Party in Resolution of External Conflicts: The Case of the Cyprus Problem*. IACM 15th Annual Conference, pp. 7-8

<sup>12</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London : Ashgate Publishing, pp 108

though the Turkish-Cypriots traditionally promote a loose federation with autonomy and more powers to the constituent states, compared to the Greek-Cypriots who prefer a more centralized one. Concerning the number of workers in all spheres of the public sector, the Turkish-Cypriots, in an effort to promote the idea of communal equality, propose a 50%-50% sharing<sup>13</sup>.

**Security matters:** The two issues pertaining to Cyprus' security are the demilitarization of the island and the Treaty of Guarantees. Regarding the Treaty of Guarantees, the Turkish-Cypriots consider its full implementation and mostly Turkey's right to intervene, necessary, in order to maximize their security. On the contrary, the Greek-Cypriots constantly underline the urgency to abolish the Treaty and establish a special UN or NATO force responsible for guaranteeing the security of the island, in fear of a revision of the 1974 events.

In respect of the military presence in Cyprus, the Greek-Cypriots have also demanded the withdrawal of all troops from the island, referring indirectly to the almost 40,000 Turkish soldiers that are stationed in the occupied areas and instead propose the establishment of a multi-national force, as opposed to the Turkish-Cypriots whose security policy includes the continuation of the Turkish military presence<sup>14</sup>.

**Territorial dispute, settlers, property issues:** Another long-lasting Greek-Cypriot demand is the issue of territorial adjustment. The Greek-Cypriots believe that 80% of the island's total surface belongs to the Greek-Cypriot community. The dispute occurred due to the Turkish-Cypriot claim that the Turkish-Cypriot zone should extend over 29% of Cyprus' total size.<sup>15</sup>

As for the wave of Turks that settled in Cyprus after the 1974 Turkish military intervention, the Greek-Cypriots demand their return to mainland Turkey, while the Turkish-Cypriots request that they all remain in Cyprus. Furthermore, during the Turkish intervention many Greek-Cypriots were made to leave their property and become refugees. Additionally, following the 1963 constitutional breakdown, many Turkish-Cypriots left their homes on purpose or after specific commands from the Turkish-Cypriot administration. The status of

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<sup>13</sup> Sozen, Ahmet (2002), *The Role of the European Union as a Third Party in Resolution of External Conflicts: The Case of the Cyprus Problem*. IACM 15th Annual Conference, pp. 7-8

<sup>14</sup> Sozen, Ahmet (2002), *The Role of the European Union as a Third Party in Resolution of External Conflicts: The Case of the Cyprus Problem*. IACM 15th Annual Conference, pp. 7-8

<sup>15</sup> Sozen, Ahmet (2002), *The Role of the European Union as a Third Party in Resolution of External Conflicts: The Case of the Cyprus Problem*. IACM 15th Annual Conference, pp. 7-8

their property has yet to be defined. The Greek-Cypriots share the view that all these individuals should have the right to return to their property, mainly because the majority of these refugees are Greek-Cypriots. Unlike the Greek-Cypriot proposal, the Turkish-Cypriots endorse the establishment of quotas for the returnees. Moreover, they support a system of compensations for the refugees that would not have the right to reacquire their property<sup>16</sup>.

**EU membership and the *acquis communautaire*:** It is essential for our study to observe the behavior of each player towards the prospect of EU accession. Even though, the discussion began after Cyprus' EC application in 1990 it might be the only issue upon which both communities agreed. Both the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots were in favor of Cyprus' EU membership. The only pre-condition placed by the Turkish-Cypriots was that before EU accession would occur, a final settlement had to be reached following its validation through separate referenda.

As for the *acquis communautaire* there are implications regarding the application of the freedoms of movement, settlement and property ownership. The Greek-Cypriots believe that these freedoms should be implemented without restrictions. In contrast, the Turkish-Cypriots support placing restrictions on all three freedoms. Specifically, regarding the freedom of settlement they suggest, as mentioned before, restrictions in order to guarantee the spirit of bi-zonality. Restrictions on the freedom of movement should be set exclusively for a few groups of people like former EOKA fighters (EOKA was a Greek-Cypriot nationalistic para-military group aiming at *enosis* meaning Cyprus' integration to Greece and was labeled as a terrorist group by the British Empire and the Turkish-Cypriots). Finally, strong restrictions should be imposed on the freedom of property ownership, according to the Turkish-Cypriot interests. This view is closely connected with maintaining the bi-zonal character of a supposed reunified Cypriot state<sup>17</sup>.

In the aftermath of the invasion, Turkish military forces occupied 37% of the island. In addition, a massive influx of Turkish settlers altered the island's population balance in favor of the Turkish-Cypriots. United Nations Resolution 3212 was unanimously passed in 1975,

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<sup>16</sup> Sozen, Ahmet (2002), *The Role of the European Union as a Third Party in Resolution of External Conflicts: The Case of the Cyprus Problem*. IACM 15th Annual Conference, pp. 7

<sup>17</sup> Sozen, Ahmet (2002), *The Role of the European Union as a Third Party in Resolution of External Conflicts: The Case of the Cyprus Problem*. IACM 15th Annual Conference, pp. 7

ordering all foreign forces to withdraw from Cyprus and urged the UN peace-keeping force to play a key-role as a mediator between the two communities. At the same time, UN-led negotiations initiated a constructive dialogue, during which the Greek-Cypriot side proposed a bi-communal federal Cyprus. The Turkish-Cypriots rejected the proposal, aiming at a looser federation with more powers to the equal constituent states.

By the end of the 1970s', a convergence was made on the issue of statehood. Both communities agreed on a bi-zonal bi-communal federal Cyprus. Specifically, in 1977 Archbishop Makarios signed a high-level agreement with Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas, who agreed to cede territory to the Republic of Cyprus. After Makarios' death in 1977, the newly elected President of the Republic of Cyprus Spyros Kyprianou proceeded to signing another high-level agreement with Rauf Denktas in 1979<sup>18</sup>. These agreements became obsolete, despite the fact that the commitment of both communities' to the form of a reunited Cypriot state was evident.

The Republic of Cyprus' efforts to internationalize the conflict combined with the UN General Assembly's decision, which supported Greek-Cypriots, led the Turkish-Cypriot leadership in 1983 to unilaterally establish the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which was not recognized by any UN country, apart from Turkey. These developments hindered the inter-communal negotiations. Talks were conducted through the mediation of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, who presented in 1986 the 'Draft Framework Agreement', which envisaged a bi-zonal federation and described the powers of the government. The plan was rejected by the Greek-Cypriot leader, Spyros Kyprianou as it did not mention the withdrawal of the Turkish military or the Turkish settlers<sup>19</sup>.

Three years later, the UNSG re-proposed a plan introducing a new Constitution for a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation and emphasized on the single personality of the new state and the equality of the two communities. Perez de Cuellar' second proposal was also turned down by the Greek-Cypriot negotiating team led by Georgios Vassiliou, Spyros Kyprianou' successor.

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<sup>18</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, *1977 and 1979 High-level Agreements*, <http://www.mfa.gr/en/the-cyprus-issue/relevant-documents/additional-documents.html?page=7>

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Report on Cyprus in chronological order*, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/cyprus.php?page=7>

Developments in Cyprus had concerned the European institutions before the RoC's application to the European Community. The European Parliament had adopted three resolutions about Cyprus before 1990. Two of them were adopted in 1983 regarding the missing persons during the 1974 events and the unilateral proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ('TRNC'), respectively. The motion for the discussion and drafting of the March 10 1988 resolution was entertained by the Greek MEP Giorgios Mavros, an iconic Greek politician who dedicated a large part of his career to Cyprus. The resolution promoted the unity of the island and endorsed the inter-communal negotiations. All three decisions repeated the European Parliament's commitment to the UN-led efforts<sup>20</sup>.

The three main reasons that impelled the EU to interfere in the settlement-finding process in Cyprus were: **A.** Greece's EU accession in 1981 **B.** The rejection of *enosis* by the Greek government (*enosis*= the nationalistic idea of Cyprus' reunification with Greece), which was a major obstacle to finding a broad resolution that would include both communities of Cyprus and **C.** The de facto Turkish-Cypriot leadership solidifying its authority in northern Cyprus.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Hakki, M. M.(2007) *Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878-2006*, London: I.B Tauris

<sup>21</sup> Suvarierol S. (2003), '*The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union*', Turkish Studies, [http://www.seminsuvarierol.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/suvarierol\\_03\\_cyprus.pdf](http://www.seminsuvarierol.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/suvarierol_03_cyprus.pdf), pp.64

## **Developments after Cyprus' European Communities application**

The purpose of this chapter is to keep a chronological record of the events that led to the Annan plan, while analyzing them briefly. Our starting point will be Turkey's and Cyprus' EC applications and the Commission's Opinion on Cyprus and the future of enlargement in 1993. Until that moment, the role of the EC was limited to supporting the efforts of the UN bodies without taking any initiatives or responsibilities. The dynamics of the conflict changed entirely, after the 1993 Commission's Opinion which decided Cyprus' capability of implementing the '*acquis communautaire*', while setting the conditionality of resolving the Cyprus conflict.

### **Turkey's and Cyprus' EC applications and the 1993 Commission Opinion on Cyprus' application**

Turkey applied for EC membership on 14 April 1987. Two years later, on 20<sup>th</sup> of December 1989 the Commission concluded that Turkey was eligible to candidacy, but acknowledged the distance between EC member-states and Turkey. The progress made by Turkey politically, socially and economically, although significant, was insufficient to render Turkey capable of opening negotiations with the EC. Despite the fact that Turkey probably did not satisfy the requirements and the criteria of an EC member-state, one the most vital reasons that Turkey's application was rejected, was due to the EC's internal. During that time integration and interdependence in regard to deepening was accelerating tremendously- the Single Market was its prime example during this period- rendering enlargement difficult-to-manage and undesirable<sup>22</sup>.

In 1988 President Vassiliou refused to apply for EC membership despite the urges of the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou. Greece held the EC Council's presidency at the time and intended to seize the opportunity to assist Cyprus and create a positive image. President Vassiliou turned the proposition down in an effort to avoid manoeuvres that could

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<sup>22</sup> Commission of European Communities (1989), *Commission Opinion on Turkey's EC application*, <http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/1/4475.pdf>



hamper the inter-communal negotiation. However, the UN's persistence in the political equality of the two communities as the key-aspect of the reunified island motivated the Republic of Cyprus to search for other means of promoting its interests internationally. On 4 July 1990, the RoC also applied for EC membership. The Turkish administration complained intensely to the EC Council, which in turn asked the Commission to publish an Opinion on the matter.

On 30 June 1993 the Commission published an Opinion on Cyprus' application and future accession. The announcement underlined the Republic of Cyprus' (RoC) eligibility for membership, while regarding it as the legitimate representative of the whole island, despite its division. Its economy would easily adapt to the European standards despite the disparities between the North and the South. The Commission concluded that ***'the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* would not present any insurmountable challenges'*** however provision 10 of the Opinion's text on Cyprus underlined that **'Freedom of goods, people, services and capital (...) could not be exercised on the entirety of the island's territory. These freedoms and rights restoring constitutional arrangements covering the whole of the Republic of Cyprus'** could have been guaranteed by a comprehensive settlement could only be perfected through the reunification of the island, in order to secure the freedom of the three movements<sup>23</sup>. Therefore, peace was an indisputable conditionality to RoC's accession and the Commission supported once more the UNSG's efforts to find a compromise between the two communities. In 1992, the Secretary General Boutros Ghali had introduced his 'Set of Ideas', the most complete answer to the Cyprus' question at that point. The Commission's persistence in resolving the conflict was counterbalanced in the last paragraph of the Opinion's conclusions, where the EC was due to re-evaluate Cyprus' status in 1995, in case the UN negotiations failed.

Turkish-Cypriots efforts to challenge the legality of the application were blocked by the Commission's Opinion. According to the Opinion, RoC's statehood legitimized its action to

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<sup>23</sup> University of Pittsburg, Archive of European Enlargement, *'The challenge of enlargement. Commission opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus for membership. COM (93) 313 final, 30 June 1993. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/93'*, <http://aei.pitt.edu/43453/>

apply for EC membership, adding furthermore, that RoC's international recognition in contrast to northern Cyprus' non-recognition was a matter of great concern.<sup>24</sup>

After the Commission's actions on enlargement and RoC's application, the 1993 General Affairs Council reaffirmed the EC's acceptance and support to the 1990 application, on an intergovernmental level. Moreover, it endorsed the UN-led negotiations and promised to coordinate its institutions in order to ensure the economic readiness of RoC. By examining the decision of the Council, we conclude that the EU's strategy towards Cyprus aimed at showing the prospects of the Cyprus' EU integration, while reaching a settlement under UN auspices<sup>25</sup>.

UN activity increased after RoC's EC application. An effort of great significance took place two years later. In 1992, the new UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali presented an in-depth solution to the Cyprus problem, named 'Set of Ideas'. The proposal's structure was similar to the previous UN efforts, founded on the idea of a bi-zonal bi-communal federation but far more detailed. Another major component of the resolution plan was founded on the idea of ameliorating the relations between the two communities via confidence building measures (CBM), equal treatment, freedom of movement for goods, people etc<sup>26</sup>. Although the Turkish-Cypriots accepted most of the proposal's content and the Greek-Cypriots were willing to conduct negotiations based on the plan, talks ultimately failed due to mistrust between the two communities. This conclusion impelled Boutros Ghali to propose innovative Confidence Building Measures (CBM), which included re-settlement of the deserted Varosha town and the re-opening of the Nicosia airport. The Secretary General's CBM were also rejected.

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<sup>24</sup> Christou ,G.(2004). *The European Union and Enlargement: The Case of Cyprus*, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, pg. 69

<sup>25</sup> Christou ,G.(2004). *The European Union and Enlargement: The Case of Cyprus*, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 71-72

<sup>26</sup>Stefanova, B.(2011) *The Europeanisation of Conflict Resolution: Regional Integration and Conflicts from the 1950s to the 21st Century*, [Series: Europe in change], Manchester: Manchester University Press.

## **From the Corfu European Council (1994) to the Luxembourg European Council (1997): Gradual Gains for the Greek-Cypriots, the 1995 Historical Compromise and Turkey's Application at a Stalemate**

**The Corfu European Council** on 24 June 1994 included proposals that had a positive effect on the Republic of Cyprus. The French presidency managed to persuade the Greek delegation to lift its veto on the Turkey-EU customs union. The Greek government threatened to veto the accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria in case Cyprus was excluded from the fifth enlargement<sup>27</sup>. Largely due to Greece's policy, the Council decided that Malta and Cyprus would be included in the next round of enlargement. Even though the message was positive for the RoC, the European Union's (former European Communities) persistence in supporting the UN's cause in Cyprus became once again clear in the Council as well as its belief in the 1977 and 1979 High-level Agreements<sup>28</sup>.

The fact that the Corfu Council reaffirmed its commitment to the UN-mediated talks it was crystal clear that the European Union had undertaken a more active role in the Cyprus conflict instead of being just an honest broker<sup>29</sup>.

**The General Affairs Council (GAC)** on 6 March 1995 organized a more detailed schedule regarding Cyprus' accession negotiations, designating September 1996 as the starting point-6 months after the March 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to be exact<sup>30</sup>. Support for the UN negotiations remained a priority in this decision also, while urging the reunification of the island as a means of bringing stability and prosperity to both communities, especially the Turkish-Cypriots living in the northern part of the island whose living standards were significantly lower in comparison to the Greek Cypriots living in the Republic of Cyprus.

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<sup>27</sup> Tocci N., *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, 2004: Ashgate Publishing, pp.125

<sup>28</sup> Hakki, M. M.(2007) *Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878-2006*, London: I.B Tauris

<sup>29</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London: Ashgate Publishing, pp.68

<sup>30</sup> Hakki, M. M.(2007) *Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878-2006*, London: I.B Tauris

The differentiating point of the GAC was the historical compromise achieved in relation with Cyprus' accession negotiations on one hand and Turkey's customs union with the EU on the other. Turkey, as a main actor of the Cyprus conflict, was directly linked to Cyprus' accession progress, therefore Turkey-EU relations and Turkey's course in the EU was of great importance for the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek government's decision to lift its veto in order to allow the completion of the EU-Turkey customs union was accompanied by the transfer of almost 1.2 billion dollar funds to Turkey and contributed to slightly softening the already intense reaction of both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots caused by the favoring stance of the EU towards the RoC during the 1994 Corfu Council<sup>31</sup>.

Three years after the Commission's conditionality on RoC's membership was set, the possibility of a divided Cyprus acceding to the EU was really high. The 'Agenda 2000' composed by the Commission in 1997 underlined the need to proceed to the scheduled negotiations with the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus in case a settlement of the conflict hadn't been achieved on time. However, the most positive development for the Greek-Cypriots was announced during the Luxembourg Council in December 1997. Cyprus would be included in the first phase of accession negotiations along with five other countries. Insistence in the form of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation under the United Nations aegis was repeated. The innovation of the Council was a provision to include Turkish-Cypriots delegates in the Cypriot negotiating team<sup>32</sup>.

Regarding the issue of representation, an effort led by the Dutch Presidency in January 1997 initially failed to persuade the Greek-Cypriot delegation to include Turkish-Cypriots diplomats in Cyprus' accession talks. Pressure from EU's member-states managed to convince Greece's Foreign Minister, Theodoros Pagkalos to accept this notion. However, the Turkish-Cypriots eventually turned the offer down, under the impression that it would harm their long-term policy of seeking political equality.

Unlike the 1995 General Affairs Council, the Luxembourg Council failed to maintain a balance between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus would open accession negotiations with the EU immediately. Turkey, on the other hand, was considered incapable of becoming an EU candidate state. In addition, a general strategy was drafted, recalling the

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<sup>31</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London: Ashgate Publishing, pp.68-69

<sup>32</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 72-73

political and economic reforms that need to be implemented as well as the obligation of Turkey to ameliorate its relations with Greece and pursue a peaceful arbitrary settlement of bilateral disputes. Concerning Turkey's role in the Cyprus conflict, the Council urged Turkey to contribute to the resolution of the conflict according to the UN mandate.

The fifth enlargement would include states that were economically more fragile than Turkey itself and had applied for EU membership in the early 90's while Turkey's application was filed in 1987. Therefore it was impossible, according to Turkish officials, for the EU not to grant Turkey candidate status<sup>33</sup>. However, the latest coalition government between Erbakan and Ciller had been toppled a few months before the European Council. The military was mostly responsible for what would be called 'the post-modern coup', provided that it involved the toppling of a government via undemocratic means, but without the use of violence by the national armed forces. This development proved that Turkey did not fulfill the 'Copenhagen criteria' on democracy, rendering EU candidacy a difficult goal to achieve<sup>34</sup>.

## **Greek-Turkish relations and their effect on the conflict**

The gradual deterioration of the Greek-Turkish relations and the hostility began in 1993 and reached its height during the 1995-1998 period. Glafcos Clerides succeeded Giorgos Vassiliou as RoC's President in 1993. He was elected by presenting a nationalistic agenda promising to remove the 'unpleasant' proposals from Boutros Ghali' 'Set of Ideas' and increase the RoC's defense expenditure. A few months later, Clerides and the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who also succeeded Konstantinos Mitsotakis in power during the same year, signed the 'Joint Defence Doctrine'. The agreement contained a transfer of military equipment from Greece to Cyprus, coordination of the two countries armed forces, the creation of a new air base in Paphos hosting Greek planes and most importantly Greece's commitment to provide its military support in case Cyprus was attacked by Turkey.

In the framework of the 'Joint Defence Doctrine', President Glafcos Clerides announced in 1997 the purchase of S-300 missiles from Russia. Turkey responded by declaring its readiness to wage war on Cyprus- most commonly known as *casus belli*- in case the missiles

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<sup>33</sup> Hannay D (2004), *Cyprus: the search for a solution*, London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.,pp.81

<sup>34</sup> Hannay D (2004), *Cyprus: the search for a solution*, London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.,pp.81-82

were installed on the island. The man who had laid the foundations of closer defense cooperation between Greece and Greek-Cypriots, the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou had died in 1996 due to illness and his successor, Kostas Simitis displayed a much more condescending behavior by trying to dissuade the RoC's President Glafcos Cleirides from acquiring the missiles<sup>35</sup>. Following a period of tension the missiles were transferred to Crete instead of Cyprus. The intervention of international actors from the US, France, the United Kingdom and Germany was decisive. It is interesting, however, to observe Russia's role during these events. According to Lord David Hannay, as he describes it in his book *Cyprus: The search for a solution*, his contacts with Vladimir Chiznov- the Russian Special Representative- were fruitless and the stubbornness of Russia's government officials, when it came to the missiles reminded of a Cold-War strategy of top national priority<sup>36</sup>.

The Greek-Cypriots attempted to internationalize the conflict through various means during the 1990's. Arbitration was not excluded as an option. The Loizidou case resulted to the deterioration of Greece's relations with Turkey and increased the mistrust between the two communities in Cyprus. Titina Loizidou was denied of passing the Green line in 1989 in order to reach her property, which she had lost during the 1974 events. In an effort to claim her rights in court, she went to the European Court of Human Rights and filed a complaint. The judges concluded that her claim could not be supported legally and the case was dismissed. In November 1993, Ms. Loizidou decided to file a complaint again to the ECHR and this time the court found Turkey guilty of not complying with the European Convention of Human Rights article on the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, while demanding from Turkey to compensate 800,000 euro to Ms. Loizidou. The differentiating factor was the support the RoC's government provided Ms. Loizidou. The court took into consideration the international recognition the RoC enjoyed compared to northern Cypriot authorities. Being a full UN member gave a great advantage to the RoC in the negotiations but also in international fora. The Loizidou case provoked great resentment to the Turkish-Cypriots, mainly because it proved that Greek-Cypriots were willing to utilize their international position to settle major issues of the conflict, such as the property dispute, via other means than negotiation.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 70

<sup>36</sup> Hannay D (2004), *Cyprus: the search for a solution*, London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.,pp.72

On the other hand, the Anastasiou court case had a tremendous and direct effect on the economy of northern Cyprus and the quality of living of Turkish-Cypriots. The Association Agreement signed in 1972 between Cyprus and the EC contained Article 5, which aimed at guaranteeing the equality between the two communities after the 1963 and 1967 events when the de facto division of the island occurred. However, the request of the Greek company Anastasiou Ltd, which had the support of the Greek government, was satisfied by the court and the member-states of the EU were obliged to discontinue trading goods with the 'TRNC'. From that point on, EU-'TRNC' trade fell dramatically. In 1996, Exports to the EU reached 35% of 'TRNC's' total exports, while trade relations with Turkey, which had been relatively low in the past years, rose significantly<sup>38</sup>.

Furthermore, the Imia incident, where US and international diplomacy prevented a war between Greece and Turkey, signaled a major deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations and had undoubtedly a negative impact on Turkey's EU accession process as well as the Cyprus conflict. In addition, the Green line events during the same year affected Turkey's prestige badly. The killings of two Greek-Cypriot citizens by Turkish soldiers were broadcasted worldwide and aggravating Turkey's image. Adding to the equation the Luxembourg council, which did not include any specific gains for Turkey, EU-Turkish and Greek-Turkish relations had reached a historic low.

These events resulted to a hardened Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot stance and a closer integration between the two actors, mainly economy-wise. Specifically, in 1997 Turkey and the 'TRNC' signed an association agreement that allowed Turkish-Cypriot officials to participate in Turkish embassies, a joint economic zone and other forms of cooperation. Characteristically, in 1998 Turkey transferred financial aid to northern Cyprus equal to half of the 'TRNC's' budget.

The fact that the Turkish side did not benefit from the Council's outcome, had an immediate effect on EU-Turkey relations. The prospect of Cyprus acceding to the European Union divided undoubtedly concerned the United States and the United Nations, resulting to a series of diplomatic efforts and meetings during the 1996-1997 period, in order to accomplish the reunification of the island before RoC's accession.

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<sup>37</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 70

<sup>38</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London: Ashgate Publishing, pp 71

## The last two historical compromises: The Helsinki European Council (1999) and the Copenhagen European Council (2002)

Taking into account the intensity surrounding Turkish-EU relations, most EU member-states were willing to bridge the gap that was created between the Union and Turkey. At the Cardiff Council in 1998 and under the initiative of the British Presidency, the EU intended to re-examine the Luxembourg conclusions on Turkey. This development was unsatisfying for Greece, which during the 1997-1998 period was constantly using the threat of veto to secure Cyprus' inclusion in the fifth enlargement, unconditionally<sup>39</sup>. Greece couldn't handle the pressure around Turkey's EU progress and finally accepted Turkey's candidacy at the Helsinki Council in 1999. This compromise was a product of pressure and part of a wider policy shift from Greece towards Turkey<sup>40</sup>.

The discontent of Turkish-Cypriots towards the EU, but most importantly towards the Republic of Cyprus, had also grown immensely. It became profound that the Turkish-Cypriots would opt for a more defensive, introvert policy, which under no circumstances could become a basis for future negotiations. Indeed, in 1997 and 1998, Richard Holbrooke - the world-famous US diplomat, who was majorly involved in the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and the Imia Crisis in the Aegean Sea - arranged two inter-communal meetings in Brussels and in Istanbul, successively. The Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktash presented a new agenda at those meetings that cancelled the progress made on the issue of the successor state's form and proposed a Cypriot confederation, between the self-proclaimed 'TRNC' and the Greek-Cypriot administration, while the Treaty of Guarantee would continue being in force and the two confederate states would maintain a special bond with Greece and Turkey, respectively<sup>41</sup>.

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<sup>39</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London: Ashgate Publishing, pp.125

<sup>40</sup> Hannay D (2004)., *Cyprus: the search for a solution*, London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. pp.84

<sup>41</sup> Hannay D (2004)., *Cyprus: the search for a solution*, London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. pp.91-93



1999 was a crucial year for the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle in regard to their EU agenda as well as their bilateral relations. An important factor that led to this development was the decision of the Greek government of Kostas Simitis to adopt a 'friendlier' policy towards Turkey and Turkey's EU accession course. The first sign of change occurred in August and September 1999 when two deadly earthquakes hit Turkey and Greece, respectively. Both neighboring countries provided aid of high symbolic importance to each other, sensitizing the public opinion. Given the up-coming shift in Greece's strategy towards Turkey and the Cyprus conflict, the Greek government seized the opportunity in order to portray the image of good neighbourliness<sup>42</sup>.

In 1999, initiatives were taken at a national and at an international level to reconcile Cyprus' two communities. The US and the UK tried to influence the two main parties of the conflict to resume to negotiations via the G-8 Summit that took place in Cologne in 1999. The UN Security Council's resolution 1250 urged the Secretary General, Kofi Annan to invite the leaders of the two communities to the negotiating table in order to openly discuss all crucial matters. Seeking international recognition, the Turkish-Cypriot delegation requested equal treatment and state-to-state consultation, but eventually they proceeded with proximity talks.

The Helsinki declaration in 1999 guaranteed RoC's EU accession, while still persisting in promoting a settlement of the conflict<sup>43</sup>. Specifically, the decision concluded that if a settlement hadn't been found until RoC's EU accession date, the reunification of the island would no longer constitute a prerequisite taking into consideration, however, 'all relevant factors'. This phrase intended to exert pressure on RoC's government so as to guarantee a more cooperative Greek-Cypriot behavior during the inter-communal negotiations.

In contrast with the 1997 Luxembourg Council, the decision taken in Helsinki could be characterized as a step forward both for Cyprus and for Turkey, known more commonly as the second 'historic compromise'. Adopting the 1995 GAC's strategy the EU officially granted Turkey 'candidate state' status. This was a great promise for Turkey regarding the country's eventual EU accession. Greece's diplomatic agility concerning Turkey contributed significantly to the final outcome. In the context, of seeking a rapprochement and a closer relation with Turkey, Greece openly supported Turkey's candidacy. The main gains that led

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<sup>42</sup> Syrigos A (2011)., *Ellinoturkikes Sheseis (Greek-Turkish relations)*, Athens: Patakis, pp. 453

<sup>43</sup> Hakki, M. M.(2007) *Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878-2006*, London: I.B Tauris

Greece to change its policy towards its neighbor was Cyprus' accession to the EU and Greece's Eurozone membership, although it finally occurred at the Feira Council in 2001<sup>44</sup>.

Apart from the abovementioned provision, Turkey had various reasons to be satisfied. The decision contained collateral benefits such as financial assistance (amounting to 177 mil. euros), a more inclusive customs union and partnership in many fields that involved the presence of Turkish officials in EU agencies. Despite the fact that the negotiation process had opened for the other 12 candidate states including the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey's development was a satisfactory one. However, the spirit of satisfaction didn't last long<sup>45</sup>.

Despite the compromise made in Helsinki the Turkish Foreign minister Ismail Cem had requested from Gunter Verheugen, who held the Enlargement portfolio in the European Commission at the time, a few days before the agreement had been reached, not to include any provisions referring to Cyprus or Greece, reflecting Turkey's intransigence towards the Greek element<sup>46</sup>. However, the Helsinki Council would eventually benefit not only the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle but also Turkey's internal democratization, as it resulted to the implementation of three reform packages relating to economic reforms, political freedoms and social justice<sup>47</sup>.

The prospect of Cyprus' accession to the EU was almost a certainty and concerned Turkey but also the Turkish-Cypriot community. This development became an obstacle for the peace-making process. In December 1999, an UN-mediated effort to reconcile the two parties of the conflict failed due to the hardened stance of the Turkish-Cypriots after the events in Helsinki. The talks consisted of five rounds initiated by the UN Secretary General and orchestrated by the Special Representative of the UNSG, Alvaro de Soto, who proposed measures in order to bridge the gap between the two sides. One year later, in December 2000 after the end of the fifth round, the Turkish-Cypriots withdrew from the process. In

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<sup>44</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London: Ashgate Publishing, pp 126

<sup>45</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London: Ashgate Publishing, pp 78

<sup>46</sup> Verney S. & Ulusoy K. (2009), 'Europeanisation and the transformation of Turkey's Cyprus policy' in Verney S., Ifantis K. (eds) *Turkey's Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change*, London & New York: Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 116

<sup>47</sup> Verney S. & Ulusoy K. (2009), 'Europeanisation and the transformation of Turkey's Cyprus policy' in Verney S., Ifantis K. (eds) *Turkey's Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change*, London & New York: Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 117

December, also, the Nice Council published a statement supporting the UNSG initiatives without making any further comments.

Cyprus' accession to the EU would take place on a certain date and this fact applied significant pressure on all major players. Therefore, in 2001 a common initiative by the US, the UK and the European Commission attempted to persuade the Turkish-Cypriot side to return to the negotiating table but President Denktas rejected it.

The pressure applied on the Turkish-Cypriot side, who was being blamed for the failure of the talks, impelled Denktas to invite the Greek-Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides for direct talks on November 2001. Alongside the UN team under the stewardship of the UNSG Special Representative Alvaro de Soto, British and American officials were also involved in the negotiations, such as the British Foreign Office Representative, Lord Hannay and his American counterpart, Tom Weston. On the contrary, the European Union and the European Commission, specifically, chose to stay in the background of the peace-building effort and assist the UN team strategy-wise by giving consultations on how the dynamics of the conflict could change and catalyze a resolution to the on-going dispute within the EU framework. The initial intention of the orchestrated effort by the UN, the US and the UK was to find an agreement by June 2002.

The European Council that took place in Seville, on 22nd June 2002, expressed once more the EU's preference for Cyprus' accession as a unified state. According to the conclusions of the Council Cyprus' reunification would ensure the proper application of the four freedoms, meaning freedom of movement for services, goods, people and capital, and EU law in general, as well as, ameliorate the Northern Cyprus' economy and its citizens' living standards.

Six months later, the Copenhagen EU Council, defined the process of EU accession for the 12 countries of the Helsinki Council, including Cyprus. The date of accession would be the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2004, which had direct consequences on the peace-making process. The 28<sup>th</sup> of February 2003 was determined as the expiry date for the resolution of the conflict. The conclusions of the Council dictated that in case a compromise was agreed between the two communities concerning a settlement, in accordance to the EU principles and law, the Council, after being consulted by the Commission, would decide on the legal and technical adjustments needed, in order to ensure the implementation of the EU law and the EU acquis to the Northern part of the island. The opposite scenario would involve the suspension of

the EU acquis to the rest of the island, beyond the RoC's border. Furthermore, the Council took into consideration the aspects of the conflict and the Turkish military presence on the island and decided to exclude Cyprus (and Malta) from any NATO-related exercises or missions without affecting its ability and responsibility to participate in the EU's defense institutions and forums such as COPS. The ministerial meeting in Copenhagen had a great impact on Turkey's accession course. According to the decision if Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria during the December 2004 European Council, accession negotiations would start immediately<sup>48</sup>.

The Council promoted a solution to the Cyprus issue based on the proposals of the UNSG, Kofi Annan. One month earlier, on November 2002, Annan presented his proposals on the form of the new reunified state, laws, Treaties and solutions to the problems between the two communities, which were often linked to Turkey and Greece (and in some occasions the United Kingdom) also. The 'Annan Plan', which was revised and amended on the same month, was a very detailed document, which contained solutions for all aspects of the conflict and it became the most promising UN attempt to find a resolution to the conflict and the most serious one since Boutros Ghali's 'Set of Ideas' since 1992.

### The Annan plan

The 'Annan Plan' was a full-fledged set of proposals pertaining to the form of the new state, its constitution, the ideas of bi-communality and bi-zonality and addressed all issues creating disputes between the two communities. Since the plan had been modified five times it would be more constructive to focus on its spirit and its fundamental ideas.

The new state would be called 'United Republic of Cyprus' and the federal state would exercise the least-required powers due to lack of trust between the two communities. Under the control of the central/federal state there would be two equal constituent states, the Greek-Cypriot state, which would succeed the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriot state succeeding the self-proclaimed 'TRNC'.

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<sup>48</sup> Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance de l'Europe (CVCE), Copenhagen European Council (2002), [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/4/20/ff7ff228-fa3b-4f89-b552-808f7eb2c5b3/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/4/20/ff7ff228-fa3b-4f89-b552-808f7eb2c5b3/publishable_en.pdf)

Regarding the administration of the two constituent states, there would be no obligatory participation of members of the other community compared to the federal state's administrative body, which included ethnic quotas and specific numbers or percentages defining the participation of each community (the same strategy would apply to the Central Bank and all public services). A nine-member presidential council, comprising of six Greek-Cypriots and three Turkish-Cypriots would assume executive powers and the President would rotate every twenty months between a Greek-Cypriot and a Turkish-Cypriot.

A bicameral parliamentary system was foreseen. The lower house would contain 48 seats, 25% of which would be occupied by Turkish-Cypriots, while the Senate would also be comprised of 48 senators, half of which ought to be Turkish-Cypriots<sup>49</sup>.

Other important aspects of the conflict were also addressed. The de-militarization of the island would formally occur in 2018 and only a few Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot units would be stationed on the island. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantees would still be in effect and became a major subject of dispute between the two communities, given that it would legitimize a second Turkish intervention, in case the recognized Turkish-Cypriot authorities decided to.

Finally, the Annan Plan included a few territorial adjustments pertaining to the return of territory to the Greek-Cypriots. The citizens that were banished from their properties, which were included in the areas that would be returned, during the 1974 developments could re-settle. In addition, certain provisions provided for the Greek-Cypriots refugees, whose properties remained at Turkish-Cypriot soil and Turkish-Cypriots, who had left their property following the 1963 constitutional breakdown and desired to re-settle. Approximately one-third of the land or its value would be returned to its rightful owner, while a full compensation would be given for the rest of the property that would be lost<sup>50</sup>.

At first, the 'Annan Plan' was supposed to become a basis for an agreement before the Copenhagen Council in December 2002. After the passing of the Council and the failure of reaching a consensus an extension was given for the 28<sup>th</sup> February as it was mentioned above. Finding a common ground on time failed again, and the UNSG suggested that despite the disagreement of the two leaderships, the third version of the 'Annan Plan' (it was

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<sup>49</sup> United Nations, *The Annan plan (text)*, [http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan\\_Plan\\_Text.html](http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html)

<sup>50</sup> Syrigos A. (2011), *Ellinotourkikes Sheseis (Greek-Turkish relations)*, Athens: Patakis, pp.636

revised one more in February 2003) should be submitted to separate referenda, but the Turkish-Cypriot administration rejected it.

In April 2003, 10 countries signed in Athens, under the Greek Presidency, the Accession Treaty that guaranteed them a place in the European 'family'. The Republic of Cyprus was one of these states which meant that the Treaty included a protocol excluding the Northern part of the island from the application of the EU acquis. To counterbalance this provision and soothe the Turkish-Cypriot stance, the EU offered financial aid and agreed to accept Turkish-Cypriot exports, a proposal which was rejected by the Republic of Cyprus claiming the only rightful authority of the island.

However, the peace-building process did not stop, despite the successive failures of finding a compromise. A meeting in New York, on February 2004, decided to divide the process into 3 phases: The first phase took place in Nicosia, where the two leaders accompanied by the UNSG Special Representative Alvaro de Soto, exchanged proposals. It ultimately failed. On 24 March 2004, during the second phase of the negotiations, the two leaders met again with the presence of Greece's and Turkey's leaders in Burgenstock, Switzerland. The four delegations also discussed the implementation of the EU acquis on the whole island and how certain restrictions could be surpassed. The final phase, since the previous two failed to present a deal, was the responsibility of the UNSG to modify the Plan and submit it to separate referenda. On 24 April and after two successive modifications on the 29th and 31<sup>st</sup> March, the Annan Plan became subject to the people of Cyprus' vote. Almost 65% of Turkish-Cypriots supported it, while the vast majority of Greek-Cypriots, specifically 76.8%, turned it down<sup>51</sup>.

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<sup>51</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London: Ashgate Publishing, pp 83-85

## EU policy towards the main actors of the conflict: Why did the EU fail to catalyze a settlement

In this chapter we will analyze the main reasons why the EU's strategy did not succeed in providing the right incentives and conditionality in order to balance the interests of all players and contribute to a resolution of the Cyprus problem. It is essential that we divide our study into three parts: EU policy towards **A. Turkish-Cypriots** **B. Turkey** and **C. Greek-Cypriots**.

### Benefits from EU membership for the Turkish-Cypriots

The EU's effort to create more incentives for the Turkish-Cypriot became a clear strategy in the 1995 General Affairs Council. The decision stated that 'the Council considers that Cyprus' accession (...) should allow the North to catch up economically and should improve the output for growth and employment, particularly for the Turkish-Cypriot community. This community must perceive the advantages of EU membership more clearly and its concerns at the prospect must be allayed'.<sup>52</sup> EU membership would occur after Cyprus' reunification since the European Parliament's resolution in 2001 excluded the possibility of northern Cyprus acceding to the EU as a separate entity or after integration to Turkey<sup>53</sup>.

First of all, EU membership would provide the Turkish-Cypriot community international recognition, which would 'pull them out' of isolation and allow them to make trade deals again with European countries. Apart from that, northern Cyprus would be included in the Single market. As for its relations with Turkey, its participation in the Turkey-EU customs

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<sup>52</sup> Cyprus & European Accession Negotiations, 1995 General Affairs Council [http://kypros.org/CY-EU/eng/07\\_documents/document002.htm](http://kypros.org/CY-EU/eng/07_documents/document002.htm)

<sup>53</sup> European Parliament resolution on Cyprus's membership application to the European Union and the state of negotiations (5 September 2001, [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/5/20/463123e2-7f19-4e26-b5c8-1868b4e9153b/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/5/20/463123e2-7f19-4e26-b5c8-1868b4e9153b/publishable_en.pdf))

union would be guaranteed while its adoption of the euro would render monetary dependence from the Turkish Lira unnecessary. The investment sector, especially tourism, would flourish and EU funds would significantly improve northern Cyprus' infrastructure<sup>54</sup>.

As for non-economic incentives, the prospect of EU citizenship was intriguing for the Turkish-Cypriots as it implied privileges, like the freedom of movement of persons. The application of the EU acquis throughout the EU member-states would open new horizons for the younger generations of Turkish-Cypriots who wished to study abroad or work elsewhere. Finally, the annual Commission report on the condition of democratic institutions of each member-state would guarantee a stable democracy, while securing their rights by discouraging their mistreatment<sup>55</sup>.

## **EU incentives and conditionality and their effect on the Turkish-Cypriot community**

The main flaw that political analysts detect when studying the behavior of the EU in relation to the Cyprus conflict is the lack of providing incentives to catalyze a settlement.

To begin with, in order for the Turkish-Cypriots to achieve and profit from EU membership a settlement of the Cyprus conflict had to occur, since states are the only entities that can join the European Union. The only viable solution for the Turkish-Cypriot community was the reunification of the island. The European Parliament's report on Cyprus in 2001, strictly excluded the possibility of the 'TRNC' entering the EU as Turkey's province, in case Turkey decided to realize its threat during the early 2000's and annexed northern Cyprus<sup>56</sup>.

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<sup>54</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 96

<sup>55</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 95

<sup>56</sup> European Parliament (2001), *Report on Cyprus*  
[https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/5/20/463123e2-7f19-4e26-b5c8-1868b4e9153b/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/5/20/463123e2-7f19-4e26-b5c8-1868b4e9153b/publishable_en.pdf)



As mentioned in the above chapters, the biggest disadvantage that the Turkish-Cypriot community had in the negotiations was the lack of international recognition. Despite Denktas' proclamation of the independent 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', no other country apart from Turkey recognized the self-proclaimed state. The Anastasiou case in 1994, during which the ECJ concluded that the EU and all EU countries should discontinue all trade deals with the authorities of northern Cyprus, proved that lack of recognition was harmful and stagnating regarding northern Cyprus' economy. THE EU's plan to attract the Turkish-Cypriots by presenting economic benefits had unexpected results. Many felt as if the European Union intended to bribe the people of northern Cyprus in order secure their consent<sup>57</sup>.

More importantly, Turkish-Cypriot participation and lobbying in international organizations-excluding the UN- was limited due to the community's international status. In 1997, The EU's proposal of including Turkish-Cypriot negotiators during RoC's accession talks was turned down by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership fearing that it would harm their image of an equal community to the Greek-Cypriots<sup>58</sup> (the issue of communal equality is another aspect of great Turkish-Cypriot interest and will be discussed later on).

However, the issue of international recognition was far more important for the Turkish-Cypriots than any economic benefits. In many occasions, the Turkish-Cypriots felt that the Greek-Cypriots were favored in the negotiations. The 1993 Commission Opinion on Cyprus declared that 'The Community, however, following the logic of its established position, which is consistent with that of the United Nations where the legitimacy of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and non-recognition of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'(..)' ,meaning that the RoC was considered the legitimate authority of Cyprus while the Turkish-Cypriots were not recognized as a separate international entity, even though the EU had invited Turkish-Cypriot officials to join the EU accession negotiations. Therefore, international recognition remained their primary goal. The ideal scenario for the Turkish-Cypriots was to gain international legal personality and then accede to the EU. If this was not possible, further economic cooperation with Turkey would also be preferable. In this case,

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<sup>57</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp

<sup>58</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 129

the Turkish-Cypriots would enjoy the EU economic benefits by associating themselves with the Turkey-EU customs union<sup>59</sup>.

Many would argue that minority protection would guarantee the safety of the Turkish-Cypriots. According to the Turkish-Cypriot logic securing their position as an equal community to the Greek-Cypriots is a key-policy in the negotiations. For this reason, accepting the minority title would be disastrous for them therefore it could not function as an incentive.

Furthermore, many elite circles in northern Cyprus were skeptical of EU integration without the presence of Turkey in the EU and the decision-making process. This explains the Turkish-Cypriot policy change, whenever Turkey's road to EU membership was stuck 'in limbo'. For instance, after the conclusions of the Luxembourg Council, when Turkey was not granted candidacy status, Denktas and the 'TRNC' delegation were intransigent during the negotiations, rejecting the idea of a Cypriot federation, opting for a confederation comprising of two overly-autonomous states, a notion that was most certainly non-negotiable. The Turkish-Cypriot firmly believed that Turkish intervention would guarantee their interests and security and Turkey's accession was closely (in not inextricably) linked to Cyprus' accession. In fact, many in northern Cyprus -including Denktas- perceived RoC's accession to the EU as an opportunity for self-determination and integration to Turkey. However, during the 2002-2003 protests, EU membership became a popular demand and the people of northern Cyprus and the civil society supported their preference of becoming EU citizens by protesting in favor of the Annan Plan. A major incentive for the people of northern Cyprus was the RoC's accession course which was proceeding at a fast pace and influenced heavily the Turkish-Cypriot community, who did not want to miss the historical chance of being participants in a major change that could potentially benefit them economically and provide them international recognition.

Denktas efforts to delay the negotiating process created great discontent both in Turkey and in northern Cyprus. This discontent was expressed in two occasions: First, were the protests, which proved that the EU in fact managed to influence the people of the 'TRNC', and second,

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<sup>59</sup> Tocci N (2002)., *Cyprus and the European Union accession process: Inspiration for peace or Incentive for Crisis?* , Turkish Studies <http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Tocci-Cyprus-and-EU-Accession-2002.pdf>

in December 2003 during the Turkish-Cypriot parliamentary elections, when the vast majority of the parliamentary seats were won by MPs who favored a solution. Even though Denktash remained President, it became clear that he could no longer continue his policy of buying time and negotiations would resume as soon as possible<sup>60</sup>.

### **The EU's success in providing the right incentives to the Turkish-Cypriot community**

The EU failed to provide incentives to the Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktas, who possibly considered the proposed plan by the UNSG unsatisfying. However, it managed to convince the people of northern Cyprus that a settlement and the consequent EU benefits served their interests. Economic stagnation and international isolation motivated them to vote for the Annan plan and seek EU membership<sup>61</sup>. The 2002-2003 protests also proved that the de-facto situation in Cyprus created a different Turkish-Cypriot approach non-identical to the Turkish one in many occasions. Although the Greek-Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan in 2004, almost 65% of Turkish-Cypriots supported it proving that EU incentives had certainly affected the outcome.

### **Benefits from EU membership for Turkey**

Turkey was definitely another major actor that the EU had to reckon in. Turkey's military presence on the island and close partnership with the 'TRNC' rendered its position vital if a settlement were to be found.

Therefore, Turkey's EU accession was interdependent to Cyprus' EU accession and naturally, the resolution of the conflict. In 1987, Turkey applied for EC membership. The Commission published its opinion in 1989 on Turkey's accession, declaring that the country was not prepared to become an EC candidate, partially because of its political and economic status at

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<sup>60</sup> Verney S. & Ulusoy K. (2009), 'Europeanisation and the transformation of Turkey's Cyprus policy' in Verney S., Ifantis K. (eds) *Turkey's Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change*, London & New York: Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group, pp.119-120

<sup>61</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, London : Ashgate Publishing, pp 108

the time but largely because of the EC's internal transformation. It also included a small clause about Cyprus and the division of the island. The European Parliament on 20 May released its resolution claiming that the Cyprus conflict hindered Turkey's EU membership<sup>62</sup>.

Turkey proceeded to the illegal occupation of Cypriot territory with the aim to create a specific amount of space between its mainland borders and Greek populations. Modern technology advances have minimized the risk of an attack and Cyprus' strategic position had retreated significantly. Despite these developments Cyprus remained a priority in Turkey's security policy and a national issue and was quite unlikely that a Turkish politician could afford the political cost of supporting a settlement for Cyprus that seemed unsatisfying<sup>63</sup>.

On the other hand, EU officials firmly believed that EU membership would eventually convince Turkey to compromise and contribute to a settlement. This notion was strengthened after Cyprus' EC application. The 1994 Council and the 1995 General Affairs Council stated that Cyprus would be included in the fifth round of Enlargement. Greece's threat to veto the enlargement in case Cyprus was excluded from the process raised Turkish fear and was believed to act as an incentive for Turkey. Furthermore, the accession of a divided Cyprus would portray a negative image for Turkey who would become the illegal occupier of EU territory<sup>64</sup>.

In addition, in case Turkey displayed good will and faith and contributed to an agreement that would include the reunification of Cyprus, many believed that the new Cypriot state would exercise its influence through the EU institutions, in order to promote the accession of Turkey. Finally, the burden of supporting the economy of northern Cyprus would no longer pose a problem for Turkey, since the re-unification and the accession of the island would guarantee its economic development<sup>65</sup>.

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<sup>62</sup> Verney S. & Ulusoy K. (2009), 'Europeanisation and the transformation of Turkey's Cyprus policy' in Verney S., Ifantis K. (eds) *Turkey's Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change*, London & New York: Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 116

<sup>63</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 96

<sup>64</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 96-98

<sup>65</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 97

## EU incentives and conditionality: Turkey's case

The Cyprus conditionality on Turkey did not have the expected results until 1999 and the Helsinki Council, mainly because the EU failed to provide the right motivation, in order for Turkey to contribute to the negotiating process. Specifically, the first historic compromise in 1995 realized a promise that Turkey was expecting for many years. Despite the anticipation, the Customs Union was a first step for Turkey-EU relations. However, its effect was counterbalanced by the 1997 Luxembourg Council conclusions, which provided no specific gains for Turkey. Cyprus would open accession negotiation in order to be included in the next enlargement, while Turkey was not granted candidate status and was given a package of general instructions to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey in return supported the Turkish-Cypriots whose intransigence at that time was profound. Turkey's stance changed completely during the 1999 and 2002 compromises. The EU realized that the only way the Cyprus conditionality would ever have any effect on Turkey, would be by providing the right incentives. The Helsinki Council guaranteed Turkey's candidacy, while the Copenhagen Council declared specifically: 'If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay'<sup>66</sup>.

Turkey-EU relations were hindered also due to misconceptions by both sides. Until 1999, many politicians in Turkey believed that the EU would never opt for a divided Cyprus in the expense of EU-Turkish relations<sup>67</sup>. Turkey's strategic geographical location as well as its security/military importance would significantly upgrade the EU's defense and foreign policy -In 1999 the discussion over Turkey's role in the European Security and Defense Policy was

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<sup>66</sup> Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance de l'Europe (CVCE), *Copenhagen European Council (2002)*, [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/4/20/ff7ff228-fa3b-4f89-b552-808f7eb2c5b3/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/4/20/ff7ff228-fa3b-4f89-b552-808f7eb2c5b3/publishable_en.pdf)

<sup>67</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 110

intense- , while Cyprus was a divided island that would only bring problems inside the EU's borders. However, the real dilemma was between Turkey and the fifth enlargement since Greece constantly threatened to veto the whole enlargement in case Cyprus was not included. The political cost of delaying the enlargement of the former Warsaw Pact states of Central & Eastern Europe would be unbearable for any politician<sup>68</sup>.

On the other hand, EU officials considered the EU far more valuable for Turkey than Cyprus. Indeed, modern technology had rendered Cyprus' position not as important as in the past. Despite the fact that Cyprus had lost its vital role for Turkey, the Turkish establishment – including the foreign ministry, the army, certain embassies, the administration and the government- regarded Cyprus as a national issue of utmost importance and were not willing to sacrifice their political careers for a settlement in Cyprus that seemed to offer more gains to the Greek-Cypriot/Greek side<sup>69</sup>.

After the Helsinki and the Copenhagen Councils, a huge debate started in Turkey between the nationalists and the Pro-Europeans. The nationalists were not willing to accept any solution in Cyprus unless it entailed a confederation and the continuation the Turkish military presence on the island, while the Pro-Europeans were willing to negotiate a solution based on the Annan Plan, aiming at Turkey's accession. The AKP won the 2002 elections and were mostly composed of MPs, who endorsed a pro-european agenda. The new government supported EU membership and for this reason held back the party's Islamist character. Its will to catalyze a settlement for Cyprus before the RoC's EU accession, impelled the new government to oppose the Turkish establishment and Denktas. In Turkey, only a few media owners, businessmen and fractions of the military supported the government. The AKP's ally in the 'TRNC' was the government of M.A Talat, which was formed after the 2003 elections<sup>70</sup>. Turkey was a key-player during the 2004 events and the negotiations with the United Nations. Even though the Annan Plan was turned down by the Greek-Cypriots,

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<sup>68</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 110

<sup>69</sup> Verney S. & Ulusoy K. (2009), 'Europeanisation and the transformation of Turkey's Cyprus policy' in Verney S., Ifantis K. (eds) *Turkey's Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change*, London & New York: Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group, pp 115

<sup>70</sup> Verney S. & Ulusoy K. (2009), 'Europeanisation and the transformation of Turkey's Cyprus policy' in Verney S., Ifantis K. (eds) *Turkey's Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change*, London & New York: Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group, pp.119-120

Turkey demonstrated good will and a compromising stance, therefore the Cyprus conditionality was lifted and Turkey opened accession negotiation in October 2005. The EU finally did accomplish its mission regarding Turkey as it managed to convince the political elite to pursue a settlement in Cyprus giving the incentive of EU membership.

### **The EU's success in providing the right incentives to Turkey**

Turkey's consent regarding the Annan plan constituted a decisive factor that influenced heavily the peace-building process. Government change in Turkey with the victory of the AKP in the 2002 elections was crucial. The majority of the party's MPs valued EU membership and were willing to make significant compromises. Even though, in the 1990's the EU followed an unsuccessful strategy of promoting solely Cyprus' accession, while Turkey's accession course remained static, it managed in the end to persuade the Turkish leadership that a settlement in Cyprus would eventually benefit Turkey. The major incentives that played a key-role in this development were the Helsinki and the Copenhagen Council in 1999 and 2002 respectively, combined with the settlement conditionality, which was reminded to Turkey by the EU institutions throughout the years<sup>71</sup>. Despite the fact that Turkey's accession process was stuck in 'limbo' during the 1990's, Cyprus' membership prospect was alarming for Turkey and potentially motivated the Turkish leadership to pursue the integration of a reunified Cyprus that would include Turkish-Cypriot officials, who would lobby for the accession of Turkey in the EU<sup>72</sup>.

### **EU membership and benefits for the Greek-Cypriots**

The Greek-Cypriot community had many reasons to aim at EU membership. Apart from the profound benefits that accompanied EU accession such as integration to the Single Market, structural funds for

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<sup>71</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 97

<sup>72</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 97-98

infrastructure, loans at almost zero-rate, adoption of the Euro, EU citizenship etc., the Greek-Cypriots firmly believed that EU membership would position them one step ahead in the negotiations. However, the difference, in comparison to the other two actors, Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey, is that after the Helsinki Council in 1999, Greek-Cypriots did not consider reaching a settlement as a precondition. Instead, they assumed that EU membership would enable them to reach an agreement on a final resolution that would be mostly beneficial to Greek-Cypriots<sup>73</sup>.

Various reasons led to this conclusion. First of all, EU's negotiations with the RoC highlighted its legitimacy as the sole recognized authority of Cyprus. Via the EU institutions, the Greek-Cypriots were given the opportunity to present their 'side of the story' and sensitize EU officials and potentially persuade them to pressure Turkey to compromise for a settlement that would be in their favor<sup>74</sup>. In addition, the notion that Turkish-Cypriots were always protected by Turkey's influence, which at a certain extent is true, led them to adopt the perception that the EU would counterbalance the Turkish power. Greece, Cyprus' traditional ally, lacked the appropriate leverage to make up for the injustice that the Greek-Cypriots endured, in contrast to the EU<sup>75</sup>.

Furthermore, EU accession would create an EU 'shield' around Cyprus. Security would be maximized, provided that in case Turkey planned a second attack on the island, it would immediately create tensions and break ties with other European states such as France and Germany. Not to mention that a European defense coalition would probably discourage Turkey from any acts of aggression<sup>76</sup>. Finally, the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* and consequently the freedom of movement and settlement (including re-settlement) would involve travelling, making transactions in northern Cyprus and could potentially enable the Greek-Cypriots refugees to reacquire their property. Greek-Cypriots lobbied intensely in order to include the full implementation of the EU *acquis* in the Annan Plan<sup>77</sup>.

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<sup>73</sup> Tocci N., *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, 2004: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 99-100

<sup>74</sup> Tocci N (2002)., *Cyprus and the European Union accession process: Inspiration for peace or Incentive for Crisis?*, Turkish Studies <http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Tocci-Cyprus-and-EU-Accession-2002.pdf>, pp. 117

<sup>75</sup> Tocci N (2002)., *Cyprus and the European Union accession process: Inspiration for peace or Incentive for Crisis?*, Turkish Studies <http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Tocci-Cyprus-and-EU-Accession-2002.pdf>, pp. 117

<sup>76</sup> <sup>76</sup> Tocci N., *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?*, 2004: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 99-100

<sup>77</sup> Tocci N (2002)., *Cyprus and the European Union accession process: Inspiration for peace or Incentive for Crisis?*, Turkish Studies <http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Tocci-Cyprus-and-EU-Accession-2002.pdf>, pp. 117



## **EU incentives and Conditionality on the Republic of Cyprus: Lack of balance and ultimate failure**

The Republic of Cyprus applied for EC membership in 1990. Three years later, a Commission Opinion expressed the EU's preference to integrate a reunified island. This conditionality gradually retreated. In 1994, the Corfu Council decided that Cyprus would be included in the next round of enlargement while in 1997 Cyprus began accession negotiations with the EU. The Helsinki Council in 1999 concluded that Cyprus would accede to the EU almost unconditionally.

The Greek-Cypriot advantage compared to the 'TRNC' in regard to the EU was that the Republic of Cyprus constituted an internationally recognized state. The UN continuously stressed out that the new Cypriot state should be founded on the equality of the two communities. The Greek-Cypriots sought other organizations to internationalize the conflict. Being the legitimate authority of Cyprus, the EU negotiated solely with the RoC, despite the calls of the EU for the participation of Turkish-Cypriot delegates in the consultations. This positioned the Greek-Cypriots one step ahead in the negotiations.

Combined to RoC's advantage, the RoC's nationalistic tendency during the late 1980's and 1990's resurfaced. The main goal was to prove that the Greek element was dominant. In 1993, Glafcos Cleirides DISY supported by Vasso's Lyssarides DIKO and the EDEK party won the most seats in the parliament. Clerides promises to modify the Set of Ideas proposed by the UN General-Secretary Boutros Ghali resulted to the freezing of the negotiations and the rejection of the confidence building measures (CBM) by the Greek-Cypriots in 1994. Furthermore, Clerides emphasized its efforts on worsening the position of Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey. He achieved his goal largely, through the Anastasiou case, which damaged the economy of northern Cyprus, and the Loizidou case, which portrayed Turkey as a violent and occupying state.

From 1995 to 1999, the Republic of Cyprus adopted a strategy of participating in the negotiations but without displaying a cooperative stance. This policy was encouraged by the progressive gains that the EU provided Greek-Cypriots. The cost of refusing to negotiate would be disastrous for the RoC and international pressure would increase heavily. Not to mention it could potentially hinder its EU accession course. Another factor which influenced

the RoC's stance towards the negotiations was Greece's role in the EU. Being a full EU member, Greece consistently promoted Cyprus' interests and did not hesitate in many occasions to threaten to exercise its veto right in order to secure Cyprus' accession in the EU.

Even though EU accession was almost guaranteed, demonstrating an intransigent behavior in the negotiation could be harmful for the RoC's EU membership. The 'all relevant factors' phrase in the Helsinki Council conclusions on Cyprus' accession sought to ensure a more cooperative Greek-Cypriot delegation in the negotiations. Denktas' decision to leave the table of negotiations in 2001 facilitated Clerides' purpose of thwarting the peace-building efforts and designated the RoC as the moderate side of the conflict. During the talks, the UNSG Kofi Annan had emphasized on the idea of the equality of the two communities and the Greek-Cypriot delegation had strongly reacted to his idea, before the Turkish-Cypriots left the discussion<sup>78</sup>.

The situation changed completely during the 2002-2003 period. Clerides' decisiveness to seal a deal during the UN-mediated negotiations on April 29 2002, led him to making unprecedented concession such as accepting the continuation of a limited Turkish military presence in Cyprus and the Treaties of Guarantees, while promising to accept the Annan Plan unchanged in case negotiations failed. The government of PASOK in Greece played a crucial role in this development. The rapprochement policy with Turkey and the policy of promoting Turkey's accession to the EU instead of its international isolation had a positive impact on the Greek-Cypriot government.

Following the negotiations, Clerides lost the 2003 presidential elections to Tassos Papadopoulos, whose skepticism for the Annan Plan led him to submitting proposals, through which he requested the full implementation of the EU *acquis communautaire* regarding the three freedoms including freedom of movement and freedom of settlement (including re-settlement) and the preparation of all federal laws and parliamentary processes before the submission of the plan to separate referenda.

Eventually, Papadopoulos urged the people of the Republic of Cyprus to reject the plan. His speech on the Annan Plan on April 7, focused on the gains the Turkish-Cypriots would enjoy, security issues and the vague provisions of the Plan such as guarantees for the Greek-Cypriot refugees that would reside in the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state etc.

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<sup>78</sup> Tocci N. (2004), *EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace Or Consolidating Partition In Cyprus?* London,: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 82-83

At the same time, the 2004 elections in Greece led to government change. The PASOK party and Kostas Simitis' government were succeeded by Kostas Karamanlis and Nea Dimokratia. The new leadership avoided to position itself with regard to the Annan Plan and kept a low-key profile, while supporting the government of RoC. On the other hand, the new president of PASOK endorsed the Plan along with RoC's former president, Glafcos Clerides.

Finally, on 24<sup>th</sup> April almost 75% of Greek-Cypriots rejected the UN solution by voting 'No' and Cyprus acceded to the European Union divided. EU conditionality persuaded Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots to pursue a settlement but it failed to do so in the case of Greek-Cypriots. Despite the fact that the Clerides' administration was willing to cooperate and accept the proposed resolution, a large part of the political elite- including the moderate leftist party AKEL- and the people of the Republic of Cyprus were suspicious towards the Annan Plan. Since EU conditionality on Greek-Cypriots was almost lifted after the Helsinki Council in 1999, the Greek-Cypriots had secured EU membership and its gains and probably lost motivation to reach a settlement.

### **EU incentives and conditionality on the Greek-Cypriot community**

The EU's success story in providing the right incentives to the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey, in order to convince them to abide by the settlement conditionality did not affect the Greek-Cypriots. Despite the multiple incentives given to the Greek-Cypriots by the EU and the prospect of EU accession, the lifting of the settlement conditionality during the 1999 Helsinki Council and the progressive gains that the Greek-Cypriots acquired from the EU throughout the 1990's encouraged the Greek-Cypriots to participate in every negotiating initiative, with no intention of making any concessions or displaying any will to contribute to a resolution of the conflict. The sole goal of the Greek-Cypriot administration from the 1993 Commission Opinion on Cyprus' EC accession until 2002 ,when president Clerides demonstrated good faith in the negotiating process and eventually supported the Annan Plan, was to accede to the EU without reaching a settlement that involved major Greek-Cypriot concessions.

Despite the fact that the government change in 2003 affected the outcome of the Greek-Cypriot referendum on the Annan Plan, since Tassos Papadopoulos, Clerides' successor, urged the Greek-Cypriots to vote 'no', the elections expressed the will of the people and the majority of the political elite disapproved of the Annan Plan. Government change in Greece

also had an effect on the Greek-Cypriot public opinion. The government of Kostas Karamanlis remained supportive but neutral during the days of the referendum.

## Greek-Cypriot Goals and the Annan Plan

In the previous chapter, we studied the EU policy towards the main players of the conflict and we highlighted the EU's share in failing to catalyze a settlement. However, it would be unfair and unreasonable to exclusively blame the EU for the failure without examining the proposed plan that was rejected by the Greek-Cypriots. To facilitate our study we will compare the Annan Plan to the primary goals of the Greek-Cypriot community analyzed in the 'Developments of the conflict before Turkey's and Cyprus' EC application' chapter.

First of all, regarding security matters the Treaty of Guarantees would still be in effect. The Greek-Cypriots explicitly disagreed with this provision, even though they were willing to make concessions in case other demands were satisfied. As for the de-militarization of the island it would happen gradually and it would be completed in 2018. Despite the 15-year time-span this provision was aligned to the Greek-Cypriot agenda<sup>79</sup>.

No Turkish settlers would leave Cyprus. As we explain in the first chapter, the Greek-Cypriots initially demanded the withdrawal of all settlers from the island. Probably, the Greek-Cypriots acknowledged the unrealistic character of their goal, however they possibly set the bar high in order to accomplish the return of a few thousands back to mainland Turkey. Instead, the Annan Plan urged all Turkish-Cypriots to remain in Cyprus. Tassos Papadopoulos' speech in 2004 emphasized on the settlers' matter<sup>80</sup>.

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<sup>79</sup> United Nations, *The Annan plan (text)*, [http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan\\_Plan\\_Text.html](http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html)

<sup>80</sup> Cyprus News Agency, *Address to Cypriots by President of the Republic Tassos Papadopoulos, on April 7, 2004, regarding the referendum of 24th April 2004*, <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2004/04-04-08.cna.html>

Finally, the restrictions on the implementation of the EU acquis created dissatisfaction among the Greek-Cypriot administration and the people of the Republic of Cyprus. For example, the quotas on the refugees who could reacquire their property was disapproved by the public opinion in the RoC, while the cost of compensating the rest who were not entitled to return to their pre-1974 properties would burden mostly the Greek-Cypriot constituent state. As for the number of Greek-Cypriots who could buy property and reside in the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state, it could not exceed one-third of the Turkish-Cypriots living in the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state and vice-versa<sup>81</sup>. The status of the Greek-Cypriots who would return to their old property in the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state regarding security guarantees and other important issues like education, healthcare etc. was still unclear<sup>82</sup>.

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<sup>81</sup> United Nations, *The Annan plan (text)*, [http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan\\_Plan\\_Text.html](http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html)

<sup>82</sup> Cyprus News Agency, *Address to Cypriots by President of the Republic Tassos Papadopoulos, on April 7, 2004, regarding the referendum of 24th April 2004*, <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2004/04-04-08.cna.html>



## Conclusions

Our study has shown the complexity regarding the Cyprus issue and the strategy that the EU had to follow in order to balance the interests of each player of the conflict, given that it had to manage two interdependent membership applications, that of Cyprus and Turkey. In addition, we noticed the determinant role that Greece played via the EU institutions and its cooperation with the Greek-Cypriots. Eventually, the EU managed to convince the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey to accept the Annan Plan but not the Greek-Cypriots. Therefore, on the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2004 Cyprus acceded to the EU divided.

The EU's failure to provide the right incentives to the Greek-Cypriots to pursue the reunification of the island before accession is mainly due to the gradual lifting of the settlement conditionality. During the Helsinki Council in 1999, Cyprus' accession in 2004 was guaranteed. The EU proceeded to lifting the settlement conditionality on the Republic of Cyprus largely because of Greece. The Greek-Cypriot aim to ensure EU membership independent of a settlement was expressed by the Greek delegations in the EU institutions, on many occasions. THE RoC was privileged on this issue, provided that Greece was already a member-state of the EU and it could influence the EU decisions either through lobbying or with its vote in the European Council and the threat of veto.

In the 1994 Corfu Council, Cyprus was included in the next round of enlargement. Greece secured Cyprus' accomplishment by threatening to veto the enlargement of Austria, Sweden and Finland. During the 1997 and 1998 pre-Helsinki period Greece threatened again to veto the fifth enlargement in case Cyprus was not included in it. EU officials considered jeopardizing the inclusion of the Central & Eastern European countries in the EU not an option, therefore Cyprus' accession was ensured in the Helsinki Council.

On a parallel manner, the EU had to manage Turkey's application. In 1989, the Commission published its Opinion on Turkey's application stating that the EU was not prepared to accept any other members at that point analyzing also the necessity for Turkey to implement a series of reforms. Throughout the 1990's, Turkey's accession course seemed to be at a stalemate with the exception of the two historic compromises in 1995 during the General Affairs Council, when Greece decided to lift its veto on the completion of the EU-Turkey customs union and the Helsinki Council in 1999, during which Turkey was granted candidate status. EU institutions often reminded Turkey that a settlement in Cyprus was a pre-



condition for Turkey's EU membership. The gradual progress of Cyprus' application, while Turkey's accession course was at a 'stand-still', led to a hardened stance both by Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots. In combination with the Greece-Turkey relations' deterioration, these two factors harmed severely the negotiations until the late 1990's along with the Anastasiou case in 1994 and the Loizidou case in 1993, which provoked great resentment to the Turkish-Cypriot community concerning the strategy that the Greek-Cypriots were following in an effort to internationalize the conflict. Not to mention, that the Anastasiou case damaged the economy of northern Cyprus as it rendered every EU country unable of trading products with the 'TRNC'.

In the early 2000's, the Turkish-Cypriot President Denktas adopted an uncompromising stance and the Greek-Cypriots were also unwilling to make concessions. The Copenhagen EU Council in 2002 expressed its preference for a settlement before Cyprus' accession and its commitment to open accession negotiations with Turkey as soon as a settlement had been reached in Cyprus or immediately after the fifth enlargement. Turkey however, had to prove its will to contribute to a resolution of the conflict. The plan designed by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan became the basis for a final resolution.

Four electoral processes influenced the course of the conflict heavily during the early 2000's. In 2003, Tassos Papadopoulos, who succeeded Glafcos Clerides as President, adopted a negative stance towards the Plan and eventually encouraged the Greek-Cypriots to vote against it. During the same year, the parliamentary elections in northern Cyprus indicated Mehmet Ali Talat as Prime Minister, while the overwhelming majority of the new parliament's MPs favored a settlement according to the Annan plan and EU accession. Despite the fact that Denktas was still President, the pressure to reach a settlement was intense. In Greece, Kostas Karamanlis and his party Nea Dimokratia became the government of Greece, replacing Kostas Simitis and the PASOK party and adopted an indefinite and supportive-to the Greek-Cypriots- stance. Finally, the AKP party in 2002 won the Turkish elections and the majority of its MP's favored a settlement in Cyprus aiming at Turkey's EU accession.

These political developments influenced the conflict but are incapable of explaining the outcome of the Annan Plan referenda without mentioning the role of the EU. EU incentives managed to cause a political turn, which explains at a certain degree the government change in Turkey and the 'TRNC'. EU policy towards the RoC was also expressed by the election of Tassos Papadopoulos and the DIKY party. Since the Greek-Cypriots had no pre-conditions for

EU accession regarding a settlement they were unwilling to accept an agreement that did not satisfy most of their goals.

On the other hand, the Annan Plan was still problematic and vague in some aspects. The Treaty of Guarantees would still be in effect and there would be major restrictions to the *acquis communautaire* despite the accession of the reunified Cyprus to the EU. The restrictions pertained to the freedom of settlement and property ownership. The quotas on the foreigners who could reside in each constituent state were strict and the division seemed to accompany reunification. Compensations for the property losses would burden the Greek-Cypriot state, given the economic weakness of northern Cyprus. Many questions arose concerning the implementation of many provisions of the Plan and the security guarantees that the UN would provide.

Therefore, it would be unjust to blame entirely the EU for the collapse of the settlement process in 2004. The reader should never forget the psychology of each player of the conflict at that time. Turkey was pursuing EU accession while trying to minimize its losses regarding an issue which was still considered to be of utmost national importance. The Turkish-Cypriot people were willing to be recognized and escape international isolation and economic stagnation. The Greek-Cypriots felt since 1974 that they were being treated unfairly. They believed that the legal owners of the Cypriot land were being disadvantaged and mistreated due to the illegal occupier's power and influence. For this reason, even if the settlement conditionality was a pre-requisite for RoC's accession during the Annan Plan referenda, it is quite uncertain whether the Greek-Cypriots would vote for a Plan that did not satisfy their fundamental demands or even mitigated them.

As for the EU's failure it should be judged qualitatively. The EU partially failed to catalyze a settlement in Cyprus, not only due to the contribution of many factors to the outcome but also because the EU motivated two of the three main players to vote in favor of the Annan Plan. Mainly in the case of Turkey the EU's partial failure is synonym to partial success. The incentive of EU accession in the early 2000's proved to have tremendous results and possibly lead to policy change. The most recent negotiations in Geneva in June and July 2017 collapsed largely due to Turkey's intransigence. Turkey's transformation since AKP's latest electoral win in 2015 and especially after the July 2016 failed coup attempt renders a solution in Cyprus quite doubtful and the prospect of EU accession very distant. On account of this, it is not unreasonable to believe that the Annan Plan was possibly the best opportunity to reach a settlement in Cyprus, provided Turkey's willingness to reach a

settlement and northern Cyprus' consent. However, no one can predict with certainty the success/failure of the negotiations in the future.

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