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***Prospects and Challenges of the European Defence &
Security Cooperation.***





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Athens 28/9/2018,

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"Europe's destiny and the future of the free world are entirely in our hands..." Simone Veil, 1982



Abstract

The enduring and ambitious aspiration of a common European Army has instilled awe to academics, political theorists and visionaries since before the establishment of the European Communities. Its immoderate fundament has been part of a paramount political process towards a fully integrated European State that would secure an inviolable peace between national actors and beyond. However its perennial inadequacies have always been the outcome of unbending national interests and structural characteristics of the international order. The changing nature of integration, political conservatism and the eroding international system are providing the grounds for a systematization of flexible solutions in European cooperation and a new sectoral domain for security and defence, the Industrial and Technological base. The mandate of Saint Malo for autonomous action provided a path that is currently leading the EU to a Structured Cooperation and a Defence, Technology and Industrial Strategy that couldn't be more alienating towards the prospect of a coherent cooperation that will direct a collective effort in implementing a 21st century security and defence union. Without the political consensus for strategic implementation and the shared threat perceptions regarding human security and its externalization through foreign policy, the new security environment that is emerging won't be pre-empted by the rather ambitious and dubious means of the current rationale.

The end of the bipolar world and the emergence of a multipolar environment have advanced the prospect of an integrated European defence as a response to conventional and asymmetric threats of the 21st century. The launch of the permanent structured cooperation in 2017 stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon signifies a pivotal change of pace in Europe's integration as it sets forth a process that reaches the boundaries set by national sovereignty. The political, financial and institutional capacity that PESCO requires have raised arguments concerning its pragmatism and whether it's only a means to an end, in order to achieve a higher level of integration. The absence of a political bedrock and the formation of new intergovernmental barriers towards a strategic autonomy status, are leading to a fragmented and disparate process that is directed towards a military and defence industry coil. Without the necessary political convergence PESCO will remain deficient and drifting between selective few and decentralized interests. Prioritization of goals, strategic communication and a societal and human security perception can direct a collective effort in implementing a 21st century defence union.

Keywords: Militarization, Intergovernmentalism, Sectoral integration, EDTIB, threat perception, post-modern security, national interests, capabilities, regulation, flexibility, defence union

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Abbreviations

PE.S.CO: Permanent Structured Cooperation
E.U: European Union
W.E.U: Western European Union
W.U.D.O: Western Union Defence Organization
C.S.D.P: Common Security Defence Policy
(E.)D.T.I.B: (European) Defence Technology Industrial Base
O.E.E.C: Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
N.A.T.O: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
E.C.S.C: European Coal and Steel Community
CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention
E.D.C: European Defence Community
E.C: European Communities
EPC: European Political Cooperation
QMV: Qualified Majority Vote
SEA: Single European Act
O.S.C.E: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
E.S.D.I: European Security Defence Identity
E.U.I.SS: European Union Institute for Security Studies
E.U.S.C: European Union Satellite Centre
E.R.R.F: European Rapid Reaction force
E.R.D.P: European Security Defence Policy
C.D.P: Capability Development Plan
N.I.P: National Implementation Plan

“Modern civilisation has based its specific foundation on the principle of liberty which states that man is not a mere instrument to be used by others but rather a main autonomous living being..”

Altiero Spinelli, Il manifesto di Ventotene



Introduction.

The elements of the 21st century and the structural variations in a global scale have challenged the international post-war order by transcending its political and societal norms and defying its solid foundations through a number of diverging factors. The rules-based international establishment and western democracies are undergoing an existential crisis that ranges through all fields of governance and reflects an overall shift in conservatism. This verse in political direction and purport however is a gradual process that since 9/11, rallied the disputants of globalization and liberalism in a single front that defies the functionality of a multilateral order. The combined emergence of hybrid and conventional threats to western ideals and borders as well as great power rivalry, protectionism and populism have caused severe rifts in transnational cooperation. Therefore Europe's role and *acquis* in cooperation remains of vital significance for the preservation of a multilateral and rules based international environment, yet its greatest challenge will be to maintain its own integrity. European integration under the provisions of the Treaties has reached a point of unprecedented inconsistency and diffidence that threaten its already fragile coherency and common direction. Diverging interests within and outside the EU have instituted different patterns of means and goals, in order to achieve a new level of conservation, that is entailed by the emerging political and security environment of the last decade. Threat perception regarding national sovereignty and security is changing rapidly as globalization, migration, climate change and cyberspace are widening and deepening the aspect of security. Yet a major state-centric approach remains undisputed in matters of security and defence and is successfully assimilating political and societal elements to counter the loss of national sovereignty.

The intertemporal significance of a European security and defence union isn't simply a step further towards the implementation of the integrative process but it indicates a transition to a new form of governance. In this emerging intergovernmental environment of the EU, state interests will be safeguarded from institutional and avant-garde endeavours, by maintaining a form of sovereignty in matters of high politics. Yet the perception of national sovereignty regarding matters of defence derives from the traditional aspect of security, which pertains to hard power elements, foreign policy orientation and decision making. Their conflation marks the inviolable power of the state to act independently regarding its affairs with other states and dictate its policies based on national interests. Deputing such jurisdictions is only possible through an intergovernmental process, which could allow the convergence and permutation of interests, strategies and foreign policy orientation on a solid common denominator. The launch of PESCO a decade after its conception in the TEU signifies this process, by allowing the progression of the C.S.D.P of the EU through a legal mechanism, designed to adjutant the MSs towards closer cooperation. The defence economy and industry framework however instead of providing an inclusive political environment, exploit the Hobbesian elements of the state which seek the advantages of acquiring more power through material means. The historical inadequacy of the C.S.D.P will prove even harder to exceed, since a series of internal factors are coinciding with a wave of domestic and systemic changes prone to reluctance regarding further integration. The research gap in matters of integration and even more so in the emerging defence landscape, remains of paramount importance not only for the EU as an international actor but in the overall aspect of governance for the 21st century.

The balance between state sovereignty and the multilateral order is showing signs that it is shifting towards national agendas and matters of security. The multipolar and asymmetric political environment as well as several destabilizing elements in regional and international affairs are depicting a constant change in global politics. Although the size of the research on European integration and the CSDP is significant, the new variables introduced through the structured cooperation and the EDTIB provide a valuable introspective on how integration and sovereignty are interacting on the changing political and security environment of Europe. Europe's prospects for a more successful security and defence policy lie to its inclination to soft power, as well as the political capacity and institutional support to externalize the MS efforts and advance a common and operational threat perception outlook.

The emergence of the individual human aspect in the essence of international law and politics remains amplified despite the considerable challenges in the field of human security. Safeguarding European liberty, prosperity and solidarity however in the 21st century, will require a political backdrop and a common ideological commitment rather than joint militaries. Yet it is considered easier to integrate brigades and engage in regional projects while regulating a common defence industry than facing the impact of a political

discrepancy. The original CFE Treaty which replaced strategic secrecy with transparency, the impact and ambitions of OSCE and the CWC and the inception of the ECSC paved the path of a post-modern continuum in international relations and provided Europe with a higher mandate for cooperation. So in an environment where borders, distances, communication and the rule of law are transcending the concept of security, transparency and political capacity for compromise and solidarity between states remains immensely vital for the EU's ambitions¹. Although I disagree with the direction that the defence cooperation is heading, it is important to propound the perspective behind the integrative initiative of the hard security aspects. As an essential state jurisdiction and domain of intertemporal necessity to assert control, security and defence have become a priority due to the eroding of international cooperation and the integrative impediments of the decade since before the Arab Spring. Advancing conventional and hard security aspects in an integrated environment is seen as a catalyst to Europe's security and path towards a single state. But in the short and midterm, a militaristic cooperation is seen as a profound step towards perceived threats and challenges, even though initiatives like the EU Battlegroups remained politically and strategically defunct². So providing an operational capability and integration of military domains through PESCO's process and an EDTIB Strategy won't address the issue as to how MSs will converge their foreign policies and their operational extensions.

The pivotal changes that have gradually taken place surrounding Europe's borders and established norms are challenging the *acquis* and the functionality that the Union has achieved. If the financial crisis and the migration flux are testing the EU's coherence and solidarity, the geopolitical shifts caused by Brexit and America's verse towards Asia have created a convergence of conjunctures for a more voluntary security and defence cooperation. Concurrently the rise of protectionism in the West, authoritarianism in the East and the instability in the South have enveloped the EU's environment and have seriously influenced domestic policies and national awareness by identifying conservatism with a form of national backlash which is apparent in various levels of governance. First I will argue that the through the realization of the end of the bipolar political environment, the EU made actual steps towards a common defence policy, which in the past were conveniently postponed by exogenous and internal factors. Yet the conformation of a European identity regarding security approaches wasn't only a by-product of the transatlantic cooperation but a collective convergence of threat perceptions that gradually took place through the WEU debates and even more so the EPC's,

¹ Robert Cooper (2003) *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Atlantic Books. p:52-67

² Reykers Yf (2017) EU Battlegroups: High costs, no benefits, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 38:3, 457-470.

which led to further institutionalization in the Post-Maastricht Era³. My retrospection in security and defence will focus in the evolution of cooperation mainly surrounding the Saint Malo declaration as a point of reference which paved the way for the introduction of the EDTIB Strategy and more recently PESCO's launch. My main argument will revolve around the nature of the new defence landscape and the rationale surrounding its implementation which is leading to a new domain of political interest and bargaining within the highly disparate integrative environment. Following the current proceedings regarding the post Lisbon era direction of the CSDP, I will articulate on how the EU can pursue its security and defence cooperation on the basis of a side-lined human and societal aspect and why such a direction would provide a much needed coherence. Lastly I will emphasize on the role of intergovernmentalism and common threat – security perception regarding the EDTIB rationale and its governance and what should precede such a direction before established, since PESCO has the primary function of incorporating policy implementation in a permanent capacity.

A Brief Retrospection in European Security and Defence cooperation

The European Post War Security Question and NATO.

The original Brussels Pact which was based on the Treaty of Dunkirk was the first effort towards a post-war European security cooperation which was a mutual defence pact primarily against Germany, not the USSR⁴ But the commonly perceived threat of communism reoriented the mutual defence pact towards an Atlanticist alliance that included Germany in the WEU instead of the super-national EDC. Basically the UK's refusal to join the EDC, the Gaullist fears for the invisibility of the French Republic and the accommodation of the security interests of the all the western allies led to the defunct WEU and NATO's territorial defence role⁵. The assimilation and amendment of the WUDO into the WEU and its military branch in NATO in 1954 along with Western Germany's admission in NATO in 1955, ended a cycle of post-war security issues without deputing of national jurisdictions into a single European army⁶. De

³ Smith, M.E. (2004), *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴ Kyle Steele (1993) *The Treaty of Dunkirk, Treaty of Brussels, and NATO: A View from the Special Relationship*. Indiana: Indiana University Press, p: 78-86

⁵ May, Alex (1999) *Britain and Europe since 1945 (Seminar Studies In History)* 1st Edition. London: Routledge. pp: 14-23

⁶ Duke, Simon (2000). *The elusive quest for European security: from EDC to CFSP*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 13–21

Gaule's grand design for Europe with the Fouchet and the Pleven plans ended by fears of undermining the EEC and NATO⁷. His substitution by Pompidou in 1969⁸ and the launch of the EPC following the summit in The Hague in 1969, which brought forth an intergovernmental consultation mechanism, gave Europeans an informal political instrument, where «politics of scale»⁹ could be achieved. But the long term impact of De Gaulle's vision for an independent Europe, included a six year delay before head of state meetings were held regularly on council level by 1975, sixteen years before the foreign policy was codified in the form of the EPC by the SEA and it took twenty three years before the pillar system introduced an intergovernmental CFSP by 1993.¹⁰

European Security and Defence on the eve of the 21st Century

The impact of the WEU's reactivation in 1984 with the Declaration of Rome¹¹, was the gradual formation of a European security pillar within NATO through the so called ESDI which basically was the Petersberg Declaration's punctuality within European security and defence culture. This security identity would provide the basis for the externalization of European efforts in defence cooperation which was initiated by the Franco-British Summit of Saint Malo.

Although the WEU remained defunct up until it was gradually assimilated until 2011, it provided the strategic framework under which Europeans would approach security and later defence in order to gain the capabilities of a functional security and defence cooperation. The Petersberg Tasks were basically the response of the Europeans to the rapidly changing environment following the regional consequences of the collapse of the communist bloc. NATO's role would gradually be reoriented towards a system of collective defence while the Petersberg Tasks would be codified by the Amsterdam Treaty¹³ and enhance the

⁷ Teasdale, Anthony () The Fouchet Plan: De Gaulle's Intergovernmental Design for Europe. London: LSE, LEQS Paper No. 117/2016 October 2016 p:44-54

⁸ Ibid, p:44-52

⁹ Ginsberg, R.H. (1989), Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

¹⁰ Teasdale, Anthony (2016) The Fouchet Plan: De Gaulle's Intergovernmental Design for Europe. London: LSE, LEQS Paper No. 117/2016. p:54

¹¹ Declaration by the WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers (Rome, 27 October 1984),

[https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/7/11/c44c134c-aca3-45d1-9e0b-](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/7/11/c44c134c-aca3-45d1-9e0b-d4d9974ddf/publishable_en.pdf)

[d4d9974ddf/publishable_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/7/11/c44c134c-aca3-45d1-9e0b-d4d9974ddf/publishable_en.pdf)

¹³ Τσάκωνας Ι. Π., Ντάλης Σ. (εισαγ. & εμ.) (2004) Η Ευρωπαϊκή Πολιτική Άμυνας και Ασφάλειας σε σταυροδρόμι. Αθήνα: Ι. Σιδέρης. Σελ. 241-243

EU's capabilities through NATO assets after the 1996 Berlin Agreement¹⁴ with several civilian and military operations¹⁵. The legal basis of the CFSP as a pillar of the Union and its political bodies like the FAC and the PSC along with the WEU's EUISS and EUSC, became instrumental in the decision making process of the CFSP without however any actual progress in matters of strategic coherence. The significance of the contribution of the Delors Commission should be noted for the institutional framework which included plans for a mutual defence in unspecified time, the enhanced cooperation provision and the role of the WEU for the future of the defence and security cooperation. Although the institutional basis for political progression in the CFSP and beyond was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty and enhanced by the Amsterdam Treaty, the defining moment for European security and defence policy was the Saint Malo Declaration in 1998¹⁶. Fifty years after the Treaty of Dunkirk the UK and France advocated a joint initiative in order to advance the capabilities for European autonomous action in matters of defence. The armed conflict of Kosovo and the failure to intervene, provided the grounds for a more direct approach with the Headline Goal, which was concluded with the creation of a 60.000 strong ERF by 2007 and a 2010 Headline Goal.

Following the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Declaration of Saint Malo which expressed different concepts of integration, the EU advanced its decision making through the QMV and the common strategies of the CFSP. It was specifically the European Council summits of Cologne and Helsinki that provided the basis for the progress achieved after the Amsterdam Treaty. Although the Treaty's significance is undisputed and besides the criticism on the institutional questions that were not settled, it focused on security related matters and introduced the enhanced cooperation, leaving defence integration out. The progress in the CFSP however is considerable by the introduction of the HR and the common strategies as well as the incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks. But the significance of the Treaty of Amsterdam is that it provided an institutional amplification on the *acquis* of the TEU and expressed the importance of projecting the values of the Union through its policies around the world. So even though a common defence framework wasn't provided, the path to the Lisbon Treaty and towards defence capabilities implementation was paved by an intergovernmental concept of a capabilities oriented defence cooperation. The impact of the changing environment around Europe made the Declaration of

¹⁴ Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Berlin, 3-4 July 1996 <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1996/9606-brl/9606-brl.htm> [last access 25-8-2018]

¹⁵ Sanchez A., Miguel A, (2011) *The EU's Military Crisis Management Operations: Petersberg Tasks and International Peace*. Saarbrücken DE: Lambert Academic Publishing. Introduction"

¹⁶ "The EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO."

- St Malo Declaration, https://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998enf3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html [last access 25-8-2018]

Saint Malo and the council summits that followed, the main instrument of the Europeans in marking their progress towards a defence cooperation. By advancing the CFSP's common strategies, decision making and the enhanced cooperation, while progressing the debate on how a defence policy can be enhanced through military capabilities, a first milestone for progress was reached. The declaratory approach of the CFSP and the new governing bodies and committees surrounding the Council however, failed to bestow a legal basis, a coherent approach or any operational directive to the Union.

The facilitation of an ESDP following the political foundations set by the Saint Malo Declaration wasn't build only on bilateral understanding, which launched a European effort to advance defence related cooperation. It was a common threat perception viewpoint which provided the initial common defence pillar at the TEU which evolved to the launch of a security and defence policy by 1999. The Helsinki council summit paved the way for a new joint military initiative on the basis of further capabilities development to military and civilian operations, without however providing a solid European strategic concept outside its role in NATO. The Declaration of the Washington Summit of 1999¹⁷ reaffirmed Europe's importance for NATO and the nature of the ESDP as a NATO pillar, especially after the conclusion of the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2002. The use of NATO assets or the EU-NATO Capabilities Group¹⁸ and the common intelligence exchange for ESDP Petersberg missions, provided a joint capabilities framework that prevented an advancement in European capacity towards operational progress on defence.

The Treaty of Nice however provided this basis for the development of the Union's military capacity and the introduction of permanent political and military structures to fully incorporate WEU functions and the Council Summit conclusions¹⁹ and assets in order to institutionalize an emerging military cooperation. Most notably the Treaty amended Article 17 of the TEU by removing the provisions that defined the relations between the EU and the WEU and it modified the QMV so that the five biggest member states will have a 60% percent of votes in the council²⁰. Although the regulation of the QMV has been criticized in the past decade regarding the cultivation of an incoherent integrative environment, I believe it reoriented progress towards a more

¹⁷ Washington Declaration (April 1999) <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm> [last access 28/8/2018]

¹⁸ Ντάλης Σ. (ε.μ.) (2004) Οι Διατλαντικές Σχέσεις: Συνεργασία ή Ανταγωνισμός; Σειρά: Διεθνής και Ευρωπαϊκή Πολιτική. Εκδ.Παράζηση. Σελ: 316 [Τσάκωνας Π., Το «Χάσμα Προσδοκίων Πραγματικότητας» και το Μετέωρο Βήμα της Ευρωπαϊκής Άμυνας]

¹⁹ 'Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence', Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council (December 1999) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm [last access 28/8/2018]

²⁰ Summary of the treaty of Nice (Brussels 2003) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-03-23_en.htm [last access 28-8-2018]

converging approach in CFSP, which I will argue that is pivotal for a higher political inclination in defence matters. Overall since the Saint Malo Declaration Europeans acted through the realization of a new international political environment and a verse towards a multipolar order which included an emerging threat – security reciprocity. Basically until the release of the ESS in 2003 which conceived the new security environment, the Union made efforts to strengthen a defence cooperation which would seem less and less usable and pragmatic by the unconventional threat asymmetries of the 21st century. However the consolidation and the convergence of hard power elements was perceived as a means to an end, even more so after key events such as the conflicts in the Balkans, 9/11 and even the transatlantic rift over the Iraq invasion.

After the Cold War and even more so after the Saint Malo Declaration, Europeans followed a path to a common defence policy in a rapid developing international and regional security environment, which was evolving much faster than their common perception of 21st century security. The establishment of the EDA in 2004 after one year of effect of the Treaty of Nice, marks the course towards the development of a sustainable defence capability implementation and management, which will be concluded in the post Lisbon era as the European Defence Action Plan of 2016. The facilitation of NATO's ESDI into the ESDP in 1999 as a common policy, the gradual incorporation of the WEU and the EU led operations and missions launched after 2003, let on a process that was defined as preconditioned extension of NATO's functions²¹. Whether systemic factors like NATO's role or predefined modalities regarding peace keeping operations and crisis management, the CSDP lacked a coherent determination and strategic decisiveness, despite the various bodies and structures founded by the Treaties and the Council²². The progress of the CSDP as the Treaty of Lisbon defined it as a policy area, advanced through the military and civilian operations on the periphery of the Union, under the intertemporal mandate of exporting cooperation, conditionality, peace and the rule of law. The tendency expressed towards advancing defence cooperation through integrating military capabilities and structures, even before the Treaty of Nice, is so far evolving in a different direction than before. The core of the CSDP is strictly based on external action and operations towards specific goals and its mandate is to provide capabilities to support the CFSP of the Union. So it would seem that instead of providing the EU with an EDTIB Strategy which will be implemented through PESCO, progress towards a more strategic CFSP and a more operational CSDP would be more prudent in PESCO's functions.

The Treaty of Lisbon provided the EU with the means for autonomous action by transfusing a legal basis for the EU's personality and making available

²¹ Shepherd J. K. A. (2001) ESDP: Recent Events, Unresolved Issues An Executive Summary. University of Aberdeen.

²² European Defence Agency(EDA), Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Union Military Committee (EUMC), Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), Politico-Military Group (PMG), Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

an enhanced cooperation in defence, while de facto merging the HR/VP offices and introducing the External Action Service. The overly debated issue of the double majority vote however failed to be extended in the CFSP and the CSDP despite the fact that a structured cooperation in defence received the new QMV extension, while limited use was pertained for specific issues in the CFSP²³. In addition the Treaty provided the mutual defence clause supplemented by a solidarity clause between MSs, which certainly strengthened the legal basis of the defence policy and marked its prospect towards a common defence²⁴. The path to a collective defence capacity however failed by the preservation of the rule of unanimity in CFSP related matters at the Assembly and the Intergovernmental Conference. The Treaty maintained «constructive abstention»²⁵ and the suspension mechanism for the QMV of the Council while any military or defence issues are subject to the exclusions of a.31 p.4 of the TEU regarding the QMV for the CFSP²⁶. The Treaty also repealed the common strategies on the basis of ineffectiveness for a successful CFSP²⁷ while it affirmed the industrial, technological and military orientation for the common defence through the economic and capability – capacity regulations of the EDA²⁸. The EDTIB Strategy that was adopted by the Council Summit of 2013²⁹ expressed the idea that without an integrated DTIB and an associated economic plan, European security and defence would not be functional within NATO's collective framework and the new security environment. So whether seen as a cornerstone or not the launch of PESCO in 2017, it is basically providing the core intergovernmental function which will implement the EDTIB through regional projects, sectoral cooperation and an assessment process.

²³ Ιωακειμίδης Κ. Π. (2008) Η Συνθήκη της Λισσαβώνας: Παρουσίαση, Ανάλυση, Αξιολόγηση. Αθήνα, Εκδόσεις Θεμέλιο. p:82-83

²⁴ Ibid, p:112-113

²⁵ Blockmans Steven (2017), Differentiation in CFSP: Potential and Limits, I.A.I. www.iai.it/sites/default/files/eu60_5.pdf [last access 6/9/2018]

²⁶ CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF [last access 28/8/2018]

²⁷ P. Gauttier «Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the European Union», European Law Journal, vol 10, 2004, p:21-40

²⁸ Ιωακειμίδης Κ. Π. (2008) Η Συνθήκη της Λισσαβώνας: Παρουσίαση, Ανάλυση, Αξιολόγηση. Αθήνα, Εκδόσεις Θεμέλιο. p:113-114

²⁹ European Council Conclusions 19-20/12/2013. <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-217-2013INIT/en/pdf> [last access 28/8/2018]

The New Defence Landscape: Beyond the Union's CSDP.

The Treaty of Lisbon despite its inadequacies concerning decision making and defence policy orientation, became the legal basis of a deeper defence cooperation, which can only be implemented by MSs on the basis of integrating capabilities and binding commitments, on a long term process of interaction. The nature of this interaction will be oriented towards the establishment of a workable framework of defence economy, capabilities and structures which will provide the means for the intergovernmental cooperation, to act in capacity with the goals set by the EDA and the EDTIB Strategy. The launch of PESCO however should only be seen as a pivotal step in a long process that began before Brexit, the Ukraine crisis or Donald Trump's presidency, by 2012 when the President of the European Council called for actions to strengthen the CSDP³⁰ and the Commission's announcement for a defence roadmap in 2013.³⁰ So when Brexit became a reality for Europe, PESCO's launch revived the prospects of a European defence cooperation and affirmed the so called CSDP 'redux'³¹, which called for an avant-garde level of integration between MSs³². Since the EUGS was published several assorted documents whether decisions or statements and

³⁰ European Council Conclusions 12-13/12/2012 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134353.pdf [last access 28/8/2018]

³⁰ European Commission Communication [COM(2013) 542 final] 'Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector' p:11. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0542:FIN:EN:PDF> [last access 28/8/2018]

³¹ Howorth, J, 'Strategic autonomy and the EU-NATO Cooperation: squaring the circle', Egmont Security Brief No 83, May 2017

³² Permanent Structured Cooperation: national perspectives and state of play. (Study) Directorate-General for External Policies SEDE, European Parliament 2017.

communications regarding European defence called for progress³³. The most notable initiatives until 2017 were the Commission Defence Action Plan³⁴, the FAC's Implementation Plan³⁵, the Franco-German non paper of 9/2016³⁶ as well as the EU-NATO Warsaw Declaration³⁷ that provided various interpretations of the ongoing debate for the EU's direction in defence related matters.

The main issue with the current rationale isn't only the direction of European defence policy towards hard security and defence economy regulations but the fact that the EUGS is considered its basic context. PESCO was launched as a means to put forth the implementation of the EUGS, which called for a new level of integration and progress in the fields of security and defence concerning the international security environment and the Union's role and position in it. Balancing hard and soft power elements as a response to the global changing environment is perceived to be a solidified path for an autonomous action on safeguarding the Union's interests. So ceding sovereignty on defence and military matters is currently surpassed through a variable that combines a strict intergovernmental process with the implementation of a defence industrial and economic framework. The intergovernmental process is the Structured Cooperation that brings together the MSs on the basis of voluntary integration on crucial military capability elements and structures. Its terminology explains the nature of the cooperation and constitutes its role in the emerging defence union that PESCO is supposed to establish over time. Defined as a process and not a framework³⁸, PESCO is supposed to pave the way for an incentive process of commitment – evaluation regulatory framework that will surpass sovereignty issues and establish a collective capability network for the CSDP.

This process that the Lisbon Treaty introduces as PESCO cannot be defined as a framework since it's not a predefined policy area but instead, it provides a balanced legal mechanism that's supposed to avoid past inefficiencies through a long term commitment and incorporation process. Its potential is considered ceaseless and on the basis of member state volition to accomplish higher levels of integration. The only respective framework enhancing PESCO is the institutional grid that will support MSs and will include the EDF, CARD, EDA and lesser existing and new structures that will be introduced by the

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ European Commission, European Defence Action Plan (COM/2016/950), 30 November 2016, <http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM:2016:950:FIN>. [last access 28/8/2018]

³⁵ Council of the European Union, Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence, 3498th Council Meeting Foreign Affairs, 14 November 2016, <http://europa.eu/!NQ34FH>. [last access 28/8/2018]

³⁶ Franco-German non paper on European Defence, 11 September 2016, <https://euobserver.com/foreign/135022> [last access 28/8/2018]

³⁷ Joint EU – NATO Declaration, Brussels, 8 July 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm [last access 28/8/2018]

³⁸ Permanent Structured Cooperation: national perspectives and state of play. (Study) Directorate-General for External Policies SEDE, European Parliament 2017.

projects of the Structured Cooperation. The use of the words ‘permanent’ and ‘structured’ constitute the gravity given to PESCO by the drafters regarding its differentiated nature and structural goals. Its definition derives from its requirements which include operational and political cooperation through a multifaceted and ceaseless process of integration which is still unclear on how it will relate to the CSDP³⁹. The fact is however that a cooperation that is structured in a permanent way has more to do with actual integration than cooperation in principle. The commitment basis of PESCO expresses this structured permanence since it provides MSs with an incessant incentive process of regulating their capabilities in a joint capacity that could be indicated as irreversible.

The same way the Maastricht criteria paved the way for the Eurozone, PESCO is a legally binding structuring process based on an enduring incorporation of military elements and defence policies towards the capacity for autonomous action⁴⁰. The ambition entwined within PESCO rests on the five prerequisites and the two conditions set by Protocol 10 of the TEU⁴¹ which define the nature and the rationale of the initiative and the articles 42(6) and 46 of TEU which include the provisions of the CSDP of the Union. The conditions refer to the criteria of military capabilities which will be made available to the Union and the commitments made between MSs to supply battle groups within defined time periods. Once admitted the MSs undertake the five commitments of Protocol 10, which overall provide a preparatory process of harmonizing and regulating defence expenditure, forces specialization availability, interoperability, flexibility, training, logistics as well as identifying common objectives. The Structured Cooperation introduces a modular two-pillar integrative process with the first being a common commitment and strategic direction pillar (council level) of the MSs towards financial regulations, technical, technological modernizations and decision making through the implementation of the CDP^{42,43} that allow MSs to develop projects. The second pillar of PESCO (project level) consists of collaborative capability implementation projects undertaken voluntarily by MSs and approved by the Council which facilitate a process of providing structures in support of the Implementation Plan⁴⁴ approved by the Council. Currently 17 MS projects [icon 1] are underway already in order to provide a consolidated structural framework on three main fields which pertain to common training, operational domains and joint capabilities [icon 2]. Within

³⁹ Daniel Fiott, Antonio Missiroli and Thierry Tardy. "Permanent Structured Cooperation: What's in a name?" CHAILLOT PAPER N° 142 November 2017, p: 53

⁴⁰ Permanent Structured Cooperation: national perspectives and state of play. (Study) Directorate-General for External Policies SEDE, European Parliament 2017.

⁴¹ Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/protocols-annexed-to-the-treaties/673-protocol-on-permanent-structured-cooperation-established-by-article-42-of-the-treaty-on-european.html> [last access 28/8/2018]

⁴² Capability Development Plan 2018. <https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018->

⁴³ [-28-factsheet_cdpb020b03fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f](#) [last access 29/8/2018]

⁴⁴ European Council Press Release, 6 March 2018. www.consilium.europa.eu/media/33064/councilrecommendation.pdf [last access 29/8/2018]

2018 a new set of initiatives is expected to enhance the current direction and implementation of the projects, many of which are still in preparatory status. Under the strategic autonomy mandate PESCO brings forth a process that will gradually envelop different defence policies and domains under the inspection and assessment of the CARD which will consolidate an information framework on defence policies, spending and military resources.

PESCO projects sorted by number of participating countries/number of projects a country participates in. Yellow = Project leader	Italy	Spain	France	Greece	Netherlands	Germany	Belgium	Croatia	Romania	Cyprus	Slovakia	Finland	Portugal	Bulgaria	Austria	Czechia	Sweden	Hungary	Ireland	Latvia	Lithuania	Luxembourg	Poland	Slovenia	Estonia	TOTAL
Military Mobility	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	24
Network of logistic Hubs in Europe and support to Operations	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
European Medical Command	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9
European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
Energy Operational Function (EOF)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3
European Training Certification Centre for European Armies	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
TOTAL	14	12	9	9	8	7	6	6	6	5	5	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1

Sources: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6393-2018-INIT/en/pdf>

Icon 1. MS participation in the PESCO. (Europa.eu)

The EDA as the coordinating and regulatory defence institution of the Union will enter bilateral talks with MSs in order to assess the feedback collected through CARD and the MSs will communicate an annual NIP which under the EDA's synchronization and commitment mechanism of the CDP, will provide a report to the Council through the HR/VP⁴⁵. The information analysis – capabilities evaluation - implementation & report procedure⁴⁶ will form the basis of the assessment process which will provide the EDA with a consolidated insight on MSs capabilities, defence planning, financial aspects as well as an overall context of their capacity for fulfilling the priorities of the CDP. The concept of commitments and criteria in a fully-fledged integrative co-optation, derives from the solemnity of PESCO as an instrumental process of vertical cooperation and synchronization of capabilities to a point that the pace of progress will constitute an assessment measure by the ministerial and technical level of the EDA.

COMMON TRAINING AND EXERCISES

- European Training Mission Competence Centre
- European Training Certification Centre for European Armies

OPERATIONAL DOMAINS (LAND, AIR, MARITIME, CYBER)

- Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle
- Indirect Fire Support
- Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package
- European Crisis Response Operation Core (European Force)
- Maritime Surveillance
- Maritime Mine Counter Measures
- Harbour Protection
- European Cyber Information Sharing Platform
- European Cyber Rapid Response Teams

JOINT AND ENABLING CAPABILITIES (BRIDGING OPERATIONAL GAPS)

- European Medical Command
- Network of logistic Hubs in Europe and support to Operations
- Military Mobility
- Strategic Command and Control System for CSDP Missions and Operations
- Energy for Operational Function
- European Secure Software for Radio Systems

Icon 2. PESCO Projects Domains (Europa.eu)

The current eurocratic rationale envisions an integrated and incorporated defence landscape where the MSs will be subject to a process of assimilation in a military industrial complex that the EDA will monitor through CARD and the HR/VP will report to the Council and the Parliament. But such a process provides the grounds of a non-modular approach and outside the project level of cooperation that basically forces MSs into a regulatory assimilation with the EDTIB capacity, which on a first step will require a harmonization of national

⁴⁵ PE.S.CO Factsheet, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanentstructured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en [last access 29/8/2018]

⁴⁶ Daniel Fiott, Antonio Missiroli and Thierry Tardy. "Permanent Structured Cooperation: What's in a name?" CHAILLOT PAPER N° 142 — November 2017 p:32-39


regulations on several fields of financial and military conduct. The announced Franco-German affiliation in defence industry for example, will orient more defence industries under a common directive or presumably create a core group of military industrial interests, which will direct political incentives within PESCO and its support bodies. It's understandable how such an ambitious form of integration requires initiatives like an action plan on military mobility to be solidified, so the structural process can enter an initial phase of implementation.

But the way for the EU to act autonomously and decisively as an international actor and security provider is not the gradual regulation an EDTIB but an enhanced political cohesion within the CSDP's military capacity for action in the South and the East, as well as a common strategic volition within the CFSP framework. The current capacity for action in the CSDP although present in several ongoing military and civilian operations [Icon 3.], is not inadequate because of defunct or fragmented military capabilities but because of a compound of financial and political aspects regarding military use.

The 2007 MS endorsement of the DTIB action plan led to the co-optation of the EDTIB Strategy of the EDA⁴⁷ which would encompass the overall financial, technical and administrative framework that will be implemented concurrently with the PESCO projects. The extensive jurisdiction over its implementation will require the extension of the eurocratic bureaucracy to MS military affairs, through the EDA's assessment mechanism that has already been launched. [Icon 4.] I agree that a modular integrating legal process like PESCO requires to enhance the CSDP with a common framework for a greater operational and military capacity. But only through a political incision regarding decision making, strategic convergence of the interests and security threat conception, can the CSDP provide a potent and direct approach in external security, migration control and more compelling operations. If the goal is to strengthen the CSDP through PESCO by obtaining strategic autonomy, the mandate of the CSDP should be enhanced with a political amendment long before an EDTIB Strategy is implemented in the long-term. This amendment can be solidified under two pillars, the first being through intense bilateral and multilateral integration of strategic and operational concepts regarding security threats and the second being political and financial coordination under the Council and the EDF's supplementary role. For if Europeans are to answer the security risks that have emerged and are threatening the foundations of the EU, strategic autonomy can be reached structurally and not by segregating the mandate of the CSDP for a secure environment around Europe from PESCO's integrative process.

⁴⁷ European Defence Agency, EDTIB Strategy. <https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-currentpriorities/strategies/Technologicalandindustrialbase> [last access 30/8/2018]

Although I don't argue that the EDTIB Strategy has no grounds for implementation, the current rationale is promoting a way around national defence and national security establishments by instrumentally providing the means for a purely European industry which will de facto create an interdependent and bureaucratic capabilities environment. But through bilateral and multilateral integration of capabilities and strategic orientation through PESCO, the CSDP can provide a more decisive approach in security risks. Such bilateral interaction is the integration of German and Dutch naval forces and divisions as well as Romanian and Czech brigade integration which is still in its initial stage⁴⁸. The Franco-German military cooperation includes a joint fighter jet project, a joint indirect fire artillery system and a new ground combat system⁴⁹. At the same time the multilateral joint intervention force of nine states including the UK, although not part of the PESCO pact, underlines the fact that the impact of bilateral ties and political initiatives can extend to common European policies like it has in the past.



Icon 3. CSDP Missions (Europa.eu)


⁴⁸ Braw Elizabeth (2017) "Germany Is Quietly Building a European Army Under Its Command". Foreign Policy <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/22/germany-is-quietly-building-a-european-army-under-itscommand/> [last access 30/8/2018]

⁴⁹ Franco – German Cooperation in Defence. DW 13/7/2017. <https://www.dw.com/en/franco-germancooperation-focuses-on-eu-reforms-defense-enterprise-and-education/a-39666836> [last access 30/8/2018]



PESCO ASSESSMENT PROCESS 12/2017 – 12/2019

HOW DOES IT WORK?



Icon 4. PESCO Assessment Process by the EDA (Europa.eu)

Common threat perception and strategic culture take time to envelop foreign policy and operational capabilities but is certainly more tangible regarding security and defence integration than an EDTIB. Such initiatives however although having the potential to procure a political context in higher politics, entail the issue of integration further outside the Treaties by finding new ways to converge national interest, which has become more and more problematic for a Union seeking strategic autonomy and political cohesion. Cooperation initiatives like the joint intervention force outside PESCO cannot enhance European defence but fragment it even further, since the implementation of the CDP and the EDTIB are already reshaping security and defence conceptualization. So an intervention force within PESCO's project level led by a Franco-German political coordination can set the example, if it provides the strategic convergence and orientation required for its deployment. Structural and balanced bilateral coherence such as the Franco-German "entete" can extend common threat perception to a political capacity, which could envelop to policy implementation and a MS core of common strategic direction. Yet the Saint Malo Declaration has yet to be fulfilled in terms of its goal for autonomous action but not because the EU hasn't developed a single DTIB or synchronized capabilities and defence spending but because a consensus cannot be reached and unanimity remains the general rule.

Although progressing integration outside the Treaties or through unofficial political cooperation is a flexible trend, a political and legal basis will be required whether it's based on common threat perception or shared interests. The modalities for a structured integration of militaries, infrastructure, training and resources can be primarily achieved by critical enablers of political impact and a co-decision community procedure, which would provide an extent of strategic autonomy in securitized threats through decision making. Without a leading politically viable core of MSs to direct the different defence union's strategic concepts, despite worries over the so called impact of the intergovernmental system⁵⁰, the EDTIB will lead to an even more disparate and eurocratic military and defence establishment, even more so with the currently uneven and fragmented defence industries of the EU. If providing the Union with more intergovernmentalism to counter static integration, inequities are bound to extend to policy areas, where new institutions will take over the legitimization of the Treaties and enhance the fragmentation between policy areas and MS participation. The inequities on defence spending among the top EU MSs that invest in R&D [Icon 5.] and the non-existent domestic defence industries of Eastern Europe⁵¹, will be enhanced by the EDTIB's implementation with consequences for PESCO's cohesion and the EU's new integrative trend.

Table 1. Top defence R&D spending in the European Union		
R&D spending 2016	Local currency m	US\$ m
France	€3,805	4,210.6
UK	£3,085	4,070.5
Germany	€745	824.9
EDF post-2020	€500	531
Poland	zł 844	214.0
Spain	€88.6	103.6

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Icon 5. (International Institute for Strategic Studies)

The combat and military shortfalls that the Union will require to counter since smaller states can't afford to maintain a full national defence spectrum as well as the funding of the EDTIB and the projects of PESCO will be directed under the EDF and its action plan for defence investment. The ambition for an autonomous European military industrial and technological capacity, which will be available to the MSs, as well as a motive for actual progress in the Union's security and defence, goes through the game changer known as the EDF.

The Juncker Commission's continuous support of a common defence initiative brought forth the EDAP⁵²⁵³ in order to enhance the EDA's capacity to launch a successful EDTIB and advance the revised CDP. The Research – Development – Acquisition pattern of the EDA [Icon 6.] will be supported by the

⁵⁰ Fabbrini Sergio (2015) Which European Union? Europe after the Euro Crisis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p:129

⁵¹ Béraud-Sudreau Lucie (2017) EU initiatives for defence industry: breaking the curse of the 'juste retour'? IISS. <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2017/09/eu-initiatives-defence-industry> [last access 30/8/2018]

⁵² European Commission Press Release, 30 November 2016. EDAP. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-4088_en.htm)

⁵³ [4088_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-4088_en.htm) [last access 30/8/2018]

EDF in terms of providing the financial capital required to persuade European leaders that the gap between rhetoric and concrete progress is at an end. The EDAP however isn't strictly launched on defence matters related to the EUGS but dates back to the Commission's Joint Framework to Counter Hybrid threats⁵⁴ which is linked to the European Security Agenda of 2015⁵⁵. This comprehensive approach regarding the level of ambition expressed by the EUGS extends to bridging the external and internal dimensions of security by creating a single coordinated technology market, that will provide the capabilities that the EDA will suggest and that MSs will acquire. However the financial capacity of the EDF does not ensure the level of ambition expressed by the EUGS and other related EU documents, since the budgetary requirements of such an initiative will require a tremendous financial input by the Fund which is not even closely matched by the current proceedings [Icon 7.] Despite the long term and ambiguous output of the ongoing rationale, especially considering the financial capital it requires, the progression of the CDP towards the EDTIB and the R&T perspective of Brussels regarding European defence should be revisited. Instead of implementing progress towards a political capacity for decisive foreign policy implementation through the CSDP and a modest internal security integrative approach as an initial phase of PESCO, the EU is setting up a new actor within an already disparate defence environment, the industry [Icon 7.]. The spectrum of this immense ambition surpasses the mandate of the CSDP, and that of a cohesive integrative intergovernmental cooperation and allows more fragmentation to take place among MSs. If the Union is to advance its security and defence policy through PESCO, the EDTIB Strategy will first require a collective political bedrock of common incentives to take place as well as a more balanced governance between intergovernmentalism and the main EU institutions.




Icon 6. European Defence Action Plan (Europa.eu)

⁵⁴ European Commission Press Release, 6 April 2016. Joint Framework to Counter Hybrid threats. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1227_en.htm [last access 30/8/2018]

⁵⁵ European Agenda on Security, 2015. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/europeanagenda-security_en



**Definition of capability priorities at EU level
(Member States, European Defence Agency, etc.)**



Icon 7. The EDF's framework in the new defence landscape. (Europa.eu)

Intergovernmentalism and Threat Perception in European Security and Defence.

New intergovernmentalism: Obstacle or conduct for security and defence integration?

The disparate integrative environment in the Post-Maastricht Era pertaining to the so called new intergovernmentalism has directed the Union from the community method towards integration within or outside the Treaties by the enhanced cooperation policy areas and the creation of de novo EU bodies⁵⁶. The idea that differentiated integration through enhanced cooperation and intergovernmentalism, can provide a strategic a centre of gravity (a MS core) within the EU, which will be anchored in the legal institutional framework of the Union by a voluntary limitation, is gaining more ground as a path forward⁵⁷. The only alternative is seen as flexibility itself towards deeper integration and without the voluntary limitation to work within the legal basis of the EU and interconnect it with the distinct policy areas already in place⁵⁸ Nevertheless the legislatively active European Council has become the de facto instrument of integration and the critical enabler of cooperation beyond or within the Treaties, on the basis of a consensus decision making necessity, in which de novo bodies centralize jurisdictions in an effort to maintain control over them by MSs⁵⁹⁶⁰. This incessant trend constitutes a Union of distinct policy area groups, differentiated levels of integration and MS clusters that perpetuate the disparate integrative environment on the basis of asserting their interests. Whether or not PESCO will perpetuate this trend towards a multi speed Europe, its inclusiveness cannot guarantee its integrity as a defence pact, since MSs view the CDP and the EDTIB merely as instruments to gain expensive capabilities, new infrastructure and technology. This national interest based output has become more apparent after the Euro-crisis and the migration boom in 2015, while intergovernmentalism has conflated with all aspects of common security, defence and foreign policy orientation. How can a European defence and security cooperation act on securitized threats when its basis comprises of a fragmented political landscape and MS participation built on regulation, which derives from seclusion apprehensions? Even with a QMV extension regarding specific exclusions from the unanimity rule, it's likely that MSs will formulate their opposition through clusters based on interests and priorities. If

⁵⁶ Christopher J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter (eds.) (2015), *The New Intergovernmentalism. States and Supranational Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era*, Oxford, Oxford University Press. p.304-32

⁵⁷ Nicolai von Ondarza (2013) *Strengthening the Core or Splitting Europe? Prospects and Pitfalls of a Strategy of Differentiated Integration*. German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) p:3031

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Christopher J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter "The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era", *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol:53 Issue 4. 30 September

⁶⁰ . P:15-16 [http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/11050/1/NI%20JCMS%20Pre-Pub%20\(2\).pdf](http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/11050/1/NI%20JCMS%20Pre-Pub%20(2).pdf) [last access 3/9/2018]

intergovernmentalism is supposed to progress integration of higher conceived policies, then it will have to make up for the divergences and the inequities that exist among nation states. Amplifying integration through enhanced cooperation may be an enabler for progress but not by finding new ways to bypass the legal basis of the Union's legislative process and institutional core.

This new normal in European integration constitutes the grounds of the emerging defence landscape surrounding the EDA and PESCO and even more so the bureaucracy and the governing boards and bodies that will see through the implementation of the CDP and the EDTIB. The governance of European defence and security is a de facto policy domain of this new intergovernmentalism⁶¹, which is legitimized by direct MS consensus and policy implementation based on participation and interests, which in turn can lead to a fragmented policy community. So far the institutional bodies and sub-bodies of the Council regarding the CFSP and CSDP⁶², which encompass a wide range of policy implementation and advisory capacity, have failed to provide the CSDP with coherent and decisive military operations. The Union's capacity to operationalize its foreign policy through the CSDP saw no more than five operations between 2008-2014, when between 2003-2008 26 missions took place, while the core functionality of the CSDP still cannot surpass small scale civilian operations in the immediate neighbourhood⁶³. The intergovernmental cooperation of the CSDP almost 20 years later after its inception as a common policy, hasn't evolved to a decisive common framework, even though no supranational elements were involved. So despite the fact that the nature of intergovernmentalism has been conceptualized as an integrative concession since the 1990s, it has come down to a preference formation of domestic interest groups through socioeconomic interests, individual leaders and political ideologies which transcend to a European level of MS strategic bargaining⁶⁴. But the fact is that concession or not, intergovernmental cooperation in specific policy areas like security and defence is only a cause of a wider problematic. For if the progression of the CSDP through PESCO is seen as a means to an end for higher levels of integration, intergovernmentalism itself as a means to an end for integration, has resulted to the systematization of a highly conflicted and pressured integrative environment between actors within the EU. Domestic constituencies however extend way beyond socio-economic interests and political ideologies, despite their impact in the current European establishment, since conflicting norms among MSs and

⁶¹ Tocci Nathalie(ed.) (2014), *Imagining Europe: Towards a More United and Effective EU*. (IAI Rome, Nuova Cultura. p:199-220 <http://www.iai.it/en/node/2154> [last access 3/9/2018])

⁶² European Defence Agency(EDA), Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Union Military Committee (EUMC), Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), Politico-Military Group (PMG), Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

⁶³ Tocci Nathalie (ed.) (2014), *Imagining Europe: Towards a More United and Effective EU*. (IAI Rome, Nuova Cultura. p:204-205 <http://www.iai.it/en/node/2154> [last access 3/9/2018])

⁶⁴ Moravcsik Andrew (1998) *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. New York: Cornell University Press. Introduction

institutional actors contribute to a wider preference formation within the EU's interdependent and interest based network.

Threat - Security Perception: An alternative to the nature new intergovernmentalism?

But this process of preference formation can also be stipulated conversely in a threat perception basis which according to Buzan provides the context of threat – security designated norms to converge on national or transnational level⁶⁵. This convergence is introduced by elements of a highly interdependent environment which defines and perceives common threats on the basis of shared norms and behavioural characteristics and introduces a form of dispersive cooperation as a counter measure. Contradictions of course between regional threat perceptions can introduce the same spill-over effect of conflicted tendencies the same way that socioeconomic and ideological interest based norms fragment the integrative process of Union through de novo institutions and strategic bargaining. Threat perception however is a construction defined and conceived when an issue is securitized by an elite and transpired to a general public⁶⁶, which resembles the way institutional constructions by MSs in policy areas of integration are considered as «securitized sovereignty [de novo] bodies». So an intergovernmental cooperation in security and defence can be introduced by the threat preference formation of the MSs in a political capacity towards identification and prioritization of policy implementation goals and comprehensive strategic – operational approaches. But in order to establish political capacity for integration under a common threat perception basis in defence, internal security would be a common priority denominator. Since intersubjectivity remains central in threat perception, it's easy for deviation to take place by conservatism's pervasive nature, when national high politics are defied in the EU, yet the internal security dimension could be the basis of this prioritized and interest oriented capacity. So even though threat perception as a struggle for power is considered outdated⁶⁷, its struggle for security has advanced to higher levels regarding globalization's asymmetric dispersion in all aspects of domestic policy and transnational cooperation⁶⁸.

Human security and societal sustainability are proving to be the converging factors on a large scale threat perception which points to the changing environment of the 21st century. So even if intergovernmentalism

⁶⁵ Buzan B., Ole W. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The structure of International Security*. Cambridge. p:4445.

⁶⁶ Waever Ole (1998). *Securitization and Desecuritization, On Security*, Ed by Ronnie Lipschutz, New York, Columbia University Press. p:6

⁶⁷ Buzan B. (2007) *People, States & Fear*. 2nd Edition. CO, UK: ECPR Press. p:8

⁶⁸ Χοιμιάουμ Ε. (2000) *Στους ορίζοντες του 21ου αιώνα: Μετά την εσχάτη των άκρων*. Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο. Εισαγωγή.

constitutes MS bargaining the basis of integration by avoiding further supranationalism, human security can be the core of this unavoidable process of disparate integration, through a preference formation based on internal security policies. And even though defence policy is seemingly under the jurisdiction of national governments, 21st century European threat perception is converging on aspects of societal sustainability, security and progress, which are intertemporally connected to Europe's ambiguous strategic culture⁶⁹. The acquis of the last decades regarding integration, although today considered as an intergovernmental cooperation with institutional support and supranational elements, is an indicator of the Union's shared threat perception which has progressed marginally since 2001. State-society relations whether based on international societal norms or political ideologies and democratic or elitist traditions have a common denominator towards collective identification propelled by domestic policies⁷⁰. Whether human security in the EU can be safeguarded through an extensive and cohesive externalization of European values or further operationalization of the CSDP's capabilities, the fact remains that the Union has perceived the soft aspects of security as a direct threat to its integrity. Domestic factors within MSs have converged to a collective perception of threat and security identification, which can provide the basis of a deeper integration, deriving from this shared intersubjective structure of European culture. The persistence for the assimilation of an EDTIB will inherently provide the EU with a personification of a material structure which will envelop national capabilities in a common framework, which will be regarded as a de facto entity by non-European states. But material structures in a 'Lockean' environment can have sui generis results on collective identity formations⁶⁸ which among others include national security-defence perceptions.

Buzan's theoretical model regarding security perception of complicated and amorphous actors⁷¹ is structured in three levels regarding its ideological disposition, its physical essence and its institutional expression which compose a pattern of comprehension of its behavioural and perceptive nature⁷². The acquis of constant compromise, cooperation and a rules based Community has provided an ideological mandate to the Union's role in the international order and is the common denominator of European politics. Its acquis communautaire envelops

⁶⁹ Indeed, nothing could be more foreign to EU member states collective culture than this apology of the use of force and unilateralism in international relations. Not that the Europeans hold identical views on this: all strategic genres are to be found today within the Union, ranging from the most interventionist to the most abstentionist, from the most nationalist to the most multi-lateralist, and from the most militarist to the most pacifist. Yet the Europeans' shared strategic culture is something very different from a rough average of their various national traditions: in particular it is the result of a unique fifty-year institutional experience marked by permanent compromise, constant negotiation and undeniable success for the Union and its member states.

Lindstrom G. (ed.) (2003). *Shift or Rift? Assessing U.S –E.U relations after Iraq*. European Institute for Security Studies (E.I.S.S). Transatlantic Book 2003, p: 28

⁷⁰ Wendt Alexander (1994) *Collective Identity Formation and the International State*, *The American Political Science Review*, American Political Science Association Vol. 88, No. 2 p:387

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p:389

⁷¹ Buzan B. (2007) *People, States & Fear*. 2nd Edition. CO, UK: ECPR Press. p:57

⁷² *Ibid*, p:65

most democratic traditions of European states and is the legal basis of integration that constitutes the core of the ideals that drove its original conception by the Treaties. The Union's physical essence which basically refers to its material structure, is under disparate national jurisdiction and fragmented like its institutional expression that has conformed to a multi-level intergovernmental cooperation that isn't functioning as a driving force for inclusive integration. Regarding the eventual physical and structural cooperation which will take place, whether through the EDTIB or in another capability capacity, it should not be the Union's definitive approach but strictly supplementary, in order to avoid the marginalization of PESCO's potential before it's even comprehended. Likewise European institutional expression today is no more than a complicated and fragmented policy communities union, with its intergovernmental functions constituting their conduct for flexible solutions in a context of an overall uncertainty that could prove irreversible for its coherence⁷³. In order for the EU to achieve a form of strategic autonomy the path of regulating a 'material' technological and industrial base through a defence economy plan, couldn't be further away from the Union's ideological, institutional and political capacity of an *acquis communautaire*. The core of European ideology and institutional expression can be converged on aspects of peace making, prosperity, freedom, individuality and rule of law through co decision and legislation that derives from the common denominator of the *acquis*.

Towards a post-modern societal security approach within PESCO?

Protecting the Union and its citizens as a mandate for action in EU security affairs couldn't be more relevant and interconnected with the Union's ideological and institutional core of ingrained norms, values and history. The importance of such an interlinked collective memory basis regarding security problematiques and perceptions, if coordinated and assimilated, can transcend integrative obstacles and provide a core of converging strategic cultures⁷⁴. Defining norms as social facts through identity emanating collective expectations⁷⁵, whether concerning the use of force, foreign affair orientation or human security concepts, make it possible to reconstruct them on a mutual basis of shared concern. Without cohesive institutional expression and preeminent ideological enunciations however, a physical base of capabilities cannot provide a

⁷³ Chatzistavrou F. (2014) Is Flexible Integration Harming the Prospect of a Common Acquis?, *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 49:1 p:98-112

⁷⁴ Rynning, Sten (2003), "The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 34, No. 4, p. 481-483

⁷⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, p:5

collective pattern for the Union's intergovernmental security and defence cooperation. So by providing a non-permanent functional nature through PESCO's integrative process, towards an internal security capacity for consensus, intertemporal challenges and issues of flexibility in higher politics could be countered.

Threat perception convergence is already a shared inter-domestic fact and has been expressed through the institutional security strategies, the CSDP mandate, the Petersberg Tasks and the use of conditionality in support of an expansion of a rules-based international order. The capacity of post-modern suasion through economy, diplomacy and political debate in foreign policy can surpass any military force in terms of effectiveness and impact in the new security and political environment⁷⁶. Army deployment can only be the extension of policy implementation and strategic orientation, which even if achieved in an operational aspect, does not guarantee goal implementation but only access to military means in a mostly deterring environment. By enhancing the internal and soft aspects of security, a consensus deriving from collective threat perception and shared security norms, can be implemented into policy through the CSDP in external affairs and PESCO's process within a more legitimized institutional framework. The accomplishment of an inter-aligning security approach would provide a more pragmatic capacity for collective political context and a post-modern aspect of defence cooperation that would enhance the Union's capability for concrete strategic convergence and operationalization in foreign affairs. The extent of the Union's ability for action can only be defined Europeanised, through policy orientation on the basis of prioritizing threats by their impact and by advocating countermeasures within the CSDP's capacity as well as the Union's normative heritage. Therefore a process of conflation and dispersion of threat perceptions within the aspect of human and societal security from the domestic to the transnational level, can be coordinated through an intrepid and conjunctive political process, which will direct PESCO's orientation with a strategic concept. So whether civilian, urban, societal, and externalized or cyber security issues, if the concept of defence integration interrelates with the Union's crucial internal security aspect, its operational externalization through the CSDP, would de facto converge capabilities, even without an existing EDTIB rationale on the making. Regarding the issue of governance, a proliferation of mechanisms, pacts and different authorities within and around PESCO, resembling the structure of the economic governance⁷⁷ should be avoided. Instead by integrating elements and rationales of policy sectors⁷⁶ and by converging policies on a basis of European societal security concerns, legalization of flexibility can gradually take shape within institutional grounds, even more so

⁷⁶ Robert Cooper (2003) *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Atlantic Books. p:70

⁷⁷ Chatzistavrou F. (2014) *Is Flexible Integration Harming the Prospect of a Common Acquis?*, *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 49:1 p:98-112 ⁷⁶ Ibid.

regarding collective systematization of MS security interests – joint policy regulations.

Conclusions

The authority bestowed to the common defence policy by the Saint Malo Declaration remains the primal focal conception of post-modern collective threat identity in Europe. On the eve of the 21st century Europeans apprehended that the nature of security would require a new level of cooperation to take place in order to facilitate a measurable response to the emergence of insecurity and asymmetry that surpassed traditional defence perceptions. The original Franco-British security alignment colluded to a common realization of the need to act separately to safeguard shared interests, which was a product of the interdependence and the collective memory of the constant compromise of the previous century. But integration itself was dispersed with elements of state interest and technocratic prerogatives that constituted identity problematiques more common in the emerging globalised environment that gradually gave shape to new threat – security configurations within domestic levels of interaction. The systemic verse towards a multipolar international order and the shifts within the nature of integration, coincided to a fragmenting and ambiguous union of communities, structured by policy clusters and sectoral domains of integration. The dispersion of conservative norms and interest based intergovernmental cooperation have become a trend for higher levels of politics, since national perspectives in the EU seem to have regained their capacity to manifest resistance to the idea of a deeper integration even before the economic crisis. The normalization of conservatism in European and national politics and the embrace of flexible semi-permanent integration caused an even deeper fragmentation of European identities in a variable of narratives depicting North and South, East and West, core and periphery, Atlanticist and European.

The more recent realization of Europeans regarding America's pivotal swift towards Asia and national protectionism as well as the secession of the UK, provided the exogenous and internal enablers to progress the defence cooperation of the Union in order to provide the autonomous action that was sought since Saint Malo. But while Europe was seeking the means to advance integration for

two decades, the defence cooperation of PESCO was pre-empted by the new security environment. Having failed to provide the criteria for a collective political capacity for common foreign policy and its military operationalization, I believe the EU is regulating a new policy field altogether by elaborating on the development of a physical technological and industrial framework, that will supplant the behavioural process formation of integration. The current rationale is elaborating that the assimilation of capabilities, infrastructure and different industries, will gradually provide extended interdependence in national defence affairs and a secure environment for the Union. I believe the overall conception of an EDTIB progression through PESCO's legal mechanism is seen as a means to supplant national defence establishments, therefore providing an integrated pool of resources, capabilities and apparatus that will force interconnection between MSs. Instituting such a material essence for security and defence however cannot guarantee capacity for autonomous action the same way that during the Cold War, British nuclear weapons were not identified with the Soviet nuclear armaments as a national threat. Identity cannot be bestowed through a physical apprehension of security and defence or a regulated defence economy that is entrusted in institutions like the EDA and the EDF without a capacity for political consensus and strategic policy direction. Therefore according to Buzan's triangular model regarding the nature of the state, if the progression of the physical essence of security, the EDTIB, takes over the overly debated 'flexibility' of PESCO, the ideological and institutional aspects of the EU will become further estranged from a technocratic security and defence union. If the Council's upcoming summits regarding the new defence landscape, amplifies the Industry's role within the EDF's coordination board [Icon 7.], the EU will not achieve strategic autonomy but further systematization of a complex, illegitimate and constrained governance.

The issue of ceding sovereignty in matters of defence cannot be implemented outside the circumstantial layer of politics and threat perception that can be traced to domestic socio-economic and political interests. So instead of providing conventional capabilities through a long term technocratic procedure that will result in a new political actor and policy domain within the EU, the Union can converge its security policy on the basis of human and societal aspects which are in the core of European threat perception and values. I believe the process of PESCO can legitimize integration in defence, only by elaborating policy implementation starting within a coherent internal security consensus and by prioritizing key goals in foreign policy and their operationalization through the CSDP. Strategic communication can be the initial phase of such a security approach, which can take shape through PESCO, while the Franco-German 'entete' can be legitimized by safeguarding the Union from constitutional asymmetries. Theorizing strategic culture and threat perception on European level however surpasses the mandate of strategic autonomy that seems to be a derivative of a much more complex state interest interdependence. The emerging Franco-German inner core is an example of how bilateral strategic

capacity can take shape through converging political identification. PESCO may be the legal aspect of intergovernmental cooperation in defence, but MS interaction is the only defined process within its provisions. Therefore the collective political substance for an avant-garde security and defence autonomy can coexist among a structured ideological identity regarding human security and a process of policy and institutional formation of state interest oriented norms. In Javier Solana's words *"In the past the E.U was intended to secure peace in Europe; today, it is about being a peace-builder in the rest of the world"*⁷⁸ So despite the overall orientation that the EUGS and the EDTIB is providing for PESCO, the EU should preserve its post-modern essence and configure a more decisive policy implementation to externalize conditionality and security, while initializing PESCO towards strategic communication and societal security. Postmodern state centric perceptions however can gain incentive within common threat realizations that introduce integration as a means for acquiring more power and incorporate it with the political capacity of shared sovereignty⁷⁸. Whether a higher Franco-German level of ambition or a post-modern approach in defence can instrumentally enhance PESCO's strategic efficiency, the EU will require a new Saint Malo and its own exceptionalism, which can be no other than its original expression as a force for peace.



⁷⁸ Bickerton C., Irondelle B., Menon A. (2010) Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. *Journal for Market Studies (JCMS)* Vol: 49 Number: 1 p. 1-21 ⁷⁸
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