



HELLENIC REPUBLIC
**National and Kapodistrian
University of Athens**



UNIVERSITY OF THE
AEGEAN

SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION
AND MEDIA STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

MSC IN MEDIA & REFUGEE / MIGRATION FLOWS

MSc in Media and Migration/Refugee Flows
THESIS

**Title: Refugee/migration flows in the North Aegean: The EU- Turkey
Statement and its implementation in Greece**

Zacharoula Tsirigoti
AM: 9983201935012

Supervisor: Professor George Pleios

Athens, September 2020

Abstract

This dissertation examines the migration phenomenon in the North Aegean in the light of the European (Dublin system and EU-Turkey Statement) and Greek policies by using the macro-spatial geopolitical context.

This dissertation has three main objectives: a) to identify and assess the strengths and opportunities of Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement, b) to identify and assess the main threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement and c) to make suggestions on how Europe and Greece should cooperate in the future in order to address the migration crisis.

To address these research objectives, the qualitative research methodology was chosen as a research method. The sample of the research consists of nine participants: the Head of the Legal Service of the UNHCR, the Director of the Doctors without Borders, two former Ministers of Immigration Policy, the Director of HumanRights360, two Representatives of the Greek Ombudsman, an expert from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs specialising in asylum and migration issues, and the former Consul General at the Turkish Embassy in Athens and current diplomatic representative of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara. The data were analysed by using the thematic analysis (codes and categories).

The main conclusions are the following: a) the most important strengths of the Dublin system are the reduction of migration flows and the willingness for better cooperation and communication, b) the participants declared that the Dublin system is still insufficient and generates inequalities, c) the research results revealed that the EU-Turkey Statement is more of a political text than a substantive agreement, d) the participants perceive the EU-Turkey Statement as a temporary solution and as a response to shortcomings and disadvantages of the Dublin Regulation, e) the research results revealed the need for a common asylum system and Europe's role to the development of such a system is of crucial importance and f) the lack of burden-sharing

as well as the lack of solidarity are two major problems of the EU migration policy that need urgent solution.

Key words: EU-Turkey Statement, Dublin system, migration, North Aegean

Table of contents

Abstract	2
Introduction.....	6
A. LITERATURE REVIEW	10
Chapter 1: THE REFUGEE/MIGRATION CRISIS IN EUROPE AND IN GREECE	10
1.1. The refugee/migration crisis of the last decade in Europe.....	10
1.2. Overview of the refugee/migration flows in the North Aegean (recent statistics).....	13
1.3. The European and the Greek refugee crisis, conflicted interests and policy developments	17
Chapter 2: THE REFUGEE/MIGRATION CRISIS AND THE EU-TURKEY STATEMENT	19
2.1. Historical development of the European refugee policies from 1990 to 2020	19
2.2. A critical examination of the EU-Turkey Statement	26
2.3. The geopolitics of the North Aegean and the European policy affecting the refugee crisis	34
2.4. The Greek policy and priorities in accordance with the EU - Turkey Statement and the Dublin I & II Regulations.....	38
2.5. The EU and national relocation and resettlement scheme	41
Chapter 3: THE FUTURE OF THE REFUGEE/MIGRATION ISSUE	43
3.1. The winners and the losers: The impact of the refugee crisis on the islands of the North Aegean	43
3.2. Dublin I, II and III Regulations. The future of the refugee/migration policy	45
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	48
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY	48
4.1. Research method.....	48
4.2. Research philosophy	50
4.3. Research approach	51
4.4. Instrument (semi structured interviews)	51
4.5. Sample and sampling technique.....	52
4.6. Procedures.....	52
4.7. Description of the data analysis process	53

4.8. Research Ethics	54
4.9. Research limitations	54
Chapter 5: Data Analysis	55
5.1. Introduction	55
5.2. Strengths and main opportunities regarding the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement	58
5.3. Threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement	65
5.4. Greece's cooperation with the European Union for the solution of the immigration crisis	71
Discussion	75
Conclusions	79
Future recommendations	81
List of references	82
Appendix A: Interviews	90

Tables

Table 1. Top 20 origin countries for asylum applications to the EU	10
Table 2. Arrivals on Greek islands Jan.-August 2015	14
Table 3. Refugees on the Aegean islands in 2018	15
Table 4. Arrivals in North Aegean 2019-2020	16
Table 5. The Dublin system	23
Table 6. Greek islands of the North Aegean. Hotspots capacity and occupancy	33
Table 7. Outgoing requests to take charge or take back, top five sending states 2013-2015	45
Table 8. Interview questions and research questions	52
Table 9. Sample information	55
Table 10. Codes and thematic categories	56
Table 11. Threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement	66
Table 12. Greece's cooperation with the European Union for the solution of the immigration crisis	71

Figures

Figure 1. Refugee and asylum seekers 1982-2015	11
--	----

Figure 2. Annual asylum application to the EU by origin country	12
Figure 3. Weekly arrivals from Turkey 2017-2020	12
Figure 4. Weekly evolution of first-instance applications for asylum.....	13
Figure 5. Refugees and asylum seekers are residing in the Aegean islands	13
Figure 6. Number of arriving migrants detected by Greek authorities by location	14
Figure 7. Monthly arrivals by sea in 2016-2020.....	15
Figure 8. Balkan and the Central Mediterranean roots used by refugees to arrive in Europe	27
Figure 9. Total numbers of arrivals on the central and eastern Mediterranean routes.	28
Figure 10. Asylum seekers in Greece 1996-2015	39
Figure 11. Relocation from Italy and Greece (October 2015-June 2017)	41
Figure 12. Number of refugees in proportion to the local population of the islands of the North Aegean and of the Attica region	44
Figure 13. Participants' answers on the possibilities and opportunities of the Dublin Regulation and the EU-Turkey Statement	60
Figure 14. Threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement.....	71
Figure 15. Greece's cooperation with the European Union for the solution of the immigration crisis	74

Introduction

The refugee crisis, which began in 2011 and reached its peak during the period 2015-2016 revealed that some member states are more powerful than others in terms of national sovereignty in times of crisis. This fact indicates that the European Union failed to develop a supranational mechanism in the context of the Schengen regime and Dublin Regulations. Both the Dublin system and the EU-Turkey Statement have been criticised for their short-term political objectives and for the violation of the human rights of refugees (Aljazeera, 2016).

The Dublin system led refugees to violate its Regulations as it allowed them to make secondary movements from their country of entry. In this context, member states involved in unilateral ad hoc measures (e.g. construction of border barriers, temporary suspension of the Schengen visa policy etc.) (Simicsko, 2016). In addition, while some member states implemented an open-door refugee policy (e.g. Germany and Sweden), some other member states decided to take rough measures to protect their borders (e.g. Greece). As a result, the refugee crisis placed Dublin system under pressure (Minns & Karnitschnig 2016).

The Dublin system's gaps led the EU to approach other countries in order to develop cooperation for addressing the migrant crisis. In this context, the cooperation between the EU and Turkey, which is a transit country, seemed as a good opportunity to Europe (Tommaso, 2016). The implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement in Greece revealed the different and conflicted interests of the EU and Greece in terms of the refugee crisis. The EU-Turkey Statement did not take into consideration the special political, economic and social landscape of Greece.

The EU-Turkey Statement blocked the refugees' entry to the rest of the European countries and thus transformed Greece (especially the islands of the North Aegean) overnight from a pass gate to a destination. The EU-Turkey Statement left no option to asylum seekers other than to apply to Greece for asylum (McEwen, 2017).

This dissertation examines the migration phenomenon in the North Aegean in the light of the European (Dublin system and EU-Turkey Statement) and Greek policies by using the macro-spatial geopolitical context. The macro-spatial geopolitical context is multilayered and has several forms (e.g. European policies and national states policies). Thus, this dissertation focuses on the European and Greece policies which aim at addressing the issue of refugee/migration flows in the North Aegean. The Aegean, which is an elongated embayment of the Mediterranean Sea, has geopolitical importance not only for Europe but also for Turkey and Greece. As a result, this dissertation examines the phenomenon of refugee/migration flows in the North Aegean not only from the scope of Europe and Greece but also from the scope of Turkey.

The SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis strategic tool is used to assess Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 as described in the Dublin I and II Regulations. The analysis will allow us to get an overall picture of Europe's response to the migration crisis.

This research is going to cover an important research gap. The international literature is fragmented as regards the Dublin system and the EU-Turkey Statement. This is the first research attempt that examines the Dublin system and the EU-Turkey Statement by using the SWOT analysis. In the international literature, there are researches that focused either on the EU-Turkey Statement or the Dublin system. On the contrary, the current research attempts to provide a holistic approach to the refugee issue. Furthermore, this is the first research attempt in the field of migration that uses a wide range of participants from different positions who work in key-positions in Greece, Turkey and Europe. Other researches in the international literature are limited to the use of statistical data on migration. On the contrary, this research attempts to provide a deep insight into the issue of the European migration policy by considering different perspectives.

The research objectives of this dissertation are the following:

Objective 1: To identify and assess the strengths and opportunities of Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement.

Objective 2: To identify and assess the main threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement.

Objective 3: To make suggestion on how Europe and Greece should cooperate in the future in order to address the migration crisis.

The research problems of this dissertation are the following:

Research problem 1: What are the strengths and opportunities of Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement?

Research problem 2: What are the main threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement?

Research problem 3: How Europe and Greece should cooperate in the future in order to address the migration crisis?

The dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 presents the refugee/migration crisis in Europe and in Greece. More specifically, chapter one attempts to provide an overview of the migration crisis that took place over the last decade in Europe. In addition, it presents an overview of the refugee/migration flows in the North Aegean based on recent statistics. Finally, the chapter examines Europe's and Greece's conflicted interests and policy developments. Chapter 2 is devoted to the EU-Turkey Statement and to the Dublin system. The aim of this chapter is to provide a critical examination of the EU-Turkey Statement and the Dublin system. Chapter 3 examines the future of the refugee/migration issue. Chapter 4 presents the research methodology (research method, philosophy, approach, sample and sampling methods, procedures, limitations and ethics). In order to give an answer to the research problems, a qualitative research will be conducted with semi-structured interviews of the following participants: the Head of the Legal Service of the UNHCR, the Director of the Doctors without Borders, two former Ministers of Immigration Policy, the Director of HumanRights360, two Representatives of the Greek Ombudsman, an expert from the

Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs specialising in asylum and migration issues, and the former Consul General at the Turkish Embassy in Athens and current diplomatic representative of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara. The research results will provide as deep insight into the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the European policy on the migration crisis. In addition, the research results will help us to clarify how so far Europe has helped Greece to address the refugee crisis in the North Aegean (EU's and Greece's policies and priorities).

Finally, chapter 5 presents the qualitative data analysis. The dissertation is completed with a Discussion, the Conclusions and future recommendations.

A. LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter 1: THE REFUGEE/MIGRATION CRISIS IN EUROPE AND IN GREECE

1.1. The refugee /migration crisis of the last decade in Europe

The European migrant crisis marks the beginning of a period characterised by high numbers of people arriving in Europe through the Mediterranean Sea or through Southeast Europe. The recent migrant crisis in Europe constitutes a part of the European migration pattern which began during the mid-20th century. Most of the refugees who arrived in Italy and Greece during 2011 leaved their countries due to the conflicts (e.g. Syrian civil war (2011), Afghanistan war (2001), Iraqi conflict (2003)).

Table 1 shows the 20 countries of origin which have sent the most applicants to the EU during the period 2006-2010 and 2011-2015. At this point, it is important to state that 65% of all the applicants who have lodged an asylum application in Europe during the period 2006-2010 come from Iraq and 85% of all the applicants who have lodged an asylum application in Europe during the period 2011-2015 come from Syria.


Table 1. Top 20 origin countries for asylum applications to the EU

Annual applications 2006 to 2010				Annual applications 2011 to 2015			
Iraq	23,491	Bangladesh	5,713	Syria	129,356	Iran	15,074
Serbia	16,670	Sri Lanka	5,439	Afghanistan	71,180	Bangladesh	11,479
Russia	16,650	Eritrea	5,403	Serbia	52,298	Macedonia	8,388
Afghanistan	13,748	China	5,251	Iraq	38,011	Georgia	8,363
Somalia	13,169	DR Congo	4,494	Pakistan	28,714	DR Congo	7,904
Pakistan	10,030	Armenia	4,335	Russia	22,958	Ukraine	7,848
Nigeria	7,851	Syria	4,228	Eritrea	22,511	Mali	6,868
Iran	7,337	Zimbabwe	3,834	Albania	21,892	Sri Lanka	6,424
Turkey	6,244	Guinea	3,167	Nigeria	16,568	Algeria	6,221
Georgia	5,722	India	3,117	Somalia	16,403	Gambia	6,148

Source: UNHCR (2015a), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014, Geneva: UNHCR.

Figure 1 illustrates the total number of asylum applications lodged in 38 industrialised countries. As it is observed in Figure 1, the asylum applications reached their peak (over 800,000) in 1992. Furthermore, on the basis of Figure 1, the asylum applications reached their peak one more time in 2015. Lastly, on the basis of the data of Figure 1, it is concluded that most of the applications are concentrated in Europe (78% of the total applications).


Figure 1. Refugees and asylum seekers 1982-2015



Source: UNHCR (2015b). Total Refugee Population by Country of Asylum, 1960-2013 & Total Refugee Population by Origin, 1960-2013. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG>

Figure 2 depicts the variations that have been observed during the last decade in Europe as regards the number of applicants who come from the top 10 countries of origin in the period 2011-2015. Additionally, this Figure shows the surges in applications that are associated with the civil war in Iraq (2006-2009) and Somalia (2007-2010).


Figure 2. Annual asylum applications to the EU by country of origin



Source: UNHCR (2015b). Total Refugee Population by Country of Asylum, 1960-2013 & Total Refugee Population by Origin, 1960-2013. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG>

Figure 3 shows the arrivals of migrants who passed illegally from Turkey to the EU, during 2017-2020. As illustrated in the following figure, during the forecast period, almost 218 migrants passed illegally from Turkey to the EU countries. 123 of them passed to Greece and 95 to Italy. In 2020, almost 9,979 migrants passed from Turkey to the EU countries. From the total number of arrivals, 9,528 passed to Greece.


Figure 3. Weekly arrivals from Turkey 2017-2020



Source: European Commission (2020). Integrated Situation Awareness and Analysis Situation Report No 216

In 2020, 24,080 applications have been lodged compared to 76,804 in 2019.

Figure 4. Weekly evolution of first-instance applications for asylum




Source: European Commission (2020). Integrated Situation Awareness and Analysis Situation Report No 216

1.2 Overview of the refugee/migration flows in the North Aegean (recent statistics)

In 2020, 32,100 refugees and asylum seekers are residing on the Aegean islands. Figure 5 shows the nationalities of the refugees and asylum seekers.


Figure 5. Refugees and asylum seekers are residing on the Aegean islands



Source: UNHCR Greece. Aegean islands weekly snapchat.

Figure 6 shows the number of arriving migrants detected by Greek authorities by location. The red columns are Jan-Aug 2015 and the blue ones Jan-Aug 2014.

Figure 6. Number of arriving migrants detected by Greek authorities by location



Source: European Solidarity initiative 2015. The 2015 refugee crisis through statistics.


Table 2. Arrivals on Greek islands Jan.-August 2015

	Number of arrivals
Island of Lesbos:	113,411
Island of Samos:	32,908
Island of Chios:	32,699

Source: European Solidarity initiative 2015. The 2015 refugee crisis through statistics.

Figure 7 shows the arrivals by sea. Almost 104 people traveled by sea and reached the North Aegean islands during the forecast period. Most of the refugees arrived at Lesbos island. In addition, Figure 4 illustrates that, during the reported period, 228 arrivals were reported during May and 2,084 arrivals were recorded during March 2015.

Figure 7. Monthly arrivals by sea in 2016-2020



Source: European Commission (2020). Integrated Situation Awareness and Analysis Situation Report No 216

Table 3. Refugees on the Aegean islands in 2018

LESVOS: Arrivals February 495 Total arrivals this year 1371 Boats February 13 Total Boats this year 31 Transfers February 384 Total transfers this year 1894 Total refugees on the island: 6984
SAMOS: Arrivals February 399 Total arrivals this year 780 Boats February 9 Total Boats this year 18 Transfers February 356 Total transfers this year 738 Total refugees on the island: 1620
CHIOS: Arrivals February 47 Total arrivals this year 226 Boats February 2 Total Boats this year 6 Transfers February 247

Total transfers this year 822 Total refugees on the island: 1530
OTHER ISLANDS: Arrivals February 304 Total arrivals this year 422 Boats February 8 Total Boats this year 11 Transfers February 88 Total transfers this year 269 Total refugees on the other islands: 1743

Source: Aegean Boat Report. Facebook page 2020.

During the period 2019-2020, arrival flows in the country have remained relatively low (453 in June), recording a significant increase (+ 60%) compared to the previous month (May). In total numbers, there were 169 more arrivals than in May. It is noted that, compared to March 2020, there is a drop by 82%. In the last quarter of 2020 (April - June), there was a decrease by 92% in flows compared to the same period in 2019.

Table 4. Arrivals in the North Aegean during the period 2019-2020

	Kos	Lesvos	Samos	Chios	Leros	Total
December 2019	342	3.487	941	701	487	7.453
January 2020	209	1.751	596	176	0	3.713
February 2020	209	521	454	306	35	2.767
March 2020	262	854	178	336	0	2.581
April 2020	0	39	0	0	0	76
May 2020	0	227	0	0	0	284
June 2020	0	245	0	0	0	453
Total 2020	680	3.637	1.228	818	35	9.874

Source: Hellenic Republic. Ministry of Asylum and Migration.

The statistics presented in this chapter highlighted the refugee /migration crisis trends of the last decade in Europe. The next chapter presents the conflicted interests of Europe's and Greece's refugee policy based on the research findings of the international literature.

1.3 The European and the Greek refugee crisis, conflicted interests and policy developments

The most affected member states of the European refugee policy are those member states which have been hit by the economic crisis, such as Greece. Greece, which has been badly affected by the economic crisis, reacted to the European Union's asylum regime. In addition, Greece's reaction to the European Union's asylum regime can be attributed to the fact that the country is located at the external EU borders and, thus, it is affected negatively by the large volumes of migrants. For Greece, the rule of the Dublin system, which states that one member state should be responsible for the handling of new asylum seekers arriving in the EU through their territory, is rather problematic. That is because the country, in parallel with the economic crisis, also had to address the Greek asylum crisis (McDonough & Tsourdi 2012).

Furthermore, many researchers (McDonough & Tsourdi 2012, Thielemann & Dewan 2006, Lopatin, 2013) argue that the European Union's asylum regime, if examined in relation to the Greek case, brings issues relating to solidarity and refugee burden-sharing to surface. Nevertheless, such issues have been historically connected with the EU's asylum policy. But the combination of the Greek economic crisis and the Greek asylum crisis contributed to a greater salience of the solidarity and burden-sharing issues. In this context, Trauner (2016) argued that the conflicted interests between Greece and Europe as regards the management of the refugee crisis can be attributed to the shortcomings and problems of the Dublin system (e.g. lack of comparability of the asylum standards of member states).

Despite the fact that Europe attempted to assist financially Greece (Greece received € 82.7 million from the European Refugee Fund) (European Commission 2014), Greece due to the financial crisis found it difficult to take full advantage of these funds due to the co-financing requirements (European Parliament 2013). In 2015, the gap between the legal EU asylum regime and the Greek asylum regime became even bigger. Greece, like other frontline member states, began to ignore Dublin's 'first-country-of-entry'.

Greece's reaction to the European's Union asylum regime led other EU countries such as Germany to suspend the Dublin rules for refugees coming from Syria. As a result, the conflicted interests between the EU and the Greek asylum policies bring the "open-door policy" issue to surface. At this point, it is important to state that, in 2015, the gaps between the EU and the Greek asylum as well as the gap between the EU and the other member states' asylum policy made it difficult for Europe to stay engaged to a policy reform (Rachmann 2015).

Chapter 2: THE REFUGEE /MIGRATION CRISIS AND THE EU-TURKEY STATEMENT

2.1 Historical development of the European refugee policies from 1990 to 2020

The European Union and Greece began to deal with immigration and asylum issues around the same time, in the mid-late 1980s.¹ Until the 1980s, immigration and asylum were not a subject of EEC's (European Economic Community) action, although Europe has long been an immigration continent. Immigration, and especially asylum policy, has begun to be the subject of cooperation between EU member states in the mid-1980s as a result of the establishment of freedom of movement and the abolition of internal borders. The main reason for this development was the need of Europe to provide "compensatory measures" to maintain internal security in a borderless Europe. Gradually, this intergovernmental cooperation gained institutional grounds with the creation of various intergovernmental cooperation structures, such as the Trevi team, the Schengen system and the ad hoc immigration team (Papageorgiou, 2017).

Despite the fact that these cooperation structures were not part of the EEC/EC European integration system, they announced and shaped the future common European policies and later led to the conclusion of the first international texts: the 1990 Schengen Convention and the Dublin Convention 1991.² An important feature of these Conventions is that they have provisions on the security of the European external borders. From the outset, European policies focused on the pursuit of states to limit the

¹¹ Intra-European migration policy before 1980 was characterised by a systematic effort to attract migrant workers from the Southern Europe and the Mediterranean (Turkey) to Eastern and Western Europe. In this context, the states signed bilateral statements in order to organise the flows of guest workers (Papageorgiou, 2013). During the period 1950-1970, the migration policy of the EEC member states was restricted to the protection of the social rights of migrant workers. Such a type of migration policy ended at the beginning of the 1980s, when the member states began to adopt a more pronounced European policy in order to fulfill the European vision.

² The Dublin Regulation system aimed at ensuring the host country's responsibilities towards migrants. The Dublin Convention, as developed in 1991, defined that only one country would be responsible to process the applications of asylum seekers. Based on the Dublin Convention, there are provisions and regulations on the transfer of migrants who want to present their case in a second country. In addition, the Convention protects asylum seekers from 'asylum shopping' when moving from one country to another and asking for multiple protection. Finally, the Dublin Convention protects asylum seekers from travelling around Europe by seeking for protection while none European country takes responsibility for their protection (Brekke & Brochmann, 2013).

number of undesirable foreigners on their territory (migrants were perceived as a threat to public order and national identity) (Papageorgiou, 2017).

The Maastricht Treaty established for the first time EU jurisdiction over these matters. In addition, it laid the ground for cooperation between member states in the so-called "third pillar" - Justice and Home Affairs - within an almost exclusively intergovernmental framework which provided that member states should consider areas and issues of common interest. In this context, member states were committed to interact with each other and communicate with the Council in order to coordinate their actions towards migration. However, the new institutional framework was clearly the result of a compromise with serious coherence problems and a clearly transitional nature (Papageorgiou, 2010).

The inadequacy of the relevant regulations was recognised almost immediately and with the next institutional revision-the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)- these policies expanded their content and became part of the national migration policies. The process of communitarianisation continued with the Program of Tampere (1999), The Hague (2004) and Stockholm (2010) (Papageorgiou, 2013).

Finally, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the asylum and the immigration are becoming areas of EU responsibility. The new treaty unifies the relevant powers under single procedures, strengthens the role of the European Parliament by establishing the usual legislative process for almost all relevant acts and facilitates decision-making in the Council and finally expands the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the Union (Papageorgiou, 2010).

Although the two sectors (asylum seeking and immigration) have had similar institutional developments within the EU, the production of legislation has been clearly larger and more binding on the asylum sector than on immigration. This different approach is mainly related to a more intense supranational dimension of asylum: applicants in one member state could much more easily enter the asylum process of another member state. The need to avoid the so-called "hunting asylum" has led to the adoption of the first relevant texts which provided the European asylum mechanisms (Papageorgiou, 2017).

The 1991 Dublin Convention, which after the communitarisation of the asylum became known as the Dublin-2 Regulation,³ regulated the way in which the member states are responsible for examining an asylum application. In addition, the Eurodac Regulation⁴ established the first EU-based asylum seekers' fingerprint basis. The gradual transformation of asylum into a serious political and social issue accelerated harmonisation (Papageorgiou, 2013).⁵

Brekke & Brochmann (2013) identified two main challenges of the Dublin Regulation which were introduced in 1997 and lately reformed (Dublin II 2003) and (Dublin III 2013) (Table 1 summarises the Dublin system). Firstly, the Dublin system burdens disproportionately the Southern European countries (e.g., Italy and Greece).⁶ Furthermore, the countries' differences in reception conditions as well as the countries' differences in processing ability have caused competition as regards the Dublin system. In addition, the differences that exist in the member states as regards living and labor market conditions as well as the differences that exist in the member states'

³ The Dublin II Regulation was adopted in 2003. This Regulation replaced the Dublin Convention. (European Commission, 2012). Dublin II defined which member state should be responsible for processing the asylum seekers' applications (Cellini, 2017). The Dublin II Regulation, which is also known as Regulation No. 343/2003, aimed at allocating the responsibility of member states for the assessment of individual asylum applications within the EU (Brekke & Brochmann, 2013).

In this regard, Dublin II Convention has provisions that enable the member states to take the decision to transfer an asylum seeker to another member state under certain circumstances (the member state which is going to accept the refugees should be considered as responsible) (Brouwer, 2013).

The Dublin II Regulation was replaced by the Dublin III Regulation also known as Regulation No. 604/2013. This regulation was accepted and applied in all member states with the exception of Denmark. This Regulation defined that the member state which is responsible for processing the asylum seekers' applications is the member state where the fingerprints of the asylum seekers are stored or an asylum claim is lodged (Regulation No 604/2013). The main aim of the Dublin III Convention is to ensure and expand the guarantees of the asylum seekers as well as to clarify the member states' obligation towards them (Cellini, 2017).

⁴ The EURODAC Regulation is part of the Dublin system. This Regulation aimed at establishing a coherent database with the fingerprints of the asylum seekers who enter the Schengen area. Based on this Regulation all the migrants who enter this area are obliged to have their fingerprints taken during registration (Brekke & Brochmann, 2013).

⁵ The Tampere Program laid the groundwork for the adoption of minimum common standards and, by 2005, four legislative texts on asylum (the so-called "building blocks") had been approved. While the Union later set out to establish a Common European Asylum System, the main features of which are contained in the texts finalised in 2013. These texts are characterised by an enhancement of the procedural and other guarantees and rights of applicants or refugees. At the same time, the texts make it as difficult as possible for migrants to enter the Union (Papageorgiou, 2013).

⁶ The Dublin II Regulation makes Greece a country that is forced to deal with a huge wave of illegal immigration alone and weak, without any mechanisms for real European Community solidarity. This is due to the fact that the EU's "Dublin II Treaty" has provisions for the return of illegal immigrants to their country of entry, which is primarily Greece!

governmental support urge asylum seekers to move from one country to the other in order to find better conditions (Brekke & Brochmann, 2013).

In the same manner, Celline (2013) divided the problems related to the Dublin system in two major categories. The first category includes problems related to the legal framework, while the second category includes problems related to the implementation of the Dublin system. As regards the legal framework of the Dublin system, Celline (2013) argued that the system generates problems related to the asylum seekers' allocation in EU member states. That is because, on the one hand, the Dublin system makes compulsory for the migrants to stay in the first country of arrival (in case their application is accepted). On the other hand, the Dublin system prevents asylum seekers to choose the member state where they want to settle themselves.

As far as the implementation gaps of the Dublin system are concerned, Celline (2013), as Brekke & Brochmann (2013) did, argued that there are differences in the member states (e.g. management of asylum applications and treatment of refugees) that influence the expected outcomes of the Dublin system. Lastly, Celline (2013) highlighted the discrepancies existing between the member states as regards the rights granted to the refugee status (e.g. each member state has the autonomy to choose which rights will be attributed to the refugee statuses).

Table 5: The Dublin system

Dublin Convention (97/C 254/01)	1997	<p>The Convention aimed at establishing the basic criteria that should be considered in order to decide which member state will be responsible for processing the asylum seekers' applications (Dublin Convention (97/C 254/01))</p> <p><i>"Article 4: if an asylum seeker had a family member that was already recognised as a refugee according to the Geneva Convention in another Member State, then that Member State should be responsible"</i> Dublin Convention (97/C 254/01)</p> <p><i>"Article 5: if a Member State had issued a residence permit or visa to an asylum seeker, then that Member State should be responsible"</i> Dublin Convention (97/C 254/01)</p> <p><i>"Article 6: if an asylum seeker had entered a Member State irregularly then the member state will be responsible"</i> Dublin Convention (97/C 254/01)</p> <p><i>"Article 8 stated that if no other Member State was found to be responsible, then the Member State in which the application for asylum was lodged would be responsible"</i> Dublin Convention (97/C 254/01)</p>
Dublin II (No. 343/2003)	2003	<p>The Dublin II Regulation replaced the Dublin Convention. Dublin II Convention has provisions that enable the member states to take the decision to transfer an asylum seeker to another member state under certain circumstances (the member state which is going to accept the refugees should be considered as responsible).</p>

		<p>Dublin II defines that only one member state will be responsible for processing the asylum seekers' applications.</p> <p><i>“When the asylum seeker is an unaccompanied minor, the Member State responsible for examining his/her application is the Member State where a member of his/her family is legally present, provided that this is in the best interest of the minor. In the absence of a family member, the Member State responsible is that where the minor has lodged his/her application for asylum”.</i> (Dublin II Regulation).</p> <p><i>“Where the asylum seeker is in possession of a valid residence document or visa, the member state that issued it will be responsible for examining the asylum application”</i> (Dublin II Regulation).</p> <p><i>“Where the asylum seeker has irregularly crossed the border into a Member State, that member state will be responsible for examining the asylum application. This responsibility ceases 12 months after the date on which the border has been illegally crossed”</i> (Dublin II Regulation).</p> <p><i>“When the asylum seeker has been living for a continuous period of at least five months in a Member State before lodging his/her asylum application, that member state becomes responsible for examining the application. Where the applicant has been living for a period of time of at least five months in several member states, the member state where he/she lived most recently shall be responsible for examining the application”</i> (Dublin II Regulation).</p> <p><i>“The Member State designated as responsible for the asylum application must take charge of</i></p>
--	--	--

		<p><i>the applicant and process the application” (Dublin II Regulation).</i></p> <p><i>“If a Member State to which an asylum application was submitted deems that another Member State is responsible, it can call on that member state to take charge of the application. A request to take charge or to take back should provide all the information for the member state requested to determine whether it is actually responsible. Where the requested State accepts to take charge of or to take back the person concerned, a reasoned decision stating that the application is inadmissible in the State in which it was lodged and that there is the obligation to transfer the asylum seeker to the Member State responsible is sent to the applicant” (Dublin II Regulation).</i></p>
Dublin III (No. 694/2013)	2013	<p>This Regulation defined that the member state which is responsible for processing the asylum seekers’ applications is the member state where the fingerprints of the asylum seekers are stored or an asylum claim is lodged (Dublin III Convention).</p>

Source Celline (2013, p. 948), Dublin II Regulation, Dublin Convention (97/C 254/01), Dublin III Convention.

2.2 A critical examination of the EU-Turkey Statement

Since 2015, the migration crisis has proved to be one of the main challenges the EU has been facing. As a result of political situations and conflicts, many people crossed the Aegean Sea in order to reach Greece's coasts. At the highest point, 221,374 persons arrived in Greece within a month. The crossings are perceived as illegal pathways, hence these groups of people are considered as irregular migrants. Due to the high numbers of the migration flows, the EU and its member states felt the urge to stop the irregular crossings from Turkey towards the Union (Knaous, 2016).

Most of the refugees arrived in Europe from military Turkish,⁷ Lebanese and Ethiopian camps. The refugees used the Balkan and the Central Mediterranean routes as depicted in Figure 8 (Council of Europe, 2019).


⁷ According to the UNHCR statistics for the period 2015-2016, almost one million people used Greece's routes to reach other North European countries. From the total one million migrants, 856,000 crossed Greece's borders in 2015 and 95,000 crossed Greece's borders in 2016. As Oikonomakis (2018) explained, most of the refugees had no intention to stay in Greece. Migrants used Greece as an entry point to the rest of the Europe. Thus, refugees stayed in Greece for a short period of time and then moved to the rest of Europe. The majority of the refugees came from Turkey, via the islands of the North Aegean Sea (Oikonomakis, 2018).

Figure 8. The Balkan and the Central Mediterranean routes used by refugees to arrive in Europe



The Balkan Route: 

By sea from Turkey to Greek Islands (mostly Kos, Samos, Kios, Lesbos) and then by land via the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary, Croatia or Slovenia, towards Central, Northern and Western Europe.


The Central Mediterranean Route: 

By land from Sub-Saharan Africa to Libya and then in often makeshift and overloaded boats from the Libyan coast to the Italian islands of Lampedusa and Sicily, to Malta, or rescued at sea by Italian and EU ships.

Source: Image re-published from Council of Europe Toolkit (2019, p.2)

According to a report issued by the European Commission in 2016 (February 10), more than 1,000,000 people had crossed it into Greece from Turkey and the EU had to cooperate urgently with the Turkish authorities in order to reduce that number (Border-monitoring, 2019) (Figure 9).

Figure 9 Total number of arrivals on the central and eastern Mediterranean routes



Source: Image re-published from Collet & Le Coz (2018).

The complicated geopolitical interests of Turkey and Europe in the North Aegean are reflected in the EU – Turkey Statement, which took effect in 2016. This Statement was an effort of Europe to protect its borders from the migrants’ flows coming from Turkey (Knaous, 2016).

According to the EU – Turkey Statement, all migrants crossing the Aegean Sea illegally would be readmitted to Turkey, while, for every Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian would be resettled from Turkey to the EU, in a process that became known as “1-to-1 mechanism”. In exchange, the EU promised to re-activate Turkey’s accession process by opening up chapters, speeding up visa liberalisation and investing a 3-billion-euro financial aid package, plus an additional amount of 3 billion Euros to improve the standard of living of the Syrian immigrant community in Turkey (Haferlach & Kurban, 2017).

While welcomed in Brussels as a positive step to addressing the “migration crisis”, the deal sparked heated criticism among international human rights organisations and civil society for being in breach of international laws, such as the ban on collective expulsions. In particular, many opposed the decision to consider Turkey a “safe third country”, i.e., a country that is safe for third-country nationals. The Statement reached

between the European Council and Turkey aimed at halting the influx of irregular migrants from Turkey via Greece mainly to Europe (Duvet, 2018).

The most considerable aim of the EU by signing the Statement with Turkey was to eliminate the activity of migrant smugglers in the Aegean Sea and, thus, to protect refugees/migrants from being drowned; in order to achieve this, the EU and Turkey decided to proceed with the following actions: all the migrants making their way through Turkey to Greece would be returned to Turkey; this measure, which came into force in March 2016, complies with both the EU and the international law; collective expulsion, though, is not allowed (Duvet, 2018).

Besides the aforementioned motives of the EU (to eliminate the activity of migrant smugglers in the Aegean Sea and, thus, to protect refugees/migrants from being drowned) some researchers (Tommaso, 2016, Gedikkaya Bal, 2016, Carrera et al., 2015, Dagi, 2018) found other motives behind the EU-Turkey Statement. For example, long before the EU-Turkey Statement, many non-governmental organisations as well as the UNHCR have been heavily criticised Europe's Dublin system for its dysfunctionality and its inability to handle effectively the refugee crisis (Gedikkaya Bal, 2016). In addition, member states have been accused of lack of solidarity as regards the implementation of the Dublin system. Thus, Carrera et al. (2015) argued that the remodeling of the sharing protection and the human rights responsibilities lack effective response and action on the part of member states. This made the Dublin system to be unworkable and ineffective (Carrera et al., 2015).

The aforementioned reasons led the EU to approach other countries in order to develop cooperation for addressing the migrant crisis. The cooperation between EU and Turkey⁸, which is a transit country, seemed as a good opportunity to Europe.

Turkey has asked for several "benefits" in order to proceed with the implementation of the Statement; first and foremost, the acceleration of the liberalisation of the visa for

⁸ Europe chose Turkey for negotiation due to its geographic position, as it is a transit country located at Europe's external borders. Due to its geographic position, Turkey was the only route between Syria and Iraq and the EU (Nur Osso, 2016).

Turkish citizens. For that to happen, Turkey should fulfill several requirements and, more specifically, 72 benchmarks.

Moreover, the EU should accelerate the allocation of €3,000,000,000 for the Facility for the Refugees in Turkey and ensure that more money will be given for the funding of other relevant projects. With this money, infrastructure will be constructed, food and other living costs will be financed and, at large, the needs of refugees will be covered. Overall, the EU will disburse €6,000,000,000 to Turkey. The upgrading of EU-Turkey relations must also be accelerated along with the re-activation of the process for the acceptance of Turkey in the EU.

Since the enforcement of the EU – Turkey Statement, one may conclude that there has been a decrease in the number of migrants reaching the Greek coastline. With a daily average of 84 migrants, the European Commission claims that the arrivals on the Greek islands have dropped by 97%. However, stating that solely the Statement has led to a decrease in migrants arriving in Europe sounds like a premature conclusion to us as other factors have to be weighed in investigating the reasons for this decrease.

For instance, Haferlach & Kurban (2017) claimed that even if the EU – Turkey Statement managed to decrease substantially the refugees flows leaving Turkey by boat for Greece (Aegean), it cannot be concluded that this is an instant effect of the EU – Turkey Statement. The researchers argued that the sharp decline could also be attributed to the closed Balkan route that left thousands of refugees stranded for months in Idomeni, an informal refugee camp in Greece on the border with Macedonia. In addition, Spijkerboer (2016), who conducted a data analysis in order to test if there is any correlation between the EU – Turkey Statement and the reduction of migrant flows, concluded that there is no positive correlation.

Furthermore, academic research has shown that the number of arrivals in Greece had already been declining prior to the enforcement of the EU – Turkey Statement. Moreover, despite the fact that the number of arrivals in Greece has decreased, migrants might still reach Europe via other routes, such as the Mediterranean Sea. As a matter of fact, since the EU – Turkey Statement, the numbers of migrants flowing from Northern Africa towards Italy and Europe have been increasing. Via the use of the 1:1 resettlement scheme, more than 11,490 Syrian refugees have already been resettled

from Turkey to Greece and vice versa. According to the Statement, the resettlements take place on an individual basis (Haferlach & Kurban, 2017).

Since the day it was signed, the EU-Turkey Statement has been received criticism. While some argue that this Statement was a quick but necessary decision in order for Europe address the migration and humanitarian crisis in Greece, critics argue that the Statement has disadvantages. For example, the EU-Turkey Statement has been accused of being politically short-sighted. This prevents Europe from developing a more sustainable and effective policy to handle the migration crisis. Such a tendency undermines any effort for the protection of human rights as well as for the promotion of the principle of mutual solidarity. Thus, Knaous (2016) argued that EU needs to offer help to Greece in order to manage to overcome the burden of the refugee policy.

The issue of solidarity has been also highlighted by Tommaso (2016), who argued that the EU-Turkey Statement created a crisis dilemma as regards human rights. More specifically, the researcher explained that the crisis dilemma concerns the interests versus the human rights. As Tommaso (2016) clarified, Europe with the Statement chose to protect its internal security and borders and sacrifice the protection of human rights. This crisis dilemma led to the revival of the old Europe policy, where national interests were above mutual solidarity (Tommaso, 2016).

In this regards, the EU-Turkey Statement led some member states like Hungary to close their borders in the name of the internal security. While some other member states like Germany decided to implement a more open-door policy and, thus, received a vast amount of applications (in 2015 the applications to Germany reached almost 476,000). Nevertheless, some scholars such as Janning et al. (2016) have criticised Germany that it used the EU institutions to fulfill its interests.

As regards the Greek case, researchers (Heck & Hess, 2017, Knaous, 2016, Haferlach & Kurban, 2017, McEwen, 2017) argued that the EU-Turkey deal had negative consequences. For example, McEwen (2017) argued that Europe by signing the Statement with Turkey chose to transfer the reception responsibility from Europe to Greece. Thus, Greece during the peak of the refugee crisis on 2015, received the vast majority of refugees coming from the EU (approximately 885,000). Thus, McEwen (2017), as other researchers did (Heck & Hess, 2017, Knaous, 2016, Haferlach & Kurban, 2017), claimed that the EU-Turkey Statement on the one hand led to the

decrease of refugee arrivals in Greece but on the other hand increased the number of asylum seekers.

It is a fact that, before Europe signing the deal with Turkey, only a few refugees stayed in Greece and applied for asylum in the country. The EU-Turkey Statement blocked the refugees' entry to the rest of the European countries and thus transformed Greece overnight from a pass gate to a final destination. The EU-Turkey Statement left no option to asylum seekers than to apply to Greece for asylum (McEwen, 2017).

Some experts may argue that the EU-Turkey Statement was not expected to affect so negatively Greece as regards the refugee burden, considering that the country could return the asylum seekers to Turkey. But, in practice, in the context of the Dublin system, the number of migrants Greece could return to Turkey was limited, considering the Greek asylum process mechanism which is overburdened (Collett 2016).

The overburdened Greek asylum process mechanism resulted in poor protection of the migrants' rights in Greece. Gogou (2017) explained the situation better by arguing that thousands of refugees in the context of the EU-Turkey Statement have no other option than to stay in Greece under challenging living conditions and to wait either for the processing of their asylum applications or for their return to Turkey (Gogou 2017).

The most affected part of Greece was the islands of the North Aegean. Overnight, the North Aegean islands were transformed into refugee detention centers. The refugees, who arrived in Greece before the Statement was signed, remained trapped on the Greek islands indefinitely. The islands of the North Aegean had been already burdened by the European hotspot policy (Table 6) and, after the EU-Turkey Statement, the living conditions of the migrants deteriorated as the islands of the North Aegean had surpassed their capacity (Asylum in Europe, 2018).

Table 6. Greek islands of the North Aegean. Hotspots capacity and occupancy

Hotspot	Start of operation	Capacity	Occupancy
Lesvos	October 2015	3,100	5,010
Chios	February 2016	1,014	1,252
Samos	March 2016	648	3,723
Leros	March 2016	860	936
Kos	June 2016	816	762
Total		6,438	11,683

Source: Asylum in Europe 2018

The international press support that Turkey is playing political games in the context of the EU-Turkey Statement. More specifically, Turkey signed the Statement in order to reap the benefits that Europe granted to it. At the same time, Greece in order to reduce the number of migrants stranded on the North Aegean islands, chose to return migrants to Turkey by violating their human rights. Finally, Europe, at the peak of the refugee crisis, did not take any necessary actions to stop Greece from violating migrants' human rights (Quantara.com, 2020).

The international press have characterised the EU-Turkey Statement as toxic for Greece. Before the elections, Greece's Prime Minister considered the refugee issue as an issue that could be easily solved by implementing strict policies as regards the protection of the Greek borders, the conditions for the reception of refugees as well as the legal framework and procedures. But the Greek government did not manage to achieve its objectives and to solve the Greek refugee crisis. As a result, Greece accepted its role to guard Europe's borders by increasing military and repressive measures. This choice turned the North Aegean islands in high-risk military zones (Refugee Support Aegean, 2020).

2.3 The geopolitics of the North Aegean and the European policy affecting the refugee crisis

To understand the EU-Turkey Statement in relation to the Greek case, it is important to understand some aspects of the geopolitical dimensions⁹ developed historically between Turkey and Greece. The geopolitical relationship between Greece and Turkey can help us to understand why so many refugees passed from Turkey to Greece before, during and after the EU-Turkey Statement. In this context, the international press (The Conversation.com, 2016, eumigration.com, 2020) have repeatedly highlighted that the geopolitical plays between Turkey and Greece are responsible for what has happened on a daily basis on the waters of the Aegean Sea.

The political geography of the Aegean region is rather complex, as it consists of small islands, especially in the eastern part of the Aegean, which, despite the fact that they are very close to the Turkish coast, belong to the Greek territory. During the years, there have been escalating ongoing distatements between Greece and Turkey as regards the sovereignty of the Greek islands of the Aegean as well as of the rocks and the islets. In 1974, such distatements resulted in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

These geopolitical relations that have been developed between Greece and Turkey throughout the years can explain the reason behind the Greek and the Turkish authorities' refusal to set up joint patrols in the Aegean, despite the fact that such a refusal ended up in many deaths in the Aegean sea. In addition, the intervention of NATO ships in the Aegean during the migration crisis in 2016 revealed another aspect of the Greek-Turkish geopolitical relations. The main aim of NATO's ships in the Aegean was to monitor human trafficking rather than to send refugees and migrants back to Turkey. Such an intervention highlighted the military and the political aspects of the Greece-Turkey geopolitical relationship.

In the beginning, Turkey was positive to NATO's intervention in the Aegean but, in the long term, the country showed a negative attitude towards NATO's intervention by

⁹ The geopolitical relationships developed between Turkey and Greece on the North Aegean islands influence the quality of the relationships of the two states. In this context, the refugee crisis in the North Aegean can be seen as a geopolitical issue that can change the constellation of powers in the region.

arguing that NATO's military is not quite effective to address the situation of trafficking. In reality, Turkey's big fear was that NATO was going to acquire power and to strengthen its presence in the Aegean region. In addition, the Turkish government did not want to allow NATO to patrol part of its maritime border. On the other hand, Europe and Greece were more positive on NATO's presence in the North Aegean as they believed that it favored them (Dimitriadi et al., 2020).

Dimitriadi et al. (2020), who gave emphasis on the changing nature of the EU migration policy in the context of the geopolitics, argued that the future of the EU-Turkey migration policy in the Aegean is characterised by the gradual incorporation of military interventions. Due to the NATO's intervention in the Aegean to prevent smuggling operations, Germany proposed joint patrolling in the Aegean between Turkey and Greece. However, the Greek government rejected the Germany's proposal. After the distatements, that occurred between Turkey and the EU about NATO's presence in the Aegean, NATO's operations terminated in 2017. But in late 2017, NATO began conversations with FRONTEX for further cooperation that would result in NATO's re-expansion in the Aegean (Dimitriadi et al., 2020).

Scordas (2020) provided also another dimension of the EU (including Greece)-Turkey geopolitical relations in the North Aegean which affected their migration policies as well as the EU-Turkey Statement. As Scordas (2020) explained, an overview of the EU geopolitics can explain both the reaction of Greece and Turkey in the context of the EU-Turkey Statement. According to Scordas (2020), the most vulnerable territories of the European's Union geopolitical space are the East (Baltic States), the South-East (Greece) and the South-Central (Italy) part of it.

Due to the vulnerability of Europe's geopolitical borders, the EU decided to externalise the protection of its borders to Libya and Turkey. In this regard, NATO was involved in the situation in order to ensure the security of the Baltics. Turkey's withdrawal from the EU-Turkey Statement during 2016 created a difficult situation on the EU borders in the South. During this period, Turkey played a geopolitical game with the refugees by threatening Europe and specifically Greece that it would unleash new waves of migrants, if Europe did not change its position on the Syrian conflict. Turkey's reactions revealed the complicated geopolitical interests in the Aegean, which gave to the EU-Turkey Statement a geopolitical and military dimension. By considering the

aforementioned incidents, it seems logical that Greece considers the situation on its borders as a threat to its national security, especially if we consider Greece's economic collapse due to the financial crisis. The North Aegean islands are the most affected territories by the escalation which occurred between Greece and Turkey, in the context of the EU-Turkey Statement.

The new elected government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis hope that the EU-Turkey Statement will help Greece to solve its border crisis. In an exclusive interview, the Greek Prime Minister declared that now that the things have calmed down, it is the time to rethink the situation and to take measures in order to prevent future similar situations at the Greek-Turkish borders. In addition, the Greek Prime Minister characterised Turkey's threats of unleashing migrants on Europe and especially on Greece as unacceptable. In this context, Kyriakos Mitsotakis proposed the revision of the EU-Turkey Statement on migration.

The Greek center-right government's response to Greece's border crisis was the reinforcement of its sea and land borders. Furthermore, the Greek government decided to take a temporary measure in order to protect its border by banning the granting of asylum to illegal immigrants. The Greek government invoke Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights to suspend the right to asylum after the events in Evros. The Greek government's quick response to its border crisis provoked reactions from Amnesty International and the UNHCR. But the Greek's government's position is the following:

«Greece is experiencing a threat to its national security. We had to find a balance between international law and the protection of our borders. It's a delicate balance, but we've managed to find the right solution» (The Guardian, 2020).

On the other hand, an the UNHCR representative declared to the international press:

«the application of Article 15 presupposes the case of "war or other public danger threatening the life of the nation", which is not the case here. In addition, he argues, "Article 15 has one paragpraph, which states that even in the cases referred to in paragraph 1, any deviation from the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment is not permitted". In any case, "the right to asylum includes the right to apply for asylum" (WD.com, 2020).


2.4 The Greek policy and priorities in accordance to the EU -Turkey Statement and the Dublin I & II Regulations

The basic documents that form the basis of Greece's refugee policy are: the Geneva Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights (UNHCR, 1967, Council of Europe, 1950). The two Conventions oblige Greece to respect asylum seekers' right to apply for asylum. The rights of asylum seekers have been incorporated into the Greek asylum law of 1959 (Greek Government, 1959). As a result, the protection of asylum seekers' rights had been instituted in Greece before the Dublin system. The only new regulation introduced by the Dublin system in Greece was the transformation of the country to a first-entry state on the common EU-border, with the responsibility of enforcing EU's external border.

It is a fact that the number of asylum seekers in Greece was very low during the first years after the signing of the Dublin Convention, especially if we compare the number of asylum seekers during 1990 and 2015 (over 885,386 migrants crossing from Turkey into Greece in 2015). The migrants used Greece as a transit country in order to travel to other European countries (Frontex, 2016). However, the implementation of the Dublin Convention in Greece had drawbacks and shortcomings due to the lack of an appropriate policy.

Figure 10 shows a growing trend in the asylum seekers in Greece during 1996 (the year before the Dublin Convention came into force) and 1997. Asylum seekers increased from 1,640 to 4,375. Due to the fact the asylum seekers decreased in number (to 2,950) during 1998, we cannot conclude that the Dublin Convention was responsible for the growing trend observed in asylum seekers in Greece during 1996-1997. As depicted in Picture, the number of asylum seeker was stable in 2016 but increased to 12,265. The number of asylum seekers continued to increase in 2007 (25,115). A new increase of the asylum seekers is observed in 2015 (13,205).

Figure 10. Asylum seekers in Greece during the period 1996-2015



Researchers (Jurado et al., 2016, Frontex, 2016) attribute the gap that exists between the number of arrivals and the number of asylum seekers to Greece's inadequate asylum-seeking policy.

Ever since the Dublin Regulation was adopted, Greece has been accused of its inadequate asylum policy. When the migrant crisis reached its peak in 2011 and especially in 2015, Greece was criticised that it overlooked the Dublin Convention and decided to purposely deny migrants reaching the Greek shores. The Greek government's decision on push-backs of migrants at sea has been considered as a violation of both Greece's international asylum obligations and the first-entry principle. The Greek government's response to the refugee crisis and the violation of the Dublin Convention reflects its different priorities in accordance to the EU-Turkey Statement and Dublin system (Frontex, 2016).

It is a fact that the Greek governments have always problems when they need to deliver their asylum obligations. Since the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2011, the previous Greek Prime Minister encountered problems with the asylum-seeking processes and responsibilities. In 2011, after the end of the court *M.S.S v Belgium and Greece*, Europe helped Greece to begin implementing the Dublin III Regulation. In this context, the Greek government of Alexis Tsipras took an important measure and established five hotspots (Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Leros, Kos) in order to help refugees to register

when arriving in its territory and to eliminate asylum-seeking applications (European Commission, 2016f).

The new government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis, after its election in 2019, decided to transfer the control of the camps from the Ministry of Migration Policy to the Ministry of Citizen Protection. If comparing Kyriakos Mitsotakis' reaction to the migration crisis to Alexis Tsipras' reaction, it can be concluded that Kyriakos Mitsotakis took rougher measures to protect Greece's borders. For example, during 2019, the Greek government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis passed a new asylum law with the aim to prevent migrants from having access to the Greek healthcare system (European Data Journalism, 2020).

Furthermore, Kyriakos Mitsotakis replaced the hotspots with closed centers. Such a policy has been heavily criticised because it has increased xenophobia (refugee camps turned into battlefields). The closed detention centers replace the RIC (Registration & Identification Centers) established by the government of Alexis Tsipras. The detention centers of the new elected government operate not only on the islands but also in the mainland. The Greek Council of Refugees has accused the closed detention centers of not meeting the basic standards (prolonged detention, poor hygiene conditions, overcrowding, etc.) (European Data Journalism, 2020).

In 2020 the Greek government introduced a new asylum law which provides for the detention of asylum applicants. This new law reflects Greece's broader deterrence policy, which is supported by the EU. This policy started with the EU-Turkey Statement (European Data Journalism, 2020).

2.5 The EU and national relocation and resettlement scheme

Before analysing Europe's relocation and resettlement scheme, it is necessary to give a definition of the two concepts. Relocation means that asylum seekers have the right to move from EU countries which are under pressure due to the migration flows (e.g. Italy and Greece) to other European countries in order to ask for asylum. On the other hand, resettlement refers to the process during which refugees need to move to other European countries because they cannot find security in the European country they first moved in (European Commission, 2015).

Due to the large migration flows towards Greece and Italy, in 2015, the European Union decided to activate a relocation scheme in order to relocate migrants from Greece and Italy to other European countries. The 2015 European relocation scheme was the first relocation scheme in the whole history of the European migration policy. With the 2015 relocation mechanism, the European Union aimed at relocating around 160,000 applicants from Greece and Italy to other European countries. In addition, during the same period, the European Commission decided to develop a resettlement scheme for 20,000 people in need of international protection. Actually, until 2016, *“only 937 people have been relocated from Italy and Greece, and only 4,555 have been resettled”* (European Commission, 2015).

Figure 11. Relocation from Italy and Greece (October 2015-June 2017)



Source: European Commission Relocation and Resettlement https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170726_factsheet_relocation_and_resettlement_en.pdf

There is a wide variety of factors which can explain the unsuccessful implementation of both schemes, including the member states' political will to deliver on their legal obligations, the "wave-through" policy along the Western Balkan route and the reluctance of the member states to resettle as people continued to arrive in an irregular way.

To understand Europe's relocation and resettlement scheme, it is important to give some background information.

It all started with the hotspots. The hotspot approach, which was introduced by the European Migration Agenda, aimed at offering support to member states that needed it. Based on the European Migration Agenda guidelines, the European Asylum Support Office, Frontex and Europol are obliged to offer operational support to member states in order to help them to address migration issues (e.g. identification, registration, fingerprints). The European Asylum Support Office, Frontex and Europol had to work in a complementary and collaborative way in order to support member states. For example, the main obligation of Frontex was to assist member states to organise the return procedures. The main obligation of Europol was to help member states to conduct investigations in order to identify smuggling and trafficking networks. At this point, it is important to clarify that European Union's supportive activities did not include the reception of claimants and the processing of claims (Maiani, 2016).

Undoubtedly, the hotspots were established in order to shift to frontline states all the responsibilities they (theoretically) shoulder under the current EU legislation. This is where temporary relocation schemes come in. The temporary relocation scheme was established by Decisions 14 and 22 in 2015. These decisions provide the member states with temporary emergency measures in order to effectively deal with the refugee situation. But Europe's temporary relocation scheme diverges from the principles of the Dublin system.

Chapter 3: THE FUTURE OF THE REFUGEE/MIGRATION ISSUE


3.1 Winners and the Losers: The impact of the refugee crisis on the islands of the North Aegean

The most affected part of Greece by the European refugee crisis is the islands of the North Aegean. Between 2015 and 2016, almost 1 million people passed from Turkey into Greece through the islands of the North Aegean. The EU-Turkey Statement had negative consequences for the islands of the North Aegean because, since December 2016, between 60,000 and 70,000 people were stranded in Greece, especially in the islands of the North Aegean (Oikonomakis, 2018). The most affected islands of the North Aegean are Samos, Chios and Lesbos. According to UN's statistics for refugees during 2019, 27,108 refugees arrived at Lesbos, 7,990 at Chios and 10,711 at Samos. Until today, the North Aegean islands handle almost 62% of the total arrivals of refugees (Wood, 2020).

In 2018, the population of the hotspot on Chios (Vial) was two times its official capacity. During that year, approximately 2,600 refugees were living in the camp under bad living conditions. In addition, during 2018, the hotspot on Kos was also overcrowded. The hotspot had a capacity of 816 refugees but hosted almost 1,185 refugees during 2018. At the same time, the hotspot on Lesbos had a capacity of 860 refugees and hosted almost 730 refugees. Furthermore, at the hotspot on Samos (Vathy), over the same period of time, the population hosted was 6 times the hotspot's official capacity (Refugee Support Aegean, 2019). It is worth noting that, during 2018, the UN Refugee Agency forced the Greek Government to take the necessary measures in order to handle the refugee situation in terms of reception and identification procedures.

According to the data presented in the Greek City Times (2020), in 2020, the islands of the North Aegean and the Attica region need to handle almost the same number of refugees (30,959 and 30,628 respectively). This is of particular importance if we consider the proportion of the refugees in comparison to the local population of the North Aegean islands and of the Attica region (15.5% and 0.8% respectively) (Figure 12). (Greek City Times, 2020).

Figure 12. Number of refugees in proportion to the local population of the North Aegean islands and of the Attica region



<https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/06/05/one-in-six-residents-in-the-north-aegean-islands-are-illegal-immigrants/>

The aforementioned situation affected badly the facilities of the islands as they did not have the capacity to handle the large numbers of refugees. The pressing situation of the North Aegean islands brings to the surface issues related to European solidarity. In this context, the North Aegean islands need the support of the other European member states in order to handle the difficult situation (Wood, 2020). Wood (2020) also argues that the screening and registration procedures taking place on the islands of the North Aegean are not transparent. This has negative consequences for the refugees' lives, as their human rights are infringed by the Greek authorities. For example, there are many vulnerable refugees, who are neither identified nor supported by the national and the EU law.

On the basis of the aforementioned data, it could be concluded that the European Union did not manage to respond effectively to the large number of refugees that need protection. This means that Europe's solidarity and burden sharing principles failed to achieve their objectives as they were not implemented in the case of Greece. At this point, it is important to note that the European Union's relocation decision was not effective. This can be attributed to the lack of political will on the part of the member states. Additionally, the EU-Turkey Statement serves the aims of an atypical readmission Statement between the EU and Turkey, which is not based on democratic

decision-making and control (e.g. absence of participation of the European Parliament) (Unluhisarcikli, 2020).

In this context, during 2020, the international press criticised negatively Greece's, Europe's and Turkey's efforts to appropriately handle the refugee situation. According to the international press, the problem is the lack of the humanitarian content in the EU-Turkey Statement. Based on the EU-Turkey Statement, Turkey took the chance to play political games with Greece. This had negative consequences on the refugee problem. Greece, in its attempt to respond to Turkey's political game, used methods that were lacking the human rights perspective. Lastly, the hotspot approach was lacking an effective individual assessment as regards its asylum procedures. This situation also resulted in the violation of refugees' rights. Thus, according to the international press, the hotspots replaced the burden sharing approach with 'burden dumping' (Unluhisarcikli, 2020).

3.2 Dublin I, II and III Regulations. The future of refugee/migration policy

The aim of this part of the dissertation is to critically evaluate the Dublin system and to give an assessment of European Union's future migration policy. Da Lompa (2019) have clearly argued that, to date, the Dublin system has failed to offer a comprehensive refugee protection regime.

The Dublin system has been heavily criticised for increasing the burden sharing for some member states which were more likely to receive the Dublin transfers. More specifically, the borderline member states such as Greece and Italy were obliged to receive the vast majority of migrants when the migration crisis was at its peak. For example, as depicted in Table 7, in 2013, they received almost 30% of refugees' requests. Sweden and Germany were among the member states which sent the most Dublin transfers.

Table 7. Outgoing requests to take charge or take back, top five sending states 2013

STATE	TOTAL OUTGOING REQUESTS	SHARE OF TOTAL BASED ON EURODAC (%)	TOTAL TAKE BACK	TAKE CHARGE			
				TOTAL	OF WHICH		
					FAMILY REASONS (ART. 6-8, 14)	DOCUMENTATION/ ENTRY (ART. 9-12)	HUMANITARIAN (ART. 15)
GERMANY	32,796	67.4	30,053	2,743	73	2,664	6
SWEDEN	10,162	53.5	5,350	4,812	57	4,737	18
SWITZERLAND	9,679	62.8	5,928	3,751	42	3,656	53
FRANCE	5,903	41.4	5,038	865	104	757	4
AUSTRIA	5,104	73.0	4,344	760	37	722	1
TOTAL (ALL DUBLIN STATES)	76,358	63.4	59,079	17,279	1,402	15,608	269

Source: Fratzke, 2015. The fading promise of Europe's Dublin System. Migration Policy and Institute in Europe.

At this point, it is important to clarify that the migration issue in Europe is multifaceted. This means that the future European migration policy should focus on many migration aspects in order to avoid being one-dimensional. A multifaceted European migration policy should help member states to cooperate in order to enforce the European migration law. The level of law enforcement will be increased only if the European migration policy takes into consideration the national conflicted interests. Some of the aspects the future migration policy should take into consideration are: borderline member states' border protection, faster asylum procedures, development of cooperation between EU and non-EU countries in the migration issue as well as the return procedures (Trauner, 2016).

Considering that the Dublin system failed to effectively address the solidarity issue, it is important for the European Union to turn its attention to this issue for managing migration. In this context, Ansems de Vries, Carrera & Guild (2016) argued that the existing Dublin system works against the institution of asylum, as one member state tries to send asylum seekers to another member state. Additionally, Mouzourakis (2014), who studied the relationship between irregular entry and asylum applications, found that there is a strong link between the two variables. This leads member states to undertake actions to protect their borders. As a result, border protection by the member states has a negative impact on asylum application procedures. Mouzourakis (2014) used the Germany-Switzerland paradigm. In this context, the researcher argued that the transfer requests between Germany and Switzerland led to unequal burden sharing.

Last but not least, many scholars argued that the burden sharing dimension of the European Asylum Policy, as established by the European Union, should include several

criteria in order to establish the responsible country (e.g. language affinities, reception capacity, etc.). However, until 2014 (the first year of the Dublin III regulation) these criteria were omitted. Thus, Mouzourakis (2014) suggested that it was important that the burden-sharing issue be handled by Brussels.

Furthermore, the future of the European's Union migration policy will be determined by the development of adequate monitoring mechanisms. This is important for many reasons. For example, some member states are more willing to take more responsibility in some areas than others. The discrepancies which exist in member states as regards the national migration policies make it necessary for the European Union to develop effective monitoring mechanisms that will ensure the equal application of the Dublin system. Lastly, a monitoring mechanism would help the European Union to assess the member states' contribution towards sharing responsibility. This could result in the improvement of the relocation mechanism (Papageorgiou, 2017).

Up to the now, the Dublin Regulations have brought to the surface issues related to solidarity and refugee burden-sharing. Such issues have been historically connected to the EU's asylum policy (Lopatin, 2013). Furthermore, Trauner (2016) argued that the Dublin rules created too much administrative work for the member states. Such a work created many unsolved administration issues due to the different bureaucratic procedures in the member states (e.g. information exchange, allocation of responsibility, case management, record keeping, transfers of applicants).

In this context, the future European migration policy should consider the conflicted interests between the member states (especially Greece) and Europe as regards the management of the refugee crisis. This is because such interests lead member states to violate the Dublin system regulations (Trauner, 2016). As Papageorgiou (2017) states, the Dublin system's shortcomings (e.g. lack of comparability of the asylum standards of member states) are responsible for the increased gap which exists between the European Union and the national migration policies. As a result, it is crucial for the European Union to shape a future migration policy that will consider the different capacities of member states in the different areas of asylum and migration-related policies (Papageorgiou, 2013).

Another important recommendation for Europe's future migration policy is that it should consider communication among the asylum authorities in the member states. Up to now, communication between the national asylum authorities and the EU can be characterised as poor and insufficient. Such a poor communication resulted in delays

in the Dublin procedures. Furthermore, such poor communication resulted in low transfer rates and low level of trust among the member states. Last but not least, learning from the past mistakes, the future European migration policy should focus on reducing unnecessary transfers and requests. Such a priority would help Europe to reduce the Dublin system's costs (Fatzke, 2015).

Another important aspect of the EU's future migration policy should be the collection of up-to-date and comparable data on many aspects of migration. The lack of adequate data prevents European Union from developing a coherent migration policy. At this point, it is important to clarify that, since 2018, the European Union has made some efforts to coordinate activities for enhancing the migration data. But its efforts have so far been insufficient. This situation has a negative impact on its decision-making process on the migration issue (MEDAM, 2018).

Bruni (2018), who studied the future of Europe's migration policy, argued that, to date, the Dublin system has failed to promote and implement harmonisation in the member states as regards the asylum system. This situation has led member states to take different decisions on the migration issue. This is the reason why some member states which have been badly affected by the refugee crisis, such as Greece and Italy, ask for further reform of the Dublin system Regulations (Schiavone, 2018).

B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the steps and procedures that were followed in order to conduct the qualitative research. According to Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2007), the basic elements of research methodology are the following: the choice of a research method, the research philosophy, the research approach, the research instrument, the sampling method and the sample selection, the description of the data analysis process, the research ethics and the research limitations (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007).

4.1 Research method

This is a qualitative research. In the international literature, there are two basic research methodologies: qualitative and quantitative. The aim of quantitative research is to find relationships between the variables and to accept or reject the research hypothesis by

using statistical methods. Basically, the researchers who choose this type of methodology want to find statistical trends and to reach safe conclusions based on statistical data. In order to develop the research hypothesis, the quantitative researchers need a comprehensive framework. Thus, this type of research is chosen when a matter has been extensively studied by other researchers (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007). On the contrary, qualitative research aims at exploring a research topic in depth. This type of research is chosen when the researcher wants to understand the underlying causes of a problem. In addition, unlike quantitative research, qualitative research explores participants' opinions and perceptions about a matter (Kothari, 2004). In this dissertation, qualitative research was chosen due to the fact that the research topic has not been extensively studied in the international literature. In addition, the qualitative research was chosen because the researcher wants to study in-depth the matter under investigation and to collect information about the participant's opinions and perceptions (Bryman, 2012).

Finally, qualitative research was chosen due to the explorative nature of the research problems:

Research problem 1: What are the strengths and opportunities of Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement?

Research problem 2: What are the main threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement?

Research problem 3: How Europe and Greece should cooperate in the future in order to address the migration crisis?

To conclude, this qualitative research aims at investigating the participants' perceptions about a) the strengths and opportunities of Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement, b) the main threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement and c) how Europe and Greece should cooperate in the future in order to address the migration crisis.

All types of researches have advantages and disadvantages. The main advantages of the current research are the following: a) the research explored in-depth the matter under investigation, b) the research gave the researcher the opportunity to understand and explain the participants' opinions, c) it's a flexible approach (May, 2011).

The main disadvantages of qualitative research are the following: a) the small sample size which does not allow space for generalisations, b) the sample bias, c) the subjectivity in data analysis and d) the delays in procedures due to the coronavirus.

4.2 Research philosophy

In general, the research philosophy reflects the basic assumptions, beliefs and values that a researcher adopts in order to carry out his/her research. There are four main research philosophies: pragmatism, positivism, interpretivism and realism (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007). This study adopted the interpretivist research philosophy. The interpretivist research philosophy fits with this qualitative study (Kothari, 2004) because the study uses the constructivist research approach in order to interpret the participants' views and to give a meaning to the data. As a result, this research, which explores the participants' views about Europe's response to the migration crisis since 2011, aims at giving a meaning to the participants' discourse by interpreting it. This is the reason why interviews were used in order to collect data from the sample.

One of the main assumptions of the interpretivist research philosophy is that reality is constructed based on social meanings (Silverman, 2013). Thus, this research used the social meanings which occurred by the analysis of the participants' views, in order to interpret the social reality associated with the Europe's response to the migration crisis. The phenomenology of this interpretivist research philosophy assists the researcher to understand the matter under investigation through the exploration of the participants' views.

The main disadvantage of the interpretivist research philosophy is its bias, as the researcher plays a pivotal role in data interpretation (Silverman, 2013). Nevertheless, the interpretivist research philosophy was adopted here because the aim of the researcher is to understand in-depth the social reality.

4.3 Research approach

Snieder & Larner (2009) explained that there are two types of research approach: deductive and inductive. The deductive approach, which uses pre-existing theories to develop the research questions and hypothesis, fits to quantitative research. While, the inductive approach fits to qualitative research. The inductive approach is used when there is lack of studies on a scientific field. Thus, the researcher used the inductive approach in order to collect information and to enrich the literature of the field.

4.4 Instrument (semi structured interviews)

In qualitative research, there are three types of interviews: structured, unstructured and semi-structured. The main purpose of interviews is to explore the participant's opinions about Europe's response to the migration crisis since 2011. The interviews help the researcher to obtain a deep understanding about the matter under investigation (Kothari, 2004).

Structured interviews are like structured questionnaires, as they consist of closed questions. This type of interviews is not flexible and this is the reason why they were rejected in the current research. Unstructured interviews have the form of a free conversation. This type of interviews needs the researcher to have experience in conducting interviews. This is the reason why unstructured interviews were rejected in the current research (Kothari, 2004). Semi-structured interviews are a combination of structured and unstructured interviews and provide the researcher with flexibility. In semi-structured interviews, the researcher develops an interview guide which consists of a list of open questions. In this dissertation, semi-structured interviews (see appendix A) were chosen due to their flexibility and to the fact that allow the researcher to obtain a deep understanding of the participants' views about the matter under investigation (Kothari, 2004).

To develop the interview guide, the following steps were followed: a) the literature review was conducted, b) the research questions were developed and c) the interview's questions were developed on the basis of the literature review and the research questions. Table 8 shows the research questions and the interview questions.

Table 8. Interview questions and research questions

Interview questions	Research questions
1-8	RQ 1. -What are the strengths and what are the main opportunities of Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement?
9-18	RQ 2.- What are the main threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement?
19-22	RQ 3-How Europe and Greece should cooperate in the future in order to address the migration crisis?

4.5 Sample and sampling technique

In qualitative research, there are various sampling techniques that you can use when recruiting participants. The most well-known are the purposive and the convenience sampling. Convenience sampling is used by the researchers who want to choose their sample based on the criteria of feasibility and accessibility. As a result, the researchers who choose the convenience sampling as a sampling technique approach the participants who are easily accessible. Purposive sampling is used when the researcher wants to approach participants who have a deep knowledge of the subject under investigation (Wiles, Crow & Pain, 2011). This research used purposive sampling as a sampling method because the researcher wanted to obtain in-depth and detailed information from the participants. The sample of the research consists of nine participants (Table 9 shows the participants' demographics).

4.6 Procedures

The participants who took part in the research belong to the close friendly and professional network of the researcher. Initially, there was a telephone conversation

with the participants where they were asked if they want to take part in the survey. Then, due to the limited time of the participants, it was decided to send the interviews by e-mail. Before completing the answers, the participants were approached again to see if they had any questions or did not understand something well. The participants responded to the interview questions and mailed them back. The interviews were sent in written form and this facilitated the data analysis procedure.

4.7 Description of the data analysis process

Thematic analysis was used as a technique in order to analyse the data. The basic phase of thematic analysis is the construction of codes and themes. Thematic analysis is recognised and valued because it generates meaningful results based on rigorous procedures. Thus, thematic analysis is widely used in qualitative research. The aim of thematic analysis is to identify, analyse and interpret the patterns of meaning that occurred from the participants' answers. Thematic analysis is useful when the researcher wants to inform theoretical frameworks for research (Kothari, 2004). Braun & Clarke (2006) argued that, when a researcher conducts a rigorous thematic analysis, then he can generate trustworthy research findings (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In this research, thematic analysis was chosen due to its advantages. For example, it provides the researcher with flexibility as regards data interpretation and the construction of codes and categories. The flexibility of thematic analysis allows the researcher to modify the research procedures based on the needs of his research (Braun & Clarke, 2006; King, 2004). In addition, thematic analysis is easy for those researchers who are not familiar with other forms of qualitative research analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Last but not least, thematic analysis gives the researcher the opportunity to examine, compare and contrast the different views of the participants (Braun & Clarke, 2006; King, 2004). Finally, thematic analysis assists the researcher to organise his data in a meaningful way and to generate unanticipated insights. Although, the main disadvantage of thematic analysis is its objectivity and bias. This is because the researcher plays a central role to the construction of codes and thematic categories and his/her personal perceptions about the matter under investigation may influence the subjectivity of the procedures (Creswell, 2007).

4.8 Research Ethics

Due to the nature of qualitative studies, the interaction between researchers and participants raises issues related to research ethics. Thus, it is important for the researcher to follow specific guidelines in order to ensure the applicability of research ethics. The most important research ethics of the current research are related to the researcher's obligation to protect personal data and their anonymity. Another important aspect of research ethics that the current research took into consideration is confidentiality. In addition, in this research, the researcher is committed not to influence the participants' answers. Research ethics are also related with data analysis. In this research, the researcher is committed to generate credible research results by following scientific procedures during the analysis and interpretation of the data (Hoeyer, Dahlager & Lynøe, 2005).

4.9 Research limitations

Every research has limitations related to its design. A basic limitation of the current research is related to the qualitative research method. The main advantages of the current qualitative research are the following: a) the research explored in-depth the matter under investigation, b) the research gave the researcher the opportunity to understand and explain the participants' opinions, c) it is a flexible approach (May, 2011). Furthermore, another limitation of the current research is its bias during the construction of codes and themes. This bias may affect negatively the credibility of results. Finally, another limitation of the current research is the small sample size which does not allow space for generalisations.

Chapter 5: Data Analysis

5.1 Introduction

In this part of the dissertation, data analysis is conducted. Data analysis was done on the basis of codes and thematic categories. The structure of the chapter follows the structure of the research questions. The codes and thematic categories were also created on the basis of the research questions. The chapter is organised in three sections and the results are presented in tables and diagrams.

1. What are the strengths and what are the main opportunities of Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement?
2. What are the main threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement?
3. How Europe and Greece should cooperate in the future in order to address the migration crisis?

Before presenting the results, it is important to present some important information about the participants.

Table 9. Sample information

	Gender	Working organisation	Job Position
Participant no1 (E1)	Female	UNHCR	Head of the legal service
Participant no2 (E2)	Male	Doctors without borders	Director
Participant no3 (E3)	Male	Ministry of Migration Policy	Former Minister of Migration Policy

Participant (E4)	no4	Female	HumanRights360	Director
Participant (E5)	no5	Female	Ombudsman	Representative
Participant (E6)	no6	Female	Ombudsman	Deputy Director
Participant (E7)	no7	Male	Ministry of Migration Policy	Former Minister of Migration Policy
Participant (E8)	no8	Female	Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Diplomatic representative
Participant (E9)	no9	Male	Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Expert

Table 10. Codes and thematic categories

Strengths and main opportunities regarding the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement	Frequencies
A rethink is important, not an update of the regulation	6
It is a complicated issue- space for more cooperation has been created	4
The Dublin Regulation is ineffective and unfair	4
There are provisions- a more comprehensive asylum system is needed	3
Europe is getting rid of her troubles- Erdogan has become the key player	3
The flows of immigrants to Greece have decreased	2
The number of immigrants has been decreased- the system is ineffective	2
It is a political text not a Statement	2
It is an opportunity to reach a Statement	2

It is not adequate anymore	2
The Dublin system has put the European immigration policy in order- this advantage does not exist anymore	2
Divergences continue between Member States- legal certainty	1
The right to respect family life has been strengthened	1
Important- adequate protection is needed for the refugees	1
The EU-Turkey Statement is not the main factor of the decrease of the new arrivals in Greece	1
Rejections have been observed for many asylum seekers	1
The Dublin Regulation and solidarity measures can have a positive impact	1
There was a better cooperation- the relationship has not been strengthened	1
The Dublin Regulation is ineffective and unfair	1
Sharing responsibility is the key	1
It does not reflect reality	1
The EU-Turkey Statement should be kept	1
The cooperation of the Turkish authorities is very important for the EU-Turkey Statement	1
Tactics are not the solution to the immigration issue	1
Questions have been raised regarding substantial access to international protection.	1
The right practices are still the big challenge	1
The effectiveness of the Statement depends on the handling of the Turkish authorities	1
The most important outcome is preventing loss of life at sea	1

The EU is given the opportunity to reduce immigration	1
---	---

5.2 Strengths and main opportunities regarding the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement

This part of the paper answers the first research question which refers to the strengths and opportunities offered by the Dublin Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement. The code table was formed on the basis of the answers given to questions 1-8 of the interview. The frequency of the codes was measured considering how many times a code was encountered in the participants' answers.

The prevailing perception of what opportunities and strengths arise from the Dublin Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement stems from the codes that appear most frequently. The codes that appeared most frequently are: “A rethink is important, not an update of the regulation” (6 times), “It is a complicated issue- space for more cooperation has been created” (4 times), “The Dublin Regulation is ineffective and unfair” (4 times), “There are provisions- a more comprehensive asylum system is needed” (3 times), “The flows of immigrants to Greece has decreased” (2 times), “The number of immigrants has decreased- the system is ineffective” (2 times), “It is a political text not a Statement” (2 times), “It is an opportunity to reach a Statement” (2 times), “It is not adequate anymore” (2 times), “The Dublin system has put the European immigration policy in order- this advantage does not exist anymore” (2 times).


On the basis of the codes that appeared most frequently, it is found that most participants, in addition to opportunities and strengths, also identified weaknesses and threats arising from the Dublin Regulation and the EU-Turkey Statement. They identify positive points, such as the reduction of migration flows and the willingness for better cooperation and communication, but on the other hand they point out the inefficiency and injustice that characterise the Dublin Regulation. They also highlight that this is more of a political text than a substantive Statement. In this way, this Statement can easily become a weapon for handling a variety of political issues, especially on the part of Turkey. The Dublin Regulation was created to satisfy situations that needed immediate solution and fulfilled its purpose with great success. But it no longer helps

to improve the situation and for this reason most participants pointed out that we should think about the possibility of amending and not renewing the regulation.

The codes that appeared with the lowest frequency, and specifically once each, are the following: “Divergences continue between Member States- legal certainty”, “The right to respect family life has been strengthened”, “Important- adequate protection is needed for the refugees”, “The EU-Turkey Statement is not the main factor of the decrease of the new arrivals in Greece”, “Rejections have been observed for many asylum seekers”, “The Dublin Regulation and solidarity measures can have a positive impact”, “There was a better cooperation- the relationship has not been strengthened”, “Sharing responsibility is the key”, “It does not reflect reality”, “The EU-Turkey Statement should be kept”, “The cooperation of the Turkish authorities is very important for the EU-Turkey Statement”, “Tactics are not the solution to the immigration issue”, “Questions have been raised regarding substantial access to international protection”, “The right practices are still the big challenge”, “The effectiveness of the Statement depends on the handling of the Turkish authorities”, “The most important outcome is preventing loss of life at sea”, “The EU is given the opportunity to reduce immigration”. Examining the codes with the lowest frequency, we find views such as that the Statement did not help strengthen relations between Turkey and the European Union and that it is essentially a matter of tactics, while the right practices for resolving the issue are still being sought. At the same time, participant E1 stressed that the regulation is not the only factor that led to the reduction of migration flows to Greece, while participant E2 stated that the Statement must be maintained.

Figure 13 shows schematically the answers of the participants.

Figure 13. Participants' answers on the possibilities and opportunities of the Dublin Regulation and the EU-Turkey Statement



Below are indicative excerpts from the participants' responses proving the allegations as they emerged from the frequency analysis of the codes.

The first participant focuses more on the measures to be taken to protect refugees, with solidarity as the key. At the same time, she points out the discrepancies observed in the implementation of the regulation, while arguing that the reduction in pre-access flows is not due to the Statement. However, she believes the Statement has strengthened EU- Turkey cooperation.

E1: *“The Dublin system is largely based on the assumption that asylum-seekers enjoy generally equivalent levels of procedural and substantive protection in all Member States. However, even where EC asylum instruments have been transposed into national law, divergences continue between Member States with some of them facing severe deficiencies vis-à-vis the asylum procedures as well as the reception conditions for asylum seekers. However, it has been positive that the Member States, following also litigation by national and supranational courts, do not “follow” the Dublin system on all occasions, meaning that they do not implement returns to countries that face severe deficiencies. Moreover, assigning responsibility for processing an asylum application to a single member state creates some legal certainty in particular when countries are supported to meet the harmonised procedural and substantial standards.”*

“In the public discourse, the decrease of new arrivals to Greece is presented as the main strength of the EU-Turkey statement. However, it shall be noted that this decrease is a combination of factors, the closure of the Balkan corridor in the beginning of 2016 being a major one among them. Another element to consider as regards the strengths of the EU-Turkey Statement is that it didn’t lead to increased and effective returns as initially expected.”

“A positive impact of the Dublin Regulation can only exist in conjunction with solidarity measures that would alleviate the burden of the external EU countries as well as with measures of support of their asylum systems and reception conditions in the forthcoming Common European Asylum System (CEAS).”

“The implementation of the EU-Turkey statement has indeed led to a strengthened cooperation at least at a technical level (Turkish liaison officers on Greek islands). Moreover, it has led to a stronger engagement of the EU in the migration management at the external EU borders.”

The second participant claims that the EU-Turkey Statement failed, but on the other hand it is important to maintain it. In terms of the EU-Turkey Statement the second participant’s opinion differs from the first participant’s opinion as the first participant believes that the EU-Turkey Statement is effective. He also stressed that the Dublin system is basically ineffective and unfair. He also said that other measures need to be taken. In contrast to the first participant, the second participant highlights that the Dublin system failed its objectives by giving emphasis on its poor implementation and unfairness.

E2: “There are basically three criticisms of the Dublin system. The first is that Dublin doesn't work fairly. Given that the most commonly used criterion is that of the first country of arrival, the responsibility falls disproportionately (in theory at least) on the border countries. Being registered in the first country of arrival means being unable to seek asylum in other member states, or, in the case of doing so, running the risk of being returned. In 2013, for example, Italy received almost a third of the asylum seekers transferred from another member state.

The second is that Dublin doesn't work efficiently. It is inefficient because, despite the criteria of giving responsibility to the first country of arrival, most applicants seek asylum in a different country to the one in which they arrived. For example, according to Eurostat and Frontex statistics, only 64,625 of the 170,000 irregular arrivals in Italy sought asylum there. In 2013, more than a third of the asylum claims were made by

people who had previously applied in another European Union country. Of those, 11% applied in Italy and did so again in Germany, Sweden or Switzerland.”

“If Dublin does not work, it is not just a question of poor implementation. As we have seen, the most basic principles fail. Consequently, the alternative is not a new update of the regulations (of Dublin II and Dublin III) but a rethink of how to build a genuine common asylum policy. This means returning to a question as fundamental as how to distribute responsibility. Currently, the criterion of the first country of arrival means the responsibility falls disproportionately on the border countries. This encourages, on the one hand, more restrictive immigration policies by “punishing” with greater responsibility those countries with more open visa policies or less control of their borders. On the other hand, it leads the border countries to seek to avoid this uneven distribution by not registering the asylum seekers entering through their borders.”

“EU-Turkey ties have been fraying for over a decade. The standoff at the Greece-Turkey frontier reveals the shortcomings of their increasingly transactional engagement. Brussels and Ankara need to build a better relationship in which both sides benefit – starting with revisiting the 2016 migration deal. The humanitarian crisis in Idlib adds urgency to the task, as neither side wants to grapple with another influx of impoverished Syrians, many of whom will seek ways to enter Europe.”

The third participant in his answers argues that the regulation is no longer sufficient and that a more comprehensive asylum system needs to be established. E3, like other participants, stated that the regulation needed to be amended and not simply updated. The fact that all the participants highlight the importance of the Dublin system’s updating indicates that all the participants agree that the Dublin system has weaknesses. But unlike other participants, participant E1 highlighted that the member states respond well to the Dublin Regulations.

E3: “The main advantage of the Dublin system was the fact that it gave a certain degree of order and continuity to European migration policies, in the sense that, since Dublin, every state and every agency pretty much knew what it was assigned to do in the process. That did not exist beforehand. However, the same advantage has been turned into a disadvantage since 2015: today and in the future, it is simply not workable that a single state will bear the full burden of processing asylum applications.”

“It’s all about implementation. The EU-Turkey Statement does contain provisions, in addition to the relevant EU legal framework concerning asylum applications and, of

course, the Geneva Convention on Refugees. However, what is really needed is a comprehensive Common European Asylum System.”

“It can and should be updated and amended, as the practice since 2016 has shown its limits and deficiencies. For example, it should be clarified that individuals transferred to the Greek mainland because of vulnerability should be included in the relocation scheme.”

The fourth participant, on the other hand, argues that this Statement is a political weapon in the hands of Erdogan, while pointing out, like other participants, that the Dublin Regulation is unfair and ineffective. More specifically, participant four argued that the Dublin system placed a disproportionate burden on the EU border countries.

The perception of the fourth participant about the ineffectiveness of the Dublin system converges with the perceptions of the previous participants. Participant four works on the HumanRights360 and thus her perception focuses on the humanitarian approach of the Dublin system and the EU-Turkey Statements. More specifically, participant four unlike the previous participants highlighted that the EU-Turkey Statement has been criticised for lowering protection standards, circumventing accountability and creating a new humanitarian disaster on the Greek islands.

E4: “A basic principle of the Dublin system is not the fair distribution of obligations among EU member states, but the determination of the state responsible for the examination of asylum applications (and, therefore, practically the determination of the state where the people will remain). So, according to the Dublin Regulation, the country responsible for the examination of an asylum application is, certain exceptions aside, the first EU country where the applicant arrives – which inevitably means Greece or Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain. So, behind the declared Dublin goal of limiting “secondary movements” through the examination of asylum applications in the first country of entry was the political possibility of limiting new entrants to the countries of first reception.”

“Back in 2016, the wearing out of the ostensibly welcoming European spirit to the refugee influx culminated in the infamous EU-Turkey deal. The deal has been heavily criticised for lowering protection standards, circumventing accountability and creating a new humanitarian disaster on the Greek islands. All this was done so that the EU countries would stop receiving refugee flows and get rid of their internal political

troubles. It was made possible by making Erdogan a key player in the regulation of flows in the region.

Thus, Erdogan's capacity to weaponise the refugee issue in order to demand more political and financial concessions from the EU was a product of the EU-Turkey deal."

The fifth participant states in his answers that migration flows have decreased, but the Statement can be an important political weapon. That is why she stresses that tactics cannot be part of the immigration issue. The fifth participant's perception about the EU-Turkey Statement converges with the perception of the fourth participant.

E5: *"Dublin I and II did not help Europe to deal effectively with immigration and asylum because they placed a disproportionate burden on the EU border countries."*

"Immigrant numbers have been reduced but safety and legality for refugees is a controversial matter. The constantly big numbers of people being held in a geographical restriction on the 5 islands of Northeastern Aegean prove the inefficiency of the system introduced."

"Tactics, as a joint statement, cannot substitute the lack of strategies, namely a European strategy on migration."

The sixth participant has common answers with participant E3 and participant E5 and adds in his answers that this is more of a political text than a Statement.

E6: *"The improvement of relations could be possible if the Turkish authorities did not use the migration crisis as a mere instrument in far broader political issues."*

"The challenge for EU Member States and EU institutions is still that, regardless the Statement, policies and practices are planned and implemented without any compromise to respect for human rights, the rule of law and the mandates of international, EU legal culture."

The seventh participant also argues that this is an unjust and ineffective system, and that building a new one is imperative. The insufficiency of the Dublin system was also highlighted by the previous participants. The seventh participant highlighted the need of a common European Asylum system and this reveals that the Dublin system fails to provide a framework for a common European Asylum System.

E7: *"The efficacy of the EU-Turkey arrangement largely depends on the good will and cooperation of the Turkish authorities. It can be and has been used by Turkey as a tool*

for exercising foreign policy in order to achieve goals that have no direct connection to the refugee issue.”

“As mentioned above, the Dublin system is outdated and inadequate vis à vis the new situation. Europe can certainly build upon the experience gained, but what we need is a Common European Asylum System.”

The eighth participant stated that this Statement creates a ground for dialogue between the countries, while she considers the significant consequence of this Statement to be the reduction of human lives lost at sea.

E8: *“It was also a wider arrangement that foresaw a stronger cooperation between Turkey and the EU (but only migration-related provisions were applied). The most important outcome is preventing loss of life at sea, which depends on less and less people putting their families at risk; decrease was very visible from the first time because of the psychological effect of the statement.”*

The ninth and final participant stated that the EU-Turkey Statement did not fulfill its purpose, so it is necessary to update and amend the Statement. The perception of the ninth participant about the EU-Turkey Statement converges with the perception of the fourth participant who argues that this Statement is a political weapon in the hands of Erdogan.

E9: *“This, coupled with the constant flows in the Aegean, led the islands to an asphyxiating reality. Sadly, this has not mobilised the EU member-states that were, and still are, very hesitant to relocate asylum seekers and share the burden.”*

“It ensues from the above that the EU-Turkey Statement, based mainly on the notion of asylum border procedure, cannot be effectively applied and needs to be modified. More emphasis should be placed on the prevention of flows, the dismantling of networks and the management of incidents before they result in search and rescue operations. The Turkish side has much to deliver in this regard. At the same time, more legal pathways, through resettlement or humanitarian admission, should be opened for people in need of protection.”

5.3 Threats and weaknesses arising from Europe’s response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement

Here is answered the second research question, which concerns the threats and weaknesses arising from the immigration crisis regarding the Dublin Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement. The second research question concerns questions 9-18 of the interview. The codes as well as their occurrence frequencies are presented in the table below.

Table 11. Threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement

The EU-Turkey Statement was made to provide a temporary solution- The Dublin Regulation was inadequate	5
It was an inevitable result	5
It had drawbacks and shortcomings from the beginning	4
The flows to the Greek islands have been reduced	4
The Dublin system was inadequate in terms of solidarity	4
The EU institutions offered solidarity to Greece	3
Dublin had no effect	3
The EU-Turkey Statement has covered many gaps of the Dublin Regulation	2
The lack of solidarity is a fact-A common solution must be found	2
Adequate funding in Greece	2
Not enough data	2
Not a well thought decision- there are still many weaknesses	1
More measures must be taken	1
Not an official position of the UNHCR- The Dublin system is not an adequate mechanism	1
Many factors lead to onward movements- solidarity measures are necessary	1
Solidarity measures are needed- Measures to meet the requirements of asylum seekers	1
Solidarity-family unity-efficient asylum procedures-proper reception conditions- Return of those who do not need protection	1

Further support to external border countries is necessary	1
Detention centers create opportunities for human rights violation-A "fortress" Europe is being built	1
There is no connection	1
Adequate funding in Greece, but not used properly	1
The lack of an effective and fair system	1
Overpopulation at the Greek sea border	1
It had a minor role	1
The statement is true	1
The distribution of charges was not based on the capacity of each country	1
Create a welcoming environment for those who have already arrived	1
The right practices are still the big challenge	1
It was insufficient from the beginning-A common European asylum system is needed	1
It is a matter of democratic operation rather than solidarity	1
It is difficult to find the right policy as the Dublin Regulation has failed	1

The codes with the highest frequency are: “The EU-Turkey Statement was made to provide a temporary solution- The Dublin Regulation was inadequate”(5 times), “It was an inevitable result”(5 times), “It had drawbacks and shortcomings from the beginning”(4 times), “The flows to the Greek islands have been reduced” (4 times), “The Dublin system was inadequate in terms of solidarity”(4 times), “Dublin had no effect” (3 times), “The EU institutions offered solidarity to Greece” (3 times).

These codes show that the EU-Turkey Statement was a temporary solution, as the Dublin Regulation had shortcomings and many disadvantages. Four (4) participants stated that the Dublin Regulation had its drawbacks and shortcomings from the beginning. At the same time, five (5) participants pointed out that the violation of the term "first country of entry" defined by the Dublin Regulation by countries such as Germany and Sweden is an inevitable result, due to the large influx of immigrants. These answers also showed that the EU-Turkey Statement led to a reduction in

migration flows to Greece, but also that the Dublin Regulation is considered insufficient in terms of solidarity. In addition, three (3) participants stated that the Dublin Regulation did not contribute to the humanitarian crisis, but also that Greece received the necessary solidarity from the European institutions. Below are excerpts from the participants' answers.

The first participant argued that the Dublin Regulation was not the best possible decision. Nevertheless, it led to a reduction in refugee flows in Greece.

E1: *“As described above, divergences among the EU refugee protection systems contribute to onward movements and, in this context, the Dublin system, without being complemented by a distribution mechanism will continue not to address the overloading of the external border countries of the EU and the exhaustion of their asylum systems and to lead to deficient protection for asylum seekers.”*

“The Dublin Regulation must be complemented with mandatory solidarity measures among EU member states so as to address the needs of the asylum and reception systems of the countries of first entry. In addition, efforts for the harmonisation of reception standards and asylum procedures should continue through the CEAS negotiations.”

The second participant also stated that refugee flows had decreased but pointed out that Europe was gradually becoming a fortress.

E2: *“The Dublin Regulation (replacing the previous Dublin Convention) determines which EU member state is responsible for processing an asylum seeker asylum application. The Regulation establishes a fingerprinting database of asylum seekers, called the EURODAC. Asylum seekers must apply for asylum in the first EU country in which they arrive and where their fingerprints are taken. Asylum seekers may be returned to another EU member state if it can be proven that they have either entered the EU (by air, sea or land) or made an application for asylum in that other state. The Dublin Regulation territory was extended to some non-EU countries such as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.*

This system puts a huge strain on several EU countries that are geographically more likely to be a country of first entry for asylum seekers.”

The third participant argued the same as participants 1 and 2, while adding that there is a lack of solidarity in Europe now and that immigration is now considered a political challenge.

E3: *“The main challenges are political and not practical or logistical. The migration issue is complex, and the numbers involved are high, but seen from the vantage point of the half-a-billion plus EU, it is not an issue that cannot be handled. In order for that to happen, member states must change their mentality and address this not as someone else’s problem, but as a common issue that needs to be tackled jointly, focusing on the social, economic and cultural integration of newcomers. If that happens, migration and asylum can indeed be a demographic benefit for Europe.”*

“It is true that European solidarity has been hard to find on several major European issues in the last decade, not just the migration issue. The cause for this is that the EU is not a single entity but rather an organization composed of several European nations, each with its own priorities and problems. This is neither good nor bad, merely a fact.”

The fourth participant argued that the Dublin Regulation was the right choice, contrary to what the other participants argued. He also pointed out that Greece received sufficient funding to resolve the immigration issue.

E4: *“On the contrary, I believe it is a very well thought decision of EU M-S who want to “confine” the problem in frontline member-states.”*

“The financial support provided to Greece is neither enough nor efficiently used, in order to compensate for the unfair burden Dublin poses to the Greek society”

The fifth participant stressed in his answers, unlike the others, that there is no decrease, but overpopulation at the Greek maritime borders. In addition, he points out that charges are not evenly distributed across states.

E5: *“It created a bottleneck at the Greek sea-borders. It de facto amended the EU relocation measures because the asylum seekers illegally crossing the borders after 20.3.2016 were not eligible for relocation to other countries. The 5 hotspot islands of the Aegean were thus a sort of transit zone. Not only for mainland Greece but, essentially, for Europe. An immense burden was placed on the Greek asylum service to decide on the admissibility and the merits of thousands of newcomers applications for asylum. The subsequent overcrowding, poor living conditions of those in long-term geographical restrictions and shortcomings in the administrative treatment inevitably fell short of humane standards and reception conditions required by EU law.”*

“Burden sharing did not consider the parameters of the capacity of each country in population and GDP and single-member processing of asylum applications did not take into account the disproportionate burden on the border EU countries.”

The sixth participant stated in his answers that the EU-Turkey Statement created an inhospitable environment for refugees and that finding good practices is still a great challenge.

E6: *“As the Greek Ombudsman stated, the emerging priority of the EU leaders as reflected in the EU-Turkey Statement created an inhospitable environment for those already staying and a deterrent one for the intended new arrivals. (Special Report 2017, p.8) In fact the geographical restriction created a bottleneck at the 5 hot spot islands. Living conditions and shortcomings in the administrative treatment fell behind the minimum acceptable standards. The burden of the Asylum Service was huge as the officers had to deal with hundreds of asylum applications.”*

“It was not effective, given that only Syrians were relocated. EU’s solidarity was expressed through the sums allocated from AMIF and emergency programs.”

Participant 7 gave answers similar to those of participant 3, adding that this is a democratic process rather than a solidarity process.

E7: *“The main political problem regarding coping with the issue of migration within the EU is that, as in the economic crisis, a European problem was addressed as a problem of member states, a Greek problem, an Italian problem etc. The main political issue in the EU is not what decisions are taken but which European institution takes the decisions. We saw that in the economic crisis, in the migration crisis and in the coronavirus crisis nowadays. It is not just a matter of solidarity. It is a matter of democratic operation of the EU.”*

Furthermore, participant 8 stressed that it is difficult to find the right immigration policy given that the Dublin Regulation has failed.

E8: *“Another problem with the Dublin system is that, because of the crisis, it has not been able to find solutions; now, we will have right-leaning governments in Europe for many years to come and left governments that will not be able to pursue proper policies regarding migrants for fear of public opinion.”*


The ninth and last participant pointed out that the institutions are willing to offer the necessary solidarity measures to Greece in order to deal with the immigration crisis.

E9: *“Migration is the hotspot approach to be applied at the member-states situated at the external border. In the “hotspot” approach, “the European Asylum Support Office, Frontex and Europol will work on the ground with frontline Member States to swiftly*

identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants. The Agencies will complement one another in the work they will do.”

The answer codes are presented in the following diagrams.

Figure 14. Threats and weaknesses arising from Europe’s response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement



5.4 Greece's cooperation with the European Union in resolving the immigration crisis

The third research question will be answered in this part of the paper. The codes were formed on the basis of the answers, while the frequency of each answer was identified. The third research question concerns questions 19-22. Below are the codes with their occurrence frequencies.

Table 12. Greece's cooperation with the European Union in resolving the immigration crisis

There must be a common asylum system	4
Resettlement and permanent relocation mechanism	3
It must be tackled at European level	2

There must be a common asylum system	2
Both Greece and Turkey need European help	2
Further solidarity mechanisms are needed	1
Distribution of asylum seekers - European Union support in the Greek institutional framework	2
Continuous support and enhancement of entry conditions	1
The immigration issue is not only linked to the EU-Turkey Statement- It should not be used for political purposes	1

The prevailing answers highlight the need to build a common asylum system, as most participants point out that the issue needs to be resolved at European level. It is also stressed that both Greece and Turkey need the help of the European Union.

The analysis is followed by excerpts from the participants' answers.

The first participant stated that solidarity measures are necessary, while Europe's support to the Greek institutions is necessary.

E1: *"The Dublin system will need to be complemented with solidarity mechanisms to be triggered in exceptional circumstances created by mass influxes."*

"a) Obligatory ratios for distribution of asylum seekers

b) Institutionalisation of the EU support in the Greek legal framework"

The second participant, on the other hand, believes that Europe expects neighboring countries to prevent the entry of migrants.

E2: *"The EU increasingly expects its neighbors to prevent people from reaching its borders. The task of controlling the EU borders is gradually transferred to the migrants' countries of origin or transit. Putting migrants in detention centers located in some countries within and outside the EU (even in Africa) and deportations have become routine practices in Europe, and they create a lot of opportunities for human rights violations. Critics state that, whilst Europe claims to be building a "common space" for freedom, justice and security, it is creating an excluded underclass of second-class citizens from non-EU member states and is building up a "Fortress Europe"."*

The third as well as the seventh participant argues that the issue of immigration is a purely European issue, which is why it is necessary to build a common asylum system.

E3: *“It is not a matter of opinion, but rather a matter of fact. The experience of Greece, but also other frontline states, clearly proves that the sheer volume of the new form of migratory flows – which is here to stay- is simply overwhelming. A single state is impossible to handle this by itself. Nor should it be expected to do so. It is an issue that, by definition, must and can only be dealt with on a European level. All the more so, given the fact that the majority of asylum seekers do not wish to remain in the state where they entered but are eager to continue their journey towards other states, often seeking family reunification.”*

“As indicated above, Turkey has often used the migration issue as a tool in order to achieve concessions on other foreign policy fields from Europe. It is not a Greek-Turkish matter, nor should it be examined in such a way. It is not Greece that Turkey is trying to pressure on these occasions, but Europe. That said, Turkey does have legitimate concerns and also needs European assistance, given that it hosts millions of Syrian refugees. But we must not confuse this with any Turkish efforts to take advantage of the plight of the migrants for its own purposes.”

E7: *“European solidarity should not be only in the form of money or equipment and personnel aimed at deterring migrants. It should focus on a common European Asylum System and a Common European Deportation System.”*

The fourth participant in her answers argues that the unequal distribution of the burden among states is inevitable. At the same time, she argues that the creation of a resettlement mechanism for refugees is necessary.

E4: *“This is the only thing that could be expected from a system that poses such an unfair burden to frontline member states. Secondary movements can only be avoided through a system that is fair, simple and predictable.”*

The fifth participant stated that the issue of immigration could become a weapon for political purposes and that burden-sharing was not based on the capacity of each country.

E5: *“Burden sharing did not consider the parameters of the capacity of each country in population and GDP and single member processing of asylum applications did not take into account the disproportionate burden on the border EU countries.”*

The sixth participant gave similar answers to the previous ones and added that the Dublin system had drawbacks and shortcomings from the beginning.

E6: *“The Dublin system is a formulation of a framework for the management of immigration flows but did not help Europe to deal effectively with immigration and asylum. The burden on the EU border countries was disproportionate and in practice movements within the EU have not been faced.”*


The eighth participant argued that Turkey does not impede migration flows, which is unfair to Greece.

E8: *“The Turkey-EU statement is a political one and does not bring legal responsibility. In any event, Turkey never was under a positive obligation to “defend the borders of the EU” and should not be expected to stop refugee flows. This is as unfair as Greece being expected to keep migrants from moving into EU. They are not criminals and shouldn’t be treated as such. Turkey should not be treated as their assigned guardian. Yet we have done our job of keeping them here so well that it turned into our “job” and whenever we couldn’t do it or felt that we didn’t have to do this for the EU, who doesn’t keep its end of the deal anyway, we were blamed.”*

The ninth and last participant pointed out that the burden should be distributed and the necessary assistance should be given to the Greek institutions.

E9: *“For those not in need of protection, Frontex will help member states by coordinating the return of irregular migrants. Europol and Eurojust will assist the host Member State with investigations to dismantle smuggling and trafficking networks”. This approach has been implemented on a pilot basis by Italy and Greece, in a substantially differentiated way.”*

Figure 15. Greece's cooperation with the European Union in resolving the immigration crisis



Discussion

In this part of the dissertation, it is attempted to combine the results of primary and secondary research. The main aim of this part is, on the one hand, to provide a comparison between the results found from primary and secondary research and, on the other hand, to interpret the results of primary research on the basis of the secondary research. This part of the dissertation is organised on the basis of the following three research questions:

1. What are the strengths and what are the main opportunities of Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Agreement?
2. What are the main threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Agreement?
3. How Europe and Greece should cooperate in the future in order to address the migration crisis?

The strengths and main opportunities of Europe's response to migration

The analysis of the primary data showed that most participants, on the one hand, identify positive points as regards the Dublin system, such as the reduction of migration

flows and the willingness for better cooperation and communication, but, on the other hand, they point out the inefficiency and injustice that characterise the Dublin system. The Dublin Regulation was created to deal with situations that needed immediate solution and fulfilled its purpose with great success. But it no longer helps to improve the situation and for this reason most participants pointed out that we should think about the possibility of amending and not renewing the regulation. The negative results of the Dublin Regulation to the islands of the North Aegean, as identified in the literature review (Oikonomakis, 2018, Wood, 2020, Unluhisarcikli, 2020), could be used to confirm the participants' views about the need to amend and renew the Dublin system. More specifically, Oikonomakis (2018) argued that the most affected part of Greece by the European refugee crisis is the islands of the North Aegean. Furthermore, Unluhisarcikli (2020) argued that the European Union did not manage to respond effectively to the large number of refugees that need protection. This is why the participants of the current research point out that the Dublin system no longer helps to improve the situation.

The participants of the research also highlight that the EU-Turkey Statement is more of a political text than a substantive agreement. In this way, this Statement can easily become a weapon for handling a variety of political issues, especially on the part of Turkey. These results are in line with literature reviews (Carrera et al., 2015, Haferlach & Kurban, 2017, Knaous, 2016). For example, Carrera et al. (2015) stated that Turkey had asked for several political benefits in order to proceed with the implementation of the Statement (e.g. acceleration of the implementation of the visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens). In addition, Turkey asked for economic benefits (e.g. the EU should accelerate the allocation of €3,000,000,000 for the Facility for the Refugees in Turkey) (Haferlach & Kurban, 2017). In addition, Knaous (2016) argued that the EU-Turkey Statement is politically short-sighted. As a result, on the basis of previous research (Carrera et al., 2015, Haferlach & Kurban, 2017, Knaous, 2016), it was expected that the participants would highlight the political rather than the substantive dimension of the EU-Turkey Statement.

At this point, it is worth noting that, based on the primary research results, the participants did not focus on the EU-Turkey relations as regards the EU-Turkey Statement. For example, by examining the codes with less frequency, we find views

such as that the Statement did not help to strengthen relations between Turkey and the European Union and that it is essentially a matter of tactics, while the right practices for resolving the issue are still being sought. All these issues are of considerable importance, but the participants seemed to underestimate such issues based on the frequency analysis of their answers.

The main threats and weaknesses arising from Europe's response to the migration crisis

The analysis of the results found from primary research showed that the EU-Turkey Statement was a temporary solution, as the Dublin Regulation had shortcomings and many disadvantages. Four (4) participants stated that the Dublin Regulation had its drawbacks and shortcomings from the beginning. At the same time, five (5) participants pointed out that the violation of the term "first country of entry" defined by the Dublin Regulation by countries such as Germany and Sweden is an inevitable result, due to the large influx of immigrants. The results found from primary research are in line literature reviews. For example, Da Lompa (2019) has clearly argued that, from the beginning, the Dublin system has failed to offer a comprehensive refugee protection regime. This is why four (4) participants stated that the Dublin Regulation had its drawbacks and shortcomings from the beginning. Additionally, Fratzke (2015) argued that Sweden and Germany were among the member states which sent the most Dublin transfers. At this point, the results of primary research converge with the results of Fratzke's (2015) research. The main point of both the primary and secondary research (Papageorgiou, 2017, Fratzke, 2015, Mouzourakis, 2014) is that the Dublin system failed to address the solidarity issue effectively. Thus, Mouzourakis (2014) argued that, in the context of the Dublin system, the border protection measures taken by the member states had a negative impact on the asylum application procedures.

At this point, it is important to highlight that the literature review (Brekke & Brochmann, 2013) revealed some challenges as regards the Dublin system that were not identified on the participants' answers. For example, Brekke & Brochmann (2013) highlighted that one of the major challenges of the Dublin system was that it places a disproportionate burden on Southern European countries (e.g., Italy and Greece). On the contrary, the majority of the participants did not emphasise this aspect of the Dublin system. Furthermore, Brekke & Brochmann (2013) argued that the differences that exist in the member states' governmental support urge asylum seekers to move from

one country to the other to find better conditions. This weakness of the Dublin system was not emphasised by the majority of the participants. Finally, Trauner (2016) gave emphasis on the administrative problems that the Dublin system generated for the member states (e.g. information exchange, allocation of responsibility, case management, record keeping and transfers of applicants). But such administrative issues were not identified by the analysis of the results of primary research.

Lastly, the majority of the participants in primary research revealed that Greece received the necessary solidarity from the European institutions. This means that the participants believe that Europe helped Greece to address the migration crisis. These research results were not in line with the literature review (Oikonomakis, 2018, Wood, 2020, Trauner, 2016). For instance, according to Oikonomakis (2018), Europe did not provide the adequate assistance to Greece to help it to address the refugee crisis. In addition, Wood (2020) argued that Europe failed to achieve its objectives in the case of Greece. Lastly, Trauner (2016) highlighted the conflicted interests between the member states (especially Greece) and the Europe as regards the management of the refugee crisis.

How Europe and Greece should cooperate in the future

The primary analysis indicated the need for a common asylum system. In this situation, according to the participants, Europe's role is of major importance. In addition, the participants declared that both Greece and Turkey need the help of the European Union. For example, participant E1 proposed that the Dublin system will need to be complemented with solidarity mechanisms. Participant E2 proposed that Europe expects neighboring countries to prevent the entry of migrants. Participants E3 and E7 proposed that the issue of immigration is a purely European issue, which is why it is necessary to build a common asylum system. Participants E5 and E9 proposed that burden sharing mechanisms should be implemented in the context of the Dublin system. Participant E8 proposed that "Turkey should not be treated as their assigned guardian" as this is unfair for Greece.

The adoption of a burden sharing mechanism is of major importance, as indicated by both primary and secondary research (Unluhisarcikli, 2020, Da Lompa, 2019, Fratzke, 2015, Mouzourakis, 2014, Ansems de Vries, Carrera & Guild, 2016). For example, Fratzke (2015) stated that borderline member states such as Greece and Italy were obliged to receive the vast majority of migrants when the migration crisis was at its peak. Additionally, Mouzourakis (2014) suggested that it is important the burden

sharing issue to be handled by Brussels. At this point, the results of primary research converge with the results of secondary research as regards the importance of the burden sharing mechanism.

At this point, it is important to clarify that Mouzourakis (2014) suggested some important criteria as regards the burden sharing policy (e.g. language affinities, reception capacity, etc.). On the contrary, the participants in primary research did not highlight such criteria. In addition, Papageorgiou (2017) proposed the importance of the monitoring mechanisms. The researcher explains his position by arguing that the discrepancies that exist in member states as regards the national migration policies make it necessary for the European Union to develop effective monitoring mechanisms. Last but not least, Papageorgiou (2017) explains that the existence of the monitoring mechanism can help the European Union to assess member states' contributions towards sharing responsibility. On the contrary, the participants in primary research did not highlight such an issue.

From the participants' answers, it can be concluded that Europe's role in the migration policy is of major importance. Trauner (2016) also highlighted the role of Europe but also stated that the European migration policy should consider the conflicted interests between the member states (especially Greece) and Europe as regards the management of the refugee crisis.

Conclusions

As we come to the end of the dissertation, all research problems have been solved. In this part, the basic conclusions are highlighted. As highlighted by the participants, the Dublin system has strengths. The most important of them are the reduction of migration flows and the willingness for better cooperation and communication. The strengths identified by the participants are important if we consider that cooperation and communication are essential elements that Europe needs to deal effectively with immigration.

Additionally, the participants highlighted some weaknesses as regards the Dublin system and the EU-Turkey Statement. For example, they declared that the Dublin system is still insufficient and generate inequalities. They therefore recommended the

amendment of the Dublin system. Furthermore, the research results revealed that the EU-Turkey Statement is more of a political text than a substantive agreement.

Another important research finding is that the participants perceive the EU-Turkey Statement as a temporary solution and as a response to the drawbacks and shortcomings of the Dublin Regulation. According to the research results, the Dublin system had many shortcomings from the beginning and this is the reason why it did not work effectively. At this point, it is important to highlight another crucial finding which is associated with the Greek paradigm. According to the research results, Greece is among the countries that did not receive help from Europe to address the migration crisis. This had negative consequences on the Greek migration policy. The most affected part of Greece during the migration crisis, which reached its peak in 2016, is the islands of the North Aegean. For instance, during the period 2016-2020, almost 104 people traveled by sea and reached the North Aegean islands. Most of the refugees arrived at Lesbos island. At this point, it is important to highlight that, despite the fact that during the migration crisis Europe attempted to assist Greece financially, Greece due to the financial crisis found it difficult to take full advantage of the European funds. Such an issue reveals that maybe Europe intended to help Greece, but its intentions were not effective due to the “special circumstances” prevailing in Greece during the financial crisis.

Last but not least, the research results revealed the need for a common asylum system. Europe’s role to the development of such a system is of crucial importance. Additionally, the research results show that both Greece and Turkey need the European help in order to overcome their problems. In this context, Europe should give emphasis on solidarity and burden-sharing mechanisms. As a result, it can be concluded that the lack of burden-sharing as well as the lack of solidarity are two major problems of the EU migration policy that need urgent solution. Such problems have negative consequences on member states, as some of them need to address the problem of the overloading of the capacity. At this point, it is important to highlight that the lack of solidarity and burden-sharing in the European migration policy are issues with institutional dimensions. This is because the solidarity is a principle established by the European Treaties, as it is necessary for the proper functioning of Europe. The protection of third-country nationals is an issue that should concern equally all the member states.

Future recommendations

In this part of the dissertation, some recommendations about the EU migration policy are suggested. Firstly, it is recommended that the European Union should rethink the functionality of the Dublin system from the perspective of the member-states. In addition, the European Union should rethink the solidarity both on the perspective of the member states and of the asylum seekers. The Dublin system's allocation mechanism is based on an incorrect assumption from the beginning. This assumption is that all member states should provide equal protection to refugees. But this is not feasible if we consider the different special circumstances (e.g. economic condition, state mechanism) that prevail in each member state. Thus, Europe should rethink the allocation mechanism by considering each member state's special circumstances. This would give to the Dublin system fairness and real equality. From a functional perspective, the European migration policy should focus on the development of a more harmonised asylum system by establishing a European-wide relocation system. Until that happens, the European migration policy will remain fragmented. Last but not least, Europe needs to establish a new burden-sharing mechanism that will foster an equitable sharing. On the contrary, the current system fosters unequal distributions. Additionally, it is important for Europe to make the necessary future steps to protect the rights of refugees. For instance, it is recommended that Europe should force all member states to implement the Facilitation Directive 2002/90/EC, which ensures humanitarian assistance to vulnerable refugees. Finally, Europe should help Greece and Turkey to develop a better cooperation in dealing with migration flows. This is of particular importance, as the EU-Turkey Statement brings many social and economic problems to Greece due to the inappropriate management of migration.

As we come to the end of this dissertation, some recommendations on future research on the matter are made, given that migration/refugee flows are a long-standing issue that requires actions at all levels (international, European and national) by both the countries of origin and the EU (European Commission). The matter of Europe's migration policy needs further investigation. Future research attempts should focus on the case of Greece because the international literature lacks such research. For example, it is recommended to the future researchers to make a qualitative and quantitative research on the matter under investigation. Quantitative researches should focus on the Greeks citizens' perceptions for the European migration policy. Qualitative researches

should focus on the in-depth investigation of the relations between EU, Greece and Turkey under the European migration policy.

List of references

- Aegean Boat Report. Facebook page (2020). *Refugees in Aegean 2018*. Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/AegeanBoatReport/posts/monthly-statistics-for-the-greek-islands-will-be-updated-daily-and-you-will-find/291294764726968/>
- Ansems de Vries, L., S. Carrera & Guild, E. (2016). Documenting the Migration Crisis in the Mediterranean. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 94, Sept. 2016. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Asylum in Europe (2018). *Reception and identification procedure*. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/asylum-procedure/access-procedure-and-registration/reception-and> [18 June 2020].
- Aljazeera (2016). *Refugee crisis: 70,000 may be stuck in Greece in March*. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/macedonia-greek-borderfaces-humanitarian-challenge-160228135807844.html> [18 June 2020].
- Brekke, J.-P., & Brochmann, G. (2014). Stuck in Transit: Secondary Migration of Asylum Seekers in Europe, National Differences, and the Dublin Regulation. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 28(2), 145–162. doi: 10.1093/jrs/feu028

- Bruni, L. (2018) The Future of Europe passes through the Dublin system, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa. Available at: <https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Europe/The-future-of-Europe-passes-through-theDublin-system-186969>
- Brouwer, E. (2013). Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU and the Burden of Proof. *Utrecht Law Review*. Retrieved from: [file:///Users/nickdentist/Downloads/218-460-2-PB%20\(1\).pdf](file:///Users/nickdentist/Downloads/218-460-2-PB%20(1).pdf) [18 June 2020].
- Braun, V., Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3, 77–101. doi:10.1191/1478088706qp063oa
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social research methods* (5th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carrera, Sergio - Blockmans, Steven - Gros, Daniel - Guild, Elspeth (2015): The EU's Response to the Refugee Crisis: Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities. Center for European Policy Studies, Essay No. 20.
- Cellini, M. (2017). Filling the Gap of the Dublin System: A Soft Cosmopolitan Approach. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 13 (1), 944 - 962.
- Constant, Amelie F.; Zimmermann, Klaus F. (2016). Towards a New European Refugee Policy that Works, CESifo DICE Report, ISSN 1613-6373, ifo Institut - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, München, Vol. 14, Iss. 4, pp. 3-8
- Collett, E. (2016). "The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal." *Migration Policy Institute*, March 2016. Accessed December 5, 2016. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/pardoxeu-turkey-refugee-deal>. [12 June 2020].
- Collet, E. & Le Coz, M. (2018). *After the storm. Learning from the EU response to the migration crisis*. Migration Policy Institute.
- Council of Europe Toolkit (2020). *The geopolitical context of migration*. Retrieved from: <https://rm.coe.int/tool-1-the-geopolitical-context-of-migration-language-support-for-adul/1680716c0d> [8 June 2020].
- Council of Europe (1950). *European Convention on Human Rights*. In: EUROPE, C. O. (ed.). Rome: Council of Europe
- Creswell, J. (2007). Data analysis and representation. In Creswell, J. (Ed.), *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (2nd ed., pp. 179–212). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Dagi, D. (2018). EU's refugee crisis: from supra-nationalism to nationalism? *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, 3(3), 9-19. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssaoar-56105-8>

- Dimitriadi, A., Kaya, A., Kale, D. & Zurabishvili, T. (2020). EU-Turkey Relations and Irregular Migration: Transactional Cooperation in the Making. *FEUTURE Online Paper* No.16. Retrieved from https://www.eliamcp.gr/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FEUTURE_Online_Paper_No_16_D6.3.pdf [16 June 2020].
- Duvell, F. (2018). The 2015 Refugee Crisis, EU-Turkey Relations and Migration Diplomacy” in “Who Counts in Crises? The New Geopolitics of International Migration and Refugee Governance” Allen, W., Anderson, B., Van Hear, N., Sumption, M., Düvell, F., Rose, L., Hough, J., Humphris, R., and Walker, S., *Geopolitics*, Vol.23, No.1
- Dublin II Regulation (). Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:l33153&from=EN> [9 June 2020].
- Dublin Convention (97/C 254/01). CONVENTION determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities. Retrieved from: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819\(01\)&from=EN](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819(01)&from=EN) [15 June 2020].
- DW.com (2020). *Παράνομη αναστολή ασύλου στην Ελλάδα*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/el/%CF%80%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%AC%CE%BD%CE%BF%CE%BC%CE%B7-%CE%B7-%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B1%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%AE-%CE%B1%CF%83%CF%8D%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%85-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BD-%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B1/a-52787585> [17 June 2020].
- EU Migration blog (2020). *The 20 days Greece-Turkey border crisis and beyond. Geopolitics of migration and asylum*. Retrieved from <https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-twenty-day-greek-turkish-border-crisis-and-beyond-geopolitics-of-migration-and-asylum-law-part-i/> [16 June 2020].
- European Commission Proposal to recast the Dublin Regulation" (PDF). *European Commission*. Retrieved 1 March 2012.
- European Data Journalism (2020). *How the Greek policy on migration is changing*. Retrieved from <https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/News/Data-news/How-the-Greek-policy-on-migration-is-changing> [16 June 2020].
- European Commission (2015). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:532a5219-eb88-11e5-8a81-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF
- European Commission (2020). Integrated Situation Awareness and Analysis Situation Report No 216.

- European Commission (2014). 5th annual report on immigration and asylum (2013). COM(2014) 288 final. Brussels: European Commission.
- European Parliament (2013). Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Decision No. 574/2007/EC with a view to increasing the co-financing rate of the External Borders Fund for certain Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (COM(2012)0527-C7-0301/2012-2012/0253(COD)). A7-0433/2012. Brussels: European Parliament
- European Commission (2020). Integrated Situation Awareness and Analysis Situation Report No 216.
- European Solidarity initiative (2015). The 2015 refugee crisis through statistics. Retrieved from <https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20-%20Refugee%20Statistics%20Compilation%20-%2017%20Oct%202015.pdf>
- Fratzke, S. (2015). *The fading promise of Europe's Dublin System*. Migration Policy and Institute in Europe.
- Frontex (2017). *Central Mediterranean Route* [Online]. Frontex. Retrieved from <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-route/> [17 June 2020].
- Gedikkaya Bal, Pinar (2016). The Effects of the Refugee Crisis on the EU-Turkey Relations: The Readmission Statement and Beyond. *European Scientific Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 8, pp. 14–35.
- Gogou, Kondylia. “The EU-Turkey deal: Europe's year of shame.” Amnesty International, March 20, 2017. Accessed May 20, 2017. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-eu-turkey-deal-europes-year-ofshame/>
- Greek Government (1959). Law No. 3989/1959, EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.]. In: GOVERNMENT, G. (ed.).
- Haferlach, L., & Kurban, D. (2017). Lessons Learnt from the EU-Turkey Refugee Statement in Guiding EU Migration Partnerships with Origin and Transit Countries. *Global Policy*, 8, 85–93. doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12432
- Heck, C. & Hess, I. (2018). Tracing the Effects of the EU-Turkey Deal The Momentum of the Multi-layered Turkish Border Regime. *Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies*, 3(1). Retrieved from: <https://movements-journal.org/issues/05.turkey/movements.3-2.turkey-migration-regime-full.pdf#page=36> [10 June 2020].
- Hoeyer K, Dahlager L, Lynøe N. (2005). Conflicting notions of research ethics: the mutually challenging traditions of social scientists and medical researchers. *Soc Sci Med.*, 61(8):1741–9.

- Janning, Josef - Möller, Almut (2016). Leading from the Centre: Germany's New Role in Europe. European Council on Foreign Relations, *Policy Brief*, 13.7.2016,
- Jurando, E., Beirnes, H., Sheilla Maas, M. L., Uncureanu, D., Fratzke, S. (2016). Evaluation of the Implementation of the Dublin III Regulation. European Commission.
- Knaus, N. (2016). Keeping the Aegean Statement afloat. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 24(1), 43-45. Retrieved from:
http://turkishpolicy.com/files/articlepdf/keeping-the-aegean-Statement-afloat_en_1496.pdf [8 June 2020].
- King, R. (2018). Context-Based Qualitative Research and Multi-sited Migration Studies in Europe. *IMISCOE Research Series Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies*, 35–56. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-76861-8_3
- King, N. (2004). Using templates in the thematic analysis of text. In Cassell, C., Symon, G. (Eds.), *Essential guide to qualitative methods in organizational research* (pp. 257–270). London, UK: Sage.
- Kingsley, P. (2016). *The new odyssey: The story of Europe's refugee crisis*. London, UK: Guardian Faber.
- Kothari, C. R. (2004). *Research methodology: methods and techniques*. New Delhi: New Age International.
- Lopatin, E. (2013). The changing position of the European Parliament on irregular migration and asylum under co-decision. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 51, no. 4: 740–55.
- May, T. (2011). *Social research: Issues, methods and research*. London: McGraw-Hill International.
- Maiani, F. (2016). *Hotspots and Relocation Schemes: the right therapy for the Common European Asylum System?* Retrieved from: <https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/hotspots-and-relocation-schemes-the-right-therapy-for-the-common-european-asylum-system/> [30 June 2020].
- McEwen, M. (2017). Refugee Resettlement in Crisis: The Failure of the EU-Turkey Deal and the Case for Burden-Sharing. *Swarthmore International Relations Journal* 2, 20-32.
- McDonough, P., and E. Tsourdi (2012). The "other" Greek crisis: asylum and EU solidarity. *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 31, no. 4: 67–100.
- MEDAM (Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration) (2018), 2018 MEDAM Assessment Report on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe. Kiel: IfW

- Minns, J. & M. Karnitschnig (2016). *Austria suspends Schengen*. Politico. Retrieved from <http://www.politico.eu/article/austria-suspends-schengen-borderchecks-eu-migrants/> [12 June 2020].
- Mouzourakis, M. (2014) 'We Need to Talk about Dublin's Responsibility under the Dublin System as a Blockage to Asylum Burden-Sharing in the European Union', Refugee Studies Centre, Working Paper Series No. 105. Retrieved from <https://www.refworld.org/docid/55c9ee694.html>
- Nur Osso, M. (2016). Success or Failure? Assessment of the Readmission Statement Between the EU and Turkey from the Legal and Political Perspectives. Institute of International Relations Prague, Nerudova 3, CZ-118 50 Prague 1. Retrieved from <https://euagenda.eu/upload/publications/untitled-70441-ea.pdf> [12 June 2020].
- Papataxiarchis, E. (2026). *Being 'there' At the front line of the 'European refugee crisis'* - part 1. <https://eclass.duth.gr/modules/document/file.php/KOM03214/AT-Paper-Being%20there-Proofs8.pdf> [12 June 2020].
- Παπαγεωργίου, Ι. (2017). Ο εξευρωπαϊσμός των πολιτικών μετανάστευσης και ασύλου: από την κοινοτικοποίηση στη συλλογική επίβλεψη;. Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης, 40, 70-94. doi:<https://doi.org/10.12681/hpsa.14559>
- Παπαγεωργίου, Ι. (2010). Το άσυλο και η μετανάστευση μετά τη Συνθήκη της Λισαβόνας. *Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Ευρωπαϊκού Δικαίου*, τχ. 4, 2010, σ. 501-2.
- Parageorgiou, I. (2013). The Europeanization of Immigration and Asylum in Greece (1990–2012). *International Journal of Sociology*, vol. 43, no. 3, DOI: 10.2753/IJS0020-7659430304
- Quantara.com (2020). The EU and Turkey need each other – and a new refugee deal. Retrieved from: <https://en.qantara.de/content/refugees-and-migration-in-the-aegean-the-eu-and-turkey-need-each-other-and-a-new-refugee> [15 June 2020].
- Rachmann, G. (2015). The end of the Merkel era is within sight. *Financial Times*. 26 October 2015.
- Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast)". *Official Journal of the European Union*. L (180/31). 29 June 2013.

- Refugee of North Aegean (2020). The EU-Turket toxic deal. Retrieved from: <https://rsaegean.org/en/the-inheritance-of-the-toxic-eu-turkey-deal-four-years-later/> [15 June 2020].
- Refugee Support Aegean (2019). The hotspots experiment. Retrieved from: <https://rsaegean.org/en/the-hotspots-experiment/#Lesvos> [25 June 2020].
- Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2007). *Research Methods for Business Students*, (6th ed.) London: Pearson.
- Silverman, D. (2013). *Doing Qualitative Research: A practical handbook*. London: Sage.
- Snieder R. & Lerner, K. (2009). *The Art of Being a Scientist: A Guide for Graduate Students and their Mentors*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schneider, J., Engler, M. & Angenendt, S. (2013) 'European Refugee Policy: Pathways to Fairer Burden-Sharing', Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration (SVR) GmbH. Available at: https://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/European-Refugee-Policy_SVR-FB.pdf
- Simicskó, I. (2016). *Reinforcement of temporary security barrier starts on the Hungarian-Serbian border*. Retrieved from: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-ofdefence/news/reinforcement-of-temporary-security-barrier-starts-on-the-hungarianserbian-border> [18 June 2020].
- Spijkerboer, T. (2016) 'Fact Check: Did the EU-Turkey Deal Bring Down the Number of Migrants and of Border Deaths?', *Border Criminologies* [online], 28 September. Available from: <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/09/fact-check-did-eu>
- The Conversation (2016). Crisis or opportunity? How European countries use refugees for political gain. Retrieved from <https://theconversation.com/crisis-or-opportunity-how-european-countries-use-refugees-for-political-gain-55351> [16 June 2020].
- Thielemann, E. & C. Armstrong (2013). Understanding European asylum cooperation under the Schengen/Dublin system: a public goods framework. *European Security* 22, no. 2: 148–64.
- Tommaso, Emiliani (2016): 'Refugee Crisis' – 'EU Crisis'? The Response to Inflows of Asylum-Seekers as a Battle for the European Soul. *College of Europe Policy Brief*, No. 6.16, 31.3.2016.

- Trauner, F. (2018). Asylum policy: the EU's 'crises' and the looming policy regime failure. *EU Policies in Times of Crisis*, 93–108. doi: 10.4324/9781315269788-7
- Trauner, F. (2016) Asylum policy: the EU's 'crises' and the looming policy regime failure, *Journal of European Integration*, 38:3, 311-325, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1140756
- The Guardian (2020). *Greece hopes EU-Turkey talks will ease tension over refugee crisis*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/16/greece-hopes-eu-turkey-talks-will-ease-tension-over-refugee-crisis> [17 June 2020].
- UNHCR (1967). *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*. In: REFUGEES, U. N. H. C. F. (ed.). UNHCR
- UNHCR (2020). *Refugee situation statistics*. Retrieved from: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179> [9 June 2020].
- UNHCR (2015a). *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- UNHCR (2015b). *Total Refugee Population by Country of Asylum, 1960-2013 & Total Refugee Population by Origin, 1960-2013*. Retrieved from: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a013eb06.html>
- UNHCR Greece. Aegean islands weekly snapchat. Retrieved from: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/77663>
- Unluhisarcikli, 2020 <https://en.qantara.de/content/refugees-and-migration-in-the-aegean-the-eu-and-turkey-need-each-other-and-a-new-refugee>
- Wiles, R., Crow, G., & Pain, H. (2011). Innovation in qualitative research methods: a narrative review. *Qualitative Research*, 11(5), pp.587-604.
- Wood 2020 <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/21942/ongoing-refugee-crisis-in-greece-set-to-continue-in-2020>

Appendix A: Interviews

RQ 1. -What are the strengths and what are the main opportunities of Europe's response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement?

The Dublin regime was originally established by the Dublin Convention signed in Dublin, Ireland, on 15 June 1990. In 2003, the Dublin Convention was replaced by the Dublin II Regulation. The Dublin system was not designed with a view to ensuring the sharing of responsibility; its main purpose from the very beginning was to assign responsibility for processing an asylum application to a single Member State.

1. According to the literature, the main strengths of the Dublin system (Dublin I and II) are the following: some member states implemented an open-door refugee policy, it helped Europe to deal effectively with immigration and asylum issues, it has provisions on the security of the European external borders, it assigns responsibility for processing an asylum application to a single Member State. What is your opinion on the matter? Do you agree or disagree? Please justify your opinion.
2. Would you like to discuss something more as regards the strengths of the Dublin system (Dublin I and II)?

3. According to some experts and politicians, EU leaders and Turkey, by signing the EU-Turkey Statement, have agreed on a comprehensive plan that opens a safe and legal route to the EU for Syrian refugees, while reducing irregular migration. What is your opinion on this matter? Do you agree or disagree? Please justify your opinion.
4. Would you like to discuss something more as regards the strengths of the EU-Turkey Statement?
5. Please comment on the declaration of the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker who underlined that “the Statement *“respects all European Union and international norms. Refugees and asylum-seekers will have their requests handled individually, and will be able to lodge appeals”*”.
6. Many experts have highlighted that the Dublin system (Dublin I and II) has failed to achieve European vision as regards its asylum policy. Up to now, no one has seen any prospect/opportunity on this issue. What is your opinion on the matter? Do you think that Dublin system, despite its disadvantages, has created opportunities for Europe?
7. Many experts perceive the EU-Turkey Statement as an opportunity for Europe, as it gave it the chance to improve its relations with Turkey as well as to strengthen the cooperation of the two countries on the migration crisis. What is your opinion on this matter? Do you agree or disagree? Please justify your opinion.
8. Would you like to discuss something more as regards the European opportunities of the EU-Turkey Statement?

RQ 2.- What are the main threats and weaknesses arising from Europe’s response to the migration crisis that began in 2011 considering the Dublin I and II Regulations and the EU-Turkey Statement ?

9. Many experts believe that the Dublin system, which focuses on the regulation of the European asylum policy, is a result of Europe’s quick and not well thought decision. What do you believe? Could you please expand more on your opinion?
10. The Dublin I and II Regulations aimed at helping Europe to address the refugee crisis. What is your opinion about the effectiveness of the Dublin system?
11. Some experts argue that the EU-Turkey Statement was developed in order to cover the Dublin system’s gaps. What is your opinion about this?
12. How the EU-Turkey Statement affected Greece? Please give me first overall picture of the matter and then focus on the refugee crisis in the North Aegean.
13. Many UNHCR’s experts argue that the EU-Turkey Statement generated a humanitarian crisis. In your opinion, what was the role of the Dublin system in addressing this crisis (e.g. effectiveness of the Dublin system)?

14. I would like your comments on the following statement: “*Given the sheer number of the newly arrived migrants, the EU ‘frontline’ member states began overtly ignoring Dublin’s ‘first-country-of-entry’ principle and allowed the migrants to move on to their preferred countries of destination, first and foremost to Germany and Sweden*”. Please justify your opinion.
15. Some experts and politicians argue that the Dublin system failed to offer solidarity to the Greek state in terms of burden sharing. What is your opinion about the European solidarity towards Greece in relation to the Dublin system (Dublin I and II)?
16. Considering that the Greek governments have always problems when they need to deliver their asylum obligations, please discuss European solidarity towards Greece during the period of the EU-Turkey Statement. Was it effective?
17. In your opinion, what are the main challenges associated with Europe’s external borders and asylum responsibilities traced back to the establishment of the Dublin Regulations?
18. Some experts and politicians believe that the Dublin system signals the end of solidarity in Europe as some countries of the EU, like Germany, have used the issue of migration to consolidate their own political power and to challenge other countries. What is your opinion on this issue?

RQ 3-How Europe and Greece should cooperate in the future in order to address the migration crisis?

19. Some experts argue that the Dublin system (the country where a refugee first enters the EU is responsible for processing their asylum request and granting them asylum if eligible) puts an unequal burden on the frontline states closest to the refugees’ countries of origin, such as Greece. What is your opinion about this? Do you agree or disagree? Please justify your opinion.
20. How Europe could help Greece to address the issues relating to unequal burden-sharing?
21. According to the literature, Turkey’s withdrawal from the EU-Turkey Statement in 2016 created a difficult situation on the Aegean islands. During this period, Turkey played a geopolitical game with the refugees by threatening Europe, and specifically Greece, that it would unleash new waves of migrants if Europe did not change its position on the Syrian conflict. Turkey’s reactions revealed the complicated geopolitical interests in the Aegean, which gave to the EU-Turkey Statement a geopolitical and military dimension. Please comment on the EU-Turkey Statement and its impact on the

islands of the North Aegean in relation to the Greece-Turkey geopolitical relations in the North Aegean.

22. What is a possible policy-wise solution that would allow a better cooperation between the EU and Greece in order to address the migration crisis in the islands of the North Aegean?