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THE CONTRIBUTION OF CONSTRUCTIONS TO DIALOGICITY AND DISCOURSE UNIT DELIMITATION: A CORPUS-BASED ANALYSIS OF BELIEVE (YOU) ME, BELIEVE IT OR NOT, THINK AGAIN, AND MIND YOU

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"Some of the world's best educators are grandparents." (Charlie W. Shedd)

Στον παππού Ανδρέα

To my grandpa, Andreas

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Table of Contents

List of Tables

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER 7

APPENDIX II – CASE STUDY 1: The BELIEVE-family constructions

APPENDIX II – CASE STUDY 2: THINK AGAIN

APPENDIX II – CASE STUDY 3: MIND YOU

List of Figures

Abstract

Motivated by the growing scholarly interest in the fields of *dialogicity, intersubjectivity,* and *conventionalised discourse phenomena*, the present doctoral dissertation provides a Construction Grammar (CxG) account of the patterns BELIEVE (YOU) ME, BELIEVE IT OR NOT, THINK AGAIN and MIND YOU. Its aim is to establish their *constructional status* in the language and empirically ascertain that they form part of *a well-entrenched, constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation motivated by mental state verbs in the Imperative* (including sub-constructions of the latter). To fulfill its aim, the research relies on *synchronic, corpus-derived* (BNC & COCA) data examined through a composite, methodological framework that combines *qualitative* and *quantitative* parameters. Adopting this empirically-grounded research design, and following random sampling practices, the study subjects its data to systematic tagging, encompassing considerations related to *internal* and *external* (i.e., contextual and discourse) features. To secure *representativeness* and *falsifiability*, the annotated data are correlated with *frequency counts* which are then measured in terms of *statistical significance* and *internal reliability*. Supported by the above, the dissertation argues against the treatment of its objects of study as mere idiomatic expressions or patterns whose meaning is exhausted compositionally. Rather, it confirms that although they retain their respective degrees of specificity and non-compositionality, they also relate to other more productive constructions in the language, as suggested by their observable similarities, i.e., their shared Imperative morphology and their common semantic anchoring to mental state verbs. In this context, the study further provides a comprehensive account of the syntactic, semantic-pragmatic and discourse properties of the constructions by teasing them apart into *inherited* and *idiosyncratic* ones. In so doing, the research reveals that the use of the

constructions in discourse invites certain contextual regularities (e.g., increased co-occurrence with *negative* and *positive lexical prosody*, *intensifying* and *stance-encoding* elements etc.,) and interdependencies. Focusing on the latter, the research casts light on the dialogic, regulatory discourse scope of the constructions which endows them with the ability to mark discourse 'boundaries', despite the inherent fluidity and incrementalism of discourse flow. In this respect, the study initiates a novel line of investigation concerning discourse structure segmentation approaches and contributes empirical insights into the specifiable, internal 'architecture' of constructionally delimited discourse units. This finding allows the study to further entertain the hypothesis that the function of the constructions in discourse bears certain similarities to the function of *discourse markers*. Integrating all the above, the research documents the presence of a well-entrenched, constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation, ranging from *maximal to minimal negotiation of viewpoints*, systematically motivated by the Imperative and the use of mental state verbs. It further reveals that this particular network situates itself within an even *broader dialogic schema*, crucially residing in the productivity of the licensing schemas of the constructions examined and the Imperative. In unveiling this, the study invites further research into the Imperative and its ability to *motivate dialogicity* and *gradience of (non-)compositionality* (i.e., idiomaticity) in the patterns inheriting it. Finally, the findings of the study pave the way for future, interdisciplinary research in the recently opened, but already productive, investigation of discourse-level constructions that crucially extends to issues concerning discourse unit delimitation and the categorial features of discourse markers.

Περίληψη

Η παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή πραγματεύεται το ζήτημα της γλωσσικής έκφανσης της *διαλογικότητας* και *διεπίδρασης* στο λόγο (dialogicity and intersubjectivity in discourse). Αναλυτικότερα, ακολουθώντας το γλωσσικό πρότυπο της Γραμματικής των Δομών (Construction Grammar), η μελέτη εστιάζει στις ακόλουθες *γλωσσικές δομές* (constructions) της Αγγλικής: BELIEVE (YOU) ME, BELIEVE IT OR NOT, THINK AGAIN και MIND YOU και επιδιώκει να τεκμηριώσει τη χρήση τους ως *δεικτών ενσωμάτωσης της οπτικής γωνίας* (perspectivisation markers) που ο *Λεκτικός Δράστης/Ομιλητής* (Speaker) εικάζει ότι υιοθετείται από τον *Λεκτικό Αποδέκτη* (Addressee). Ο βασικός ερευνητικός στόχος της παρούσας μελέτης είναι να καταδείξει ότι όλες οι υπό εξέταση δομές αποτελούν μέρος ενός σαφώς εδραιωμένου δικτύου δομών ενσωμάτωσης οπτικής γωνίας στο λόγο (well-entrenched constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation) που συστηματικά εδράζεται στη *χρήση ρημάτων διανοητικής κατάστασης* (mental state verbs) στην *Προστακτική* (Imperative). Υιοθετώντας ένα μεθοδολογικό πλαίσιο που συνδυάζει *ποσοτικές* (quantitative) και *ποιοτικές* (qualitative) παραμέτρους, η μελέτη αντλεί τα δεδομένα της από τα δυο πιο διαδεδομένα σώματα κειμένων (corpora) της Αγγλικής, το British National Corpus (BNC) και το Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), ακολουθώντας τη μέθοδο της τυχαίας δειγματοληψίας (random sampling). Στη συνέχεια, η συλλεχθείσα εμπειρική βάση δεδομένων και οι επισημειώσεις αυτών (annotations) υπόκεινται σε καταμέτρηση συχνοτήτων (frequency counts) και συνεπακόλουθο έλεγχο στατιστικής σημαντικότητας (statistical significance measurements) και εσωτερικής αξιοπιστίας (internal reliability measurements). Ακολουθώντας το παραπάνω ερευνητικό και μεθοδολογικό πλαίσιο, η μελέτη αρχικά εξετάζει τα εμπειρικά δεδομένα στα γλωσσικά περιβάλλοντα που αυτά εντοπίζονται στοχεύοντας στην πλήρη ανάλυση των επιμέρους μορφολογικών, συντακτικών, σημασιολογικών και πραγματολογικών χαρακτηριστικών τους.

Έπειτα, με βάση το γλωσσικό πρότυπο της Γραμματικής των Δομών, τα παραπάνω χαρακτηριστικά κατηγοριοποιούνται σε *ιδιοσυγκρασιακά* (idiosyncratic) και *κληρονομούμενα* (inherited). Από την ανάλυση καθίσταται σαφές ότι οι εν λόγω δομές *δεν* αποτελούν απλές ιδιωματικές εκφράσεις (idioms), παρότι εμφανίζουν υψηλή *μη συνθετικότητα* (non-compositionality), αλλά συνδέονται άμεσα με άλλες παραγωγικές δομές της γλώσσας. Επιπλέον, εστιάζοντας στην ανάλυση των συμφραστικών πλαισίων (contexts) στα οποία απαντούν οι υπό εξέταση δομές, η μελέτη φέρνει στο φως τη *συστηματική συνεμφάνισή* τους (co-occurrence) με συγκεκριμένα *συμφραστικά στοιχεία* (contextual features), όπως ενδεικτικά, τη χρήση αρνητικής και θετικής σημασιολογικής προσωδίας (negative and positive lexical prosody), τη χρήση ενισχυτικών εκφράσεων (intensifying features), κ.ά. Η εξέταση του συμφραστικού πλαισίου αποδεικνύεται καίριας σημασίας και ως προς τη συμβολή των ίδιων των γλωσσικών δομών, καθώς αναδεικνύονται σε κύριους ρυθμιστικούς παράγοντες που συστηματικά οριοθετούν το λόγο σε ενότητες (discourse unit delimitation), οι οποίες ακολουθούν μια συγκεκριμένη διμερή, τριμερή ή τετραμερή εσωτερική «αρχιτεκτονική». Υπό αυτή την έννοια, η μελέτη προτείνει την περαιτέρω διερεύνηση των εν λόγω δομών – και πιθανώς και άλλων που παρατίθενται και ομοιάζουν με αυτές – διακρίνοντας ότι αυτή τους η ιδιότητα τους αναδεικνύει σε δείκτες λόγου (discourse markers). Στο πλαίσιο των ερευνητικών προτάσεων που απορρέουν από τα ευρήματα της παρούσας μελέτης, εντάσσεται και η διερεύνηση επιπλέον γλωσσικών δομών που βασίζονται στη χρήση της Προστακτικής και προσφέρονται τόσο για την εξέταση της ενσωμάτωσης της οπτικής γωνίας όσο και για την κινητροδότηση (motivation) της μη συνθετικότητας στη γλώσσα που οδηγεί στη δημιουργία ιδιωματικών, γλωσσικών εκφράσεων, όπως οι υπό εξέταση δομές.

"If you think you can grasp me, think again;
my story flows in more than one direction
a delta springing from the river bed
with its five fingers spread."

From the poem 'Delta' by Adrienne Rich

"Believe me, you are not real.
But neither am I.
I am the dream of
Myself, the Almighty."

From the poem 'Believe me' by Erin Hanson

"She wasn't me
She wasn't you
Believe you me
Knew what to do"

Jim Morrison

"There is nothing that isn't true if you believe it;
and nothing is true, believe it or not.'"

Byron Katie

"Mind you, every cloud has a silver lining."

*From Lexical and Semantic Aspects of
Proverbs by Čermák, František*

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation for the research and theoretical grounding

The present work provides an account of the expressions BELIEVE (YOU) ME, BELIEVE IT OR NOT, THINK AGAIN and MIND YOU within a Construction Grammar (CxG) framework.[1] To appreciate the motivation for the study, this introductory section is tasked with a concise overview of the above theoretical model that situates the work at hand within the most recent developments in the field of constructional research.

Since its inception in the 1980s, CxG has developed into a well-established theoretical model, primarily in view of its commitment to account for language *in its totality* (i.e., without excluding less productive or idiomatic patterns) and to lay bare its specifics as *a learnable cognitive system*. In undertaking the task to ultimately provide an answer to the fundamental, theoretical question of *"what language is"*, CxG responds by introducing the notion of *construction*.

Defined as symbolic units/pairings of form and meaning (Goldberg 1995), constructions serve as the basic unit of analysis of the model (Fried and Östman 2004, Fried 2015). Viewed as abstract, representational schemas, compatible with the speakers' cognitive and interaction mechanisms, constructions operate as *'stretchable blueprints'* (Fried and Östman 2004:13) for licensing all possible language

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[1] As in the title, the conventional lowercase character typeset of small capitals is herein employed to indicate that the patterns are viewed as *constructions*, disassociating them from *corpus-attested instantiations* (i.e., tokens) of the expressions which will appear in italics (e.g., *believe me*), and from the *pattern types* which will appear as follows: 'believe me', suggesting that it is the compositional outcome of 'believe' + 'me'.

instantiations (i.e., *constructs*) regardless of complexity. To rise to the challenge of functioning as effective *'licensors'* for all actual language use, constructions essentially exhibit a '*gestalt*' (Nikiforidou, Marmaridou and Mikros 2014:693)*, non-modular* status[2] as they *economically* and *holistically* encapsulate all the much-needed, but *not, necessarily,* readily observable, linguistic information required for this licensing task.[3]

Given the above, constructions, expectedly, vary in terms of *size* (i.e., ranging from morphemes to genres), *complexity* and *schematicity* (i.e., their degree of freedom in form), as does the *totality* of naturally-occurring language use they represent. However, they do *not* vary in importance since, in the context of CxG, no construction is granted greater informational value (Fried 2015:974) in understanding language, and no distinctions are made between supposed *'core'* and *'peripheral'* elements (see Goldberg 1995; 2006). Adhering to this view, CxG ultimately succeeds in offering a viable way out of *"the lumper/splitter dilemma"* (Goldberg 2006:45) faced by other linguistic models since, in its framework, *'idiomatic'* patterning, and *'in-between'* cases do not 'fall through the cracks'. Rather, they are fully accounted for alongside the so-called *'regular'* instances of language use.

In CxG terms, therefore, *'knowing a language'* practically corresponds to knowing the *inventory of all the constructions* available in that language (Goldberg 2006) and *"nothing else in addition"* (Hilpert 2014:22, cited in Groom 2019:293). Perhaps even more importantly, though, CxG posits that *'knowing the inventory'* involves a crucial awareness of its *internal structure* expressed by means of *inheritance*-based relations

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[2] *Non-modularity* foregrounds that, in the context of CxG, linguistic meaning is *not* seen as *stored*, i.e., *categorised*, into separate, autonomous modules of descriptions promoting strict divides between the grammar and the lexicon (see also Chapter 2, section 2.3.1).
[3] The linguistic information, in this case, would be most accurately envisioned as *clusters* of fairly elaborate formal, semantic-pragmatic, prosodic and contextually conventionalised properties.

holding between constructions. Inheritance, thus, emerges as a key concept-mechanism of the model in that it provides a coherent way of capturing the organisation of constructions in networks of different degrees of complexity and abstractness (see Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996).[4]

Subscribing to the above theoretical commitments and siding with recent developments in CxG that promote *supra-clausal, discourse* and *genre*-level goal-setting (cf. Fried and Östman 2005; Östman 2005; Ruppenhofer and Michaelis 2010; Fischer 2010; Shaw 2010; Antonopoulou and Nikiforidou 2011; Hoffmann and Bergs 2015), the present study ventures into a *corpus-based*, linguistic investigation with a *discourse-level orientation*. Geared in this direction, it empirically confirms that the broadened discourse scope of CxG (Östman and Trousdale 2013; Nikiforidou *et al.* 2014; Aijmer 2016; Nikiforidou and Fischer 2015; Enghels 2017; Fischer and Niebuhr submitted), makes it particularly well-suited to the analysis of discourse phenomena (Groom 2019).[5]

Inspired by the robust body of CxG-based research cited above, the present thesis sets out to contribute to the recently opened, but already highly promising, area of *conventionalised, discourse-level constructions*. Targeting mainly the issue of the *delimitation of discourse units* by means of *phrase-level constructions*, the study

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[4] Schematically represented through *box notation diagrams* (see Kay and Fillmore 1999; Fried and Östman 2004, see also Chapter 7, section 7.3), inheritance relations allow for a considerable degree of overlapping, i.e., *multiple inheritance* (Trousdale 2013) related to linguistic *redundancy* (Campbell 1982; Hunnicutt 1985; Pinker 1995). Naturally nested in language phenomena, linguistic redundancy is not only fully recognised in CxG (Denison 2011; Hoffmann and Trousdale 2013; Koutsoukos, Van Goethem and De Smet 2018), but is also argued to merit an approach of *tolerance* in that it can uniquely motivate the analysis of particular constructions or reinforce their use.

[5] In CxG terms, the broadened discourse scope encompasses all the conventionalised aspects of a construction *"which may include not only properties of the situation described by the utterance but also of the discourse in which the utterance is found [...] and of the pragmatic situation of the interlocutors"* (Croft and Cruse 2004:258) (for more details, see Chapter 2, section 2.3).

embarks on a CxG-informed linguistic endeavour with a series of specific aims and objectives, to be presented in section 1.2 that follows.

1.2 Aims and objectives of the research

Motivated by the most recent CxG-informed research and supported by corpus-attested evidence, this dissertation aims to make a case for the suitability of CxG as a theoretical model for discourse-level exploration. Channeling my efforts in this direction, I particularly aim to *empirically ascertain the existence of a well-entrenched, constructional network of phrasal patterns* which index *discourse perspectivisation,* in the form of *dialogicity,* and ultimately *delimit the discourse unit* of which they form a part. To this end, I specifically examine the phrasal patterns BELIEVE (YOU) ME, BELIEVE IT OR NOT, THINK AGAIN and MIND YOU – among others (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1) – as cases in point by first providing a detailed description and analysis of their syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and conditions of use.

Dialogicity is an intriguing, key term for the study at hand encompassing the profiling of (assumed or real) participants in discourse (De Cock 2014) and the promotion of *perspectivisation* and *intersubjectivity* (Schwenter 2000; Traugott 2005, 2006) manifest in the expression of opposing viewpoints. Its counterpart, *monologicity*, legitimises *subjectivity* in discourse, which is reflected in the promotion of only one acceptable perspective and a shutting down to *'alteric potential'* (White 2009). Essentially, both terms refer to *internal* (i.e., *endocentric* (Romero Trillo 2015:55)) features of discourse and, in this respect, they differ from *monologuality* or *dialoguality* (also discussed in the present work), reserved for the *external* (i.e., *exocentric* (Romero Trillo 2015:55)) features of dialogue, namely the number of participants in a certain communicative situation.

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This intersubjective, dialogic space, generated by the use of specific constructions in discourse, such as the ones focused upon herein, opens up a further, interesting line of investigation concerning *discourse unit delimitation* practices (Selting 1996, 1998; Simon 2004; Degand and Simon 2005). The present thesis contributes to this field by proposing a novel, alternative, and, most importantly, viable approach. Adopting a complementary and integrative approach towards previous models of discourse analysis, which traditionally– and, typically, mutually exclusively – relied on syntax and prosody (see Blanche-Benveniste, Deulofeu, Stéfanini and van den Eynde 1984, Blanche-Benveniste, Bilger, Rouget and van den Eynde 1990; Roulet 2002; Chafe 1994; Auer 1992, 2009), I put forth that the discourse units may be effectively defined by means of constructions; the latter roughly acquiring the status of regulatory *'discourse delimitators'*. By extension, I further propose that the rather 'volatile' concept of discourse units can thus receive considerable, construction-based, definitional refinement (see Chapter 2, section 2.5).

In examining the use of the constructions at hand as possible discourse delimitators, I observe a systematic regularity of certain, contextual features that merits investigation in that, as will be exemplified, it provides valuable insights into: a) the scope of the discourse units, b) their conventionalised and interdependent (sub-)components, and c) their predilection for *stance-enriched* contexts (i.e., contexts rich in *"the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgements or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message"* (Biber and Finegan 1989:124) and *'antagonistic'* environments (Cappelli 2005:235).

Drawing on the above-cited literature (see also section 1.1) as motivational springboard, the present work extends research, both *qualitatively* and *quantitatively*, in a threefold

way: a) by providing constructional evidence for the linguistic attestation of *perspectivisation* in the form of *dialogicity,* which will ultimately be shown to assist in a more enhanced and finessed definition of it, b) by suggesting a more fine-grained and, at the same time, holistic treatment of the hitherto elusive concept of *discourse units,* and c) by advocating a constructional approach to *discourse unit delimitation,* according to which, constructions, and, in particular, constructions indexing dialogicity, can function as fairly reliable discourse unit delimitators.

Following the overarching aim, and the individual, related objectives outlined above, section 1.3 that follows presents samples of the corpus-retrieved data and the working hypotheses on which the methodological framework of the study relies, paving the way for the research questions addressed in section 1.4.

1.3 A corpus-based approach, data collection and working hypotheses

In line with its CxG theoretical underpinnings (see section 1.1 and Chapter 2, section 2.3), the present study adopts a methodological framework that complies with the usage-based (i.e., empirically-grounded) requirements of the model. It thus systematically commits itself to tracing the patterns of interest presented in section 1.2 in synchronic, authentic, corpus-derived data (BNC and COCA) as in (1) – (5) below.[6]

Example (1): *"'I would not eat cat,' he murmurs. Yes, the little sod would. "**Believe me**, when you are hungry, really hungry, so that your stomach clings to your backbone, nothing is more tasty than a succulent rat or a well-roasted leg of cat!'"*

> BNC, [Title: The White Rose Murder, Books, Author: Clynes Michael],
> Source: Written books and periodicals, Date: 1992]

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[6] BNC refers to the British National Corpus while COCA refers to the Corpus of Contemporary American English (for more details, see Chapter 3).

Example (2): *"When he was killed in the car accident I thought I understood how my friend was feeling, and I thought I understood his loss, but **believe you me**, until it happens to you, you have no idea of the pain, grief, despair, anger, depression and loneliness of a bereaved parent. My whole world came crashing down."*

BNC, [Testimonial Blogs, Author: Unknown
Source: Website text, Date: 2009]

Example (3): *"A week ago, Ann Romney tried to project similarly warm image of her husband including a depiction of their years as a young married couple. Mrs. Obama offered another vignette of a young, struggling couple. "And, **believe it or not**, when we were first married, our combined monthly student loan bills were actually higher than our mortgage, "she said." We were so young, so in love, and so in debt. "That's why Barack has fought so hard to increase student aid and keep interest rates down,…"*

COCA, [Title: National; The Road to The White House: The Democratic National Convention
Source: A Resounding call for a second term, Date: 2012]

Example (4): *"WASHINGTON#He said he'd overturn Roe v. Wade. JOHANSSON# We have Republicans trying to redefine rape. LONGORIA# Trying to force women to undergo invasive ultrasounds. If you think that this election won't affect you and your life, **think again**."*

COCA, [The Five for October 15, part of a video-clip ad],
Source: Spoken_Fox, publication date: 2012)

Example (5): *"He apparently doesn't consider the possibility that in three-quarters of a century the novel's reputation will be reduced to something like that of the movie. I'm not predicting it, **mind you**, but it does seem at least possible that the illusion on which both the novel and its cinematic translation are based will not survive the tough times that currently seem to lie ahead for America's position of leadership in the world."*

COCA, [*Reminders of America's Decline*, Author: James Bowman],
Source: MAG_ American Spectator, Date: 2013]

Drawing on such corpus-retrieved data and relying on a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis that secures *falsifiable* and *measurable* results (Rosnow and Rosenthal 1989; Moran 2003), the present study examines the patterns focused upon in relation to the *systematicity* of the properties they exhibit and the *discourse correlates* they invite. In so doing, it aims to establish their entrenchment in the language and arrive at an integrated account of their formal, semantic-pragmatic and discourse properties. A further objective of their systematic tracing in corpus data is their disassociation from potential, fully-compositional counterparts as those in (6) and (7) below available – as will be exemplified – only for the patterns 'believe me' and 'think again'. [7]

Example (6): *"I managed to interrupt Mrs. Butler before she repeated the whole cycle of symptoms again, asked the cat's age (six months) and whether or not she'd been spayed (no.) Fairly patiently I explained that her cat was in heat and that it was normal for a cat in heat to behave in such a fashion. Mrs. Butler didn't seem inclined to **believe me**, and I ended up on the phone answering questions for a good twenty minutes, but finally she hung up."*

(COCA, [Title: As Time Goes By, Author: Amy Bechtel],
Source: Fiction-Analog Science Fiction & Fact (publication date: 1999)

Example (7): *""Here is an example spoken by David when he is told that his son has been killed: «But the king covered his face and the king cried with a loud voice. O my son Absalom, O Absalom, my son, my son». **Think again** of these words. What anguish they express!"*

(BNC, [Hearing Loss: A guide to self-help. Domain: Social Sciences],

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[7] Although the present work acknowledges the constructional status of fully-compositional instances as well, the term *constructional* shall henceforth refer only to the instances whereby the patterns examined exhibit additional, idiosyncratic properties and do not exhaust themselves in fully-compositional accounts.

Written books and periodicals: publication date: 1985-1993)

In light of the above, all the patterns in focus will be shown to resist a fully-compositional account. They will also be shown to be embedded in the rest of the grammar, since they relate to more general, schematic constructions, while retaining their respective degrees of specificity.

A final, interesting observation applying to all the constructions – including others to be presented in Chapter 3 (e.g., GUESS WHAT?, TRUST ME) as findings of the preliminary groundwork of the study at hand – is that the constructions exhibit three pronounced similarities. They all share a common, *phrasal status*. They all anchor their meanings to *mental state verbs* (Schiffer 1990; Jaszczolt 1999; Moltmann 2003; Cappelli 2005, 2007a, 2008). And they all carry the morphological marking of the *Imperative* (Aikhenvald 2004, 2006, 2010; Bruil 2014).[8] These similarities are crucial for the present work in that they call for explanation as to their consistency in the data, thereby stressing the need for further examination of the following: a) the relation of the phrasal constructions identified with the complex, dynamic and, most importantly, *polysemous* semantic class of mental state verbs (Cappelli 2008, see Chapter 2, section 2.2) and b) the interconnection of constructions with dialogicity and intersubjectivity by virtue of the Imperative, which has itself been hailed as a confirmed marker of both in the relevant literature (Traugott 2005; Enghels 2017).[9] Essentially functioning as the

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[8] It should be noted that three of them also form a lexically-related family, hereafter referred to as the BELIEVE-family.

[9] While pointing out that the mental state verbs of the phrasal patterns in focus systematically set up a dialogically perspectivised 'space' between the Speaker and the Addressee, the present study acknowledges that motivating dialogicity might not be a common, uniform property for all the members of the verbal class. In briefly sketching the theoretical interest involved in such an enquiry, I suggest that dialogic perspectivisation contributed by mental state verbs in the Imperative poses as an interesting area for further research, particularly as regards the 'less prototypical' members of the class. Using the verbs *'remember'* and *'evaluate'* as provisional cases in point, I propose that, as indicated by the examples (1-2) below, dialogicity might emerge as a further point of differentiation among the members of the class, which, in all likelihood, relates to aspects of their semantics-pragmatics (e.g., their invites to recalling facts or to performing calculated judgements) and their syntactic complementation. For instance, in the dialogual example (1) below the Speaker invites the Addressee to recall a commercial. In responding

'backbone' of the study, and, by extension, of the constructional network focused upon, these two consistent features of the patterns ultimately drive the following *interrelated, working hypotheses* which set the present research project in motion:

a) If the patterns in focus exhibit semantics that exceeds the fully-compositional, predictable meaning of their components, their account needs to take their phrasal status into consideration, thereby addressing their formal, semantic-pragmatic properties, and specific contextual regularities, naturally accommodated in the CxG framework.

b) If the constructional status of the patterns is confirmed, their being part of the language system should be further established by relating them to other more productive constructions by teasing apart the features they inherit from those that are idiosyncratic to them, and, no less, by statistical evidence reflecting such systematicity in the data.

c) If the phrasal patterns examined present observable formal, semantics-pragmatics and discourse commonalities, then the possibility of them forming a constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation should be explored in light

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affirmatively, and siding with the Speaker's appraisal of the commercial, the Addressee is crucially shown to manifest *alignment in perspective*, i.e., *monologicity*. In the monologual example (2), the Speaker, in a form of advising, phrased through multiple Imperatives, urges the (assumed) Addressee to follow a specific process for his/her own benefit, thus discouraging the possibility of the verb pairing with setting up a dialogic space of lack of alignment in perspective.

1) *"Not to mention wp7 overloaded my tv with commercials. **Remember** the one with the guy and his chick at the restaurant, where he turns into his avatar? I do, it was on every five minutes."*
[COCA, Blogpost, *Amazon China apologises and cancels Lumia 920T orders*, 2012]

2) *"4. **Evaluate** each choice. Use your standards and judgement criteria to determine the cons and pros of each alternative. 5. Determine the best alternative or way to accomplish that goal. 6. Get a plan into place. Put the decision into action. 7. **Evaluate** the outcome of your decision and action steps. What are the lessons that you got from this?"*
[COCA, Blogpost, *Ugg Bailey Button Mini Chocolate Boots Outlet: In order to be*, 2012]

of their motivation which, in all likelihood, relates to the variability of the mental state verbs they feature and their Imperative morphological marking.

d) If the patterns are indeed shown to form a constructional network whose members exhibit a regulatory, dialogic scope in discourse, this should be associated with certain regularities, textual interdependencies and discourse correlates that appear with consistency (i.e., systematic frequency) in their immediate or broader context of use.

e) Finally, if the constructions at hand are shown to have a regulatory, dialogic scope in their discourse context, their overall discourse 'architecture' should include the proposition /*p*/ in which they occur, thereby crucially bringing to the forefront that constructions are 'key stakeholders' in delimiting a discourse unit.

To effectively test the interrelated hypotheses entertained above, the study follows *random sampling* practices in order to collect *representative* data (Moran 2003) for the entirety of the corpus population (*N*) for each construction in both corpora (BNC and COCA). The data collected are subjected to manual tagging and *statistical significance* as well as *reliability measurements* with respect to a number of different parameters relevant to the analysis including: a) the *semantics* of the patterns (i.e., fully-compositional or not), b) their *pragmatics* (i.e., the speech act performed), c) their positioning in the *dialoguality-monologuality* axis (i.e., the *external* features of dialogue), d) their positioning in the *dialogicity-monologicity* axis (i.e., the *internal* features of dialogue associated with perspectivisation), e) their *positional flexibility* (i.e., Do the patterns exhibit a sentence-initial/-final or parenthetical position? Are there any instances of the patterns having an independent sentential status? In case of multiple possibilities, is there any possible preference for any of these positions?), f) their

morphosyntax which encompasses both *internal* and *external* features, and g) their *collocational behaviour* in relation to *intensifying* and *affective*, *stance*-encoding elements.

Having established the context of the present study in terms of its data, working hypotheses and the main aspects of the rationale accounting for its methodological framework, I will now focus on the specific research questions that the present work sets out to address.

1.4 The research questions addressed

Aligned with the aim and related objectives of the present study and informed by its CxG theoretical underpinnings and the relevant literature on mental state verbs, the Imperative, dialogicity, and discourse unit delimitation, the present section offers an overview of the five main *research questions* addressed. It further correlates these questions with the working hypotheses outlined in section 1.3 and the semantic and formal similarities exemplified by all the constructions in focus. In so doing, the study illustrates that responding effectively to the questions raised below relies on the initial, empirical confirmation of the constructional status of the patterns and the attendant, holistic analysis of their broader context. The empirical confirmation of the constructional status of the patterns draws on a) their independent lexicographic overview, b) their attestation in corpus-retrieved data, and c) their treatment (and the treatment of their components) in the relevant literature. The analysis of the broader context of the patterns relies on examining their interrelationship with specific contextual regularities, other constructions in the language, and ultimately, with the discourse units of which they form a part.

Against this background, the present doctoral dissertation embarks on its research enterprise by addressing the following questions in the order they appear given that one informs the other and the sequence of the methodological steps taken.

➤ **Research Question 1**

How can the *constructional semantics* of the patterns BELIEVE (YOU) ME, BELIEVE IT OR NOT, THINK AGAIN and MIND YOU *be confirmed, measured,* and *distinguished* from possible, available, compositional semantics? In this context, what are the *properties* confirming the need for a constructional account that exceeds compositional semantics and how can these properties be *classified* in a theoretically informed way into *inherited* and *idiosyncratic* properties?

Capitalising on the salient semantic and formal similarities shared by all the constructions, namely their featuring of mental state verbs and their consistent morphological marking for the Imperative, the present study addresses this question by drawing insights from the lexicographic treatment of the patterns, their frequency of occurrence in corpus-retrieved data, and the relevant literature.

More specifically, in correlation with working hypotheses (*a*) and (*b*) presented in section 1.3, the principles of CxG briefly outlined in section 1.1 (see Goldberg 1995, Fried 2015), and the broader research in collocations (see Sinclair 1991; Hanks 2004, 2013), each construction (including its individual components where applicable) is first examined by means of an independent lexicographic overview. This much-warranted, initial research step provides valuable insights into the semantic and pragmatic differences instantiated by the constructions in focus and their potential, fully-compositional counterparts. Abiding by the principle of *minimal constructional*

synonymy (Goldberg 1995, see also Chapter 2, section 2.3.2), according to which differences in syntactic configuration between constructional counterparts automatically result in meaning differences as well, the present study suggests that in cases whereby fully-compositional counterparts are detected (as in the cases of BELIEVE ME (see Chapter 4) and THINK AGAIN (see Chapter 5)), these should be interpreted as different, yet related, constructions.

Supported by the insights gained from this initial lexicographic overview, the present study then proceeds to systematically trace the patterns of interest in corpus-retrieved data. As will be discussed, these two methodological steps manifest a mutually-informing bidirectionality. Dictionaries point to differences in syntactic configuration that ought to be considered and corpus data point to a refinement of the lexicographic treatment that typically relegates the patterns under study to a purely idiomatic status. In light of this, and following random sampling practices, one of my main objectives in working with corpus-retrieved data is to confirm the frequency of occurrence and, by extension, the preponderance of constructional meaning. The results of this corpus-based investigation are then subjected to frequency counts, statistical significance, and reliability measurements so that their validity in positing links between the specific language patterns and their input frequency (and, in this sense, language entrenchment) could be further substantiated.[10]

Once confirmed and measured in terms of frequency, the constructions are analysed in terms of a CxG, inheritance-based account (Fried and Östman 2004) with a view to

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[10] Aligning with Gilquin (2008), despite the usage-based, corpus-attested evidence provided, the present work refrains from making strong claims about *frequency* (and its interrelationship with *salience* and *prototypicality*, see Chapter 3). Thus, it restricts itself to proposing that the frequency of occurrence and the observable consistency in terms of collocational behaviour are strong constructional indicators that merit attention.

teasing apart their *inherited* (i.e., motivated) and *idiosyncratic* (i.e., particular and distinctive) properties (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.4). Greatly assisted in this by the relevant literature on the Imperative (Aikhenvald 2004, 2010; Bruil 2014; Van Olmen and Heinold 2017) and mental state verbs (Bertuccelli Papi 1998; Ifantidou 2001; Cappelli 2005, 2007a, 2008), the present study argues that the constructions inherit features motivated by their Imperative morphology and the semantics of the verbs involved. Typical examples of their inherited features in this case include the directive, intersubjective and dialogic function of the patterns inherited by the Imperative or their partly-motivated semantics and pragmatics, traceable back to the mental state verbs they feature.

In certain cases, further syntactic marking will also be shown to motivate certain properties exhibited by the constructions examined, as in the case of BELIEVE YOU ME (see Chapter 4) and MIND YOU (see Chapter 6), which inherit features from the specific sub-construction of the NON-CANONICAL IMPERATIVE WITH FOCUSED POST-POSED SUBJECTS.[11] The same applies for BELIEVE IT OR NOT (see also research question 3 below) which, apart from the features associated with its Imperative, further inherits features from the construction of DISJUNCTION and from the *factuality* and *contextual recoverability* involved in the use of the pronoun *'it'* (see Chapter 4). Another case in point is THINK AGAIN (see Chapter 5) which also inherits the pragmatics and *repetitive*, *restitutive,* and *weakening-concessive* semantics involved in the conjunctive adverb *'again'* (Klein 2001; Georgakopoulos 2009; Beck, Berezovskaya and Pflugfelder 2009).

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[11] The conventional lowercase character typeset of small capitals is here employed to indicate the constructional status of the non-canonical imperatives with post-posed pronominal Subjects.

Moreover, the idiosyncratic features of the constructions, defined as their 'sui generis' properties, are also shown to exhibit considerable systematicity. Among others to be discussed in detail (see Chapters 4-6), these include: a) their specific discourse-pragmatic functions, b) their specific contextual regularities (e.g., their systematic collocational co-occurrence with forms of non-assertion in the form of direct questions and conditional sentences), and c) their preferences for certain discourse positions (e.g., sentence-final/-initial, parenthetical).

➤ **Research Question 2**

Once the constructional status of the patterns is (statistically) confirmed (see research question 1), how should the patterns be viewed *in relation to other constructions in the language*? To put it differently, are the patterns accurately defined as *fixed, substantive, and arbitrary* formations (i.e., fixed idioms) or do they merit a theoretical treatment that views them as *entrenched instances of more productive constructions* whose features they systematically inherit?

Following the above and what has been hypothesised in (*b*) in section 1.3, the present work argues *against* a treatment of the patterns in focus as fixed, substantive, and arbitrary formations. Although it openly acknowledges a cline of schematicity for the constructions examined, with BELIEVE YOU ME and MIND YOU being the most substantive ones because of their non-canonical Imperative morphology,[12] the study maintains that all constructions manifest considerable systematicity in terms of semantics-pragmatics, morphosyntax and contextual interdependencies. On the basis of

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[12] As will be discussed in Chapter 2, *substantive* idioms are lexically filled, i.e., *"all (of their) elements are fixed and nothing can be grammatically altered"* (see Croft and Cruse 2004:233 and examples like *'hit the nail on the head'*), whereas *schematic* ones (also referred to as *formal*) *"have at least one slot where appropriate items can be filled in"* (*ibid.*:233) as in the CORRELATIVE CONDITIONAL construction THE X-er THE Y-er.

this, they will be argued to qualify for well-entrenched instances of more productive constructions whose features they systematically inherit. Embedded in the rest of the grammar and related to other constructions by means of *inheritance* or *partial-inheritance* relations, as in cases of family resemblance (e.g., the BELIEVE-family network), all the constructions examined will be argued to inherit properties from both the mental state verbs and the Imperative. Following what was argued in research question 1 above, some of the patterns, such as BELIEVE YOU ME and MIND YOU, will be shown to inherit features from the Imperative and its specific sub-construction of NON-CANONICAL IMPERATIVE WITH FOCUSED POST-POSED SUBJECTS (see Chapters 4 and 6) mentioned above.

In a similar vein, the template that licenses BELIEVE ME (and, to an extent, BELIEVE YOU ME, which will be treated as a variant form of BELIEVE ME (see Chapter 4)) is evidently once more connected to the Imperative. However, it will also be shown to further inherit features from the specific sub-construction of the Imperative that is typically, but not exclusively, associated with a verb of affective semantic undertones followed by pronominal self-reference, expressed through its object complementation (i.e., V(AFF)/IMP + ME). Interestingly, this specific sub-construction of the Imperative will also be argued to license other constructions in the language, similar to the one identified in the present work, such as TRUST ME and WATCH ME (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.4 and Chapter 7, section 7.3). Likewise, for BELIEVE IT OR NOT, the inheritance relations correlate its IMPERATIVE with DISJUNCTION and will also be shown to license other similar constructions in the language, such as LIKE IT OR NOT (see Chapter 4, section 4.5 and Chapter 7, section 7.3).

Although a more detailed analysis of the inheritance relations is reserved for the relevant chapters of data analysis (see Chapters 4-6) and the concluding chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 7), the above illustrate that the present work responds to research question 2 by essentially arguing that *constructions do not emerge in a vacuum*. Rather, they form part of a larger network connected in a principled way by means of (partial-)inheritance, which further accounts for the emergence of (potential) constructional variants. Perhaps even more importantly, the present study further argues that the inheritance-based commonalities identified among the constructions indicate that they form part of an even broader *constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation* to be fully addressed in Chapter 7 (see section 7.3).

Naturally, at this point, the question poses itself as to the *motivation* behind the existence of such a constructional network, which may (or may not) couch variants, and its interrelationship with the dialogic function exhibited by all the constructions. This will be the focus of research question 3 which, in addressing the issue, argues that the motivation for the dialogic function of the constructions should be sought in the variability of the mental state verbs they feature and their Imperative (see hypothesis (*c*) in section 1.3).

> **Research Question 3**

How are the individual constructional features (once identified and classified into inherited and idiosyncratic ones (see research question 1) and once related to other more schematic constructions (see research question 2)) associated with *dialogicity*? In other words, what motivates the non-alignment in perspectivisation between a Speaker and an (imaginary or assumed) Addressee indexed by the constructions and how is this non-alignment linguistically attested?

Following Traugott's (2008) definition of dialogicity as *"lack of homogeneity in orientation"* and *"encouragement or negotiation of meaning or viewpoint"* (*ibid.*:143), the dialogicity indexed by the constructions will be argued to be motivated by: a) their consistent morphological marking in the Imperative, b) the additional, idiosyncratic, morphological and/or syntactic features they exhibit, e.g., their disjunctive syntax (see also questions 1 and 2 above) and c) the internal variability, and identifiable polysemy, exhibited by the semantic class of the mental state verbs they feature.

As far as the Imperative is concerned, its use as a marker of intersubjectivity has been well-established in the relevant literature (Traugott 2005; Enghels 2017), which argues that it functions as a *'decoder-oriented'* expression with *'an overt realisation of the Encoder's sensitivity to the Decoder's subjectivity'* (Traugott 2005:2). In specific cases, the dialogicity motivated by the Imperative morphology of the patterns will be further enhanced by further features, as in the case of the disjunctive syntax of BELIEVE IT OR NOT. In this case, and by analogy with what the relevant literature proposes about scalars and concessives as indexes of dialogicity (König 1991; Schwenter 2000; Traugott 2010 and Makkonen-Craig 2014), the present work argues that dialogicity is further enhanced by the particular disjunctive syntax of the pattern and its configuration of two equally possible, but opposing, construals of reality simultaneously attributed to the Addressee (cf. Politzer and Noveck 1991; Lee 1995; Schwarz 2000; Noveck, Chierchia, Chevaux, Guelminger and Sylvestre 2002; Geurts 2005).

The correlation of dialogicity with the Imperative will also be shown to be at work with instances of NON-CANONICAL IMPERATIVES WITH FOCUSED POST-POSED SUBJECTS, as in BELIEVE YOU ME and MIND YOU. The additional property in this case, which will be brought to bear on the constructional account offered, is that the post-posed pronominal

Subjects (*'you'*) will be shown to exhibit a receding 'agentive' function, thereby semantically qualifying for the θ-role of Patients (Verhoeven 2010; De Cock 2014). As will be discussed in Chapter 7 (section 7.5.2) this merits further investigation as it points to the existence of *variability of dialogicity*, which, if confirmed, is expected to lead to significant, definitional refinement of the concept.

Finally, apart from the Imperative, the dialogic function of the constructions will be shown to be motivated – and, most importantly, reinforced – by the polysemy of the mental state verbs involved. As argued in the relevant literature (Cappelli 2005, 2008), the specific semantic class exhibits a hybrid form of propositional and interpersonal (i.e., perspectivised) semantics, which accounts for their systematic occurrence in *stance-enriched 'antagonistic contexts'* (Cappelli 2005:235). This oscillation between a propositional and an interpersonal, intersubjective, perspectivised meaning (Bertuccelli Papi 2000) adds to the dialogic function motivated by the Imperative and accounts for the use of intensifying elements in their immediate or broader context of use. Contextual regularities and other discourse correlates then is what will be focused upon in research question 4 that follows.

➢ **Research Question 4**

By adhering to CxG principles, the present study adopts the view that the meaning pole of constructions encompasses *discursive specifications* that involve the presence of specific *discourse correlates* and *contextual regularities* that the constructions invite. In this context, research question 4 takes the following form: What are the contextual regularities associated with each construction and how do they relate to their semantics, pragmatics, and discourse function? Additionally, how can their *systematicity* be

20

established in the data so as to *validly* suggest that the regularities identified are not random findings in the contextual environment of constructions?

The CxG discourse-oriented motivation for the present study (see Fried and Östman 2005; Wide 2009; Fischer 2010; Antonopoulou and Nikiforidou 2011; Nikiforidou *et al.,* 2014; Nikiforidou 2016) naturally calls for a broader treatment of the meaning pole of the constructions that encompasses the discourse correlates that each construction invites. This is also in line with the fact that, as mentioned in research question 3 above, the constructions in focus contribute a dialogic, scaffolding effect to the overall 'architecture' of the discourse of which they form a part. In so doing, they give rise to specific contextual regularities which, as hypothesised in (*d*) in section 1.3, merit further qualitative and quantitative investigation.

Following the above, the discourse environment in which the constructions are traced is systematically annotated with respect to a) the discourse position of the constructions, b) their syntactic interdependencies, and c) their collocational behaviour. Supported by frequency counts and statistical measurements, I particularly aim to show that the phrasal status of the constructions endows them with the ability to create broader contextual dependencies and regularities which are no random discourse features. Rather, they consistently correlate with the distinct, dialogic, regulatory discourse function that each pattern is shown to exhibit.

In light of this, it will be argued that each construction displays a specific set of contextual features, with certain predilections for position (e.g., sentence-initial/-final or parenthetical etc.,), or syntactic interdependencies (e.g., the systematic presence of non-assertion in the form of conditional sentences or direct questions etc.,), all in line with the specific discourse function it performs. Interestingly, contextual features and

collocational patterns will be argued to differ for each construction, including instances

of near-synonymous, variant forms, as is the case with BELIEVE ME and BELIEVE YOU

ME, which will be shown to differ as well, albeit minimally.

Apparently, apart from differences in terms of their contextual features, the

constructions will also be shown to exhibit contextual similarities either *within* the

lexical family identified (e.g., the BELIEVE-family) or *across* the whole constructional

network identified. A notable similarity in this case would be the marked predilection

for stance-enriched environments, typically abundant in evaluative items, negative and

positive semantic/lexical prosody[13] or other intensifying elements used for the

evaluation of non-aligned perspectives.[14]

Finally, the systematicity of the discursive specifications of each construction will be

shown to be particularly enlightening as to the ability of the constructions to exceed

sentential boundaries and 'delimit' the discourse units in their scope. This will be the

focus of research question 5 that follows.

  ➢ **Research Question 5**

To what extent can the dialogic, regulatory discourse scope of the constructions

contribute to their function as discourse unit 'delimitators'? More specifically, how can

discourse units be delimited in constructional terms and what insights can we gain in

this case regarding a) the notion of discourse units, b) the overall 'architecture' of

discourse, and c) the individual 'scaffolding' contribution of each construction to the

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[13] As will be discussed in Chapter 3, in the context of the present study, semantic prosody is viewed as *"a consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates"* (Louw 1993:157) whose primary function is to express "the Speaker's/Writer's attitude or evaluation" (Louw 2000:58).
[14] To effectively operationalise the measurement of contextual regularities, the study follows a nine-category framework (see Chapter 3, Table 3.2) relying on Traugott's (2010) work on intensifiers.

discourse unit of which it forms a part (e.g., its scope and its conventionalised components)?

Following hypothesis (*e*) in section 1.3 above and aligning with the most recent developments in CxG and discourse-level constructions, the present study aims to contribute to this field by proposing that the constructions in focus can function as fairly effective 'benchmarks' for discourse unit delimitation.

Arguing against dichotomic approaches on the issue endorsing either a *structure-product* approach to discourse with emphasis on *syntax* (e.g., the Dependency Grammar Model (Blanche-Benveniste *et al.*,1984; Blanche-Benveniste *et al.*,1990) and the Geneva Discourse Model (Roulet 2002)) or an *interaction-process* approach with emphasis on *prosody* (e.g., Chafe 1994; Koch and Oesterreicher 2001; Auer 1992, 2009), the present study adopts a complementary and integrative approach in line with its theoretical grounding. Acknowledging that both paradigms provide useful insights but advocating against a distinct treatment of discourse units by either syntax or prosody, the present study has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it aims to contribute to the elucidation of the notion of discourse units by responding to the definitional challenges this notion poses due to its *multidimensional* (Steen 2005), *flexible* and *expandable* standing in discourse (Selting 2000). On the other, it aims to stress the need for an alternative, all-encompassing, and holistic approach to discourse units naturally accommodated within a constructional framework. In this respect, and heavily informed by the relevant literature (Selting 1998, 2000), the present study ultimately argues that although the inherent fluidity of discourse phenomena remains a considerable challenge, a constructional framework can effectively accommodate the delimitation of fairly specifiable discourse units. This is constructionally achieved

23

precisely because CxG frameworks are fully compatible with the *'gestalt'* status of discourse units themselves resulting from the *"interplay of syntactic, lexico-semantic, pragmatic, activity-type specific and prosodic devices in their sequential context"* (Selting 1998:14).

This *'gestalt'* approach to discourse units, which bears striking similarities to the definitional treatment of constructions themselves (see section 1.1), will be shown to relate to *lexico-syntactic/semantic and pragmatic projections* which are crucial for marking the 'completion', so to speak, of a unit in the incremental discourse flow. To put it differently, by bringing syntax and prosody together under the notion of constructions, the present study advocates that discourse units may be effectively delimited – to a considerable extent at least – through the *dialogic projections* that the constructions in focus trigger in their (immediate) discourse environment (see Chapter 2, section 2.5.2). In this sense, the 'completion' of a unit, i.e., its discourse 'boundaries' (sensu lato) will be shown to heavily correlate with *the dialogic framing effect* that each construction (e.g., THINK AGAIN, MIND YOU etc.,) has in naturally occurring discourse. This dialogic framing effect/function, particular to each construction, will be further argued to correlate with a *forward-* (*anticipatory*) or *backward*-looking (*responsive*) scope respectively that accounts for the distinctive development of each unit in discourse (see Chapters 4-6).

In light of the above, apart from the definitional refinement of the concept of a discourse unit, the present work also accounts for the specific inherited lexico-syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic functions on which the discourse units rely. In other words, far from arguing against the importance of syntactic dependency relations (as is the case with *interaction-process* models (see Chapter 2, section 2.5.1.2)), the present work maintains

that the Imperative of the constructions and its assumed or linguistically (post-verbally) surfacing Subject are significant for the discourse unit that the constructions define. The same holds true for the host utterance of each construction and the fact that it constantly involves a proposition /*p*/ in the scope of each verb in the constructions. As will be shown, this proposition /*p*/, and its discourse positioning, are crucial in determining the distinctive development of the constructionally-delimited discourse unit, which may ultimately result in minimally binary, tripartite, or maximally four-place units.

The existence of a prosodic contour for all the constructions examined is also an interesting possibility that could provide additional support to my suggestion that discourse unit delimitation can be achieved constructionally. Unfortunately, given the lack of access to audio files for the corpus data collected (see Chapters 3 and 7), I can presently only restrict myself to suggesting that examining this possibility for all the constructions features as a welcome desideratum for future investigation, fully in line with the constructional account offered herein. Seen from a different perspective, however, this methodological limitation (see Chapter 7, section 7.4) may indirectly credit the present study with offering a *valuable, preliminary testing ground* for the empirical confirmation of the *key role* of the constructions in the delimitation of discourse structure. This, however, is expected to be fully elucidated once the investigation of prosodic considerations is integrated in accounts similar to the present one (see Chapter 2, section 2.5.2 and Chapter 7, section 7.4).

At this point, it might be fruitful to briefly present one indicative example (8) of a discourse unit constructionally delimited by BELIEVE ME, reserving more detailed discussion for the relevant chapters that follow (Chapters 4-6).

Example (8): *"If you're a beginning observer, this inventory of celestial treats may at first seem daunting. **Believe me**, we've only scratched the surface. I hope you'll continue to seek out the many deep-sky objects within the Hunter's boundaries that don't appear on this list. Good luck!"*

COCA, [Discover ORION'S DEEP-SKY GEMS
Source: MAG: Astronomy, Date: 2015]

In example (8), the conditional sentence preceding the construction serves as the ***i**nitial **p**roposition* (***i/p***) that emphasises the syllogistic procedure attributed to the Addressee. Interestingly, it involves negative lexical prosody evident in the use of the adjective *'daunting'* employed for evaluation purposes. The construction itself serves the purpose of ***a**nnouncing*/*marking* the unexpected information (***a***), while the part involving the ***u**nexpected **i**nformation* itself (***u/i***) follows. This is succeeded by the ***e**laboration* part (***e***) relying on both quantifiers (*'many'*) and positive lexical prosody (e.g., *'I hope'*/ *'Good luck'*).

Drawing on similar corpus-retrieved data, the constructional account offered herein ultimately illustrates that all the constructions under study can: a) effectively contribute to framing 'boundaries' in discourse, and b) allow us to make 'informed predictions' as to the scope of a discourse unit and its unfolding in discourse through its discernible, interdependent, and conventionalised (sub-)components.

Concluding this section, I would like to point out that the order of the research questions, including their sub-questions, has considerably contributed to the internal structure of each chapter of data analysis. Each chapter is thus devoted to a specific construction – or family of constructions in the case of *'believe'* – seeking to respond to all five questions posed, starting with presenting empirical evidence for the constructional semantics of the patterns, while juxtaposing it with the meaning of their

(potentially available) fully-compositional counterparts. This is followed by the identification of the individual properties of the constructions and their classification into inherited and idiosyncratic features that ultimately contribute to their dialogic, regulatory discourse scope and the formation of a constructional network.

In the context of all the above, the section that follows offers an overview of the main contributions of the present dissertation (see also Chapter 7, section 7.3) and the chapters comprising it.

1.5 Contributions and overview of the dissertation

Inspired by the recent developments in the field of CxG, and the increased research interest in conventionalised, discourse-level constructions, the main contributions of the present dissertation may be summarised as follows:

i)   The study offers a detailed description and analysis of the syntax, semantics-pragmatics, and conditions of use for all the patterns it examines, thereby essentially providing empirically-grounded confirmation of their constructional status in the language. In light of this, it further reveals that all the patterns under study call for a refinement of their common, and occasionally only *optional*, lexicographic, and perhaps instructional (in classroom settings) treatment as 'purely idiomatic' expressions. The latter is shown to significantly restrict our understanding of the semantic and discourse-pragmatic complexity of these patterns, and possibly other similar ones (see Chapters 3, Table 3.1 and Chapter 7, Figure 7.2). By arguing against this 'purely idiomatic' treatment, the findings of the present study are also expected to enhance our understanding of the cline between idiomaticity and regularity in the language, particularly when this is

motivated by the use of mental state verbs in the Imperative and their attendant polysemy (see also Chapter 7, section 7.3).

ii) By confirming and accounting for the constructional status of the patterns, the study ultimately offers an inheritance-based, integrated account of their formal, semantic-pragmatic properties and contextual regularities that essentially brings to the fore the presence of a broader constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation ranging from maximal to minimal negotiation of viewpoints. As will be shown through box notation diagrams (see Chapter 7, section 7.3), this network is motivated by the crucial commonalities of the patterns, reflected in their morphological marking in the Imperative (including its possible sub-constructions, see also (*iii*) below) and their semantic and lexical anchoring to mental state verbs.

iii) It contributes to the discussion of dialogicity (in the sense of perspectivisation and intersubjectivity) and the definitional refinement of this concept by offering falsifiable and measurable linguistic evidence for its attestation in discourse. Most importantly, it also contributes to confirming the presence of constructions in the language that inherently index dialogicity on account of their (partly)-motivated semantics-pragmatics, always in keeping with the mental state verb they feature, and their morphological marking in the Imperative. Interestingly, the latter will also be shown to include certain sub-constructions as well, which differ, however, with respect to their productivity as licensing schemas in the language. The sub-constructions of the Imperative identified involve the following, listed here in terms of productivity (see also Chapter 7, sections 7.2-7.3): a) V(AFF)/IMP + ME (self-referent object) as in BELIEVE ME, also licensing TRUST

ME, HATE ME, WATCH ME, BITE ME, etc., b) V$_{IMP}$ + AGAIN as in THINK AGAIN,[15] also licensing START AGAIN, TRY AGAIN, SAY AGAIN, COME AGAIN etc., all interestingly featuring gradient degrees of compositionality which, in certain cases, might suggest that, as was the case with THINK AGAIN, they also feature both compositional and constructional semantics lending themselves to further investigation (for more details, see Chapter 7, section 7.3), c) V$_{IMP}$ + IT + OR + NOT $_{(disjunction)}$ as in BELIEVE IT OR NOT, also licensing LIKE IT OR NOT, d) V$_{IMP}$ + YOU $_{(post-posed\ Subject)}$ as in the case of MIND YOU and other, crucially receding in frequency patterns, such as MARK YOU or HARK YOU (see Chapter 7 sections 7.2-7.3) and, finally, the morphosyntactically unique and thus not productive as a licensing template of e) V$_{AFF/IMP}$ + YOU+ME $_{(self-referent\ object)}$, accounting for the *'singleton'* case of BELIEVE YOU ME only. In confirming the above, the present work provides further, empirical support for the hypothesis entertained in earlier literature (Makkonen-Craig 2014) that certain linguistic expressions, conventionally related to non-assertive communicative tasks, may inherently index dialogicity *"because they establish dynamic interrelations with one or more utterances in the episode"* (*ibid.*:113). Perhaps even more importantly, it illustrates that the morphological marking of the Imperative is, in all likelihood, readily associated with non-compositional semantics in the language. This hypothesis will be further addressed in Chapter 7 (section 7.3) in light of the analysis of all the case studies examined, as it essentially opens up a new line of further study correlating idiomaticity (in the sense of non-compositionality) with morphosyntactic considerations.

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[15] Evidently, the sub-constructions of V$_{(AFF)/IMP}$ + ME and V$_{IMP}$ + AGAIN described in (a) and (b) above form daughter constructions (i.e., inherit) of the broader constructional schemas of V$_{IMP}$ + OBJECT and the V$_{IMP}$ + ADVERB. respectively.

iv) Finally, the study offers original insights into the contribution of constructions as 'key stakeholders' to the overall discourse 'architecture' and their function as fairly reliable discourse unit delimitators primarily on account of their contextual interdependencies and their responsive or anticipatory discourse scope. Geared in this direction, it provides considerable, empirical evidence that CxG-oriented studies are definitionally capable of accounting for supra-clausal, discourse-level phenomena, despite the apparent sensitivity of the latter to the fluid and incremental nature of conventionalised discourse.

To effectively discuss all the above, the present dissertation is divided into seven chapters, including the present one. In light of the relevant literature, Chapter 2 presents an overview of the central axes that inform the theoretical background of the study and situate it in the context of recent CxG-based research on discourse-level constructions. Chapter 3 correlates the overall aim and the individual, related objectives of the dissertation with its methodological framework; the latter comprising the quantitative and qualitative parameters taken into consideration for the research design, tools, and sampling techniques employed.

Chapters 4-6 present the data analysis for each construction examined. In particular, Chapter 4 presents the constructional analysis of the BELIEVE-family (i.e., BELIEVE ME, BELIEVE YOU ME and BELIEVE IT OR NOT), which occupies the functional space of marking (i.e., announcing) unexpected information, while stressing the differences and similarities exhibited by each family member. Chapter 5 examines THINK AGAIN with the aim to show that it constitutes a well-entrenched construction indicating a 'reconsideration of a state of affairs (i.e., $/p/$) with a view to changing one's thoughts/opinion or actions', not immediately derivable from its constituent parts.

Chapter 6 concludes the data analysis with MIND YOU which due to its attention-summoning effect in discourse will be argued to alert the Addressee to the imposition of a 'rectification'/reformulation concerning a proposition /*p*/ (see also Ranger 1998, 2015). As will be argued, this 'rectification'/reformulation may relate either to a global revision of the content of /*p*/ or to a reformulation for the sake of greater linguistic accuracy, thereby correlating the construction with metalinguistic interpretations, not brought to the fore by other accounts.

Chapter 7 offers an overview of the main findings of the work at hand by providing box notation diagrams for the dialogic perspectivisation network (see Figure 7.1) essentially brought to the forefront as the result of the interplay between the Imperative and the semantic class of mental state verbs. It further offers box notation diagrams for each individual construction identified as a member of this network (see Figures 7.3-7.7), thereby foregrounding the principled, methodological decision to focus attention on the specific constructions. In so doing, Chapter 7 also traces the constructions examined back to their licensing schemas and assesses their productivity in the language. In particular, adopting a funnel-like representation (see Figure 7.2), the study shows that the licensing schemas of the constructions point to: a) the existence of an even broader network of dialogic perspectivisation expressed by means of an array of other constructions in the language and b) a particularly noteworthy and systematic interrelationship between the Imperative and non-compositionality (i.e., idiomaticity). These two crucial observations highlight that in unveiling the properties of the specific constructions, the present study also contributes to the unveiling of a number of other constructions in the language which share (partially) common licensing templates with those of the objects of the present study. Finally, Chapter 7 offers an overview of the limitations of the present work, while also suggesting areas for future research,

including further instantiations of dialogicity, categorial features of discourse markers, and the recently opened, but highly promising, investigation of discourse-level constructions.

CHAPTER 2

THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

2.1 Introduction

In line with the research aim of the present study to bring to the fore the contribution of a constructional account to dialogicity and discourse unit delimitation, this chapter addresses the five central axes that inform the theoretical background of the study and, by extension, the 'backbone' of its overall research design.

As already pointed out in the Introduction, the *phrasal* patterns under examination, namely BELIEVE (YOU) ME, BELIEVE IT OR NOT, THINK AGAIN and MIND YOU, merit a discussion of their *constructional status* in the language and an *integrated* account of their properties. To this end, the study draws on synchronic, corpus-retrieved data for all the said patterns by employing a combination of *qualitative* and *quantitative* research methods through a multistep process of data collection, annotation, and classification (see Chapter 3).

Capitalising on the observations made at the early stage of data collection (see Chapter 1, section 1.3 and Chapter 3, section 3.2.1), the patterns in focus are found to exhibit three significant shared features. They all share a common *phrasal*, as opposed to lexical, status. They all carry the morphological marking of the *Imperative,* which is systematically correlated with a *dialogic, intersubjective construal in discourse,* and they all feature *mental state verbs* with consistent contextual regularities and interdependencies. These shared properties, along with further idiosyncratic ones, are argued to motivate the semantics, pragmatics, and extended discourse scope of the

patterns, thereby lending support to the central hypothesis entertained herein that the patterns form *a constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation* whose members *profile* (assumed) Addressees, *index* non-alignment, and *delimit* discourse units falling within their scope.

On the basis of the above, the theoretical context of the proposed account to be discussed in the present chapter comprises the following:

a) *the semantics of mental state verbs* and their *intersubjective function* that inform the semantics of all the patterns under examination through (partial-) inheritance,

b) the *Imperative* morphology, and the contextual support of its directive function in discourse, which is further enriched by the *systematic contextual presence of intensifiers,* such as emotive lexis and stance-encoding elements,

c) the *phrasal* (rather than lexical) status of the patterns which lends itself to *usage-based accounts*, naturally embraced by the *CxG model* that can effectively accommodate the teasing apart of their *inherited* (i.e., motivated) from their *idiosyncratic* (i.e., 'sui generis') properties, thus revealing their systematic linking to the rest of the grammar,

d) issues related to *dialogicity*, namely the notion of *perspectivisation* in discourse, in the sense of non-alignment of viewpoints, along with the profiling of discourse participants (assumed to be) involved in a given utterance, and, finally,

e) the contribution of the dialogic, regulatory scope of the constructions focused upon in the overall discourse 'architecture' and *the delimitation of fairly specifiable discourse units*.

In light of the above, the present chapter is divided into six sections. Section 2.2 presents an overview of the semantics, pragmatics, syntactic complementation, and discourse function of the polysemous semantic class of mental state verbs. It further argues that only certain properties of the mental state verbs involved are inherited by the constructions at hand, while others are incompatible with the constructional meaning identified herein. Section 2.3 discusses the phrasal status of the patterns and how this is profitably investigated both lexicographically and through a CxG-based account of corpus-attested data. Section 2.4 analyses the notion of dialogicity in the sense of non-aligned perspectivisation, which is found to correlate with the morphological and syntactic marking of the constructions, their semantic and lexical anchoring to mental state verbs, and their consistent contextual predilection for intensifying and stance-encoding elements. Section 2.5 discusses the discourse unit delimitation and the contribution of prosody and syntax to the issue. It ultimately puts forth that the proposed CxG-based account constitutes an alternative, viable approach to discourse unit segmentation in that it effectively accommodates syntactic dependency relations, while also welcoming insights from potentially observable prosodic regularities. The latter are not only fully compatible with the present account but are also expected to further substantiate the contribution of constructions, which are definitionally capable of incorporating prosodic considerations as well. Finally, section 2.6 offers some concluding remarks and paves the way for Chapter 3, which focuses on methodological issues, and the relevant chapters of data analysis that follow.

2.2 Mental state verbs: The common lexis of the constructions

The presence of mental state verbs (Schiffer 1990; Jaszczolt 1999; Moltmann 2003) in all the constructions examined is crucial for two main reasons. On the one hand, it accounts for the properties exhibited by the constructions (see below and Chapters 4-6)

and, on the other, it indicates that the particular semantic verb class constitutes a privileged source for constructions manifesting a dialogic, intersubjective function in discourse (see section 2.4).

2.2.1 The semantic class of mental state verbs

The investigation of the conventional aspects related to the semantics, pragmatics, syntactic complementation (including their complementation by adverbial adjuncts such as *'again'* discussed in Chapter 5) and discourse function of verbs expressing mental states and/or processes related to thought has been the object of several studies and different linguistic models (cf. Gleitman 1990; Bertuccelli Papi 1998, 2000; Nuyts 2001; de Villiers 1995, 2005; Anand and Hacquard 2013). Characterised by considerable referential opacity, as they refer to unobservable events (see Gillette, Gleitman, Gleitman and Lederer 1999; Slaughter, Peterson and Carpenter 2008), mental state verbs have consistently kindled research interest in their internal classification and the identification of their individual features. However, attempts to provide rigid typologies as regards both have systematically proved counterproductive.

More specifically, as regards their internal classification, initial work in the field has proposed a tripartite distinction into a) *volitional* mental state verbs expressing desires and intentions, b) *cognitive* ones expressing thought, intellect and reasoning, and c) *dispositional* ones expressing preferences and affect (Booth and Hall 1995; Slaughter *et al.*, 2008:1053). However, voices of dissent in more recent literature argue that the semantic class of mental state verbs is a complex dynamic system with further nested and intricate microsystems surfacing in the form of the individual verbs involved in the class (Cappelli 2008). This high density, therefore, along with the subtle differences exhibited by the microsystem of each individual verb, endow the members of the class

with a high level of adaptivity to external pressures of contextual variables. These variables can, in their turn, change, weaken or strengthen the semantics of these verbs, thus *"pushing them into the semantic space of another verb of the class"* (Cappelli 2008:533) as in examples (1) and (2) that follow:

Example (1): *"**I believe** that this is what happened."* (Expressing an epistemic and evidential evaluation of a certain state of affairs expressed by the verb 'believe' + *that*-complementiser.)

Example (2): *"You really need to **believe** me."* (Expressing the dispositional, affective semantics of 'having faith' ('believe' + object pronoun) further stressed by means of the adverbial 'really'.)

Following the above, external variables, mainly expressed through contextual aspects and complementation or combinatorial configurations, are shown to affect the semantics and discourse-pragmatics of these verbs and, by extension, endow the whole class with an *identifiable polysemy* and *polyfunctionality*. The latter are most readily observed in cases whereby mental state verbs (i.e., verbs encoding processes and/or outcomes of thought) acquire the status of *propositional attitude verbs*, thereby allowing for the expression of psychological states, desires, or the evaluation of truth through the related speech acts (Ifantidou 2001, 2005). The oscillation of some members of the class – occasionally resulting in instances of partial overlap as well – between the expression of a *mental state* and the expression of *propositional attitude* further complicates the issue of taxonomic problems raised above (see also Cappelli 2005, 2007a, 2008).[16] Interestingly, the data available (see Chapters 4-6) not only concur with the relevant literature but further put forth that the morphosyntactic

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[16] See also the taxonomies proposed in relation to the six-level hierarchisation of meaning expressed by cognitive mental state verbs (cf. Hall, Scholnick and Hughes 1987; Booth and Hall 1995; Ifantidou 2005).

configuration of these verbs may accentuate their internal ambiguity and partial overlap in relation to – at least – the following three parameters: a) the expression of *mental state and processes related to thought* which appears to serve as the 'starting semantic point', common to all the members of the class, b) the expression of *propositional attitude and subjective evaluation,* which is typically paired with different degrees of certainty and commitments on the veridicality of the proposition /*p*/ in scope of the verb, and c) the expression of *relational disposition* (Bertuccelli Papi 2000:227) which refers to *interpersonal, intersubjective (i.e., perspectivised)* meaning resulting from *"colouring the whole utterance* and *positioning the speaker with regard to the status of the information that is being communicated in terms of both cognitive and socio-emotional evaluations"* (see Bertuccelli Papi 2000:42). The latter is particularly interesting for the dialogic considerations of the present study in that it foregrounds that the verbs belonging to the class can crucially *"orient the inferential processes of the mind and provide a schema which encodes the Speaker's meaning and the Addressee's interpretation of that"* (Cappelli 2007a:29).[17]

Although acknowledging that the above internal complexity and polysemy of the semantic class is itself a highly promising area for further research, the present study shall restrict itself to the following:

a) The term *'mental state verbs'* will be henceforth employed as a 'cover term' suggestive of the common mental origin of all the verbs involved; a terminological decision taken in the interests of avoiding proliferating the terms used throughout the study and not because the identified sub-classes should be conflated. In fact, *not* conflating the sub-categories and providing further (constructional) evidence for still

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[17] See also Calabrese 1986; Bertuccelli Papi 2000 and Bondi 2002.

more polysemy and polyfunctionality available in the class is one of the main research objectives of the work at hand.

b) The ability of mental state verbs to function as *indexes* pointing towards the interpretation that the Speaker wishes to assign to a given utterance will be focused upon in that it crucially positions (cognitively and emotionally) the participants in a communicative situation, not only in relation to each other, but also in relation to the proposition /*p*/ of the communicative act. The latter further accounts for the increased presence of mental state verbs in contexts *"encouraging contrast (either explicit or hypothetical) between the interlocutors' attitudes towards a certain state of affairs in 'antagonistic contexts'"* (Cappelli 2005:235) as in the following literature-cited example (3).

Example (3): - *Oh you're smiling now, dude, but in a couple of minutes that smile will be long gone. It ends here. Right now. -You **think** so? - I **don't think** so. I **know so**. You see, I've been doing my research."* (Cappelli 2008:536).

The contrast identified between the different attitude construals in these contexts is typically accompanied by the co-occurrence of certain lexical items pertaining to *subjectivity* and *evaluation* (Cappelli 2005, 2007a, 2007b). As will be discussed in the chapters that follow, the ability of mental state verbs to express contrast and their tendency to emerge in *"antagonistic contexts"*, enriched with *intensifiers* (i.e., *evaluative* lexical items and *stance* elements (see also Athanasiadou 2007, Rentoumi, Vouros, Karkaletsis and Moser 2012),[18] supports the function of the constructions to express dialogicity in discourse (see section 2.4).

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[18] As Rhee (2016) observes, *stance* is characterised by significant notional complexity compounded by the lack of a commonly agreed definition and the existence of various competing terms to denote it. What is common, however, in any definitional attempt made (and also compatible with the present account) is

Further to the above, as far as their individual features are concerned, it seems that mental state verbs have consistently been found to correlate with the following: a) a *stative* (rather than dynamic/action) status, b) an *evidential* function and c) an *epistemic* function. Their characterisation as stative verbs sets them apart from *dynamic/action* verbs, e.g., the verb *'push'* (Vendler 1967). Statives do not typically allow for the progressive aspect in English and, apparently, this is a criterion which further distinguishes between the different *outcome-* or *process*-related senses that may be exhibited by such verbs. For example, *"I wish I had a knish"* is possible, while *"I'm wishing I had a knish"* is only possible on the action sense of *wish*, i.e., *'make a wish'* (Lakoff 1971:334). In this respect, for instance, the sense of '*think'* as a stative, verb is to be distinguished from the mental activity sense of *'having a thought'* (Cappelli 2005:233). Arguably, the activity sense of this verb may be considered an extension of the state sense, as a *'state-for-the-activity'* metonymy, which will be of interest to the present study. The same holds true for the other two features mentioned above, namely the evidential and epistemic functions typically assigned to these verbs. However, since their presence (or lack thereof) in the constructions examined depends on a number of other semantic, pragmatic and morphosyntactic aspects, *evidentiality* and *epistemicity* will be credited an independent discussion in section 2.2.2 that follows.

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that the concept is seen as embracing a variety of terms related to the *lexical* or *grammatical* coding of the Speaker's attitudes and beliefs (*ibid.*:397). Examples of linguistic forms marking the Speaker's stance include – among others – stance adverbs, degree modifiers, and focus and scalar particles which are employed to indicate the degree of strength of a given proposition /p/ as a whole or in part, by signalling evidence, certainty, confidence, and insistence (Rhee 2016:398). In complementing and refining previous accounts of the concept (cf. Lyons 1982; Ochs 1990, 1996), Rhee (2011, 2016) proposes four main subcategories of the concept: a) *attitudinal stance*, b) *epistemic stance*, c) *emotional stance* and d) *evidential stance*.

2.2.2 Evidentiality, epistemicity and mental state verbs

As already shown, the class of mental state verbs forms a dynamic system of individual, intricate micro-systems exhibited by the verbs belonging to it, particularly in relation to the expression of *propositional attitude* and *subjective evaluation*. Following the relevant literature (Bertuccelli Papi, Cappelli and Masi 2007), the conceptual dimensions largely responsible for the complexity of the system (and its micro-systems) relate to the elements of *evidentiality* and *epistemicity* and *"their rich and varied interplay"* (Cappelli 2008:531).

Evidentiality has been described as the coding of the source of information which, however, differs among languages that choose to treat it as a *grammatical* category with obligatory coding and others that treat it as a *functional* category *"that refers to the perceptual and/or epistemological basis for making a speech act"* (Cornillie 2009:45). As Fetzer and Oishi (2016) observe, when the coding of evidentiality is *obligatory*, it is generally administered by a closed set of morpho-syntactic markers (cf. research in non-Indo-European languages, Boas 1911/2002; Faller 2002; Aikhenvald 2004). However, when the coding of evidentiality is *optional*, there is no closed set of evidential markers but rather an open set of linguistic devices which may code it, for instance, lexical verbs (e.g., *'suppose'*), lexical nouns (e.g., *'opinion'*), modal auxiliaries (e.g., *'may'*, '*must'*), or modal adverbs (e.g., '*allegedly', 'apparently'*). Obligatory or not, the generally observed presence of evidentiality in languages has urged Cornillie (2009) and other scholars to suggest that *"the functional domain of evidentiality […] may be considered a language universal"* (Cornillie 2009:45).

According to its source, evidentiality is further divided into two main types: a) *direct evidentiality* (i.e., attested through visual, auditory, or other sensory channels) and b)

indirect evidentiality (i.e., reported or inferential) (Willett 1988; Ifantidou 2005). Both types confirm that its main function is to indicate how the Speaker claims to have become the source of knowledge (e.g., by hearsay, observation, inference, memory etc.,), or the degree of commitment (weak or strong) that the Speaker wishes to claim in relation to the information conveyed and the proposition expressed (Ifantidou 2001; Papafragou and Li 2001). It is in this respect that cognitive verbs like *'think', 'believe'* etc., are typically argued to function as evidential markers as in the following literature-based examples (4-6).

Example (4): *"John, I **think**, is at the airport."* (Ifantidou 2001:131)

Example (5): "*I **think** that John is in Berlin."* (Ifantidou 2001:7)

Example (6): *"Henry **believes** that Louise has left the town."* (Simons 2007:1038)

Example (4) showcases *'think'* in a parenthetical position, which although still evidential, requires greater degree of decoding processing (see Ifantidou 2001:131), than examples (5) and (6) which constitute more straightforward (in terms of processing) examples of evidential use. Interestingly, examples (5) and (6) feature declarative sentences in which the mental state verbs *'think'* and *'believe'* function evidentially in relation to the proposition /p/ that follows while syntactically emerging in the form of *that*-complementisers. The latter is an interesting morphosyntactic observation to which I shall return below.

Epistemicity, also referred to as *epistemic modality* (Carretero 2016), on the other hand, is defined as the linguistic expression of the estimation of the likelihood of a proposition /p/ to be or become true (Nuyts 2001). In other words, it refers to the Speaker's

evaluation, judgement and degree of commitment attached to the truth-value of a piece of information /*p*/.[19]

The difficulty in assigning an exact position for each mental state verb in this evidential and epistemic complex system of evaluation is argued to be inherited by each verb belonging to the class (Cappelli 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). This further partly explains why certain mental state verbs encoding propositional attitude and evaluation may showcase various (sub-)features of attitude and relational disposition as in cases of cognitive verbs manifesting affectivity (e.g., the verb *'believe'*) or verbs exhibiting the reverse trend (e.g. the verb *'trust'*). In this context, Cappelli (2005) observes that if a Speaker expresses a subjective judgement, i.e., based on *"the ego of the Evaluator"*, then this should be interpreted as an instance of *affective evidence* (*ibid.:*229). In this respect, the presence (or absence) of affective evidence can be crucial in deciphering possible, semantic differences exhibited by mental state verbs when encoding propositional attitude. In fact, affectivity will be brought to bear on the analysis of the constructions in this study. Against this background, I will now briefly examine some further differences identified by the relevant literature among the (proto)typical mental state verbs (and, by extension, also (proto)typical for the encoding of propositional attitude) *'know'*, *'believe'* and *'think'*, aiming to focus on the latter two given their special interest to the present study.

The verb *'know'* conventionally expresses the highest degree of likelihood that the Speaker/Evaluator assigns to /*p*/, accompanied by the highest degree of certainty as well (cf. Ranger 2018). In this sense, and in the absence of refutation by the Addressee,

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[19] Although *epistemicity* and *evidentiality* are interrelated, some scholars, such as DeLancey (1997) and Nuyts (2001), argue in favour of a discrete treatment of the two with epistemicity dealing with the evaluation of likelihood of /*p*/ and evidentiality signalling the nature of the evidence that Speaker has for /*p*/.

'know' lexicalises that the Evaluator has evidence to maintain that /*p*/ is true as in (7) below.

Example (7): *"I **know** that Jack is a master chairmaker and I admire what he does."* (Cappelli 2008:539)

The verb *'believe'*, however, is generally employed when the Speaker expresses his/her personal opinion about /*p*/ in a committed, yet retractable way. In this case, the degree of likelihood assigned to /*p*/ is not as well-defined as in the case of *'know'* but it nonetheless features a positive value along the epistemic scales (Ranger 2018). In other words, the Speaker allows for – or even favours – the possibility that /*p*/ is true but cannot commit to its truth on objective grounds, only on affective ones. The correlation of *'believe'* with affectivity finds additional support in the adverbial modification that the verb permits by adverbs like *'passionately'* and *'strongly'* (as in examples 8-9 below) that would not be acceptable with other mental state verbs encoding propositional attitude (e.g., *'think'*). This provides further evidence that, although cognitive in origin, the verb *'believe'* exhibits dispositional semantics confirming the already argued (see section 2.2.1) intolerance of the semantic class to rigid typologies (see also Chapter 4).

Example (8): *"'I **passionately believe** by working as a team we can help young people to lead happy and successful lives,' he said."* (Cappelli 2007b:540)

Example (9): *"I **strongly believe** that if someone says to me, 'I've had my house interior designed,' it's just meaningless rubbish."* (Cappelli 2007b:540)

In a similar vein, *'think'* also differs from both *'know'* and *'believe'* as it is argued to be a purely epistemic verb which lexicalises the Evaluator's assignment of a positive degree of likelihood to /*p*/, while leaving room for doubt. *'Think'* thus encodes a rational

evaluative process whose output results in the Evaluator's opinion which depends on the available evidence provided in the context (Ranger 2018). This suggests that the evidential function of *'think'* is *"not inherent in the semantic potential of the verb"* (Cappelli 2007b:540) but is supplied contextually. Consequently, although *'believe'* and *'know'* lexicalise a medium to high level of commitment to the evaluation of /*p*/, *'think'* allows the Evaluator to express varying degrees of uncertainty in the context in which it is traced (Lehrer 1974). *'Think'* is, therefore, argued to be 'neutral' as far as evidentiality is concerned and less specified as to the Speaker's certainty. Moreover, its extreme context-sensitiveness endows it with even further polyfunctionality (Cappelli 2007a, 2007b). For instance, it is associated with a prototypical *'cognitive attitude function'* by indexing *tentativeness* (Aijmer 1996; Cappelli 2007a), as in (10) below, where it can be paraphrased by other expressions signalling probability (e.g., *'probably'*).

Example (10): *"He won't be er, but she was so she said you're gonna chop the tree down, that tree whe, that he bumped into! But I **think** he won't do that again. Will he?* [= But he probably will not do that again.] (Cappelli 2008:540)

In this respect, *'think'* is also associated with a *"bleached cognitive attitude function"* that endows it with a more *deliberative* meaning conveying authority rather than uncertainty (Simon-Vanderbergen 2000). In this sense, it is typically encountered in argumentative contexts, such as political debates, an in (11) below:

Example (11): *"This president has left them in shatters across the globe, and we're now 90 percent of the casualties in Iraq and 90 percent of the costs. I **think** that's wrong, and I **think** we can do better."* (Senator Kerry, The First Bush-Kerry Presidential debate, 30 September 2004; Cappelli 2008:541)

Moreover, *'think'* can also be used as a *politeness-strategic device* for corrective face-work, essentially functioning as a *hedge* or *downtoner* (see Brown and Levinson 1987) as in (12) below:

Example (12): *"I **think** we'd better have a talk."* (Cappelli 2008:541)

Finally, the epistemic difference between the pairs *'know - believe'* (see Chapter 4) and *'know - 'think'* (see Chapter 5) is further evidenced through their ability to feature in the slots of the negation-framed construction I DO NOT V1 SO, I V2 SO that marks them as antonyms, as in the following examples (13-14):

Example (13): - *"Thomas: "Let me get this straight. You think that the entire world is getting dumber?"-Ross: "No, **I don't think so**. **I know so**. It's a known fact that the world is devolving into chaos."* (Cappelli 2008:542)

Example (14): *Is there a contradiction in the word of God? **I don't believe so... I know so**."* (Cappelli 2008:542)

On the basis of the above, it may be concluded that *'think'* is an antonym of *'know'* with respect to epistemicity, but when the contrast concerns evidentiality, it is *'believe'* that functions as the privileged antonym of *'know'* (cf. Jones 2002; Lynne Murphy 2003).

Unlike *'believe'* and *'think'*, the verb *'mind'*, which is a less prominent member of the verbal semantic class in focus, consistently features dispositional semantics. Furthermore, it is incompatible with evidentiality and epistemicity as it neither evaluates the degree of likelihood of /p/, nor does it signal commitment to a specific source of evidence. Interestingly, this is consistently the case regardless of whether the

verb carries the morphological marking of negation (15) or of the Imperative in either an injunctive pattern[20] (16) or in the construction focused upon in the present work (17).

Example (15): *"I **don't mind** having a dog in the house so long as it's clean."* (CED)

Example (16): *"**Mind** that you don't bang your head on the shelf when you stand up.* (CED)

Example (17): *"Most of our clients are individuals who hold numbered accounts with the bank. You might see their names penciled somewhere inside their files. Penciled, **mind you**. Erasable. They are to remain officially anonymous."* (*Numbered Account – Christopher Reich,* cited in Bell 2009:15)[21]

In the above sense, '*mind*' is not only argued to be the least prototypical mental state verb of the category (including the sub-class of propositional attitude verbs) but to also exhibit properties that would unequivocally set it apart from other members of the class. From a theoretical standpoint, this adds both to the significance of its independent, focused study and to the contribution of the present work to honing our understanding of the semantic complexities couched in the specific, semantic verbal class.

In what follows, therefore, my focus will be placed on the semantics of the verbs appearing in the constructions under study and its correlation with the Imperative morphological marking. Particular emphasis will also be given to examining issues related to the *state* vs. *activity* features displayed by mental state verbs.

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[20] As will be discussed in Chapter 6 (see section 2.6.1), *injunctive patterns* feature the verb *'mind'* in the Imperative but are typically followed by a negatively polarised clause in which the pronoun *'you'* functions as the Subject.
[21] See also Ranger (2015).

2.2.3 Mental state verbs in the Imperative

The lexical and syntactic combinatory patterns exhibited by mental state verbs contribute significantly to our understanding of their semantics, pragmatics, and discourse function and shed light on their internal complexity. Adopting a constructional approach, which views constructions as *paired* units of *meaning* and *form* (see also section 2.3), I maintain that it is the combination of form and meaning in constructions featuring mental state verbs that contributes to their *polysemy* and internal *variability*.[22] I further argue that the latter is largely motivated by the oscillation they exhibit between the expression of mental state (or a process) and the encoding of propositional attitude.

In this respect, apart from the progressive aspect mentioned above (see section 2.2.1), the morphological marking of the Imperative will also be shown to be incompatible with the encoding of propositional attitude by mental state verbs. Evidence for the general incompatibility of the expression of propositional attitude with the Imperative is also provided by Cappelli (2005) who points out that an example like: *"*Guess she was scared of him"* (as opposed to *"Assume/Suppose she was scared of him"*) is unacceptable, whereas *"Guess what I found"* is acceptable by virtue of its non-attitude sense of *'figure out'* (*ibid.*:244).

Imperative clauses are also incompatible with both epistemicity and evidentiality. This is so because unlike declarative sentences, Imperative clauses are directive in nature (i.e., they express a form of request or command) and, as such, do not have the purpose of transmitting knowledge. To put it differently, Imperative clauses do not indicate the

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[22] As a term, *variability* (see also section 2.3.5) refers to the property of a structural unit to *"include a set of fluctuating variants showing meaningful co-variation with an independent set of variables"* (Wolfram 2006:334).

Speaker's attitude and degree of commitment to the veridicality of a proposition /*p*/, because they cannot be directly linked to an information source that can be questioned (Aikhenvald 2004, 2006, 2010; Bruil 2014; van Olmen and Heinold 2017).[23] In this sense, Imperative clauses also lack epistemic authority since they cannot be given truth-conditions, that is to say, they cannot be assigned a value of truth or falsity (Strawson 1971; Davidson 1967, 1984). This general incompatibility of the Imperative with epistemicity and evidentiality is also the case for instances of affective evidentiality (see Cappelli 2007a, 2007b, 2008).

Finally, it should also be noted that by virtue of its Addressee-evoking semantics (Makkonen-Craig 2014), the use of the Imperative endows the constructions with an intersubjective, dialogic orientation (see section 2.4), even in discourse contexts whereby an active, co-temporal participant is not present (Traugott 2010). These observations are crucial for the present study for two reasons. On the one hand, they confirm the presence of further variability (than the one already cited in the relevant literature) inside the semantic class of mental state verbs. On the other, they provide important empirical support for the motivation of the constructional network of perspectivisation identified in the present work.

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[23] Aikhenvald's works (2004, 2010, 2012) are – to the best of my knowledge – the only studies confirming a form of interrelationship between Imperatives and evidentiality, whereby the former feature only *reportative* evidentials that serve the function of relaying someone else's order as in the following example from the Panoan language Shipibo-Konibo:
"Onpax-ki be-wé!
Contained.water:ABS-REP bring-IMP"
'(She says that you must) bring water!' (Valenzuela 2003:42)

2.2.4 Mental state verbs: An interim summary

Following the above (section 2.2.1 - 2.2.3), the present section provides an interim summary of the literature-cited features of mental state verbs which will be brought to bear on the constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation identified by the present study (for a box notation representation of the network see Chapter 7, section 7.3). These features crucially include the following:

a) A systematic evasion of rigid semantic classifications due to the high adaptivity of mental state verbs to external pressures and contextual variables which change, weaken, or strengthen their semantics by adding to them qualities (e.g., dispositional, affective semantics) not originally available in their cognitive origin, as in the case of the verb *'believe'*.

b) A far-reaching influence of morphological and syntactic combinatorial configurations on the semantics of these verbs, as in the case of the Imperative which is crucially shown to be incompatible with the encoding of propositional attitude and the expression of evidential and epistemic considerations. This foregrounds that epistemicity and evidentiality cannot be regarded as general, consistent, and uniform features of the semantic class, even in the absence of the Imperative, as in the case of the verb *'mind'*.

c) An internal complexity and variability emerging from their ability to express mental state, encode propositional attitude, and offer an interpersonal, intersubjective *"colouring"* of utterances (Bertuccelli Papi 2000). In the present study, the latter will be shown to essentially couch the dialogic function of these verbs in *"antagonistic contexts"* (Cappelli 2005) that further necessitate the use of intensifying elements, typically used for evaluation purposes.

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The identification of all the above enhances our understanding of the specific semantic class, and of the language patterns identified, and calls for empirical evidence. The latter requires a usage-based theoretical treatment which can yield a principled and – most importantly – integrated account of their features. Aligning with this methodological necessity, the section that follows provides a detailed overview of the main tenets of the CxG framework adopted in the present work. It further proposes that through (partial-)inheritance the constructions identified can be effectively embedded in the rest of the grammar and in a broader network of more schematic constructions.

2.3 Construction Grammar (CxG): The theoretical model of the study

Given that, as already mentioned, the language patterns in focus are of a phrasal, rather than a lexical status, their analysis would most profitably relate to a treatment similar to that of *phraseologisms*. In recent phraseological studies (e.g., Gries 2007, Wulff, Gries and Stefanowitsch 2007; Granger and Meunier 2008), a phraseologism refers to the co-occurrence of a form of a lexical item and one or more linguistic elements, which functions as one semantic unit in a clause and whose frequency of co-occurrence is larger than expected on the basis of chance (Gries 2008:6).[24]

This approach to linguistic meaning is in line with what is theoretically advocated by the linguistic model of CxG, thereby highlighting its methodological appropriacy for the present research project. The sections (2.3.1 - 2.3.5) that follow present an overview of the main tenets of CxG, its treatment of meaning at various linguistic levels (from

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[24] As Gries (2008:6) observes, phraseology is a very widespread concept which is sometimes unprofitably conflated with others. To avoid potential problems in this direction, Gries (2008) identifies the following set of parameters as typically implicated in phraseological research: (i) the nature of the elements involved in a phraseologism, (ii) the number of elements involved in it, (iii) the number of times it must be observed before it counts as a phraseologism, (iv) the permissible distance between the elements involved in it, (v) the degree of lexical and syntactic flexibility of the elements involved and (vi) the role that semantic unity and semantic non-compositionality/non-predictability play in its definition (for a similar critique, see Howarth 1998:25).

morphemes to discourse-level and genre-specific constructions (see Nikiforidou 2016, 2018, 2021)), the way it organises constructions, and how it deals with phenomena of change and variation in language, all these issues being relevant to the present study.

2.3.1 Constructions and the main tenets of CxG

As briefly outlined in Chapter 1 (see section 1.1), CxG maintains that all language patterns, regardless of their varying degrees of (ir)regularity, *"have an equal informational value in our quest for understanding the nature of language as a particular kind of cognitive and social behaviour"* (Fried 2015:974). In this respect, language should be studied in its totality *"without making any distinction between core and periphery or assuming that certain structures are inherently more deserving of an analyst's attention"* (*ibid.*:974-975). The motivation behind this *holistic, all-encompassing* approach of CxG to language lies on two main hypotheses:

 a) A model capable of accounting for the most complicated or 'irregular' patterns of language use should by default be capable of also handling the most regular instances of language use as well.

b) A more profound understanding of the rather 'idiosyncratic' or 'opaque' patterns of language could contribute to a much clearer understanding of language organisation in general. This is the case even when it comes to seemingly more straightforward patterns, which, however, could also be shown to exhibit unpredictable constraints (see Fillmore 1986; Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988; Boas 2010; Fried 2015).

Consistently with the above, CxG further defines itself as a *non-derivational*, *non-modular* and *usage-based* theoretical model that seeks to find the most effective, all-encompassing, and representation-wise economical way of capturing the relationship between *structure*, *meaning* and *use* (Fried and Östman 2005; Goldberg 2006). By

adhering to such a commitment, CxG essentially undertakes the responsibility to provide empirically-grounded linguistic accounts which, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, are in line with the methodology adopted herein, the recent advances in Corpus Linguistics, and the constant refinement of statistical methods used in linguistic analysis (e.g., Gries 2003, 2005; Gries and Stefanowitsch 2004, 2006, Groom 2019).

Seeking to offer a *holistic* and *maximalist* treatment of language, CxG posits that the central blocks of language are most effectively represented by *constructions.* Constructions are defined and stored in the minds of the speakers as *"learned pairings (units) of form and semantic or discourse meaning (function) which may differ in terms of size, complexity and meaning"* (Goldberg 2006:5). They vary across a continuum ranging from *fully-substantive* (i.e., *idiomatic*) to *fully-schematic* (i.e., *productive*) language patterns, all sharing an equally important status in our understanding of language. This continuum-like organisation makes CxG particularly suitable for exploring *"the middle ground"*, namely instances of language use that fall somewhere along the continuum by exhibiting partial-fixedness, which receive, however, the same treatment with fully-substantive ones (e.g., *"give the Devil his due")* and more schematic ones, like the PASSIVE *(e.g., "The armadillo was hit by a car.")* or the DITRANSITIVE *(e.g., "He baked her a muffin").*

The symbolic architecture of a construction, according to Croft (2001:18), may be represented schematically as follows in Figure 2.1, while the continuum-like organisation of constructions is depicted in Figure 2.2:

Figure 2.1: The symbolic structure of a construction (Croft 2001:18)

Figure 2.2: The idiomaticity continuum (based on Kay and Michaelis 2012, adapted from Michaelis 2017:10)[25]

In light of their definition, symbolic architecture and continuum-like organisation provided above, constructions may be argued to operate as '*conglomerates*' of phonological, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic information occupying *"the functional space of 'gestalts' and, in the case of discourse constructions licensing discourse-specific constructs"* (Nikiforidou *et al.,* 2014:693). The latter, i.e., *constructs*

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[25] The downward arrow in Figure 2.2 above indicates a decreasing amount of pre-specified lexical content.

are defined as specific language instantiations and physical realisations of constructions in actual discourse (Kay and Fillmore 1999).

Having provided a concise overview of the main tenets of CxG, and the treatment of constructions, both at the level of linguistic analysis and abstract representation, I will now focus on how meaning is viewed within the framework of the model.

2.3.2 The treatment of meaning in CxG

A central parameter involved in defining constructions and viewing meaning in CxG is the concept of *predictability* and its interconnection with *compositionality*. As Goldberg (2006) observes, the degrees of (internal) predictability among constructions are expected to differ while *"any linguistic pattern is recognized as a construction as long as some aspect of its form or function is not strictly predictable from its component parts or from other constructions recognized to exist. In addition, patterns are stored as constructions even if they are fully predictable…"* (*ibid.*:5).

As a concept, compositionality posits that the meaning of every expression in a language is viewed as the function and meaning of its constituents and the syntactic rule used to combine them (Goldberg 1995).[26] Accordingly, and following principles of mathematical logic, this suggests that: a) the meaning of an expression would be predictable by the meaning of its individual parts, and b) the meaning of the whole expression would equate the sum of the meaning of its constituents. However, such a compositional treatment of language is hardly the case in actual language use. As Szabó (2007) observes: *"If a language is compositional, it cannot contain a pair of non-synonymous complex expressions with identical structure and pairwise synonymous*

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[26] In its strict sense, compositionality functions as a formula whereby σ is understood as a function that maps expressions to meaning: $\sigma(x +_{\text{syntactic-composition}} y) = \sigma(x) +_{\text{semantic-composition}} \sigma(y)$ (Goldberg 1995:13).

constituents" (cited in Kay and Michaelis 2012:2276). A case in point is that of PSEUDO CONDITIONALS as in the literature-cited example (18) that follows.

Example (18): *"If you're George Bush, you're now allowed to lie in the faces of trusting young voters."* (Kay and Michaelis 2012:2276)

In an ordinary conditional, the sincere speaker of such a protasis would not hypothesise an impossible state of affairs, which is the case in the *if*-clause above, since the Speaker expresses the manifest impossibility that the Addressee is identical to George Bush. This suggests that, despite the syntactic form (i.e., IF YOU ARE X, P(X)), which is similar to that of ordinary conditionals (at least one form of them) (see also Athanasiadou and Dirven 1996; Dirven and Athanasiadou 2005), the semantics of the pattern in (18) is distinct as no hypothetical situation is posed. Rather, a categorical judgement is expressed, and the subject of that judgement is *not* the Addressee, but the person identified as X. In this respect, (18) is clearly *about* X (i.e., George Bush) and *not about* the consequences of a hypothetical identity between George Bush and the Addressee. The available distinct interpretations for a pattern, therefore, despite its piece-by-piece constituent analysis, indicate its *non-compositionality*. If this is seen in conjunction with the productivity that characterises PSEUDO-CONDITIONALS, one understands the need for a grammar account that adequately describes the interpretive and combinatorial constraints that define any pattern which – as in this case – may well sit on a cline of idiomaticity.

Further evidence of the non-compositionality in language stems from lexically fixed, substantive idiomatic expressions (e.g., *"red herring", "hit the nail on the head"*) or

formal, lexically-open idioms[27] like the 'correlated scales' involved in THE X-ER, THE Y-ER construction[28] or the WHAT'S X DOING Y? (WXDY) construction[29] whose meaning can neither be predicted by, nor exhausted in, the sum of the senses of their individual components.

At the same time, CxG acknowledges the existence of syntactically transparent composition as well, [30] arguing for the presence of varying degrees of predictability and compositionality among constructions. In fact, as Goldberg (2006) observes, the degree(s) of predictability determine whether a certain language pattern relates to an already known construction or whether a new, separate construction should be introduced (see section 2.3.5) because *"it is not really possible to predict all of the facts about the use, internal composition, combinatory potential, or meaning of the pattern under study" (ibid.:6).*

Building up on distinguishing between available constructions, it should be noted that, regardless of their degree of schematicity, if two constructions bear certain similarities, but are syntactically distinct, then they are also expected to be semantically and/or pragmatically distinct (Goldberg 1995). In other words, differences in complement configuration are automatically associated with differences in meaning as evident in examples that would otherwise seem even interchangeable like *"John gave an apple to Mary"* (an instance of the DITRANSITIVE construction) and *"John gave Mary an apple"* (an instance of the PREPOSITIONAL DATIVE construction). Undoubtedly, both sentences

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[27] Fillmore *et al.*, (1988) define *formal idioms* as syntactically regular structures that derive their idiomaticity from the fact that they feature conventional interpretations distinct from what 'rule-to-rule' semantic composition would allow.
[28] E.g., *"The faster we run, the slower they run."* (Croft and Cruse 2004)
[29] E.g., *"What's that fly doing in my soup?"* (Croft and Cruse 2004)
[30] As Kay and Michaelis (2012) note: *"...no matter how paradoxical it might seem, only CxG is able to actually 'salvage' compositionality because when a syntactic construct (i.e., a string of words with a particular hierarchical structure) has two distinct meanings, a constructionist attributes these meanings to two different collections of form-meaning licensors" (ibid.:2274).*

share considerable semantic similarities, but their syntactic configuration results not only in semantic differences but also different degrees of emphasis on direct and indirect objects, respectively.[31] These differences are further reflected in frequency measurements on the use of one construction as opposed to the other (Bresnan *et al.*, 2007). The ease of processing involved in each construction might also play a decisive role in which one of two 'competing' structures may eventually dominate in actual language use.[32] Differences like the ones identified between similar constructions, reflected in frequency of use by speakers, ultimately suggest a type of functional difference between the alternatives, thus corroborating that idea that *constructional synonymy* should be considered *minimal*.

As will be discussed in Chapter 4, this is the case particularly with constructions exhibiting partial-inheritance (see also section 2.3.4), largely regarded as synonyms with one of the two alternatives featuring as the emphatic counterpart of the other. In the context of the present study, a case in point is that of BELIEVE ME and BELIEVE YOU ME. Although their difference has traditionally been associated solely with emphasis, the present work provides empirical support for the fact that the non-canonical word

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[31] Apart from their differences as regards emphasis, the DITRANSITIVE construction requires that its goal argument be animate (1a and 1b), while this is not the case for the PREPOSITIONAL DATIVE construction (2a and 2b).
*(1) a. I brought **Pat** a glass of water.*
*b. I brought a glass of water **to Pat**.*
*(2) a. *I brought **the table** a glass of water.*
*b. I brought a glass of water **to the table**.*
Moreover, as Bresnan, Cueni, Nikitina and Baayen (2007) note, the DITRANSITIVE also manifests a strong predilection for highly accessible or pronominal Recipients and that certain verbs, whose meaning is compatible with both constructions, tend to occur *only* in one of the two. For instance:
(3) a. John donated the painting to the museum.
b. * John donated the museum the painting.
[32] For instance, the PREPOSITION STRANDING construction (e.g., *'Which student did you ask Mary about?'*) has been explored against the PREPOSITION PIED-PIPING construction (e.g., *'About which student did you ask Mary?'*). Cross-linguistically, the latter has been found to be more common because of less cognitive processing and because, unlike its counterpart, it does not allow for 'garden path effects'. 'Garden path effects' refer to instances in which a grammatically correct sentence starts in such a way that a reader's most likely interpretation will be incorrect. In other words, the reader is lured into a parse that turns out to be a 'dead end' or yields a clearly unintended meaning (cf. Trotta 2000; Hawkins 2004; Hoffmann 2008).

order of BELIEVE YOU ME makes it a *variant* form (see also section 2.3.5) of BELIEVE ME in that its focused, post-posed pronominal Subject functions semantically as a Patient (Biberauer and Roberts 2010; Frascarelli and Stortini 2019). In this respect, their discourse-pragmatics also differs from *inviting faith in/trust to the Speaker (S)* to *demanding faith in/trust to the Speaker (S)* concerning the veridicality of a proposition /*p*/ (see Chapter 4, sections 4.3 – 4.4).

Given the centrality of the discourse function performed by constructions, the following section (2.3.3) offers a detailed analysis of how this can be effectively couched in CxG terms.

2.3.3 Discourse-level constructions

CxG is definitionally capable of venturing analyses of language patterns that move beyond the *morpheme-* and *word*-level to *clausal* or *supra-clausal* level. The latter is reflected in a robust body of work in the field (Fried and Östman 2005; Östman 2005; Linell 2009; Nikiforidou *et al.*, 2014) and in the present study which aims to show that phrasal constructions (varying from substantive to semi-schematic) can effectively function at a discourse level.

Gearing itself to such type of analyses, CxG adopts an *"all-feature-embracing"* approach to meaning which is expected to accommodate: *"all the conventionalized aspects of a construction's function, which may include not only properties of the situation described by the utterance, but also properties of the discourse in which the utterance is found…and of the pragmatic situation of the interlocutors"* (Croft and Cruse 2004:258). This treatment of meaning suggests that any regularities of pragmatic or discursive nature are also part of the conventional make-up of constructions, along

with any specific prosodic, syntactic, and pragmatic features, as in the following examples (19 - 22) discussed extensively in the relevant literature:

Example (19): *"What's that fly doing in my soup?"* (expressing incongruity, see Kay and Fillmore 1999)

Example (20): *"Him be a doctor?!"* (expressing incredulity, marked for its half question, half exclamative intonation and pause after the first word)[33]

Example (21): *"Fred won't eat SHRIMP, let alone SQUID."* (imposing pragmatic scalar interpretation; capitals suggestive of prosody stressing, see Fillmore *et al.*, 1988)

Example (22): *"Blend all the ingredients together. Serve Ø cold. Measure in one teaspoon of salt. Mix Ø well."* (genre-based argument omissions in the context of recipes, see Culy 1996; Bender 1999).

In a similar vein, examples of idiomatic constructions like the construction *"we need to talk"*,[34] which is characterised by empirically-grounded, discourse-specific conventionality (i.e., interpersonal, 'couple-talk' setting) is not expected to have the same meaning with propositionally equivalent expressions such as *"we must talk"*. In instances like these, the non-compositional meaning (i.e., the unpredictable, not computable from the individual parts sense) emerges from the semanticisation of the implicature that serious talk between a couple might also entail the unpleasant news of breaking up.

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[33] For a detailed discussion of the Incredulity Response Construction (IRC), see Sailer 2002; Szcześniak and Pachol 2015 and Szcześniak 2016.

[34] *"We need to talk"* would qualify as an instance of *an idiom with a pragmatic point* (Fillmore *et al.*, 1988). According to Fillmore *et al.*, (1988), these idioms are constrained to be used in certain contexts, e.g., *"once upon a time"* (in fairytales) or *"hey"* and *"take care"* (in standard ways of opening and closing conversations).

As already mentioned, more recent work has extended the scope of the meaning pole of constructions to include discursive specifications, such as their association with genres. Some typical examples of discourse-level and genre-based constructions include *headlines* (Ruppenhofer and Michaelis 2010),[35] *labelese* (Haegeman 1990),[36] *diary writing* (Ruppenhofer and Michaelis 2010),[37] *horoscopes* (Fried and Östman 2005),[38] *classroom discourse* (Antonopoulou and Nikiforidou 2011),[39] *football chants*[40] (Shaw 2010; Hoffmann and Bergs 2015; Hoffmann 2015) or *stage directions* (Nikiforidou 2017, 2021).[41]

Motivated by, and fully-aligned with such CxG-based, discourse-oriented work, the present study puts forth that the constructions examined exhibit consistent correlations with features of their surrounding context that exceed the limits of a clause, ultimately delineating discourse units in their scope (see section 2.5). More specifically, I propose that all the constructions discussed herein exceed sentential boundaries and manifest

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[35] Headlines are characterised by regular omission of articles as in the examples: *"Dog saves baby"* or *"Prime Minister to visit US"*.

[36] Labelese are characterised by subject omission as in: *"∅ Contains alcohol"* and *"∅ Weights 9 pounds"*.

[37] Typically characterised by subject omission as in: *"∅ Read but not liked the book"*.

[38] Horoscopes follow a particular 'template' with certain slots to be filled, e.g., a) *a heading slot* (sign name), b) *the daily, weekly, monthly predictions slot* that typically includes love life, health or professional aspects and c) *the character analysis*.

[39] Classroom discourse is characterised by pragmatically-defined schematic slots in a fixed order referred to as the IRE tripartite sequence, consisting of: a) **I**nitiation (teacher), b) **R**eply/**R**esponse (students) and c) **E**valuation (the follow up performed by the teacher).

[40] A typical example of this is the ARE YOU X IN DISGUISE? construction with variations as regards its X slot which can be filled either by a country's name (e.g., England, Andorra etc.,) or the name of a team (e.g., Arsenal, Scotland, Swansea, Tottenham, etc.,). The form of the construction includes substantial, phonologically filled elements [ɑː juː] and [ɪn dɪsˈɡaɪz] as well as schematic slots for the name (or country of origin) of a rival football team. Both of which have to be repeated in certain, designated places. In terms of prosody, the text is always sung to a fixed tune (Hoffmann 2015:7-8).

[41] The use of semi-schematic constructions in stage directions that function as genre-markers with the following features: a) ENTER X/ Y+X (no need to agree with the singular or plural marking of the post-posed Subject, b) EXIT Y and c) EXEUNT Y +X (agreement with the marking of the post-posed Subject). At the same time, the verbs used are constrained to be either *enter* or *exit*. The constructions identified disallow pronominal subjects (i.e., "**Enter he*"), feature with consistency in Present Simple, and exhibit increased co-occurrence with adverbial or adverb-like modification (Nikiforidou 2017).

certain contextual dependencies and regularities, while imposing a dialogic construal on their contexts (see section 2.4).

Acknowledging that constructions exhibit varying degrees of complexity and a broadened discourse scope argues for their systematicity, regularity and connectedness in the language. In what follows, the theoretical underpinnings of this claim will be further explored with a view to highlighting the mechanism whereby such systematicity, regularity and relatedness is established in language.

2.3.4 CxG and inheritance-based networks of meaning

Following Langacker (1987:63-76), CxG accepts that constructions form *"a structured inventory of a Speaker's knowledge of the conventions of their language, and not a random collection of exceptions and irregularities"*. To model the relations formed among constructions, CxG posits that constructions are organised in a system of intricate, but principled taxonomic networks, whereby each construction constitutes a node of the network. Each node, as already mentioned, forms a continuum ranging from the fully-substantive to the fully-schematic, which is organised on the basis of *inheritance*. Inheritance is the concept-mechanism that *"provides a coherent way of capturing which properties individual constructions have in common and what sets them apart as related but distinct grammatical patterns"* (Fried and Östman 2004:12). It, therefore, accounts for the relation between more productive, compositional, and predictable patterns of language with more formal/substantive ones (see Fillmore *et al.*, 1988). Inheritance hierarchies constitute a crucial feature of the taxonomic networks in CxG in that they allow for broad generalisations to be captured by higher-level constructions which are then inherited by others. They also allow for sub-regularities to be captured in this hierarchical network at various midpoints. Figure 2.3 that follows

showcases an example of a taxonomic hierarchy as cited in Croft and Cruise (2004: 264).[42]

Figure 2.3: A sample of a taxonomic constructional hierarchy (Croft and Cruise 2004:264)

As the positioning in Figure 2.3 above suggests, at the bottom of the hierarchy, there are two partially-filled idiomatic constructions, namely *"kick the bucket"* and *"kick the habit"*. Both of them typically exhibit the same argument structure pattern as instantiations of the transitive use of the verb '*kick*' which, as Figure 2.3 illustrates, is placed one level higher in terms of hierarchy. This shows that the constructions at the bottom of the hierarchical network inherit the general properties involved in the use of the verb and, by extension, the *'mother construction'*. In other words, they inherit verb inflection, phonological realisation, and certain specifications with reference to the Subject (e.g., its predilection for animate subjects).

The hierarchical networks that capture the relationships across constructions are of two types: a) those that operate on strictly hierarchical trees with a root (i.e., the most

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[42] For the sake of economy, only the syntactic (form) side of the construction will be represented.

general pattern) inherited by all its descendants, each of which is a more specialised and narrower variant (e.g., Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996) and b) those capturing partial-inheritance, in which constructions are related through family resemblance relationships.

The former type of hierarchies is employed primarily to account for similarity in form and can be illustrated through networks of related modification patterns, e.g., *"blue ink", "blue eyes", "blue moon"* etc., In this case, all these expressions represent a continuum of form-meaning integration since all of them are instances of the same syntactic pattern (MODIFIER-NOUN). But, although this is a generalisation worth capturing, they also differ in terms of productivity and compositionality. In practice, they capture a hierarchy of increasingly restricted variants of the most general, schematic MODIFICATION construction at the root while each variant is represented as a *'daughter'* introducing particular constraints until one reaches the level of fully-filled and fully-fixed combinations as in *"blue moon"*, *"black eye"* and *"red eyes"*. They all share the same syntactic configuration with the other expressions in the network but, being at the bottom level of the hierarchy, they have a specific colour adjective and, in this case, also a specific noun (Fried 2015:984-985).

The second type of network hierarchies used for capturing partial-inheritance is particularly applicable to cases in which constructions are related through family resemblance. This is the case with groups of constructions related through various subsets of shared features but where *"a true hierarchy of increasingly more constrained variants or an empirically attested root cannot be established"* (Fried 2015:985). Additionally, despite the obvious similarities observed, and the overall similar syntactic configuration, the variants present only partial overlaps. It would, therefore, be more

accurate to conceptualise their relationships as *"a constructional map"* (Fried 2015:986). These types of networks, and this concept of family resemblance, which is of particular interest to this study, are often at play when attempting to capture diachronic relationships among constructions. In these cases, synchronic research (like the present one) might illustrate certain residues alluding to a certain type of hierarchy which is, however, difficult to pinpoint unless diachronic analysis is conducted. And, even in cases whereby diachronic analysis is conducted, the results as to the exact starting point of a construction or as to its exact development trajectory might only be tentative. The benefit of this type of networks is that they offer valuable organisational information in relation to capturing associations between a particular functional domain and the constructions that can be said to encode it. In such an approach, therefore, the unifying element in the network is not the root construction but the functional, conceptual space onto which the constructions are mapped (Fried 2015).

As will be argued in the relevant Chapters (4-6), the constructions under investigation exhibit both idiosyncratic and inherited properties related to more general constructions in the language. For instance, as already pointed out, all the constructions examined inherit semantic features from mental state verbs (see section 2.2). At the same time, they also inherit features from the IMPERATIVE, while some of them further inherit features from certain sub-constructions of the latter, such as the NON-CANONICAL IMPERATIVE WITH FOCUSED POST-POSED SUBJECTS at work for BELIEVE YOU ME and MIND YOU. Accordingly, the template that licenses BELIEVE ME and – to a certain extent through partial-inheritance – its variant form, i.e., BELIEVE YOU ME, is evidently connected to the IMPERATIVE sub-construction of $V_{(AFF)/IMP}$ + ME whose verbal slot is frequently, though not exclusively (hence the parentheses), occupied by a verb with affective semantic undertones paired with pronominal self-reference. In its turn, this

specific sub-construction produces further similar constructions in the language that would include TRUST ME[43] or WATCH ME[44] among others to be discussed (for a detailed discussion see Chapter 7, section 7.3).

In the case of BELIEVE IT OR NOT, the inheritance relations correlate the IMPERATIVE with DISJUNCTION; a combination also licensing other similar constructions in the language as well, such as LIKE IT OR NOT.[45] Similarly, for THINK AGAIN, its licensing template pairs the IMPERATIVE with adverbial complementation, whose slot is lexically-filled by the conjunctive adverb *'again',* also licensing other constructions in the language, such as SAY AGAIN[46] or COME AGAIN.[47] A more detailed analysis of all the above, the inheritance relations, and the productivity of the licensing templates involved will be reserved for Chapters 4-6 and Chapter 7 (section 7.3). The latter will also offer suggested box notation diagrams for the inheritance relations of each construction examined and the overarching dialogic perspectivisation network brought to the fore.

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[43] *"I remember I read somewhere that in the distant past writers used to let a finished work "rest" for a few years before editing it with a fresh eye - and only then published it. **Trust me**, the only writers who could actually do that are the ones who either have another source of income or who are so wildly successful that they're not under pressure to publish a book a year to keep from starving…"*
(COCA, [Title: An interim report from the coal face - Charlie's Diary],
Source: BLOG http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2012/11/an-interim-report-from-the-coa.html
(publication date: 2012)
[44] *"Oh, so very happy right now!!! I may actually take a "mental-health day" from work tomorrow. Think I'm kiddin'? **Watch me**!!!"*
(COCA, [Title: Medical Cannabis: Voices from the Frontlines, Blog Archive, DC],
Source: BLOG http://safeaccessnow.org/blog/blog/2012/10/17/dc-circuit-orders-supplemental-
briefing-in-federal-landmark-medical-marijuana-case/ (publication date: 2012)

[45] *"**Like it or not**, Obama is our first black president, and **like it or not**, racism does still exist in this country. I'm not accusing anyone that has made a death threat against Obama of being racist, but these facts put the secret service on edge…"*
(COCA, [Title: Death Threats Against Bush at Protests Ignored for Years, zomblog],
Source: BLOG http://www.zombietime.com/zomblog/?p=621 (publication date: 2012)

[46] *"The DNA match is on your father's side. I'm sorry. -**Say again**? -The vigilante is your sister. -No!"*
(COCA, TV Series: *Arrow*, 2019)
[47] *"'What's that, Fred luvvie?' she called from the stove. 'Stupid bastards,' he mumbled on. -' **Come again**, Fred?' -'I said stupid bastards!'*
(BNC, *Man at the Sharp End*, Kilby M., 1985-1993)

Recognising that tracing inheritance relations is the first step to identifying the source of the development of constructional variants, one of the central research foci of this work is to confirm that the literature-established, internal complexity and polysemy of mental state verbs is in fact one of the main sources of motivation for the inheritance-based relations at work among the constructions identified. If this is indeed the case, then the verbs in the patterns under study will be crucially shown to emerge as further, variant forms of the prototypical *'believe'*, *'think'* and *'mind'*, thus begging the question as to the motivation for the emergence of a network of constructions in which variants are couched. These issues will be taken up in the next sub-section in the context of CxG.

2.3.5 Construction formation, change, variation, and synchronic variability

Given its usage-based orientation, CxG acknowledges that grammar is a dynamic, emergent phenomenon shaped by cognitive processes involved in and conditioned by language use (cf. Hopper 1987; Milroy 1992, 2003; Croft 2000; Langacker 2007; Bybee 2010). In this respect, it recognises the need to account not only for the *motivation* for a construction but also for its potential *change* and the creation of *variant* forms, all of which are argued to be the outcome of the interaction of various, social, and linguistic aspects, crucially recognised by various scholars even outside the context of CxG (cf. Weinreich, Labov, Herzog 1968; Thomason and Kaufman 1988; Thomason 2001; Winford 2003).

Zeroing in on CxG, the motivation for the formation and development of constructions is accounted for by properties of human cognition and interaction since a considerable number of (new) aspects of grammatical form emerge from contexts of social interaction between speakers. As Traugott (2008) observes: *"constructions are abstract schemas and do not spell everything out in an efficiently computational way but rather*

leave room for generalizations, realignments and negotiated interaction, hence change…" (*ibid.*:239).

In an attempt to identify instances of use favouring language change and functioning as privileged external motivation for it, Traugott (2008) concludes that dialogic contexts should be considered a primary case in point in that they feature a consistent, positive correlation with new, emergent grammatical forms (see section 2.4). This view has found additional support in a number of similar related studies,[48] such as Schwenter and Traugott (2000) on the use of the epistemic '*in fact'*, Schwenter (2008) on *sentential negation*, Traugott (2010) on *pseudo-clefts*, Waltereit and Detges (2007) on the use of the *modal particle 'bien'*, Schwenter and Waltereit (2010) on the *refutation marker 'too'*, Haselow (2015) on the *final particles 'then', 'though' and 'away'* and Chen (2017) on the *discourse marker 'bienshuo'*.

Evidently, the synchronic status of the present work sets a discussion on tracking language change outside its research scope, although it acknowledges that the use of the constructions in dialogic contexts maximises their likelihood of (progressively) featuring as candidates for linguistic change; a hypothesis to be further entertained in the conclusions of the present study (see Chapter 7, section 7.5.3). In its synchronic context of examination, however, the present study maintains that the data at hand might be profitably correlated with *synchronic variation* considerations. Synchronic variation, and by extension change, are key features common to all human languages and as Hudson (1997, 2007) observes: "*due to* [their] *central role [...], any explanatorily adequate cognitive theory of language should aim to account for both of these phenomena (i.e., change and synchronic variation)"* (Hudson 2007:383-384).

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[48] For a detailed overview, see Traugott (2010:21).

Typically functioning as the drive for linguistic change, synchronic, co-temporal variation, is tied with the notions of *entrenchment* and *productivity*. The former refers to *"the degree to which a formation and activation of a cognitive unit is routinized or automated"* (Schmid 2010:119). The latter, i.e., productivity, refers to the possibility of either using a certain construction with new lexical items in its available slots or the enrichment of an already known item with a new meaning (see Goldberg 1995, 2006; Bybee 2010, 2013).[49]

Following the above, for variant forms to be motivated, a construction first needs to become deeply entrenched so that its abstract schema can become productive. To put it simply, the more entrenched a construction is, the more productive, (i.e., the more open to deviation from its prototypical form) it will be (Langacker 2000; van Bogaert 2010). In this sense, the notion of *linguistic variable,* namely the fact that *"a structural unit* [includes] *a set of fluctuating variants showing meaningful co-variation with an independent set of variables"* (Wolfram 2006:334) emerges as a key concept reflecting actual language use and change. The initial variables, namely the *'novel structures'* (see Langacker 2000:100) will then progressively become entrenched constructions themselves, while any further possible, variant forms will also come to assume their own position in the overall constructional taxonomy. Ultimately, the production of novel forms is essentially seen as the 'vehicle' of confirmation for the further expansion and deeper entrenchment of a higher-order construction (van Bogaert 2010).

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[49] A case in point would be the WAY-construction since the candidates for its verbal slot appear to form part of a continuously expandable list, as illustrated by the following:
(1): "*He **made his way** to the workbench.*"
(2): "*[F]armers […] were beginning **to hack their way** through primeval forests.*"
(3): *"[W]e **talked our way** into the VIP area."*
(4): "*[H]e could watch trainees **grunting their way** under barbed wire."* (see Perek 2018)

The concept of gradual, co-temporal variation is particularly relevant to the analysis intended, given that it focuses on the variant forms of the mental state verbs involved in each construction. Aligning with work in this direction (Kärkkäinen 2003; van Bogaert 2006, 2010; Ranger 2018), I put forth that the verbs identified in the constructions (along with their idiosyncratic, internal features and co-textual dependencies) function as variant forms of the prototypical I THINK, I BELIEVE, and I MIND constructions with their own distinct, particular properties.

I further propose that each construction may be profitably viewed as yet another variant form of the abstract schema it functionally serves. For instance, in the BELIEVE-family, every member will be considered a variant form of the functional space of marking/announcing unexpected information. THINK AGAIN will be viewed as a variant form of Speaker-generated, pre-emptive rebuttal of challenge and MIND YOU as a variant form of summoning the Addressee's attention to impose the rectification of the proposition /p/ in its scope (see Chapters 4-6 and Chapter 7 (section 7.3)). Perhaps even more importantly, I further suggest that all the constructions identified should also be seen as forming part of the even more abstract schema of dialogicity in the language; itself functioning as a motivating source for the constructions at hand (see Chapter 7, section 7.3). Dialogicity, then, will be taken up in the next section.

2.4 Dialogicity and perspectivisation in discourse

As briefly mentioned in the introduction of the present chapter, *dialogicity* and, its counterpart, *monologicity* constitute a focal point of interest for the present analysis. The sections that follow (2.4.1 - 2.4.3) trace their roots back to the philosophical context of discussion on *dialogue*, examine their in-between differences, and advance the

hypothesis that certain patterns in language inherently function as indexes of dialogicity.

2.4.1 The concept of dialogue: From Philosophy to Linguistics

As a concept, dialogue has been characterised by a significant degree of abstraction and ambiguity in both Philosophy and Relational Communication Theory (McAllister-Spooner 2008). This probably explains the general lack of agreement on an effective and all-encompassing definition of the concept (see Buber 1929/1958; Bakhtin 1975/1981; Heath, Pearce, Shotter, Taylor, Kersten, Zorn, Roper, Motion and Deetz 2006; Kelleher 2007). Nevertheless, as will be shown below, various aspects of dialogue have been productively addressed by different scholars highlighting the complexity of all the issues involved.

Typically associated with *process* rather than *outcome* status (Heath *et al.*, 2006; Kelleher 2007), dialogue has been defined as a kind of interaction according to which participation is distributed across individuals, the production of meaning is context-dependent and, at the same time, dynamically negotiated among the participants (Wells 1999; Enyedy and Hoadley 2006). Similarly, Bokeno and Gantt (2000) view dialogue as the interplay between the Speaker, the others, and the world, and consider it *"mutually constructive, critically reflective, participatory and emergent engagement of relations between self, other and the world"* (*ibid.*:250).

David Bohm (1986) relates dialogue to *holism*. Going against a fragmentary view of interaction, Bohm views dialogue as an undivided whole which is not static, but dynamic. In Bohm's theory, this is termed *holomovement*, i.e., a type of wholeness-in-motion which, in the context of dialogue, suggests that dialogue participants suspend judgement about their own and others' beliefs and create meaning together.

This joined creation of meaning is also shared by the existentialist philosopher Martin Buber, who associates dialogue with an effort *"to recognise the value of the Other"* (Kent and Taylor 2002:22). The key concepts in Buber's theory are *reciprocity*, *mutuality*, *involvement,* and *openness*; all contributing to defining the *Other* and then to constructing a world upon the dual acts of *distancing* and *relating* towards that *Other*. Buber is best known for his effort to distinguish between the *'I-Thou'* and the *'I-It'* modes of existence and his emphasis on the interrelationship between *'dialogical'* intersubjectivity and *'monological'* self-consciousness, which may be understood as 'forerunners' of the concepts of *monologicity* and *dialogicity* discussed in the present work (see section 2.4.2).

The Bakhtinian theory of dialogue stands out from other philosophical proposals on account of its comprehensive treatment of the concept. Central to Bakhtin's theory, is the concept of *"utterance"* (or *"word"*), i.e., a *unit of interaction* in a living context of exchange (rather than abstract decontextualised sets of sentences), independent of any syntactic unit *"delimited by the change of a speaking subject"* (Bakhtin 1979/1986:77). *Otherness* (also referred to as *Other-Orientedness* or *Alterity*) is an important attribute of an utterance that holds a special place in theories about dialogue and about the notion of Self in dialogue. Apart from other people, or interlocutors, and their expressions, *Otherness* also encompasses *"the lived cultural world in time and place"* because according to Bakhtin (1979/1986): *"any form of expression is 'always-already' embedded in a history of expressions by others in a chain of ongoing cultural moments* since *"any understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is inherently responsive…any utterance is a link in the chain of communication"* (*Speech Genres*, 68:84)

In other words, Bakhtin's theory promotes a conceptualisation of dialogue, which is in line with the other approaches, but differs in that it views discourse as an ongoing social

process of meaning-making that takes the form of a chain/string of statements, in which new statements presuppose earlier ones and, at the same time, anticipate future responses (see also Irvine 2012). Bakhtin's conceptualisation of dialogue suggests that discourse typically entails not only the perspectivisation of the Speaker but that of the (assumed/imagined) Addressee whose *"voice"* (in the sense of approval or objection) is always present in discourse-making. In other words, discourse is expected to be *inherently responsive* and consequently *"any understanding is imbued with [a] response which is necessarily elicited in one form or another by turning the listener into the speaker"* (Bakhtin 1979/1986:68). In this respect, each utterance is always oriented towards the specific conceptual horizon of the Addressee and hence "*the entirety of language is eventually dialogic*" (*ibid.*:68). However, the term *dialogic* warrants further discussion especially in its relation to its counterpart, *monologic*.

2.4.2 Dialogicity and monologicity

Bakhtin's work on developing an understanding of the concept of dialogue has been crucial not only in that it has offered a more fine-grained treatment of the concept but also in that it has given the impetus for the development of the epistemological framework of *dialogicity* (Linell 1998, 2003, 2009). Dialogicity has been defined as a paradigm that *"denies the autonomous subject"* (Linell 2009:13) and views the *Other* in a definitional way, arguing that no interaction ever happens in isolation. Rather, interaction is always seen as *"oriented towards the perceived, expected, or assumed actions of other humans"* (Makkonen-Craig 2014:100).[50]

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[50] This is also in line with Schegloff, Ochs and Thompson's (1996) observation that: *"The meaning of any single grammatical construction is interactionally contingent, built over interactional time in accordance with interactional actualities. Meaning lies not with the Speaker, nor with the Addressee, nor the utterance alone ... but rather with the interactional past, current and projected next moment."* (*ibid.*: 40).

In the Bakhtinian logic, dialogue manifests itself in a double form: a) the *external dialogue*, marked by alternating speech turns and different speakers, and b) the *internal dialogue* whereby one speaker interacts with one or several other discourses. This double form of dialogue has prompted the formulation of a more elaborate framework that would encapsulate the differences between *the number of participants* and *the viewpoints* involved in discourse. The endeavour to operationalise these differences in a framework attracted the interest of many scholars, including Ducrot (1984); Schwenter (2000); Goodwin (2007); Traugott (2008, 2009) and Bres, Nowakowska and Sarale (2016).

Acknowledging the need for this distinction, the present study adopts Schwenter's (2000) classification framework whose two main axes are: a) the *external* features of dialogue (i.e., the number of participants involved) and b) the *internal* features of dialogue (i.e., the presence of multiple perspectives in discourse).[51] Aligning with Schwenter, on the basis of the number of participants involved in discourse, texts may be classified into *monologual* or *dialogual*, while differences in viewpoint might be argued to relate to *dialogicity* or *monologicity* in discourse, thus making texts essentially *monologic(al)* or *dialogic(al)*. In fact, differences between monologicity and dialogicity relate to either legitimising only one possible perspective (i.e., subjectivity and a shutting down to *'alteric potential'* (White 2009)), or promoting multiple voices (i.e., intersubjectivity and (potentially) negotiation of viewpoints). Schwenter's framework, methodologically adopted in the present work (see also Chapter 3), may be schematically presented as follows in Table 2.1.

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[51] This distinction between internal and external features of dialogue further correlates with Romero Trillo's (2015) classification of *'endocentric'* (i.e., orienting the Addressee to previously agreed common ground) and *'exocentric'* (i.e., orienting the Addressee towards an alternative meaning outside the Speaker-Addressee cognitive realm) markers (Romero Trillo *ibid*.:55).

Number of Speakers	Number of Viewpoints in Context	
	One Monologual/Monologic	**Two** Monologual/Dialogic
One: **Monologual**	**One** Monologual/Monologic	**Two** Monologual/Dialogic
Two: **Dialogual**	**One** Dialogual/Monologic	**Two** Dialogual/Dialogic

Table 2.1: Schwenter's framework (Schwenter 2000:260)

To arrive at a more comprehensive account of dialogicity, and to avoid the unprofitable conflation of external and internal features of dialogue, the present study complements Schwenter's (2000) framework with Traugott's (2008) definition of dialogicity and monologicity, according to which:

> *Dialogic texts (which) are "not homogeneous in orientation" but multiply perspectivized either within or across turns", promoting the negotiation of non-aligned perspectives "to others or to imaginary interlocutors". Monologic(al) texts, on the other hand, are typically associated with an 'authoritative voice' discourse that is not characterised by encouragement or negotiation of meaning or viewpoint.* (Traugott 2008:143)

Complementing Schwenter's framework with Traugott's definition of dialogicity has endowed the study with an even more fine-grained classification network which also illustrates the complexity of categorising cases of hybrid texts in terms of monologuality - dialoguality and monologicity - dialogicity (e.g., voice-overs in videos, TV and radio reports, announcement of news, lectures, or read-aloud speeches in front of audiences (see also Chapter 7, section 7.4)). The complexity in these cases arises from the implication that these genres technically require that one participant be present (monologual) although the discourse produced is clearly addressed to a certain

audience, which, however, need not (necessarily) be co-present in the interaction; an instance of what White (2009) has termed *'dialogue in absentia'*.

Examples like the above illustrate that the medium, which relates to external features of dialogue, may blur the lines between monologual and dialogual features. It cannot, however, possibly affect dialogicity and monologicity which seem to reside in a deeper textual level or to be inherently present in certain language patterns (or possibly be the result of a combination of both). This point is taken up in the next section which suggests that language has its own indexes of dialogicity.

2.4.3 The linguistic attestation of dialogicity

Consistently with all the above, the present study aligns with more recent linguistic work in the field, which proposes that every communicative act should be seen as interdependent with certain contextual aspects and as manifesting both *responsive* (i.e., *backward pointing*) and *anticipatory* (i.e., *projective pointing*) features regarding previous or following utterances (Linell 1998, 2003, 2009). In this respect, meaning is determined neither a priori nor outside context; rather it is constructed *in dialogue* and exhibits an *internal* and *external* structure (Linell 2009:106) evident in certain language patterns.

Linell's (2009), along with Bres *et al'*s., account (2016), the latter to be viewed as a refinement of the former, essentially propose that dialogicity may be attested linguistically through different strategies that the Speaker uses *"in order firstly to reply in advance to questions or objections the Recipient might formulate and secondly to rectify any fallacious conclusions that s/he might draw"* (Bres *et al.*, 2016:80).[52]

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[52] In very similar terms, Bakhtin has claimed that: *"...as a Speaker progresses through his/her own speech, s/he imagines the discursive reactions of his/her recipient"* (Bakhtin 1979/1986:97).

Following Bres *et al.*, (2016) who argue that dialogicity manifests itself through different mechanisms used by the Speaker, such as *prolepsis* (i.e., a question or an objection raised and answered by the Speaker), the present work also argues in favour of the existence of other similar mechanisms, such as Bres *et al.*'s (2016) concepts of *interdiscursive dialogicity,* which refers to the *internal structure* (i.e., the scope) of the language patterns, and *interlocutive dialogicity* referring to the reaction(s) that the Speaker expects on the part of the (assumed) Addressee.

Against this background, as will be discussed in section 2.5.2, the constructions at hand will be shown to have both an internal and an external structure. The latter will be argued to range from a two-place to a tripartite or (occasionally) a four-place structure, encompassing antecedent and subsequent segments as well as certain, co-occurring contextual features. It is precisely the existence of this internal and external structure that, as will be proposed in section 2.5.2, endows the constructions with an extended discourse scope, supported by specific contextual regularities, which sanctions their function as discourse unit 'delimitators'. The contextual regularities identified are triggered by the assumptions that the Speaker has about the Addressee and conventionally involve – inter alia – the presence of intensifying features, such as evaluative or emotive lexis and stance elements (see also section 2.2).

Returning to the initial hypothesis that certain language patterns might inherently exemplify an orientation towards a 'dissenting *Other*' and function as responsive utterances to assumed questions or objections, I align with the relevant literature arguing in favour of their existence as *"'veiled' dialogic sequences"* (Makkonen-Craig 2014:109). In particular, following Makkonen-Craig (2014), I also argue that constructions which *"relate to non-assertive communicative tasks"* make better candidates for dialogicity *"because they establish dynamic interrelations with one or*

more utterances in the episode" (*ibid.*:113). Following Makkonen-Craig (2014), typical examples of these include the following:

a) Questions (in a conventional form or as verbless utterances and phrases with increased orality (e.g., *"Hot?"/ "Hard to believe?"*))

b) Directives (in 2nd person Imperatives (e.g., *"Think!"/ "Look!"*), plural first persons (e.g., *"Let's have a look"*), modal zero constructions (e.g., *"One has to make further inquiries"*) and modal verbless constructions (e.g., *"Quickly to the fax machine!"*)

c) Commissives (e.g., promises (e.g., *"Must find out."*))

d) Comments and concessions in various forms, e.g., interjections and dialogue particles (e.g., *"Oops", "Hey", "Well, ... yes but"*), adjective phrases (e.g., *"Too bad"*) and evaluative clauses (e.g., *"This is enough."*)

Acknowledging that any discussion of linguistic patterns in isolation is counterproductive, Makkonen-Craig (2014) stresses the importance of context (preceding or following) as well as the evaluative or persuasive resources used in Speaker-Addressee interaction. Her proposal partially overlaps with Traugott's (2010) who argues that several linguistic expressions inherently index dialogicity. Among these, Traugott singles out: a) *adversatives* like *"but"* in the sense that they signal a confrontation of the 'incompatible' (see also Schwenter 2000:261), b) *concessives* like *"although", "however"* etc., because they convey *"the implicature that there is dissonance or incompatibility between two eventualities"* (König 1991:134), c) *negation* particularly of the non-canonical forms (e.g., *"not...either", "no...thing"*) in the sense of denying or correcting the 'truth' or a presupposition of a prior proposition or utterance (Givón 1978; Geurts 1998)), d) *epistemic modal adverbs* (e.g., "*surely",*

78

"possibly") which index dialogicity by virtue of evoking alternative worlds and, by extension, doubt (see Lyons 1977), e) *focus particles* (e.g., *"even"* or *"only"* because *"they exclude alternatives and carry an implication of dissonance or incompatibility"* (König 1991:131; Traugott 2006), and f) *scalars,* such as *"at least"* or *"still"* because of their ability to configure alternatives (i.e., *"particles that relate the value of the focused expression to a set of alternatives"* (König 1991:32)).

Correlating the above with the present study has largely informed its methodological and tagging decisions made (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2). The latter relate both to the internal structure of the constructions (e.g., the Imperative as a marker of intersubjectivity by virtue of its Addressee-evoking semantics) and their external one including their contextual cues, the presence of other directives, forms of non-assertion (questions or conditionals), or affective stance elements used in evaluation practices (Ochs 1990, 1996; Rhee 2011, 2016).

The consistent use of the Imperative across all the constructions is itself an important index of dialogicity, also discussed in more recent literature. As Enghels (2017) notes: *"2nd person stance constructions deserve [at least as much] attention given that, on the basis of their morphology alone, they foreground an extra dimension, namely the aspect of intersubjectivity, and thus the relationship between the Speaker and the Hearer."* In Traugott's (2005) terms, the Imperative, or any other intersubjective expressions, *"are decoder-oriented as they are the overt realization of the encoder's sensitivity to the decoder's subjectivity"* (*ibid.:*2).

In other words, intersubjectivity is closely related to perspectivisation issues generated by the different reality construals performed by the Speaker and the Addressee, respectively. In the constructional network of perspectivisation identified in the present

work, intersubjectivity is further enhanced by the epistemic semantics of the verbs, which encourage contrast between interlocutors' attitudes towards a state of affairs in antagonistic contexts (see section 2.2). While these verbs primarily externalise the Speaker's mental state and present reality as construed by the Speaker/Cognizer (Krawczak, Fabiszak and Hilpert 2016), their semantics, couched in the Imperative, opens up an intersubjective space between the Speaker and the Addressee. It is in this intersubjective space that dialogicity is established through the expression and promotion of different reality construals.

This intersubjective, dialogic space is discoursally defined by the scope of each construction that further delimits the discourse unit of which it is a part. The next section analyses how this is achieved in discourse highlighting the contribution of constructions in this direction.

2.5 Discourse units and discourse unit segmentation

This final section of the theoretical background of the study focuses on the concept of *discourse units* which is a basic component of analysis for every construction examined in the present work (see Chapters 4-6). Rather than reviewing the definitional challenges surrounding the topic, as well as the different (and frequently opposing) models of analysis proposed in relation to discourse units and their effective segmentation, I will restrict myself to presenting prominent syntactic and prosodic approaches to the subject that will be brought to bear on my argument towards a constructional approach to discourse unit delimitation.

My goal is to contribute to this field of research in a twofold way: a) by suggesting a *holistic treatment* of the concept of discourse units that argues in favour of revisiting strict dichotomies between *syntax*-only and *prosody*-only approaches and b) by

advocating a different approach to discourse unit delimitation, not yet explored in its full potential, according to which, constructions and, in particular, constructions indexing dialogicity, could prove fairly effective benchmarks for discourse segmentation.

2.5.1 Discourse units: Syntactic and prosodic approaches

The existence of structure in written or spoken discourse cannot be denied. However, its organisation and coherent interpretation in *discourse units* have been the object of considerable debate (cf. Chafe 1994; Mosegaard Hansen 1998; Selting 1998, 2000; Steen 2005; Hannay and Kroon 2005; Degand and Simon 2005, 2008, 2009; Taboada and Hadic Zabala 2008). Rather than providing an exhaustive overview of the various proposals and arguments put forth concerning this issue, the aim of this sub-section is to underline the complexity of such an endeavour by referring to specific approaches to segmentation that have informed the present, constructional account.

Expectedly, the various definitional and taxonomic challenges that have attracted scholarly interest in the field have been channelled into segmentation practices, ultimately aiming at a better appraisal of the underlying units of discourse. As Chafe (1994) observes, *"…researchers are always pleased when the phenomena they are studying allow them to identify units. Units can be counted and their distributions analyzed, and they can provide handles on things that would otherwise be obscure."* (*ibid.*:58). Polanyi, Culy, van den Berg, Thione and Ahn (2004) add that *"a discourse theory must specify how 'segments' (i.e., units) should be identified in light of the questions the theory is set up to answer."* (*ibid.*:3). In practice, this suggests that discourse segmentation is not a theory-neutral operation (Degand and Simon 2009) in

that it contributes valuable insights into how a theory conceives discourse in the first place.

The research interest in the field has therefore been geared in, at least, the following two directions: a) discourse in a *structure-product* approach, according to which discourse structure is built from smaller 'building blocks' related to one another in a coherent way by means of syntactic dependency and interdependency relations (see section 2.5.1.1) and b) discourse in an *interaction-process* approach (see section 2.5.1.2) that focuses on the interactional and progressive construction of discourse, with emphasis on phenomena such as *self-correction* (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977), *turn-taking* (Auer 1996), or *increments* (Vorreiter 2003; Couper-Kuhlen and Ono 2007), which are regarded as an inherent part of discourse, rather than as mere 'side effects'.

Naturally, in seeking to segment discourse into units, the two approaches rely on different linguistic correlates, which, in the case of discourse as *structure-product* emphasise *syntax*, while in the case of discourse as *interaction-process* emphasise *prosody*. The present study acknowledges that both approaches contribute useful insights into discourse unit delimitation but argues against a strict divide between syntax and prosody. In light of this, the sections that follow (2.5.1.1 - 2.5.1.2) focus on some indicative but representative models of analysis belonging to each paradigm with the aim of bringing to the fore that, although their contributions are highly appreciated, *syntax*-only and *prosody*-only models are confronted with serious challenges and limitations. This highlights the need for an alternative, all-encompassing, holistic approach to discourse that is naturally accommodated by CxG; an idea to be further entertained in section 2.5.2.

2.5.1.1 Discourse units in the structure-product approach: The contribution of syntax

The basic underlying assumption of the models falling into this *structure-product* approach to discourse is that of 'building blocks' that relate to one another *"…to form larger units, which in their turn may be the building blocks of yet larger units. Discourse understanding is thus based on … the way in which a discourse is built up out of constituent units."* (Polanyi 1986:6).[53]

For the sake of economy, and a more focused discussion of discourse structure as represented in well-cited works in the field, the present section draws its examples from the Geneva Discourse Model (Roulet 2002) and the Dependency Grammar Model (Blanche-Benveniste *et al.,*1984) as examples of approaches incorporating syntactic components in their analysis of discourse units. My aim is to demonstrate the extent to which discourse units can be defined and delimited in the framework of the models mentioned above, as well as to discuss the points of criticism that they have attracted. I further intend to show that although the contribution of these models should be acknowledged, reliance on syntax-only approaches essentially limits our understanding of discourse and, in all likelihood, offers only a partial account of discourse units.

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[53] The most influential models of discourse as *structure-product* targeting discourse units in well-entrenched *genres* include: a) the *Dependency Grammar Model* (Blanche-Benveniste *et al.*, 1984; Blanche-Benveniste *et al.*, 1990; for a more recent account, see van den Eynde and Mertens 2003), b) the *Grosz and Sidner Model* (1986), c) the *Rhetorical Structure Theory*, advocated by Mann and Thompson (1987), d) the work of Polanyi (1986, 1988), e) the work of Sanders, Spooren and Noordman (1992), f) the work of van Kuppevelt (1995), g) the *Geneva Discourse Model* advocated by Roulet (2002) and, finally, h) the *Segmented Discourse Representation Theory* (SDRT) proposed by Asher and Lascarides (2003). The present work acknowledges the theoretical insights of all the above and, particularly, the importance of genre in constructional analyses. However, given that genre considerations fall outside the intended research scope, the present study restricts itself to suggesting that they form a highly promising area to be fully addressed in future work (see Chapter 7 (see section 7.4).

i)   The Geneva Discourse Model

For the Geneva Discourse Model (Roulet 2002), the *minimal discourse unit* (also termed *"discourse act"*) is defined as *"une étape du processus de négociation sous-jacent à toute interaction"*[54] where *"chaque acte doit faire l'objet d'un enregistrement en mémoire discursive"*[55] (*ibid.*:64). The main principle of this model is that every time a verbalised piece of information coincides with the end of a syntactic dependency clause, then this piece of information is an *"act"* (i.e., a unit) that becomes available for transfer to the discourse memory.[56] Following this, the operational criterion for the identification of a discourse unit is that of the substitution of a segment by a definite anaphoric expression pointing to a referent stored in discourse memory, as indicated by examples (23) and (24) below.

Example (23): *"j'ai téléphone à la voisine[i] pour que la brave femme[i] m'achète du thé"*

I called the neighbor[i] so that the friendly lady[i] would buy me some tea

Example (24)*: "mon voisin[i] m'a dit qu'il[i] /*le pauvre homme[i] était malade*

my neighbor[i] told me that he[i] */the poor man[i] was ill

(Examples adapted from Roulet, Filliettaz, Grobet and Burger 2001, cited in Degand and Simon 2009)

In (23), the transfer of the referent *"la voisine"* to the discourse memory allows for the establishment of a co-referential link between the two definite expressions *"la voisine"* and *"la brave femme"*. In this respect, the discourse sequence is analysed as containing two discourse acts, i.e., units. The same, however, does not hold true for (24), in which a co-referential link between *"mon voisin"* and *"le pauvre homme"* cannot be established. As a result, no transfer to the discourse memory takes place and the

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[54] (i.e., a step in the negotiation process underlying any interaction)

[55] (i.e., each act must be recorded in discursive memory)

[56] Discourse memory (i.e., *'mémoire discursive'*) corresponds to the mutual cognitive environment of the audience and communicator in Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995, 1987) inferential model (see also Berrendonner 1993).

utterance is interpreted as a single act, i.e., a unit. In this respect, the discourse unit delimited by this model is understood to be co-extensive with a syntactic clause (Degand and Simon 2009) and neither prosody nor punctuation are assigned a role in determining any aspect of it (also advocated by Monschau, Kreyer and Mukherjee 2003). In other words, although the focusing function of prosody or punctuation is recognised, the model argues that neither of the two can determine the way discourse structure is segmented. This is a rather strong claim suggesting that syntax should be seen as consistently overriding prosody, which does not accurately reflect what happens in naturally-occurring discourse. As pointed out by Selting (1996), there are cases of syntactic units that are understood as units by discourse participants precisely because of their prosodic packaging that might prompt either for an integration with the previous unit in discourse or for an attachment to a new one. For instance, if examined from the perspective of syntax, the continuation of a sentence with a following causal clause introduced by "*because*" will be seen as integrated with the previous unit as in (25) below.

Example (25): *"I didn't do it because I was afraid."*

However, if looked at from the perspective of prosody, a prosodically independent causal clause headed by "*because",* typical in a delayed continuation indicating hesitation, as in (26) below, might legitimise its treatment as a new unit.

Example (26): *"I didn't do it [...] because I was afraid."*[57]

Another compelling argument adding to the significance of prosody is that if a prosodic break occurs between a possible syntactically complete unit and its grammatically

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[57] The bracketed ellipsis notation in the example signals the lapsed time before the continuation of the clause, suggesting the Speaker's hesitation.

cohesive expansion, then the expansion is prosodically packaged and contextualised as a new unit (Selting 1998). Example (27) cited below, as transcribed by Selting (1998), illustrates that this is possible even when the same words (*"genau"* and *"da"*) are involved.

Example (27): 979 Nat: *ach dieses bene**FIZ**kon**ZERT**,*
          \   F(\   /)
         <1   *1>*
         oh this benefit concert
     980 Ron: *ja;*
         <all>
         Yea
         (.)
         \
     981 Nat: **JAA**:; ge**NAU**; da mußt ich **AR**beiten;
    —>   M(\ )   M(\ )   M(\   )
         yeah right at that time I had to work
         (.)
     982 Ron: AH:[JA;
         M(/   \)
         oh yeah
     983 Ida: [mhm,
           \ /
          (.)
     984 Nat: genau da mußt ich **AR**beiten un dann: war ich noch
    —>   F(\
         right at that time I had to work and then I was
     985 Nat: auf ner **AN**dern fete einge[ladn.
              _   )
         invited to another party
     986 Ron: [da kann NICH viel
                    F(\
               there can't have been
     987 Ron: **LOS** gewesen sein inner **FANN**kuchenstube.
       \   _   )
      much going on in the pancake studio at that time
                              (Selting 1998:22)

The extract features two different turn-beginnings involving the words *"genau"* (*'right'*) and *"da"* (*'at that time'*) in lines 981 and 984, respectively. Prosody in this case signals whether "*genau" ('right')* should be interpreted as a separate unit or as an integrated one into the following unit. In the first instance, it is constructed as a separate unit and is thus given the status of an interjection. In the second instance, however, it is

integrated into the following sentence, functioning as an adverbial specifying the temporal adverb *"da" ('at that time')*, yielding the temporal *"genau da" ('right at that time')*.

Examples like this showcase that, syntactically allowable, complete units are only recognised as such on the basis of their prosodic packaging, thereby suggesting that although syntax is a determining factor, prosody offers valuable insights to both the Addressee's effective understanding of a discourse unit and its effective delimitation. The same applies to utterances like *"I am happy. More than happy!"* whereby the second segment is a kind of 'after thought expansion', prosodically packaged as such, indicating that the first segment was only seemingly syntactically complete. Similar examples may be drawn from incidental clauses interrupting the supposed normal flow of a discourse unit or from 'delayed self-repairs', particularly frequent in spoken discourse (Simon 2004).

ii)   The Dependency Grammar Model

By analogy with the Geneva Discourse Model, in dependency grammar, discourse units are again viewed as syntactic units composed of a *'nucleus'* (mostly verbs and occasionally nouns or adjectives) accompanied by its *dependants*. Each nucleus may govern various kinds of dependants marked in the examples that follow in lowercase capitals. For instance, it may govern *"actants"*, i.e., specific, but not necessarily compulsory, dependants belonging to the restricted valency of the verb as in (28) below. It can further govern *"circumstants"*, which are also dependent on a verb, but out of its strict valency pattern (see 29 below) and *"adjuncts"* that can be added to any 'nucleus' but in a somewhat more easily detached way (see 30 below).

Example (28): *"Tu* sonnes à David Lombard**ACT** *par exemple***ADJ***"*
you   call   David Lombard   for instance

Example (29): *"de toute manière***ADJ** *j'ai pas le permis***ACT** *pour le moment***CIRC** *quoi"*
in   any   case   I do not have   the licence [driver's] for the moment

Example (30): *"et Charleroi***ACT** *ça te tente pas du tout***ADJ***"*
and Charleroi   it does not tempt you at all

(Examples 28-30 are cited in Degand and Simon 2005:68)

The defining factor in this case is *valency* between the elements governed by the verb ('*actants'* and '*circumstants'*) and those that are not (e.g., *'adjuncts'*[58] or other associated elements).[59] Once completed for the selected discourse part, the outcome of such a syntactic analysis offers a segmentation of the verbal chain into 'nuclei' and 'adjuncts'; each nucleus potentially functioning as a minimal discourse unit.

The definition of a discourse unit in terms of valency seems a useful tool towards discourse unit segmentation in many cases. However, if, as it seems, the concept of a discourse unit is again co-extensive with a clause, its theoretical significance is in question since this definition seems to leave out discourse instances in which actants and circumstants are not lexicalised, as, for example, in certain genres, such as cooking recipes (e.g., *"Serve Ø cold." / "Mix Ø well."* (Massam and Roberge 1989; Massam 1992) and labelese (e.g., *"ØContains alcohol"/ "Weighs 5 pounds"* (Haegeman 1990)), among others.

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[58] As Degand and Simon (2005) observe, typical oral discourse markers, such as *"tu vois", "ben", "quoi", "j'veux dire"* (and, by analogy, English ones like *"you see", "well"* etc.,) also belong to the category of adjuncts, since they are not governed by the verb.
[59] Governed elements have an interrogative pronominal counterpart, while simply associated elements lack one. Furthermore, governed elements can be subject to pseudo-clefting or extraction, while associated elements cannot. Finally, governed elements experience no (contrastive) modality restrictions, while associated elements do.

Having illustrated that discourse units cannot be uniquely and unambiguously defined, or delimited, by reliance on syntax only, the upcoming section intends to demonstrate that this is also the case with *prosody*-only models of analysis.

2.5.1.2 Discourse units in the interaction-process approach: The contribution of prosody

The models falling into this *interaction-process* paradigm view discourse as a temporal, dynamic, transitional event subject to interactional phenomena and the progressive flow of thoughts/ideas and sounds/forms. Therefore, in their context, meaning is understood to be interactional and contextualised, or in Auer's (1992) terms: *"to comprise all activities by participants which make relevant, maintain, revise or cancel [...] any aspect of context which, in turn, is responsible for the interpretation of an utterance in its particular locus of occurrence"* (*ibid.*:4).[60] Given the heavy emphasis of the models belonging to this paradigm on *prosody* and *prosodic units*, I will subsequently briefly refer to how these terms are treated in the relevant literature before I focus on the findings of prosodic research in relation to discourse structure and discourse unit delimitation.

As a term, prosody covers a wide repertoire of phenomena. From a *linguistic* point of view, it relates to the description of a series of suprasegmental units (i.e., syllables, stress groups, intonational units) and phenomena (i.e., stress, intonation, rhythm (see below)). From a *phonetic* point of view, it is defined with respect to its different *phonetic correlates*, such as the *fundamental frequency (F_0) variations* (i.e., the curves generated by pitch analysis), *length changes* or *pauses* (see Witten 1982).

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[60] The influence of this line of thinking is further reflected in the works of Chafe (1994), Koch and Oesterreicher (2001), Auer (1992, 2009), den Ouden, Friston, Daw, McIntosh and Stephan (2009) and Couper-Kuhlen (2012).

A prosodic unit is largely understood as *"a stress group consisting of a lexical (stressable) word plus the adjacent clitics that are governed by it, which forms the locus for the realisation of intonation patterns"* (Di Cristo 1998:196). However, as Degand and Simon (2009) stress, with approaches emphasising discourse as interaction, *"the notion of a unit is never taken for granted"* in that *"it is construed as progressively projecting possible endings that are not necessarily made use of"* (*ibid.*:4). Adhering to a similar line of thinking, Lerner (1996) observes that prosodic units should be seen as borderline units between grammar and interaction, co-defined by Speaker(s) and Hearer(s). Physically manifesting themselves in the speech chain through phonetic cues, i.e., the phonetic correlates of prosody mentioned above, prosodic units are found to consistently relate to the suprasegmental features of *intonation*,[61] *stress*,[62] *rhythm*,[63] and *speech rate* (also referred to as *tempo*).[64] The interplay of these features determines considerably the final F_0 contour of an utterance that may be *'local'* (affecting certain syllables or groups of syllables) or *'global'* (affecting wider units, such as intonation phrases or even sentences and paragraphs)[65] as argued by Nespor and Vogel (1986), who contend that the scope of prosodic units may range from paragraphs and sentences to feet (i.e., rhythmic units), syllables and mora.[66]

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[61] *Intonation* relates to pitch variations (F_0) and determines changes in other phonetic parameters as well (e.g., the length of pre-pausal syllables). As a term, it covers phenomena occurring at a sentence level, unlike *tone* which is reserved for word-level phenomena (Crystal 2002).

[62] *Stress* refers to the presence of a special degree of prominence on specific syllables (Crystal 2002).

[63] *Rhythm* refers to the perceptive effect produced by the periodical repetition of some phonetic phenomenon along the discourse (Crystal 2002).

[64] *Speech rate* ('*tempo*') refers to the speed at which a Speaker produces utterances, often measured as the number of sounds uttered per second (Crystal 2002).

[65] Prosodic units are marked for their complex prosodic representation which has given rise to multiple coding schemes (e.g., PROSPA, IPA, ToBi etc.,) and different models of prosodic transformation.

[66] *Mora* is a phonological unit that determines syllable weight, which in some (quantity-sensitive) languages is responsible for stress or timing (Crystal 2002).

According to Chafe (1994), prosodic/intonation(al)[67] units are essential in discourse (including conversational language) because of the fact that: *"every intonation unit activates a new piece of information and carries one new idea"* (*ibid.*:119). In this respect, research focusing on the progressive construal of discourse into units and their effective segmentation is expected to be largely informed by intonation and, in particular, by identifying a final intonation contour. The latter is conventionally interpreted as an indicator of a strong boundary between the discourse locus of preceding information, cognitively processed as a unified whole, and the advent of new discourse elements packed into another unit (Auchlin and Ferrari 1994; Simon 2001).

Following the above, prosodic delimitation of discourse structure cannot but depend on the effective recognition of boundaries between the discourse units in the speech chain. This is achieved mainly by studying the perceptual and acoustic cues involved in the internal structure of a unit as in measuring fundamental frequency (F_0) (Mertens 2004; Hermes 2006), silent pauses (Candea 2000; Campione 2001) and syllable lengthening (e.g., final lengthening and high or low tone, initial rush, pause, and pitch reset) (Amir, Silber-Varod and Izre'el 2004). Furthermore, the tone marking of intonational boundaries is expected to function as a significant indicator of *continuity* or *finality* in the discourse unfolding. Cases of a final *high* tone are interpreted to project *continuity* whereas cases of a *low* tone are suggestive of *finality*. There are also cases of *'minor continuity'* signalling the internal boundaries of prosodic units or instances of *'appeal'* in which the Speaker seeks validation by the Addressee (Du Bois, Cumming, Schuetze-Coburn and Paolino 1992). *Salience* or *accessibility* of discourse referents included in

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[67] Prosodic units are conventionally hierarchically structured into *tonal units* (lower, word level) and *intonation(al) units* (higher level of prosodic structure) (Chafe 1994). Given the emphasis of the present study on the clausal level, prosodic and intonation(al) units will be henceforth largely treated as synonymous.

the prosodic/intonation(al) units is achieved by means of pitch accents. For instance, Brown, Currie and Kenworthy (1980) observe that Speakers typically start new topics in discourse by exhibiting a relatively high pitch range, while they finish topics by compressing their range. Similarly, Silverman, Beckman, Pitrelli, Ostendorf, Wightman, Price, Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1992) maintain that manipulation of pitch range alone, or in conjunction with pausal duration between utterances, enables the Speaker to reliably disambiguate potentially doubtful topic structures.

The theoretical contribution of all the above to discourse is beyond any doubt significant. However, their practical application in research on discourse structure and its effective delimitation necessitates a methodological commitment to spoken data, since, as the following literature-cited example (31) indicates, written data may allow for multiple – and perhaps misleading – prosody-based interpretations.

Example (31): *"The government claims the defendants knew that William Parkin a private consultant hired by Teledyne Electronics was paying bribes to Stuart Berlin the Navy official".* (Hirschberg and Grosz 1992:442)

Depending on how (31) is uttered, it may be open to the following, equally valid interpretations: (a) the government claims that the defendants knew X (simple complement); (b) the government claims X, but the defendants knew[68] X (right-node-raising);[69] or (c) the defendants knew that the government claims that X (parenthetical),

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[68] Note that in this case the commitment to 'knowing' on the part of defendants may range from 'knowing' to 'not knowing' with all in-between possibilities (e.g., 'might not know') equally valid for a possible interpretation of the utterance.

[69] Right node raising is a sharing mechanism that treats the linguistic material involved in the immediate right of parallel structures as in some sense "shared" by those parallel structures, e.g., "*[Sam likes] but [Fred dislikes] the debates*." (Postal 1974).

whereby X= "that William Parkin a private consultant hired by Teledyne Electronics was paying bribes to Stuart Berlin the Navy official".

Apart from the methodological commitment of working with spoken data, segmenting discourse structure by means of prosody only is faced with a number of further challenges. Following what was presented in section 2.5.1.1 (example (27)), it is important to consider that there are also instances in which a syntactically complete unit may be divided into different prosodic units, as in the case of self-repairs with internal prosodic breaks, exemplified in the literature-retrieved example (32) below.

Example (32): 30 Ida: und: (.) *SECHS stunden;*
                                  F[M(\ )
                                        \<c>
                    and   six hours
        31 man kann das nur SECHS stundn:, (.)
         \<u>   (\   /)
       you can only for six hours
        32 *INnerhalb   ä:hm (..) von den **FOL**genden sechs STUNden.*
       F(\   \   _   )
       \<u>   \<c.>   \<d>   \<c.>
       within uhm the following six hours
        33 nach**DEM** es pasSIERT ist. **NÄ**hen.=ne,
        F(\   _   ) (\   /)]
        \<u>   \<u>
       after it happened sew it up you know

                                                (Selting 1998:29)

The upstep[70] for *"man kann das nur SECHS stundn"* (i.e., *"you can only for six hours"*) in (32) above marks itself as the beginning of a new prosodic unit. In its turn, "*INnerhalb"* seems to signal a new beginning of a separate prosodic unit that marks the repair of the previous formulation. Similarly, *"nachDEM"* and "*NÄhen*" feature the beginning of new prosodic units via upsteps in pitch, while almost all component parts

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[70] *Upstep* expresses a phonemic or phonetic upward shift of tone between the syllables or words of a tonal language (Crystal 2002).

of the entire turn (apart from *"stundn:"* (line 31)) end with possible prosodic/intonational completions. Moreover, the phrase *"INnerhalb ä:hm (..) von den FOLgenden sechs STUNden"* is presented as having three pitch accents on a descending line, ending with a possible turn-yielding pitch. Likewise, the phrase *"nachDEM es pasSIERT"* involves two falling pitch accents, indicative of possible turn-yielding pitch contours.

The above indicate that a syntactically complete and cohesive utterance may be packaged into different prosodic units which, despite marking the potential beginning of new units, in reality constitute the continuation of the previous one. This suggests that, in instances like this, the syntactic projections included in each successive prosodic unit are stronger than prosody, which does not package the unit as a unified whole (i.e., a discourse unit) but its components only. Segmenting, therefore, such a discourse unit only by means of prosody involves the considerable risk of segmenting a syntactically cohesive but complex unit into several, prosodic, incohesive ones. As pointed out by Selting (1998), in cases of conflict between syntactic and prosodic signalling like the one exemplified in (32), *"syntax might be stronger (i.e., more far-reaching) and might override the more local prosodic signalling"* (*ibid.*:29).

Consequently, adding to what was already discussed in section 2.5.1.1, this section illustrates that prosody on its own may be insufficient in delimiting discourse units. It further shows that a syntactically- and a prosodically-defined unit need not coincide (although there are cases of self-contained discourse segments characterised by congruent mapping between the two) and that any approach to discourse unit delimitation can be effective only on the grounds of combining syntax and prosody and the projections they give rise to. Capitalising on these, the next section focuses on suggesting an alternative, constructional approach to identifying and segmenting

discourse units on the basis of the *dialogic projections* triggered by the use of the constructions at hand, crucially integrating both syntactic and prosodic considerations.

2.5.2 Discourse units in a CxG approach: The contribution of constructions

Having discussed the theoretical significance and contribution of syntax and prosody to discourse unit delimitation, the present section focuses on examining the issue from a constructional perspective which features as a promising alternative to the challenges described above. My objective in this section is twofold: a) to explain how the notion of discourse unit is perceived in the present study, and b) to illustrate how CxG contributes to discourse unit delimitation by 'relaxing' the boundaries between syntax- and prosody-only approaches, arguing that the discourse effect of constructions and, in particular, their dialogic projections legitimise their use as fairly effective 'benchmarks' for delimitation.

Given that CxG argues against a strict divide between syntax and prosody by viewing both as crucial parts of the form pole of constructions, the constructional treatment of discourse units proposed herein recognises the importance of the interplay of both for the identification and delimitation of the former. Most importantly, apart from the form pole mentioned above, CxG recognises a *'conceptual gestalt status'* in constructions in that they consist of formal, lexico-semantic, and pragmatic properties (Nikiforidou *et al.*, 2014:693). Interestingly, although not constructional in orientation, research in the direction of approaching discourse units holistically (i.e., by combining syntax and prosody) (see Selting 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007) also defines discourse units in a similar way to constructions by attributing to them a *'gestalt'* status. Such a treatment essentially foregrounds *"the holistic – and yet analytically decomposable or deconstructable – nature of a unit"* (Selting 1998:19) which is seen as the outcome of

the *"interplay of syntactic, lexico-semantic, pragmatic, activity-type specific and prosodic devices in their sequential context."* (*ibid.*:14). An additional, important theoretical insight contributed by literature arguing for the combination of syntactic and prosodic considerations is that it introduces the factor ('criterion' in their terms (see Selting 1998)) of *projectability/projection* that can be crucial for marking the 'completion' of a discourse unit (i.e., its understanding as complete). The notion of *projectability/projection* is argued to include *lexico-syntactic* or *lexico-semantic and pragmatic* considerations (Selting 1998).[71] In providing linguistic instantiations of these projections in discourse, Selting discusses the *'if-then'* and *'when-then'* constructions, whereby the *'if'/'when'* component projects its syntactic continuation by means of the *'then'* component, as in the following corpus-retrieved example (33).

Example (33): *"**If** this is accepted, **then** the semantic content of (21) (and identically for (22)) would only allow the interpretation that A is better than A (where A is composed of p and 4 or q and p, neutral with respect to ordering). <u>But</u> such a reading is either necessarily false or meaningless, and in any case semantically anomalous."*

(BNC, [Title: *Pragmatics*, Author: Levinson, Stephen C],
Source: Sample containing about 36715 words from a book (domain: arts)
(publication date: 1985-1996)

Semantically and pragmatically, the use of these constructions in discourse typically involves: a) a hypothetically positively evaluated scenario expressed by means of the protasis of the conditional sentence *("**If** this is accepted,"),* b) its further appraisal, which reveals a negatively evaluated aspect, or at least a limitation involved in it, expressed in the apodosis headed by *'then'* ("**then** *the ...to ordering"*) and (optionally)

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[71] Selting (1998) distinguishes 'activity-type' as a third kind of projection for discourse units (not related to the research agenda of the present study) which largely corresponds to projections related to genres, such as story-telling.

c) further argumentation that warrants change of attitude towards the original, hypothetical scenario (*"__But__ such…anomalous."*).

Other, similar examples of lexico-syntactically, semantically, and pragmatically projected discourse units discussed by Selting are instances of ordinal adverbs used in sequencing discourse (e.g., *'firstly'/'first of all', 'secondly'* etc.,) or patterns formulating alternatives such as *"either – or", "neither – nor"*, or *"on the one hand – on the other hand"*.

The criterion of projection, as exemplified above, and the definition of discourse units in construction-oriented terms – albeit inadvertent – contributed by Selting are particularly insightful for the hypothesis entertained herein, as, by analogy with these, I also argue that the constructions identified delimit the discourse units in their scope by means of their *dialogic projections*. More specifically, informed by the literature overview presented, and Selting's (1998, 2000, 2007) work on lexico-syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic projections, I also concur that the greatest challenge involved in defining and delimiting discourse units relates to their *multidimensional* (see also Steen 2005), *flexible* and *expandable* (Selting 2000) standing in discourse. However, I propose that a constructional treatment of discourse units can inherently accommodate the (also inherent) multidimensionality of discourse units motivated by their syntactic dependency relations, the (possible) presence of specific, prosodic regularities, and the discourse projections that the combination of both triggers.

Focusing on the constructions examined, I observe that they all manifest a clausal status, i.e., they involve predicates with pronominal dependants as well as adverbial adjuncts, or are part of disjunctive syntactic patterns. This suggests that any possible proposal for the correlation of constructions with discourse units entails syntactic dependency relations, even though such relations are *not* themselves the *only* means of

delimitation. I further expect that the syntactic relations in these constructions will (optimally) correlate with a specific prosodic packaging as well, i.e., a specific prosodic contour with observable regularities.

As will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 7, the lack of access to audio files for the corpus data collected necessarily restricts the study to the observational data at hand which reveal that a discourse unit may indeed 'flesh out' due to the dialogic projections that the constructions trigger in discourse. These dialogic projections will be shown to contribute fundamentally to the ability of the constructions to regulate the interaction flow between the (assumed) participants concerning the proposition /*p*/ in their scope. In the context of the present study, therefore, a *discourse unit* is understood as an interactionally complete stretch of discourse that is lexico-syntactically and semantically-pragmatically fairly specifiable and whose discourse 'completion' (sensu lato) is co-extensive with the end of the projectability/projection effect that each construction has in discourse. To put it differently, the 'completion' of a discourse unit, i.e., its discourse 'boundaries', so to speak, will be shown to heavily correlate with the *framing* effect that each construction (e.g., THINK AGAIN, MIND YOU etc.,) has in naturally occurring discourse. As will be argued (see Chapters 4-6), this framing effect/function, particular to each construction, will be correlated with a *forward-* (*anticipatory*) or *backward-*looking (*responsive*) scope, respectively, which accounts for the distinctive development of each unit in discourse.

A further contribution of the present work is that the lexico-syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic functions affecting discourse unit delimitation are shown to be *inherited*. In other words, I contend that the Imperative of the constructions, and its assumed or linguistically (post-verbally) surfacing Subject, are significant for the discourse unit that the constructions define. At the same time, I argue that the presence of a proposition

/p/ in scope of the verb in the Imperative[72] determines the role of each construction in discourse and may result in minimally binary or maximally four-place discourse units (see Chapters 4-6).

Moreover, aligning with most recent CxG research on the issue (Kerstin Fischer and Oliver Niebuhr (submitted)), I propose that the framing, regulatory function of the constructions identified is essential in that: a) it can generally mark 'boundaries' in discourse, b) it allows us to make 'informed predictions' as to the scope of a specific discourse unit and its unfolding/spanning in discourse, and c) it yields reasonably reliable insights into the discernible and conventionalised components of these units.

By means of an example and following the *'if-then' - 'when-then'* analysis put forth by Selting (1998), I propose that THINK AGAIN manifests specifiable discourse characteristics, which ultimately result in the formation of a discourse unit with conventionalised sub-components. For example, in *'If you think that this election won't affect you and your life, think again'*, the protasis of the conditional sentence expresses a disputable proposition /p/ assigned to the (assumed) Addressee that the construction, i.e., THINK AGAIN, placed in the apodosis, pre-emptively rebuts. As will be argued (see Chapter 5, section 5.5), the conventionalised discourse component of the disputable **p**roposition (*p*), followed by its **ch**allenge (*ch*) in the form of the construction, constitute a bipartite discourse unit delimited by the construction THINK AGAIN.[73]

In the context of the above, constructional frameworks emerge as particularly apt for discourse unit delimitation, complementing and, to a certain extent, even furthering

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[72] Depending on the construction identified this may be an **i**nitial **p**roposition (*i/p*) that triggers the announcement of unexpected information or a **p**roposition (*p*) in need of revision that triggers rectification or even a disputable **p**roposition (*p*) that generates challenge and calls for amendment.

[73] As will be discussed (see Chapter 5, section 5.5), discourse units delimited by THINK AGAIN may also feature a potential, third part, following (*ch*), referred to as the **a**mendment part (*a*).

syntactic approaches on the issue, while also being fully-compatible with prosodic considerations. Apparently, the latter merit additional investigation because, although it is reasonable to hypothesise that the prosodic contour of discourse units delimited by THING AGAIN, for example, is quite comparable to – if not inherited by – the more general intonation patterns stereotypically associated with *if*-clauses, research on the issue might perhaps reveal that the two are not exactly identical. As will be proposed in Chapter 7 (section 7.4), the main question to be answered concerning the correlation of prosody with the constructional approach to discourse units is whether there is a congruent mapping between the two or whether, perhaps, prosody may prove to exhibit a larger or more restricted 'packaging effect'.

Pursuing this line of thought, Chapters 4-6 provide empirical support for the systematic correlation of each construction with identifiable, contextual regularities and a specific *backward*- and/or *forward*-looking dialogic scope giving rise to minimal bipartite or maximally four-place discourse units. A final implication arising from the above, and possibly from the discourse position that the constructions occupy (or their increased positional flexibility) as well, is whether the constructions at hand could plausibly qualify for discourse markers. To put it differently, given that discourse markers are typically argued to exhibit increased positional flexibility and fulfil certain 'boundary framing' functions, such as indicating the Speaker's closure or inception of a topic (cf. Bangerter and Clark 2003; Mayor and Bangerter 2015; Goutsos 2017), it might be fruitful to examine whether the constructions under study may ultimately be (in the process of) functioning as discourse markers. This line of thinking is also taken up by other works in the field of CxG as well (see Fischer and Alm 2013; Kerstin Fischer and Oliver Niebuhr (submitted)) which argue that a correlation between discourse function, position, and prosody is highly possible for constructions operating as discourse

markers. This is indeed a particularly interesting line of investigation to which I shall return in the last chapter of the present thesis (see Chapter 7, section 7.5.3).

2.6 Summary and concluding remarks

The present chapter presented the theoretical background of the present study and highlighted that the proposed account is informed extensively by the interplay of the following main axes:

a) the semantics of mental state verbs, their internal complexity, and identifiable polysemy which crucially involves intersubjective considerations,

b) the Imperative morphology and its directive, perspectivised meaning which is found to be further enriched by the systematic contextual presence of intensifiers and stance-elements functioning as further 'boosters' of intersubjectivity,

c) the phrasal status of the patterns, which lends itself to usage-based accounts, naturally embraced by CxG that adopts an extended research scope encompassing all the conventionalised aspects involved in the use of a construction in its (immediate or broader) context,

d) issues related to dialogicity, i.e., the notion of non-aligned perspectivisation in discourse and the respective profiling of discourse participants that it triggers, and

e) the contribution of the scope of the constructions to the delimitation of fairly specifiable discourse units and the regulation of the overall discourse flow by means of their dialogic, semantic-pragmatic projections, further enhanced by their syntactic dependency relations and their (strongly hypothesised) prosodic contour.

Against this theoretical background, Chapter 3 that follows discusses how the individual research objectives outlined in the Introduction of the present thesis inform the methodological practices adopted herein, always in keeping with the research agenda that the study at hand commits itself to.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY, SAMPLING AND RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 Introduction

Following Chapter 1, which presented the overall research agenda of the present work, and Chapter 2, which analysed its theoretical background, the present chapter correlates the overarching aim, and interrelated research objectives of this work, with its methodological framework. It further accounts for the combination of *qualitative* and *quantitative* research tools employed as well as the sampling techniques followed.

Offering a CxG account of the patterns in focus, the present research project argues in favour of their constructional status and aims to provide an integrated account of their inherited and idiosyncratic properties. Moreover, it aims to illustrate how the constructions identified relate to other more productive constructions in the language, while also retaining their own respective degrees of specificity. A further aim is to cast light on the functional space that the constructions in focus occupy, the specific discourse functions they serve, and the consistently dialogic construal they import to their contexts of use.

Given the aims outlined above, and the *phrasal* status of the patterns (see Chapter 2, section 2.3), the present study proposes that the constructions discussed could be profitably investigated through methods and practices adopted in *phraseological studies* (Gries 2008; Granger and Meunier 2008). This approach to linguistic meaning and function is theoretically supported by CxG, which views language as consisting of constructions of different complexity and size organised in taxonomic networks by

means of inheritance (Fried and Östman 2005; Goldberg 2006, see Chapter 2, section 2.3). It is also compatible with the usage-based commitment of CxG as a model which naturally embraces corpus-based analyses (see also section 3.3.1) that lend themselves to principled descriptions of constructions exhibiting considerable variability but also interrelatedness with other constructions in the language. This variability and interrelatedness will be argued to account for the existence of (typically more fixed) constructions which have an inheritance-based relationship with other more schematic constructions that motivate them (see Chapters 4 - 6).

The grounding of the present work in CxG necessitates a methodological framework that relies on access to authentic language data, excluding contrivance or impressionistic views. To this end, the present study draws primarily on *lexicographically attested evidence* for the constructions analysed and *naturally occurring language data*, thus rendering *dictionaries* and *corpora* respectively its two main *qualitative* research tools.

Dictionaries are, by definition, usage-based tools, often associated with corresponding language corpora, electronic or otherwise. Their aim is to account for the polysemy of lemmas and related idioms, while also providing comprehensive coverage of their respective morphosyntactic features. The concise and precise lexicographic descriptions of the verbs involved in the patterns, as well as of the patterns as a whole, are shown to provide valuable insights into the variability detected in the semantics, pragmatics and syntactic configuration of the expressions and the verbs they feature.

Corpora are also usage-based linguistic tools par excellence given that they comprise large, principled, and systematic collections of naturally occurring examples of language stored electronically, i.e., in a machine-readable form (see Crystal 1992;

Leech 1992; Gries 2006; McEnery, Xiao and Tono 2006; McEnery and Gabrielatos 2006). Their far-reaching impact on linguistic research has led to the establishment and continuing development of Corpus Linguistics (henceforth CL) as a paradigm, mostly associated with the works of Gries and Stefanowitsch (2003, 2004, 2005).[74] In this respect, the empirical status of research falling within the paradigm of CL ties in well with CxG-based research, urging scholars working 'at the crossroads' of the two to point out that '*synergies*' between CL and CxG is a necessity or – at least – a much-desired possibility (Groom 2019:219). In light of the above, the methodological decision to consult two corpora (BNC and COCA) in the present study is crucial in that it allows for the linguistic attestation of the variability detected in the verbs of the patterns across the two main standard varieties of English. It further allows for arriving at *representative, falsifiable,* and *measurable* results (Moran 2003) in relation to the entrenchment of the patterns, their properties, and the dialogic construal they impose on their contexts (see section 3.3.1). The measurability of the results correlates with the *quantitative* methods of analysis employed in the present study that encompass statistical sampling practices, significance measurement tools, and reliability statistics (see section 3.4).

To facilitate the reader's understanding and provide a comprehensive description of the overall research design and the way the objectives of the present study are fulfilled methodologically, the present chapter is divided into five sections, including the present one. Section 3.2 presents the rationale behind the lexicographic overview which functions as a pivotal methodological step for the semantics-pragmatics of the verbs and their detected polysemy. Section 3.3 discusses the methodological decision to work

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[74] The works of Sinclair (1987, 1991) and Leech (1992) also stand out as 'forerunners' of the more recent Corpus Linguistics endeavours reflected in the works of Gries and Wulff 2005; Gries 2008, 2009 and McEnery and Hardie 2012.

with corpora along with the qualitative considerations which correlate the internal and external features of the constructions and ultimately inform the data annotation grid designed. Section 3.4 provides an overview of all the quantitative tools employed for the data collection at different research stages, while also explaining the rationale behind each statistical measurement test administered. Finally, section 3.5 offers some concluding remarks on how the overall, composite, methodological framework adopted serves to successfully fulfil the research aims and objectives set by the present study, to be further discussed in the respective chapters of data analysis that follow.

3.2 Independent lexicographic research: The contribution of dictionaries

3.2.1 Initial observations on the data: The semantic classification of the verbs

The observation which determined all of the subsequent research steps, and many of the qualitative considerations of the study (see section 3.3), was the semantic classification of the verbs in the constructions as *mental state verbs* (Gleitman 1990; Nuyts 2001; de Villiers 1995, 2005; Anand and Hacquard 2013).

As already discussed in Chapter 2 (for an overview, see section 2.2), and is briefly repeated here for convenience, the increased referential opacity of such verbs allows them to evade rigid typologies, despite their generally agreed tripartite distinction into *volitional*, *cognitive,* and *dispositional* ones (Slaughter *et al.*, 2008). In fact, the present work argues that the above semantic taxonomy of the class members calls for revision that arises mainly from the oscillation of the said verbs between the expression of propositional attitude, along with subjective evaluation, and the expression of relational disposition that encompasses interpersonal and intersubjective (i.e., perspectivised) meaning (Bertuccelli Papi 2000; Cappelli 2007a). As proposed (see Chapter 2, section 2.2), this latter feature is inherited by the constructions, motivates their variability, and

accounts for their further identifiable polysemy detected in terms of their stative vs. action/dynamic semantics (Vendler 1967; Lakoff 1971) or other aspects related to their semantics-pragmatics, also associated with their Imperative morphological marking (Aikhenvald 2004, 2010; Van Olmen and Heinold 2017).

3.2.2 The rationale behind the selection and use of dictionaries

In line with CxG principles (see Goldberg 1995 and Chapter 2, section 2.3), and the broader research in the field of collocations (Sinclair 1991; Hanks 2004, 2013), an independent lexicographic checking provides insight into the semantic, pragmatic, and syntactic features of lexical items and the patterns they give rise to. These features are concisely reflected in dictionary examples which illustrate how they correlate with the distinct, yet – to some extent – related senses that would have otherwise gone unnoticed. Adhering to this line of thinking and, in an effort to secure greater reliability, all the verbs, and, by extension, the patterns as a whole, were cross-checked in the online versions of three standard dictionaries, namely the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED), the *Cambridge English Dictionary* (CED) and the *Collins English Dictionary* (ColED). Although their size, informational validity and long-lasting standing in lexicographic research provide sufficient grounds for their selection among other dictionaries, it should be stressed that their shortlisting was a conscious methodological decision. Evidently, all three are highly acknowledged among learners, teaching practitioners, translators, and scholars, but, at the same time, they also differ with respect to *formation-compilation procedures*, *focus,* and/or *targeted end-users*.

For instance, the OED – despite its regular updates – is mostly regarded as a historical dictionary and, as such, it differs from other dictionaries of contemporary English, which focus on more current, i.e., present-day meanings. Consequently, even though

the research at hand addresses the synchronic aspects of the patterns in question, OED contributes significantly to a deeper understanding of their semantics by informing the present account with examples (possibly) reflecting diachronic developments. Moreover, OED also encompasses examples from miscellaneous, and quite diverse, genres. These include a large number of quotations ranging from classic literature and specialist periodicals to film scripts and cookery books, thereby adding a type of 'across-genre' applicability to the definitions it provides. As claimed by its developers, OED is rightfully *"widely regarded as the accepted authority on the English language [because] it is an unsurpassed guide to the meaning, history, and pronunciation of 600,000 words – past and present – from across the English-speaking world"*.[75] On the other hand, the CED, as maintained by its developing lexicographic committee, aims to provide *"'flexible' solutions for a range of uses and end-users, targeting mainly learners of English,"*[76] hence its targeted, special edition of the highly popular *Advanced Learner's Dictionary*.

Finally, ColED sets itself apart from the others because of the extensive use of corpora and vast databases that have been employed for its compilation. Uniquely marked for its direct typesetting (see Kilgarriff, Rundell and Uí Dhonnchadha 2006; Atkins and Rundell 2008) on the basis of its corpus-generated database (i.e., the Collins Corpus),[77] it can rightfully pride itself on securing that every aspect of an entry is substantiated through a two-factor checking process. The latter involves an initial editing team for

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[75] For further information, see https://www.oed.com/ (Last accessed 08/04/2020).

[76] For further information, see https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ (Last accessed 08/04/2020).

[77] According to the developers of ColED, its corpus contains over 4.5 billion words and is regularly updated so that its content and definitions accurately reflect and monitor (possible) language change, see https://www.collinsdictionary.com/about (Last accessed 08/04/2020).

lemmas and a different one responsible for keying them into the assembled dictionary database.[78]

In the context of the above, the concise lexicographic overview conducted for the purposes of the present study contributes to the following:

a) It provides information as to the semantics, pragmatics and syntactic configurations of the verbs involved in each pattern. This information is crucial for the variability and polysemy briefly discussed in section 3.2.1 (also to be discussed in section 3.2.3 and Chapters 4, 5 and 6, respectively).

b) It provides information for the constituent parts of the patterns, whenever this is applicable. A case in point is the use of the conjunctive adverb *'again'* involved in the construction THINK AGAIN (see Chapter 5).

c) It casts light on the lexicographic treatment of the expressions as a whole, most of which are (optionally) listed as *purely idiomatic* expressions (see Appendix II for Chapter 4 - 6).

d) It contributes to disassociating the fully-compositional semantics of the patterns (whenever this is applicable) from the constructional semantics identified in the present work.

e) Most importantly, it informs the parameters to be taken into consideration for the annotation grid designed and the tagging of the data collected (see also section 3.3.2).

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[78] For further information, see https://www.collinsdictionary.com/ (Last accessed 08/04/2020).

3.2.3 The findings of dictionaries: A case in point

As will be discussed in the chapters of data analysis that follow, the findings of the independent, lexicographic research indicated that all the constructions in focus are (optionally) included in dictionaries as *idiomatic* expressions. As expected, this treatment misses out on the fact that they are not arbitrary but *motivated* form-meaning pairings. At the same time, however, the presence of the patterns in the dictionaries argues for their systematic occurrence in the language and hence makes them good candidates for linguistic investigation.

Moreover, the lexicographic overview illustrated that the patterns in focus exhibit semantic, pragmatic and morphosyntactic properties that cannot be fully predicted on the basis of the verbs used in them. At this point, let us consider the case of '*believe*' as an indicative example.[79] A careful observation of the relevant dictionary examples reveals that the different senses of the verb correlate with specific syntactic configurations. In particular, in its fully-compositional semantics, the lexicographic research indicates that the verb can be followed by *that*-complementisers as in (1), *personal objects* (e.g., personal pronouns) as in (2), or *prepositional* complementisers as in (3) below.

Example (1): *"Experts believe that the coming drought will be extensive."* (ColED)

Example (2): *"I believe you."* (OED)

Example (3): *"I believe in fairies."* (ColED)

Example (1) is typical of the evidential meaning of the verb expressed by *that*-complementation. The personal object of the verb in example (2) contributes to the

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[79] For the sake of economy at this point, I will provide only some indicative examples for the findings of the lexicographic research concerning the verb *'believe'* whose detailed analysis follows in Chapter 4 (see also Appendix II for Chapter 4, Tables 4.1 - 4.2).

concept of faith in/trust to (or lack thereof in the case of negative sentences) an individual, metonymically standing for this individual's written or oral statements, while the prepositional complement in (3) contributes to the expression of faith in the existence of an idea or entity, metonymically also standing for the prototypical properties of this idea or entity (e.g., *'I believe in daily exercise'*, *'I don't believe in diets'*).

The above suggest that, in correlating with different syntactic configurations, the verb *'believe'* exhibits *considerable* and *identifiable polysemy*. Drawing on this, the study further argues that the pattern illustrated in (4) below constitutes a different unit of form and meaning than the ones presented in the above dictionary examples, even though the sense of *'believe'* in (4) would not be unrelated to (2) above, namely the expression of faith in an individual, i.e., the Speaker, in this case.

Example (4): *"So resist the temptation to have your cuticles cut; pushing them back is infinitely safer." The odds of something bad happening are slim, but, **believe me**, serious problems do arise, so it's worth it to be cautious," says Dr. Day."*

(COCA, [Title: Beware of these Beauty Dangers],
Source: MAG-Cosmopolitan (publication date: 2004)

Apparently, what sets (4) apart from examples (1) - (3) above is that the expression *'believe me'* in (4) is positionally flexible and lacks formal variation, since it consistently features in the Imperative, expectedly disallowing *tense-* or *person*-related changes. Moreover, it does not feature in negative or interrogative forms and does not take *that-* or *prepositional*-complementation as in (1) or (3) above. It further exhibits a noticeable predilection for intensifying and stance elements, such as *'infinitely'*, *'bad'*, etc., that reflects part of the contextual regularities associated with the particular construction.

Other dictionary examples, often termed idiomatic, illustrate more specialised syntactic configurations of this verb, such as 'believe' + object + infinitive as in (5) and 'believe' (usually in the negative) + it + of + NP[80] as in example (6) below:

Example (5): *"I believe her to be the finest violinist in the world."* (CED)

Example (6): *"I wouldn't have believed it of Lavinia—what an extraordinary woman!"* (OED)[81]

In (5), the personal pronoun, which is placed immediately after the verb, draws attention to a particular individual and contributes to expressing faith in one's abilities (in this case, abilities as a violinist), similarly to (2) above. Example (6), however, differs in that it expresses the Speaker's surprise for a fact (i.e., *'it'*), independently of any evidence. As will be shown in the relevant chapter, the factuality associated with *'it'* and the element of the 'unexpected' are also apparent in the construction BELIEVE IT OR NOT (see Chapter 4, section 4.5). Moreover, another important aspect related to the semantics of the verb in the syntactic configurations in (5) and (6) is the expression of affectivity (also available in (4)) expressed in the context of intensifying elements, such as *'the finest'* and *'extraordinary'* in each example, respectively. As will be further elaborated on in Chapter 4, the lexicographically-attested, affective semantic undertones traced in the different, syntactic combinatorial patterns of the verb are particularly relevant to the constructional account of BELIEVE ME and BELIEVE YOU ME.

The above discussion of the semantics of *'believe'* in different syntactic configurations is intended as an example of showing that the constructions under study exhibit

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[80] NP in this context is typically a proper name or a personal pronoun.
[81] For a more detailed discussion of this example, see Chapter 4, section 4.2.

semantics that is related to (in fact, inherited from) the different senses of the verbs they feature. These senses also include possible affective semantic undertones which, as discussed through the above dictionary examples, also surface in specific constructions, often termed idiomatic.

In this context, the findings of the lexicographic research are particularly insightful not only in that they cast light on the polysemy of the verbs detected in their different syntactic configurations but also in that they indicate which aspects need to be considered for a comprehensive analysis of the semantics, pragmatics, and discourse functions of the patterns in focus. In this respect, lexicographic evidence becomes particularly relevant to the qualitative considerations of the present work discussed in the upcoming section (section 3.3.1) and the design of its annotation grid for the data collected (section 3.3.2).

3.3 Qualitative analysis and considerations

3.3.1 The methodological decision to work with corpora

As already mentioned in the introduction of the present chapter, corpora provide access to multi-genre, authentic language use and, in this respect, allow for the empirical validation of research hypotheses regarding token frequency, function, collocational behaviour and many more. Consequently, the use of corpora is in absolute agreement with the usage-based approach adopted in the present study which serves as an instance of how the paradigm of CL can methodologically form *'synergies'* (Groom 2019) with CxG, thereby giving rise to the present *corpus-based, CxG-grounded* study.

Corpus-based studies differ from *corpus-driven* ones in that they approach a corpus as a form of repository out of which material is extracted to verify (or alternatively

disconfirm) expectations and research hypotheses, to allow linguistic phenomena to be quantified, or to provide supporting evidence for existing theories through illustrative examples (Tognini-Bonelli 2001). Corpus-driven studies, on the other hand, are primarily used in lexicographic research (see Sinclair 1987) since they aim at extracting data and detecting linguistic phenomena *without any* prior assumption, expectation, or theoretical underpinning (Tognini-Bonelli 2001; Biber 2009; Meyer 2014). In practice, this means that corpus-driven analyses would *"assume only the existence of words, while concepts like "phrase" and "clause" [would] have no a priori status"* (Biber 2009:4). However, as Tognini-Bonelli (2001) admits, *'pure induction' (ibid.:*85) is more of a rarity and intuition (or theory) that will at some point of the research process inevitably play a role in the selection of the phenomenon to be investigated or in the interpretation of the results (see also Saldanha 2009). The distinction between the two methodologies, therefore, is not uniformly accepted by all the practitioners of CL, with Xiao (2009) arguing that there is no real difference between the two and Gries (2010) providing evidence that corpus-driven analyses *"are not always really corpus-driven"* (*ibid.:*329), to ultimately conclude that *"truly corpus-driven work seems a myth at best"* (*ibid.:*330).

Regardless of the (possible) differences between the two CL approaches, their common benefit is that they methodologically allow a researcher to draw not on what is *linguistically possible* or *intuitively accepted* (*introspective* data) but on real, authentic, attested language use (*observational* data) (Arppe, Gilquin, Glynn, Hilpert and Zeschel 2010). The main principle of CL, therefore, is that the focus is on what is *'textually attested'* rather than the *'encoded possible'* (McEnery, Xiao and Tono 2006). In light of this, the corpus findings of the present study are interpreted as cues to the entrenchment, frequency of occurrence, and encoding properties of the constructions

under examination, rather than as cues to absolute generalisations and statements about their use (or frequency) in language.

An additional benefit of the methodological decision to work with corpora is that they contribute significantly to the validity of the findings yielded by the research and the concomitant refinement of the linguistic proposal put forth (Goutsos and Fragkaki 2015; Mikros 2017; Juola, Mikros and Vinsick 2019). This is so because corpora allow for securing *representative*, *plentiful* (i.e., a reasonable number of data based on the size of a corpus) and, most importantly, *replicable* (and by extension *falsifiable*) results, which enhance the robustness of a study and its cross-research consistency (cf. Rosnow and Rosenthal 1989; Moran 2003).

In the context of all the above, and against the background of similar, constructionally-oriented work on discourse-level constructions presented in Chapter 2 (Fischer 2010; Nikiforidou *et al.,* 2014), the present study examines how the corpus-based and CxG-grounded account offered herein could contribute to the linguistic attestation of dialogicity (Schwenter 2000; Traugott 2008, 2010; Makkonen Craig 2014). Pursuing this line of thought, the research project at hand entertains the hypothesis that the constructions examined function as inherent indexes of a dialogic construal that they consistently import to their context of use. Moreover, following the proposal that dialogicity is associated with *"non-assertive communicative actions"* (Makkonen Craig 2014:113, see Chapter 2, section 2.4.3) which typically include – inter alia – *questions* and *directives*, the present study seeks to explore if this is confirmed by authentic language data. To do so, the study initially employed literary texts and, in particular,

fiction novels which, through the Sketch Engine corpus query system,[82] were uploaded in the form of different, mini corpora. Realising, however, that this might restrict the data at hand to one genre only (and possibly to specific conventions and patterns favoured by certain authors in that genre), I decided to use those initial data as a springboard for discussion, but then broaden the spectrum of analysis to different genres by using the BNC[83] corpus available through Sketch Engine (see Panaretou 2006).

Focusing on identifying instances of non-assertion and non-aligned perspectivisation in discourse, the initial, preliminary corpus quest in BNC[84] yielded twenty different expressions which could be seen as conducive to research exploring the linguistic manifestation of dialogicity. Table 3.1 below summarises the findings of this initial corpus search and *tentatively* classifies them into: a) *directives*, in the form of Imperatives, b) *non-assertive audience-oriented* expressions (in the form of questions or protases of conditional sentences) with occasional explicit Speaker or Addressee lexicalisation, c) expressions used for *reformulation* practices, closely associated with the Speaker's intentions to express *hesitation*, *honesty*, etc., and d) *adverbial/adjectival phrases* signalling intersubjectivity.[85]

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[82] Sketch Engine is a corpus query system that contains 500 ready-to-use corpora in 90+ languages, each having a size of up to 30 billion words to provide a representative sample of language. It also offers to its users the ability to upload and create their own corpora (see https://www.sketchengine.eu/).

[83] The British National Corpus (BNC) comprises a collection of approximately 100 million words deriving from samples of written and spoken language from a wide repertoire of sources, designed to offer a representative collection of both written and spoken British English from the late twentieth century (see http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/).

[84] Details on the sampling practices adopted for this initial BNC search are provided in section 3.4.1.

[85] It should be noted that this classification − particularly for the patterns listed in 10 - 20 in Table 3.1 − can only be *tentative* and *provisional* in that no research has been conducted on their formal or other properties and their discourse function. For example, the pattern *'never mind'* appears to be of particular interest in that it is lexicographically commonly catalogued as an idiom, an interjection or a conjunction listed under the entry of the adverb *'never'* (cf. *Cambridge Online Dictionary, Grammarist, Word Reference*). These lexicographic sources further suggest that its spelling as one lexical unit, i.e., *'Nevermind'*, already traced in several texts, may soon result in its listing as an independent lexicographic entry, suggestive of the loss of its clausal status. At the same time, other lexicographic sources (e.g., ColED) treat the pattern as a verb phrase with syntactic dependence on the adverb *'never'*. In this latter sense, *'never mind'* is also lexicographically presented as co-occurring with a noun phrase functioning as the object in its scope, i.e., *"Dorothy, come on. Never mind your shoes. They'll soon dry off"* (ColED).

Expressions Identified	Categorisation
1) Believe me	*Directives* in the form of Imperatives
2) Believe you me	
3) Believe it or not	
4) Think again	
5) Mind you	
6) Guess what	
7) Trust me	
8) Rest assured	
9) Like it or not	
10) Hard to believe?	*Non-assertive audience-oriented*
11) If you ask me	*expressions* (in the form of questions or
12) If you know what I mean	protases of conditional sentences) with
	occasional explicit Speaker or Addressee
	lexicalisation
13) You see	Expressions used for *reformulation*
14) I mean	practices, likely to encode *hesitation,*
15) To tell you the truth	*intentions towards the Addressee*
16) To be frank	
17) To be honest	
18) To think	
19) Never mind	Adverbial phrasal patterns signalling
20) Fair enough	*intersubjectivity*

Table 3.1: Patterns signalling non-aligned perspectivisation in discourse

Acknowledging the need to secure a manageable research project with as fine-grained

outcomes as possible, the research scope was restricted to the first five patterns involved

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Adding to this, I propose that the verb *'mind'* merits further investigation concerning its presence in other Imperative-based constructions as well, without excluding the possibility that it could well motivate its own specific family network of constructions with: a) Imperative instances followed by object complementation as in *"Mind the gap"* or *"Mind your own business"* or b) yet another instance of non-canonical Imperative with a *pre-posed* Subject as in *"Never you mind",* whose semantics/pragmatics borders closely that of *"Mind your own business"*. Apparently, our understanding of all the patterns outlined in Table 3.1. and, certainly, not least, of *"never (you) mind" / "Nevermind"* would benefit from further research.

in the category of directives, all carrying the morphological marking of the Imperative (see also Chapter 7, section 7.5).[86] As expected, this methodological decision contributed significantly to the narrowing down of investigation foci for the present study and its pursuit of more targeted results. I do contend, however, that all the remaining patterns readily lend themselves to future research in the field of dialogic markers. What is more, a future, in-depth analysis of them could reveal not only interesting aspects of the patterns per se but also of the motivation surrounding the concept of dialogicity in language.

Following the decision to restrict the present study to the expressions listed in (1) – (5) in Table 3.1 above, I complemented the BNC-retrieved data pools with COCA-drawn data. The methodological decision to enrich the data pools with COCA-derived data, by following specific sampling practices (see sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2) was a much-warranted addition to the research design of the present study that contributed significantly to enhancing the *validity* and *reliability* of its findings. More specifically, as stated by their developers, BNC and COCA constitute the two largest, freely-available and well-balanced corpora used for linguistic research. In this respect, they secure *adequacy* of samples and better *representativeness,* although they present differences in terms of their size and updating practices.[87] Presently, COCA involves more than one billion words with constant updates, whereas BNC slightly above 100 million words, while also following a more conservative policy as regards constant updating.[88] At the same time, the two corpora also follow a different approach to genre

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[86] As will be discussed in Chapter 5, THINK AGAIN can also feature in infinitival form supported by contextual directives. Its prototypical form, however, appears to be the one carrying the morphological marking of the Imperative.

[87] COCA is updated on a yearly basis retaining its even distribution as far as genres are concerned, whereas BNC has undergone only two major updates in 2007 and 2014 respectively after its first, official release in 1994.

[88] It should be stressed that in 2017, which marked the beginning of the use of COCA-retrieved data in the present study, COCA involved approximately 560 million words, i.e., about half of its presently

balance as BNC consists of 90% written texts and 10% spoken, while in COCA the relevant percentages are evenly divided (20% in each genre) between spoken, fiction, popular magazines, newspaper and academic texts.[89] As regards spoken and written texts, BNC has a much wider range of spoken sub-genres (cf. Panaretou 2006), while COCA is composed mainly of more recent, unscripted conversation of TV and radio shows, although it has significantly enriched its spoken data with its last update (March 2020).

Considering the above, the use of corpora relates profitably to the CxG, usage-based research agenda of the present study and further endows it with certain methodological assets; namely the exclusion of contrivance or impressionistic views and the ability to arrive at attested, representative, sufficient, and replicable data. Nonetheless, as the relevant literature suggests (Widdowson 2000; Flowerdew 2009), the use of corpora also entails certain limitations that need to be taken into consideration. In particular, the validity of a study involving corpora findings is largely dependent on the following three factors: a) *the (optimum) size of the corpus involved* (de Haan 1992; Mikros 2002), b) *the operationalisation of the research questions posed*, and c) *the judicious interpretations of the findings* (Widdowson 2000; De Beaugrande 2001). As Gilquin (2008) points out, corpora cannot function as a 'shortcut' to cognition, therefore strong claims about *salience*, *prototypicality* or *frequency* should be avoided.[90] This, however,

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available word population. Consequently, any attempts for comparisons between BNC and COCA as regards the present study should consider the population differences exhibited by the two at the time of the initial data collection.

[89] At present, COCA contains different genres, namely: spoken, fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, academic texts, and with its last update in March 2020, it further includes TV and film subtitles, blogs, and other web pages (see also: https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/, last accessed in 08/04/2020).

[90] Gilquin (2008) proposes that *prototypicality* is teased apart in *salience* (as measured by the relative accessibility of different senses of a polysemous word in a zero-context sentence production task) and *frequency* (as measured by sense frequency counts in two different corpora). Recognising the complexity of the issue behind the interrelationship of the three concepts and the inherent difficulty in quantifying their differences, the present study aligns with Geeraerts (1988) on this issue and views frequency (the only most objectively measurable concept of the three) as a *"heuristic tool in the pinpointing of*

does not suggest that corpora cannot effectively contribute to revealing or – at least– positing links between a specific language form, its input frequency, and its (statistically confirmed) collocational behaviour. As Baker (2006) argues, corpus-based studies, just like *"any method of research has associated problems which need to be addressed and also limited in terms of what [it] can and cannot achieve"* (*ibid.*:7). The present study, therefore, treats corpus data as valuable sources of linguistic evidence and restricts itself to suggesting that this evidence merits attention in that it confirms the constructional status of the patterns which cannot be exhausted in a compositional account. The corpus data collected further confirm the systematicity of occurrence of the constructions examined, their idiosyncrasies, and their contextual regularities that could not have been possibly predicted on the basis of their constituents alone. However, as will be discussed, the corpora do not provide access to audio files for the concordance lines collected with the exception of BNC, which provides only minimal access to a restricted number of concordance lines originating in spoken discourse. Admittedly, this lists itself as a limitation of the present study to be fully addressed in Chapter 7 (section 7.4).

At this point, the question that naturally poses itself is against which parameters the data collected were examined so that frequency of input and systematicity could be established. This is precisely the focus of the upcoming section which analyses the annotation grid designed in the framework of the present study.

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prototypes" (*ibid.*: 222). As such, any claims made henceforth restrict themselves to *suggestions* that increased frequencies might correlate positively with more prototypical uses of a given form.

3.3.2. Annotation of the data and manual tagging considerations

The morphological similarity of the constructions in terms of the Imperative and the semantic classification of their verbs as mental state ones necessitate certain contextual considerations that relate both to their *internal* and *external* features. These contextual considerations methodologically result in a combination of automatic and manual tagging of the data with respect to the contextual regularities and interdependencies exhibited by the patterns.[91]

The automatic, corpus-generated annotation of data concerns information about the authorship, the time period, the (written or spoken) source of the text and its genre (e.g., newspaper/magazine article, novel extract etc.,). The manual tagging relates to the idiosyncrasies observed in relation to the following parameters which make up the annotation grid employed:

a) the *semantics* of the patterns (i.e., To what extent the patterns exhaust themselves in a fully-compositional account?),

b) the *pragmatics* of the patterns (i.e., Which functional space do the patterns occupy in discourse? Do they consistently correlate with specific speech acts? If so, how can these be accounted for?),

c) their positioning in the *dialoguality - monologuality* framework (i.e., To what extent do the patterns correlate with the *external* features of dialogue relating to the presence of one or more interlocutors?),

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[91] The analysis of collocates and contextual regularities (in particular intensifiers) in the surrounding context of the constructions was based on the frequency of their presence in the context displayed automatically by both corpora for each node word or expression (i.e., the standard KWIC (Key Word in Context) size for each concordance line). Consequently, for the purposes of the present study, the automatic KWIC size generated by each corpus is what determined the stretch of discourse to be examined as the (immediate) context of each construction in every concordance line.

d) their positioning in the *dialogicity - monologicity* framework (i.e., To what extent do the patterns correlate with the *internal* features of dialogue associated with multiple perspectivisation in discourse?),

e) their *positional flexibility* (i.e., Do the patterns exhibit a sentence-initial/-final or parenthetical position? Are there any instances of the patterns having an independent sentential status?[92] In case of multiple possibilities, is there any possible preference for any of these positions? And finally, how can discourse positioning relate to discourse unit delimitation practices?),

f) their *morphosyntax* (This encompasses both *internal* and *external* syntax and other contextual regularities (see below)). And, finally,

g) their *collocational behaviour* in relation to *intensifying* and *stance-encoding* elements (see below).

The final two parameters of manual tagging (*f* and *g* above) merit further discussion. The category of *morphosyntax* includes both *internal* morphosyntactic features (e.g., the Imperative or the infinitival morphological marking) and *external* ones that might vary among the constructions. The external features involve the contextual presence of: a) *directive performatives*, grammatical (e.g., modal verbs like *"should"*) or lexical (e.g., the verb *"encourage"*), b) *preceding or following non-assertion*, in the form of questions or conditional sentences), c) *connectors* like *"and"* and *"but",* and d) *preceding* (e.g., *"not a notary, **mind you**…"*) or *following negation* (e.g., *"but **believe you me**, until it happens to you, you have no idea of..."*). The latter should be seen as a

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[92] It should be noted that the internal classification of positional flexibility as a tagging parameter is necessarily constrained by the fact that the sampled data are represented in writing along with the respective punctuation conventions chosen by their authors which may influence – at least to a degree – the frequency counts related to positioning, particularly in cases of an independent sentential status (cf. Chaida, Nirgiannaki and Panaretou 2010).

distinct category from that of negative lexical prosody (e.g., *"ridiculous"*, *"awful"*). It refers to the negative formal marking of the verb (or surrounding verbal forms), which in many cases follow(s) the constructions, hence termed as *'post-use'* negation in the present work, conventionally employed for reformulating or debunking potential, alternative viewpoints (see Chapters 4-6 and Appendix II for Chapters 4-6).

The category of *collocational behavior* encompasses the presence of *intensifiers* and *stance-encoding* elements (e.g., negative and positive lexical prosody), which will be further shown to relate to the ability of the constructions to delimit discourse units. For the purposes of the present study, intensifiers will be treated as a superordinate term for all the linguistic items and mechanisms that *strengthen* (i.e., amplify or boost), *weaken* or *evaluate* the proposition /p/ they modify (Athanasiadou 2007, Rentoumi *et al.,* 2012). These include *stance* elements, which as discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.1), refer to the lexical or grammatical coding of the Speaker's attitudes and beliefs (Rhee 2011, 2016).[93]

Generally, intensifiers function like degree words that *"scale a quality up or down to a certain degree"* (Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartvik 1985:590-591) and, as Klemola (2013) argues, they *"assign prominence to some constituent of a sentence"* (*ibid.*:82). Schmidt (2007) further observes that they can also be of an emotive nature performing three main functions: a) boost the Speaker's illocutionary force and serve to maximise the dramatic effect in communication, b) elicit attention from the Addressee and, finally, c) under certain circumstances, establish rapport between interlocutors.

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[93] See also Biber and Finegan 1989; Ochs 1990, 1996.

Aligning with Athanasiadou (2007) and Traugott (2010), I argue that intensifying elements, including stance-encoding features, are an expected finding in discourse contexts promoting (inter)subjectivity and evaluation of non-aligned perspectives. To effectively operationalise their measurement as contextual regularities, I adopt the following nine-category framework (see Table 3.2 below) which relies extensively on Traugott's (2010) work on intensifiers. To facilitate the reader's understanding, each category is correlated with corpus-retrieved examples, or parts of examples, featuring the intensifying element in focus.

Intensifying Elements

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1. **Negative lexical prosody** [94] (e.g., the word '*ridiculous*' in the following example: *"…, if you honestly think that I'm going down to the police station and verifying a story like that then you can think again! It's <u>ridiculous</u>.")*

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2. **Positive lexical prosody** (e.g., the adjectives *'young'*, *'sparky'* and *'outgoing'* in the following example: *"…I suggest you think again. There were twelve of us…and everyone was <u>young</u>, <u>sparky</u> and <u>outgoing</u>.")*

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3. **Comparatives** (e.g., the use of *'more careful'* in the following example: *"If he fails to do this, … a <u>more careful</u> look at our experiment and think again.'*)

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4. **Superlatives** (e.g., the use of *'most popular'* in the following example: *"If you think people from Orange County … think again. The third <u>most popular</u> city…")*

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5. **Quantifiers** *(e.g., a lot of, (a great) many etc.,)*

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[94] Semantic prosody (also referred to as *'semantic harmony'*, *'discourse/pragmatic prosody'* and *'semantic association'* (Sinclair 1987)) is used in the context of the present study as: *"a consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates"* (Louw 1993:157). Its primary function is to express the Speaker's/Writer's attitude or evaluation (Louw 2000:58). The relevant literature (Stubbs 1995; Xiao and McEnery 2006) distinguishes semantic prosody into: a) *positive*, b) *neutral*, and c) *negative*. For the purposes of this study, only the first and the last type will be taken into consideration.

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6. **Epistemic modal adverbials** (e.g., *surely, certainly etc.,* in the sense of boosting/increasing the Speaker's certainty)

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7. **Focus particles** (e.g., the use of words like *'even', 'only'* etc. in the sense that they exclude alternatives and they *"carry an implication of dissonance or incompatibility"* (König 1991:131, Traugott 2006, 2010)

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8. **Marked word order** (e.g., Inversion, Fronting, etc., as in the following example: *"<u>Bless you Beryl</u>, I thought to myself…")*

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9. **Lexical repetition** (i.e., repetition of a lexical item twice within the immediate context of the construction, e.g., *"…I <u>suggest</u> -- I strongly <u>suggest</u> -- you think again." / <u>Whoever</u> you meet, <u>whoever</u> you speak to, <u>whoever</u> you write to, ask yourself:" Is there any way I can help this person?" If the answer is" No", think again.*"

Table 3.2: The set of the intensifying elements examined

The categories of intensifying elements are not mutually exclusive. To put it differently, a given concordance line may exhibit more than one, or even all, of the above categories, including those that may seemingly appear as opposite, such as the categories of negative and positive polarity, respectively.

As is evident by the number of the tagging categories and their interrelationship with stance, the latter is a typically elusive concept in terms of measurement and quantification, likely to also interfere with the subjectivity of the coder. As a result, the data annotation is a highly complex process involving a number of different parameters. As Wilson and Thomas (1997) maintain *"there can be no ideal annotation system […] and this becomes even more complicated when the semantic categories comprising the semantic annotation fall into evaluative categories, which relate to semantic prosody"*

(*ibid.*:55-56). [95] This is further complicated by the large-scale status of the present work and the fact that the constructions in focus exhibit a phrasal status paired with a discourse function that exceeds sentential boundaries.

Against this background, and in a consistent effort to restrict subjectivity and ensure *inter-coder reliability*,[96] the tagging procedure was independently – and at regular intervals – monitored by three adult speakers, proficient in the language. The qualitative parameters discussed in the present section, along with the annotation grid specifically designed for the present study, and its attendant data tagging, informed the quantitative considerations and research tools to be focused upon in the next section.

3.4 Quantitative analysis and considerations

3.4.1 Initial data collection: Non-probability sampling on BNC

As briefly discussed in section 3.3.1, the process of data collection is distinguished into two different phases, an initial one conducted on BNC data only, following *non-probability* sampling (Lavrakas 2008, see below), and a final data collection conducted on both BNC and COCA by using *random* sampling (see section 3.4.2).

Starting with the initial data collection phase, the aim was to establish to what extent the patterns in question were indeed traceable (i.e., frequent) in the BNC, thereby allowing for sufficient data to be collected for observation. In particular, following the Central Limit Theorem (hereafter CLT)[97] on *statistical significance requirements*,

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[95] See also Hunston (2004): *"...the group of lexical items that indicate evaluative meaning is large and open and does not lend itself easily to quantification"* (*ibid.*:157).

[96] *Intercoder reliability* refers to the extent to which two or more independent coders agree on the coding of the content of interest with an application of the same coding scheme (Lavrakas 2008; Artstein and Poesio 2008; Krippendorff 2011; Mouter and Vonk Noordegraaf 2012).

[97] The Central Limit Theorem is calculated through the formula: $\sigma_{\bar{x}} = \dfrac{\sigma_x}{\sqrt{n}}$

robustness (i.e., resistance to errors) *of statistical models* and *normal distribution of sample means* (Johnson 2004; Mordkoff 2000, 2011, 2016), my aim was to be able to safely argue for the systematicity of the patterns in BNC. To this end, I proceeded to form data pools consisting of *at least* 35 concordance lines per expression, since in adherence to CLT, any sample of a population (N), whereby $N \geq 30$, approaches *normal distribution* in its main statistical parameters and is thus considered to be capable of yielding statistically valid generalisations. [98] Non-probability sampling, therefore, does not involve random selection and, as such, it is *not* intended for sample-based, proportionality inferences as to the entirety of the population (N) involved. The specific type of non-probability sampling employed at the initial data collection would more accurately fit the *non-probability, targeted* sampling technique in that the data were sought after in BNC with the predefined aims described above.

The CLT-based confirmation of the systematicity and frequency of occurrence of the patterns, along with the methodological decision to complement BNC-based data pools with COCA-data pools, naturally redirected my interest from collecting targeted samples to collecting *representative* ones for the *entirety* of the population (N) available in both corpora. This marked the beginning of the second – and final – stage of data collection analysed in the next section.

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[98] *Normal distribution* is a continuous probability distribution that is symmetrical on both sides of the mean to the effect that the right side of the center is a mirror-image of its left side. Simply put, if data follow normal distribution, then their graph depiction would follow a bell-curve shape, exhibiting equal distance from a central value and no left or right bias (McLeod 2019).

3.4.2 Final data collection: Random sampling on BNC and COCA

Following the above, the data on which the findings of the present study rely were collected at a more refined stage of research with the aim of securing representativeness. A further objective at this stage was to provide (tentative) insights into confirming (or alternatively disproving) a positive correlation between the token frequency of the specific language patterns and their degree of entrenchment. Moreover, the close examination of a sufficient number of concordance lines featuring the patterns would also allow the present research to yield fairly reliable insights into the contextual regularities of the patterns and their collocational behaviour.

To achieve the above aims, the final data collection was conducted on the basis of *random*, *unbiased* and *without replacement* sampling as this would secure an equal possibility of selection for all the subjects involved in the population to be examined (Lavrakas 2008). The random selection and sequencing of corpus concordances was determined by a random number generator that would prevent a specific subject from being selected twice, hence its *'without replacement'* feature. Random sampling processes of this type are characterised by increased accuracy of representation even when large populations (N) are involved and, theoretically at least, their representativeness can only be compromised by luck itself. The only limitation typically acknowledged in this sampling technique is that it requires that the entire population (N) be known to the researcher (i.e., it requires a *finite* population). This limitation, however, is not applicable to the present research design since the total number of concordance lines ($=N$) corresponding to each pattern of interest is automatically available to the researcher upon submission of the respective corpus query.

Given the above, the primary objective behind the random sampling technique chosen was to collect a sample by providing equal probability to each one of the concordance lines to be chosen as representative of the overall population (*N*). The formula used was the following:

$$n = \frac{N}{(N-1)E^2 + 1}$$

An additional important methodological commitment made at this stage concerned the *margin of error* (i.e., the degree of error tolerated by the study) and the *respective confidence level* (i.e., the degree of uncertainty tolerated by the study) adopted for the random sampling (Lavrakas 2008). Conventionally, in statistical hypothesis testing, the typical margin of error is set at 5%, the confidence level at 95%, and the significance level at a p-value <0.05. However, in the context of the present study, and in order to ensure a more manageable – but still representative – sample, the margin of error was set at 10% and the respective confidence level at 90% with the resultant p-value < 0.10. As will be shown, this did not compromise in the least the statistical significance and validity of the findings, suggesting that, even if the stricter, conventional percentages of confidence level and margin of error had been adopted, the respective degree of statistical significance for each case study would still be quite comparable to that of the present findings.

Given that the overall population (*N*) available for every pattern in each corpus was finite, i.e., known to me upon submitting the query, the random data pools were formed after estimating the appropriate sample size (*prospective estimation*) which would allow for statistically valid generalisations (Lavrakas 2008). The sample size was

estimated through the raosoft.com online power analysis calculator[99] and it relied on the following parameters: a) *the overall population* (N) available in each corpus, b) *the confidence level,* and c) *the margin of error*. Even though the overall population (N) of the patterns of interest in each corpus differed (see Table 3.3 below), the sample size calculator exhibited only minimal differences as far as sample sizes were concerned. This is the case because as the overall population (N) increases, its distribution *asymptotically* converges with the distribution of the sampled population (n) (Höpfner 2014; Lehmann 1999). The *asymptotic theory* (also referred to as '*large sample theory*') assesses the properties of estimators and statistical tests and relies on the assumption that the sampled population (n) may grow indefinitely. In this respect, the properties of the estimators for (n) would be evaluated under the limit of $n \rightarrow \infty$, which, in practice, suggests that a limit evaluation on (n) would be valid (with some degree of approximation) for a large, finite sample as well (Höpfner 2014).[100]

Table 3.3 below presents an overview of the overall population available in both corpora for each construction as well as the precise number of random concordance lines that had to be collected per construction and corpus.[101]

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[99] The online sample size calculator used may be accessed through the following link: http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html.

[100] This is why, sample size estimators openly accept that sample sizes (n) change only minimally for populations (N) larger than 20.000 (see also raosoft.com).

[101] The concordance lines collected per construction and corpus are available in their annotated form in Appendix I.

Constructions	BNC (Sketch Engine)	COCA
	Confidence Level: 90%	Confidence Level: 90%
	Margin of Error: 10%	Margin of Error: 10%
BELIEVE ME	Overall Population Size 783	Overall Population Size 4723
	Number of concordances: **62**	Number of concordances: **67**
BELIEVE YOU ME	Overall Population Size 1153	Overall Population Size 57
	Number of concordances: **64**	Number of concordances: **32**
BELIEVE IT OR NOT	Overall Population Size 156	Overall Population Size 1879
	Number of examples: **48**	Number of examples: **66**
THINK AGAIN	Overall Population Size 339	Overall Population Size 758
	Number of examples: **57**	Number of examples: **63**
MIND YOU	Overall Population Size 1390	Overall Population Size 1042
	Number of examples: **65**	Number of examples: **64**

Table 3.3: An overview of the random number of concordances (*n*) examined per construction and corpus

3.4.3 Statistical significance and the use of non-parametric tests

The qualitative analysis conducted on the basis of the annotation of the data was systematically correlated with quantitative measurements. In particular, all the randomly-sampled data (see section 3.4.2) were first subjected to frequency counts in terms of the annotation grid (see section 3.3.2) and then to normal distribution tests that would allow statistical significance and reliability measurements to follow. The test administered to indicate whether the frequency sets followed normal or non-normal

distribution was the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (henceforth K-S) test. The K-S test functions as a *'goodness of fit test'* because of its inherent sensitivity to differences associated with the location and the shape of the empirical, cumulative distribution functions involved in any two given samples (Massey 1951; Justel, Peña and Zamar 1997). This sensitivity allows KS to successfully quantify the distance between the empirical distribution functions of two samples and determine with increased accuracy whether these two distributions, in this case the BNC and COCA population distributions, differ or whether an underlying probability distribution differs from a hypothesised one (cf. Jarque and Bera 1980; Dallal and Wilkinson 1986; Weber, Leemis and Kincaid 2006). As will be discussed in the chapters that follow, the K-S test conducted for all the frequency sets collected per construction and corpus indicated that the samples exhibited *non-normal distribution*,[102] which necessitated the use of *non-parametric tests*.

Non-parametric statistics is based on data that are distribution-free or exhibit a specified distribution but with unspecified parameters (i.e., mean and variance) for this distribution (Puri and Sen 1971; Shorak and Wellner 1986). In this respect, they are typically used when data involve ranking but have no clear numerical interpretation, as in the case of measuring preferences which, in the context of this study, would correspond to the semantic-pragmatic, and contextual preferences of the constructions. As far as levels of measurement are concerned,[103] non-parametric tests result in *ordinal*

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[102] Non-normal distribution suggests that, if placed on a graph, the data would exhibit a left or right bias (McLeod 2019).

[103] *Level of measurement* (also *scale of measure*) is a classification that describes the nature of information within the values assigned to variables. According to Stevens (1946), there are four levels or scales of measurement: the *nominal*, the *ordinal*, the *interval,* and the *ratio*. A more contemporary definition identifies measurement as *"the estimation or the discovery of the ratio of some magnitude of a quantitative attribute to a unit of the same attribute"* (Michell 1997:358).

data which enjoy greater robustness. [104] This is so because due to their restricted reliance on assumptions about the data, they become more broadly applicable than their corresponding, parametric counterparts (see Conover 1999; Sprent and Smeeton 2001). Their greatest advantage in this respect is their robustness which endows the research projects that involve them with greater resistance to errors conventionally associated with deviations from assumptions of normality.

The two non-parametric tests employed throughout the study are the Mann Whitney Wilcoxon (MWW) and the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test, respectively. The MWW test is a non-parametric test of the null hypothesis that it is equally likely that a randomly selected value from one population may be less than or greater than a randomly selected value from a second population (Wilcoxon 1945). As in the present study, the MWW is reserved for the comparison between two-category frequency sets, investigating whether two *independent* samples selected from populations would exhibit the same distribution (Wilcoxon 1945; Wainer and Robinson 2003; Kerby 2014). A case in point for the present study is the comparison between the frequency sets of constructional and compositional semantics, whenever the latter is available.

On the other hand, the KW test is a non-parametric method for testing whether samples originate from the same distribution. A significant KW test indicates whether at least one sample *stochastically dominates* another sample but it does not identify where this stochastic dominance occurs or for how many pairs of groups it can be obtained. [105]

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[104] *Ordinal data* is a type of categorical, statistical data whose variables form natural, ordered categories and the distances between these categories are not known (Stevens 1946). An ordinal scale is distinguished from a nominal one in terms of ranking while it also differs from interval and ratio scales by not having category widths which represent equal increments of the underlying attribute.

[105] *Stochastic dominance* is a partial order between random variables. The concept arises in decision theory and decision analysis in situations where one gamble (a probability distribution over possible outcomes, also known as *prospects*) can be ranked as superior to another gamble for a broad class of decision-makers. It is based on shared preferences regarding sets of possible outcomes and their associated probabilities (see Vickson 1975, 1977; Kuosmanen 2004).

That is why, unlike the MWW, KW is reserved for multiple-category frequency sets. An example of its applicability in the present study is the comparison between BNC and COCA samples as regards intensifying and stance elements that involve multiple frequency sets.

3.4.4 The internal reliability of the data

The final step involved in examining the internal consistency, namely the reliability of the scale formed by the data was measuring the Cronbach's alpha (α) coefficient. Cronbach's alpha (α) is viewed as the expected correlation of two tests that measure the same underlying construct on the assumption that the average correlation of a set of items is an accurate estimate of the average correlation of all items pertaining to that construct (Taber 2018). As such, (α) is a function of the *number of items* in a test, the *average covariance* between *item-pairs*, and the *variance* of *the total score*. Calculating Cronbach's alpha (α) has become common practice in quantitative research in that it functions as a consistency reliability estimator for measures containing multiple components. On these grounds, it is widely recommended as a necessary 'step' in statistical analysis as it allows for safer conclusions concerning *reliability* (Tavakol and Dennick 2011). In the context of the present study, Cronbach's alpha (α) has been used for frequency sets involving multiple sub-sets (e.g., the contextual features or the intensifying elements) but also for the overall frequency sets collected for each construction per corpus.

The resulting (α) coefficient ranges from $0 - 1$ and provides an overall assessment of a measure's reliability. If all the scale items involved are entirely independent from one another (i.e., are not correlated or share no covariance), then (α) $=0$ (or close to 0). If, however, all the involved items exhibit high covariance, then (α) will approach 1 as the

items in the scale approach infinity. In other words, the higher the (α) coefficient, the greater the shared covariance among the items resulting in increasingly reliable measurements (Thompson 1992; Osburn 2000; Ritter 2010). In this respect, (α) ultimately functions as a consistency reliability estimator for *composite* measures, i.e., measures involving multiple category sets.

As will be discussed in the chapters of data analysis that follow, the respective results for both statistical significance and reliability are consistently high for the frequency sets examined, thus lending further support to the initial hypothesis set (H_o) made per construction. It should also be noted that, in certain cases, the internal reliability for some scales is so high that the results yielded an (α) reaching the numerical value of almost absolute 1 (see Chapter 5 and Appendix II for Chapter 5).

For the convenience of the reader, Figure 3.1 that follows presents a schematic overview of the multistep, methodological framework adopted across all the case studies examined. The multi-level arrangement of Figure 3.1 is suggestive of the rich and varied interplay between qualitative and quantitative considerations that ultimately informed the sequence of all the methodological steps taken.

Figure 3.1: An overview of the methodological framework adopted

3.5 Summary and concluding remarks

Adhering to the research agenda outlined in the introduction, the present chapter presented a detailed overview of the lexicographic, qualitative, and quantitative considerations that informed the methodological framework, the sampling practices, and the overall research design adopted.

More specifically, the lexicographic entries of the verbs participating in the constructions under investigation provide usage-based evidence for their distinct, yet related, senses and the corresponding syntactic patterns in which they occur. Given that

the focus of the present work is not on the lexical semantics of these verbs but on the lexical information concerning these verbs in the said constructions, the dictionary entries themselves formed a valuable data base for the initial steps of the research. They further fed into the specification of the internal and external features of each construction and served as testing grids for the theoretical discussions of the semantics-pragmatics and morphosyntax of the constructions in focus.

To methodologically fulfill its research objectives and operationalise the effective measurement of the frequency sets collected upon the completion of the annotation process, the present work employed quantitative methods and tools for statistical significance and reliability. As will be exemplified in the chapters that follow (Chapters 4-6, see also Appendix II for Chapters 4-6), the findings systematically indicate a positive correlation between each construction and all the parameters (i.e., the frequency sets) examined, thus lending further support to the research hypotheses entertained in Chapter 1 (section 1.3).

The present chapter also briefly referred to the limitations of the research design adopted (for a detailed overview, see Chapter 7, section 7.4), acknowledging that an annotation system, and particularly one involving semantic categories, can never be absolutely impervious to potential, methodological criticism. At the same time, it clarified that the present study has systematically sought to minimise subjectivity by securing inter-coder reliability through regular, external monitoring. A further potential limitation acknowledged was the methodological decision to commit to a margin of error set at 10% and a respective confidence level at 90%. As argued, this methodological choice was made in the interests of securing a more manageable large-scale research project without, however, compromising the ability of the sample

collected to yield statistically valid, reliable, and representative (for the entirety of the corpora population (N)) findings.

All things considered, the lexicographically-attested information and the combination of the qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis applied herein illustrate that the CxG account of the constructions in focus is a viable one with considerable points in its favour. The chapters of data analysis that follow are expected to further illustrate – by means of examples – the suitability of the composite, methodological design described in the present chapter. The latter has not only enabled the present work to provide fine-grained and comprehensive answers to its research questions, but it has also contributed to the refinement of the lexicographic presentation of the patterns under study by foregrounding aspects of the polysemy of the mental state verbs they feature.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY 1: The BELIEVE-family constructions

4.1 Introduction

The present chapter marks the beginning of the data analysis and presents the CxG-based account of the linguistic patterns BELIEVE ME, BELIEVE YOU ME, and BELIEVE IT OR NOT as constructional instances of Imperatives. As will be argued, the patterns constitute a family of constructions occupying the common functional space of marking a proposition /*p*/ in discourse as unexpected. However, they also present important differences that sanction their treatment as distinct, but related, constructional entities.

More specifically, the first two of the above-mentioned members will be shown to relate to the pragmatics of *requesting faith/trust in the Speaker (S) about a proposition /p/* in their scope. However, BELIEVE ME will be crucially shown to specifically express the pragmatics *of inviting faith/trust in the Speaker (S)*, whereas BELIEVE YOU ME will be shown to relate to the pragmatics of *demanding faith/trust in the Speaker (S) as regards /p/*. Importantly, the third member of the family will be shown to distance itself from requesting (varying from *inviting* to *demanding*) trust/faith in that its pragmatics will be shown to consist in *the declaration of /p/ as fact*. In this respect, inviting faith/trust in the Speaker (S) regarding /*p*/ is, simply put, redundant (or, perhaps, counterproductive) given that /*p*/ emerges as impervious to any veridicality concerns or objections.

Against this backdrop, this chapter sets out to discuss not only the common, but also the different features that each member of the constructional family exhibits. In

particular, as regards their *common features*, the present chapter aims to show that all the constructional members of the family:

a) are substantive in form and share partly-motivated features as they inherit certain aspects of the semantics and pragmatics of the mental state verb '*believe',*

b) inherit the directive, intersubjective, dialogic, and, typically, non-evidential function associated with their Imperative morphological marking,

c) perform the discourse function of marking a proposition /*p*/ as unexpected, i.e., contrary to a real or imaginary Addressee's (assumed) beliefs or expectations,

d) impose a dialogic construal on their context of use, which is further found to relate to their morphosyntax and inherited features,

e) exhibit considerable positional flexibility, which correlates with their *backward-* or *forward*-looking discourse scope, and

f) systematically present contextual regularities (e.g., a consistent correlation with stance elements and intensifiers) and dependencies which, along with their discourse scope, contribute to delimiting the discourse unit of which they form a part.

At the same time, however, the constructions also exhibit differences originating mainly in their different morphosyntax. On the basis of inheritance and, in particular, partial-inheritance, as will be discussed, these differences inform their pragmatics and discourse function and account for their related, but also differentiated, function and status in the language. In this context, the present research identifies the following as *elements of differentiation*:

a) The corpus investigation for the pattern *'believe me'* yielded both tokens of constructional semantics (i.e., BELIEVE ME) and of fully-compositional semantics (i.e.,

'believe' + 'me'). The latter will be argued to be available *only* for this pattern but markedly different from, and significantly less frequent than, the constructional semantics of BELIEVE ME, focused upon in section 4.3. Apart from differences with respect to frequency, the fully-compositional semantics will also be shown to exhibit considerable formal variation, e.g., *tense-* and *person*-related changes, infinitival, negative, and interrogative marking, *that-* and *prepositional*-complementation as well as a restricted, inter-sentential, discourse scope. BELIEVE ME, on the other hand, in its constructional semantics, will be shown to exhibit considerable substantivity, specific properties and collocational regularities as well as a broad discourse scope paired with the speech act of *'inviting'* the Addressee to show faith/trust in the Speaker. In this context, BELIEVE ME will ultimately be argued to be a distinct construction from its synchronically-available and – to a certain extent – related fully-compositional counterpart.

b) Although BELIEVE ME and BELIEVE YOU ME will be shown to bear certain similarities (e.g., their common Imperative morphological marking, their shared self-reference to the Speaker ('*me'*) and the encoding of affective, semantic undertones), the unique syntactic configuration of the latter tallies it with the status of an 'extragrammatical idiom' in Fillmore *et al.,*'s (1988) terms and endows it with properties not available in BELIEVE ME. In particular, I argue that the non-canonical word order followed in BELIEVE YOU ME, evident in its post-posed, pronominal Subject ('*you'*), renders the construction a variant form of BELIEVE ME. This variant form, as will be exemplified, is commonly regarded as more emphatic in that its Subject, referring to the (assumed) Addressee, functions semantically as a Patient.[106] In this respect, the broader discourse

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[106] For a discussion on the notion of the *Imperative Subject*, its interpretative constraints and the semantic roles associated with it, see section 4.4.

scope of the construction, associated with the marking of /p/ as unexpected, will be argued to pair with the speech act of *'demanding faith/trust'* (rather than just *'inviting it'*, as is the case with BELIEVE ME).

c) BELIEVE IT OR NOT is argued to be the most distinguishable of the three due to its morphosyntax and the fact that it is not readily associated with affective, semantic undertones. At the same time, it is further shown to inherit the semantics of DISJUNCTION along with the factual reference and contextual recoverability, involved in the use of the pronoun *'it'*, as in the following syntactic configuration pattern featuring 'believe' + NP $_{(Object, human^-)}$, whereby the NP referent is a non-human entity.

d) The final point of differentiation concerns the degree of productivity of the licensing templates of the family members, which is a shared quality by BELIEVE ME and BELIEVE IT OR NOT (albeit in different degrees), but *not* by BELIEVE YOU ME. More specifically, BELIEVE ME is licensed by the template $V_{(AFF)/IMP}$ + ME which motivates similar constructions in the language, such as TRUST ME or WATCH ME, also opening up to the possibility of manifesting an extended discourse scope.[107] BELIEVE IT OR NOT is licensed by the template V_{IMP}+IT+OR+NOT, which also produces other similar disjunctive constructions in the Imperative, such as LIKE IT OR NOT. However, this is not the case with BELIEVE YOU ME which appears to be morphosyntactically unique, i.e., a *'singleton'*, in the English language (for a detailed discussion, see Chapter 7, section 7.3).[108]

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[107] As will be discussed (see Chapter 7, section 7.3), the fillers of the verbal slots in the constructions licensed by the same template do not exclusively feature verbs exhibiting affective semantic undertones. This is an interesting observation to which I shall return in the concluding chapter of the present work in that it genuinely sparks interest for further research in the area of dialogicity.

[108] BELIEVE YOU ME is herein considered unique in the sense that – to the best of my knowledge – there is no other instance of $V_{AFF/IMP}$ +YOU+ME $_{(self-referent object)}$ in the English language (see Chapter 7, section 7.3). There are, of course, instances of other verbs in the Imperative followed (optionally) by a post-posed Subject like *'mind (you)'* (see Chapter 6), or negative Imperatives with optional surfacing of a post-posed Subject, such as *"Don't (you) dare"* or *"Don't (you) even think about it"*. Interestingly, the

To illustrate the above, the chapter is divided into eight sections, starting with 4.2 which presents the semantics of the verb '*believe*' and its lexicographic treatment. This is followed by the constructional analysis of each pattern presented in sections 4.3 - 4.5 and the discussion of discourse unit delimitation in 4.6. Section 4.7 presents the frequency counts along with the reliability and validity statistics conducted. Finally, section 4.8 offers some concluding remarks on the constructional family-network identified.

4.2 The semantics of the verb '*believe*'

Following the methodological framework outlined in Chapter 3, the discussion of the corpora data for each case study is preceded by an independent, lexicographic overview of the semantics of the verb involved, in this case, the verb *'believe'*.

The cognitive and epistemic dimension of the verb (Ifantidou 2005; Papafragou, Li, Choi and Han 2007; Slaughter *et al.,* 2008), which does not necessarily rely on external, objective evidence, is lexicographically acknowledged by all three dictionaries consulted (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.1). This is also in line with the relevant literature (Biber, Johansson, Leech, Conrad and Finegan 1999; Daisy 2005) which suggests that verbs like *'believe'* and *'think'* (see Chapter 5) differ from other mental state verbs such as *'know'* in their encoding of propositional attitude and subjective evaluation; the latter being frequently paired with a more authorial, evaluative perspective and resistance to alternative epistemic stances (Cappelli 2008). In this respect, the use of *'believe'* in discourse typically encodes the Speaker's

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latter are also widely interpreted as more emphatic (and by extension forceful) than their counterparts with no post-posed Subjects (cf. their lexicographic treatment in ColED, CED, OED). Another common feature pertaining to the negative Imperatives listed is their conventional association with idiomaticity, related, in all likelihood, to their non-canonical word order and their post-posed Subject.

personal, non-categorical, epistemic stance which allows for alternative perspectives to be expressed.

As already argued in Chapter 2 (see sections 2.2.1 - 2.2.2), and is briefly repeated here for convenience, this observation is particularly interesting in that it foregrounds an interrelationship between *epistemicity* and *evidentiality*. The former refers to the Speaker's evaluation, judgement and degree of commitment attached to the truth value of a proposition /*p*/, whereas the latter refers to the Speaker's assertion of the source and kind of evidence available (Nuyts 2001; Palmer 2001; De Haan 2005, Cornillie 2009; Carretero 2016). In this context of interplay between epistemicity and evidentiality, the verb *'believe'* is argued to be employed when the Speaker cannot guarantee the truth of a given proposition /*p*/ but commits to its positive evaluation on the grounds of some sort of *affective evidence* (Cappelli 2007a, 2007b, 2008, see also Chapter 2, section 2.2.2). To put it differently, the use of the verb *'believe'* in discourse signals that the Speaker is quite confident that /*p*/ is the case but does so in a committed, yet retractable way.

Informed by the above, the principles of CxG (Goldberg 1995), and the broader research in the field of collocations (Sinclair 1991; Hanks 2004, 2013), the present section explores the semantic and pragmatic features of the verb *'believe'* as instantiated in different syntactic configurations. These are concisely reflected in the examples provided in the dictionaries, which illustrate that the various syntactic patterns in which the verb occurs correlate with different – yet to some extent – related senses. More specifically, the independent lexicographic checking of the semantics of the verb indicated the following:[109]

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[109] For a detailed overview of the findings of the lexicographic checking, see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.1.

a) 'Believe' + *that*-complementisers, as in (1) below, which highlights the evidential and epistemic evaluation of the verb on the clause that is in its scope and expresses the Speaker's stance on the veridicality of the proposition /*p*/.

Example (1): *"He **believes that** all children are born with equal intelligence."* (CED)

b) 'Believe' + personal objects[110] (e.g., personal pronouns), as in (2), which refers to one's faith/trust (or lack thereof in the case of negative sentences, e.g., *"He didn't believe her."* (OED)) in a person, metonymically standing for this person's written or oral statements.

Example (2): *"I **believe you**."* (OED)

c) 'Believe'+ in + NP which refers to the Speaker's commitment to/faith in the existence of the NP referent,[111] as in (3) below:

Example (3): *"I **believe in fairies**."* (ColED)

d) 'Believe' (typically in the negative) [112] + it + of + NP (often a proper name or a personal pronoun), as in (4) below, which highlights the Speaker's counter-to-expectation attitude, or surprise, towards another referent's actions, which constitute a fact.

Example (4): *"I **wouldn't have believed it of Lavinia**—what an extraordinary woman!"* (OED)

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[110] This is also the case when the object pronoun refers to the Speaker.

[111] This also applies to elliptical sentences whereby the NP refers to God.

[112] A query in the BNC indicated that although the pattern in question exhibits low frequency, its verb tends to feature with a negative morphological marking. Alternatively, when this was not the case (only one instance in the corpus), the semantics of negation was contextually-induced by means of an amended, negatively-formed repetition of the pattern, e.g., *"It's an appealing notion, that animals should contain the souls of gods. You **can believe it of** a cat. Even a mule. You **can't** believe it of Bustos, loose-skinned and entirely frivolous, with his entreating eyes."* [BNC, Written Books & Periodicals, *Time's Arrow*, 1991]

e) 'Believe' + object (typically a personal pronoun or a proper name) + infinitive, which refers to the Speaker's confidence in one's abilities, as in (5):

Example (5): *"I **believe her to be** the finest violinist in the world."* (CED)

The above suggest that the semantics of the verb '*believe*' correlates with its syntactic configurations which motivate its variability, and by extension, its identifiable polysemy. An additional, crucial observation emerging from this preliminary, independent lexicographic overview is that the patterns under study are only *optionally* included as lexicographic entries, featuring primarily as *idiomatic* expressions (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.2). Such a treatment, however, essentially restricts our understanding of the patterns in focus suggesting that they are arbitrary formations in the language, rather than motivated form-meaning pairings. In what follows, therefore, I intend to show that a constructional treatment of the patterns, which views them as forming a family-network occupying a common discourse-functional space, adds significantly both to their more refined lexicographic treatment and to our enhanced understanding of their status in the language.

4.3 BELIEVE ME

Following Chapter 3 (see section 3.4.2), *'believe me'* is examined on the basis of 62 BNC and 67 COCA concordance lines and as already mentioned, it is the only pattern of the three whose corpus query yielded both instances of *fully-compositional semantics* (i.e., 'believe' + 'me') and *constructional semantics* (i.e., BELIEVE ME) focused upon in the present work. On the basis of this, the data collected have been classified into two main categories: [113]

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[113] For the sake of greater accuracy and consistency with the statistics to be presented, it should be noted that the corpus query of the pattern yielded a third category of data as well, referred to as *false positives*. This category includes instances (only one in BNC) in which the verb '*believe*' simply neighbours the

a) the *fully-compositional* category, in which there is a highly predictable and transparent relation between the meaning of the expression as a whole and the individual meaning of its components (i.e., 'believe' + 'me') along with the way(s) in which these are grammatically organised, and

b) the *constructional* category, in which the expression is viewed as a paired unit of form and meaning with certain semantic, pragmatic and morphosyntactic properties that transcend the meaning(s) of its individual parts and which can be neither predicted by, nor exhausted in, a compositional account (see also Geka and Marmaridou 2017).

The results of the annotation process illustrated that an adequate analysis of *'believe me'* cannot be exhausted in its fully-compositional semantics, which although present in the random sample, cannot account for the majority of the data which exhibit the constructional meaning identified herein. [114]

The following two sections, therefore, focus on discussing the differences between the fully-compositional and the constructional semantics identified, which constitutes one of the main contributions of the present work in relation to the BELIEVE-family.

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personal object pronoun '*me*' as in cases of sentence borders or parts of titles, as in the following concordance line:

*"...which its bustled daughters could play 'The Last Rose Of Summer' and '**Believe me**, if all those Endearing Young Charms' politely on rosewood pianos antlered with candlesticks;..."*

BNC, [Title: *The Magic Toyshop*, Books, Author: Carter Angela], Source: W-fict-prose, Date: 1993

[114] Detailed statistics and more information on frequency counts on the totality of the concordance lines will be provided in section 4.7. However, it might be useful to note at this point that in the case of COCA, only 23.9% of the data (i.e., 16/67 concordance lines) feature the fully-compositional semantics of the patterns, while in BNC, the respective percentage rises to 38.7% of the data (i.e., 24/62 concordance lines), which although higher, cannot possibly question the preponderance of the constructional semantics.

4.3.1 The fully-compositional 'believe + me'

The fully-compositional 'believe + me' expresses faith/trust in a person, metonymically standing for this person's written or oral contributions and exhibits a transparent, predictable, and computational relation between its constituents.[115] It further presents considerable formal variation evident in its *tense-* and *person*-related changes and its infinitival or interrogative morphological marking as in (6) and (7).

Example (6): *"I managed to interrupt Mrs. Butler before she repeated the whole cycle of symptoms again, asked the cat's age (six months) and whether or not she'd been spayed (no.) Fairly patiently I explained that her cat was in heat and that it was normal for a cat in heat to behave in such a fashion. Mrs. Butler didn't seem inclined to **believe me**, and I ended up on the phone answering questions for a good twenty minutes, but finally she hung up."*

(COCA, [Title: *As Time Goes By*, Author: Amy Bechtel],
Source: Fiction-Analog Science Fiction & Fact (publication date: 1999)

Example (7): *"One second longer, I shoot your father in the face. Do you understand what I just said? # KATE # Yes. # SETH # Do you **believe me**? # KATE # Yes. # SETH # You damn well better."*

(COCA, [Title: *From Dusk till Dawn*, Author: Amy Bechtel],
Source: Fiction-Analog Science Fiction & Fact (publication date: 1996)

As exemplified above, the fully-compositional 'believe + me' does not present any formal or positional restrictions apart from the grammatically conventional ones. In this respect, its discourse scope typically extends to its inter-sentential, related arguments only since it features as the main predicate of a clause or as an infinitive anchored to

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[115] To gain in economy and focus, the patterns henceforth discussed (constructional or otherwise) will be examined on the basis of a selection of targeted examples, aiming to illustrate their representative features. The total number of examples is available in Appendix I.

the main predicate. It further allows for negation, which can be retained even when carrying the morphological marking of the Imperative as in *"Don't believe me if you don't want to."* in which case faith or trust to the Speaker (i.e., to the Speaker's story) is, apparently, not promoted.

4.3.2 The constructional BELIEVE ME

Unlike the previous examples, the majority of the random data collected showcase BELIEVE ME with semantic, pragmatic, and formal qualities that exceed the meaning of its constituents. More specifically, the constructional BELIEVE ME illustrated in the following examples (see 8-11 below) *invites* faith/trust and, in this sense, alignment with the Speaker's view concerning the truthfulness of the proposition /*p*/ in its scope. This suggests that despite its cognitive origin, the verb in the construction exhibits affective semantic undertones (Cappelli 2007a, 2007b, 2008) that extend the meaning of *'belief'* to that of *'trust',* thus making the verb *'slide'* from the cognitive-mental category into the dispositional one (see also Chapter 2, sections 2.2.1 – 2.2.2). At the same time, its non-evidential function is further reinforced by its Imperative morphology, since unlike declarative sentences, in which the information source may be questioned, Imperative clauses lack an epistemic authority since they express a command or a form of request (Aikhenvald 2006, 2010; Bruil 2014; Van Olmen and Heinold 2017).

As regards discourse function, the construction occupies the functional space of marking a proposition /*p*/ as unexpected for the Addressee. Consequently, it is conventionally traced in contexts whereby the Speaker is caught in a process of persuading an (imaginary) Addressee, because conflicting viewpoints are advanced or anticipated (see examples 8-11 below). In this respect, BELIEVE ME is crucial for the

overall meaning of the utterance in which it is traced in that apart from its pragmatic perspective to the proposition /p/ in its scope, it further contributes a dialogic construal that regulates the discourse flow and profiles the (assumed) Addressee and his/her different belief expectations. By virtue of these, although its omission from discourse is possible because of its phrasal status and its attendant syntactic independence (see examples 8-11 below), in its absence, the meaning of its host utterance is expected to be influenced, primarily in terms of expressivity. To put it differently, although the data illustrate that BELIEVE ME does not interfere with the propositional meaning of its host utterance per se, it would be inaccurate to assume that it does not contribute to the overall meaning of the utterance of which, as will be shown, it forms a crucial part. In line with the CxG, holistic and all-encompassing approach to meaning outlined in Chapter 2, I therefore propose that apart from its pragmatic perspective to the proposition /p/, BELIEVE ME also opens up the possibility for an extended discourse scope along with a uniquely interpersonal, intersubjective, perspectivised and, essentially, dialogic Speaker-Addressee interpretative frame for the whole discourse 'architecture' (see also section 4.6).[116] This is an interesting observation to which I shall return, by means of examples, in section 4.6 which focuses on the ability of all the constructional members of the BELIEVE-family, and no less of BELIEVE ME, to delimit the discourse unit of which they form a part.

Returning to the formal properties of the construction, it should be noted that, unlike its fully-compositional counterpart, BELIEVE ME exhibits no formal variation. It features consistently in the affirmative/positive Imperative, hence allowing for no *tense-* or

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[116] As recognised in the relevant literature (see Davidse and Simon-Vandenbergen 2008), interpersonal meaning in the sense described above − primarily expressed through *scoping* and *framing* (McGregor 1997) − is particularly important for the overall meaning of an utterance and its effective interpretation.

person-related changes (other than the expected flexibility between the 2nd person singular/plural). Notably, it also disallows *that-* or *prepositional*-complementation. Further to these, and on account of its independent clausal status, it is also characterised by considerable positional flexibility which allows it to occur parenthetically (hereafter P, see example 8), as an independent sentence (hereafter IS, see example 9), sentence-finally (hereafter SF, see example 10), or sentence-initially (hereafter SI, see example 11). As will be discussed (see section 4.7), although positional flexibility is a given for BELIEVE ME (and the whole family) in both corpora, positional preferences do emerge. In the case of BELIEVE ME, frequency counts indicate that the parenthetical position is its most-favoured one, accompanied by a combination of *backward-* and *forward-* looking scope in discourse. For instance, in (8) below, the construction refers to the preceding sentence (i.e., *"The odds…slim")* and culminates in the announcement of the actual, unexpected information (*"serious…Dr. Day."*) which follows the construction.

Example (8): *"So resist the temptation to have your cuticles cut; pushing them back is* infinitely *safer." The odds of something* bad *happening are slim, but,* **believe me**, serious problems do arise, *so it's* worth *it to be cautious," says Dr. Day."*

<div align="right">

(COCA, [Title: *Beware of these Beauty Dangers*],
Source: MAG-Cosmopolitan (publication date: 2004)

</div>

In example 9, however, its independent sentential status necessitates a *backward-* looking scope since the unexpected information has already been presented. The two brief, independent expressions: *"The only way."* and ***"Believe me."*** further add to the intensity and the expressivity of the utterance, functioning in a way as the Speaker's 'guarantee' on the truthfulness of the proposition /*p*/, so to speak.[117]

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[117] The surfacing of the construction punctuated as an independent sentence in example (9) above, paired with its backward-looking scope in discourse, interestingly allows for its treatment as an alternative version of final position; an observation that will be shown to apply to other corpus instances and patterns under study as well.

Example (9): *"At the <u>bad</u> moments <u>don't look back</u> and think, 'Well at least I'm a major in the British Army.' And <u>don't look forward</u> to a time when you can tell somebody all about it. You've got to live in the moment and the way to do that is to think they don't know and <u>really enjoy</u> it. The <u>only</u> way. **Believe me**."*

<div align="right">

(BNC, [Title: *The Crocus List*, Author: Lyall Gavin],
Source: W-fict-prose (publication date: 1985-1993)

</div>

In example (10), the sentence-final position correlates again with a predominantly *backward*-looking scope in discourse that includes the unexpected information ("*It is an infatuation - and one I understand,…*") but its scope extends to the upcoming discourse part as well. As will be discussed (see section 4.6), this upcoming part functions as the typical locus for further elaboration.

Example (10): *"'Ludo,' he said softly. 'You have been this way before. <u>Don't be silly</u> about this girl. It is an <u>infatuation</u> - and one I understand, **believe me**. She is foreign and <u>beautiful</u>, I am sure. You have awakened her to <u>passion</u> and taken her virginity."*

<div align="right">

BNC, [Title: *A Woman of Style*, Books, Author: McDowell, Colin,
Source: Written books and periodicals, Date: 1991]

</div>

Example 11 is a dialogual one, in which the expression refers to the previous sentence murmured by the Addressee (i.e., *'I would not eat cat'*). In an attempt to convince, the Speaker frames his reply with *'believe me',* placed on the left periphery of the utterance for more prominence and invites the Addressee to show trust despite contrary beliefs.

Example (11): *"'I would not eat cat,' he murmurs. Yes, the <u>little sod</u> would. "**Believe me**, when you are <u>hungry</u>, <u>really hungry</u>, so that <u>your stomach clings to your backbone</u>, nothing is <u>more tasty</u> than a <u>succulent</u> rat or a well-roasted leg of cat!"*"

<div align="right">

BNC, [Title: *The White Rose Murder*, Books, Author: Clynes Michael],
Source: Written books and periodicals, Date: 1992]

</div>

Finally, with reference to contextual and collocational regularities, it should be noted that there is a systematic correlation with connectors, such as *'but'* (see example 8) and *'and',* along with stance and intensifying elements, i.e., negative and positive lexical prosody (see underlined lexical items interspersed in all the examples listed), negative imagery involved in metaphors (see example 11), emphatic structures (as in 8), lexical repetition (as in 9 and 11), use of (heavy) adverbial and adjectival modification (see 8, 9, 10, 11) and use of comparatives (as in 11).

On the basis of the above, the pattern identified in examples 8-11 is shown to be a different unit of form and meaning from the one discussed in section 4.3.1 which merits constructional status in the language in that it features increased substantivity by invariably disallowing formal variation. Further to that, it also exhibits specific semantic and pragmatic properties, conventionalised contextual and collocational regularities, and a consistent discourse function paired with an extended scope.

For all the above reasons, I put forth that BELIEVE ME discussed in the present section should be viewed as a distinct constructional entity from its fully-compositional and synchronically-related counterpart discussed in 4.3.1.

4.4 BELIEVE YOU ME

In accordance with the metrics presented in Chapter 3 (see section 3.4.2), BELIEVE YOU ME is examined in a data pool consisting of 67 BNC and 32 COCA concordance lines, respectively.[118] The morphosyntactic idiosyncrasy of its post-posed pronominal Subject

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[118] The difference between the numbers of concordance lines is attributed to the more restricted number of data available in COCA in 2017. Following the principles of asymptotic theory discussed in Chapter 3 (see section 3.4.2), however, this does not interfere with the validity of the findings and their ability to generate statistically significant generalisations (Lehmann 1999, see also section 4.7).

precluded the occurrence of any compositional instances in the random sample.[119] As a result, the data collected showcase only the constructional semantics.

Following what has been briefly mentioned in the introduction of the present chapter, and is also in line with the CxG principle of *minimal constructional synonymy* (Goldberg 1995; see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2), BELIEVE ME and BELIEVE YOU ME should be viewed as distinct but related constructions to such an extent that I propose that BELIEVE YOU ME should be best seen as a variant (and less frequent) form of BELIEVE ME. [120] In particular, as will be exemplified, the two constructions: a) present the same formal fixedness (i.e., no *tense-* or *person*-related flexibility (other than the conventional one associated with the Imperative) and no negation allowed), b) share common, affective, semantic undertones, c) exhibit a very similar degree of positional flexibility (although, as will be discussed, they differ in position preferences), d) manifest a highly comparable, extended discourse scope and e) share the same discourse function i.e., that of marking /*p*/ as unexpected and contrary to Addressee's beliefs.

In light of these similarities, I propose that the relationship between the two constructions should be interpreted as an instance of *partial-inheritance* (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.4) whereby BELIEVE YOU ME inherits all the features of BELIEVE ME but further exhibits its own idiosyncratic properties. Their main difference will be shown to relate to the presence of a post-posed pronominal Subject, which accounts for the

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[119] The random sample did not yield any instances of false positives either. Thus, the categories of fully-compositional instances and false positives were consistently null for both corpora and were kept as separate categories only to facilitate comparisons across all the patterns investigated (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.4).

[120] Although discussion on sample-based frequency counts is reserved for section 4.7, it might be useful to note that the raw frequency for BELIEVE YOU ME in BNC is 0.12 per million, while the respective one for COCA is 0.10 per million. BELIEVE ME, on the other hand, presents a raw frequency of 6.97 per million in BNC and 16.36 per million in COCA. Useful though raw frequencies may be, given the differences in the overall size of the corpora, they will herein be interpreted only as possible indicators of more or less widespread use in the language.

emphatic use of BELIEVE YOU ME so that the *invitation for faith/trust* in the Speaker (S) performed by BELIEVE ME evolves into a *demand*. At this point, a brief discussion on this special, non-canonical form of the Imperative, and the typically unexpressed *Imperative Subjects,* seems in order.

The notion of the Imperative Subject and its interpretive constraints have been widely discussed in the relevant literature (Downing 1969; Potsdam 1996; Platzack and Rosengren 1998). In line with Jensen (2004), the present work recognises that a typical Imperative Subject, unlike the one to be discussed in the non-canonical Imperative of BELIEVE YOU ME, contains two semantically distinguishable parts. The first part conventionally involves an *Intended Agent* and the second part the *Addressee* (see also Hamblin 1987; Potsdam 1996). The combination of the two creates what is typically perceived as the *Unified Imperative Subject*. Conventionally, the θ-roles for the Speaker of an utterance in the Imperative are those of a *Causer + Agent*, while in the case of the Addressee, these involve the *Causee + (intended) Agent* (Takahashi 2012). In this sense, when an Imperative is issued to an Addressee X, then X can be said to have been ordered/implored/invited to bring about some event by doing it himself as in the example: *"Move"*.

Post-posed Subjects in Imperatives, however, appear to complicate the issue. Aligning with recent research in this field (cf. Vázquez Rozas 2006; de Cock 2014), I concur that Imperatives with post-posed pronominal Subjects, typically involved in the profiling of discourse participants, undergo a form of pragmatic strengthening. As de Cock (2014) observes, in this case, *"post-posed pronouns receive focus and the imperatives emphasise even more strongly the Addressee… […] …the directionality of imperatives is [thus] strengthened and they frequently evolve into hearer mobilization markers…"* (*ibid.*:269)*.*

Lamiroy and Swiggers (1991) along with Martin-Zorraquino and Portolés Lázaro (1999) further argue that this type of Imperatives, which typically encompass cognition (e.g., *'imaginate'* (to imagine) or *'fijate'* (to pay attention to)) and sense/perception verbs (e.g., *'mirar'* (to look) or *'oir'* (to hear/listen)) should be viewed as desemanticised *'alterity markers'* in that their semantics bleach in favour of enhanced intersubjectivity and participant profiling, evident in their post-posed Subjects.[121] The *perception* or *cognition* status of the verbs involved in these Imperative-based 'alterity markers' is also in line with Traugott's (2008) claim that cognition verbs signal attention to the Speaker's and the Addressee's attitudes and beliefs and thus lend themselves as privileged loci for subjectivity and intersubjectivity. However, as de Cock (2014) observes, when the strengthening of (inter)subjectivity involves the use of subject pronouns, *"...it is the cognition verbs that usually take a subject pronoun"* (*ibid.*:269), rather than the perception verbs, which, by extension, contributes to the further strengthening *"of their hearer-orientation, but not because the Hearers express a belief, but to confine to an observation and the Speaker's point of view."* (*ibid.*: 269).

Consistently with the above, the present research further proposes that the use of the pronominal Subject in the right periphery relates to the concepts of *givenness* and *newness* associated with *Information Structure* (henceforth InS). Following Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993), who argue in favour of a gradient nature of *given* and *new* information respectively, I maintain that the post-posed Subject at hand is discoursally constrained to represent *discourse*-new information, which is, however,

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[121] De Cock notes that post-position in Imperative is the case with a number of different pronouns in Spanish, namely *'usted'*, *'vosotros'*, *'vosotras'* and *'tu'* but stresses that the most frequent one concerns the use of 'usted' as in the following example:
"*Sepor Mendoza, cierre usted cuando pueda, por favor.*"
"Mr. Mendoza, bring (you) it to an end as soon as you can, please." (De Cock 2014:146)
This high frequency of postposed *'usted'* has been further related to research on attenuating strategies (see Bolinger 1966:83) and signs of deference (see Fernández Soriano 1999:1232)

Hearer-given (O'Grady 2016). This is so because the post-posed Subject, which by default refers to the Addressee, is always pronominal ('*you*') and thus contextually recoverable, either *textually* (in dialogual examples) or *inferentially* (in monologual examples) (see Lambrecht 1994). Despite, therefore, its *Hearer*-givenness (and in this sense *topical* status), its movement to the right periphery renders it into a *focal* element of the InS, associating it with new information. In particular, following Ladd (1980) and Gundel, Borthen and Fretheim (1999), I consider the post-posed '*you*' an instance of *psychological*, *narrow focus*. It is *narrow* because only a single constituent is in focus and *psychological* because, as defined by the relevant literature (Gundel *et al.*, 1999), it is the salient centre of attention between the speech participants conventionally referring to some entity that is affected in discourse and expressed by means of a pronoun or a definite article. Given the above, Gundel *et al.*, (1999) further observe that the psychological focus constitutes a type of *shared information* between the Sender (i.e., Speaker) and the Addressee, thereby acquiring a *'hybrid'* status between a focus and a topic. This seems to accurately reflect the way the pronominal post-posed Subject of the construction at hand functions.

Further evidence confirming the status of the post-posed Subject as an affected entity may derive from its semantic role. Given the semantics of the verb, and its affective undertones, its Subject would be expected to function semantically as an Experiencer.[122] However, its placing in the right periphery, conventionally reserved for Objects, and by extension for Themes and Patients/Undergoers, deprives the Subject of an '*agentive*' reading and turns it into a Patient/Undergoer, which frequently correlates

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[122] The thematic role of the Experiencer is assigned to the bearer of a particular psychological state or a form of sensory or emotional input typically associated with psychological, belief and perception predicates.

with involuntary action.[123] In other words, the Subject does not act (even to the extent that an Experiencer does) but is rather acted upon.[124] This is, in all likelihood, the main reason why although in BELIEVE ME, a context-based paraphrase like *'trust me'* would be effective, in BELIEVE YOU ME, any possible context-based paraphrase, accurately reflecting its meaning, should be supported by grammatical or lexical directives e.g., *'you'd better trust me'*.

The following examples (12-15) illustrate the discourse function of the construction which, regardless of its discourse position, is consistently connected to the Speaker's announcement of unexpected information to which the Addressee is emphatically urged to show trust/faith, and by extension, alignment. In all the examples, the construction is used as part of the Speaker's systematic attempt to request faith and persuade, often on the basis of personal experience, or supported by additional justification provided in the preceding or upcoming discourse, thus giving rise to certain contextual dependencies (see section 4.6).

More specifically, in (12), the construction is used parenthetically (its second most-favoured position), preceded by the connector '*but*'. As was the case with BELIEVE ME, in this position, the construction exhibits either a *backward-* or *forward*-looking scope. In (12), the important, doubted, and unexpected information appears after the use of the construction in discourse.

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[123] The placing of Experiencers in the right periphery is also in line with the relevant literature about *'psych'* and *cognition* verbs (cf. Postal 1970; Belletti and Rizzi 1988; Dowty 1991; Verhoeven 2010; de Cock 2014). However, in most of these cases, the Experiencer functions as the Object, while the Subject functions semantically as a Stimulus, e.g., *"Spiders annoy/scare him"*, *"Romantic films please him"* and *"Mary disappointed me"*. While bearing this in mind, the present study restricts itself to suggesting that these verbs are typically non-agentive and tend to show a predilection for right-periphery-placed Experiencers.

[124] This seems to also be the case with other negative Imperatives in which a pronominal Subject may optionally surface syntactically after the auxiliary verb as in: *"Don't (you) dare…"* and *"Don't (you) even think about it…"*. Again, the Subjects involved appear to feature semantically as Patients, i.e., profiled as involuntary Participants who are being ordered to perform as requested.

Example (12): *"When he was killed in the car accident I thought I understood how my friend was feeling, and I thought I understood his <u>loss</u>, but **believe you me**, until it happens to you, you have <u>no</u> idea of the <u>pain</u>, <u>grief</u>, <u>despair</u>, <u>anger</u>, <u>depression</u> and <u>loneliness</u> of a <u>bereaved</u> parent. My <u>whole</u> world <u>came crashing down</u>."*

<div align="right">

BNC, [Testimonial Blogs, Author: Unknown
Source: Website text, Date: 2009]

</div>

Example (13) instantiates the construction in sentence-initial position, which is its favoured one, while its discourse scope extends to the preceding sentence (*"Well,… wrong"*). This preceding part triggers the use of the construction itself and the unexpected information that follows, which is expressed by means of a conditional sentence (*"if we get"*), indicative of the syllogism followed.[125]

Example (13): *"COX# Well, the Brits are <u>wrong</u>, they are <u>wrong</u>. And our first minister has said it, and they are <u>wrong</u>, they <u>really</u> are <u>wrong</u>. **Believe you me**, if we get an independent Scotland on Friday they are going to be coming to us, because there's <u>too much</u> cross-fertilization going on between England - That is <u>not</u> going to go away, <u>we are just talking</u> about independence. <u>We are not talking</u> about stopping trading."*

<div align="right">

(COCA, [Title: Special: Scottish Independence Vote],
Source: Spoken_ Fox (publication date: 2014)

</div>

Example (14) below presents the construction sentence-finally, preceded by a very brief sentence which is emphatically affirmed by the construction itself. In this case, the construction has a clear *backward*-looking scope that extends to the preceding sentence, while its use automatically rules out any opposition.

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[125] Conditional sentences are a common contextual regularity for all three constructions (heavily favoured by THINK AGAIN (see Chapter 5)) as they are typically involved in outlining persuasive, syllogistic logic (see section 4.6).

Example (14): *"There are <u>lots of</u> other rules, but the <u>big</u> one from my point of view as the navigator is that you're not allowed to have any timekeeping device, electronic device including cell phones, computer, or even wristwatches in the car, aside from one clock. And they check, **believe you me**."*

<div align="right">BNC, [Website text, Author: Unknown
Source: Website text (splinters.suriel.net), Date: 2009]</div>

Following what has been argued for BELIEVE ME (see section 4.3), BELIEVE YOU ME is also crucial for the overall meaning of its host utterance in that, as a variant form of the former, it also contributes a pragmatic perspective to the proposition /*p*/ in its scope, and a dialogic Speaker-Addressee interpretative frame. In this respect, although the omission of BELIEVE YOU ME from discourse prima facie seems as not affecting the grammaticality of its host utterance (see examples 12-13 above), the meaning of the latter is expected to be influenced, primarily at the level of expressivity and perspectivisation, which – in CxG terms – are considerable aspects of linguistic meaning. Example (14) is an interesting example in this respect illustrating that the removal of the construction (from a sentence-final position in this case), apart from significant loss in terms of expressivity, perspectivisation, and the profiling of an (assumed) Addressee might also incur slight awkwardness, in the sense of abrupt ending. Interestingly, in the absence of the construction, a falling intonation might be expected by the Speaker as a means of resolving any possible awkwardness or abruptness. If confirmed (see also Chapter 7, section 7.4), this will relate to the present account in – at least – the following two respects: a) If the Speaker feels the need to prosodically make-up for the loss of the construction in discourse, then its inclusion in context in the first-place was important and much-needed for the Speaker's intended meaning, namely the emphatic request for trust. b) If the resolution of awkwardness is achieved prosodically, then the remedial prosodic contour employed may be strongly

hypothesised to be the conventional one associated with the construction. As will be proposed (see Chapter 7, section 7.4), further research in the direction of identifying possible prosodic regularities for the objects of this study is much sought-after not only because it will shed light on the formal, prosodic properties of the constructions, but also because it will fully elucidate their contribution to discourse unit delimitation (see Fischer and Niebuhr submitted).

Example (15) is the only one available in both corpora that features the construction punctuated as an independent sentence with the unexpected information /*p*/ appearing in the upcoming discourse part.

Example (15): *"I'd like to have an old man, a man who will be there for me, a partner. **Believe you me**. I've been trying to find one and I am <u>a lot less picky</u> than I used to be. It just ain't working out... The last guy I was with <u>almost got me fooled</u>."*

COCA, [Female Crack Users and their Sexual Relationships: The Role of Sex-For-Crack Exchanges. Source: ACAD: Journal of Sex Research, Date: 2000]

All things considered, the examples (12-15) indicate readily identifiable similarities between BELIEVE ME and BELIEVE YOU ME. When placed sentence-initially, or parenthetically, they both aim to *request* (ranging from *inviting* to *demanding*) the Addressee's faith/trust in the Speaker and his/her commitment to the truthfulness of the proposition /*p*/ that follows. When featuring sentence-finally, they request the Addressee's faith/trust in the Speaker concerning the proposition /*p*/ that precedes in discourse. In this respect, their regulatory discourse scope appears to be to a great extent defined by their position. I further notice similar systematicity in terms of intensifying elements, such as positive and negative lexical prosody or imagery (see the interspersed, underlined lexical items in 12-15 above, with greater emphasis on 12). The same holds true for lexical repetition (see example 13) and the use of quantifiers

(both in 13 and 15), which are consistently present in the surrounding context of the constructions, thereby contributing to the enhanced expressivity of the host utterance.

For all the above reasons, I put forth that the constructional treatment of BELIEVE YOU ME as a variant form of BELIEVE ME on the grounds of partial-inheritance not only contributes to a more effective analysis of both, but also deepens our understanding of the constructional family network identified. Against this backdrop, the next section focuses on bringing to the fore the properties of the last member of the family.

4.5 BELIEVE IT OR NOT

BELIEVE IT OR NOT is examined on the basis of 48 BNC and 66 COCA concordance lines, respectively. Due to its formal substantivity (i.e., fixedness), the random sample yielded only instances of constructional semantics.[126] The morphosyntax of the construction, however, merits further discussion as it sets it apart from the other two family members.[127] This is so because although the pattern features in the Imperative, it lexicalises neither the Speaker (absence of self-reference ('*me*')), nor the Addressee, as is the case with BELIEVE YOU ME. It further inherits the factuality and contextual recoverability involved in the use of the pronoun *'it'*, crucially relating the construction to the syntactic configuration of 'believe' + NP (Object, human⁻). Moreover, it is the only member of the family that carries and, by extension inherits, the syntax of the higher order construction of DISJUNCTION*;* a property that merits further discussion.

Disjunctions typically refer to two-place truth functional connectives between any two given propositions *p ('believe it')* and *q ('not believe it')*, forming compound statements

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[126] The categories of *fully-compositional* instances and *false positives* were null for both corpus queries on this construction.

[127] As already noted, although substantive in form, the template that licenses the particular construction enjoys a certain degree of productivity by producing similar patterns, such as LIKE IT OR NOT.

of the type '*p* or (v) *q*' (cf. Politzer and Noveck 1991; Lee 1995; Schwarz 2000; Noveck *et al.*, 2002 and Geurts 2005).[128] Furthermore, as the relevant literature (Snider 2017) suggests, their felicitous contextual use draws on the implicature of uncontrollability. In practice, this means that when employing a disjunction, the Speaker has no control over what the Addressee will choose to believe. In this sense, it could be argued that a disjunction parallels – to a certain extent at least – the use of a propositional tautology in that a tautology is a formula of assertion, which is true in every possible interpretation, given that the disjuncts exhaust between them all possibilities (see relevant examples in literature as: "*You are either with us or you're not.*" / "*Either I'll like him, or I won't.*" (Ward and Hirschberg 1991; Haspelmath and König 1998; Sawada 2003; Snider 2015)). Thus, following the above, and by analogy with what has already been argued for the other two family members, although such a disjunctive utterance might at a surface level seem uninformative (i.e., as not making a semantic contribution), it turns out to be quite an informative discourse-pragmatic addition, which, if absent, is expected to significantly affect the expressive force of the utterance.

Further to the above, on account of its morphosyntax, BELIEVE IT OR NOT also carries an inherent, latent form of concessive conditionality (i.e., *'even if you believe it or not'*), simultaneously involving two different perspectives; each one functioning as the exact opposite of the other. By analogy, therefore, with what the literature suggests about scalars and concessives (König 1991; Schwenter 2000; Traugott 2010; Makkonen-Craig 2014), I propose that, in addition to its Imperative form and concomitant dialogic function, the construction at hand further inherits dialogicity by virtue of its disjunctive syntax. This is the case because, in compliance with the definition of dialogicity (see

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[128] In propositional logic, a disjunction is a binary connective (∨) [wedge serves as its symbol] classically interpreted as a truth function whose output is true if at least one of the input sentences (*disjuncts*) is true, and false otherwise (see Aloni 2016 [The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]).

Chapter 2, section 2.4), a disjunction by default configures two opposing construals of reality as equally valid or possible.

As regards discourse function, the construction marks upcoming or preceding information as unexpected and contrary to the (assumed) Addressee's beliefs, but nonetheless true. It has, that is, a similar marking/announcing function to that of the other two construction-members of the family, but it neither invites nor demands trust. In this sense, it does not manifest the inherent affectivity expressed by the other two constructions, although it also contributes significantly to the expressivity and perspectivisation of the utterance by foregrounding the different reality construals available in the (assumed) Addressee's state of mind.

In the context of all the above, I therefore argue that its discourse function is to *declare* the content of the preceding or following proposition /p/ as *fact*, which is resumed in the use of the pronoun *'it'*, regardless of alternative, anticipated beliefs on the part of the Addressee (see examples 16-19). In so doing, the construction ultimately marks the proposition /*p*/ asserted by the Speaker as a matter beyond faith or trust, i.e., *a fact beyond any possible doubt*. By assigning factuality, and by openly accepting that the Addressee's siding with either of the two equally valid construals of reality involved in the disjunction could not possibly affect the factual status of the proposition /*p*/, the Speaker ultimately cancels the relevance of belief to the matter at hand.

Bearing the above observations in mind, in what follows, I focus on examining some indicative, corpus-retrieved data of BELIEVE IT OR NOT. As examples (16) – (19) below illustrate, the construction is characterised by considerable positional flexibility, although it exhibits a certain predilection for parenthetical position (as in 18), followed

by the sentence-initial one (as in 16). The next most favoured position is the sentence-final one, illustrated in example (17).[129]

Another interesting parameter of differentiation is that, unlike the other two constructions, BELIEVE IT OR NOT shows a propensity for collocating with verbs either in past (mostly Simple Past) or present tenses, and in particular in Simple Present (see examples 16 - 19).[130] This, in all likelihood, relates to the inherent factuality of the construction which favours either past tenses typically signalling completion or present tenses, and particularly Simple Present, employed to signal factuality. [131]

In (16), the construction exhibits a combination of *backward-* and *forward*-looking scope, with the preceding discourse functioning as the initial proposition (*"Thanks to… the country."*) that triggers the subsequent use of the construction. In its turn, the upcoming part, serves as the discourse locus for the counter-to-expectation information (*"I'd* <u>*never*</u> *actually…job"*). As will be discussed (see section 4.6), the use of negation after the construction (i.e., *"I'd* <u>*never*</u>*…"* and <u>*"At least not"*</u>) is a common contextual regularity, which, in the context of the present study, has been termed *'post-use'* negation (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2).

Example (16): <u>*"Thanks to*</u> *Dad, I had* <u>*a nice little nest egg*</u> *for myself* <u>*long before*</u> *I* <u>*hit it big*</u> *working with Whitestone,* <u>*one of the top*</u> *private equity investment firms in the country. # **Believe it or not**, I'd* <u>*never*</u> *actually been* <u>*financially ambitious*</u>. <u>*At least not*</u>

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[129] The independent sentential status of the construction is significantly more limited (only 3 instances) and available only in BNC data (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.7, and section 4.7).

[130] The verbs in this case refer the verbal forms featuring in the clause that carries the unexpected/doubted information.

[131] It should be noted that in BNC, the construction collocates with Simple Present (47.9% i.e., 23/48 concordance lines), followed by Simple Past (29%, i.e., 14/48 concordance lines). In COCA, the torn collocational behaviour of the construction between Simple Present and Simple Past is more in evidence with 37.8% (i.e., 25/66 concordance lines) sentences featuring verbs in Simple Past, while the respective percentage for Simple Present rises to 36.3% (i.e., 24/66 concordance lines). Quite notably, the remaining data also showcase a preference for perfected/accomplished facts as compared to futurity. For a detailed overview, see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.3.

in the greedy sense. I <u>loved</u> to <u>get it right</u>, to invest <u>well</u>, to have my intuition <u>richly</u> <u>rewarded with high growth and big margins</u>, in short to be <u>good</u> at my job."

<div align="right">

COCA, [Title: *If I could turn back time*, Author: Harbison, Elizabeth M.
Source: FIC: If I could turn back time, Date: 2015]

</div>

In example (17), due to its sentence-final position, the construction exhibits a *backward*-looking scope over the preceding discourse and signals the counter-to-expectation flavour that the Speaker's proposition /*p*/ entails.

Example (17): *"…match in 1970, I <u>at least</u> get one or more people coming up to me talking to me about it. <u>Most</u> people, if they're old enough to have seen it, remember <u>exactly</u> where they were that day. And they tell me their story and it's <u>very fascinating</u> all the different stories. DAVE-DAVIES# I confess I did, I remember where I was. BILLIE-JEAN-KING# See. Where were you? Were you... DAVE-DAVIES# I was actually, I was in college and I missed the match because I was at a political meeting that night, **believe it or not**. BILLIE-JEAN-KING# Well, that's <u>good</u>, at least you're an activist. (LAUGHTER)*

<div align="right">

COCA, [Title: Pioneer Billie Jean King Moved the Baseline for Women's Tennis
Source: Spoken: NPR, Date: 2013]

</div>

In (18), the construction is placed parenthetically, in an extract of reported speech, after the connector *'and',* while its scope extends to the upcoming discourse.

Example (18): *"A week ago, Ann Romney tried to project similarly <u>warm image</u> of her husband including a depiction of their years as a young married couple. Mrs. Obama offered <u>another vignette of a young, struggling couple</u>. "And, **believe it or not**, when we were first married, our combined monthly student loan bills were <u>actually</u> <u>higher</u> than our mortgage, "she said." We were <u>so young</u>, <u>so in love</u>, and <u>so in debt</u>. "That's why Barack has fought <u>so hard</u> to increase student aid and keep interest rates down,…"*

<div align="right">

COCA, [Title: National; The Road to The White House: The Democratic National Convention
Source: A Resounding call for a second term, Date: 2012]

</div>

In example (19), the construction features sentence-initially, preceded (and followed) by conditional sentences which set up an intensifying, persuasive, syllogistic procedure. The construction precedes the sentence with the unexpected (and perhaps alarming) information that follows (i.e., *"one out… of two."*), the latter providing further justification for the rather bold prediction made towards the end. Due to its predictive function, and the use of conditional sentences, this is one of the few instances in which the construction is used in a context entailing futurity; a type of 'predicted futurity' though which the Speaker wishes to present /*p*/ as a fact.

Example (19): "*Chances are, <u>if you have a cell phone</u>, it's made by a Finnish company. And <u>if you are in Finland</u> and you are an adult, <u>and if you don't have a cell phone</u>, well, you are <u>definitely</u> <u>in the minority</u>. (voice-over) In <u>tiny</u> Finland, cell phones are <u>everywhere</u>, in restaurants, on the street, in cars and taxis, in office buildings, even school kids have them. (on camera)* **Believe it or not**, *one out of every three people in Finland now uses a cell phone, and if experts are right, by the turn of the century, that figure will <u>jump</u> to one out of two.(voice-over)*"

<div align="right">COCA, [Title: High-tech Finland
Source: Spoken-ABC-GMA, Date: 1997]</div>

Finally, as regards intensifying elements and evaluative or emotive lexis, negative and positive lexical prosody are once more contextually present (see underlined lexical items in examples 16-19, with emphasis on examples 16 and 18). The same holds true for lexical repetition, quantifiers, and comparatives (see example 18).

In light of the above, I contend that BELIEVE IT OR NOT occupies the same general, functional discourse scope of dialogic perspectivisation with the other two constructional members of the family-network identified. Nonetheless, it differentiates

itself considerably on account of its syntax which motivates its disparate semantic, pragmatic, and discourse properties.

4.6 The BELIEVE-family and discourse unit delimitation

As argued, in correlation with their discourse position, the BELIEVE-family constructions exhibit both a *responsive* (i.e., backward) and an *anticipatory* (i.e., forward) discourse scope. Consequently, the constructions develop contextual regularities and dependencies that lend themselves to further discussion as regards their ability to delimit discourse units. The present section proposes that the constructional analysis provided herein should be seen as a viable alternative to discourse unit delimitation practices, traditionally relying exclusively on syntax or prosody. The following, indicative examples (20 – 22) aim to show how this can also be achieved constructionally.[132]

Example (20) presents the construction BELIEVE ME in sentence-initial position. Given the initial proposition (i.e., *"If...daunting"*), the Speaker announces the unexpected information (i.e., *"we've only scratched the surface."*) which is – optionally – followed by further elaboration.

Example (20): *"If you're a beginning observer, this inventory of celestial treats may at first seem daunting. **Believe me**, we've only scratched the surface. I hope you'll continue to seek out the many deep-sky objects within the Hunter's boundaries that don't appear on this list. Good luck!"*

<div align="right">

COCA, [Discover ORION'S DEEP-SKY GEMS
Source: MAG: Astronomy, Date: 2015]

</div>

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[132] For the sake of economy, only one example shall be presented for each case study. However, to enrich the data available to the reader, the examples provided are different from the ones used in the preceding sections.

As can be noticed, each part of the discourse unit that emerges involves the use of a number of different intensifying features. For instance, the part of the **i**nitial **p**roposition (hereafter *i/p*) involves a conditional sentence to emphasise the syllogistic procedure attributed to the Addressee as well as negative lexical prosody involved in the use of the adjective *'daunting'*. The part of the **u**nexpected **i**nformation (hereafter *u/i*) involves the use of the focus particle *'only'*, while the **e**laboration part (hereafter *e*) involves quantifiers (*'many'*) and positive lexical prosody (e.g., *'I hope'/ 'Good luck'*). Schematically, the discourse unit may be delimited as follows in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Discourse unit delimitation _ BELIEVE ME

Example (21) features BELIEVE YOU ME in parenthetical position, following an initial proposition (*i/p*), i.e., *"I've known…them"* which involves intensifiers (i.e., *'plenty of'*) and marked use of irony as far as the noun *'saint'* is concerned. The construction announces the unexpected information that follows (*"they were anything but."*) but in this case without providing any further elaboration.

Example (21): *"That's the tricky part about being a saint. If you ever think of yourself as one it throws you out of the running. I've known people who thought they were saints, plenty of them, and, **believe you me,** they were anything but."*

COCA, [Title: *The patron saint of liars*

In this case, the discourse unit may be proposed to exhibit the following internal 'architecture', schematically depicted in Figure 4.2:

Figure 4.2: Discourse unit delimitation _ BELIEVE YOU ME

Finally, example (22) shows BELIEVE IT OR NOT sentence-initially, functioning as a reply to the preceding question that is employed to set up a direct, but counter-to-expectation tone, also drawing on the use of superlatives (e.g., *'the most common'*). The construction marks the upcoming information as unexpected, while the discourse part following provides further justification for the 'controversial' point raised, which is further strengthened by means of quantifiers and negative prosody (e.g., *'thousands'*, *'every morning'*, *'all'*, *'sweat'*).

Example (22): *"WHAT'S THE MOST COMMON CAUSE OF BLOCKED PORES? MAKE-UP, DIET OR ANTI-PERSPIRANT?* **Believe it or not***, anti-perspirants block your pores. Not the pores on your face of course, but the thousands under your arms. Every morning the chemicals in your anti-perspirant react with your sweat to form a plug. Stopping the flow of perspiration. Since the day they were introduced, all anti-perspirants have worked in this way."*

In this context, the discourse unit is argued to be delimited as follows in Figure 4.3:

WHAT'S THE MOST COMMON CAUSE OF BLOCKED PORES? MAKE-UP, DIET OR ANTI-PERSPIRANT?

initial proposition (*i/p*)

Believe it or not,   *anti-perspirants block your pores.*

Announcement of unexpected information (*a*)   The unexpected information (*u/i*)

Not the pores on your face of course, but the thousands under your arms. Every morning the chemicals in your anti-perspirant react with your sweat to form a plug. Stopping the flow of perspiration. Since the day they were introduced, all anti-perspirants have worked in this way."

(Further) elaboration (*e*)

Figure 4.3: Discourse unit delimitation _ BELIEVE IT OR NOT

In view of the above, the present study proposes that the BELIEVE-construction family, empirically supported by the systematic co-occurrence of certain contextual regularities (e.g., the use of intensifiers, quantifiers), delimits fairly specifiable discourse units which manifest a *minimally tripartite* and *maximally four-plac*e internal, 'architectural' structure consisting of the following, conventionalised sub-components:

a) The 'antecedent' part preceding the construction which is referred to as the ***initial proposition (i/p)***.

b) The second part, whereby typically the construction itself comes in, marking the upcoming proposition /*p*/ as unexpected, while emphatically confirming its content. This discourse part bears the name of ***announcement of unexpected information (a)***.

c) The third part, which follows the announcement, and is reserved for the ***unexpected information (u/i)*** itself.

d) And, optionally, the last part which functions as the discourse locus for further *elaboration* (*e*).

Consistently with all the above, what I argue for in the present constructional account is that, although none of the discourse stretches in (20) – (22) above can be considered incohesive or syntactically incomplete in the absence of the constructions under study, all of them are *uniquely framed* by the use of the constructions in their context. In other words, the presence of any of the family-members in their context, automatically gives rises to *certain syntactic, semantic-pragmatic, and dialogic projections* (see also Chapter 2, section 2.5). Interestingly, the 'completion' of the discourse effect of these projections is shown to coincide with the 'completion' of the discourse unit that contains them, thereby illustrating the pivotal role of the constructions in discourse organisation. The resulting discourse unit in these cases is thus argued to be fairly specifiable, featuring the specific, conventionalised sub-components outlined above, always in keeping with: a) the consistent presence of an initial proposition (*i/p*) in scope of each construction, b) the consistent presence of an (assumed) Addressee evoked by the Imperative and the syntactic dependency relations this creates (particularly in the case of the post-posed Subject involved in BELIEVE YOU ME), c) the consistent discourse regulatory function that each construction has so that its marking of unexpected information (*a*) can be meaningful, paving the way for the unexpected information (*u/i*) per se and, finally, d) the optional presence of elaboration (*e*).

4.7 The BELIEVE-family: Frequency counts, reliability, and validity statistics

4.7.1 Random sample, manual tagging, and overall methodological framework

In line with what has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the randomly-sampled BNC and COCA data were subjected to annotation with respect to:

a) their status as *fully-compositional* vs. *constructional instances*,[133]

b) their *annotation* with respect to the *dialoguality-monologuality* and *dialogicity-monologicity* framework,

c) their *collocation with intensifying and affective stance elements* (e.g., negative and positive prosody, superlatives, marked word order),

d) their *contextual features* (e.g., the systematic presence of connectors, questions, negation, conditionals), and

e) their *positional flexibility* (i.e., sentence-initial, parenthetical or sentence-final position and possible instances of independent sentential position).[134]

Following Chapter 3 (see section 3.4.4, Figure 3.1), the methodological framework adopted for the analysis of all the members of the BELIEVE-family may be schematically summarised as follows in Figure 4.4 below.

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[133] Note that the respective table, i.e., Table 4.4 in Appendix II for Chapter 4, also features the category of *false positives* available only for BELIEVE ME (see section 4.3).
[134] Note that the annotation on the basis of the categories (b) - (e) above concerns *only* the constructional instances identified.

Figure 4.4: An overview of the methodological framework adopted for the analysis of the BELIEVE-family constructions

4.7.2 Frequency counts

The frequency counts were used as preliminary indicators of trends exhibited by the data and were then subjected to statistical significance and reliability measurements (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Tables 4.4 - 4.8).

4.7.2.1 Distribution of fully-compositional, constructional and false-positive results

The first sets subjected to frequency counts involved the categories of: a) fully-compositional, b) constructional and c) false positive instances identified in the sample collected (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.4).

As argued, BELIEVE ME is the only construction that exhibits a fully-compositional counterpart and, in this respect, it is the only expression that merits further discussion as regards this categorisation of the data. However, as indicated by the frequency counts, the majority of the data features the constructional semantics, amounting to 59.7% (i.e., 37/62 concordance lines) of the BNC data and 76.1% (i.e., 51/67 concordance lines) of the COCA sample. These frequencies are, therefore, interpreted

as tentative indicators of a high degree of conventionalisation and entrenchment of BELIEVE ME in language use as compared to its compositional counterpart.

4.7.2.2 Distribution of dialogicity-monologicity and dialoguality-monologuality

The constructional semantics of all the family members were then classified with respect to dialoguality-monologuality and dialogicity-monologicity (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.5). More specifically, the data were annotated with respect to perspectivisation and (non-)alignment of viewpoints and were accordingly categorised into monologic or dialogic. At the same time, they were also tagged in relation to external features of dialogue (i.e., the number of participants involved) as monologual (e.g., when traced in an expository part of a novel) or dialogual (e.g., when traced in a conversation between two or more interlocutors). Quite notably, none of the instances of the constructional semantics of the patterns under study were found to be compatible with monologicity. In this respect, they are all argued to be consistently dialogic and, most importantly, inherently incompatible with monologicity (see also Geka and Marmaridou 2017).[135]

Regarding the distribution of data per construction within the *monologual-dialogic* (henceforth MD) and *dialogual-dialogic* (henceforth DD) axes, BELIEVE ME exhibits a noticeably stronger preference for *dialogual-dialogic* data in both corpora (BNC 81.1% (i.e., 30/37 concordance lines) and COCA 70.6% (i.e., 36/51 concordance lines)). BELIEVE IT OR NOT, on the other hand, exhibits a rather balanced distribution between MD and DD in both corpora. In particular, 52.1% of BNC data (i.e., 25/48 concordance lines) and 45.5% of COCA-derived data (i.e., 30/66 concordance lines) have been tagged as *monologual-dialogic* (MD), while 47.9% in BNC (i.e., 23/48 concordance

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[135] The entirety of the sampled population (*n*) for all the BELIEVE-family constructions is available in Appendix I for Chapter 4.

lines) and 54.5% in COCA (i.e., 36/66 concordance lines) have been tagged as *dialogual-dialogic* (DD). Finally, BELIEVE YOU ME seems to differ not in that the construction does not favour dialogicity, but in terms of its distribution in *dialogual* and *monologual* texts. More specifically, the BNC data for BELIEVE YOU ME are in their vast majority (91%, i.e., 61/67 concordance lines) *monologual-dialogic* (MD), while the respective COCA data are mainly *dialogual-dialogic* (DD) (68.8%, i.e., 22/32 concordance lines). This difference might be attributed to the text-type sources (already discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.1) that each corpus employs and indicates that future research is needed in this direction so that safer conclusions can be drawn (see also Chapter 7, section 7.4).

4.7.2.3 Distribution of intensifying features

The distribution of the intensifying features across the constructional family in both corpora presents various similarities. Negative lexical prosody systematically features as the most dominant intensifying element across all three constructions in both corpora with percentages ranging from the lowest 81.8% (i.e., 54/66 concordance lines) to the absolute 100%.[136] Positive lexical prosody ranks with consistency as the second most dominant intensifying feature with its percentages ranging from 52.9% (see BELIEVE ME-COCA, 27/67 concordance lines) to 83.6% (see BELIEVE YOU ME-BNC, 56/67 concordance lines). This is interpreted as an expected finding because of the dialogic function of the constructions at hand. More specifically, the non-alignment of perspectives in discourse naturally demands more affective language conventionally used for evaluation purposes. The high percentages of negative and positive prosody are followed by the use of quantifiers ranging from the lowest 34.4% (BELIEVE YOU

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[136] The lowest score of negative lexical prosody (i.e., 81.8%) was identified in the COCA sample of BELIEVE IT OR NOT, while the highest score (i.e., 100%) was identified in the BNC sample of BELIEVE ME.

ME-COCA, 11/32 concordance lines) to 77.6% (BELIEVE YOU ME-BNC, 52/67 concordance lines), the use of comparatives ranging from the lowest 36.4% (BELIEVE IT OR NOT-COCA, 24/66 concordance lines) to 50.7% (BELIEVE YOU ME-BNC, 34/67 concordance lines)) and the use of superlatives (ranging from the lowest 18.8% (BELIEVE YOU ME-COCA, 6/32 concordance lines) to 41.8% (BELIEVE YOU ME-BNC, 28/67 concordance lines)).

Focus particles, epistemic modal adverbials and lexical repetition are among the least frequent intensifying elements. Of the three, the lowest scores concern instances of marked word order traced in BELIEVE ME-BNC (i.e., 2.7%, namely 1/37 concordance line) and the use of epistemic modal adverbs in BELIEVE ME-COCA amounting to 3.9% (i.e., 2/51 concordance lines). Focus particles also present fairly low percentages ranging from 3 to 4 concordance lines, which depending on the number of total population (N) in each case, correspond to percentages ranging from 7.8% (BELIEVE ME-COCA) to 10.8% respectively (BELIEVE ME-BNC). Their percentages, however, are somewhat increased in the case of BELIEVE YOU ME-BNC accounting for 16.4% (i.e., 11/67 concordance lines) of the data and BELIEVE IT OR NOT-COCA accounting for 16.7% of the data (i.e., 11/66 concordance lines), respectively.

Table 4.6 in Appendix II of the present chapter offers a detailed overview of the percentages reflecting the use of all intensifiers along with the raw number of their corresponding concordance lines which is expected to facilitate comparisons among the constructions identified. Setting possible comparisons aside, it is important to note that all the categories of intensifying elements appear to exhibit a cross-constructional applicability to all the family members.

4.7.2.4 Distribution of contextual features

The distribution of contextual features was examined with respect to their systematicity along the following parameters (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.7):

a) the tendency of the constructions to collocate with *connectors* (the use of *'but'* and *'and'*),

b) the tendency of the constructions to collocate with *conditionals* (preceding and following),

c) the tendency of the constructions to collocate with *negation* (grammatical or lexical, preceding or following), and [137]

d) the tendency of the constructions to collocate with *questions* (preceding and following).

As far as connectors are concerned, the use of *'and'* exhibits a higher frequency than that of *'but'*, reaching its peak in BELIEVE YOU ME-BNC (19/67 concordance lines, i.e., 28.4%,), BELIEVE ME-COCA (16/51 concordance lines, i.e., 31.4%) and BELIEVE IT OR NOT-COCA (15/66 concordance lines, i.e., 22.7%). As regards *'but'*, the relevant percentages are quite smaller, but fairly comparable, across all the constructional members of the network. More specifically, in BELIEVE IT OR NOT-BNC and BELIEVE IT OR NOT-COCA, '*but*' features only in one concordance line accounting for the relevant percentages of 2.1%, i.e., 1/37 concordance lines in the BNC sample, and 1.5%, i.e., 1/51 concordance lines in the COCA sample. BELIEVE YOU ME, however, exhibits a somewhat more balanced approach in the use of *'but'* as opposed to BELIEVE

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[137] As discussed in Chapter 3 (see section 3.3.2), in order to arrive at a more comprehensive appraisal of the contextual parameter of negation and its systematicity, apart from negative semantic prosody, contextually-present, grammatical (e.g., negation of auxiliaries) and lexical negation (e.g., *'never'*) were also investigated.

ME. In particular, in BELIEVE YOU ME-BNC, the relevant percentage rises to 10.4% (i.e., 7/37 concordance lines), while in BELIEVE YOU ME-COCA the percentage is 6.3% relying, however, on a significantly smaller number of tokens, namely 2/51 concordance lines.

Although the above suggest that more research is needed in this direction, the preference exhibited for *'and'* (as opposed to *'but'*) might be attributed to the fact that the constructions identified either function affectively, in the sense of inviting or demanding trust, or stress factuality. As a result, although these discourse functions do not preclude the need for contrast or concession, they might favour discourse organisational practices that draw on providing additional reasons in support of the proposition /*p*/ made, rather than direct contrast.

Turning my attention to conditionals, I observe that, as already argued, they are compatible with all three constructions since they assist in building the presence of an intensifying syllogistic procedure in discourse. However, none of the three exhibits a more marked preference than the others, although it could be argued that BELIEVE YOU ME in both BNC and COCA appears to exhibit a somewhat more systematic, and comparable, contextual presence in relation to them (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.7).

The percentages of questions and negation – and, in particular, those of *'post-use'* negation – are considerably, and consistently, higher than all the other percentages of the contextual parameters discussed, making *'post-use'* negation a contextual regularity, particularly for BELIEVE ME. The relevant percentages across the COCA sample range from the lowest 15.2% (i.e., 10/66 concordance lines of BELIEVE IT OR NOT) to the highest 29.4% (i.e., 15/51 concordance lines of BELIEVE ME). The

respective percentages in BNC range from the lowest 16.7% (i.e., 8/48 concordance lines of BELIEVE IT OR NOT) to the highest 32.4% (i.e., 12/37 concordance lines of BELIEVE ME). Crucially, both corpora exhibit the same ordering in terms of post-use negation with BELIEVE ME ranking first, followed by BELIEVE YOU ME, and then by BELIEVE IT OR NOT (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.7). This is interpreted as an expected finding given the dialogic function of all the constructions and their ability to profile non-alignment of perspectives, which may conveniently be couched in negation as well.

Finally, with respect to questions (both preceding and following), the constructions seem to share comparable percentages (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.7). More specifically, the respective percentages for preceding questions across all constructions are quite similar, ranging from the lowest 6.1% (i.e., 4/66 concordance lines) in BELIEVE IT OR NOT-COCA ME to the highest 14.6% in BELIEVE IT OR NOT-BNC (i.e., 7/48 concordance lines). It should be noted, however, that the percentages, and related raw frequencies, for preceding questions are generally more restricted in both corpora. Similarly, the percentages of questions following the constructions are also comparable, but even more restricted, with the lowest percentage being exhibited by BELIEVE YOU ME-BNC amounting to 3%, i.e., only 2/67 concordance lines (for more details, see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.7).

Given that questions typically contribute to setting up the image of the (assumed) Addressee and to introducing alternative viewpoints in discourse, their presence, as a form of non-assertion (by analogy with conditionals), is interpreted as an expected finding. Their somewhat restricted percentages, however, might be an indication of the strong dialogic function of the constructions themselves. In other words, by evoking the presence of an (assumed) Addressee and his/her non-alignment with the Speaker's

beliefs, the constructions might indirectly render the increased presence of questions redundant.

4.7.2.5 Distribution of positional flexibility

Although all three constructions are characterised by considerable positional flexibility (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.8), they do exhibit certain preferences with respect to positioning, worthy of being captured. More specifically, the parenthetical position appears to be the most favoured one by all of constructions of the network (with the exception of BELIEVE YOU ME-COCA, see below) with percentages ranging from 28.1% (BELIEVE YOU ME-COCA, 9/32 concordance lines) to 56.1% (BELIEVE IT OR NOT-COCA, 37/66 concordance lines). Preference for parenthetical position is followed by preference for sentence-initial placing.[138] As already hinted at above, the only exception concerns BELIEVE YOU ME-COCA which exhibits a preference for sentence-initial position (50%, i.e., 16/32 concordance lines), followed by the parenthetical one (28.1%, i.e., 9/32 concordance lines). Apparently, this raises the need for further research which could possibly correlate positional flexibility (and, by extension, specific positional preferences) with organisational strategies favoured in discourse, both in oral and written media (Goutsos 2017). Interestingly, what remains invariable, regardless of position, is the extended discourse scope of the constructions over preceding or following discourse and their ability to delimit discourse units. This is an interesting finding which correlates with recent work in the field of discourse position (Fischer and Niebuhr submitted) and, potentially, with discourse markers (see Chapter 7, section 7.5).

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[138] It might be useful to note that the respective percentages for the sentence-initial position across all constructions and both corpora range from 27.5% (BELIEVE ME-COCA) - 50.00% (BELIEVE YOU ME-COCA.

4.7.3 Reliability and validity statistics

The frequency counts outlined in the previous section per construction and corpus were initially calculated for their Mean (M), Standard Deviation (StD) and Range (R) (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.9). This was followed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) normality test (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Tables 4.10 - 4.12), which indicated that the data did not follow a normal distribution ($p>0.1$) and would, therefore, need to be subjected to non-parametric tests. Given the non-normal distribution of the data and their status as multiple-categories frequency sets, the Kruskal Wallis (K-W) non-parametric test was used for all the subsequent statistical significance measurements.

4.7.4 BELIEVE ME: *The statistical significance of the data*

The first frequency set subjected to statistical measurements as regards BELIEVE ME was that of *fully-compositional*, *constructional semantics* and *false positives*. The test yielded statistically significant results, with a p-value=0.000 <0.1 (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.13), suggesting that the preponderance of constructional semantics in the random sample is, in all likelihood, representative of the overall corpora population. In light of this, it can then be safely argued that the constructional semantics of the specific pattern is more prototypical (in the sense of frequency at least) than the semantics of its synchronically available and full-compositional counterpart. In other words, the semantics-pragmatics of *inviting faith/trust in the Speaker* from an (assumed) Addressee, along with the specific morphosyntactic regularities identified herein, have more chances of being traced in authentic language use.

The second frequency set examined in relation to BELIEVE ME was that of the classification of the data in terms of monologuality-dialoguality and monologicity-dialogicity. The results indicated statistical significance with a p-value=0.029 <0.1 (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.14), suggesting that dialogicity is consistently compatible with the construction and the same can be reasonably safely expected from the overall corpus population.

Positional flexibility was also found to be statistically significant (Asymp. Sig.= 000<0.1, see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.15), with parenthetical position featuring as the preferred one for the construction. As maintained, further research is needed in the field of the organisational strategies favoured in discourse by the Speaker in different channels of communication (oral or written) and different text-types and genres. Still, as argued, irrespective of position, the constructions identified manifest an extended discourse scope which correlates with their ability to delimit discourse units and is contextually supported by means of certain regularities, including the use of intensifying elements. With respect to the latter, their contextual presence was also found to be statistically important (p=0.00<0.1, see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.16), with negative and positive lexical prosody featuring most dominantly than the other elements. As maintained, stance elements, evaluative and emotive lexis, quantifiers, superlatives, comparatives etc., contribute significantly to the different viewpoints contextually expressed. Their high frequency, therefore, along with their statistical significance, is an expected finding which can further allow us to hypothesise that intensifiers are an anticipated contextual regularity for the entirety of BNC and COCA population.

The final parameter examined in relation to BELIEVE ME was that of contextual features. The K-W test yielded statistically significant results (p=0.00<0.1, see Appendix II for

Chapter 4, Table 4.17) which suggest that the 8-member category frequency set examined is representative of the whole corpus population, with negation standing out as the most central contextual regularity. The heightened presence of negation is also in line with the dialogic function of the constructions, and the expression (or anticipation) of conflicting viewpoints, which naturally call for debunking, conventionally associated with negation.

4.7.5 BELIEVE YOU ME: *The statistical significance of the data*

The absence of false positives and fully-compositional semantics as far as BELIEVE YOU ME is concerned, was a very significant finding in itself, rendering statistical measurement on that frequency set redundant and unobtainable due to the null status of the categories. All the other sub-frequency sets involved in the use of BELIEVE YOU ME were found to be statistically significant. In particular, the first frequency set of dialogicity-monologicity and monologuality-dialoguality was found to be statistically significant ($p=0.00<0.1$, see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.18) suggesting that the regularity observed in relation to dialogicity is representative of the entire population of BNC and COCA. This is also in line with the arguments presented herein contending that dialogicity is an inherited property of the construction.

The next frequency set subjected to statistical measurement with the aim of confirming its representativeness for the whole corpora population was that of positional flexibility. The data evinced statistical significance (Asymp. Sig.= 000<0.1, see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.19) suggesting that the construction exhibits a somewhat balanced preference towards sentence-initial (SI) and parenthetical (P) position (with the differences discussed in section 4.7.2.5), followed by a less-frequently occurring sentence-final (SF) position. Instances of a free-floating, independent, sentential status

(IS) were even rarer. As already proposed, the discussion of positional flexibility opens up an interesting field for further research concerning the function and status of the constructions identified (see Chapter 7, section 7.5.3).

The frequency set of intensifying features was the next one to be subjected to statistical measurement. The test indicated that their regularity of contextual occurrence is characterised by statistical significance (Asymp. Sig.=000<0.1, see Appendix II, Table 4.20), with negative and positive prosody featuring once more as the dominant intensifying features. This is in accordance with their dialogic function which typically entails the use of evaluation practices for the different viewpoints expressed and hence relies on emotive lexis and various stance elements.

The final variable examined was that of contextual features, which was also found to be statistically significant (Asymp. Sig.= 000<0.1, see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.21), thereby corroborating the centrality of the features involved and, primarily, the use of negation. The latter, as has already been proposed, adds to the discourse function of the construction given that an unanticipated proposition /p/ is highly likely to be met with opposition couched in lexical or grammatical negation.

4.7.6 BELIEVE IT OR NOT: *The statistical significance of the data*

Following the principle of representativeness of random sampling, the systematically unique presence of BELIEVE IT OR NOT in the constructional semantics identified in the present work, along with the absence of any fully-compositional or false positive instances, allow for the assumption that the entire population in both corpora showcases only constructional instances. Moreover, all the other parameters involved in the annotation process were also found to be statistically significant. In particular, the first frequency set examined and found to be statistically significant (Asymp. Sig.= 001<0.1,

see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.22) was that of monologicity-dialogicity and dialoguality-monologuality. The test thus confirmed that dialogicity is indeed an essential, inherent feature of the construction, likely to be so for the entirety of the corpora population.

Positional flexibility was also found to be statistically significant (Asymp. Sig.= 000<0.1, see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.23) with parenthetical position surfacing as the most favoured one in the overall corpora population, followed by the sentence-initial one.[139] What is particularly noteworthy, however, is that, regardless of any positional predilections, the ability of each construction to import dialogicity to its context and add to the expressivity of its host utterance remains invariable.

Intensifying features were also found to be statistically significant (Asymp. Sig.= 000<0.1, see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.24). More specifically, negative and positive lexical prosody were once more the most dominant intensifying elements, suggesting that this is an expected contextual attribute for the entirety of the corpora population. Quantifiers, comparatives, and superlatives were the next most frequent intensifying features, thus lending further contextual support to my argument in relation to the expressivity of the utterance, both at the level of context, and at the level of the use of the construction itself.

The final frequency set examined was that of contextual features which also manifested statistical significance (Asymp. Sig.=000<0.1, see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.25), showcasing negation as the most important contextual feature, in line with what

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[139] Given that the sentence-final position, including independent sentence status, were significantly more infrequent in both corpora and that, with the exception of BELIEVE YOU ME-COCA, all the constructions examined in both corpora exhibit a consistent predilection for parenthetical position, it could be argued that the constructions tend to exhibit a more *forward*-looking (as opposed to *backward*-looking) regulatory discourse scope.

has been presented for all the other constructions in the family. Negation was followed by an increased contextual presence of conditionals, conducive to the Speaker's overall persuasive, syllogistic procedure.

As it transpires from the above, the findings of random sample confirm that the annotation parameters taken into consideration are likely to apply (in the sense of representativeness) for the entire population (*N*) of all the constructions in both BNC and COCA.

4.7.7 The internal reliability of the data

The final step of the statistical analysis involved measuring the internal consistency (i.e., reliability) of the data through Cronbach's alpha (α).[140] The resulting (α) coefficient (range $0 - 1$) provides an overall assessment of a measure's reliability. As argued in Chapter 3 (section 3.4.4), this means that the higher the α coefficient, the more the items involved have shared covariance and thus serve to measure reliably the same underlying concept. To ensure, therefore, the reliability of the scale of the frequency sets assessed, Cronbach's alpha (α) was administered in three different phases:

Phase 1: Cronbach's alpha (α) was administered for the overall frequency sets of each construction in each corpus. This was important for ascertaining the decisions made concerning data annotation in relation to:

a) the fully-compositional, constructional or false positives instances (where applicable),

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[140] As mentioned in Chapter 3 (see section 3.4.4), calculating Cronbach's alpha (α) is typically employed as an internal consistency reliability estimator for composite measures involving multiple components. As such, it is widely recommended in statistical analysis for safer conclusions as regards the reliability of outcomes (Thompson 1992; Osburn 2000; Ritter 2010).

b) the dialogual-monologual or dialogic-monologic framework,

c) the intensifying and affective stance elements,

d) the contextual features, and

e) their positional flexibility.

Phase 2: Focusing on contextual features encountered in the discourse environment of the constructions, Cronbach's alpha (α) was also administered for the combination of the categories of intensifying elements and contextual features across the BELIEVE-family in both corpora. The aim was to establish whether these frequency sets, along with their subgroups, composed a reliable scale conducive to the research intended and informative about the collocational regularities and dependencies of the family.

Phase 3: Finally, Cronbach's alpha (α) was administered on all three constructions in both corpora as an aggregate frequency set so as to confirm:

 a) whether the same parameters (i.e., frequency categories) were rightly measured across all three constructions, and

b) whether the family as a whole comprises a reliable scale that legitimises statistically safe assumptions.

4.7.7.1 The internal reliability of the data: Phase 1

Cronbach's alpha (α) results for each construction in each corpus indicate considerably high reliability ranging from (α)=0.715 to (α)=0.912 (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.26). The results indicate that the construction which exhibits the most reliable scale is that of BELIEVE IT OR NOT-BNC (α)=0.912, followed by that of BELIEVE ME-COCA with (α)=0.890. This was followed by BELIEVE YOU ME-BNC whereby (α)=0.850 and BELIEVE IT OR NOT-COCA whereby (α)=0.812. BELIEVE YOU ME-

COCA manifested a somewhat less reliable (compared to the others) scale with (α)=0.788, followed by BELIEVE ME-BNC with (α)=0.715. Regardless of minor differences, what is particularly noteworthy in all cases is that the respective Cronbach's alpha (α) for all the constructional members of the family is considerably high since they all exhibit an (α) ranging above 0.700, which is the conventionally-agreed 'threshold' of satisfactory reliability.

4.7.7.2 The internal reliability of the data: Phase 2

With respect to the intensifying and contextual features of the constructions, Cronbach's alpha (α) showed consistently high internal reliability for all the constructions (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.27). More specifically, the results indicated that BELIEVE YOU ME exhibits the greatest degree of internal reliability with (α)=0.880, followed closely by BELIEVE ME with (α)=0.850 and, finally, by BELIEVE IT OR NOT with (α)=0.754. These findings suggest that all three constructions and, in particular BELIEVE YOU ME, exhibit considerable *'resistance to error'* with respect to all the parameters examined in relation to intensifying and contextual features.

4.7.7.3 The internal reliability of the data: Phase 3

Finally, Cronbach's alpha (α) was administered for the aggregate frequency set across the constructional family in both corpora with (α)=0.680 (see Appendix II for Chapter 4, Table 4.28). Although somewhat less strong, the result suggests that the parameters taken into consideration are in the position to yield reliable, valid, and statistically significant results given that they differ only minimally with respect to the conventionally-agreed threshold of sufficient reliability, i.e., (α)=700.

4.8 Summary and concluding remarks

Adhering to the research agenda outlined in the Introduction, the present chapter, supported by qualitative and quantitative analysis, has provided synchronic, corpus-attested evidence for the constructional status of BELIEVE ME, BELIEVE YOU ME and BELIEVE IT OR NOT. In particular, it has argued in favour of a constructional family network of BELIEVE-imperatives whose semantic, pragmatic and discourse input cannot be exhausted in a compositional account. At the same time, it has further proposed that, apart from their common features, shared on the grounds of partial-inheritance, the constructions in focus also exhibit certain points of differentiation.

Regarding their common features, all three of them were shown to be substantive in form, but *not* equally productive, with partly-motivated semantics-pragmatics and a common discourse function, consisting in the marking of the Speaker's proposition /*p*/ as unexpected. Moreover, they have all been argued to inherit properties associated with their common Imperative morphological marking or their ability to set up an intersubjective, dialogic space. An additional, shared feature brought to the fore is their considerable positional flexibility and their contextual regularities and interdependencies which contribute to their extended discourse scope and their ability to function as fairly effective 'benchmarks' for discourse unit delimitation.

As far as their differences are concerned, the research indicated that *'believe me',* as a token, might be the only one featuring in both fully-compositional and constructional semantics. The compelling empirical evidence provided, however, confirmed that the pattern is not exhausted in its fully-compositional account, since constructional semantics (i.e., BELIEVE ME) was identified as reflecting the vast majority of the random data collected. Additionally, affective stance (in the sense of requesting faith/trust in the

Speaker's proposition /*p*/) was argued to be a common feature shared by BELIEVE ME and BELIEVE YOU ME, but *not* by BELIEVE IT OR NOT, which is characterised by factuality. At the same time, BELIEVE YOU ME and BELIEVE IT OR NOT have been argued to inherit further features related to their special morphosyntax. In particular, the non-canonical word order of BELIEVE YOU ME has been shown to make the construction an emphatic variant form of BELIEVE ME, with its post-posed Subject semantically functioning as a Patient, and in this respect, as an involuntary participant that is discoursally 'acted upon'. As far as BELIEVE IT OR NOT is concerned, it has been argued that its assertive, declarative, and factual semantics-pragmatics is strongly related to its disjunctive syntax, the lack of self-reference to the Speaker (S), and the factuality and contextual recoverability involved in the use of the pronoun '*it*' and, by extension, the tenses of the verb of the proposition /*p*/ in its scope.

The attempt to correlate these findings with discourse phenomena and, more specifically, with discourse unit delimitation, opens up a very interesting field of research for studies geared in the direction of delineating discourse structure despite the inherent variation of discourse itself. In light of this, the constructional analysis of the discourse regulatory function of phrasal constructions, like the ones in focus, emerges as a promising model for bringing to the fore the strategies involved in organising discourse.

Against this background, Chapter 5 that follows sets out to examine another case of a phrasal pattern, namely THINK AGAIN, with the aim of showing that it is also fully amenable to a constructional treatment.

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY 2: THINK AGAIN

5.1 Introduction

Following Chapter 4 and the account of the BELIEVE-family constructions, the present chapter examines the linguistic pattern *'think again'* through corpus-attested data with a view to showing that it also merits constructional status in the language. Supported by quantitative analysis, I propose that THINK AGAIN is a well-entrenched construction characterised by specific, semantic-pragmatic, and discourse properties as well as contextual and morphosyntactic regularities, not available in its fully-compositional counterpart (i.e., 'think' + 'again'). In this context, the present chapter puts forth the following:

a) In terms of semantics, THINK AGAIN expresses *'reconsideration of a state of affairs /p/ with a view to changing one's thoughts/opinion or actions'* and is not exhausted in the fully-compositional semantics of *'repetition of one's thinking process'*.

b) With regard to morphosyntax, THINK AGAIN exhibits considerable fixedness of form given its intolerance to substitution of *'again'* by other synonyms and its consistent morphological predilection for the Imperative, which is argued to constitute its prototypical form. However, it also allows for some degree of schematicity because in its regular embedding in recognisable morphosyntax, such as the apodosis of conditional sentences, it also inherits the morphosyntactic alternatives compatible with this context and its expected (to a degree) directive meaning. In this respect, it can also feature in the Subjunctive, or in infinitival form with syntactic dependency on modal

verbs or other expressions indexing directive modality, which is herein argued to be part of the semantics-pragmatics of the construction. Further to these, the construction also manifests noticeable resistance to negation and restricted positional flexibility as it is consistently placed in sentence-final position – occasionally clause-final as well – with a *discourse-responsive* (as opposed to discourse-initiatory) function. Alternatively, the construction may also marginally feature as an independent sentence paired with the same discourse-responsiveness available in sentence-final positioning. Drawing on this crucial similarity, the limited instances of its independent sentential standing in discourse are herein argued to be minimally variant forms of sentence-final positioning.

c) In terms of pragmatics, THINK AGAIN is consistently associated with the speech act of *challenge* and, as a matter of fact, the *pre-emptive rebuttal of challenge*, which, as will be proposed, accentuates the dialogic perspective that the construction imports to its context. In light of this, THINK AGAIN is eventually shown to provide a discourse interpretative framework for the whole utterance in which it is traced and to crucially regulate the relationship between the Speaker and the (assumed) Addressee.

d) With reference to contextual regularities and interdependencies, THINK AGAIN is shown to correlate systematically with certain features of its surrounding context that contribute to its ability to delimit discourse units. Apart from its systematic co-occurrence with the Imperative and other lexical and grammatical directives, such as the modal verbs, or the Subjunctive mentioned in (*b*) above, THINK AGAIN also correlates with preceding non-assertion in the form of interrogatives, typically featuring the epistemic sense of the verb *'think'*, or conditional sentences, in which the protasis /*p*/ also features the epistemic semantics of *'think'*. An additional, contextual regularity observed is the pervasive tendency of the construction to collocate with intensifying

features, such as stance-related elements and emotive lexis, which enhance its aforementioned, dialogic function.

To illustrate all the above and integrate them into a CxG-based account, the present chapter is divided into six sections, including the present one. Section 5.2 focuses on the semantics and the lexicographic treatment of the constituent parts of the construction, namely the verb *'think'* and the adverbial adjunct *'again'*. Section 5.3 presents linguistic evidence that confirms that although synchronically related to the fully-compositional pattern 'think' + 'again', the pattern under study sanctions its distinct treatment in the language as a construction with specific properties. Section 5.5 focuses on the inherent dialogicity of the construction, namely its ability to index non-aligned perspectivisation in discourse, which foregrounds specific, contextual regularities and interdependencies. In this context, section 5.5 entertains the hypothesis that THINK AGAIN contributes to discourse unit delimitation, promoting the idea that constructional frameworks emerge as a viable alternative to discourse unit segmentation approaches. Section 5.6 presents the statistical significance and reliability measurements conducted, while section 5.7 offers a summary of the chapter along with further, concluding remarks.

5.2 The semantics of the constituent parts of THINK AGAIN

5.2.1 The semantics of the verb 'think'

The present section offers an overview of the lexicographic treatment of both the verb *'think'* and the linguistic pattern *'think again'* as a whole in OED, CED and ColED (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.2). As argued in Chapter 3, the independent lexicographic checking precedes the data analysis so that the different senses related to the constituents of the pattern under examination, and their syntactic configuration, may be

further determined. The syntactic patterns identified correlate with different, yet related, senses of the verb *'think'*, thereby giving rise to variant forms and, possibly, to different constructions as well.

Drawing on the examples collected through the lexicographic overview (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.1), and the main findings of the relevant literature about the polysemy of mental state verbs as a semantic class (for a detailed overview, see Schiffer 1990; Jaszczolt 1999; Moltmann 2003; Ifantidou 2005; Cappelli 2005; Papafragou *et al.*, 2007; Slaughter *et al.*, 2008, and Chapter 2, sections 2.2.1 – 2.2.2), the following may be observed:

a) Although fully recognising the cognitive origin of *'think'* as a mental state verb, all three dictionaries seem to agree that its primary sense is that of encoding propositional attitude, i.e., the expression of a certain type of opinion. This is also in line with the relevant literature presented in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.) which stresses that mental state verbs form a complex and dynamic semantic class that is readily associated not only with the expression of a mental state (or process (see below)) but also with the encoding of propositional attitude. It is in this latter sense that *'think'* is also shown to relate to evidential and epistemic considerations that further allow it to lexicalise the Evaluator's assignment of a positive degree of likelihood to the proposition /*p*/ in its scope, while also leaving the possibility of erroneous judgement open (Cappelli 2008). However, as noted by Cappelli (2008), the evidential dimension of *'think'* *"is not inherent in the semantic potential of the verb but is supplied at the level of the context"* (*ibid.*:540). Interestingly, this suggests that context is particularly relevant to the semantics of the verb (Lehrer 1974) and can further relate it to the positive side of the likelihood scale as far as epistemicity and, by extension, evidentiality are concerned (Cappelli 2008). As argued (see Chapter 2,

section 2.2.2), this *context-sensitiveness* motivates the increased *polyfunctionality* of the whole semantic class (Cappelli 2007a, 2007b) which is instantiated in its encoding of propositional attitude and its typical stative standing in the language (Vendler 1967) which, however, does not preclude the possibility of mental activity semantics as well (Lakoff 1971). Along these lines, I concur with Cappelli (2005) who also argues for a distinction between the sense of *'think'* as a stative verb encoding propositional attitude, and its mental activity sense of *'having a thought'* (Cappelli 2005:233). I further put forth that the latter can arguably be considered an extension of the state sense, as a *'state-for-the-activity' metonymy,* which will be brough to bear on the present account, primarily in relation to the distinction between the fully-compositional and constructional semantics of the pattern (Geka, Marmaridou and Nikiforidou 2020).

b) Further to what the relevant literature suggests about the *polyfunctionality, polysemy* and *context-sensitiveness* of *'think'*, the independent lexicographic checking demonstrated that the verb is consistently associated with – at least – the following three main syntactic configurations:

   i) the presence of *that*-complementation as in (1) below,

   ii) the use of prepositional clauses, headed by the prepositions *'of'* and '*about*', as complements of the verb (see examples 2 and 3) and,

   iii) the use of the verb + infinitive, paired with the semantics of having (or not having) the foresight or awareness to perform a certain action (see example 4 below):

   Example (1): *"She thought that nothing would be the same again."* (OED)
   Example (2): *"Tell me, what do you think of my theory?"* (ColED)

Example (3): *"I have often thought about this problem."* (ColED)[141]

Example (4): *"I hadn't thought to warn Rachel about him."* (OED)[142]

c) Finally, as regards the expression *'think again'* as a whole, all three dictionaries consulted (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.1) concur with its treatment as an idiomatic phrase with the meaning of *'reconsideration often with the result of changing one's mind'* and possibly *'one's course of action'*. This crucially suggests that lexicographers are – at least partially – aware of the somewhat substantive status of the pattern, namely its considerable degree of fixedness.

5.2.2 The semantics of the adverb 'again'

Turning to the semantics of *'again'*, its lexicographic treatment is in line with the relevant literature (Klein 2001; Georgakopoulos 2009; Beck *et al.*, 2009) which highlights its dual interpretation between *repetitive* and *restitutive* semantics. The former is associated with the meaning of *'repetition'* as expressed in (5) below, while the latter with *'reinstatement'* and the return to a previous position, condition, or state as in (6):

Example (5): "*Could you spell your name again, please?"* (CED)

Example (6): *"He rose, tidied the bed, and sat down again."* (OED)

What invites further consideration though is that lexicographically, *'again'* is also associated with a contrasting, weakening, or even cancelling/concessive effect on what was previously mentioned, particularly evident when used as part of the expressions:

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[141] Note that in this example, the meaning of the verb *'think'* is that of putting mental effort into considering something, rather than having a certain opinion/belief about something.

[142] This use of *'think'* + infinitive with the meaning of having foresight is in line with the relevant literature about tensed and infinitival complements, according to which, *that*-complementisers in English illustrate propositions with a certain truth value, thus showcasing an event associated within the realm of reality. The infinitival form, on the other hand, suggests an irrealis event, on which no truth value can be ascribed, thereby entailing futurity or hypothesis (Owen Van Horne and Lin 2011; de Villiers 2004).

'but again', *'but then again'*, *'then again'* and *'there again'* as in (7) below (see also Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.2):

Example (7): *"I never saw any signs, **but then again**, maybe I wasn't looking"*. (OED)

And, although it would seem reasonable to claim that it is the very co-occurrence of *'again'* with concession markers like *'but'* that accounts for the weakening/contrasting of the previous proposition /*p*/, it seems that this is not the case as *'again'* inherently carries semantic undertones of contrast. This explains why contrast is still in evidence even in cases whereby *'again'* is not paired with concessive markers but with *'then'* or *'there'* as in the following corpus-retrieved examples (8-9):

Example (8): *"Unless Atari has a surprise in terms of its chipset, the company may have a way to go to convince buyers that its product's mix of open software, custom UI, preloaded Atari games, and Atari 2600-based design is somehow a better combination of value, design, and power than a Raspberry Pi 3 system (if it ever makes it to production, of course). **Then again**, maybe Atari is just banking on retro-computing fans paying top dollar to snap up this sleek take on the old 2600 design -- or, at least, its wood-paneled variant."*

> COCA, [Ataribox aims high with $250-300 price point, Linux core]
> (**MAG**: *Ars Technica*, publication date: 2017 (17-09-26))

Example (9): *"Trump said on Wednesday that he wouldn't benefit personally from the reforms. It's possible he was just being clever: It would be his kids, rather than him, who would save the estate taxes. **There again**, it's possible he was just lying."*

> COCA, [The $2.8 billion winners of Trump's proposed tax cuts are his kids]
> (**MAG**: *MarketWatch* publication date: 2017 (17-09-28))

Both examples (8-9) illustrate that even in the absence of concessive markers, the adverb expresses contrast, and by extension, amendment, or cancellation of the

previous proposition /*p*/. To further confirm its inherent, weakening function, example (10) below illustrates that this is the case even when the adverb is used on its own and not as part of an idiomatic phrase.

Example (10): *"A very similar sort of enterprise has been engaged in by philosophers interested in the notion of speech act (addressed in Chapter 5): either by examining a special set of verbs called performative verbs, or by more abstract conceptual analysis, they arrive at classifications of the basic purposes for which language can be used (see e.g. Searle, 1976).* **Again,** *such schemes seem to be far too broad to relate to detailed aspects of linguistic structure. How else, then, might we proceed? One possibility, which has scarcely been explored…"*

BNC, [*Pragmatics*, Author: Levinson, Stephen C.]
(Written books & periodicals: Pragmatics, Publication date: 1987)

As will be discussed in section 5.4 (see also Chapter 7, section 7.3), I propose that this feature of the adverb is – inter alia – one of the main sources of motivation for the special semantics-pragmatics of THINK AGAIN.

5.3 THINK AGAIN

5.3.1 Think Again: The fully-compositional semantics

Following what has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 4 about the principle of *minimal constructional synonymy* (Goldberg 1995) and the fact that CxG recognises varying degrees of *predictability* and *compositionality*, the present section focuses on examining the corpus-retrieved tokens of the pattern. Drawing on the premises that the interrelationship between predictability and compositionality determines whether a new construction should be introduced (or whether it should be seen as connected to another already known one) and that differences in complement configuration between

constructions automatically result in differences of meaning,[143] it is proposed that the random sample showcases *'think again'* both in *fully-compositional* and *constructional semantics.* The former reflects a predictable, computational (i.e., 'think' + 'again') and almost transparent relation between the meaning of the expression as a whole and the individual meaning and grammatical organisation of its components. The latter, however, as the term itself suggests, is used to describe instances in which *'think again'* functions as a paired unit of form and meaning with properties that can neither be predicted by, nor exhausted in, the meaning(s) of its individual parts.

The data indicate that an adequate analysis of *'think again'* cannot restrict itself to the fully-compositional instances, which although present in the random sample, account only for a minimal number of instances (see section 5.6.2.1). In what follows, therefore, I focus on examining the fully-compositional instances of *'think again'* (see examples 11-15) with the aim of suggesting that they differ from the constructional instances, which will be discussed in section 5.3.2.[144]

Example (11) illustrates the use of *'think again'* in 1st-person singular in the sense of repeating one's reasoning process.

Example (11): "*So I <u>think</u> there is something qualitatively different when the subject, or perhaps more appropriately the object of sexual harassment are women. It's doubly destructive to them. I **think again** it's a power thing, though, isn't it?"*

(BNC, [Bill Heine radio phone-in, S _ broadcast _ discussion], sample containing about 109439 (domain: leisure context) publication date: 1985-1993)

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[143] See also Chapter 2 (section 2.32) and the discussion on the DITRANSITIVE and the PREPOSITIONAL DATIVE construction or the PREPOSITION STRANDING and the PREPOSITION PIED-PIPING construction.

[144] As was the case with Chapter 4, to gain in economy and focus, the patterns henceforth discussed will be examined on the basis of a selection of targeted examples, aiming to illustrate the representative features of *fully-compositional* and *constructional* semantics, respectively. Detailed statistics and more information on frequency counts on the totality of the data will be provided in sections 5.6.2 and 5.6.3, while the entire data pool is available in Appendix I.

In this example, the verb *'think'* is used in the preceding part of discourse (underlined in (11) above) and, in a way, invites the second use of the verb along with the adverb *'again'* which seems to add a weakening function, reinforced by the use of *'though'*. In terms of speech acts, the pattern functions assertively, and in this respect, also evidentially, so as to highlight the Speaker's belief or opinion. The latter, however, appears to be in need of further confirmation invited by the use of the question tag *'isn't it'*.[145] In this case, *'think again'* presents no contextual or morphosyntactic constraints, such as restrictions in tense-marking, negation, or sentence type, while the adverb *'again'* can be substituted by another synonym with no, or little, difference in meaning. Importantly, the syntactic configuration in (11) is compatible with *that*-complementation, although *'that'* is not lexicalised in discourse.[146]

Example (12) features the verb in the negative, which, expectedly, suggests that the subject will *not* be involved in repeating the thinking process.

Example (12): *"Max did not **think again** of the mailbox or the baseball card until he passed by the beech tree the next day…"*

(COCA, [The Home Forum: Kidspace, Title: Max's Midnight Adventures], Source: NEWS- Christian Science Monitor (publication date: 1993)

In terms of syntactic configuration, the verb is followed by a prepositional complement, headed by the preposition *'of'*. A further observation is that, in this example, the adverb

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[145] Note that in this example, although *'think'* functions as the main predicate of the sentence, it remains transparent to the question tag that picks up on the verb *'to be'* involved in "*it's a power thing"* suggesting that this is the main information conveyed by the sentence and that the verb 'think' provides only 'ancillary', 'background' information (Van Bogaert 2010).

[146] The *retention* or *omissibility* of *that*-complementisers in CxG terms is in fact interpreted as another instance of syntactic differentiation illustrating the existence of variant forms of constructions (for a detailed discussion on retention vs. omissibility see Biber *et al.*, 1999; Dor 2005; Downing and Locke 2006; Carter and McCarthy 2006).

'again' presents detachability from the verb, thus allowing for the insertion of linguistic material as in *"Max did not **think (again)** of the mailbox or the baseball card **(again)**"*.

In example (13), *'think again'* appears in an infinitival form with the semantics of repetition of the mental process, i.e., activity, which is further reinforced contextually through the inchoative verb *'began'*. What is more, as in all examples discussed so far, the pattern seems to favour a Subject (or Speaker) orientation as it consistently refers to the thinking process/activity performed by him/her.

Example (13): *"I began to **think again** about escape. Perhaps Friday wanted to go home too. Perhaps together we could get to his country. But what then?..."*

(BNC, [*Robinson Crusoe*: Oxford Bookworms edition], Written books and periodicals (domain: Writing-fiction-prose; publication date: 1985-1993)

As far as syntactic configuration is concerned, *'think again'* is followed by a prepositional complement headed by *'about'* allowing for *syntactic permutation* and *interruptibility* in that *'again'* can be detached from the verb, sanctioning the two possible alternatives (13a and 13b) below:

(13a): *"I began to **think again** about escape."*

(13b): *"I began to **think** about escape **again**."*

Once more, the verb allows for *tense-* and/or *person*-marking changes as well as negation without any restrictions (e.g., *"She **thought** about it **again**"*, *"They **never thought** about it **again**"*, etc.,). Additionally, the adverb *'again'* can be replaced by near synonyms with little, if any, difference in meaning (e.g., *"I began to **think (one more time)** about escape **(one more time)**."*).

202

Example (14) features *'think again'* in an infinitival form. By analogy with the verb *'began'* in example (13), the meaning of repetition of the thinking process/activity is further accentuated through the use of the opposite verb, i.e., the verb *'paused'*, suggesting that the previous thinking process should be terminated in order for another one to start anew.

Example (14): *" 'Shit, my whole damned business model is screwed to hell! If the inner system is destroyed, what do I do for a customer base?' He paused to* **think again***. A nasty smile formed on his face. But I'd still be sitting on top of the richest find the Oort Cloud has ever produced."*

<div align="right">(COCA, [Title: El Dorado, Author: Tom Ligon],
Source: Fiction-Analog Science Fiction & Fact (publication date: 2007)</div>

Example (15) is the final one in this section and illustrates the verb in 1st-person singular expressing the Speaker's judgement and, by extension, commitment to the truth of the proposition /*p*/ that follows. In this respect, the verb functions both evidentially and epistemically in relation to its *that*-complement, while *'again'* presupposes that the commitment to the truth of the same proposition /*p*/ has occurred in the past. Pragmatically, therefore, the sentence asserts the Speaker's thinking process.

Example (15): *MARGARET WARNER: "… Now, Prime Minister Netanyahu has also had some hot words for the Palestinians. He likened the measures he's taking against the Palestinians to say sanctions that the U.S. imposes like Libya that export terrorism. Would you put that in the same category? SEC-MADELEINE-ALBR: I* **think again** *that this is an analogy that simply does not work."*

<div align="right">(COCA, [Title: Newsmaker; Hazardous Terrain; The Real Deal],
Source: Spoken _PBS: Newshour; publication date: 1997)</div>

Moreover, although there are no contextual or morphosyntactic constraints on the pattern, permutation or detachability of *'again'* are not possible, given that, in this case, the adverb attaches to the verb immediately preceding it.[147] Yet, its substitution with synonymous expressions (e.g., *"one more time"/ "once more"/ "once again"*) is possible.

Consistently with what was mentioned at the beginning of this section about the importance of differences in syntactic configuration, the examination of the corpus-retrieved data has so far indicated that in its fully-compositional sense (i.e., 'think' + 'again') the pattern is compatible with – at least – the following:

a) the occurrence of the verb *'think'* in its metonymic sense of mental activity which, paired with the semantics of the co-occurring adverb 'again' motivate the sense of *'repetition of one's reasoning process/activity'*,

b) the syntactic presence of prepositional complements (most typically headed by the prepositions *'of'* and *'about'*) priming the metonymic, activity sense of the verb, or the presence of *that*-complements which relate to the epistemic, evidential and, by extension, assertive function of the verb,

c) formal variation, evident in the mood-, infinitival-, negative- and person-marking changes of the verb, [148]

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[147] For instance, in the sentence: *"I think that this book is worth reading again", 'again'* attaches to the predicate *'read'* rather than *'think'* (Cappelli 2005; Beck 2006).

[148] There is also only one instance of the pattern in its fully-compositional meaning featuring in the Imperative. Interestingly, in this case, the Imperative is followed by a prepositional complement, which suggests that complementation patterns are crucial for disambiguating the semantics of the pattern in focus: *"**Think again** of these words. What anguish they express! Where is the natural pause as you say this sentence?"*

(BNC, [*Hearing loss? A Guide to Self-help*],
Written books and periodicals (domain: social science) publication date:1992)

d) a noticeable predilection of the pattern for the 1st-person singular which conventionally signals a *Speaker-* or *Subject-*orientation in discourse,

e) absence of positional restrictions of occurrence in sentences, other than the grammatically conventional ones,

f) detachability of the adverbial adjunct *'again',* which allows for the insertion of linguistic material,[149]

g) substitution of the adverb *'again'* by other near-synonymous expressions with minimal, if any, variations in meaning, and, finally,

h) a tendency to co-occur with *inchoative* verbs (or their semantic opposites), typically associated with the semantics of *'again',* which also serve to accentuate the activity sense of the verb.

Following the above, the next section focuses on identifying the differences between the compositional and constructional semantics of the pattern, with emphasis on the latter.

5.3.2 THINK AGAIN*: The constructional semantics*

The corpus-retrieved data indicate that a comprehensive analysis of *'think again'* cannot possibly be exhausted in its fully-compositional semantics (i.e., 'think' + 'again') and the meaning of repetition of one's mental process, discussed in section 5.3.1. Rather, as the examples below (16 - 21) illustrate, the meaning of the pattern extends to the semantics of *'reconsideration'*, crucially involving *'a potential, or*

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[149] This is incompatible with instances of *that*-complementation.

recommended, change of thought or action'. This extended sense, which is also lexicographically acknowledged (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.1), accounts for the majority of the randomly-sampled data (see section 5.6.2.1) and is further found to systematically correlate with particular morphosyntactic and contextual properties.

Starting with example (16), THINK AGAIN features in sentence-final position and infinitival form, syntactically dependent on the modal verb *'should'* which serves as a marker of directive modality.

Example (16): *"So, how did the city get the names of online cigarette buyers? From court cases against a couple of Web sites. Now it's asking more Web sites to cough up their customers' lists. (voice-over): Smokers elsewhere who <u>think</u> they do not have to worry should* **think again***."*

<div align="right">

(COCA, [Friday Consumer Alert],
Source: Spoken _ CBS _ Rather, publication date: 2005)

</div>

The pattern is preceded by the same mental state verb, i.e., the verb *'think'*, which functions both evidentially and epistemically as the predicate of the clause and is followed by a *that*-complement (although *'that'*, as such, is not lexicalised). In this case, *tense*-related or other minor morphological changes are possible (e.g., *"Smokers elsewhere who thought or might/may think/might/may have thought…"*), unlike the second occurrence of the verb *'think'*, which is characterised by morphosyntactic fixedness. *Tense*-related changes and interrogative or negative formal marking are not possible in this case. However, the use of different expressions of directive modality is not precluded since *'should'* can be substituted by other modal verbs or expressions, such as *'must/need to/have to* or *had better'.* This further suggests that directive modality is part of the construction, which, in this case, does not assert the repetition of one's thinking process/activity. Rather, it invites the Addressee to reconsider the truth

of a preceding proposition /*p*/ with a view to challenging this truth and changing his/her beliefs. By foregrounding reconsideration with the possibility of cancelling the previous line of thinking, THINK AGAIN ultimately weakens the preceding proposition /*p*/, and, by extension, challenges its content. Interestingly, since example (16) is part of a voice-over, the Speaker seems to be acting *pre-emptively* before any actual objections are raised by the (assumed) Addressee. Essentially, this suggests that THINK AGAIN exhibits a certain intersubjective, perspectivised, and dialogic function in the sense that it indexes the Speaker's attention to the Addressee's needs even when the Addressee is not an active, co-temporal participant in discourse (Traugott 2010). In this respect, it also illustrates that the methodological decision of data annotation in relation not only to *external* (*monologual – dialogual*) but also to *internal* (*monologic – dialogic*) features of dialogue (Schwenter 2000) contributes significantly to our deeper understanding of the properties of the construction and its Addressee-orientation.[150]

In the following example (17), the pattern in question is placed sentence-finally, preceded by three instances of non-assertion, two of which feature the same mental state verb, i.e., the verb *'think'*.

Example (17): *"When I was your age, did I get to do whatever I wanted to do? Do you* <u>*think*</u> *I broke my back so you can be some bohemian? You* <u>*think*</u> *that's why I did it? I* <u>*suggest*</u> *-- I* <u>*strongly suggest*</u> *-- you* **think again***."*

(COCA, [*The Passion Dream Book*, Author: Whitney Otto], Source: Fiction, publication date: 1997)

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[150] Examples like (16) or (19) listed onwards further illustrate the complexity of the issue when it comes to 'hybrid cases' of monologual-dialogual texts, such as voice-overs, TV, and radio reports (e.g., announcement of news), lectures and read-aloud speeches in front of audiences (for a discussion of the complexity of the issue, see also Chapter 2, section 2.4.2 and Chapter 7, section 7.4).

The first two structures of non-assertion feature two direct (rhetorical) questions: *"…did I get to do whatever I wanted to do?"* and *"Do you <u>think</u> I broke my back so you can be some bohemian?"* and a non-inverted one, typical of informal conversation: *"You <u>think</u> that's why I did it?"*. Directive modality is once more present both lexically (through *'suggest'*) and grammatically through the Subjunctive form of *'think again'*. The directive meaning is further enhanced by the adverb *'strongly',* which, along with the lexical repetition of the verb *'suggest'*, serve as intensifying elements.

Example (18) illustrates that the pattern can also have an independent sentential status in discourse, although, as the data suggest, it is not its most frequent form of positioning (see section 5.6.2.5).

Example (18): *"Current Health doesn't usually print fiction, but in this case, we think this story speaks volumes. <u>Think</u> only bad kids bully others?* **Think again**. *Author Rona Maynard wrote this story in the 1960s, when she was 14."*

(COCA, [*The Fan Club*, Author: Maynard Rona],
Source: Fiction, Current Health Teens, publication date: 2012)

In this context, the pattern is a response to the non-inverted question preceding it: *"<u>Think</u> only bad kids bully others?"* syntactically dependent on the verb *'think'* whose evidential function has receded because of its placing in a form of non-assertion. Moreover, intensifying elements in the immediate context abound, e.g., the marked idiomatic expression: *"speaks volumes"*, or negatively evaluative items like the adjective *"bad"* along with the verb *"bully"*. What is of particular relevance in this example, as in most of the data collected, is that THINK AGAIN features in the Imperative. Its persistent occurrence in the Imperative, or generally in contexts favouring the use of the Subjunctive or the presence of other grammatical and lexical directives (e.g., modal verbs), highlights the directive force and intersubjective,

dialogic function of the pattern in focus. The latter is evident in the participant role of an Addressee (typically non-lexicalised in the Imperative) and his/her different viewpoint(s) that the Speaker pre-emptively rebuts in an effort to avoid potential, upcoming challenge.

The examples that follow (19-21) present the pattern embedded in the apodosis of a conditional sentence, while the same mental state verb (i.e., *'think'*) features in the non-assertive protasis of the conditional. Instances of conditionals like these may be argued to relate to Sweetser's (1990) *speech-act* conditionals, in which the *"performance of the in-process speech act (i.e., the apodosis) is presented as being conditional on the fulfillment of the condition expressed in the protasis (i.e. the antecedent)"* (*ibid.*:84).[151] Following this line of thought, the examples below may be regarded as *'speech act conditionals'* (for a detailed discussion on conditionals, see also Athanasiadou and Dirven 2000; Athanasiadou 2010) in the sense that the Speaker takes the content of the antecedent as given, or very probable, and by extension, as the background for the

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[151] Sweetser (1990) distinguishes between *content*, *epistemic* and *speech act* domains in conditionals and argues in favour of different relations linking *p* (protasis) and *q* (apodosis) depending on the domain they belong to. In her treatment of the topic, the conditionals in the *content* domain are linked causally as in: *"If Mary goes, John will go."* In this case, the event of Mary's going might bring about the event of John's going. In the *epistemic* domain, the *protasis* can be seen as a *premise*, while the *apodosis* as a *conclusion* like in the following example taken from Sweetser (1990) *"If she's divorced, (then) she's been married"* or in the example taken from Bryant and Mok (2003) *"If he typed her thesis, he loves her"*. In the epistemic domain, the parts of the conditional sentence are space-builders, setting up a primary, but not always an alternative, space. This suggests that *p* and *q* follow a reasoning pattern, which often manifests a reverse-causal relationship, since reasoning can go forward or backward in time, with no tense restriction on either clause. In the *speech act* domain, the protasis expresses the condition under which the speech act in the apodosis is relevant and satisfactory. The following examples from Dancygier (2004) and Bryant and Mok (2003) illustrate this claim further: a) *"If Mary goes, John will go."* b) *"If John went to that party, (then) he was trying to infuriate Miriam."* c) *"If I haven't already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you go."*, d) *"If you need any help, my name is Ann."*. In these examples, the parts of the conditional clause are space-builders, in the sense that the *p* clause sets up the frame in which *q* is supposed to be understood but there is no alternative space. The speech-act exists in both the new space and the base space and, once said, it cannot be retracted. The content of *q* can hold true both in the speech-act space and the base space. According to Fauconnier (1985, 1997) and Fauconnier and Turner (2002), space builders set up a mental space in the mind of the reader that is different from the mental space of the real world. The base space is defined as: *"a starting point for the construction to which it is always possible to return"* (Fauconnier 1997:49).

performance of the speech act in the apodosis, which, in the case of THINK AGAIN, performs the speech act of *challenge*.

Furthermore, as the examples illustrate, the pattern embedded in the apodosis may surface in the Imperative (example 19), which is its prototypical form in terms of frequency, in infinitival form with syntactic dependence on a lexical directive (example 20) or in the Subjunctive (example 21) which serves as a form of grammatical directive.

Drawing on the above, in example (19), the verb *'think'* features both in the protasis of the conditional clause and the apodosis, as part of the pattern in question, which features in the Imperative (i.e., "*If you <u>think</u> that this election won't affect you and your life, **think again**.*").

Example (19): *"WASHINGTON#He said he'd overturn Roe v. Wade. JOHANSSON# We have Republicans trying to redefine rape. LONGORIA# Trying to force women to undergo invasive ultrasounds. If you <u>think</u> that this election won't affect you and your life, **think again**.*"

<div align="right">

COCA, [The Five for October 15, part of a video-clip ad],
Source: Spoken _Fox, publication date: 2012)

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Example (20) below exemplifies the same protasis-apodosis pattern. The conditional clause is once more preceded by another non-assertive form expressed by means of a direct question. The only minor difference compared to example (19) above concerns modality, which is expressed lexically, through the use of the verb *'encourage'* (i.e., "*If your school colleagues answer this question by listing the current course offerings and curriculum arrangements, <u>encourage</u> them to **think again**.*").

Example (20): *"How can the school best provide for the learning that will get the desired outcomes? If your school colleagues answer this question by listing the current course offerings and curriculum arrangements, <u>encourage</u> them to **think again**."*

<div align="right">

COCA, [*Breaking the Scheduling Straitjacket*, Author: Tewel, Kenneth, J.],
Source: ACAD: Clearing House, publication date: 1991)

</div>

The final example (21) showcases THINK AGAIN in the Subjunctive, as the complement of the verb *'suggest'*.

Example (21): *"If you've succumbed to Miles Kingston's image of the National Trust volunteer being elderly, preferably female, and usually asleep in the window seat of a stately home, I <u>suggest</u> you **think again**. There were twelve of us finally assembled at Clumber, including Carole and Debby, the assistant leader, and everyone was young, sparky and outgoing."*

<div align="right">

BNC, [Written books and periodicals],
Title: The National Trust Magazine, publication date: 1991)

</div>

An additional observation to be made in this case is that the pattern is embedded in the apodosis of a conditional sentence which does not employ the same verb (i.e., *'think'*) in its protasis (i.e., *"If you've succumbed to… I <u>suggest</u> you **think again**…"*). The surrounding context employs several intensifiers and evaluative items drawing on negative and positive lexical prosody, respectively, like the verb *"succumbed"*, the adverb *"preferably"*, and the adjectives *"sparky"* and *"outgoing"*. What invites further consideration is that the clause that follows THINK AGAIN functions as a spelled-out form of amendment of the previous proposition /*p*/ attributed to the (assumed) Addressee, i.e., *"There were twelve of us … everyone was young, sparky and outgoing"*. This amendment, however, need not always be explicitly present, particularly in contexts whereby an alternative line of thinking can be easily retrievable

<div align="center">211</div>

from context or assumed on the basis of the preceding proposition(s) (see also section 5.5).

Acknowledging that the semantics of THINK AGAIN cannot be exhausted in a fully-compositional account, as was the case with the examples presented in section 5.3.1, I conclude that it is in fact a well-entrenched construction with specific, semantic, and pragmatic properties as well as contextual interdependencies and morphosyntactic regularities. In a form of interim summary, therefore, the present study has so far proposed the following in relation to THINK AGAIN:

a) Its *semantics* relates to *'reconsideration of a state of affairs (i.e., /p/) with a view to changing one's thoughts/opinion or actions'* and, in this respect, it differs from the semantics of *'repetition of one's reasoning process/activity'* (see section 5.3.1).

b) Its *morphosyntax* exhibits: (i) considerable fixedness of form (although some degree of schematicity is possible) given its consistent morphological preference for the Imperative, argued to be its prototypical form, (ii) noticeable resistance to negative morphological marking, and (iii) relatively restricted positional flexibility, in that the construction exhibits a specific predilection for sentence-final position (occasionally clause-final as well).[152]

c) In terms of *pragmatics*, it is consistently associated with the speech act of challenge and the pre-emptive rebuttal of the (assumed) Addressee's objections, further related to its prototypical Imperative form that endows it with an enhanced intersubjective, dialogic function (see section 5.5). On these grounds, the construction is also found to

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[152] For the sake of greater accuracy, the limited instances of *independent sentences* have been retained as a separate category in the frequency counts (see section 5.6.2.5), although they are argued to be an alternative form of *sentence-final* positioning.

correlate with an *Addressee-orientation* in discourse, unlike the *Speaker-orientation* of its compositional counterpart (see section 5.3.1).

d) With reference to *contextual regularities*, the data illustrate: i) consistent co-occurrence with the Imperative, modal expressions, or other grammatical and lexical directives, ii) systematic co-occurrence with preceding forms of non-assertion, such as interrogatives or protases of conditional clauses which frequently feature the epistemic semantics of *'think'*, and iii) considerable co-occurrence with intensifying features, such as affective stance elements and emotive lexis.

In the context of all the above, the question that arises is how the motivated and predictable (i.e., inherited) properties of the construction may be teased apart from its idiosyncratic, 'sui-generis' properties. This will be the focus of the next section.

5.4 THINK AGAIN: The emergence of the construction and its inheritance-based network

The consistent regularities and properties of the construction identified in section 5.3.2 argue *against* its treatment as a fixed, frozen, idiomatic expression occupying a 'peripheral' status in the language. An additional goal of the present study, therefore, is to offer a principled account of its motivated and idiosyncratic properties that would embed it in the rest of the grammar. Aligning with the interim summary offered at the end of the previous section, in what follows, I intend to focus on the inheritance relations of THINK AGAIN by arguing *against* its treatment as a substantive idiom of challenge.[153]

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[153] As explained in Chapter 2 (see section 2.3.1), *substantive* idioms are lexically filled, i.e., *"all (of their) elements are fixed, and nothing can be grammatically altered"* (Croft and Cruse 2004:233) whereas

Against this backdrop, I propose that THINK AGAIN qualifies for a construction that is not categorically substantive but rather allows for some degree of schematicity. It can thus feature in the Imperative, embedded in the apodosis of a conditional sentence (see example 22 below), or in an infinitival form, syntactically dependent on modal expressions again in the context of a conditional sentence (see example 23). Alternatively, it can also have an independent sentential status as a form of a reply to a direct question (see example 24), thus forming part of a 'question-answer' adjacency pair, with the question featuring as the *first-pair part,* and its attendant answer as the *second-pair part* (Sacks and Schegloff 1973; McCarthy 1991).

Example (22): *"If you <u>think</u> it can't happen to you, **think again**. The horror stories are too numerous to discount."*

> BNC, [Written books and periodicals], Title: *Do-it-yourself Home Surveying*,
> (Author: Taylor Jennifer, publication date: 1990)

Example (23): *"What? Now look here, if you honestly <u>think</u> that I'm going down to the police station and verifying a story like that then you <u>can</u> **think again**! It's ridiculous. No one would believe it!"*

> BNC, [Written books and periodicals], Title: *Destined to Love*,
> (Author: Taylor Jennifer, publication date: 1992)

Example (24): *"<u>THINK YOU'RE FAST?</u> **THINK AGAIN'** Disney THINK Fast - the exciting new quiz game that lets all family members compete as their favourite Disney characters."*

> COCA, [Great Gifts for 20$ or less], Author: Marcia Mac Quarrie],
> (Source: MAG: Today's Parent, publication date: 2008)

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schematic ones (also referred to as *formal*) *"have at least one slot where appropriate items can be filled in"* (*ibid.*:233).

Furthermore, the types of non-assertion featuring in its context of use may also differ taking the forms of direct questions (as in 24 above), conditional clauses which may, or may not, employ the same mental state verb *'think'* (see 25 and 26 respectively) or even temporal clauses expressing futurity, in the sense of a possible scenario (see example 27).

Example (25): *"Also, if you <u>think</u> people from Orange County won't attend a nighttime event in Arcadia, **think again**. The third most popular city where attendees come from is Irvine, Hwang said."*

<div align="right">COCA, [Summer now better late than ever], Author: Richard Chang],
(Source: NEWS: Orange County Register, publication date: 2013)</div>

Example (26): *"Whoever you meet, whoever you speak to, whoever you write to, ask yourself:" Is there any way I can help this person?" If the answer is "No", **think again**. If the answer is still "No", think once again."*

<div align="right">BNC, [Written books and periodicals], Title: *Profit Boss: 100 Steps to Achieving Better Profits*,
(Author: Freemantle David, publication date: 1988)</div>

Example (27): *"Once all this country is solid against the Act, and all across the Lowlands, then the government <u>must</u> **think again**."*

<div align="right">BNC, [Written books and periodicals], Title: *King Cameron*,
Author: Craig David, publication date: 1991)</div>

Aligning with the CxG theoretical background that informs the present study, I maintain that THINK AGAIN merits a linguistic treatment that foregrounds its schematic, grammatical status as a construction with the pragmatic point of challenge which – through the mechanism of inheritance – licenses all the particular constructs of THINK AGAIN as encountered in the corpus-retrieved data. The existence of this inheritance-based network, paired with observable systematicity in form and function, discourages an account of THINK AGAIN as a completely fixed, frozen and substantive idiom, in that

the latter obscures important aspects of the whole network of which it is a part (see also Chapter 7, section 7.3). In light of the above, I contend that there are three main sources of motivation for the development of the constructional semantics of THINK AGAIN which may be summarised as follows:

a) the semantics of *'consideration'* typically encountered in the mental state verb *'think'*,

b) the semantics of *'repetition-restitution'* of *'again'* along with its *'weakening-concessive'* function on the preceding proposition /*p*/, and, finally,

c) the directive, dialogic and intersubjective (i.e., perspectivised) meaning of the Imperative, or of alternative, grammatical, or lexical directive performatives, consistently co-occurring with the use of the construction in discourse, particularly in the context of the apodosis of a conditional sentence. The latter suggests that THINK AGAIN also inherits properties of the higher-order construction of CONDITIONALS and, in particular, the syntactic properties associated with its apodosis, though – interestingly – *not* all of them. As the data illustrate, THINK AGAIN idiosyncratically pairs with those compatible with its directive meaning, such as the use of the Imperative or the Subjunctive and the use of lexical directives or modal verbs like *'should'*. It does not, however, seem to collocate with other modal verbs, such as *'would'* or *'might'*, which, although fully compatible with the apodosis slot of CONDITIONALS, do not express directive modality and, in this respect, are not that likely candidates for the construction's list of collocates.[154]

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[154] In listing the minimal formal variations of the construction, Table 5.1 (see below) displays a number of different modality markers, similar to the ones suggested above, collocating with the construction in the context of a conditional apodosis. Examples (32) and (35), however, lend themselves to further discussion in that they feature a form of 'camouflaged' directive modality couched in the use of *'could'* as in *"If he thought she was going to be a nice little stepsister he could* **think again***!"* and *'might'* as in

Each one of these three main sources of motivation displays a set of very specific attributes that account for THINK AGAIN. More specifically, the semantics of *'consideration'* (i.e., mental activity) of the polysemous *'think'* and the semantics of *'repetition-restitution'* of *'again'* are inherited from the construction and become pivotal aspects of its own semantics. Moreover, the independent lexicographic and corpus-attested evidence illustrates that *'again'* contributes to the weakening of the content of a previously expressed proposition /*p*/, thereby performing a concessive discourse function, as illustrated in section 5.2.2 and example (10), repeated here for convenience.

Example (10): *"A very similar sort of enterprise has been engaged in by philosophers interested in the notion of speech act (addressed in Chapter 5): either by examining a special set of verbs called performative verbs, or by more abstract conceptual analysis, they arrive at classifications of the basic purposes for which language can be used (see e.g. Searle, 1976).* **Again**, *such schemes seem to be far too broad to relate to detailed aspects of linguistic structure. How else, then, might we proceed? One possibility, which has scarcely been explored…"*

BNC, [*Pragmatics*, Author: Levinson, Stephen C.]
(Written books & periodicals: Pragmatics, Publication date: 1987)

In this example, *'again'* inherently expresses cancellation (and, by extension, urges for revision) of the preceding proposition /*p*/, which, as I put forth, is a feature of the adverb that serves as an additional source of motivation for the semantics and pragmatics of THINK AGAIN.

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the *"…if you're buying equipment on the street or equipment without retail packaging, you might want to* **think again**.*"* Evidently, their effective interpretation in this context of use would not promote a reading of futurity or possibility.

Moreover, as already argued, the use of the Imperative endows the construction with an intersubjective, dialogic function, crucial for the speech act of challenge that it systematically performs. By virtue of its Addressee-evoking semantics (Traugott 2005, 2010; Makkonen-Craig 2014; Enghels 2017), the Imperative itself functions as a marker of intersubjectivity (Traugott 2010) in that in establishing an (assumed) Addressee in discourse, it further allows for the cultivation of a dialogic, perspectivised 'space'. Alternatively, but still in consistence with the directive and intersubjective meaning that it expresses, the construction also appears in contexts exhibiting surrogate forms of directives (as in example 28 below).

Example (28): *ANYONE who <u>thinks</u> that Donegal are a spent force following their National League final defeat by Dublin should **think again**."*

<div align="right">

(BNC, [The Belfast Telegraph],
Source: W-newspaper-other-reports, publication date: 1985-1993)

</div>

An additional observation to be made at this point is that the revising/reconsidering (and to a certain extent amending) function of the construction typically requires that the challenged proposition /p/ be placed *before* the amendment part. This accounts for the high frequency of occurrence of THINK AGAIN in recognisable morphosyntax, which involves a conditional clause or a direct question that the Speaker (conventionally expressed through 2nd-person doxastic mental state verbs, indicating someone else's set of beliefs) wishes to present as disputable or in need of revision. This accounts for the noticeable predilection of THINK AGAIN to occupy either a clause-/sentence-final position (as is in the vast majority of examples) or to exhibit an independent, sentential status (see example 18, section 5.3.2), which systematically correlates with the amendment following the construction. Its limited positional flexibility essentially points to the fact that THINK AGAIN does not initiate discourse and, in this sense, tallies

with a remarkably consistent *responsive* (i.e., *backward*-looking) scope, crucial for its ability to delimit discourse (see section 5.5).

Following the above, reducing the analysis of THINK AGAIN to merely ascribing to it an idiomatic status in the language would significantly restrict our understanding of it in relation to – at least – the following aspects:

a) The systematic tendency of the construction to appear in recognisable morphosyntax which involves preceding non-assertion and the featuring of the construction in the Imperative, in Subjunctive or in infinitival form with syntactic dependence on grammatical or lexical directives. The minimal formal variations identified on the basis of corpus-retrieved data may be argued to relate to the *'thinking'* or *'action'* domain associated with the preceding form of non-assertion and may be summarised as follows in Table 5.1 below.

‘Thinking’ Domain	‘Action’ Domain
If you (do not) think X, THINK AGAIN (Imperative)	**If you do X, THINK AGAIN** (Imperative or infinitive)
Example (29): *“If you think that this election won't affect you and your life, **think again**.”* COCA, [The Five for October 15, part of a video-clip ad], Source: Spoken _Fox, publication date: 2012)	Example (35): “…*if <u>you're buying</u> equipment on the street or equipment without retail packaging, you might want to **think again**.”* COCA, [The Unreal Deal, Author: Null Christopher], Source: MAG, PC World, publication date: 2013)
If you (do not) think X / THINK AGAIN **(modal verb + infinitive or Subjunctive)**	**If/ When/Once (sb else) do(es) X, THINK AGAIN** (Imperative or Infinitive)
Example (30): *“And, Leon, if you think that is an isolated story, you need to **think again**, because the news that's emerging from these hearings today is frankly shocking.”* COCA, [Congress Holding Hearings on Tax Fraud], Source: Spoken_ CNN _Live, publication date: 2002)	Example (36): *“When he slaps a shell-shocked kid -- twice -- any man <u>should</u> **think again** before joining the army.”* COCA, [The Misanthrope's Misanthrope], Source: MAG: Esquire, publication date: 2009)

Think X? THINK AGAIN

Example (31): *"Finally, let's talk about last-minute meals.* <u>Think</u> *you can't do it? Well,* **think again**. *Dede Wilson is the editor of Bon Appetit magazine."*

COCA, [Five last-minute tips for Christmas,

Authors: Lester Halt, Ann Curry],

Source: Spoken _ NBC _ Today, publication date: 2007)

If (sb else) think(s) (also tensed, usually Simple Past), THINK AGAIN

(Imperative or Infinitive)

Example (32): *"If he* <u>thought</u> *she was going to be a nice little stepsister he could* **think again**!*"*

BNC, [A Healing Fire], Author: Wilson Patricia
Source: Written Books-Periodicals; publ. date: 1993)

Anyone who thinks X, modal verb/expression + THINK AGAIN

Example (33): *"ANYONE who* <u>thinks</u> *that Donegal are a spent force following their National League final defeat by Dublin* <u>should</u> **think again**.*"*

BNC, [The Belfast Telegraph],

Source: Written books and periodicals, public. date: 1993)

Example (34): *"Anybody who thought that Bath's tight grip on the Pilkington Cup was over* <u>had better</u> **think again**.*"*

BNC, [Rugby World and Post],

Source: Written books and periodicals, public. date: 1992)

Table 5.1: A summary of the minimal formal variations identified for THINK AGAIN

b) The systematic correlation of the construction with directive contexts, involving the Imperative and the Subjunctive (irrealis mood), and its consistent pairing with an increased use of intensifiers in the form of evaluative items and stance elements that relates to – and to a certain extent motivates – its special semantics-pragmatics.

c) The consistent, intersubjective function that the construction exhibits, evident in its morphological marking, the speech act it performs, and the foregrounding of different, non-aligned perspectives in discourse (see section 5.5).

The final part of this section addresses the issue of motivation with respect to the creation, development, and potential change and variation of a construction, which are largely dependent on properties of human cognition and interaction (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.5). Within the framework of CxG, change is typically viewed as gradual and incremental, influenced by a number of different factors (Traugott 2008; Traugott and Trousdale 2013; Holyk 2014). Given the synchronic status of the present study, though, any discussion of change can only be safely limited to its synchronic aspects, namely the synchronic variation identified in the constructions under study, and in this case, in THINK AGAIN.

As proposed in the relevant literature (Langacker 2000, Van Bogaert 2010), linguistic variation typically correlates with well-entrenched constructions that are likely to exhibit greater productivity. The deep entrenchment and high frequency of mental state verbs in human communication and interaction, therefore, renders them good candidates for the production of variant forms. An additional reason that makes them particularly amenable to linguistic variation is their ambiguity between a propositional and an interpersonal reading (Hooper 1975); the latter referring to their ability to

"orient the Hearer aright towards the statements with which they are associated" (Urmson 1952:482/491; Kärkkäinen 2003; Van Bogaert 2006).

In light of the above, I propose that the data at hand illustrate that in the morphological marking identified herein, THINK AGAIN has experienced (and may well still be experiencing) loss of compositionality which has contributed to the development of a variant form. This co-temporal, variant form exhibits systematicity and regularity in terms of morphosyntax, semantics-pragmatics, and conventionalisation in terms of use which foregrounds its dialogic perspectivisation. It further exhibits both inherited and idiosyncratic properties that set the verb it features apart from other, potentially evidential, and epistemic instantiations of it in the language or in its surrounding context. Finally, on the basis of frequency counts (see section 5.6.2.1), I further propose that the variant form identified is also more frequent than its compositional counterpart; an observation crucially related to its licensing template form (i.e., V_{IMP} + 'again') (see Geka *et al.*, 2020), to be further addressed in detail in Chapter 7 (section 7.3).

Having confirmed the constructional semantics of THINK AGAIN and its inheritance-based motivation and variability, I will now shift my attention to examining its discourse function and its ability to function as a discourse unit delimitator.

5.5 THINK AGAIN: Dialogicity and discourse unit delimitation

The present section has a dual focus as, on the one hand, it aims to confirm the dialogic function of THINK AGAIN in discourse and, on the other, to show that its discourse effect, which is heavily correlated with its inherent dialogicity, should be seen as the main contributing factor to its ability to delimit discourse units. More specifically, in the present section, I argue that THINK AGAIN exhibits *responsive* (with reference to the antecedent disputable proposition /*p*/) and (occasionally) *anticipatory* (in cases where

an amendment part follows) *dialogic projections*. In using the construction, that is, the Speaker regulates discourse on the basis of an (assumed) image and belief-system about the Addressee and attempts to parry his/her (potential) reactions/objections to the proposition /*p*/ put forth by making all kinds of necessary provisos.

Following the relevant literature (see Chapter 2, section 2.5, Traugott 2010; Makkonen Craig 2014) which suggests that certain language patterns inherently pose as better candidates for indexing dialogicity (e.g., questions or directives), the present work proposes that THINK AGAIN lists itself among these. Supported by corpus-attested evidence, I maintain that, by analogy with what the relevant literature suggests concerning inherent dialogicity in language structures featuring non-assertions and directives, THINK AGAIN is dialogic because:

a) It is regularly embedded in the recognisable, non-assertive contexts of conditional sentences and question-answer adjacency pairs (Sacks and Schegloff 1973; McCarthy 1991).

b) The morphological marking of the Imperative, which constitutes its prototypical form, is by default intersubjective in orientation, primarily on account of its Addressee-evoking semantics (Traugott 2005; Enghels 2017).

c) The verb it features belongs to the semantic class of mental state verbs which designates and externalises (or reports on) innermost reality appraisals as construed by the Speaker/Cognizer, thereby accentuating the intersubjective space between the Speaker and the Addressee (Krawczak, Fabiszak, and Hilpert 2016).

d) It correlates with an increased presence of intensifying features, including stance elements, emotive lexis, superlatives, and comparatives etc., which are, expectedly,

involved in the evaluation of non-aligned perspectives, thus giving rise to discourse negotiation practices as to which line of thought will dominate (Schmidt 2007; Traugott 2010). In this respect, the contextual presence of intensifying features corroborates the inherency of the dialogic function by the pattern. In other words, intensifying features contribute to legitimising the Speaker's construal of reality as the correct one and the (assumed) Addressee's line of thinking as erroneous or in need of amendment.

Having provided evidence for the inherent and contextually-enhanced dialogic function of THINK AGAIN, I will now direct my attention to offering a CxG-based proposal as to how the dialogic projections triggered by its use in discourse can contribute to the organisation and delimitation of discourse structure into units. Following Chapter 2 (see section 2.5.2), the present work perceives discourse units as interactionally 'complete', so to speak, stretches of discourse (i.e., differentiated from other neighbouring ones) which are lexico-syntactically, semantically, and pragmatically specifiable and whose discourse realisation is co-extensive with the completion of the projectability/projection effect (Selting 1998, 2001, 2005) that each construction examined has in discourse.

In line with the above, in what follows, I propose that THINK AGAIN essentially frames the 'boundaries' of a discourse unit in naturally occurring discourse by means of its extended discourse scope and its concomitant effect that gives rise to a *maximally tripartite* or *minimally bipartite/two-place* structure consisting of the following:

a) The 'antecedent' part before the construction, which will be referred to as the *disputable/challengeable **p**roposition (**p**)* that is discoursally expressed by means of a form of non-assertion.

b) The second, main part whereby the construction itself comes in, performing the speech act of challenge and the pre-emptive rebuttal of the (assumed) Addressee's

objections, hence expectedly bearing the name ***challenge (ch)***. As will be argued, this sub-component, which is also the final one when the construction features in its minimal bipartite structure, is discoursally indispensable on account of the inheritance relations that THINK AGAIN manifests. In other words, following the different instantiations of the disputable **p**roposition (***p***), the discourse locus of **ch**allenge (***ch***) is, in fact, interpreted as a projected conversational or grammaticosyntactic necessity, the absence of which is expected to trigger considerable *'non-sequiturs'* in discourse (see Mann and Thompson 1987; Mann and Taboada 2010).

c) The third part, immediately following the challenge part *(ch),* is referred to as the ***a**mendment/justification (**a**)* part, since this is the discourse locus in which the Speaker rectifies, revises or (slightly) amends the challengeable, disputable proposition (***p***) of part one. It should be noted, however, that amendment may not always be spelled out discoursally, particularly in cases whereby it can be contextually inferred. Moreover, in the examples in which amendment is not lexicalised, the speech act force of challenge performed by the construction against the line of thinking of the disputable/challengeable proposition part (***p***) is so forceful that it simply renders the amendment/justification part (***a***) redundant. It is in this latter form that the discourse unit delimited by THINK AGAIN manifests a bipartite, rather than a tripartite, structure; the former being treated as the most standard (with minor variations) formula of the two.

To illustrate the above by means of examples, let us use example (16), repeated here for convenience, as a case in point. Example (16) showcases an instance of the minimal bipartite discourse unit structure, consisting only of a disputable proposition (*p*) and the part of challenge (*ch*).

Examples (16): *"So, how did the city get the names of online cigarette buyers? From court cases against a couple of Web sites. Now it's asking more Web sites to cough up their customers' lists. (voice-over): Smokers elsewhere who think they do not have to worry should* **think again.***"*

<div align="right">(COCA, [Friday Consumer Alert], Source: Spoken _ CBS _Rather,
publication date: 2005)</div>

Schematically, the discourse unit in this case, and its interdependent sub-components, may be represented as follows in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1*: The bipartite discourse unit delimited by* THINK AGAIN

Example (21), also repeated here for convenience, features the discourse unit in its fully-fledged, tripartite structure. To offer a more holistic overview of the scaffolding, regulatory function of the construction in discourse, the example is provided in its enriched form, as retrieved through Sketch Engine.[155]

Example (24): *"If you've succumbed to Miles Kingston's image of the National Trust volunteer being elderly, preferably female, and usually asleep in the window seat of a stately home, I suggest you* **think again***. There were twelve of us finally assembled at Clumber, including Carole and Debby, the assistant leader, and everyone was young,*

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[155] For the sake of economy and precision, the examples of discourse units provided have been abridged so that they gain in focus. However, the data collected feature the entire context as retrieved in the respective corpora following their standard, automatic specifications for context size (see Appendix I).

sparky and outgoing. Mike, an ex-philosophy student, was going off to Germany in the New Year; Naomi from Bristol was about to embark on a Museum Studies course at university; Liane, a weights and measures official, was one of the many volunteers who had helped at Uppark after the fire; and Hugh, a quantity surveyor currently between jobs, set out to astound us over the…"

<div align="right">BNC, [Written books and periodicals],
Title: The National Trust Magazine, publication date: 1991)</div>

In this example, the conditional clause introduces the disputable/challengeable proposition (*p*): *"…the National Trust volunteer being elderly, preferably female, and usually asleep in the window seat of a stately home,…",* and is then followed by the challenge *(ch)* expressed with the directive force of the Subjunctive, i.e., "*I suggest you think again*". As can be observed, omitting the discourse locus of challenge (*ch*) would result in considerable abruptness and significant loss of grammaticality due to the syntactic continuation (i.e., projection) necessitated by the protasis of the conditional clause. This is an interesting case of delimitation because the discourse unit exceeds sentential boundaries and the scaffolding and regulatory discourse effect of THINK AGAIN extends not only to the following sentence, which functions as the main part of the amendment (*a*), but to all upcoming discourse which provides further clarifications. Most likely, the amendment part (*a*) in this case is spelled out because the challenge (*ch*) performed goes markedly against the stereotypes and world knowledge of the assumed Addressee.

The tripartite structure of the discourse unit, its interdependency, and the whole spectrum of the scaffolding discourse effect of the construction, are schematically depicted Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2: The tripartite discourse unit delimited by THINK AGAIN

In view of the above, and the discussion on discourse-unit delimitation (see Chapter 2, section 2.5.2), what I argue for is that the use of THINK AGAIN in discourse manifests specifiable regularities. These regularities, in their turn, result in the formation of a discourse unit with conventionalised sub-components. The latter are fundamentally informed by the semantic-pragmatic and syntactic dependency relations that the construction inherits from other higher order constructions, such as the CONDITIONALS, or the even broader constructional schema of the question-answer conversational pattern.

Following, therefore, a similar approach to that of Selting (1998, see also Chapter 2, section 2.5.2) in discussing how the *'if'* and *'when'* discourse parts necessitate the *'then'* component, I propose that THINK AGAIN is discoursally indispensable because it functions as the much-anticipated *apodosis* of the preceding protasis. In this respect, its discourse omission would result in considerable loss of grammaticality and

awkwardness. Likewise, when THINK AGAIN functions as a reply to a direct question, as in *"Think only bad kids bully others?* ***Think again****."*,[156] it is conversationally indispensable in that it functions as the much-awaited, and discoursally-projected, *second-pair part* continuation (Sacks and Schegloff 1973; McCarthy 1991) with the *first-pair part* component being discoursally expressed by the direct question.

In light of the above, the CxG-informed and inheritance-based discourse proposal outlined involves an important benefit in its favour. It allows for 'informed predictions' as to the scope of a specific discourse unit and its discernible, specifiable and conventionalised sub-components, thereby illustrating that, despite their fluidity, discourse phenomena can be fairly amenable to a construction-based description.

5.6 THINK AGAIN: Frequency counts, reliability, and validity statistics

5.6.1 Random sampling, manual tagging, and overall methodological framework

Following what has been discussed in Chapter 3, the random-sampled data collected for the case study of THINK AGAIN were subjected to manual tagging with relation to:

a) their *semantics* as *fully-compositional* or *constructional instances*,

b) their *pragmatics*, namely the *speech act force* of the construction,

c) their annotation with respect to *dialoguality-monologuality* and *dialogicity-monologicity,*

d) their *collocational behaviour* in relation to *intensifying* features,

e) their *morphosyntax* (i.e., their *internal syntax* and *external, contextual regularities*) and,

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[156] This is an extract from example (18), available in section 5.3.2.

f) their *positional flexibility* (e.g., their distribution in clause-/sentence-final position or their independent, sentential position in discourse).

The annotation of the data was followed by systematic frequency counts for all the aforementioned category sets. Schematically, the methodological framework adopted may be presented as follows in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: An overview of the methodological framework adopted for the analysis of THINK AGAIN

5.6.2 Frequency counts

5.6.2.1: Distribution of fully-compositional and constructional instances

The first two category sets subjected to frequency counts were the categories of fully-compositional and constructional instances of the pattern *'think again'* in each corpus. As argued, the majority of the concordance lines in both corpora features the constructional semantics identified herein (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.3). In particular, the percentages of constructional instances in both corpora are quite

comparable, amounting to 77.8% (i.e., 42/54 concordance lines) of the BNC data and 76.2% (i.e., 48/63 concordance lines) of the COCA data, respectively. Expectedly, the relevant percentages of the fully-compositional instances are also comparable, accounting for 22.2% (i.e., 12/54 concordance lines) of the BNC sample and 23.8% (i.e., 15/63 concordance lines) of the COCA sample.

Following that frequency can be regarded as a reliable indicator of prototypicality (Schmid 2007, 2010), the significantly higher frequency of the constructional instances of THINK AGAIN might probably suggest that it also enjoys greater entrenchment in the minds of language users. If confirmed, this would suggest that the synchronic, constructional variant form of the pattern has become considerably more frequent in use compared to its template licensing form of the mental state verb 'think' + 'again'. Nonetheless, as already suggested in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.1), the corpus findings of the present study are expected to be interpreted as *possible* cues to entrenchment and *not* as absolute cues to generalisations about the use and salience of the constructions in language. In this sense, I will presently restrict myself to stressing that the preponderance of constructional semantics, on the basis of raw frequencies at least, is a remarkable finding with interesting implications for linguistic variation and constructional productivity.

5.6.2.2: Distribution of dialogicity-monologicity and dialoguality-monologuality

The constructional instances were then categorised in relation to *external* (i.e., dialoguality-monologuality) and *internal* (i.e., dialogicity-monologicity) features of dialogue. The frequency counts indicated that the constructional instances were consistently compatible *only* with dialogicity, thus lending further support to my main hypothesis that dialogicity is an important, inherent feature of the construction that it

consistently imports to its context of use (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.4). Following this line of argumentation, I propose that the frequency counts (and the relevant statistical measurements, see section 5.6.4) further illustrate the inherent intersubjectivity of THINK AGAIN, residing not only in its morphological marking but also in the speech act of challenge that it systematically performs. Consequently, regardless of whether a text is monologual or dialogual, the construction imposes dialogicity on its context in that it signals non-alignment of perspectives and an urge for reconsideration.

More specifically, 71.4% of the BNC data (i.e., 30/42 concordance lines) showcase the construction in monologual-dialogic contexts, while the respective percentage in COCA rises to 72.9% (i.e., 35/48 concordance lines). The remaining percentages, namely 28.6% of BNC data (i.e., 12/42 concordance lines) and 27.1% of the COCA data (i.e., 13/48 concordance lines) reflect the use of the construction in dialogual but still consistently dialogic contexts.

The preference of the construction to surface in monologual contexts might relate to the fact that dialogual environments provide the interlocutors with ample opportunity and intersubjective space to co-construct discourse. In this sense, interlocutors are also able to avail themselves of a wider repertoire of strategies to express (mildly or forcefully) their different viewpoints. Alternatively, the specific tendency might also relate to the fact that face-to-face dialogual communication typically favours more delicate, face-saving negotiation strategies which do not promote the use of the Imperative or other directives.

5.6.2.3: Distribution of intensifying features

Frequency counts were also conducted on the sets of intensifying features available in the contextual environment of the construction. Bearing in mind that the sub-sets of the category of intensifying features are not mutually exclusive, the frequency counts indicated that the sub-sets of negative and positive lexical prosody were consistently the two most dominant ones, sharing quite similar percentages in both corpora (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.5). More specifically, in the case of BNC, negative lexical prosody ranks first traced in 88.1% of the data (i.e., 37/42 concordance lines), while in COCA the relevant percentage, still considerably high, accounts for 83.3% of the data (i.e., 40/48 concordance lines). Positive lexical prosody in BNC is also significantly high as it is present in 76.2% of the data (i.e., 32/42 concordance lines), while in COCA the relevant percentage is even higher, but still fairly comparable, amounting to 79.2% of the data (i.e., 38/48 concordance lines). Quantifiers, comparatives, and superlatives (in the order they appear here) were the next three most frequently encountered intensifying elements with their percentages in both corpora ranging from 78.6% (i.e., 33/42 concordance lines) for quantifiers in BNC to 19.05% (i.e., 8/42 concordance lines) for superlatives in BNC. These were followed by less frequently used intensifying features, like the focus particles, the epistemic modal adverbials, the use of marked word order, and lexical repetition ranging from the highest 20.8% (i.e., 10/48 concordance lines) focus particles in COCA to the lowest 4.2% (i.e., 2/48 concordance lines) marked word order in COCA (for a detailed overview, see Appendix II of Chapter 5, Table 5.5).

Acknowledging that the above may be influenced by the genres and text-types comprising a corpus and their conventions concerning the presence (or absence) of more or less elaborate, intensifying techniques, I restrict myself to suggesting that the

consistency of stance elements in the environment of the construction is a well-established contextual regularity. Quite notably, this regularity is also in line with my hypothesis for an enhanced dialogic function. However, safer conclusions can only be drawn if further research is conducted in relation to the genre make-up of the sample.

5.6.2.4: Distribution of morphosyntactic and contextual features

The frequency counts for the distribution of morphosyntactic and contextual features related to the construction both internally and externally. Their frequency set, therefore, involves the morphosyntactic features pertaining both to the form of the construction (e.g., the Imperative or its infinitival form) and its contextual environment (e.g., its use in the apodosis of a conditional sentence, the use of questions, negation, or the same mental state verb in the preceding and following context). The results indicate that the categories that stand out with respect to this frequency set in both corpora are the following (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table: 5.6):[157]

a) The presence of the construction in the apodosis of a conditional clause is an attested regularity in approximately half of the concordance line population in both corpora (BNC: 45.2% (i.e., 19/42 concordance lines) and COCA: 54.2% (i.e., 26/48 concordance lines)).

b) The morphological marking of the construction in the Imperative or in infinitival form appears to be a well-established regularity. More specifically, the data suggest that COCA showcases the construction mostly in the Imperative (62.5%, i.e., 30/48 concordance lines), while the relevant percentage in BNC appears to be somewhat more restricted, accounting for 40.5% (i.e., 17/42 concordance lines). Quite expectedly, the

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[157] For the sake of economy, only the features that stand out are presented here, but an overview of all the contextual features examined is available in Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.6.

corpora exhibit the reverse trend as regards the infinitival form (BNC: 57.1%, i.e., 24/42 concordance lines and COCA: 35.4%, i.e., 17/48 concordance lines). Given that directive modality, however present, was herein argued to be an essential part of the semantics-pragmatics of the construction, this finding was interpreted as an expected one that also served to confirm the minor formal variations of the construction identified in section 5.4 (Table 5.1).

c) The consistent presence of directive (grammatical or lexical) performatives was another well-established contextual regularity in line with the finding presented in (*b*) above. The differences in directive performatives in BNC and COCA relate primarily to the use of the construction in the Imperative or in infinitival form. Quite predictably, based on what was argued in (*b*) above, the use of directive performatives is considerably higher in BNC, as they are present in 54.8% of its data (i.e., 23/42 concordance lines). In COCA, the use of directive performatives is somewhat more restricted, although still present in a considerable percentage of data, rising to 39.6% of the sampled population, namely 19/48 concordance lines collected.

5.6.2.5: Distribution of positional flexibility

The final category subjected to frequency counts was that of the positional flexibility of the construction (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.7). Given its systematic predilection for recognisable syntax and, particularly, its embedding in the apodosis of conditional sentences, the construction exhibits fairly restricted positional flexibility, since it features mostly in sentence-final position in both corpora with its percentage reaching 88.1% of the BNC data (i.e., 37/42 concordance lines) and 79.2% of the

COCA data (i.e., 38/48 concordance lines).[158] In addition to the inheritance-based explanation provided herein for the restricted positional flexibility of the construction, sentence-final position is also in line with what the relevant literature (Traugott 2007; Brinton 2008; Degand 2014) suggests about intersubjectivity in general and its increased compatibility with the right periphery of an utterance. The latter is argued to be the discourse-reserved locus for reformulation practices whereby the Speaker addresses (or attends to) the Hearer's needs.[159] It should be noted, however, that sentence-final positioning also exhibits an alternative, variant form in the data, allowing the construction to discoursally manifest itself in the form of an independent sentence (see section 5.3.2). The latter accounts for 11.9% (i.e., 5/42 concordance lines) of the BNC data and 20.8% (i.e., 10/48 concordance lines) of the COCA data.

Following the above, I argue that the restricted positional flexibility of the construction, that, in practice, corresponds to sentence-final positioning only, coupled with the anaphoric use of *'again'*, essentially confirm the responsive discourse effect of the construction. In other words, THINK AGAIN does not initiate discourse. Rather, it responds to a preceding discourse part typically involving a form of non-assertion, whose syntactic, semantic-pragmatic, and dialogic projections trigger the use of the construction in discourse.

5.6.3 Reliability and validity statistics

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[158] It may also occur occasionally in clause-final position, typically before a temporal clause, as in *"When he slaps a shell-shocked kid -- twice -- any man would **think again** before joining the army."* Instances like this are scant in the data collected, though.

[159] The right periphery is typically the plac*e "where the now existing message can be reflected upon, reformulated or corrected. It is also the place where the Speaker can give the turn to the Hearer, or address other Hearer's needs. We thus expect to find 'turn-yielding discourse particle meanings (Mulder & Thompson 2008), i.e., interpersonal (Brinton 1996), but also modal functions (Hansen 1997) [sic] and more general intersubjective meanings (Barth-Weingarten & Couper-Kuhlen 2002; Verstraete 2004; Traugott 2007, 2010; Strauss & Xiang 2009)"* (adapted from Degand 2014:158).

The frequency counts were followed by a calculation of the Mean (M), Standard Deviation (StD) and Range (R) of each frequency-set examined (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.8). This was followed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) normality test which indicated that the data did not follow a normal distribution (p>0.1) and would, therefore, require non-parametric tests (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.9).

Given their non-normal distribution, the non-parametric tests used were the Mann-Whitney (MW) test for the frequency sets involving two categories and the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test, respectively, for the frequency sets that subsumed more than two categories. The sections that follow present the results of the statistical significance and reliability measurements.

5.6.4 The statistical significance of the data

Following the K-S test, the first frequency set subjected to statistical measurements was that of the fully-compositional vs. constructional semantics. Given that this frequency set consists of only two categories, the test used was the Mann-Whitney U (MWW), which yielded statistically significant results with a p-value=0.000<0.1 (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.10). This confirms that the constructional semantics identified in the random sample is, most likely, representative of the overall corpora population (*N*). Additionally, it corroborates my above-mentioned suggestion that THINK AGAIN is, in all likelihood, prototypically (in the sense of frequency) stored in the minds of language users as a construction performing the speech act of challenge.

The second frequency set examined was that of the classification of the construction in terms of monologuality-dialoguality and monologicity-dialogicity. The results of the KW test (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.11) indicated that the correlation

between dialoguality-monologuality and dialogicity-monologicity is statistically significant with a p-value=0.015<0.1, thus confirming the inherent, dialogic status of the construction, although more research is needed in relation to its distribution in monologual and dialogual contexts of use.

The next frequency set examined was that of positional flexibility, which for the sake of greater accuracy, was split into two groups despite that one could well be interpreted as a variant form of the other. The groups involved were those of sentence-final positioning and independent sentential status. The M-W results indicated statistical significance with a p-value=0.000<0.1 (see Appendix II, Table 5.12), suggesting that the significantly restricted positional flexibility of the construction, paired with its systematic discourse-responsive function, is a well-established and statistically-significant regularity likely to be the case for the overall population (*N*) in both corpora.

This was succeeded by the statistical significance measurements in relation to the nine-category frequency sets collected for the intensifying elements (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.13). The test yielded statistically significant results (p-value=0.000<0.1) illustrating that the overall frequency set examined, with positive and negative lexical prosody standing out, is positively (i.e., not randomly) correlated with the presence of the construction in discourse, as illustrated in the corpus-collected data.

The final frequency set subjected to statistical measurements was that of the morphosyntactic and contextual features that involved both features related to the internal morphosyntax and the contextual environment of the construction (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.14). The K-W test indicated statistical significance (p-value=0.000<0.1), confirming a positive correlation between the frequency set examined and the use of THINK AGAIN in discourse. This adds further support to my

hypothesis that the presence of THINK AGAIN in the apodosis of a conditional clause, and its morphological marking in the Imperative or in infinitival form with syntactic dependence on directive performatives and other contextual regularities, is not a random finding but a well-established regularity.

5.6.5 The internal reliability of the data

The final step of the statistical analysis involved measuring the internal consistency, that is to say, the reliability of the data by measuring Cronbach's alpha (α). To ensure and measure the reliability of all the variables assessed for the present case study, Cronbach's alpha (α) was administered for each frequency set, namely: a) the frequency set of fully-compositional vs. constructional instances, b) the dialogual/ic and monologual/ic frequency set, c) the intensifying elements, d) the contextual features, and e) the set of positional flexibility.

All of the frequency sets were found to form extremely strong and, thus, reliable scales since Cronbach's alpha (α) results ranged from almost an absolute one (i.e., (α)=0.998) as regards the fully-compositional and constructional semantics to the lowest – but still remarkably high – numerical value of (α)=0.828 for the set of contextual features (see Appendix II for Chapter 5, Table 5.15). The frequency sets collected from the classification of the data with respect to dialoguality-monologuality and dialogicity-monologicity formed the second most reliable scale whereby (α)=0.992, which was followed by the also reliable scale of intensifying elements ((α)=0.956) and the scale of positional flexibility ((α)=0.938).

So increased numerical values for Cronbach's alpha (α) typically indicate an exceptionally high degree of internal reliability and, by extension, a noteworthy resistance to error. They further confirm that the composite scale formed for the

measurement of THINK AGAIN in the present proposal can reliably, and effectively, measure the underlying concepts involved (Thompson 1992; Osburn 2000; Ritter 2010).

5.7 Summary and concluding remarks

Supported by qualitative and quantitative research, the present chapter has provided lexicographic and synchronic, corpus-attested evidence for the constructional status of THINK AGAIN. It has further confirmed that, although synchronically related, by means of inheritance, to its fully-compositional counterpart, THINK AGAIN can neither be predicted by, nor exhausted in, a fully-compositional account.

Moreover, the present chapter has systematically sought to reveal the contextual regularities and interdependencies of the construction as well as its consistency in performing the speech act of challenge and in imposing a dialogic and intersubjective construal to it context of use. The latter was further explored in conjunction with the regulatory function of the construction and its extended discourse scope which – sensu lato – corresponds to framing its contextual, discourse 'boundaries'. In this context, the present chapter has put forth that by virtue of its semantic-pragmatic, syntactic and, most importantly, dialogic projections, the construction can effectively function as a discourse structure 'delimitator' framing the discourse unit of which it, itself, forms part. In so arguing, the present chapter has provided two more empirical examples of substantiation for its theoretical proposal that constructional frameworks offer themselves as viable alternatives to discourse unit delimitation approaches. Equally importantly, it has stressed the theoretical and applied benefits involved in adopting such an approach by singling out the ability of constructional frameworks to overcome the challenge of inherent variation that characterises discourse phenomena and yield

reliable insights into the interdependent, discernible, and conventionalised sub-components of discourse units.

On similar grounds with the proposal put forth in Chapter 4 with respect to the BELIEVE-family, therefore, in the present chapter I have argued for the existence of one more phrasal construction operating at a discourse level in the language, which, interestingly, is also anchored to a mental state verb. Against this backdrop, I will now proceed to Chapter 6 with the aim of showing that MIND YOU is another instance of a phrasal construction operating at a discourse level with both inherited and idiosyncratic properties and an extended, regulatory, dialogic scope which invites further study.

CHAPTER 6

CASE STUDY 3: MIND YOU

6.1 Introduction

The present chapter concludes the data section of this thesis with the constructional analysis of MIND YOU. Following the same methodological framework adopted for the other two case studies, MIND YOU is also examined through synchronic, corpus-attested data which demonstrate its constructional status in the language. Unlike the other patterns discussed so far, MIND YOU has attracted the interest of previous linguistic research arguing for its treatment as a *comment clause* (Quirk *et al.*,1985; Brinton 2008), a *parenthetical disjunct* (Quirk *et al.*,1985), an *attention-getter* and a (*non-) concessive, cancellative discourse marker* (Bell 2009) or a *rectification discourse marker* (Ranger 2015).

Reviewing, therefore, the relevant literature, while also examining the pattern from a CxG perspective supported by quantitative analysis, the present chapter aims to show that MIND YOU is a construction that exhibits the following characteristics:

a) It has partly-motivated semantics and pragmatics since it inherits the conventional semantics of *'caring and paying attention'* available in the dispositional mental state verb *'mind'* and the directive speech act force of the Imperative. Drawing on the latter, it consistently performs the speech act of *summoning the Addressee's attention* which motivates its pragmatics and its discourse function.

b) In terms of discourse function, it (proactively) *marks the upcoming or retroactive 'rectification'/reformulation* of a proposition /*p*/ in discourse *either in terms of content or in terms of linguistic accuracy of expression*; the latter crucially correlating it with *metalinguistic interpretations*. Invariably, in both cases though, the construction functions as an *intersubjective marker* that discloses the Speaker's meaning-making process to an (assumed) Addressee, while also signalling that the type of *reformulation/rectification imposed on the Addressee's attention* (see also (*d*) below) is crucial for restricting possible, but unwelcome, and typically inferentially augmented, interpretations of /*p*/.

c) It presents certain, contextual dependencies and regularities that contribute to its ability to signal *rectification*, delimit *discourse units* in its scope, and import a *dialogic* construal to its contextual environment.

d) Finally, as regards morphosyntax, MIND YOU exhibits considerable formal fixedness, thus qualifying for a *(semi-)substantive* idiom (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2), which might – at a surface level at least – make it less interesting theoretically. However, by analogy with what has been argued for BELIEVE YOU ME (Chapter 4, section 4.4), the non-canonical form of MIND YOU as an inverted Imperative with a post-posed pronominal Subject invites further discussion. This is so because its non-canonical Imperative form (i.e., V_{IMP} + YOU $_{(post-posed\ Subject)}$) affects the semantic role of its Subject, which, as has been argued, functions as a Patient.[160] In other words, the Subject of the construction is uniquely profiled as an involuntary participant that does not act (even to

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[160] More discussion on the licensing template of the construction will be reserved for Chapter 7 (see section 7.3) which will further correlate it with other constructions in the language that are crucially shown to recede in frequency of occurrence, such as MARK YOU or, the almost completely obsolete, HARK YOU.

the extent that a typical Experiencer would)[161] but is rather acted upon. As will be illustrated, this is important for the semantics-pragmatics of the construction and its discourse function, which are not restricted to merely summoning the Addressee's attention to the intended reformulation/rectification of /p/ (see (*a*) and (*b*) above). Rather, they crucially extend to *imposing this rectification/reformulation of /p/ on the Addressee's attention*.

To illustrate the above, the chapter is divided into six sections, including the present one. Section 6.2 deals with the semantics of the verb, its dispositional, mental state status, and its idiosyncratic, morphological marking along with the treatment that the pattern has received so far in the relevant literature. This is followed by section 6.3 which offers a constructional account of the pattern by providing evidence for the inheritance-based properties it exhibits, its regularity of occurrence and function in discourse, and its systematic contextual interdependencies. Following the above, section 6.4 suggests that the treatment of MIND YOU as a construction brings to the fore its dialogic, discourse-regulatory function that is ultimately argued to contribute to its ability to delimit discourse units. This function of the construction has not been accounted for in other theoretical proposals, despite the fact that certain aspects of it (e.g., the marking of reformulation) have been hinted upon. Section 6.5 offers an overview of the frequency counts conducted on the data and the statistical evidence of the significance and reliability of the findings. Finally, section 6.6 offers a summary of the chapter along with some concluding remarks.

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[161] As has been discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.4), psychological, belief and perception verbs are typically associated with the thematic role of an Experiencer who functions as the bearer of a particular psychological state or a form of sensory or emotional input.

6.2 MIND YOU

6.2.1 The semantics of the verb 'mind'

Adhering to the same methodological framework adopted for all the other case studies examined, the constructional analysis of *'mind you'* is preceded by an independent, lexicographic checking of the verb involved. Unlike the verbs featuring in the other case studies, which belonged to the category of cognitive mental state verbs, the present case study features a *dispositional* mental state verb (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.1). The lexicographic overview of the verb *'mind'* (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.1) further confirms the *affective/dispositional* semantic undertones carried by the verb, evident in its *'expressing of one's annoyance, concern or worry in relation to a certain aspect',* often placed in the negative as in (1) - (3) below:

Example (1): *"I don't mind the rain".* (OED)

Example (2): *"I don't mind having a dog in the house so long as it's clean."* (CED)

Example (3): *"I don't mind the noise during the day."* (ColED)

Moreover, the morphological marking of the verb in the Imperative is lexicographically associated with the meaning of *'urging someone to remember to do something or to tell them to be careful of something'*. Typical examples of this function, consistently showcasing the verb in sentence-initial position, include the following:

Example (4): *"Mind you look after the children."* (OED)

Example (5): *"Mind that box – the bottom isn't very strong."* (CED)

Example (6): *"Mind that bike."* (ColED)

Example (7): *"Mind you don't burn those sausages."* (ColED)

Example (8): *"Mind (that) you don't bang your head on the shelf when you stand up."* (CED)

As can be observed, in terms of syntactic complementation, the verb is followed by a noun which is frequently preceded by a demonstrative determiner as in (5) and (6) above. Examples (4), (7) and (8) are also interesting in that they serve as instances of the expression featuring as an *injunctive* pattern (Ranger 2015). Injunctive patterns (i.e., constructions) showcase the verb *'mind'* in the Imperative, typically followed by a negatively polarised clause in which the pronoun *'you'* functions as Subject. This might be clearer in example (8) because of the optional use of *'that'* which clarifies that *'you'* is not a postposed Subject of an inverted Imperative but, rather, the Subject of the upcoming verb (i.e., the verb *'bang'*). As argued by Ranger (2015) and is further confirmed by the dictionary-retrieved examples above, the speech act typically associated with the injunctive construction is that of *warning*.[162]

As a pattern, *'mind you'* is lexicographically associated with a form of '*qualification*' of the previous statement. In this context, CED and ColED list it as an idiomatic expression that introduces a *'qualification'* by either making *"what has just been said less strong"* (CED) or by *"emphasising a piece of information"* that someone adds *"especially when this new information explains what somebody has said or contrasts with it"* (ColED).[163] As will be discussed, this lexicographically acknowledged combination of a qualifying and weakening effect in discourse vis-à-vis a previous

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[162] As will be discussed (see section 6.5.2.1 and Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.2), few instances of the injunctive pattern have also been traced in the data collected.

[163] OED does not list *'mind you'* as a separate idiomatic expression but concurs with the other two dictionaries consulted on the association of the expression with a form of qualification of the previous statement (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.1).

proposition /p/ is also upheld by the relevant literature (see Bell 2009) and will be brought to bear on the present account as well.[164]

Summarising the above, the lexicographic overview of the verb *'mind'* confirmed its dispositional semantics, which was, interestingly, shown to frequently pair with a negative morphological marking of the verb (e.g., *'I don't mind X'*). Furthermore, the expression under study, i.e., *'mind you',* was seen listed either as an instance of an injunctive pattern or as an idiomatic expression (with the exception of OED which does not list it as an idiom but treats it as such in the entry for the verb *'mind'*) *'qualifying'* a previous proposition /p/ by providing new information that explains it or weakens/contrasts it (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.1). The (optional) listing of the pattern as an idiomatic expression has been interpreted as an expected finding, related primarily to its non-canonical Imperative form. The section that follows addresses this issue by arguing that although the idiosyncratic morphosyntax of the pattern may tally it with the status of an 'extragrammatical idiom' in Fillmore *et al.,'*s (1988) terms (see also Chapter 4 and the discussion of BELIEVE YOU ME (section 4.4)), relegating the pattern to a mere idiomatic expression would significantly impact on our effective appraisal of its status in the language.

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[164] It should be noted that OED and ColED also include the elliptical, variant form of the pattern (i.e., *'mind'*), whose absence from the data has been, to a large extent, interpreted as an indication of its more restricted frequency in the language, or perhaps, in certain varieties of the language. With respect to the latter, CED and ColED (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.1) observe that *'mind you'* (i.e., the form of the pattern under study) is mainly associated with British English. This is further reflected in the regional note offered by ColED proposing '*take care of'* and *'watch'* as its possible equivalents in American English. Bell (2009) also observes that the pattern is characterised by relative infrequency in American English. While acknowledging the above, the present study restricts itself to suggesting that the concordance lines collected point to sufficient frequency of occurrence of *'mind you'* in both varieties. Nonetheless, their raw corpus frequencies appear to differ as in BNC, the relevant frequency for *'mind you'* is 1.382 per million (out of approx. 100 million words), while in COCA, the respective frequency is 0.202 per million (out of the approx. 560 million words available in the corpus in 2017, i.e., the year of the data collection).

6.2.2 The morphological marking of 'mind you'

As argued in the introduction of the present thesis, the Imperative is a common feature of all the constructions examined. However, MIND YOU, as a (semi)-substantive construction, just like BELIEVE YOU ME (see Chapter 4, section 4.4), stands out as an instance of an inverted Imperative with an overt, post-posed, pronominal Subject. Arguably, these forms of the Imperative retain a considerable degree of fixedness, i.e., substantivity, which frequently relates them to idiomatic language patterning or dialectal issues (see Henry 1995; Weir 2013, 2017).[165]

In line with what was argued in Chapter 4 (section 4.4), and in the relevant literature on profiling discourse participants (cf. Vázquez Rozas 2006; de Cock 2014), I propose that the post-posed Subject in MIND YOU receives focus and contributes to the use of the pattern as *"a hearer-mobilization marker"* (de Cock 2014:269). Following Ladd (1980) and Gundel *et al.*, (1999). I further argue that – by analogy with BELIEVE YOU ME – the pronominal, post-posed Subject in MIND YOU is an instance of *psychological, narrow focus* (see Chapter 4, section 4.4). It is *narrow* because it features only a single constituent and *psychological* because this constituent becomes the salient, i.e., focused, centre of attention and refers to an entity that is affected in discourse. The status of the pronominal Subject as an affected, focused-upon entity, and its placing in the right periphery, crucially relate it to the semantic role (i.e., θ-role) of Patients/Undergoers. In this respect, despite the affective semantics of the verb that would conventionally associate its Subject with the θ-role of an Experiencer (see Chapter 4, section 4.4), the Subject in this case appears to be deprived of an 'agentive'

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[165] Henry (1995:50) observes that the inverted Imperative pattern may be found in two different 'sub-dialects' of Belfast English, namely dialect A and dialect B. The former is restricted to a subset of intransitive verbs, referred to as unaccusative verbs i.e., verbs whose grammatical Subject is not a semantic agent and, as such, does not actively initiate action. The latter allows for inversion with all verbs and it can thus be used with verbs that take overt Objects but show Verb-Subject order.

function. This endows it with qualities matching the *θ*-role of a *Patient/Undergoer* that is by definition profiled as an *involuntary participant who is acted upon*.

My approach to the morphosyntax and semantics-pragmatics of the pattern as an instance of an inverted Imperative with a pronominal, post-posed Subject semantically functioning as a Patient seems to be compatible with Ranger's (2015) proposal for *'mind you'* as well (see also section 6.2.3). Ranger (2015) argues that in a sequence of the type *'a mind b'*, *'b'* should be interpreted as the phenomenon, or course of action, *imposed* [my emphasis] upon the attention of a given Subject (i.e., *'a'*) as in *"Well just* ***mind you****, behave yourself now"* (*ibid.*:8-9). In this sense, as pointed out by Ranger (2015), the use of *'mind you'* in discourse is characterised by *"a projected inferential movement which might take 'a' from an initial value of /p/ to an augmented (because of undesirable, or – initially at least – unpredicted inferences) value /p^+/"* (*ibid.*:9). In other words, *'mind you'* signals that the resulting proposition /p^+/ functions as an obstacle, corresponding to *'b'* mentioned above, which the Speaker rectifies so as to prevent any undesirable or erroneous conclusions.

Given the above, and the scholarly interest that *'mind you'* has attracted, the section that follows presents an overview of the different theoretical proposals put forth as to the origin and function of the pattern. In so doing, the section illustrates that the proposed CxG account can naturally integrate theoretical insights contributed by other scholars, thus highlighting the *gestalt* (in the sense of *'unit'*) status of the pattern under study and its extended discourse scope and function.

6.2.3 'Mind you' in different linguistic accounts

Although research related to *'mind you'* is not extensive, it is the only language pattern in the present study that has received attention in relation to its origin and function in other accounts. My aim in the present section, therefore, is to offer a concise overview of the earlier works comprising the relevant literature and illustrate how they inform aspects of the present approach.

Adopting a chronological order in the overview of the relevant literature, I observe that the pattern has originally been classified by Quirk *et al.*, (1985) as a *comment clause* and, in particular, as a *"content parenthetical disjunct"* that *"expresses the Speaker's comments on the content of the matrix clause […] realized by finite clauses"* (*ibid.*:1112). In this account, comment clauses have been associated with performing a number of different functions, including: a) hedging, (e.g., *"I guess", "I suppose"*), (b) expressing the Speaker's certainty (e.g., *"I know", "I must say", "I don't doubt")*, (c) expressing the Speaker's emotional attitude towards the content of a matrix clause, (e.g., *"I hope", "I'm afraid"*)[166] and d) claiming the Addressee's attention (and occasionally his/her agreement).[167] Evidently, *'mind you'* relates to the last category and, as the authors observe, the Subject in this case is commonly the personal pronoun *'you'* (or the *'implied you'*) of the Imperative as in the patterns *"you know"* and *"you can see"* (Quirk *et al.*, 1985).

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[166] When performing the types of functions described in (a) - (c) above, the Subject is typically the personal pronoun *"I"* and the verb features in Simple Present. In particular, in type (a) the Subject may be an indefinite one or the pronouns *"they"* and *"it"* respectively. In addition, the verb may have a modal auxiliary, e.g., *"I can see"* or it might be placed in the present perfective, e.g., *"I have heard"*.

[167] In this case, Quirk *et al.*, (1985:1113) claim that comment clauses exhibit a *"more informal tone, indicative of greater 'warmth' and intimacy towards the Hearer"*, belonging to the *"Listener/You-oriented expressions"*.

The formal and functional idiosyncrasy of *'mind you'* has triggered the interest of more recent linguistic research as well (see Brinton 2001, 2008; Bell 2009; Ranger 2015). Brinton (2001, 2008) entertains the hypothesis that *'mind you'* has developed from an original matrix clause via a process of *reanalysis*.[168] In Brinton's (2001, 2008) treatment of the pattern, *'mind you'* was originally an Imperative matrix construction which experienced loss of a subordinating conjunction and significant restructuring so that the 2nd-person pronoun *'you'* – which set out initially as the Subject of the complement clause of the verb *'mind'* – was reanalysed as the Subject of the verb *'mind'* as in example (9) below.

Example (9): *"**Mind that** you apply not your Traphine on the temporal Bones, Sutures, or Sinciput" (1686/9 John Moyle, Abstractum Chirurgiae Marinae; or an Abstract of Sea Surgery ii. vii; OED, s.v. sinciput)*

Brinton's (2001, 2008) discussion of *'mind you'* restricts itself to offering an account of the possible syntactic development of the pattern through *grammaticalisation* processes but does not venture a discussion of the discourse function of the pattern or its specific discourse and semantic-pragmatic properties.[169]

Bell's (2009) treatment of *'mind you'* argues in favour of an increased use of the pattern in spoken discourse (primarily in sentence-final position) and a dual function. The first function, which, according to Bell (2009), is considerably less frequent, refers to the use of *'mind you'* as *an attention, emphatic marker* (i.e., a *highlighter*) chiefly due to

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[168] Harris and Campbell (1995) see *reanalysis* as a process that involves change in constituency, hierarchical structure, category, grammatical relations, or boundary types, while Croft (2002) refers to it in more general terms as a change of form-meaning mapping of a grammatical construction.

[169] Following Hopper and Traugott (1993/2003), although the term dates back to Meillet 1912/1958, *grammaticalisation*, also referred to as *grammaticisation*, *"is the process by which grammar is created"* (Croft 2006:366) or the study of this process, mostly related to diachronic research with emphasis on constraints on change (cf. Lehmann 1982/1995; Hopper and Traugott 1993/2003; Fischer 2007).

its Imperative morphological marking. In this case, *'mind you',* and its elliptical form *'mind'*, invites the Addressee's attention to the information already presented in discourse, mainly for *repetition* or *elaboration* purposes as in example (10) cited in his work:

Example (10): *"Most of our clients are individuals who hold numbered accounts with the bank. You might see their names penciled somewhere inside their files. Penciled,* ***mind you****. Erasable. They are to remain officially anonymous." (Numbered Account – Christopher Reich)*

The second function of *'mind you'*, according to Bell (2009) refers to its use as a discourse marker that may surface in two possible forms: a) as a *concessive, cancellative marker* or b) as a *non-concessive cancellative marker*. Apparently, although not pointed out by Bell, such a formalisation essentially suggests that the cancellative function is central to the semantics-pragmatics and conditions of use of the pattern, while its (non-)concessive function may relate to other, perhaps, contextual parameters.

In offering examples for the first instantiation of *'mind you'* as a concessive, cancellative discourse marker, Bell cites example (11) below suggesting that in its context, the pattern has a jointly concessive and cancellative function because *"an implied consequence derived from the first discourse segment /p/ is cancelled in the second discourse segment /q/"* (*ibid.*:917).

Example (11): *"Royal St George's doesn't exactly offer the most challenging opening test on the Open roster. They'll have to get the birdies in early,* ***mind****, because the closing holes are hellish." (Guardian 17/7/2003)*

In other words, in the context of (11), Bell argues that the second discourse segment */q/,* which includes the language pattern in question (i.e., "*They'll have to get the birdies in early, **mind**, because the closing holes are hellish.*"), is interpreted as cancelling the implied consequence triggered by the first discourse segment */p/*, namely that the course will be an easy one (i.e., *"Royal St George's doesn't exactly offer the most challenging opening test on the Open roster.)*. He further proposes that the concessive function of the pattern can be confirmed through its possible substitution by concessive markers as in "***But/Nevertheless***, *they'll have to get the birdies in early, because the closing holes are hellish.*"

The *non-concessive, cancellative* function of *'mind you'*, which in Bell's account (2009), is also more frequent than its concessive counterpart, is largely understood as the ability of the expression to *weaken* the claim(s) expressed in */p/*. Pursuing this line of thought, Bell crucially adds that this cancellative, i.e., weakening, function frequently pairs with an identifiable *"shift of focus from the 'story-line' frame to the 'interaction' frame between the Speaker and the Addressee"* (see *ibid.*:917). This essentially allows *'mind you'* to surface in contexts whereby no implied concession holds between the */p/* and */q/* discourse segments, thus making its substitution by concessive markers like *'but'* or *'nevertheless'* ineffective as in (12) below.

Example (12): *"But, to be fair, Fraser and Hammond made a head-turning pair, exploited very well by one particularly funny and touching scene in which the couple arrived, separately, for some clandestine nookie at a chic modern hotel. Nicky couldn't reach the lift buttons while Chris had trouble with his credit card room key. **Mind you/?Nevertheless**, I can never get those credit card keys to work either, and I've got no excuse."* (Observer, 18/4/2004)

Following the above, *'mind you'* is ultimately argued to surface as a discourse signal of an abrupt change of focus from the content of the preceding discourse segment /*p*/ to the 'self-deprecation' of the Speaker in the upcoming discourse segment /*q*/. This has the effect of weakening, or even undermining, the content of /*p*/. According to Bell (2009), this abrupt shift of focus crucially promotes divergent *'orientation frames'*, namely a split between the *'story-line'* and the *'interaction'* frame within the same utterance. This further accounts for the frequent use of the pattern in jokes or in *'discourse invitations'* initiated by the Speaker to create laughter at his/her expense, or at the expense of a third party, as in examples (13) and (14) below, also cited in his work.

Example (13): *"I was sacked for laffing once.[170]* **Mind you**, *I was driving a fuckin' hearse at the time."* (Guardian, 3/10/2001)

Example (14): *"So Roy Keane's on 50 grand a week.* **Mind you**, *I was on 50 grand a week until the police found my printing machine!"* (Guardian, 3/2/2002)

This occasional and somewhat abrupt change of focus is argued by Bell to offer a sense of *'unplanned spontaneity'* that promotes greater intimacy between the Speaker and the Addressee, thereby cultivating the impression of an ad hoc meaning-making process. In a way, that is, the Speaker undertakes the task to deliberately undermine the *'legitimacy'* of his/her preceding arguments so that the Addressee can experience *"the unedited effects of real-time meaning making"* (Bell 2009:918).

As far as the development of the pattern in the language is concerned, Bell (2009) suggests that the discourse marker meaning and function of *'mind you'* derive from its

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[170] Laff: (chiefly humorous or for children) alternative spelling of *'laugh'*.

Imperative-based, original attention marker meaning that underwent a process of *subjectification* (Traugott 1999) similar to that of the Italian discourse marker *'guarda'* (i.e., *'look';* see Waltereit 2002).[171] Following this line of thought, Bell suggests that *'mind you'* progressively turned into a signalling device suggesting that the focus was no longer on the content of the preceding discourse as such but onto the Speaker's ad hoc meaning-making process, switching from the narrative mode to the interactive one. Even though Bell's (2009) formalisation of the functions of *'mind you'* contributes significant theoretical insights, he provides no criteria for the differentiation (or alternatively the unification) of these functions. To put it differently, one can neither understand where to draw the line between the different functions, nor effectively integrate all of them under the same pattern which may well function as an attention-getter and a (non-)concessive, cancellative discourse marker. The proposed analysis (see section 6.3) attempts to address this issue.

Ranger (2015) offers – to the best of my knowledge – the most recent account of the pattern, arguing against the dual function of *'mind you'* proposed by Bell as both an attention marker and an occasionally (non-)concessive but consistently cancellative discourse marker. Ranger (2015) proposes that the pattern is used for *"qualification"* purposes mainly in sentence-initial position (more frequent), although it also features in sentence-final discourse position as well. In sentence-initial position, *'mind you'* follows the configuration pattern *'p mind you q'*, whereby /p/ represents the initial statement that the Speaker perceives as in need of further qualification (or revision)

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[171] Traugott (1989) defines subjectification as a particular type of semantic change correlated with the following three tendencies: a) Tendency 1: meanings based in the external described situation become meanings based in the internal (evaluative/perceptual/cognitive) described situation, Tendency 2: meanings based in the external or internal described situation become meanings based in the textual and metalinguistic situation and c) Tendency 3: meanings tend to become increasingly based in the Speaker's subjective belief state/attitude toward the proposition (Traugott 1989:34–35; adapted from Diewald 2011)

because it may potentially give rise to unwelcome inferences. To retroactively restrict potential misinterpretations, the Speaker uses /q/. In other words, *'mind you'* surfaces as linguistic proof of the Speaker's constant concern to monitor discourse and restrict inference(s) *potentially*, but not necessarily *objectively,* available in /p/ as in (15) below cited in his work.

Example (15): - *A: "Did you see much action there?"*

- *B: "Mm?"*

-*A: "Did you did you fight at that time then? Did you fight this time?"*

-*B: "No I was only garrison artillery on guns.* **Mind you,** *we used to fire guns, I saw (….) Cathedral knocked down, by Gerry [sic]"*.

(Ranger 2015:3)

In this sequence, the original question of Speaker A (i.e., *'Did you see much action there?')* puzzles Speaker B, whose reply prompts Speaker A's reformulation of the question for the sake of greater clarity. Speaker B replies negatively to the re-formulated question (i.e., *'No I was only garrison artillery on guns.')* but feels the need to qualify his answer by adding further clarification introduced by *'mind you'* (i.e., *'Mind you we used to fire guns,..').*

Another indicative example of *potentially* – but not necessarily *objectively* – available inferences involved in proposition /p/ cited by Ranger is example (16) below.

Example (16): *"-A: When I went first went to work at a laundry. I used to work there eight till six and er I got four and six a week. Four and six when I went down Nottingham to work, at the box place, Henry (…)'s I got seven and six a week. And I got paid one and six some weeks for a weekly ticket. In them days mother used to give me sixpence to spend and*

-B: (laugh)

*-A: **Mind you**, you could do a lot with that sixpence. We used to go to pictures. Used to get in pictures for thruppence, tuppence and thruppence."* (Ranger 2015:4)

In the /*p*/ segment of this example, Speaker A intends to present sixpence as a considerable sum of money for that time but Speaker B's laugh functions as an indication of the assumed erroneous inference, i.e., that the money sum described was rather meagre. This suggests that the initial proposition /*p*/ inadvertently carries inferences that could potentially lead to the two different interpretations /*q_s*/ presented in (16a) and (16b) below:

16a) *'Mother used to give me sixpence to spend. **Mind you**, you <u>could do</u> a lot with that sixpence.'*

16b) *'Mother used to give me sixpence to spend. **Mind you**, you <u>couldn't do</u> much with sixpence.'* (Ranger 2015:4)

The fact that such inferences are contextually possible but *not* objectively available in /*p*/ prompts Ranger to advance the hypothesis that the pattern may occasionally, but *not* consistently, function either as a concessive or a cancellative discourse marker. As Ranger (1998, 2015) observes what remains consistent in relation to the use of *'mind you'* in discourse is its function as a *rectificative-argumentative and reformulation marker* which *retroactively* repairs (or restricts) the inferences triggered by /*p*/ (Ranger 1998:39-44).

Sentence-final *'mind you',* according to Ranger (2015)*,* follows the configuration of '*p. q mind you'* and is characterised by lower frequency (a finding also corroborated in the

present research (see section 6.5.2.3)) along with the ability of the pattern to be Addressee-introduced in discourse as in example (19) below: [172]

Example (19): - *"A: Star Trek, it takes one million dollars to film just erm to make just one episode (pause) of Star Trek.*

*- B: I think it's a great programme **mind you**."* (Ranger 2015:6)

The function of the pattern remains the same, however, since it performs a retroactive qualification of the previous statement /*p*/, although, in this case, the expression first qualifies /*q*/ (i.e., *'I think it's a great programme')* and then, by extension, qualifies /*p*/ (i.e., '*Star Trek, it takes one million dollars to film just erm to make just one episode (pause) of Star Trek*') in the sense of restricting the potential inferences that /*p*/ might generate, namely that despite the money spent, the quality of the series is poor.

All things considered, Ranger (2015) views *'mind you'* as performing a form of *'retroactive modalisation'* (*ibid.*:6) by qualifying a proposition /*p*/ and restricting the potential (but unwelcome) inferences generated by /*p*/. Nonetheless, his account does not address the attention-summoning effect of *'mind you'* and its attendant, extended discourse scope.

Extending the line of thinking presented in the relevant literature, the present chapter argues that precisely because of its attention-summoning effect, *'mind you'* signals, and on the basis of its morphosyntax, uniquely *imposes* on the Addressee's attention a form of *rectification* that should not go unnoticed. In this respect, the expression crucially contributes to the overall expressivity of its host utterance (see section 6.4) and to the Speaker-Addressee interpretative frame within which the whole utterance is expected

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[172] The randomly-sampled corpus data for the present study did not yield any instances of an Addressee-introduced use of *'mind you'*.

to be understood. This is essential for the effective understanding of the discourse function of the pattern, which is primarily an intersubjective, dialogic marker and, as such, acquires a signalling, regulatory scope over the discourse unit in which it is traced.

Acknowledging, therefore, the contribution of all the above accounts to the discussion of the origin and function of *'mind you',* and relating them to the data at hand and the CxG framework adopted, the present study foregrounds that *'mind you'* is a *construction*, i.e., MIND YOU, which although *fairly substantive*, is characterised by both *inherited* and *particular to it* properties as well as a specific discourse function to be discussed in the upcoming section.

6.3 MIND YOU: The constructional semantics

Informed by the independent lexicographic checking (section 6.2.1) and the different linguistic proposals offered for *'mind you'* (section 6.2.3), the data collected on the basis of 65 BNC and 64 COCA concordance lines have been analysed with the aim of identifying the semantics-pragmatics, and discourse function of the pattern.[173]

Starting with example (20) below, the expression is preceded by negation (i.e., *'not'*) that adds to the Speaker's intended reformulation performed retroactively, relying on

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[173] Despite the advanced CQL (Corpus Query Language) options available in both corpora, the random sample featured a very limited number of false positive instances which lie outside the scope of the present research. The false positives identified were either sequences in which *'mind'* (as a verb or as a noun) neighbours with *'you'* (see example (*a*) below) or instances of *'mind you'* being part of an injunctive pattern discussed in section 6.2.1 (see example (*b*)).

Example (a): *"One of those salt-and-pepper Hemingway types whose resumes say they've covered three dozen wars in 140 countries and they don't mind you knowing all about it."*

COCA, [*Brooklyn, NY: Akashic Information Books*, Author: Abdoh Salar], Source: FIC_ Tehran at twilight, Date: 2014

Example (b): *"We'll be safe enough, Coll. They've left their coble on the deck. And with the ship at the angle it is now, Mace and I should be able to launch it ourselves. Then we'll be fine. Mind you don't go too far north if we lose you," he added."*

COCA, [*NY: Forever Editions*, Author: Amanda Scott], Source: FIC: Highland Lover, Date 2012

the assumption that the preceding proposition /*p*/ might trigger an erroneous line of thinking for the Addressee (cf. Bell 2009).

Example (20): "*There is little doubt that the central government knew what Alibaba was up to and allowed it to proceed. But the state-owned banks are not pleased about the new competition for deposits, and there are signs the Financial Empire is starting to strike back. <u>Not</u>, **mind you**, <u>by going</u> after Yu' e Bao directly, <u>but by putting pressure on…</u>*"

<div align="right">

COCA, [*The $200 Billion 'Open Sesame'*, Author: Power Bill], Source: MAG_ Newsweek global, Date: 2014

</div>

To add to the reformulation of the preceding discourse part (i.e., *"…and there are signs the Financial Empire is starting to strike back."*), the Speaker provides further clarifications immediately after the use of the construction in discourse, which summons the Addressee's attention (i.e., *"<u>Not</u>, **mind you**, <u>by going</u> after Yu' e Bao directly, <u>but by putting pressure on…</u>"*.). Interestingly, this clarification part also involves the use of the concessive marker *'but'* to further accentuate the 'counter-to-expectation attitude' intended by the Speaker. As will be discussed in section 6.5.2.4, negation (in the form of *'not'* or in the negative morphological marking of the verb) and the use of concessive markers are typical contextual features, either preceding or following the construction. This increased presence of negation and concessive markers in the immediate contextual environment of the construction might partly explain why Bell (2009) originally surmised that concessive semantics largely reflects the semantics of the pattern itself.

Further to the above, the corpus-retrieved data indicate that the construction frequently co-occurs with instances of lexical repetition, which is in itself a marker of intensification, as illustrated by examples (21) and (22) below.

<div align="center">

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Example (21): "*He was helping an older woman with her order, and he didn't seem to have recognized me yet. I would have left then, but the sight of this familiar face from the Doomsday Computer Club was so improbable -- and so joyous -- that I hesitated. <u>Not</u> <u>long</u>,* **mind you***. Just <u>long</u> enough for the chill of the Chicago air to reach the coimter.*"

<div align="right">COCA, [Chatang, Author: Rich Nathaniel],
Source: FIC_ The American Scholar, Date: 2013</div>

Example (21) features the expression following the negation lexicalised by *'not'* and accompanied by the repetition of the adjective *"long"*. The Speaker describes her hesitation and, in an attempt to counter the unintended in this case, but world-knowledge-based inference that hesitating may imply a prolonged period of quandary, she starts a new elliptical sentence that draws on negation and the adjective *"long"*. Although in sentence-final position in this example, *'mind you'* is once more shown to manifest a broad discourse scope with both responsive and anticipatory correlations with contextual elements. In this sense, its discourse effect does not only signal the rectification of its immediately preceding statement (i.e., *"not long"*) but it further extends to the preceding discourse part (i.e., *"I hesitated"*). At the same time, it also introduces the upcoming clause that provides further details and clarification for the rectification intended (i.e., "*Just <u>long</u> enough for the chill of the Chicago air to reach...*"). By summoning the Addressee's attention, the expression serves to make explicit the relation between *p* and *q*. Arguably, this relation can also be discoursally inferable (hence the possibility for the discourse omission of the expression to be discussed in section 6.4) but the Speaker's apprehension for a possibly erroneous interpretation by the Addressee calls for greater discourse clarity and reformulation uniquely signalled by *'mind you'*.

In the context of (22), the expression is used in parenthetical position, which has not been identified in other accounts as a possible discourse position for the pattern. The data, however, illustrate that parenthetical position is not infrequent, particularly in the case of COCA (see section 6.5.2.3). In this sense, the present account also reveals one more interesting feature associated with the use of the pattern in discourse, namely its positional flexibility. Returning to example (22), the expression is flanked by the lexical repetition of the adjective *"brief"*, thus giving rise to what appears to be a 'dramatic crescendo' of rectification, indicative of the Speaker's effort to proactively dispel any possible erroneous inference(s) as to the duration or the seriousness of the affair described.

Example (22): *"My affair -- brief, **mind you**, brief -- occurred before Ilona married Ramsey. Twenty-five years ago! Get over it, lady! "*

COCA, [Author: Brown, Rita Mae],
Source: FIC_ *The tell-tale horse: A novel*, Date: 2008

Consistently with the above, the attention of the Addressee is at this point summoned for the *imposition* of the important reformulation intended by the Speaker. Moreover, following what was argued about the θ-role of the post-posed Subject (i.e., the Addressee) as a Patient, I consider this a particularly apt example of imposition of a rather forceful reformulation in a context employing intensifying, elliptical, exclamatory sentences and yet another instance of Imperative (i.e., *"Get over it, lady!"*)

In example (23), the expression is once more used parenthetically to signal reformulation that apparently relates to the morphological negative marking of the preceding verb (i.e*., "I'm not predicting it"*).

Example (23): *"He apparently doesn't consider the possibility that in three-quarters of a century the novel's reputation will be reduced to something like that of the movie. I'm*

not predicting it, **mind you**, *but it does seem at least possible that the illusion on which both the novel and its cinematic translation are based will not survive the tough times that currently seem to lie ahead for America's position of leadership in the world.*"

<div align="right">COCA, [Reminders of America's Decline, Author: James Bowman],
Source: MAG_ American Spectator, Date: 2013</div>

The expression is followed by the upcoming clause ("*but it does seem… leadership in the world.*") which serves as the discourse locus for the Speaker to provide additional arguments in an attempt to obviate potential misunderstandings, inadvertently triggered by unwelcome inferencing. To further stress the intended reformulation, the Speaker resorts to employing a number of different intensifying elements, namely the use of the emphatic *'do'*, the adverbial adjunct *'at least'* and negatively polarised evaluative items, like the noun *'illusion'* or the verb *'survive'*.

Building on what has just been mentioned about the consistent contextual presence of intensifying elements, example (24) showcases lexical repetition (i.e., *"his mother- his mother"*) preceding the use of *'mind you'* along with several intensifiers in the form of idiomatic expressions, e.g., "*dead gone on you*" / "*to the core*", superlatives, e.g., "*the smartest girl*", and comparatives e.g., "*better*". Quite remarkably, negation is once more contextually present in the preceding discourse part which features yet another instance of a negative Imperative with a post-posed, pronominal Subject (i.e., *"And don't you be too sure your name won't ever be written up."*).

Example (24): *"And don't you be too sure your name won't ever be written up. Charlie Sloane is <u>dead gone on you</u>. He told <u>his mother</u>-<u>his mother,</u> -**mind you**-that you were the <u>smartest</u> girl in school. That's <u>better</u> than being good-looking." "No, it isn't," said Anne, feminine <u>to the core</u>. "<u>I'd rather be pretty than clever</u>.*"

<div align="right">COCA, [A Tempest in the School Teapot, Author: L. M Montgomery],
Source: FIC_ Read, Date: 2007</div>

Occasionally, but perhaps equally importantly, the emphatic attention to reformulation performed by *'mind you'* is achieved not only through the repetition of the identical lexis, but through the repetition of lexically-related terms or the use of alternative, almost-synonymous terms in an attempt to secure accuracy and further elucidation of meaning, crucial for the rectification of /*p*/. This brings to the fore that the construction signals that the reformulation/rectification to be performed relates not only to the content of /*p*/ but also to its accurate phrasing as a linguistic expression. In this respect, *'mind you'* is shown to be readily associated with *metalinguistic interpretations*. The latter relate to the conscious concern of the Speaker to monitor whether the Addressee understands the *code* used, thereby directing his/her attention to the *code* itself and the *glossing* used (Jakobson 1960). In such cases, therefore, *'mind you'* is critical because it alerts the Addressee to this metalinguistic operation which does not aim at a holistic rectification of /*p*/, but rather at a specific and conscious (on the part of the Speaker) way of phrasing /*p*/. Examples (25), (26) and (27) that follow illustrate this point further.

In example (25), by selecting words from the same lexical field of norm-setting, the Speaker stresses that using the exact term is crucial so that misunderstandings can be effectively avoided.

Example (25): "*But you should think about <u>breaking the rules</u>. <u>Not the regulations</u>, **mind you**. But <u>go against the standard operating procedures</u> of downing ducks on public lands, and you'll walk out with birds aplenty.*"

<div align="right">COCA, [Title: This Land, Author: Anonymous],
Source: MAG_ Field & Stream, Date: 2009</div>

In other words, the Speaker's initial /*p*/, ("*But you should think about <u>breaking the rules</u>*") should not be wrongly interpreted as an incitement for going against *"regulations"*. To clarify this, in the upcoming discourse part, the Speaker states that

"breaking the rules" in this context refers to *"going against the standard operating procedures"*. Once more, the immediate context features the use of negation (in the preceding part) and the use of the concessive connector *'but'* (in the part following the construction).

The same holds true for example (26) below, whereby despite the observable similarity among the expressions employed from the same lexical field of lack of consciousness, namely *"knock [someone] stupid"*, *"[be]into a coma"* and *"[be] unconscious"*, the Speaker uses *'mind you'* to draw attention to the most accurate phrasing carrying the intended meaning, i.e., "*just a <u>pretend concussion</u>"*.

Example (26): *"Matty says to himself and then strikes himself in the temple with the heel of his hand to make himself stop thinking and then smacks himself again and pretends to <u>knock himself stupid</u>-not into a <u>coma</u>, **mind you**, not even <u>unconscious</u>, just a <u>pretend concussion</u>…"*

<div align="right">COCA, [Title: The Son's point of view, Author: Brock Clarke],
Source: MAG_ Field & Stream, Date: 2003</div>

To further enrich the data discussion with spoken source texts, the following two examples (27 and 28) come from the BNC sample and feature the conversational use of the expression.[174] In example (27) below, the expression is used sentence-initially and highlights the incidental rectification that the Speaker wishes to signal in relation to potential, undesirable inferences involved in the preceding /p/ (i.e., "*But she's sworn*

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[174] As will be discussed in section 6.5.2.2, the data collected differ with respect to their source texts as in COCA the percentage of written texts (mainly novels and magazines) rises to 79.63% (i.e., 43/54 concordance lines), while spoken data account only for 20.37% (i.e., 11/54 concordance lines). In BNC, however, the relevant percentage of spoken data accounts for 53.45% (i.e., 31/58 concordance lines), while the percentage of written data restricts itself to 46.55% (i.e., 27/58 concordance lines). Quite expectedly, this furthers explains why the two samples present differences in relation to monologuality-dialoguality (see section 6.5.2.2).

me to secrecy''), namely that the Speaker might actually reveal a secret unless sworn to secrecy; hence the use of the near synonyms, namely *secrecy* and *not telling*.

Example (27): *"And plus, you know, she's in flat now where she's got heating and it's Yeah. Good God, yeah, she was frozen in that house wasn't she? Oh God! Terrible in there! Like the North Pole up there. It was, yeah. But she's sworn me to secrecy.* **Mind you***, I wasn't gonna tell anybody she was writing to me anyway! Just in case he's gets a whiff of it, you know."*

<div align="right">
BNC, [103 conversations recorded by 'Raymond'],
Source: Spoken _ Conversation, Date: 1985-1993
</div>

In example (28), the expression introduces what might be regarded as the Speaker's 'afterthought'. That is, although, initially, the interlocutors appear to share a different viewpoint than the one exhibited by a third party mentioned immediately before, the use of *'mind you'* signals the on-the-spot rectification that follows. What is of particular relevance in this example is the systematic use of Imperatives and direct questions in the discourse part preceding the construction, coupled with the also systematic use of the subject pronoun *'you',* and the respective reflexive pronoun *'yourself'* in the discourse part following *'mind you'*.[175] The systematicity of these contextual features is fully compatible with the inherent dialogicity of the construction and highlights the discoursal setting up of the image of an Addressee on whose attention the reformulation is to be imposed.

Example (28): *"That's basically it really. Think, they've got no mortgage. And the bills aren't that high are they? Think they've actually bought the TV now haven't they? Oh yeah. T.V and the video.* **Mind you** *when you think of it like that when you when you*

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[175] The systematic use of the Imperatives, direct elliptical forms of questions and personal pronouns further endow the example with an increased degree of orality, in line with the dialogual classification of the example.

say that you've got no mortgage and your kids grow up they don't need your money and that and if you're both in good jobs it is you do tend to think to yourself well at least lot lot longer than."

<div align="right">BNC, [103 conversations recorded by 'Brenda'],
Source: Spoken _ Conversation, Date: 1985-1993</div>

Finally, the random sample also showcased a number of concordance lines in which the expression was intended as an aside of the Speaker to the (assumed) Addressee, used humorously, and, occasionally, ironically as illustrated in (29) and (30) below.

Example (29): "*She is now shooting the Michael Mann film version of Miami Vice (with Jamie Foxx and Colin Farrell) and will then be in Peter Webber's Lecter prequel Young Hannibal." I don't feel this is a big barrier for me anymore, "she says of acting in English. (**Mind you**, she says it through a translator.)*"

<div align="right">COCA, [Title: *Gong Li*],
Source: MAG_Time, Date: 2006</div>

Example (30): *"But according to a bible of all things related to domestic perfection, Home Comforts: The Art and Science of Keeping House by Cheryl Mendelson, you can save time by occasionally combining loads. (**Mind you**, this is a book that devotes four pages to the proper sorting of laundry.)"*

<div align="right">COCA, [Title: *Steal his Routine*, Author: Timothy Gower],
Source: MAG _ Prevention, Date: 2005</div>

In both examples, the expression is (befittingly) placed in sentence-initial position in relation to the aside and serves to jocularly introduce to the Addressee the Speaker's innermost thoughts about a third party involved in discourse. In both examples, the concessive marker *'but'* could be an expected collocate of the pattern that would endow the whole utterance with greater emphasis in line with the contrast intended and its jocular effect in discourse. What adds an interesting dimension to these examples is that

in their context, the expression is intended as a Speaker-initiated commentary on others' statements, *not* his/her own. Consequently, the humorous, ironic effect of the expression, derives precisely from the fact that *'mind you'* marks an upcoming clarification that contradicts what somebody else has stated, thus signalling a shift to the 'interaction' frame between the Speaker and the Addressee.[176] As already pointed out, this 'aside' use of *'mind you'* and the shift from the 'narrative' to the 'interaction' frame have also been identified by Bell (2009), who has chosen to interpret them as two distinct operational frames giving rise to two distinct functions of *'mind you'*. This is an interesting observation to which I shall return in section 6.4.

Summarising the above, the analysis of the corpus-retrieved examples indicates that *'mind you'* is a paired unit of form and meaning, that is to say, a construction (i.e., MIND YOU) that performs the speech act of summoning the Addressee's attention in an emphatic way. In this respect, it crucially regulates discourse as a marker of reformulation (Ranger 2015), thereby making itself also fully-compatible with concession and/or cancellation (Bell 2009). Unlike previous accounts, however, what is herein proposed is that its discourse function is related to, and in fact *motivated*, by its pragmatics and the speech act of emphatically drawing the Addressee's attention. To put it in Gricean terms of communicative sense, MIND YOU is intended to perform the act of summoning attention precisely by relying on the Addressee's recognition of the Speaker's intention to do so, namely to attract the former's attention (Levinson 1983:101). Apparently, the emphatic use of such an attention-getting expression calls for some kind of justification. In other words, if the Speaker is using such powerful means to secure the Addressee's attention (especially since on many occasions the

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[176] This might also relate to Quirk *et al'*s., (1985:1113) claim that comment clauses like *'mind you'* exhibit a *"more informal tone, indicative of greater 'warmth' and intimacy towards the Hearer"* (see section 6.2.3).

discourse omission of MIND YOU would not interfere with the propositional meaning of its host utterance),[177] then s/he probably has some good reason for doing so, namely, to alert the Addressee to the rectification of a proposition regarding either its content or its accurate linguistic phrasing. On this account, the pragmatics of MIND YOU, evident in its performing the speech act of summoning attention, also motivates its discourse function of signalling reformulation or rectification of /p/. Even more importantly, though, the use of MIND YOU in discourse uniquely evokes, and by extension, sets up the image of an Addressee and his/her assumed (or anticipated) erroneous line of thinking in relation to a proposition /p/ that (inadvertently) allows for fallacious inferencing.

The proposed account, then, combines insights from Bell's (2009) and Ranger's (2015) analyses, but rather than viewing them as opposing each other, shows that they are, in fact, compatible. It further shows that the compatibility of the two accounts naturally follows from the morphosyntax, the semantics-pragmatics, and the inherent dialogicity of MIND YOU, as analysed in a CxG framework.

In a form of interim summary, the present study has so far proposed that the expression should best be treated as a construction (i.e., MIND YOU) exhibiting the following characteristics:

a) It has partly-motivated semantics-pragmatics inherited from the dispositional mental state verb *'mind'*.

b) Its Imperative morphosyntax contributes to its directive force and intersubjective function which jointly motivate its pragmatics.

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[177] Note that in CxG terms, its discourse removal would still be significant in relation to other aspects of linguistic meaning (see section 6.4).

c) Its pragmatics consists in the speech act of summoning the Addressee's attention in discourse with respect to the imposition of the intended rectification /reformulation. This expressive attention-getting act licenses the regulatory scope of the construction in discourse (see also section 6.4), thereby addressing both Bell's (2009) and Ranger's (2015) accounts.

d) It consistently signals upcoming or following rectification by exhibiting a responsive or anticipatory scope in discourse. As such, it involves a proposition /*p*/ which is rectified, revised (or mitigated to a certain extent) in terms of content or phrasing because of potential but unwelcome and inferentially augmented interpretations. The discourse part that follows (or occasionally precedes) the construction conventionally involves the rectification itself which may, in certain cases, be accompanied by further clarification. This is essential for the discourse framing effect that the construction has (see section 6.4), which, along with its contextual regularities (see (e) below) and dialogic construal (see (f) below), empirically support its ability to function as a fairly reliable discourse 'delimitator'.

e) It exhibits certain contextual regularities and interdependencies with other elements in discourse, such as the use of grammatical or lexical negation, the use of concessive markers, and the increased use of intensifiers, among which lexical repetition appears to have a central place.

f) Its consistent marking of rectification, along with its responsive and anticipatory scope in discourse and its contextual regularities, ultimately contribute to the dialogic construal that it imports to its contextual environment (see section 6.4).

6.4 MIND YOU: Dialogicity and discourse unit delimitation

Capitalising on Ranger's (2015) *'p mind you q'* and *'p. q mind you'* configuration patterns (see section 6.2.3) but extending them to discourse phenomena through a constructional approach, the present study proposes that the use of the construction in discourse exceeds sentential limits and effectively frames discourse unit 'boundaries'. In this context, the present section aims to demonstrate that the (responsive and anticipatory) regulatory scope of MIND YOU establishes its own conventionalised and interdependent sub-parts in discourse, thus giving rise to specifiable units. In particular, I put forth that the units delimited by the construction manifest *an internal tripartite,* or occasionally *four-place, structure* comprising the following sub-components:

a) The 'antecedent' part preceding the construction which will be referred to as the *'in need of revision proposition' (p)* due to potential, unwelcome inferences arising either from its content or its linguistic glossing.

b) The part which involves the construction itself and *signals* the upcoming (or occasionally preceding) *rectification/reformulation*, expectedly carrying the 'shortcut coding' of *'rectification-signalling' (r-s)*.

c) The part that involves the *rectification* itself, namely the specifics of correction or rephrasing/reformulation that the Speaker deems necessary so that erroneous and typically inferentially augmented interpretations related to (*p*) are cancelled. Expectedly, this discourse part carries the name *'rectification' (r),* and depending on the position of MIND YOU, it may precede or follow the (*r-s*) part outlined above.

d) The final, but optional, *'rectification-clarification'* part (coded as (*r-c*)) surfacing in discourse when the Speaker wishes to provide more clarifications on the intended rectification.

To gain in focus and economy, the present section will present only two examples of how MIND YOU contributes to discourse unit delimitation. In the first example (31), the construction features in its *four-place discourse unit*, signals the rectification that has just preceded in discourse, and marks the upcoming part as the discourse locus for further clarification on the rectification performed. Apparently, in this case, the rectification concerns the accuracy of linguistic expressions used in proposition /*p*/, thereby essentially associating MIND YOU with the metalinguistic operations described in section 6.3.

Example (31): *"Don Hilarin felt very important, and his family thought that he was and therefore they also felt very important. Don Hilarin was a notario, not a notary, **mind you**; that does not quite convey the meaning, but a notario. A notario in Spain, at least in Don Hilarin's day, was a title given to a man having achieved the summit of his career in the field of law."*

COCA, [Title: *Chromos*, Author: Alfau Felipe],
Source: ACAD_ Review of Contemporary Fiction, Date: 2007

Schematically, the discourse unit delimited in this case may be presented as follows in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1: The four-place discourse unit delimited by MIND YOU

The following example (32) presents a *tripartite discourse unit* delimited by the construction featuring in sentence-initial position.[178] As outlined above, the rectification in this case follows the use of the construction in discourse and concerns the content of /*p*/ rather than its linguistic phrasing, as was the case with the previous example.

Example (32): *"...But she's sworn me to secrecy.* **Mind you**, *I wasn't gonna tell anybody she was writing to me anyway! Just in case he's gets a whiff of it, you know."*

<div align="right">
BNC, [103 conversations recorded by 'Raymond'],
Source: Spoken _ Conversation, Date: 1985-1993
</div>

In this case, the tripartite discourse unit delimited is proposed to take the following form:

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[178] The example used here is the abridged version of example (27) analysed in section 6.3.

> *But she's sworn me to secrecy.*
>
> *in need of revision proposition (p)*
>
> **Mind you**,
>
> *rectification-signalling (r-s)*
>
> *I wasn't gonna tell anybody she was writing to me anyway! Just in case he's gets a whiff of it, you know."*
>
> *rectification (r)*

Figure 6.2: The tripartite discourse unit delimited by MIND YOU

In view of the above, the present study proposes that MIND YOU, contextually supported by the systematic co-occurrence of intensifying elements (e.g., lexical repetition) and other regularities, such as the use of negation and concessive markers, delimits discourse units that exceed sentential boundaries. Its discourse effect is also shown to crucially rely on its inheritance-based pragmatics of attracting the Addressee's attention on whose perception the rectification and possible, attendant clarifications are to be imposed. The latter is also in line with what has been herein suggested about the inverted Imperative morphological marking of the construction which attributes to its pronominal Subject properties conventionally associated with the θ-role of a Patient (see section 6.2.2). The signalling effect of the construction in discourse further accentuates the Speaker's need to rectify potential, erroneous assumptions available – but not intended – in the content of the original proposition /p/ or its phrasing. In this respect, the use of MIND YOU highlights intersubjectivity and the Speaker's constant monitoring of discourse. The latter ultimately endows MIND YOU with the ability to form a regulatory, interpretative frame for the whole (rectified) utterance and the relationship between the Speaker and the Addressee. In this sense, although Bell's

(2009) identification of a split between a *'story-line'* frame and an *'interaction'* frame concerning MIND YOU is an important theoretical insight, in the proposed CxG treatment of MIND YOU this is no longer seen as a split. Rather, it is considered a property of the construction motivated by its semantics-pragmatics and its inherent dialogicity which by default involves an 'interaction' regulatory frame between the Speaker and the (assumed) Addressee. By virtue of the latter and its dialogic projections, the construction becomes discoursally indispensable, although, as was the case with the BELIEVE-family constructions, its omission might still be possible. Nonetheless, as already hinted at in different parts of the data discussion in section 6.3, the omission of MIND YOU, although not interfering with the grammaticality or propositional content of its host utterance, would result in significant changes in its overall expressivity which – in CxG terms at least – is an important aspect of its linguistic meaning. Moreover, its omission would also affect the regulatory, dialogic flow of discourse which relies fundamentally on the use of the construction and its profiling of an (assumed) Addressee with the θ-role of a Patient; an important aspect of the construction crucially related to the increased expressivity of the whole utterance that encompasses it.

Along these lines, Figures 6.1 and 6.2 above show that the discourse stretch delimited by MIND YOU will not be considered incohesive or syntactically incomplete in its absence (as was the case with THINK AGAIN). Rather, what both figures show is that the construction typically enters discourse upon the Speaker's call so that the rectification or invalidation of unwelcome inferences can be meaningfully imposed on the Addressee's attention. In so doing, the construction ultimately frames a fairly specifiable discourse unit with the sub-components outlined above.

6.5 MIND YOU: Frequency counts, reliability, and validity statistics

6.5.1 Random sample, manual tagging, and overall methodological framework

Following the methodological framework outlined in Chapter 3, the random sample of BNC and COCA instances of *'mind you'* was subjected to annotation with respect to:

a) *the semantics of the pattern* (including constructional instances (i.e., MIND YOU), false positives and injunctive patterns (see section 6.3)),

b) the *dialoguality-monologuality* and *dialogicity-monologicity* framework,

c) the collocational patterns identified in relation to *intensifying* features (e.g., lexical repetition, negative and positive lexical prosody, marked word order etc.,),

d) the *contextual features* (e.g., the systematic presence of negation and concessive markers) and, finally,

e) *positional flexibility* (i.e., the possible preference(s) of the construction in relation to sentence-initial, parenthetical or sentence-final positioning).[179]

The manual tagging of the frequency sets described in (b) - (e) concerned only the instances of the constructional semantics under examination, (i.e., instances of MIND YOU) excluding false positives or injunctive patterns. Schematically, the methodology adopted for the analysis of MIND YOU may be presented as follows in Figure 6.3.

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[179] The random sample did not yield any instances of independent sentential status.

Figure 6.3: An overview of the methodological framework adopted for the analysis of MIND YOU

6.5.2 Frequency counts

The frequency counts were used as preliminary indicators of trends exhibited by the data and were then subjected to statistical significance and reliability measurements (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Tables 6.7 - 6.14). The sections that follow present the frequency counts for each set examined.

6.5.2.1 Distribution of the constructional semantics, the injunctive pattern, and the false positives

The first sets subjected to frequency counts were the categories involved in the classification of the data into: a) constructional semantics, b) false positives, and c) instances of the injunctive pattern. The majority of the concordance lines was found to exhibit the constructional semantics focused upon in the present study (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.2). In particular, in the case of BNC, out of the 65 overall concordance lines examined, 58 of them (i.e., 89.2%) were classified as constructional

instances, while only 6 (i.e., 9.2%) were characterised as instances of false positives and only 1 (i.e., 1.6%) as an instance of the injunctive pattern. As far as COCA is concerned, the sample was composed of 64 concordance lines, out of which, the majority, namely 54 instances (i.e., 84.4%) were classified as constructional instances, followed by 6 (i.e., 9.4%) false positives, and only 4 instances (i.e., 6.2%) of the injunctive pattern. The above indicate that the pattern under examination is thus prototypically (in the sense of frequency at least) used as a (semi-)substantive construction with the semantics, pragmatics, and discourse function identified herein.

6.5.2.2 Distribution of dialogicity-monologicity and dialoguality-monologuality

The frequency sets of the constructional semantics were then examined in relation to dialoguality-monologuality and dialogicity-monologicity (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.3). As already explained in section 6.3, the two corpora differ in terms of this parameter because they also differ in terms of source texts, given that BNC features 31 (i.e., 53.5%) spoken source texts as opposed to 28 (i.e., 46.5%) written source texts, while COCA features 43 (i.e., 79.6%) written texts and only 11 (i.e., 20.4%) categorised as spoken. This, by extension, influences their allocation in relation to monologuality and dialoguality but, interestingly, *not* their allocation as regards dialogicity and monologicity. The consistently null category for monologicity once more highlights the inherent dialogicity of the construction and its incompatibility with a monologic perspective. In particular, in BNC, 74.1% of the data (i.e., 43/58 concordance lines) are instances of dialogual-dialogic (DD) (con)texts, while only 25.9% (i.e., 15/58 concordance lines) are instances of monologual-dialogic (MD) (con)texts. In COCA, the relevant percentage for dialogual-dialogic (DD) (con)texts rises to 44.4% (i.e., 24/54 concordance lines), while the percentage for monologual-dialogic (MD) (con)texts amounts to 55.6% (i.e., 30/54 concordance lines). Despite, therefore, the

external features related to dialogue and the number of participants involved, the constructional semantics identified is inherently dialogic in the sense of signalling a form of rectification and reformulation performed by the Speaker while regulating the speech event. Admittedly, though, the allocation of the construction in dialogual or monologual contexts merits further investigation, primarily directed to exploring possible interrelations with genre conventions.

6.5.2.3 Distribution of positional flexibility

The difference observed in relation to the source texts of the corpora also accounts for the different distribution they exhibit in relation to positional flexibility (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.4). More specifically, BNC data show a consistent predilection for sentence-initial position (82.8%, i.e., 48/58 concordance lines), while only marginally featuring MIND YOU in parenthetical (12%, i.e., 7/58 concordance lines) or sentence-final position (5.2%, i.e., 3/58 concordance lines).

In the case of COCA, however, it is parenthetical position that is mostly favoured, although not to the same extent with sentence-initial position in BNC. More specifically, the parenthetical position in COCA accounts for 51.9% of the data, namely 28/54 concordance lines. As regards sentence-initial and sentence-final position, I observe a more balanced trend, however, with 25.9% (i.e., 14/54 concordance lines) of the data featuring the construction sentence-finally and 22.2% (i.e., 12/54 concordance lines) featuring it sentence-initially.

The differences identified suggest that in BNC, which features more dialogual (con)texts, MIND YOU is chiefly placed in sentence-initial position. This is most likely the case because the Speaker makes a conscious attempt to secure the Addressee's attention from the beginning of the utterance – a conventional strategy in conversational

interactions, particularly in relation to cueing attention (cf. Tomlin 1995, 1997; Gleitman, January, Nappa and Trueswell 2007; Myachykov, 2007; Myachykov, Posner and Tomlin, 2007) – so as to emphasise the upcoming discourse part associated with the important (and, in this case, typically rectified) information. At the same time, it might also be argued that dialogual (con)texts favour a more 'incidental' and 'en passant' use of the construction in sentence-initial position, thus allowing it to shift attention from the 'storyline' frame to the 'interaction' one, whose merging, as has been argued, is a unique property of the construction.

On the other hand, COCA includes more monologual texts which mostly correlate with the pattern in a parenthetical position. This, in all likelihood, relates to the fact that, unless imitating real-life conversations, written texts are characterised by considerably less spontaneity in discourse organisation. Consequently, by placing MIND YOU in parenthetical position, authors wish to capitalise on its regulatory function and scope in discourse but do not foreground a direct appeal to the Addressee (frequently associated with the left periphery of an utterance (see Haddican 2015)), as conventionally expected in spoken discourse.

6.5.2.4 Distribution of contextual features

The category of contextual features was also subjected to frequency counts in order to measure the systematicity of the parameters examined and confirm the regularity of certain contextual dependencies. The frequency counts indicate that there are specific trends shared by both corpora as regards their collocational patterns with the connector *'but'*, the contextual presence of negation (either *before* or *after* the construction), and the use of conditional sentences or questions *before* and *after* the construction (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.5).

In line with what has been argued, the systematic contextual presence of negation is apparently one of the main contextual features that stands out in both corpora. In particular, in BNC, 55.2% (i.e., 32/58 concordance lines) of the data showcase negation following the construction and 13.8% (i.e., 8/58 concordance lines) preceding it. In COCA, the relevant percentages rise to 31.5% (i.e., 17/54 concordance lines) for the negation following the construction and 44.4% (i.e., 24/54 concordance lines) for negation preceding the construction. The enhanced use of negation in context is an expected finding given that the construction typically signals (preceding or following) rectification which, more often than not, involves negation that contributes to the invalidation of an alternative line of thought.

On similar grounds, I also interpret the systematic contextual presence of the concessive marker *'but'* as an expected finding, although the two corpora exhibit considerable differences in terms of raw frequencies. More specifically, in BNC, the presence of *'but'* is traced in 6.9% (i.e., 4/58 concordance lines) of the data while for COCA the respective percentage rises to 27.8%, (i.e., 15/54 concordance lines). The contextual presence of concessive markers apparently relates to the signalling of rectification in discourse and the expression of cancellation of an alternative viewpoint. However, the considerable differences between the corpora might indicate that although in certain cases MIND YOU might be effectively substituted by concessive markers, this is not always preferred probably on account of the significant loss of expressivity and dialogicity that this incurs to its host utterance. At the same time, the contextual presence of concessive markers might be indicative of the Speaker's conscious decision to retain the construction in discourse precisely because it expresses more than just the meaning of concession. If further confirmed, this is expected to provide further support to the hypothesis entertained herein that the primary function of MIND YOU is *not* that

of expressing concession or cancellation as argued by other accounts (cf. Bell 2009, Ranger 2015). Rather, its primary function, which, in fact, licenses its regulatory scope, is that of emphatically drawing the Addressee's attention to the intended rectification that may be supported by the contextual presence of concessive markers.

6.5.2.5 Distribution of the intensifying features

The final frequency set examined is the one involving the use of intensifying features in both corpora (see Appendix for Chapter 6, Table 6.6). Quite expectedly, and in view of what has been discussed in relation to the previous case studies as well, negative and positive lexical prosody stand out among the intensifying features. In particular, in BNC, negative lexical prosody accounts for 87.9% of the data (i.e., 51/58 concordance lines), while in COCA, the respective percentage rises to the astounding 96.3% (i.e., 52/54 concordance lines). Positive lexical prosody ranks consistently as the second most prominent contextual feature accounting for 72.4% of the BNC data (i.e., 42/58 concordance lines) and 81.5% of the COCA data (i.e., 44/54 concordance lines).

The increased preference for these contextual features is followed by the use of quantifiers, traced in 74.1% of the BNC data (i.e., 43/58 concordance lines) and 57.4% of the COCA data (i.e., 31/54 concordance lines). Comparatives also manifest fairly increased percentages accounting for 39.7% of the BNC data (i.e., 23/58 concordance lines) and 27.8% of the COCA data (i.e., 15/54 concordance lines). Their increased, contextual presence is another anticipated finding, interpreted in the present account as further attestation of the Speaker's intention to evaluate different (erroneous) viewpoints and promote the concomitant rectification.

What differs from the other case studies though and seems to be an intensifying element particular to the construction at hand, is the increased percentages of lexical repetition.

Its increased presence is argued to be an intensifying element related to the attention-summoning effect of the construction and its association with metalinguistic interpretations. The instances of lexical repetition in BNC account for 24.1% of the data (i.e., 14/58 concordance lines), while in COCA the relevant percentage rises to 40.7% (i.e., 22/54 concordance lines). The differences with respect to percentages in this case might also relate to the differences between the spoken and written data of the two corpora. These may allow us to assume that written data might be more readily associated with practices of fine-tuning both in relation to the content and the linguistic glossing of /p/.

6.5.3 Reliability and validity statistics

6.5.3.1 The statistical significance of the data

The frequency counts described were followed by a calculation of the Mean (M), Standard Deviation (StD) and Range (R) of every category of frequencies examined for each corpus (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.7). The calculation of M, StD, and R was followed by subjecting the data to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) normality test, which indicated that the data did not follow a normal distribution ($p>0.1$) and would, therefore, need to be subjected to non-parametric tests (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.8). To measure the statistical significance involved in each sub-group set, the two corpora were examined comparatively for each frequency set collected. The first set examined was that of the constructional semantics, the false positives, and the instances of the injunctive pattern (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.9). The results indicated statistical significance with a p-value=$0.000 <0.1$, thus lending considerable, statistical support to the initial hypothesis put forth that the

constructional semantics (i.e., MIND YOU) can be safely argued to be representative of the available population (N) of the pattern in both corpora.

A similar procedure was followed for the statistical significance of the allocation of the constructional semantics in the dialogicity-monologicity and dialoguality-monologuality axes in both corpora (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.10). The results were once more statistically significant with a p-value=0.000<0.1, suggesting a positive correlation between the construction and dialogicity.

The next frequency set examined was the set of the contextual features as traced in both corpora (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.11). The test yielded statistically significant results, with a p-value=0.000<0.1, lending additional support to the argument presented that the contextual presence of negation and the concessive marker *'but',* among others, are not random findings but rather representative of the contextual regularities of the construction.

The final two frequency sets examined were that of positional flexibility (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.12) and of intensifying features (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.13). They were both found to exhibit statistically significant results (p-value=0.000<0.1). As regards positional flexibility, I maintain that, although statistically significant, further research on defining a preferred position for the construction is needed, as this could possibly relate to different genres or to the written and spoken medium of source texts (see section 6.5.2.3). With reference to intensifying elements, the statistical measurements confirm that negative and positive lexical prosody, along with quantifiers and lexical repetition stand out as intensifying elements that further reinforce the rectification-signalling effect of the construction.

6.5.3.2 The internal reliability of the data

The final step of the statistical analysis involves the measurement of the internal consistency, that is to say, the reliability of the data through Cronbach's alpha (α). As explained, the closer to 1 the resulting (α) coefficient of reliability tends, the more reliable it is, while the opposite signifies limited reliability. To ensure, therefore, the reliability of the scale of the frequency sets assessed for both corpora, Cronbach's alpha (α) was administered for the following:

a) the overall frequency sets,

b) the frequency set of intensifying elements,

c) the frequency set of positional flexibility, and

d) the frequency set of contextual features.

All the frequency sets examined exhibited extremely strong, and thus reliable, scales, almost reaching the value of absolute one (1), as in the case of the overall frequency sets between BNC and COCA (a)=0.954 or of the intensifying elements (a)=0.948 (see Appendix II for Chapter 6, Table 6.14). The scale of positional flexibility follows with (α)=0.923 suggesting that although necessarily constrained by the source texts employed by the corpora, the scale of positional flexibility enjoys a considerable degree of internal reliability. Finally, the frequency sets of contextual features manifest considerable, but more restricted, internal reliability given that (a)=0.753. This probably relates to the fact that the frequency sets in this case include null categories as well, as in the case of the total absence of collocation with *'and'* in the BNC data.

6.6 Summary and concluding remarks

Supported by qualitative and quantitative analysis, this final chapter of data discussion argued that MIND YOU is a (semi-)substantive construction with a regulatory, intersubjective discourse scope and partly-motivated semantics-pragmatics related to the dispositional mental state verb *'mind'* and its non-canonical inverted Imperative form with a post-posed Subject. The latter was crucially shown to semantically function as a Patient (i.e., a discourse entity 'acted upon') on whose attention the rectification signalled by MIND YOU is imposed. Moreover, the construction was also shown to contribute significantly to discourse unit delimitation by establishing its own conventionalised and interdependent sub-components in the discourse flow, thus giving rise to specifiable units with an internal tripartite, or occasionally four-place, structure.

Concluding, it is important to stress that – in accordance with what was proposed for the other constructions examined – the present one also has a phrasal status, a number of inherited and idiosyncratic properties, and an extended discourse scope. Importantly, all these features were shown to be well-accommodated in a CxG framework, in which the pattern is viewed as a *'gestalt'*, i.e., a unit of form and meaning systematically related to the rest of the grammar (see inverted Imperatives with post-posed Subjects). This also reflects the main contribution of the present study to the analysis of the specific construction, in the sense that it naturally accommodates previous accounts by bringing to the forefront the relation of the attention-getting pragmatics of MIND YOU with its fundamental, discourse regulatory scope.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

7.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with a 'vantage point' informed by the joint discussion of all the issues and different points raised throughout the present doctoral dissertation in light of *the network of dialogic perspectivisation* that it brought to the fore. In line with the hypotheses and research questions outlined in Chapter 1, it provides a comprehensive overview of the chapters of the study, their empirically grounded findings, and theoretical contributions. At the same time, it also addresses the limitations with which the study is confronted, ultimately paving the way for future research.

To effectively discuss all the above, this chapter is divided into seven sections including the present one. Section 7.2 provides a targeted overview of the objectives, methodological considerations and findings presented in all the chapters comprising the study. Section 7.3 offers a comprehensive account of the principal, theoretical and empirical contributions of the research to different fields of study. It further identifies the specifics of the broader network of dialogic perspectivisation, hinted at in the previous chapters, and documents how the constructions examined form a crucial part of it. Section 7.4 focuses on the limitations of the research project at hand and on how these could be effectively addressed in future research. Section 7.5 focuses on areas for future exploration which spring directly out of the findings of the present study and may well function as the impetus for novel lines of thinking expanding on what the work at hand has already contributed. Finally, section 7.6 completes the present chapter,

and the dissertation as a whole, by offering some concluding remarks and reflections on the desirability of more CxG-based research in the study of discourse-level constructions.

7.2 A comprehensive synopsis of the chapters of the study

Each chapter of the study at hand has served its own specific purpose and has significantly contributed to the overall structure of the dissertation, its overarching aim, and individual research objectives. The aim of the present section, therefore, is to provide an overview of the 'milestone effect' of each chapter on the methodological framework adopted as well as the insights and findings presented.

Chapter 1 has presented the motivation for the present study. Inspired by the growing interest of CxG scholars in the field of conventionalised, discourse-level constructions (Nikiforidou *et al.,* 2014; Aijmer 2016; Nikiforidou and Fischer 2015; Groom 2019), the work at hand has systematically sought to make a case for the methodological suitability of CxG in this direction. Besides motivation, Chapter 1 has established the present work as a corpus-informed linguistic endeavour in line with the maximalist, holistic and usage-based commitments of CxG as a model. Perhaps even more importantly, Chapter 1 has elucidated the overall aim as well as all the further, but interrelated, objectives of the study comprising its research agenda. Aiming to empirically ascertain the existence of a well-entrenched constructional network consisting of the phrasal patterns BELIEVE (YOU) ME, BELIEVE IT OR NOT, THINK AGAIN and MIND YOU, I have specifically directed my attention to their inherent ability to index *dialogicity* at a discourse level (in the sense of *perspectivisation* and *intersubjectivity*) and ultimately delimit *discourse units*.

In pursuing its aim, the study has essentially brought to the fore the shared similarities of the constructions which inform the empirical 'backbone' of the work at hand and concern their semantic and lexical anchoring to *mental state verbs* as well as their consistent morphological marking in the *Imperative*. These similarities have been of vital importance for the present work. On the one hand, they have shed light on the interrelationship of the constructions with the complex and *polysemous* class of mental state verbs due to their oscillation between *the expression of a mental state* (occasionally also a *process*), *the encoding of propositional attitude* and/or *the expression of relational disposition* (see Chapter 2, section 2.2, Bertuccelli Papi 2000; Cappelli 2008). On the other, they have highlighted the correlation of the constructions in focus with dialogicity through their Imperative morphology; the latter being itself a confirmed marker of dialogicity (Traugott 2005; Enghels 2017). This inherent, intersubjective, regulatory, dialogic scope of the constructions in discourse has been shown to contribute essentially to their ability to delimit the discourse units of which they form a part, thereby initiating a novel line of investigation concerning discourse structure segmentation practices.

Further to the above, in Chapter 1, I have also presented my working hypotheses that have set the whole research project in motion, informed my methodological decisions and functioned as a springboard for the research questions addressed. In line with these hypotheses, which urged for a closer examination of the particular, formal, semantic, and pragmatic properties of the constructions in focus, I have proceeded to examine the contextual regularities of the constructions as well as their inheritance-based relations with other more productive constructions of the language (see Chapter 1, section 1.5; for an overview through box notation diagrams, see section 7.3). In so doing, my aim has been to show that the constructions feature: a) semantics that exceeds the fully-

compositional, predictable meaning of their components and lends itself to a constructional account, b) both inherited (i.e., motivated) and idiosyncratic morphosyntactic and discourse-pragmatic properties, c) a common, dialogic function whose motivation should be sought in the variability (i.e., polysemy) of mental state verbs and their Imperative morphological marking, d) a regulatory, dialogic discourse scope that consistently invites certain discourse correlates in their immediate or broader context and e) the ability to function as fairly reliable discourse 'benchmarks' for the delimitation of discourse units crucially involving the proposition /*p*/ in which they occur.

In light of the above, and in accordance with the research hypotheses and questions presented, Chapter 2 has delved into the five central axes that inform the theoretical background of the study. Situating the work at hand in the context of CxG-based research at a discourse level, and building on the crucial commonalities of the constructions in focus, Chapter 2 has elaborated on the literature related to: a) the *semantics of mental state verbs* and their intersubjective function, b) the association of their *Imperative* morphology with *dialogicity*, c) the *CxG model*, its theoretical and methodological commitments as well as its ability to offer *inheritance-based* accounts which can effectively embed constructions (regardless of their degree of schematicity or substantivity) in the rest of the grammar, d) *dialogicity* in the sense of perspectivisation, non-alignment of viewpoints and profiling of (assumed/implied) discourse participants, and e) *discourse unit delimitation* practices.

By capturing the interconnection of all the aspects outlined above, Chapter 2 has been pivotal in providing the required theoretical background for the findings presented in Chapters 4-6 (for a summary of the contributions and findings, see section 7.3). In discussing the theoretical background of the study, I have further documented strong

correlations between the idiosyncratic properties of the constructions and specific findings in the earlier literature. It is in this context, for instance, that the specific, intersubjective, and dialogic function of the constructions has been accounted for (see section 2.4.3).

Moreover, in Chapter 2, I have elaborated on the methodological suitability of CxG as a linguistic model for the present study (section 2.3). Maintaining that the phrasal status of the constructions profitably relates to *phraseological analyses* (Gries 2007; Granger and Meunier 2008), I have advocated the appropriacy of CxG for the research task at hand. In particular, having provided an overview of the main tenets of the model (Chapter 2, section 2.3.1), and its treatment of meaning at various linguistic levels, ranging from morphemes to genres (Chapter 2, section 2.3.2), I have illustrated that CxG is definitionally capable of venturing into discourse-level analyses as well (Ruppenhofer and Michaelis 2010; Nikiforidou *et al.,* 2014, Nikiforidou 2017, 2018, 2021).

In this context, I have also pointed out that CxG posits that constructions are organised in a system of intricate, but principled taxonomic networks, whereby each construction occupies a node-position (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.4). Each node then forms a continuum, ranging from the fully-substantive to the fully-schematic, organised on the basis of inheritance which *"provides a coherent way of capturing which properties individual constructions have in common and which set them apart as related but distinct grammatical patterns"* (Fried and Östman 2004:12). As stressed, (partial-) inheritance-based hierarchies constitute an essential feature of the taxonomic networks in CxG in that they allow for broad generalisations to be captured by higher-level constructions, which are then inherited by other, more constrained ones. Equally importantly, they also allow for sub-regularities to be captured at various midpoints of

the hierarchical network formed in each case. This principled and organised structure of constructional inventories in the language, and of more specific networks as well, will also be shown to be at work in the constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation revealed by the present study (see section 7.3).

Dialogicity has also been a central research focus of Chapter 2 (see section 2.4). Tracing it back to its origin in early philosophical accounts (Buber 1929/1958; Bakhtin 1975/1981), I have put forth that the concept may be productively examined from a linguistic perspective as well (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.1). Following similar works in the field (Schwenter 2000; Traugott 2008, 2009; Romero-Trillo 2015), the present study has acknowledged that dialogue involves both *external* (i.e., monologual and dialogual) and *internal* (i.e., monologic and dialogic) features (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.2). Focusing primarily on the latter and capitalising on Schwenter's (2000) framework and Traugott's definition of dialogicity (2008), I have sought to illustrate that the use of the constructions in focus is fully compatible with an intersubjective, dialogic construal that promotes perspectivisation and profiling of (assumed) Addressees in discourse. In this context, I have further pointed out that the dialogic construal introduced by the constructions in discourse manifests a systematic co-occurrence with stance, evaluative, and intensifying linguistic elements conventionally employed in Speaker-Addressee interaction for negotiation practices (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.3).

The contextual regularities and systematic discourse correlates of the constructions along with their consistent regulatory, dialogic scope have provided the impetus for exploring their correlation with the discourse units in which they occur and the overall discourse 'architecture', discussed in the last section of Chapter 2 (see section 2.5). Complementing previous approaches on discourse segmentation practices emphasising either syntax (see section 2.5.1.1) or prosody (see section 2.5.1.2) as effective

delimitators, the present work has proposed that a constructional approach to discourse structure may feature as a promising alternative. In this respect, it has particularly aimed to illustrate that discourse units may profit from a more holistic approach which would effectively combine syntax- and prosody-only approaches under the notion of constructions (see section 2.5.2).

In particular, refraining from assigning priority to either syntax- or prosody-based mechanisms as effective discourse structure delimitators, I have argued in favour of the interplay of both and the need for a more holistic, gestalt-like approach towards discourse units. Following Selting (1998), I have also concurred that discourse units should be viewed as the multidimensional outcome of the *"interplay of syntactic, lexico-semantic, pragmatic, activity-type specific and prosodic devices in their sequential context"* (*ibid.*:14) whose 'completion' in discourse depends on *projectability/projection* that may be lexico-syntactic or lexico-semantic and pragmatic. Building on the latter and correlating it with the data and the constructional approach adopted herein, I have illustrated that the discourse units delimited by the constructions largely depend on the *dialogic projections* that their use in discourse triggers. Most importantly, I have demonstrated that there is a systematic correlation between these projections and the proposition $/p/$ in the scope of the constructions that ultimately contributes to the overall discourse unfolding. In this sense, the present work has also contributed to the field of discourse studies (see section 7.3) by proposing that the constructions identified operate as fairly effective discourse delimitators which can yield reliable insights into the discernible, interdependent, and conventionalised sub-parts of the discourse units that they frame in discourse (see Chapter 2, section 2.5.2).

The overview of the theoretical background of the study is followed by the detailed discussion of its methodological framework presented in Chapter 3. Elaborating on the

specifics of the research design adopted, my main aim in Chapter 3 has been to account for the *qualitative* and *quantitative* considerations that shaped my methodological rationale and determined my research tools and sampling techniques.

Adhering to the research agenda and the methodological requirements of CxG outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, respectively, Chapter 3 has accounted for the need of the study to process authentic language data, thereby excluding contrivance or impressionist views. In light of this, Chapter 3 has stressed that *dictionaries* and *corpora* have constituted the two main verification tools of the initial hypotheses of the study. Dictionaries have been used for the examination of the lexicographic entries of the verbs featuring in the constructions under investigation and, occasionally, of each pattern as a whole, treated as an independent entry and typically assigned an idiomatic status in the language. Corpora, on the other hand, have been used for the collection of construction tokens (constructs) in contexts of authentic language use featuring the two main standard varieties of English in both spoken and written contexts.

As far as the sequencing of methodological steps is concerned, the independent lexicographic checking has consistently been the initial step in that it provided crucial lexical information and usage-based evidence for the distinct, yet related, senses and corresponding syntactic patterns in which the verbs of interest occur. In other words, the lexicographic entries of the dictionaries consulted (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.2) have served as valuable testing grids for the theoretical discussions of the semantics and morphosyntax of the constructions, thus informing all the subsequent research steps. The concomitant research steps involved the formation of data pools on the basis of randomly-sampled, corpus-retrieved data (both BNC and COCA, see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1) which were subjected to frequency counts in relation to: a) the *semantics*

of the patterns (i.e., fully-compositional or constructional),[180] b) the *pragmatics* of the patterns, c) their positioning in the *dialoguality-monologuality* axes, d) their positioning in the *dialogicity-monologicity* axes, e) their distribution as regards *positional flexibility*, f) their *morphosyntax* (both internal and external) and g) their *collocational behaviour* (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2).

As expected, a considerable part of Chapter 3 has also been devoted to discussing the specifics of the operational, quantitative aspects of the framework adopted so that the research objectives set could be effectively met by yielding representative, reliable, measurable, and falsifiable results. By elucidating the specific random sampling practices adopted and the annotation parameters considered, Chapter 3 has provided a detailed overview of the statistical significance and reliability measurements conducted mainly through robust, non-parametric tests (Conover 1999; Sprent and Smeeton 2001). Aiming to arrive at fine-grained and comprehensive answers to the research questions posed, I consider Chapter 3 crucial for the substantiation of the findings presented herein and for offering a much-warranted discussion on the transparency, sequencing, and rationale of my methodological decisions (for an overview, see Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3, section 3.4.4).

Chapter 4 has marked the beginning of the data analysis by discussing the BELIEVE-family of constructions consisting of BELIEVE ME, BELIEVE YOU ME and BELIEVE IT OR NOT. As argued, the members of the family occupy the functional space of marking (i.e., announcing) unexpected information contrary to Addressee's (assumed) expectations or beliefs, thereby bearing observable similarities with respect to their semantics-

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[180] As discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, respectively, apart from the constructional and fully-compositional semantics, the corpus queries have also occasionally yielded instances of false positives or of different patterns than the ones focused upon, such as the injunctive pattern discussed in Chapter 6 (see Chapters 4 and 6 as well as Appendix II for the relevant chapters).

pragmatics, discourse function and contextual regularities. Nonetheless, at the same time, they have also been found to exhibit distinct properties which legitimise their treatment as related, but different, constructions. Against this backdrop, and after discussing the semantics of the verb *'believe'* (section 4.2), Chapter 4 engages in an independent discussion of each construction (see sections 4.3 - 4.5) aiming to tease apart their inherited from their idiosyncratic properties, reflected mainly in their different morphosyntax (see also Geka and Marmaridou 2017).

In this respect, Chapter 4 has critically established the BELIEVE-family as a case of a partial inheritance-based family network whose members exhibit both common features and elements of differentiation. Their common features have been shown to include: a) substantivity in form, b) partly-motivated semantics-pragmatics inherited from the mental state verb *'believe'*, c) an inherited, directive, intersubjective and dialogic function associated with their Imperative morphological marking, d) a shared discourse function of marking the content of proposition /*p*/ as unexpected information contrary to the Addressee's (assumed) belief system or expectations, e) a consistent dialogic construal affecting their context of use, f) considerable positional flexibility found to correlate with their *backward-* or *forward*-looking discourse scope, and g) a systematic co-presence of certain contextual features and interdependencies related to the proposition /*p*/ in their scope, crucially associated with their ability to delimit discourse units.

Their elements of differentiation have also been critical in that they have shed light on the intricate, and ultimately, differentiating relations. To start with, the corpus investigation for the pattern *'believe me'* has yielded both instances of fully-compositional semantics (i.e., 'believe' + 'me') and instances of the constructional semantics of BELIEVE ME focused upon in the present work; the latter found to be

considerably more frequent (and in this sense well-entrenched) in both corpora. The constructional instances of BELIEVE ME were shown to inherit the semantics and affective undertones of the compositional 'believe' + 'personal object' but, unlike the other, related compositional patterns anchored to the verb *'believe'*, BELIEVE ME, expectedly, because of its Imperative morphology, resists formal variation as in tense- and person-related changes, or infinitival and interrogative marking. Moreover, BELIEVE ME does not allow for the use of negation or *that*-complementisers and does not manifest a restricted, inter-sentential discourse scope as is the case with its fully-compositional counterpart in: "*Mrs. Butler didn't seem inclined to **believe me**"* (see Chapter 4, section 4.3). Rather, it exhibits considerable substantivity and a broad discourse scope paired with the pragmatics of *inviting faith/trust in the Speaker concerning the proposition /p/*, thereby marking itself as a distinct construction from its synchronically available, fully-compositional counterpart.

BELIEVE YOU ME, on the other hand, has been shown to merit a constructional treatment that acknowledges its status as a *variant* form of BELIEVE ME despite the considerable similarities of the two, associated with their common Imperative morphology, the self-reference to the Speaker (*'me'*), and the affective semantic undertones. This is mainly due to the unique syntactic configuration of BELIEVE YOU ME which, as discussed in section 4.4, would readily associate it with Fillmore *et al.,*'s (1988) category of extragrammatical idioms (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2), thereby also excluding the possibility of it manifesting compositional instances. In light of this, and following Goldberg (1995), as well as the broader research in the field of collocations (Sinclair 1991; Hanks 2004, 2013) which posits that differences in syntactic configuration between constructional counterparts necessarily result in meaning differences, I have maintained that the unique morphosyntax of BELIEVE YOU ME endows it with properties

not available in BELIEVE ME. In this respect, Chapter 4 has brought to the fore that the non-canonical Imperative of BELIEVE YOU ME, evident in its post-posed pronominal Subject, accounts for its emphatic use in discourse which has evolved from *'inviting'* faith/trust in the Speaker (performed by BELIEVE ME) to *'demanding'* it. Drawing on similar research on profiling discourse participants and the pragmatic strengthening that this incurs on Imperative-based constructions (cf. Vázquez Rozas 2006; de Cock 2014), I have put forth that the postposed Subject of the construction in this case should be seen as semantically occupying the θ-role of a Patient/Undergoer which typically correlates with involuntary action. In other words, I have argued that the Subject involved in the construction in focus is deprived of *'agentive'* functions and is rather (involuntarily) acted upon by the Speaker using the said construction. This is most likely one of the main reasons why although in BELIEVE ME, a context-based paraphrase like *'trust me'* would be effective, in BELIEVE YOU ME, any possible context-based paraphrase, accurately reflecting its meaning, should be supported by grammatical or lexical directives e.g., *'you'd better trust me'*.

As regards BELIEVE IT OR NOT, I have pointed out that it is perhaps the most distinguishable of the three family members due to its syntax and the fact that it is not associated with affective semantic undertones available in the other two family members (see Chapter 4, section 4.5). In particular, I have argued that its differentiation lies in its inheriting the semantics of disjunction along with the factual reference, and contextual recoverability, involved in the use of the pronoun '*it*'. The latter crucially relates the construction to the syntactic configuration pattern of 'believe' + NP $_{(Object,\ human^-)}$. In this context, unlike the other two members of the family, which *invite* (or *demand*) faith/trust in the Speaker concerning the proposition /*p*/, this family member

declares the proposition /p/ as fact, thereby making inviting (or demanding) faith/trust irrelevant to the veridicality of the matter at hand.

A final, but particularly stimulating, point of differentiation among the members of the BELIEVE-family concerns the degree of productivity associated with their licensing schemas (see also section 7.3, Figure 7.2), which, as discussed in Chapter 4, is a shared quality by BELIEVE ME and BELIEVE IT OR NOT – though not to the same extent – but *not* by BELIEVE YOU ME. In other words, the template that licenses BELIEVE ME, namely a verb frequently – but not exclusively – paired with affective semantic undertones in the Imperative along with pronominal self-reference (i.e., V$_{(AFF)/IMP}$ +ME) licenses similar constructions with a potentially extended discourse scope such as TRUST ME, HATE ME,[181] WATCH ME[182] or BITE ME[183] (see Chapter 1 (section 1.5) and section 7.3). Likewise, BELIEVE IT OR NOT is licensed by the template V$_{IMP}$ + IT + OR + NOT $_{(disjunction)}$ that draws on the DISJUNCTION in the Imperative which enjoys a certain, but considerably more limited, degree of schematicity by licensing similar patterns, such

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[181] As in the following example retrieved from COCA: *"Even though there are still many problems that are quite widespread, we women facing these problems are not alone. We can STILL be empowered individuals from an empowered gender despite all the bullshit that we have to put up with. So whatever.* **Hate me** *all you want. Accuse me of being a troll, or some secret anti-feminist man, whatever you like."* (COCA, Blogpost: *Why "I prefer small boobs" isn't helping,* 2012)

[182] As in the following examples 1 (a) and 1 (b) retrieved from BNC exhibiting considerable differences in terms of compositionality.

1 (a): *"'It's not that easy,' Vic said. -'No?* **Watch me***!' Mungo said, full of bravado to impress Emily."*

(BNC, *The Forest of the Night,* Kelly Chris, 1991)

1 (b): *"Ryan was pretty sensitive, he could always tell when she was upset. - 'Yeah,* **watch me** *turn into a pumpkin any minute now.'"*

(BNC, *The Prince,* Brayfield, Celia, 1990)

[183] This Imperative also lends itself to further discussion in relation to semantics-pragmatics, discourse function, and prosodic contour which, in all likelihood, would be shown to relate to different degrees of compositionality as illustrated in 1(a) and 1(b) below.

1 (a): *"Come here.* **Bite me**, *woman, stab me, but I beg of you, don't cry at me. Don't cry? Don't cry?"*

COCA (*Pennyworth*, episode: *The Landlord's Daughter,*

Genre: Action, Crime, Drama, 2019)

1 (b): *"She's playing you, just like she played me. There's a guy I recently met said, "* **Bite me**, *asshole. " Don't... Don't be stupid, Pastor man. If you even are a pastor. You sure as hell don't seem like one to me."*

COCA (*Impastor*, episode: *Ex Communication,*

Genre: Comedy, Crime, 2015)

as LIKE IT OR NOT, although instances of creative exploitation of the licensing schema are always a possibility.[184]

Regardless of the differences detected, however, all the members of the family have been shown to share the common, core discourse function of marking unexpected information. This discourse function has been shown to relate to the proposition /*p*/ in the scope of each construction, and, by extension, to their framing effect in discourse, and their ability to delimit discourse units with fairly specifiable sub-components (see Chapter 4, section 4.6).

Chapter 5 focuses on THINK AGAIN with the aim of showing that it is as a well-entrenched construction with specific semantic-pragmatic and contextual properties, occupying the functional space of pre-emptive rebuttal of challenge. More specifically, in Chapter 5, I have sought to show that, although synchronically related to its fully-compositional counterpart (i.e., *'think again'*), the linguistic evidence collected points to the fact that THINK AGAIN exhibits properties that can neither be predicted by, nor exhausted in, a fully-compositional account (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.1) of the semantics of *'repetition of one's thinking process/activity'*. Rather, it merits an integrated constructional account of its distinct, formal, semantic-pragmatic and discourse properties that legitimise its treatment as a different construction in the

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[184] It is useful to note that disjunctions generally allow for a variety of verbs. This suggests that any possible restrictions should be sought in the Imperative morphological marking involved in this specific, constructional schema; a hypothesis that seems to be corroborated by the findings of a small-scale random-sampling in BNC which showcased only *'believe'* and *'like'* as possible candidates for the V_{IMP} slot of the construction. Similarly, a mini random sampling in COCA illustrated the consistency of the same two verbs as fillers of the V_{IMP} slot. Nonetheless, it also featured the following instance of creative exploitation (i.e., stretching) of the constructional schema:
*"A couple of nice white sailboats came behind on the same route, gleaming majestically, passed by and turned north toward Freeport. How they carry sail! It is said the two happiest moments of a man's life are: when he buys his boat; and when he sells his boat. **Use it or not**, it grows old eating your money. But on a day like this..."*
<div align="right">COCA (Blogpost: Heron: Part 2, My Brain Cancer Diary, 2012)</div>

language and the minds of the users. To this end, and supported by both qualitative and quantitative findings, I have contended that although THINK AGAIN features partly-inherited properties associated with the mental state verb *'think'* (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.1) and the adverb *'again'* (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2), its semantics still differs from that of its fully-compositional counterpart in that it *'expresses a reconsideration of a state of affairs (i.e., /p/) with a view to changing one's thoughts/opinion or actions'* (see Chapter 5, section 5.3).

With respect to its morphosyntax, THINK AGAIN has been shown to exhibit considerable fixedness of form paired with an intolerance to possible substitution of *'again'* by near synonyms. It is licensed by the broader constructional template of V$_{IMP}$ +AGAIN that enjoys a considerable degree of productivity in the language by further licensing similar patterns, such as START AGAIN, TRY AGAIN, SAY AGAIN and COME AGAIN, with respect to which two crucial observations can be made: a) their verbal slots allow for a variety of candidates, not necessarily restricted to the semantic class of mental state verbs, and b) they interestingly point to different degrees of compositionality, thereby stimulating further study as to whether they give rise to compositional and constructional counterparts, as was the case with THINK AGAIN.[185] Both observations are particularly insightful for the present work and, as such, they will be fully-addressed in the section

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[185] To briefly illustrate this point further, it might be useful to consider some of the Imperatives mentioned above in the following paired examples of corpus-retrieved instances that invite further research on their semantics-pragmatics, discourse function and, most likely, their prosodic contour as well.
1 (a) *"-'Do **come again**,' said Irene, following them to the front door. -'You're very kind.' - He smiled charmingly."*
(BNC, *Hearts in Hiding*, Grey Alice, 1985-1993)
1 (b) *"'What's that, Fred luvvie?' she called from the stove. 'Stupid bastards,' he mumbled on. -' **Come again**, Fred?' -'I said stupid bastards!'*
(BNC, *Man at the Sharp End*, Kilby M., 1985-1993)
2 (a) "Where did you get the gun from? -***Say again***. -Where did you get the gun from? -I collect weapons."
(BNC, *Central Weekend Live - part 1: television broadcast., 1985-1993*)
2 (b) *"The DNA match is on your father's side. I'm sorry. -**Say again**? -The vigilante is your sister. -No!"*
(COCA, TV Series: *Arrow*, 2019)

that follows (see Figure 7.2) in that they critically broaden the spectrum of analysis vis-à-vis dialogic perspectivisation.

In light of the above, the prototypical (in the sense of entrenchment) morphosyntactic form of THINK AGAIN is argued to heavily correlate with the use of the Imperative and its concomitant directive force, without, however, ruling out the possibility of schematicity through alternative forms of grammatically-induced directive meaning, such as its featuring in the Subjunctive or its syntactic dependance on modal verbs (i.e., *'should'*, *'must'*). Lexically-induced directive meaning has also been attested, encoded mainly through various lexical items (e.g., the verb *'encourage'* or *'urge'*) used in the immediate context of the construction. A further syntactic regularity of the construction is its noticeable resistance to negation and its considerably restricted positional flexibility as it exhibits a particular consistency in clause-/sentence-final position. Alternatively, the construction may also feature as an independent sentence which has been herein treated as a variant form of sentence-final positioning by virtue of the consistent backward-looking, i.e., discourse-responsive (as opposed to discourse-initiatory) scope of the construction.

Moreover, as already stated with reference to pragmatics, THINK AGAIN has consistently been associated with the speech act of challenge and, in particular, its pre-emptive rebuttal. This contributes to the enhanced, dialogic perspective that the construction imports to its context and its ability to provide a regulatory discourse interpretation framework for the interaction between the Speaker and the (assumed) Addressee. In this context of use, the construction has been further shown to manifest specific regularities and interdependencies focused upon in the light of its discourse function. More specifically, apart from its systematic co-occurrence with the Imperative or other lexical and grammatical directives, it has also been shown to strongly correlate

with preceding non-assertion in the form of interrogatives or the protases /p_s/ of conditional sentences, frequently – but not exclusively – including the verb *'think'* as well. A final, contextual regularity observed is the pervasive tendency of THINK AGAIN to collocate with stance elements, emotive lexis, and intensifiers, which further enhance its dialogic, intersubjective function associated with the evaluation of non-aligned perspectives in discourse (see also Geka *et al.*, 2020).

The combined presence of all the above has provided ample support to my hypothesis that the extended dialogic scope of the construction in discourse endows it with the ability to function as a fairly effective 'benchmark' for marking discourse 'boundaries'. It further corroborates the regulatory and scaffolding function of THINK AGAIN to the overall discourse flow in its immediate or broader context, always in conjunction with the specific proposition /p/ in its scope (see Chapter 5, section 5.5).

Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the data analysis section of the present dissertation by focusing on the constructional analysis of MIND YOU, which occupies the functional space of *summoning the Addressee's attention for the imposition of rectification/reformulation concerning the preceding or upcoming proposition /p/ in its scope*. The rectification/reformulation is shown to relate either to the *content* of /p/ or to its *linguistically accurate (from the Speaker's perspective) glossing*. Following the same methodological framework adopted for the other two case studies (see Chapter 6, sections 6.2.1 – 6.2.2), MIND YOU has also been argued to merit constructional status in the language. Albeit significantly more substantive than the other constructions examined, to the extent that it might – at a surface level at least – seem less interesting from a theoretical standpoint, MIND YOU has attracted considerable interest from other scholars as well (Quirk *et al.*, 1985; Brinton 2008; Bell 2009; Ranger 2015, for an overview see Chapter 6, section 6.2.3).

In the present account, however, MIND YOU has been focused upon on the basis of the relation between its partly-motivated semantics-pragmatics and its regulatory, dialogic (in the sense of attention-summoning) discourse scope. More specifically, as argued in Chapter 6, MIND YOU has inherited certain features from the dispositional mental state verb *'mind'* and the directive speech act force associated with its non-canonical Imperative. The construction is thus shown to be licensed by the broader template of V$_{IMP}$ + YOU $_{(post-posed\ Subject)}$ which enjoys a somewhat restricted degree of productivity as a licensing template since, apart from MIND YOU, it is mainly instantiated through receding in frequency constructions, such as MARK YOU or HARK YOU (for an overview see Figure 7.3).[186] Zeroing in on the pronominal, post-posed Subject involved in all the patterns, and chiefly on MIND YOU as the pattern of interest in the present work, I have argued that, on similar grounds with BELIEVE YOU ME, the post-posed Subject in MIND YOU is also assigned the θ-role of a Patient/Undergoer. This accounts for the emphatic summoning that the construction performs on the focused Addressee's attention in discourse and the profiling of the latter as a discourse entity that does not act, but is rather acted upon (see Chapter 6, section 6.3).

Further to the above, the Imperative morphological marking of MIND YOU has been shown to motivate its specific, intersubjective, regulatory discourse scope, which

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[186] The use of *'mark you'* may be further illustrated in the following BNC-retrieved example:
*"She took off her bright blue suit with the square shoulders, the outfit she had worn on the morning of her departure from Downing Street, that dreadful day, when betrayed by her Cabinet she had been persuaded ('against my better judgement, **mark you'**) to vote for John Major."*
(BNC, The Floating Voter, Author: Critchley Julian, 1985-1993).
The specific construction presents only 71 instances in the whole corpus (i.e., a raw frequency of 0.000063% per million tokens) which points to its limited use, at least, from a synchronic point of analysis. Interestingly, *'hark you'* yields no tokens in BNC and only 6 in COCA (i.e., it manifests 0.000000006% frequency per one billion tokens) as in the following example:
*"Everything went well for a week or a fortnight, and then the woman said, "**Hark you**, husband, this cottage is far too small for us, and the garden and yard are little…"*
(COCA, The Fisherman and His Wife - Brothers Grimm, 2012).
Apparently, the limited occurrence of *'hark you'* in the corpus suggests its extremely infrequent, if not obsolete, use in the language.

mainly concerns the marking of the preceding/upcoming rectification of a proposition /*p*/ available in its immediate discourse scope. Essentially functioning as an intersubjective marker, MIND YOU discloses the Speaker's meaning-making process in discourse and signals that the reformulation performed by the Speaker is required so as to retroactively restrict unwelcome, inferentially-augmented interpretations (i.e., /*p*$^+$/) for the proposition /*p*/, related either to its (accurate) means of linguistic expression or to its content altogether. This further accounts for the attested contextual regularities of the construction, which include an increased co-occurrence with grammatical or lexical negation and the use of concessive markers and intensifiers (primarily lexical repetition in cases whereby the construction is readily associated with metalinguistic interpretations) typically employed in Speaker-Addressee interaction foregrounding rectification and reformulation. It is in this context that MIND YOU has also been shown to delimit the discourse unit of which it, itself, forms a part through the dialogic projections that its use in discourse entails, and always in correlation with the proposition /*p*/ that is focused upon as in need of some form of rectification (see Chapter 6, section 6.4).

Having provided a synopsis of the main findings and insights that each chapter has contributed, in what follows I intend to offer a comprehensive overview of the theoretical and empirical contributions that the work at hand has hopefully offered, integrating all of them into the constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation revealed by the study.

7.3 Putting it all together: The contributions of the present study

Acknowledging that the outcomes of the multifaceted research enterprise undertaken by the present study would naturally extend to different fields of study, the aim of the

present section is to provide a targeted overview of the main theoretical and empirical contributions offered. These may be effectively summarised into the following three, each one displaying its own set of further, related proposals.

a) The emergence of a constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation

The present work is shown to have contributed novel insights into the properties of the constructions examined, their conditions of use and, most importantly, their forming part of a broader and well-entrenched *constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation,* whose motivation has been sought in the interplay between mental state verbs and the Imperative (including its sub-constructions). To offer a principled account of this motivation, the study traced all the constructions in focus back to their licensing schemas, thus revealing their intricate 'lattice' of *complete* and *partial-* inheritance relations (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.4). In so doing, it crucially brought to the fore that the specific constructions not only embed themselves in the broad network, i.e., the *'overarching parent schema',* of dialogic perspectivisation motivated by the Imperative, but they further form part of a specific sub-network *within* this schema motivated by mental state verbs.

Following the above, my aim in this sub-section is twofold. On the one hand, I aim to provide a schematic summary of the specific, dialogic sub-network, and its constructional members, by means of *box notation diagrams* (see Kay and Fillmore 1999; Fried and Östman 2004; Nikiforidou 2015). On the other, I wish to call attention to the productivity of the licensing schemas of the constructions involved that point to the existence of a yet broader dialogic perspectivisation network which, in the absence of constructional endeavours as the present one, would have remained undisclosed.

In line with the above-mentioned aims, Figure 7.1 below ventures a box notation for the dialogic network springing out of the findings of the present study. Although not intended as a strict formalisation of any sort, Figure 7.1 is expected to shed light on the crucial commonalities of the constructions, placed in nested boxes at the bottom part of the diagram so as to signal their *direct* and *complete* inheritance of all the properties of the higher-order dialogic perspectivisation network (ranging from maximally- to minimally-negotiatory) of which they are a part.[187]

Figure 7.1: Dialogic perspectivisation: The network in box notation form

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[187] For a detailed discussion of maximal to minimal negotiation, see section 7.5.2.

Aligning with CxG conventions, the top part of the box notation diagram in Figure 7.1 above features the prag(amatics), sem(antics) and syn(tactic) attributes of the broader overarching constructional schema (i.e., *'the parent'*) inherited by all the constructions included in the nested boxes of the lower part.

The first nested box on the left of the diagram illustrates the interconnection of the lexically-related family of the BELIEVE constructions. It thus uses a bold compact line connecting all the family members starting with BELIEVE ME (see Figure 7.3 below) which occupies the highest position in the diagram, followed by BELIEVE IT OR NOT which is placed at the midpoint of the compact line. The medial placing of the latter suggests that, although unmistakably related to BELIEVE ME, its disjunctive syntax, and its association with the syntactic configuration 'believe' + NP $_{(Object, human^-)}$ (see Figure 7.4 below), endow it with specific properties that render it a different, though related, construction. The final constructional 'sibling', namely BELIEVE YOU ME, is directly linked to BELIEVE ME (see Figure 7.5 below). This schematic convention is intended to signal not only the function of BELIEVE YOU ME as a variant form of BELIEVE ME, but also the direct inheritance-based relation holding between the two. At the same time, the placing of BELIEVE YOU ME in the lowest position of the diagram serves to signal its *'singleton'*, and thus more constrained, status in the language, 'earned' by its unique morphosyntax. Expectedly, the other two constructions, namely THINK AGAIN (see Figure 7.6 below) and MIND YOU (see Figure 7.7 below) occupy the second and third nested boxes, respectively, thus signalling their independent discussion as members of the dialogic perspectivisation network identified.

Before proceeding to offering box notation diagrams for all the individual constructions involved in Figure 7.1, I propose that the productivity of their licensing schemas should receive special attention in that it points to the presence of an even broader network of

dialogic perspectivisation. To illustrate this point further, Figure 7.2 embeds all the related, licensing templates in a *funnel-like* representational 'shortcut'. Adopted as a convenient image schema for the reader, and not as a formalisation of the frequency of the patterns involved in it,[188] the funnel demonstrates that in unveiling the properties of the first construction of each tier below, the study ultimately discloses the existence of an even broader network.

$V_{(AFF)/IMP}$ +ME
e.g., BELIEVE ME, TRUST ME, WATCH ME, HATE ME, BITE ME
etc.,

V_{IMP} +AGAIN
e.g., THINK AGAIN, START AGAIN, TRY AGAIN, SAY
AGAIN, COME AGAIN etc.,

V_{IMP} +IT+OR+NOT
e.g., BELIEVE IT OR NOT, LIKE IT OR NOT

V_{IMP}+YOU$_{(post-posed\ Subj)}$
e.g., MIND YOU, MARK YOU

$V_{AFF/IMP}$+YOU+ME
i.e., BELIEVE
YOU ME

Figure 7.2: The Imperative-based licensing templates in a funnel-like representation

Focusing on this broader dialogic network, I observe that although the Imperative appears to be once more a given, the verbal candidates for the patterns of Figure 7.2 are not restricted to the semantic class of mental state verbs. A further observation to be

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[188] Note that the present study acknowledges that certain patterns might be considerably less frequent, as is the case with *'mark you'* and *'hark you',* the latter not included at all in Figure 7.7 given its obsolete status in the language (see Chapter 1, section 1.5, and section 7.2). Accordingly, it also recognises that certain patterns licensed by the templates included in the funnel above enjoy particularly high (raw) frequency, and in this sense, considerable entrenchment in the minds of language users.

made at this point is that the remaining patterns (i.e., constructions) in each tier of the funnel lend themselves to further study with respect to *compositionality* in that, as was the case with the constructions under study, they are also strongly hypothesised not to exhaust themselves in fully-compositional accounts. If this hypothesis is confirmed, then the findings of the work at hand should be interpreted as offering a 'baseline' for the association of the Imperative with gradient degrees of non-compositionality (i.e., idiomaticity); a line of thinking that, in view of the corpus-retrieved data presented in section 7.2, seems solid enough to stimulate further study.

Informed by the above, I will now shift my attention to offering a box notation diagram of the prag(matics), sem(antics) and syn(tactic) attributes of each individual construction examined and included in Figure 7.1. Starting with the BELIEVE-family, Figures 7.3 – 7.5 below showcase the properties of each member belonging to the family. Each box diagram includes nested boxes with *the constituent structure,* i.e., the specific component parts of each construction, (cf. Fried and Östman 2004) which occupy its bottom part. The nested boxes spell out the information involved in the syn(tax), sem(antics) and prag(matics) attributes of every individual component that navigates upwards (hence the use of upward arrows) leading to the motivation of each overarching construction which, expectedly, occupies the top part of each diagram.

Figure 7.3 presents the box notation diagram of BELIEVE ME. The bottom part of the diagram involves two nested boxes which feature its components and their properties that motivate, and in fact, license the semantics-pragmatics and discourse function of the said construction. As illustrated below, the construction inherits the affective, semantic undertones of the verb *'believe',* available in the 'believe' +NP (Obj, human+) syntactic configuration, which are further reinforced though the pronominal self-

reference expressed by *'me'*.[189] In this context, the semantics of the construction in focus consists in the *expression of faith/trust in the Speaker* regarding the content of a proposition $/p/$, which is marked by the use of the construction in discourse as *unexpected*, i.e., as counter to the (assumed) Addressee's expectations.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                              BELIEVE ME                                   │
│                                          Inherits DIALOGIC PERSPECTIVISATION │
│                            Inherits BELIEVE + NP [grfn Obj, human⁺ […]]   │
│                                                           Inherits ME      │
│   prag [mark /p/ as unexpected]                                           │
│        [invite faith/trust in the Speaker (S)]                            │
│                                                                           │
│   sem [have faith/trust in the Speaker (S)]                               │
│                                                                           │
│   syn  ⎡ [cat V], [mood IMP]                          ⎤                   │
│        ⎣ [max⁺, V_finite, base, neg⁻, Subj⁻, Obj⁺]    ⎦                   │
│   ┌──────────────────────────────┐  ┌────────────────────────────────┐   │
│   │ prag↑ [...]                  │  │ prag ↑ [...]                    │   │
│   │                              │  │ sem↑ [context-retrievable       │   │
│   │ sem↑ [have faith/trust]      │  │        self-reference]          │   │
│   │                              │  │ role [ rel [grfn Obj] ]         │   │
│   │ lxm  believe                 │  │       θ-role Theme              │   │
│   │                              │  │ lxm   me                        │   │
│   └──────────────────────────────┘  └────────────────────────────────┘   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Figure 7.3: BELIEVE ME in box notation form

Moving on to BELIEVE YOU ME, the present study proposes a box notation that reflects its status as the morphosyntactically substantive variant form of BELIEVE ME. In view of this, Figure 7.4 below captures the direct inheritance between BELIEVE YOU ME and its licensing template, i.e., BELIEVE ME (see also Figure 7.1), but at the same time further demonstrates that BELIEVE YOU ME gains its status as a distinct construction on account of its non-canonical Imperative and the θ-role of its post-posed Subject. The prag(matics) and sem(antics) attributes of the latter, consisting in *enhanced focus* and

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[189] Following Fried and Östman (2004), the notation [...] is herein used in certain prag(matics) attributes as a typographical shortcut for indicating that although a value merits further specification, it will presently not be spelled out for reasons of focus and lack of space. To this end, in all the subsequent box notation diagrams, the prag(matics) attributes of the individual, lexical components of the constructions will either carry the notation **prag↑** […] or will include a formalisation of generic properties, such as ⁺/⁻ focus.

　
lack of volition, respectively, motivate the prag(matics) of the construction, i.e., its *demanding of faith/trust in the Speaker (S)* concerning a proposition /p/, marked as unexpected.

BELIEVE YOU ME

Inherits DIALOGIC PERSPECTIVISATION
Inherits BELIEVE ME
Inherits YOU

prag [mark /p/ as unexpected]
[demand faith/trust in the Speaker (S)]

sem [have faith/trust in the Speaker (S)]

syn [cat V], [mood IMP]
[max$^+$, V$_{finite, base}$, neg-, Subj$^+$, Obj$^+$]

---

prag$_↑$ [...]

sem$_↑$ [have faith/trust in the Speaker (S)]

lxm *believe*

---

prag ↑ [focus$^+$]

sem$_↑$[context-retrievable reference to the Addressee (A), volition$^-$]

role [rel [grfn Subj]]
[θ-role Patient]

lxm *you*

---

prag ↑ [...]

sem$_↑$ [context-retrievable self-reference]

role [rel [grfn Obj]]
θ-role Theme

lxm *me*

Figure 7.4: BELIEVE YOU ME in box notation form

The final member of the family, namely BELIEVE IT OR NOT, is also shown to mark a proposition /p/ as unexpected. Significantly though, it inherits properties which distance it from requesting (varying from *inviting* to *demanding*) faith/trust in the Speaker but correlate it with *declaring /p/ as fact,* thus ultimately rendering /p/ impervious to any possible objections concerning its veridicality. This is accounted for by the fact that the

construction inherits the higher order construction of DISJUNCTION along with the factual reference, and contextual recoverability, involved in the use of the pronoun '*it*'. The former, i.e., the DISJUNCTION, allows the construction to configure the two opposing construals of reality available in the (assumed) Addressee's state of mind as equally valid or possible. The latter, i.e., the use of the pronoun *'it'*, crucially relates the construction to inheriting *contextual recoverability* and *factuality* available in the syntactic configuration of *'believe'* + NP (Object, human⁻). In assigning factuality, therefore, and in openly accepting that the Addressee's siding with either of the two equally possible construals of reality involved in the disjunction could not possibly affect the factual status of the proposition /*p*/, the Speaker ultimately cancels the relevance of belief to the matter at hand. Against this background, the semantics of the construction does not consist in having faith/trust in the Speaker about a proposition /*p*/ but in *accepting /p/ as fact* regardless of its degree of unexpectedness.

On these grounds, the present study proposes that the box notation diagram for BELIEVE IT OR NOT takes the following form illustrated by Figure 7.5 below.

BELIEVE IT OR NOT

Inherits DIALOGIC PERSPECTIVISATION
Inherits DISJUNCTION
Inherits BELIEVE + NP [grfn Obj, human⁻ […]]
Inherits IT

prag [mark /p/ as unexpected]
[declare /p/ as fact]

sem [accept /p/ as fact]

syn [cat V], [mood IMP]
[max⁺, V_{finite, base}, Subj⁻, Obj⁺]

prag↑ [...]	**prag** ↑ [...]	**prag** ↑ [...]	**prag** ↑ [...]
sem↑ [accept as true]	**sem**↑ [expressing context-retrievable factuality] **role** [rel [grfn Obj]] θ-role Theme	**sem**↑ [expressing alternatives]	**sem**↑ [expressing negation]
lxm *believe*	**lxm** *it*	**lxm** *or*	**lxm** *not*

Figure 7.5: BELIEVE IT OR NOT in box notation form

Turning to THINK AGAIN, the construction has been argued to inherit the semantics of *'consideration'* available in the verb *'think'*, paired with the *reiterative-restitutive* and *weakening-concessive* semantics of the conjunctive adverb *'again'*. The combination of these two, motivates the semantics of *'reconsideration'* available in the construction, further associated with prompting *a change of one's opinion or course of action in relation to /p/*. Along these lines and situating itself within the network of dialogic perspectivisation discussed in Figure 7.1, THINK AGAIN is shown to pragmatically perform the speech act of (*pre-emptive) rebuttal of challenge* of the (implied) Addressee's assumed line of thinking in relation to /p/. The latter, as argued, is typically expressed in context through a form of *non-assertion*, such as a *direct question* or the *protasis of a conditional sentence*. In this context, and although acknowledging that, as

discussed in Chapter 5 (see Table 5.1), THINK AGAIN allows for minimal formal variations (i.e., partial schematicity), the systematic occurrence of the construction in the Imperative along with its frequent embedding in the apodosis of CONDITIONALS argue for singling this out as the prototypical form of the construction to be described in Figure 7.6 below. Following Fried and Östman (2004), this entrenched occurrence of the construction is acknowledged in its syn(tactic) attribute illustrated below by means of "*the single quote prose box notation convention*" (*ibid.*:19).

THINK AGAIN

Inherits DIALOGIC PERSPECTIVISATION
Inherits THINK
Inherits AGAIN

prag [(pre-emptive) rebuttal of challenge]

sem [reconsider */p/* towards changing opinion or action]

syn [cat V], [mood IMP]
[max$^+$, V$_{finite, base}$, Subj$^-$, Adv Compl]
['entrenched instance in the apodosis slot of CONDITIONALS']

prag ↑[...]

sem↑ [have an opinion; consider]

lxm *think*

prag ↑[...]

sem↑ [repetition, restitution, weakening-concession]

lxm *again*

Figure 7.6: THINK AGAIN in box notation form

Finally, turning to MIND YOU, the present study has argued that the construction inherits the dispositional semantics of the verb *'mind'* consisting in *'showing care and paying attention'*. Furthermore, as was the case with BELIEVE YOU ME, its post-posed pronominal Subject has been shown to assume the θ-role of a Patient, thus not only

inheriting considerable discourse focus, but also lack of agentivity and volition. The combination of these informs the prag(matics) of the construction that consists in emphatically *summoning the Addressee's attention* so that *the rectification/reformulation of /p/ can be meaningfully imposed*.

Following the above, the box notation diagram of MIND YOU takes the form illustrated in Figure 7.7 below.

MIND YOU

Inherits DIALOGIC PERSPECTIVISATION
Inherits MIND
Inherits YOU

prag [summon the Addressee's (A's) attention]
[impose rectification/reformulation of /*p*/]

sem [care; pay attention]

syn [cat V], [mood IMP]
[max$^+$, V$_{finite, base}$, neg-, Subj$^+$]

prag ↑[...]

sem↑[care; pay attention]

lxm *mind*

prag ↑[focus$^+$]

sem↑[context-retrievable
reference to the
Addressee (A), volition$^-$]
role [rel [grfn Subj]]
[θ-role Patient]
lxm *you*

Figure 7.7: MIND YOU in box notation form

All the above crucially confirm that the constructions comprising the network in question are amenable to a linguistic treatment that does not relegate them to the status of arbitrary formations in the language, but rather foregrounds their systematicity, (partial-) schematicity, and considerable interrelation with other more productive constructions in the language, of which the Imperative markedly stands out. In the context of this discussion, the findings of the present work may profitably extend to, at

least, two more fields of study: a) the field of Lexicography and b) the field of Applied Linguistics with emphasis on Language Instruction (LI) practices and Second Language Acquisition (SLA) environments.

As regards Lexicography (see Croft and Sutton 2017; Lyngfelt, Borin, Ohara and Torrent 2018), the findings of the work at hand become relevant in that they can inform a more precise and refined description of the patterns under study which, in traditional lexicographic practice, have *commonly* (and, as shown, occasionally *only optionally*) been restricted to the status of purely idiomatic expressions. As demonstrated, however, such an approach essentially limits our understanding of the patterns, conceals their identifiable interrelationship with other constructions, their internal, multi-levelled complexity, their consistent contextual regularities, and their conditions of use in discourse.

The field of Applied Linguistics, with emphasis on Language Instruction (LI) practices and Second Language Acquisition (SLA) environments, also lists itself among the fields of study benefitting from the present work. In particular, acknowledging the burgeoning scholarly interest in the fields of Applied Cognitive Construction Grammar (Boers and Lindstromberg 2008; Kristiansen, Achard, Dirven and Ruíz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2008; Holme 2012; Newby 2015) and Pedagogical Construction Grammar (Holme 2012; Torres-Martínez 2015, 2016; De Knop and Gilquin 2016), I propose that the findings of the study at hand may well contribute to research in the direction of establishing effective teaching practices for both native and foreign learners of English.

Given that CxG promotes a holistic treatment of language with no 'core' or 'periphery', but rather a continuum-like organisation ranging from highly schematic to fully substantive patterns, I contend that the findings of the study could significantly benefit

the formal instruction not only of the specific constructions per se, but also of those mentioned as their form-wise 'siblings' on account of their common licensing template. In this respect, the present research project may contribute to the effective development of teaching resources designed to address challenges associated mainly with the following parameters:

a) The *involvement of mental state verbs* in such patterns, which by definition pose as demanding candidates for language instruction not only in L2 but also in L1 teaching settings (Asplin 2002; Ifantidou 2009) due to their *referential opacity* (see Gilette *et al*., 1999; Slaughter *et al.*, 2008) and their internal polysemy (Bertuccelli Papi 2000) which complicates their formal teaching to learners. Any formal method of instruction (see Papafragou, Cassidy and Gleitman 2007; de Mulder 2015; Carr, Slade, Yuill, Sullivan and Ruffman 2018) incorporating insights similar to the ones contributed by the present work is expected to benefit learners, as it will promote awareness of the identifiable variability couched in this semantic class.

b) The *treatment of the idiomaticity* involved in the patterns which is generally acknowledged to pose a significant challenge in teaching-learning environments (Liontas 2003, 2015; De Knop and de Rycker 2008; Boers 2011). In particular, I propose that CxG-based studies, as the present one, can effectively accommodate patterns placed at various midpoints of the idiomatic continuum (De Knop, Boers and de Rycker 2010) by pointing to the motivation of their idiomaticity (i.e., their non-compositionality). Interestingly, as shown in this case, this idiomaticity may relate to the morphological marking of the Imperative, which is itself addressed as a polyfunctional construction (Stefanowitsch 2003), thereby posing challenges to language learners,

particularly in relation to politeness considerations (see Sifianou and Tzanne 2010; Bella, Sifianou and Tzanne 2015) and/or its special pragmatics (Ifantidou and Tzanne 2012). Seen from this perspective, the findings of the study are also expected to cast light on the versatility of the Imperative itself and the way it motivates the semantics-pragmatics and (frequently extended) discourse scope of the language patterns that inherit it. To put it differently, by using the constructions at hand as cases in point, language instructors and learners may indirectly profit from identifying the multi-purpose use (other than just ordering) of the IMPERATIVE as a construction in the language and its motivating interrelationship with idiomaticity and dialogicity.

In summarising all the above and identifying the specifics of the constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation, the present study has provided ample, empirical support of the regulatory, dialogic discourse scope common to all the constructions belonging to this network. This contribution then merits its own independent discussion, in (*b*) below as it sparks further constructional research interest in the area of discourse units to be fully addressed in section (*c*).

b) From Philosophy to Linguistics: The linguistic attestation of dialogicity

Following what has been hitherto discussed, dialogicity and its counterpart monologicity have been of particular interest to the present study for two main reasons. The first one relates to the much-warranted linguistic attestation of dialogicity on the basis of naturally occurring language data (see section 7.5.1), progressively leading to a definitional refinement of this philosophical concept (see section 7.5.2). The latter relates to the confirmation of the literature-cited hypothesis (Traugott 2005, 2006; Makkonen-Craig 2014) – also shared by the present work – that certain language patterns may be privileged to inherently function as indexes of dialogicity in discourse.

In light of the above and drawing on Traugott's (2008) definition of dialogicity, as well as Schwenter's (2000) classification framework that operationalises differences between *dialogicity-monologicity* and *dialoguality-monologuality*, the work at hand has systematically revealed aspects of dialogicity as exhibited by the members of the constructional network in the form of perspectivisation and intersubjectivity. In so doing, the study has contributed to the empirical, linguistic construal of the concept and has further accounted for its motivation in the language by expanding on the findings of similar works in the field (Traugott 2010; Makkonen-Craig 2014). In particular, adding to what has been previously proposed, the data at hand illustrate that the orientation towards a *'dissenting Other'* (Bakhtin 1979/1986:77) is linguistically motivated by the Imperative (including its non-canonical instances) and the use of mental state verbs, which typically position the Speaker and his/her beliefs in a landscape of different belief systems expressed by the (assumed/implied) Addressees. It has also been illustrated that, in certain cases, by analogy with what has been proposed in the relevant literature for scalars and concessives (see König 1991; Schwenter 2000; Traugott 2010; Makkonen-Craig 2014), dialogicity is also motivated by the disjunctive syntax of the patterns as in the case of BELIEVE IT OR NOT (see Chapter 4, section 4.5). In this context, the study has provided empirical confirmation for the hypothesis that language patterns associated with non-assertive communicative uses pose as highly likely candidates for dialogicity because of the features they inherit. This also accounts for the noticeable predilection of the constructions in focus to co-occur with evaluative expressions and intensifiers typically employed in cases whereby different perspectives are assessed (see section 7.2 above).

Further to the above, and in line with research in the field of discourse units (Selting 1998, 2000), the dialogic projections triggered by the use of the constructions in

discourse have been shown to correlate with the proposition /*p*/ in their scope, their regulatory function in discourse, and their ability to delimit the discourse units in which they occur. The latter will be the focus of (*c*) below in that they constitute another contribution of the present study kindling further interest in the field of conventionalised discourse constructions and the delimitation of discourse units.

c)   Constructions, discourse units and discourse-level phenomena: The desideratum of expanding the spectrum of analysis

In line with the growing scholarly interest of CxG practitioners to venture into maximalist and usage-based (typically corpus-based) discourse analyses, the present work has sought to assess the ability of constructional frameworks to do so effectively. Focusing on discourse unit delimitation and making a case for the suitability of CxG as a model geared in this direction, the study at hand has contributed to the field of Discourse Analysis in a twofold way. It has proposed a more fine-grained but, at the same time, holistic treatment of the hitherto elusive concept of *discourse units* which offers reliable insights into their scope and their conventionalised, and interdependent, components. Further to these, the study has advocated a constructional approach to *discourse unit delimitation*, according to which, constructions, as 'key stakeholders' in discourse structure, may function as fairly reliable 'benchmarks' for discourse unit delimitation practices.

Adhering to the holistic line of thinking mentioned above, the study has adopted an *all-encompassing*, *gestalt-like* approach towards discourse units (Selting 1998; Degand and Simon 2009), which, in the framework of the present work, are construed as interactionally complete stretches of discourse, lexico-syntactically, semantically, and pragmatically specifiable (see Chapter 2, section 2.5.4). Moreover, arguing against strict divides between syntax and prosody upheld by *structure-product* (see Chapter 2,

section 2.5.1.1) and *interaction-process* discourse models (see Chapter 2, section 2.5.1.2), the present work acknowledges that both paradigms provide useful insights into the formation and delimitation of discourse units which are, however, naturally integrated in constructional frameworks that view prosody and syntax as crucial parts of the form pole of constructions. In this respect, CxG as a model poses no exigencies of mutual-exclusive siding with either paradigm. Rather, it brings the insights of both paradigms together under the notion of constructions. This is also reflected in the present CxG-based account which has empirically confirmed that discourse units are amenable to a constructional treatment that addresses holistically all their formal, lexico-semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic properties (see section 7.4). These properties (both inherited and idiosyncratic) have been shown to be the outcome of the association of the discourse stretches examined with the constructions in focus, their specific discourse effect reflected in a *forward-* or *backward*-looking scope, and their contribution to the overall discourse 'architecture'. It is through this 'framing' effect that the constructions regulate the discourse units that contain them by delimiting their conventionalised and interdependent sub-components and by setting them apart from other neighbouring or upcoming units built in the incremental flow of discourse.

The above findings seem to also contribute to recent developments in CxG. In particular, they serve as the testing ground for constructional frameworks to commit to undertaking more research challenges posed by phenomena sensitive to the incremental, and typically fluid, status of conventionalised discourse. Offering discourse-level constructional accounts is not only fully compatible with a holistic, usage-based model, but it further constitutes a methodological and theoretical desideratum of CxG. In this sense, the present work has both offered insights into the field of discourse studies and has also expanded the spectrum of analysis of CxG studies

by lending substantial, empirical support to its aim of venturing analyses beyond the word level (see Groom 2019).

Hoping that the points outlined above will be useful in further CxG and multi-disciplinary research (see also section 7.5), I would now like to turn my attention to the limitations of the present study which warrant their own, independent section of discussion in 7.4 below.

7.4 Limitations of the present study

Given that the present work relies on a research design that combines both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis, its limitations are quite expectedly also related to specific quantitative or qualitative considerations which, however, in certain cases exhibit noticeable bidirectionality.

Starting with a quantitative limitation, the methodological decisions related to conventional, statistical hypothesis testing have presented certain challenges. More specifically, I acknowledge that adopting a slightly less strict margin of error (i.e., 10%) and confidence level (i.e., 90%) compared to the conventional ones, set at 5% and 95% (i.e., p-value<0.05), respectively, has resulted in a greater degree of tolerance to uncertainty and error. At the same time, it has also restricted the demands in the number of tokens required for the data pools examined. Although, as already explained (see Chapter 3, section 3.4.2), this was done on the grounds of securing a more manageable, multiparameter research project involving five different language patterns in two corpora, it could be argued that the research outcomes might differ had the data pools consisted of more tokens and less tolerance to error.

Fully aware of this limitation from the outset of data collection, I committed myself to securing – through alternative means – that the validity of the findings of the present

work would not be affected by this necessary, methodological compromise. Therefore, to mitigate potential, undesirable effects and secure the greatest possible representativeness for the sample collected, I systematically focused my attention on examining the internal reliability of the data by measuring the Cronbach's alpha (α) coefficient for all the frequency sets examined. As discussed (see Chapter 3, section 3.4.4, and Appendix II for Chapters 4-6), in the vast majority of cases, the resulting (α) coefficient was systematically high, sometimes almost reaching its highest numerical value of absolute 1. This confirmed that the items examined shared considerable covariance and could therefore be confidently argued to reliably measure the same underlying concept (Thompson 1992; Osburn 2000; Ritter 2010). Furthermore, the fact that non-parametric tests have consistently been employed for the frequency sets examined in all constructions has significantly maximised the robustness of the study, thereby securing greater resistance to potential errors (Conover 1999; Sprent and Smeeton 2001).

An additional limitation of the study, associated with qualitative considerations, relates to identifying a specific prosodic contour for each of the constructions examined. Understandably, this limitation relates to technical issues involved in the use of the corpora consulted. More specifically, COCA does not provide access to audio files for any of the constructions encountered in concordance lines originating in spoken discourse.[190] On the other hand, Sketch Engine (used for accessing BNC) provides only minimal access to audio files for a restricted number of concordance lines originating in spoken discourse.[191] In accepting this as a limitation of the study at hand, I presently

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[190] It should be stressed that this refers to the version of COCA available in 2017 which marked the year of the data collection included in the present work.

[191] Using THINK AGAIN as a case in point, it might be useful to note that Sketch Engine provides access to only 6 audio files featuring the pattern. Their poor audio quality, however, could not possibly allow for further research.

restrict myself to suggesting that examining the possibility of a specific prosodic contour for all the constructions features as a desideratum for future research. Work in this direction is expected not only to be fully compatible with the constructional account offered herein but also provide further support to its main line of argumentation concerning the contribution of constructions to discourse unit delimitation (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 3).

This methodological limitation notwithstanding, the present study has offered a *valuable, preliminary testing ground* for the empirical confirmation that constructions are in fact important in the delimitation of discourse structure. The latter, however, is expected to be fully elucidated once the investigation of prosodic considerations is correlated with the findings of the present account. The research question to be addressed in this case would be whether the construction- and prosody-driven delimitation exhibit a fully-congruent mapping or whether prosody exhibits a more expanded or, alternatively, a more restricted 'packaging effect' of discourse units (see Chapter 2, section 2.5.2).

The last limitation of the present study to be mentioned at this point relates to the fact that it did not channel its efforts into examining the correlation between the constructions identified and their possible predilection for specific genres and monologual or dialogual contexts. This is indeed a very engaging area for further exploration that could possibly yield interesting insights into the preferences of the Speakers regarding the use of the specific constructions.

Inspiring as the above may seem, venturing into a genre or text-type level examination of the construction-members of the network would necessarily commit the present work to examining several other parameters – including the parameter of dialoguality-

monologuality – which would result in a counterproductive proliferation of research foci for a doctoral dissertation. To this end, I have consciously narrowed down my focus of investigation for the sake of greater precision and more targeted results, setting the issue of genres aside for further research. The same holds true for examining the preferences of the constructions in relation to monologual and dialogual texts and contexts; an issue already plagued with definitional challenges associated with hybrid forms such as voice-overs in videos, TV and radio reports, announcement of news, lectures, and read-aloud speeches in front of audiences, to name but a few. Apparently, the complexity in approaching and defining cases like these arises from the fact that they technically require that one participant, i.e., the Speaker, be present (monologual), but the discourse produced is clearly addressed to an audience, i.e., an Addressee who may not, however, be co-present in the interaction ('dialogue in absentia' (White 2009)). Equally interestingly, research focusing exclusively on dialogual contexts of use could also serve as valuable testing ground for the perlocutionary effect of the constructions on the Addressee(s). For instance, given that the speech acts of the patterns examined are associated with inviting or demanding faith/trust in the Speaker (as in the BELIEVE ME and BELIEVE YOU ME), declaring /p/ as fact (as in BELIEVE IT OR NOT), pre-emptively rebutting challenge (as in THINK AGAIN) or summoning the Addressee's attention for the imposition of rectification (as in MIND YOU), it might indeed be particularly interesting to examine if the Addressee accepts the Speaker's 'voice' and conforms to what is being asked. However, given that my primary objective in the present research project has been to set a baseline for the constructional framework identified by establishing its (inheritance-based) motivation, its collocational preferences and discourse functions, areas of exploration relating to Addressee perlocutionary uptake fell outside my research scope. Nevertheless, I do

acknowledge that the above lines of investigation readily offer themselves for future research mainly from the standpoint of Discourse and Conversation Analysis (Wooffitt 2005), thereby suggesting that the outcomes of the present work may also be of relevance to these fields of study.

As the above indicate, limitations may pose as a form of 'necessary evil', but they also contribute essentially to methodological and theoretical decisions as well as areas for future research and exploration. The latter will be the exclusive focus of the upcoming section 7.5.

7.5 Implications and suggestions for future research

The present section proposes areas for future investigation that relate to a) *the additional phrasal patterns* identified at the initial stages of the present work, b) the study of *dialogicity,* and c) the concept of *discourse markers*. Section 7.5.1, therefore, briefly recounts the need for further investigation of the additional phrasal, constructional patterns yielded by the initial, preliminary corpus queries. I propose that these patterns most readily offer themselves for further similar research endeavours. Sections 7.5.2 and 7.5.3 respectively sketch two proposals for further research which are expected to extend our understanding of the concepts of dialogicity and discourse markers mentioned above. To this end, both sections critically advance considerations that – to the best of my knowledge – have not received adequate attention in previous research and may well function as the springboard for future work.

7.5.1: Expanding the data pool: More phrasal patterns to examine

As discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.1), and is here briefly repeated for convenience, my initial corpus research had yielded twenty different patterns that could be conducive to research focusing on dialogicity. As summarised in Table 7.1 that follows, the

patterns have been tentatively classified in the categories of: a) *directives*, in the form of Imperatives, b) *non-assertive audience-oriented* expressions (in the form of questions or protases of conditional sentences) with occasional explicit Speaker or Addressee lexicalisation, c) expressions used for *reformulation* practices, closely associated with the Speaker's intentions to express *hesitation*, *honesty*, etc., and d) *adverbial/adjectival phrases* signalling intersubjectivity. [192]

Expressions Identified	Categorisation
1) Believe me	*Directives* in the form of Imperatives
2) Believe you me	
3) Believe it or not	
4) Think again	
5) Mind you	
6) Guess what	
7) Trust me	
8) Rest assured	
9) Like it or not	
10) Hard to believe?	*Non-assertive audience-oriented expressions* (in the form of questions or protases of conditional sentences) with occasional explicit Speaker or Addressee lexicalisation
11) If you ask me	
12) If you know what I mean	
13) You see	Expressions used for *reformulation* practices, likely to encode *hesitation, intentions towards the Addressee*
14) I mean	
15) To tell you the truth	
16) To be frank	
17) To be honest	
18) To think	
19) Never mind	Adverbial phrasal patterns signalling *intersubjectivity*
20) Fair enough	

Table 7.1: Patterns signalling non-aligned perspectivisation in discourse

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[192] It should be noted that, as discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.1), this classification – particularly for the patterns listed in 10 - 20 in Table 7.1 above – is *tentative* and *provisional* given that no research has been conducted on their properties and their discourse function. Consequently, any further research attempting to provide a more fine-grained classification or address liminal cases, such as the pattern *'never mind'/'Nevermind'* (see Chapter 3) is strongly encouraged.

Acknowledging the need to arrive at a manageable research project with more fine-grained outcomes though, the research scope has been restricted to the first five patterns examined herein, although still suggesting that the remaining patterns are likely to function as markers of dialogicity with an extended discourse scope. I further contend that by using these patterns as cases in point, future research might not only yield valuable insights into their (strongly hypothesised) dialogic function but also reveal interesting aspects of the expression and motivation of dialogicity in the language in general. The latter will be the exclusive focus of the upcoming section 7.5.2.

7.5.2: Dialogicity: Variability and perspectivisation - The emergence of a new definition

Dialogicity has been one of the main issues addressed in the present work. Wishing to bridge the gap between philosophical and linguistic accounts, I have herein systematically directed my efforts to deciphering how dialogicity, as a philosophical concept, can be linguistically attested in naturally occurring discourse data. To this end and capitalising on Traugott's (2008) seminal definition and Schwenter's (2000) related operationalising framework, I have approached the concept (and by extension the data collected) from the standpoint of *"lack of homogeneity in orientation"* and *"multiple perspectivization either within or across turns"* (Traugott 2008:143). Apart from perspectivisation, however, Traugott's definition underscores that dialogicity also *"promotes the negotiation of non-aligned perspectives to others or to imaginary interlocutors"* (*ibid.*:143), which is *not* available in its counterpart, i.e., monologicity. The latter, as argued by Traugott (2008), is *"typically associated with an 'authoritative voice' discourse that is not characterized by encouragement or negotiation of meaning or viewpoint."* (*ibid.*:143). Focusing on dialogicity, this definitional treatment

essentially suggests that the concept consists of two fundamental features: a) *perspectivisation* and b) *encouragement or negotiation of viewpoints.*

Although Traugott's (2008) definition of dialogicity has been of great theoretical significance, the data at hand point to the need for revision as regards the above two fundamental features (Geka in preparation). To briefly illustrate how this need for definitional refinement arises, let us consider the following on the basis of the findings of the present work.

In examining the constructional BELIEVE-family, I have concluded that the construction members share similarities while also manifesting identifiable differences. In particular, in discussing the partial-inheritance mechanisms at work for each construction-member of the family, I have argued that they exhibit a related, but differentiated function and status in language. Among other differences identified (see Chapter 4 and sections 7.2 and 7.3 above), I have particularly stressed that the discourse function of BELIEVE ME involves an *invitation of faith/trust* in the Speaker. Its variant, emphatic counterpart, however, i.e., BELIEVE YOU ME, is an instance of non-canonical Imperative with a post-posed pronominal Subject that semantically functions as a Patient (cf. Martin-Zorraquino and Portolés Lázaro 1999; Vázquez Rozas 2006; de Cock 2014). By virtue of this, its discourse function has evolved from *inviting faith/trust* in the Speaker to *demanding it* from the Addressee (for a comparison, see Figures 7.3 and 7.4). In a similar vein, as already argued, the specific disjunctive syntax of BELIEVE IT OR NOT also motivates its differentiated discourse function, which is to *declare* a proposition /*p*/ as fact, thereby making the Addressee's faith/trust in the Speaker irrelevant to the veridicality of the matter at hand. To put it differently, the family network exhibits its own *internal variability* as far as *faith/trust* is concerned. BELIEVE ME and BELIEVE YOU ME request trust to the Speaker on the part of the Addressee with the former

expressing it as a form of *invitation* and the latter as a form of *demand*. The factuality and disjunctive syntax inherited by BELIEVE IT OR NOT (see Figure 7.5), however, *declare* the proposition /*p*/ in the scope of this construction as fact i.e., a form of *non-negotiable truth* that the Addressee has to accept as such.

Extending this line of thinking to THINK AGAIN, which, as demonstrated, expresses a form *of pre-emptive rebuttal of challenge* that the Speaker performs in fear that the Addressee will not align with his/her thinking (see Figure 7.6), I also observe a form of imposition on the Addressee's state of mind. Typically placed after a form of non-assertion (i.e., the protasis of a conditional sentence or an independent direct question) which expresses the erroneous line of thinking attributed to the Addressee, THINK AGAIN functions cancellatively urging for *'reconsideration with a view to changing one's thoughts or actions'*. Interestingly, in addition to its Imperative morphology, the construction frequently co-occurs with other lexical or grammatical directives that further enhance the rebuttal of challenge and the imposition of a cancellation of a line of thinking on the Addressee's state of mind.

Finally, given that MIND YOU is also an instance of non-canonical Imperative with a post-posed verbal Subject, a form of imposition on the reality construal of the Addressee is also observed (see Figure 7.7). In particular, as argued, drawing on its attention-summoning effect in discourse, MIND YOU imposes a rectification of the proposition /*p*/ in its scope either in terms of content or in terms of its linguistic glossing so that the Addressee's potential and inferentially augmented interpretations of /*p*/ are effectively cancelled.

All the above ultimately suggest that the constructions identified are shown to function dialogically not because they promote negotiation of viewpoints but because they

inherently index a concern for *'Alterity'/'Other-Orientedness'* (Bakhtin 1979/1986:77). This by extension suggests that dialogicity does not necessarily hinge on negotiation of viewpoints (in fact in certain cases it might even be prone to disallowing it) but on *the acknowledgment of different perspectives*, and, by extension, of the different reality construals that the Speaker takes into account while constructing his/her discourse.

Against this backdrop, the linguistic attestation of dialogicity poses as a candidate for further research on the basis of, at least, the following hypotheses:

a) If the Speaker constructs his/her discourse on the assumption of the possible approval or objection of the Addressee (in Bakhtin's terms (1975/1981) the Addressee's 'voice'), then to what extent should his/her voice be regarded as 'always-already' restricted by the assumed Addressee's belief-system? In other words, to what extent does the Speaker build his/her own discourse independently of the image that s/he has set up for the assumed Addressee? Moreover, is it plausible to hypothesise that the Speaker's decision to use dialogic patterns that favour a directive force is motivated by his/her need to impose on the Addressee?

b) If dialogicity mainly concerns perspectivisation, rather than negotiation, the latter being sometimes linguistically ruled out even as a possibility, then its definition should be recast in a way that accurately reflects the consistency of perspectivisation and the optionality, or, perhaps more accurately, the variability of the degree involved in negotiation. Interestingly, if confirmed, this will bring to the fore that perspectivisation – rather than negotiation – is the *primary* and *defining* feature of dialogicity. To put it differently, the extent to which the Speaker wishes to stand his/her ground on asserting a proposition /p/

as a *negotiable* or *non-negotiable truth* might be shown to differ, but his/her acknowledgement of different perspectives while constructing his/her own discourse is expected to remain invariable. In these terms, for instance, BELIEVE YOU ME and BELIEVE IT OR NOT would be maximally perspectivising, but not negotiatory, whereas BELIEVE ME, in its requesting pragmatics, would be both perspectivising and negotiating the truth of /*p*/ on the Addressee's trust in the Speaker.

All the above give rise to implications for further research (see Geka in preparation) which is expected to cast light on the concept of dialogicity *per se*, its emerging variability, and how this is reflected in the constructional network identified as a provisional case in point.

7.5.3: Dialogic constructions: A case in point for the development of discourse markers

The purpose of this final sub-section is to outline one more suggestion that may well lead to a productive line of research focusing on the interrelationship between the constructional network identified and the category of discourse markers (henceforth DMs). To this end, I will first briefly outline the theoretical context for such an endeavour and then proceed to put forth how this could develop into a research enterprise exploring the possibility that the dialogic constructions identified function (or are in the process of functioning) as discourse markers.[193]

Acknowledging the complexity and controversy surrounding issues related to the *terminology*, *definition,* and *classification* of discourse markers, my attention will not be directed to generally addressing the challenges arising in discussing this category.

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[193] It should be noted that, as discussed in Chapter 6, MIND YOU has already been categorised as a discourse marker in earlier works (Bell 2009; Ranger 2015), although neither of them has provided criteria for this or an independent discussion on the status of the pattern as a discourse marker.

Rather, my main intention will be to consider the possibility that, if a correlation can be established between the constructions at hand and the category of DMs, then this merits attention that will contribute both to CxG research and the analysis of the category of DMs.

Despite their omnipresence in discourse and the considerable research interest that they have attracted by researchers working in different linguistic models, DMs still lack a uniform approach or even a commonly accepted definition. Notorious for their multifunctionality and *'trans-categorical'* nature (Rezanova and Kogut 2015), DMs have been argued to include a variety of different forms ranging from conjunctions (e.g., *'but', 'and'*), adverbials (e.g., *'frankly', 'apparently'*), interjections (e.g., *'oh', 'well'*), phrases (e.g., *'as a result', 'in addition'*) and clauses (e.g., *'you know', 'I mean'*).

The tension surrounding DMs as an object of study is reflected in the terminology used. More specifically, there appear to be three more related terms conventionally used to designate the category, namely *'pragmatic markers'* (e.g., Brinton 1996, 2006; Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2004; Aijmer, Foolen, and Simon-Vandenbergen 2006; Fischer 2010; Aijmer 2013)*, 'discourse particles'* (Schourup 1985; Fischer 2000, 2006; Dedaić and Mišković-Luković 2010) and *'pragmatic particles'* (Hölker 1990; Östman 1991, 1995; Foolen 1996; Beeching 2002; Fried and Östman 2005). Apparently, their terminological differences relate to the use of the pairs: *'discourse – pragmatic'* and *'markers – particles'* which have been caught in the crossfire of different models and approaches. Consciously refraining from siding with any of the proposals made in either direction, I wish to clarify that the term *'discourse markers'* is provisionally adopted herein in that it could potentially reflect more accurately the *'marking'* (i.e.,

signposting) function of the expressions (including larger discourse entities) involved in the category (see Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2009:227).[194]

Being the object of study for many scholars, DMs have been investigated in the framework of: a) *Coherence Approaches*[195] particularly aiming at explaining how DMs assist Speakers and Addressees in constructing relations in discourse, b) *Conversation Analysis*[196] that seeks to explain how DMs work within the regularities and social negotiations of talk-in-interaction, c) *Relevance Theory*[197] which focuses on the constraints that DMs may impose on the Addressee's inferential processes and, recently, d) *Construction Grammar*[198] which views DMs as pairings of form and meaning sensitive to aspects related to co-text and context, which are crucial for their interpretation as markers (or particles).

Temporarily disengaging myself from the possibility of examining the issue of DMs from a CxG perspective (which essentially forms part of my future research), I observe that the extensive body of research conducted on DMs has contributed a form of *common ground*, essentially comprising a set of working classification criteria. It is in this direction that I will now shift my attention with a twofold aim. On the one hand, I intend to examine the commonly agreed classification criteria vis-à-vis the constructions under study so as to examine the possibility of the latter functioning as

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[194] Schourup (1999:229) and Fischer (2006:4) argue that the term *'particle'* concerns mainly the form and syntactic behaviour of the words. They also argue that particles are typically small, uninflected words that are only loosely (or not at all) integrated into the sentence structure. Fischer (2006) further notes that the term *'particle'* implies a contrast with clitics, full words, and bound morphemes, as well as with large entities, such as phrasal idioms. At the same time, choosing the term *'discourse'* over *'pragmatic'* also entails certain theoretical and methodological implications with the former usually being more readily associated with textual and discourse organisation functions, while the latter being more correlated with the interactional aspects between the participants and the restriction of inferential processes in utterance interpretations (Andersen and Fretheim 2000:2-3).

[195] E.g., Schiffrin 1987; Lenk 1998; Aijmer, Foole and Simon-Vandenbergen 2006 and Aijmer 2013.

[196] E.g., Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; Heritage 1984, 1988, 2002.

[197] E.g., Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Blakemore 1987, 1992, 2002; Carston and Uchida 1998; Noh 2000; Carston 2002 and Dedaić and Mišković-Luković 2010.

[198] E.g., Imo 2007, 2008; Diewald 2008; Fried 2009; Fischer 2010; Fischer and Alm 2013; Koier 2013 and Van der Wouden and Foolen 2015.

DMs. On the other, I wish to focus on the *efficacy* and *validity* of the proposed taxonomic criteria in successfully accounting for any linguistic expression potentially functioning as a DM (including the ones discussed herein). [199]

Admittedly, arriving at a commonly accepted set of taxonomic criteria for DMs is yet another challenge for the scholars in the field. However, there seems to be a form of general agreement on – at least – the following as a set of necessary attributes (Chen 2019:6):

a) DMs are characterised by *connectivity*. As argued by Schiffrin (1987), DMs are *"sequentially dependent elements which bracket units of talk and which are both cataphoric and anaphoric whether they are in initial or terminal position"* (*ibid.:*31). Extending this line of thought, Redeker (1991) adds that the primary function of DMs is the *linkage* of the upcoming utterance with the immediate discourse context. Adopting a more holistic approach on the issue of connectivity but moving along the same lines as Schiffrin and Redeker, Fraser (1999) contends that DMs should essentially be seen as imposing a relationship between some aspects of a given discourse segment. In this respect, a DM is expected to function as a two-place relation, with one argument residing in the segment they introduce and the other one in the preceding discourse. Blakemore (2000) critically revises Fraser's (1999) proposal by suggesting that the

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[199] It should be clear from the onset of this section that the classification criteria of DMs to be discussed are acknowledged to be theory-sensitive and, to a certain extent, theory-bound as well. In this respect, my discussion of them will precisely seek to reveal that although generally agreed to by many linguistic paradigms, some of the proposed criteria are perhaps more theoretically neutral (e.g., the criterion of *connectivity*) than others (e.g., the criterion of *optionality*) which seem to be confronted with considerable challenges when examined in the context of linguistic models that seek to account for language in its totality. Along these lines, and in a conscious attempt to avoid the methodological pitfall of examining the criteria proposed by adopting a specific linguistic model as my 'filtering grid', I will attempt to offer *an independent discussion of their efficacy and validity* by checking them against the linguistic data at hand. In sketchily laying the groundwork for a new line of future research, I ultimately wish to propose that the taxonomic criteria of DMs call for a recasting, even outside the context of CxG.

connectivity of DMs may relate not only to discourse segments but also to the connection between the utterance, the co-text, and the broader context.

b) DMs are characterised by *optionality* in the sense that their syntactic removal is not expected to interfere with the grammaticality of their host sentence.[200] Optionality also entails a further dimension, according to which, DMs do not *"enlarge the possibilities for semantic relationship between the elements they associate"* (Chen 2019:7). This suggests that if a DM is omitted, the relationship it signals is still available to the Addressee, though no longer explicitly cued (e.g., *"My younger sister loves classic music. <u>However</u>, I'm fond of pop music."* / *"My younger sister loves classic music. Ø I'm fond of pop music."*). In this sense, DMs emerge as *"linguistic encoders that facilitate the process of utterance understanding, not as syntactically integrated constituents, but as pointers to the way the basic proposition /p/ should be understood by the Addressee"* (Bonifazi, Drummen and de Kreij 2016:2).

c) DMs are characterised by *non-truth conditionality*. This means that they are not considered to contribute to the truth-conditions of the proposition /*p*/ expressed by the utterance in which they are involved. Essentially argued by Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2002) and further upheld by Mosegaard Hansen (1998) and Hall (2007), this line of thinking was to a great extent commonly interpreted as suggesting that DMs lack propositional/conceptual meaning. Despite legitimate

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[200] As already stressed, the discussion of the above taxonomic criteria, and certainly not least of criteria (*b*) and (*c*) above should be viewed as an *independent* consideration of their argued capacity to effectively fulfil their classification task. Nonetheless, their status as taxonomic criteria should by no means be seen as aligned with the CxG theoretical grounding of the present work that would for instance emphatically dismiss optionality as an effective criterion given that differences incurred by the presence or absence of a linguistic form are crucially connected to meaning differences (BELIEVE ME vs. BELIEVE YOU ME would be an apt case in point). In this context, therefore, my aim is to essentially examine the *tenability* of the proposed criteria and bring to the fore that although their significance as theoretical insights should be appreciated, their taxonomic predictions appear to be questionable.

objections on the co-extensiveness of non-truth conditionality with the lack of propositional/conceptual meaning (see Fuller 2003),[201] non-truth conditionality, in the above sense, appears to be recognised as a common attribute among the members of the category of DMs.

In addition to the above, and setting aside several other disagreements of scholars on a number of further, interrelated issues, the relevant literature also seems to largely converge on three more generalisations about DMs as a category: a) it has both *more* and *less prototypical* members (Jucker and Ziv 1998), b) it is characterised by substantial *morphological, syntactic, distributional and functional versatility* which emphatically resists a uniform source of origin for its members (Dedaić and Mišković-Luković 2010:2), and c) the function of its members is to organise and regulate discourse (Hyland 2005; Carter and McCarthy, 2006; Liu 2016).

In this context, the question that naturally poses itself is if – and to what extent – the constructions identified herein relate to the category of DMs and respond to the above criteria, broadly accepted as common ground in the relevant literature. In what follows, therefore, I would like to outline some of my thoughts by juxtaposing the taxonomic criteria outlined with what the data at hand point to. Hoping that these thoughts may serve as the impetus for further, targeted exploration of the issue, I will phrase my suggestions as tentative research hypotheses and questions correlating the properties and discourse functions of the patterns of interest with the fundamental aspects of DMs sketched above.

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[201] E.g., in the utterance: *"Frankly, I find this party boring."*, *'frankly'* might indeed not be contributing to the truth conditions of the utterance. However, it would be awkward to suggest that *'frankly'* has no propositional meaning on its own right since, on certain occasions, it may allow for discourse reformulations with analogous conceptual content as in the example that follows:
"- Peter: Frankly, I find this party boring.
- Mary: That's not true. You're not being frank. I've just seen you dancing with the blond beauty in blue."
(Cited in Chen 2019:4)

As already mentioned, besides the taxonomic criteria, the relevant literature on DMs acknowledges that the members of the category may be more or less prototypical. At the same time, it further concurs that the category subsumes a great variety of linguistic patterns, ranging from interjections to larger discourse entities, all functioning to organise and regulate discourse. In view of the above, I contend that it is plausible to hypothesise that the clausal patterns in focus may form part of, at least, the less prototypical members of the class of DMs. To illustrate if this initial hypothesis can fruitfully stand to reason, the remaining part of the present section will be devoted to examining how each of the three criteria listed above correlates with the constructions in focus. At the same time, this discussion will serve to test whether the criteria proposed are sufficient to unambiguously identify members of the category of DMs as regulating discourse.

Starting with *connectivity*, the present work has provided ample evidence for the ability of the constructions to connect discourse parts forming minimally two-place relations which frequently extend to tripartite or four-place ones (see correlation with Fraser's (1999) and Blakemore's (2000) suggestion outlined in (*a*) above). Through their different discourse positions (increased positional distribution is also among the properties frequently associated with DMs (Degand 2014)), they have all been shown to *'bracket discourse'* Schiffrin (1987). Moreover, they have been found to link different stretches of discourse with co-text and the immediate or broader context, thereby providing an interpretative frame for the understanding of a specific utterance by the Addressee. Most importantly, they have all been shown to exhibit a specific *forward-* or *backward*-looking scope (see correlation with Schiffrin's (1987) anaphoric and cataphoric function outlined in (*a*) above) associated with marking 'boundaries' in discourse and delimiting the discourse units of which they form a part. The latter, being

an aspect par excellence related to connectivity and to the core regulatory function of DMs, appears to provide my reasoning with fairly sound evidence. Apparently, this criterion correctly applies in identifying the constructions in focus as DMs of the language and is compatible with their regulatory scope in discourse.

Moving on to the second criterion of *optionality*, I tend to support that its validity as a classification criterion for DMs, albeit theoretically appreciated, appears to be questionable in that it makes wrong predictions for expressions that are typically included in the category of DMs, such as *however*, for example, while excluding from the category language patterns whose function is clearly to regulate discourse, as the ones analysed in this study. Following what has been exemplified in (*b*) above through the omission of *'however'* (e.g., *"My younger sister loves classic music. <u>However,</u> I'm fond of pop music." / "My younger sister loves classic music. Ø I'm fond of pop music."*), optionality is typically interpreted as the absence of explicit cuing of a discourse relationship which is, however, still available to the Addressee through contextual inferencing. In this sense, as noted by Bonifazi *et al.,* (2016), DMs essentially function as *"facilitators"* of utterance understanding and *"pointers to the way the basic proposition should be understood by the Addressee"* (*ibid.*:2). Restricting the function of DMs to mere, explicit cuing, however, appears to offer a rather narrow appraisal of what they actually contribute to discourse organisation and the overall meaning of the utterance in which they occur. Regardless of whether a DM contributes mostly to (cueing) the expressivity of an utterance and less to its grammaticality or syntactic completion, its optionality in discourse might still crucially affect the expression of non-propositional, pragmatic meaning, such as that of contrast in the use of *'however'*, for example, which is not necessarily inferable. In the context of the description of music preferences by members of a family, the two clauses could be

understood as offering complementary, rather than contrastive, information, in which case, if conjoined at all, could be conjoined by *"and"* as follows: *"My younger sister loves classic music and I'm fond of pop music."*

Similarly, the constructions examined in this work (with the exception of THINK AGAIN, see below) seem to meet the optionality criterion since, if omitted, the grammaticality and propositional meaning of the sentences they join is unaffected (see Chapters 4-6). Although this would obviously lend support to my initial hypothesis that the constructions at hand indeed function as DMs, I contend that this does not accurately reflect their specific, dialogic, intersubjective, perspectivised and regulatory functions, let alone the expressivity they contribute to the surrounding discourse. Thus, even if the BELIEVE-family patterns and MIND YOU might prima facie seem omissible, their discourse removal, as already argued, would result in significant meaning loss at other levels. In light of the above, the optionality criterion applies only *seemingly* – and in the context of CxG not in the least – in that it either makes questionable predictions, as is the case with *'however'* in the example above, or in that it misses out on the regulatory function of the members of the category.

As argued in Chapter 5 (see section 5.5), THINK AGAIN, merits special attention in this discussion because its frequent co-occurrence with recognisable morphosyntax endows it with certain properties that resist optionality. In particular, by analogy with what Selting (1998) argues about the *'if-then'* and *'when-then'* constructions, whereby the *'if'/'when'* component projects its necessitated syntactic continuation by means of the *'then'* component (see Chapter 2, section 2.5.2), I have also argued that THINK AGAIN exhibits a similar discourse behaviour. More specifically, THINK AGAIN has been shown to prototypically follow types of non-assertion either in the form of direct questions or in the form of protases $/p_s/$ of conditional sentences, which make it syntactically

indispensable in discourse. As regards the former, the construction features as the *second-pair part* following the conversation analytic conventions related to the adjacency pair created in conversational turns, whereby the question features as the *first-pair part* and its related response as the *second-pair part* (Sacks and Schegloff 1973; McCarthy 1991). Apparently, the pair members of such an utterance are mutually dependent conversationally in the sense that a question invites an answer (see also Bella and Moser 2018). This mutual dependence between pair members is inherited by THINK AGAIN when featuring in the second-pair part position. Consequently, failure to provide a response to a preceding question would in all probability be noticeable, thereby rendering the omission of THINK AGAIN less preferred and awkward, though still possible. In reference to conditional sentences, as argued in Chapters 2 and 5, THINK AGAIN, as the apodosis of a conditional clause, cannot be omitted without loss of grammaticality. Expressed in CxG terms, when placed in the apodosis of a conditional sentence, THINK AGAIN does not restrict itself to inheriting properties related to the Imperative or the other grammatical directives available in its context. Rather, it further inherits properties associated with the morphosyntax of the higher-order CONDITIONAL construction which renders it syntactically non-omissible. Even more importantly, it is in this context that the pattern exhibits its non-compositional interpretation. On these grounds, the optionality criterion would exclude THINK AGAIN from the category of DMs. However, as already shown (see Chapter 5) this construction marks the protasis as a disputable proposition /*p*/ as in *"If you think that this election won't affect you and your life, **think again**"*. Moreover, apart from its pragmatic perspective to the protasis, THINK AGAIN has also been shown to contribute to the dialogic, intersubjective, and regulatory scope of the discourse of which it is a part. As already pointed out, the optionality criterion, restricting itself to grammaticality and propositional meaning,

does not apply to such aspects of meaning and function. Hence, although it may correctly account for many members belonging to the category of DMs, it cannot in itself constitute a reliable taxonomic criterion to be uniformly met by any given linguistic expression that regulates discourse.

Turning my attention to the third criterion of *non-truth conditionality*, it is important to clarify that the present work sides with accounts (see Fuller 2003) that do not consider non-truth conditionality to be co-extensive with lack of propositional meaning. In fact, using the constructions at hand as cases in point, I have argued that they all have propositional content which they inherit from the semantics of the respective mental state verbs and their further components. However, they do not contribute to the truth conditions of their host utterances. The latter is the case not only because of their clausal status and their main parenthetical positioning which by default correlate with lack of interference with the truth conditions of surrounding sentences, but also because of their shared Imperative morphological marking.[202]As argued in the relevant literature (Strawson 1971; Davidson 1967, 1984), non-declarative sentences, such as orders phrased in the Imperative, or questions, cannot be given truth-conditions since they do not describe a state of affairs and, as such, cannot be assigned a value of truth or falsity. As a result, they cannot affect the truth conditions of their host utterances. The implication arising from this, however, appears to be complicating the use of truth conditionality as a reliable taxonomic criterion for DMs. Since any pattern in the Imperative is inherently non-truth conditional, then the constructions at hand would be good candidates for the category of DMs. However, given that they have propositional

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[202] Excluding certain instances of THINK AGAIN, which although not prototypical of the construction, correlate it with an infinitival form or the Subjunctive.

content, they should be excluded from this category. Apparently, the criterion of non-truth conditionality cannot be applied effectively in this case.

As it transpires from the above, the commonly accepted classification criteria for DMs pose as an interesting area for further research in that, as shown through their correlation with the constructions focused upon, their validity may be challenged. Nonetheless, as has been pointed out from the beginning of this section, classification criteria are necessarily theory- bound, at least to a certain extent. Therefore, while connectivity seems a theoretically neutral concept, optionality and truth-conditionality seem to subscribe to linguistic models aiming to account for aspects of language that are considered to be 'core', rather than the totality of language. Hence, the expressivity and discourse function(s) of linguistic expressions, such as the ones analysed in this study, are discarded as falling outside the framework of such theories.[203] Not so in a CxG framework, in which the totality of language should be accounted for. Nevertheless, what makes research in the direction of revisiting the existing taxonomic criteria even more inviting is the fact that the constructions identified have been shown to *regulate* discourse, which, as already mentioned, is commonly regarded as the core function of DMs par excellence (Hyland 2005; Carter and McCarthy, 2006; Liu 2016). Even so, I will presently restrict myself to suggesting that confirming the hypothesised DM function of the constructions under study will require further research which should also seek to establish a set of classification criteria effectively rising to the challenges presented herein.

Finally, adding to the suggestions outlined above about the correlation of constructions with DMs, I maintain that future investigation would significantly benefit from

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[203] For the importance of expressivity, see also Ifantidou and Hatzidaki (2019).

diachronic research. This could provide enlightening insights into the attested discourse function of the constructions by tracing them back to their verbal origin given that many DMs have been shown to have their origin in the Imperative.[204] This could further shed light on aspects related to their particular semantics-pragmatics, discourse preferred position (Goutsos 2017) or their unique trajectory in the language by detecting the potential *subjectification,*[205] *intersubjectification*[206] and *grammaticalisation*[207] processes involved in their development as language patterns or – in all likelihood – as discourse markers.

7.6 Final remarks

Fundamentally inspired by research interest in exploring conventionalised, discourse-level constructions reflected in a robust body of recent CxG-based studies, the present doctoral dissertation set out to contribute to this line of investigation. Aiming to make a case for the suitability and practical viability of CxG as a model for discourse-level exploration, the study focused on empirically ascertaining the existence of a well-entrenched constructional network of dialogic perspectivisation motivated by the Imperative and the polysemous semantic class of mental state verbs. It further brought to the fore an intriguing interrelationship between the Imperative and non-compositionality which lends itself to further research that could substantially illuminate aspects of constructions occupying various midpoints of the continuum between regularity and idiomaticity.

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[204] See similar research by Traugott 1995; Brinton 2001; Waltereit 2002; Fagard 2010.

[205] See Chapter 6, section 6.2.3 (for a more detailed overview of the concept see Bonifazi *et al.*, 2016).

[206] As Bonifazi *et al.*, (2016) intersubjectification processes involve the Speaker's attention to the Addressee's 'self'. As Traugott and Dasher (2002:5) observe, *"intersubjectification is the ambient context in which linguistic change takes place and to which linguistic change contributes."*

[207] See Chapter 6, section 6.2.3 (for a more detailed discussion, see Traugott 1989, 1995; Hopper and Traugott 1993/2003; Croft 2006; Fischer 2007).

Bringing together insights from diverse fields of study, including early philosophical accounts on dialogue and dialogicity, semantics, pragmatics, discourse studies, CxG and corpus-based approaches to language, the present work is hoped to have contributed both theoretical and empirical insights into the motivation of the constructions in focus, their inherent dialogic function, and their ability to delimit the discourse units of which they form a part. By extension, it also aspires to have proposed novel and fruitful lines of thinking regarding the concepts of discourse units, dialogicity and discourse markers.

Reaching its end, this dissertation is also expected to have convincingly substantiated its claims and to have sparked interest in research extending, or alternatively contradicting, the line of argumentation adopted herein. Ultimately, the success of an academic endeavour lies mainly in its functioning as motivational springboard for other members of the academic community to commit themselves to investing time, energy, and effort in investigating the issue further or trying an alternative approach to it.

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APPENDIX I

Appendix I for all the constructions retrieved in BNC are available at the following link:
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1CYr4vSlpXIqPgTO1da3KcmT-fXLpjLYR?usp=sharing

Appendix I for all the constructions retrieved in COCA are available at the following link:
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1eghIweKkwAQINyXYqczLuJvlHfim9oeE

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY 1: The BELIEVE-family constructions

4.2 The semantics of the verb '*believe*'

	Oxford English Dictionary (OED)	*Cambridge English Dictionary* (CED)	*Collins English Dictionary* (ColED)
believe	**Believe (verb [with object]** **Accept that (something) is true, especially without proof.** *'The superintendent believed Lancaster's story.'* **with clause** *'Some 23 per cent believe that smoking keeps down weight.'* **1.1 Accept the statement of (someone) as true.** *'He didn't believe her.' / 'I believe you.'* **1.2 [No object] Have religious faith.** *'There are those on the fringes of the Church who do not really believe.'* **1.3 believe something or feel sure that (someone) is capable of doing something.** *'I wouldn't have believed it of Lavinia—what an extraordinary woman!'* **2 [with clause] hold (something) as an opinion; think.** *'I believe we've already met.'*	**to think that something is true, correct, or real:** *'Strangely, no one believed us when we told them we'd been visited by a creature from Mars.'* **[+ that]** *'He believes that all children are born with equal intelligence.'* *'She's arriving tomorrow, I believe.'* **[+ obj + to infinitive]** *'I believe her to be the finest violinist in the world.'* **[+ obj + adj]** *'All the crew are missing, believed dead.'* **[I (always) + adv/prep]** **If you believe in something, you feel that it is right:** *[I (always) + adv/prep] 'I believe in giving a person a second chance.'*	**1. If you believe that something is true, you think that it is true, but you are not sure. [formal]** *'Experts believe that the coming drought will be extensive.'* **[VERB that]** *'The main problem, I believe, lies elsewhere.'* **[VERB]** *'We believe them to be hidden here in this apartment.'* **[VERB noun to-infinitive]** **Synonyms: think, consider, judge, suppose** **2. verb If you believe someone or if you believe what they say or write, you accept that they are telling the truth.** *'He did not sound as if he believed her.'* **[VERB noun]** **Synonyms: accept, hold, buy [slang], trust** **3. verb If you believe in fairies, ghosts, or miracles, you are sure that they exist or happen. If you believe in a god, you are sure of the existence of that god.** *'I don't believe in ghosts.' / 'I believe in fairies.'* **[VERB + in]** **4. verb** **If you believe in someone or what they are doing, you have confidence in them and think that they will be successful.** *If you believe in yourself, you can succeed.* **[VERB + in]**

Table 4.1: A lexicographic summary of the verb *'believe'* in OED, CED and ColED

	Oxford English Dictionary (OED)	*Cambridge English Dictionary* (CED)	*Collins English Dictionary* (ColED)
believe me	**(listed as a phrase; believe you me is listed as a synonym)** **Used to emphasize the truth of a statement.** *'Believe me, it is well worth the effort.'*	**(listed as a phrase)** **said when emphasizing that something is true**: *'Believe me, I was scared!'*	**No entry** --
believe you me	**listed as a synonym of 'believe me'** [no example provided]	**No entry** ---------------------------------	**(listed as a phrase)** **You can use believe you me to emphasize that what you are saying is true. [emphasis]** *'It's absolutely amazing, believe you me.'*
believe it or not	**(listed as a phrase) Used to concede that a statement is surprising.** *'Believe it or not, I was considered quite bright in those days.'*	**(listed as a phrase)** **(Also: would you believe it?)** **Said when telling someone about something that is true, although it seems unlikely:** *'He's upstairs doing his homework, believe it or not.'*	**(listed as a phrase)** **You can use believe it or not to emphasize that what you have just said is surprising. [emphasis]** *'That's normal, believe it or not.'*

Table 4.2: A lexicographic summary of the BELIEVE-family patterns in OED, CED and ColED

4.4 BELIEVE IT OR NOT

Tenses of the verbs included in the proposition /p/ in scope of each construction (cxn)					
BELIEVE ME		**BELIEVE YOU ME**		**BELIEVE IT OR NOT**	
BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA
37	51	67	32	48	66
Simple Past 9 24.3%	3 5.9%	9 13.4%	9 28.1%	14 29%	25 37.8%
Simple Present 18 48.7%	24 47.1%	39 58.2%	9 28.1%	23 47.9%	24 36.3%
Present Perfect 2 5.4%	5 9.8%	1 1.5%	3 9.4%	3 6.3%	4 6%
Future 4 10.8%	6 11.8%	5 7.4%	3 9.4%	1 2.1%	2 3%
Other 4 10.8%	13 25.4%	13 19.5%	8 25%	7 14.7%	11 16.6%
Other [Explained per construction]					
Modals 2 5.4%	Modals 8 15.65%	Modals 4 6%	Modals 3 9.4%	Modals 2 4.2%	Modals 5 7.6%
Conditionals 1 2.7%	Be going to 1 1.95%	Conditionals 2 3%	Conditionals 1 3.1%	Verbless cxn** 1 2.1%	Present Continuous* 2 3%
Temporal Clause-future reference* 1 2.7%	Verbless cxn 1 1.95%	Verbless cxn 1 1.5%	Imperative 1 3.1%	Present Continuous* 3 6.3%	Past Perfect** 1 1.5%
	Present Continuous* 2 3.9%	Present Continuous* 1 1.5%	Past Perfect** 3 9.4%	Imperative 1 2.1%	Verbless cxn 3 4.5%
	'Would rather' 1 1.95%	Imperative 3 4.5%			
		Past Continuous** 2 3%			

The instances listed in the *Other* section carrying one asterisk (*) were calculated as instances of *futurity*.
The instances listed in the *Other* section carrying two asterisks (**) were calculated as instances of *past tenses* and *accomplished/perfected facts*.

Table 4.3: An overview of the tenses used in the proposition /p/ that lies in the scope of the constructions

4.7 The BELIEVE-family: Frequency counts, reliability, and validity statistics

4.7.2 Frequency Counts

4.7.2.1 Distribution of the BELIEVE-*family compositional, constructional, and false-positive results*

Data Classification	Fully-Compositional		Constructional		False Positives	
BELIEVE ME	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA
BNC total sample: 62	24	16	37	51	1	0
COCA total sample: 67	38.7%	23.9%	59.7%	76.1%	1.6%	---
BELIEVE YOU ME	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA
BNC total sample: 67	0	0	67	32	0	0
COCA total sample: 32	---	---	100%	100%	---	---
BELIEVE IT OR NOT	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA
BNC total sample: 66	0	0	48	66	0	0
COCA total sample: 48	---	---	100%	100%	---	---

Table 4.4: An overview of the frequencies of the compositional, constructional, and false positives

4.7.2.2 Distribution of the dialogicity-monologicity and dialoguality/monologuality

Classification of Data	Monologual-Dialogic (MD)		Monologual-Monologic (MM)		Dialogual-Dialogic (DD)		Dialogual-Monologic (DM)	
BELIEVE ME	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA
BNC total sample: 62	7	15	0	0	30	36	0	0
(37 constructional)	18.9%	29.4%	---	---	81.1%	70.6%	---	---
COCA total sample: 67								
(51 constructional)								
BELIEVE YOU ME	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA
BNC total sample: 67	61	10	0	0	6	22	0	0
COCA total sample: 32	91%	31.2%	---	---	9%	68.8%	---	---
BELIEVE IT OR NOT	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA
BNC total sample: 48	25	30	0	0	23	36	0	0
COCA total sample: 66	52.1%	45.5%	---	---	47.9%	54.5%	---	---

Table 4.5: An overview of the frequencies of the MD – MM – DD – DM

4.7.2.3 Distribution of intensifying features

Frequency Sets (F)	Intensifying Features BELIEVE-family					
	BELIEVE ME BNC	BELIEVE ME COCA	BELIEVE YOU ME BNC	BELIEVE YOU ME COCA	BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC	BELIEVE IT OR NOT COCA
Constructional Semantics	37/62	51/67	67/67	32/32	48/48	66/66
Negative Lexical Prosody	37	49	63	31	44	54
	100%	96.1%	94%	96.9%	91.7%	81.8%
Positive Lexical Prosody	29	27	56	19	34	47
	78.4%	52.9%	83.6%	59.4%	70.8%	71.2%
Comparatives	18	22	34	13	19	24
	48.6%	43.1%	50.7%	40.6%	39.6%	36.4%
Superlatives	10	16	28	6	10	24
	27%	31.4%	41.8%	18.8%	20.8%	36.4%
Quantifiers	26	37	52	11	29	42
	70.3%	72.5%	77.6%	34.4%	60.4%	63.6%
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	4	2	7	3	6	6
	10.8%	3.9%	10.4%	9.4%	12.5%	9.1%
Focus Particles	4	4	11	3	6	11
	10.8%	7.8%	16.4%	9.4%	12.5%	16.7%
Marked Word Order	1	5	10	4	9	7
	2.7%	9.8%	14.9%	12.5%	18.8%	10.6%
Lexical Repetition	7	14	9	9	6	11
	18.9%	27.5%	13.4%	28.1%	12.5%	16.7%

Table 4.6: An overview of the frequencies of the intensifying features for the BELIEVE-family

4.7.2.4 Distribution of contextual features

	Contextual Features							
	Collocating with Connectors				Collocating with Conditionals			
BELIEVE ME	BNC (37)		COCA (51)		BNC (37)		COCA (51)	
	And	But	And	But	Preceding	Following	Preceding	Following
	5	2	16	5	3	1	7	3
	13.5%	5.4%	31.4%	9.8%	8.1%	2.7%	13.7%	5.9%
BELIEVE YOU ME	BNC (67)		COCA (32)		BNC (67)		COCA (32)	
	And	But	And	But	Preceding	Following	Preceding	Following

19	7	5	2	4	4	5	3
28.4%	10.4%	15.6%	6.3%	6%	6%	15.6%	9.4%

BELIEVE IT OR NOT	BNC (48)		COCA (66)		BNC (48)		COCA (66)	
	And	But	And	But	Preceding	Following	Preceding	Following
	3	1	15	1	---	1	4	10
	6.3%	2.1%	22.7%	1.5%	---	2.1%	6.1%	15.2%

	Collocating with Questions				**Collocating with Negation**			
	Preceded by Questions		Followed by Questions		Preceded by Negation		Followed by Negation	
BELIEVE ME	BNC (37)	COCA (51)	BNC (37)	COCA (51)	BNC (37)	COCA (51)	BNC (37)	COCA (51)
	4	7	3	2	7	11	12	15
	10.8%	13.7%	8.1%	3.9%	18.9%	21.6%	32.4%	29.4%
BELIEVE YOU ME	BNC (67)	COCA (32)	BNC (67)	COCA (32)	BNC (67)	COCA (32)	BNC (67)	COCA (32)
	9	2	2	5	11	8	14	5
	13.4%	6.3%	3%	15.6%	16.4%	25%	20.9%	15.6%
BELIEVE IT OR NOT	BNC (48)	COCA (66)	BNC (48)	COCA (66)	BNC (48)	COCA (66)	BNC (48)	COCA (66)
	7	4	6	5	5	6	8	10
	14.6%	6.1%	12.5%	7.6%	10.4%	9.1%	16.7%	15.2%

Table 4.7: An overview of the frequencies of the contextual features for the BELIEVE-family

4.7.2.5 Distribution of positional flexibility

	Positional Flexibility BELIEVE-family					
Frequency Sets (F)	**BELIEVE ME BNC (37)**	**BELIEVE ME COCA (51)**	**BELIEVE YOU ME BNC (67)**	**BELIEVE YOU ME COCA (32)**	**BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC (48)**	**BELIEVE IT OR NOT COCA (66)**
Sentence Initial (SI)	12	14	28	16	14	21
	32.4%	27.5%	41.8%	50%	29.1%	31.8%
Parenthetical (P)	14	28	31	9	24	37
	37.9%	54.9%	46.2%	28.1%	50%	56.1%
Sentence-Final (SF)	9	8	8	6	7	8
	24.3%	15.7%	12%	18.8%	14.6%	12.1%
Independent Sentence (IS)	2	1	0	1	3	0
	5.4%	1.9%	---	3.1%	6.3%	---

Table 4.8: An overview of the frequencies of positional flexibility for the BELIEVE-family

4.7.3 Reliability and validity statistics

	BELIEVE ME BNC	BELIEVE ME COCA	BELIEVE YOU ME BNC	BELIEVE YOU ME COCA	BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC	BELIEVE IT OR NOT COCA
N	3	2	2	2	2	2
Mean	7	7	7	7	7	7
(M)	20.666	25.50	33.50	16.00	33.00	24.00
Standard Deviation (StD)	18.23	17.017	47.376	22.627	46.669	33.941
Range (R)						
Minimum	1	0	0	0	0	0
Maximum	37	51	67	32	66	48

Table 4.9: Calculation of Mean (M), Standard Deviation (StD) and Range (R) for the BELIEVE-family

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test **The BELIEVE-family constructions** **BELIEVE ME** **BNC: Overall Frequency Set**						
F: BELIEVE ME BNC		F: BELIEVE ME BNC Constructional Semantics	F: BELIEVE ME BNC DD / MD/ MM / DM	F: BELIEVE ME BNC Intensifying Features	F: BELIEVE ME BNC Positional Flexibility	F: BELIEVE ME BNC Contextual Features
N Normal Parameters		3	4	9	4	8
	Mean	20.666	9.25	9.25	1.5	3.0278
	StD	18.23	14.221	5.439	2.38	1.74
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	.239	.313	.232	.333	.164
	Positive	.139	.313	.159	.333	.122
	Negative	-.239	-.236	-.232	-.264	-.164
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		.414	.616	.626	.463	.985
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.995	.843	.829	.983	.286
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test **The BELIEVE-family constructions** **BELIEVE ME** **COCA: Overall Frequency Set**						
F: BELIEVE ME COCA		F: BELIEVE ME COCA Constructional Semantics	F: BELIEVE ME COCA DD / MD/ MM / DM	F: BELIEVE ME COCA Intensifying Features	F: BELIEVE ME COCA Positional Flexibility	F: BELIEVE ME COCA Contextual Features
N Normal Parameters		2	4	9	4	8
	Mean	33.50	12.75	12.75	4.75	8.05
	StD	24.749	17.91	11.47	6.60	5.06
Most	Absolute	.260	.262	.207	.264	.249

Extreme Differences	Positive	.260	.262	.207	.264	.249
	Negative	-.260	-.238	-.158	-.236	-.165
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		.368	.368	.523	.413	.495
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.999	.916	.745	.999	.223

Table 4.10: The K-S test results for BELIEVE ME (BNC & COCA)

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test The BELIEVE-family constructions BELIEVE YOU ME BNC: Overall Frequency Set						
F: BELIEVE YOU ME BNC		F: BELIEVE YOU ME BNC	F: BELIEVE YOU ME BNC DD / MD/ MM / DM	F: BELIEVE YOU ME BNC Intensifying Features	F: BELIEVE YOU ME BNC Positional Flexibility	F: BELIEVE YOU ME BNC Contextual Features
N Normal Parameters	Mean	2	4	9	4	8
		33.50	16.75	7.53	16.75	8.52
	StD	47.376	31.532	5.557	15.449	4.77
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	.260	.419	.286	.262	.190
	Positive	.260	.419	.286	.220	.190
	Negative	-.260	-.298	-.235	-.262	-.142
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		.368	.837	.857	.524	.139
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.999	.485	.150	.9277	.139
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test The BELIEVE-family constructions BELIEVE YOU ME COCA: Overall Frequency Set						
F: BELIEVE YOU ME COCA		F: BELIEVE YOU ME COCA	F: BELIEVE YOU ME COCA DD / MD/ MM / DM	F: BELIEVE YOU ME COCA Intensifying Features	F: BELIEVE YOU ME COCA Positional Flexibility	F: BELIEVE YOU ME COCA Contextual Features
N Normal Parameters	Mean	2	4	9	4	8
		7.00	6.00	7.29	20.00	4.77
	StD	4.000	4000	3.310	16.00	2.00
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	.398	.398	.293	.398	.261
	Positive	.269	.269	.293	.269	.261
	Negative	-.398	-.398	-.162	-.398	-.239
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		1.593	1.593	1593	1.593	1.568
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.012	20.00	6.00	7.00	.150

Table 4.11: The K-S test results for BELIEVE YOU ME (BNC & COCA)

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test					
The BELIEVE-family constructions					
BELIEVE IT OR NOT					
BNC: Overall Frequency Set					
F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC		F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC	F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC DD / MD/ MM / DM	F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC Intensifying Features	F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC Positional Flexibility	F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC Contextual Features
N		2	4	9	4	8
Normal Parameters	Mean	33.000	16.50	16.50	8.000	4.97
	StD	46.669	16.176	19.330	9.899	2.79
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	.260	.200	.303	.260	.226
	Positive	.260	.200	.303	.260	.173
	Negative	-.260	-.154	-.241	-.260	-.226
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		.368	.368	.401	.607	.357
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.999	.999	.997	.855	.500
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test					
The BELIEVE-family constructions					
BELIEVE IT OR NOT					
COCA: Overall Frequency Set					
F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT COCA		F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT COCA	F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT COCA DD / MD/ MM / DM	F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT COCA Intensifying Features	F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT COCA Positional Flexibility	F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT COCA Contextual Features
N		2	4	9	4	8
Normal Parameters	Mean	24.00	12.00	17.64	12.00	5.75
	StD	33.941	13.880	14.07	8.367	32.40
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	.260	.306	.348	.263	.177
	Positive	.260	.306	.348	.263	.177
	Negative	-.260	-.286	-.204	-.201	-.156
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		.368	.613	.336	.527	.501
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.999	.847	.964	.944	.964

Table 4.12: The K-S test results for BELIEVE IT OR NOT (BNC & COCA)

4.7.4   BELIEVE ME: *The statistical significance of the data*

BELIEVE ME BNC vs. COCA Fully-compositional vs. Constructional semantics					
F:	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
BELIEVE ME BNC	37	20.666	18.23	0	37
BELIEVE ME COCA	51	33.50	24749	0	51
Ranks					
	Categories (F)		**N**	**Mean Rank (MR)**	
BNC	Constructional semantics		37	43.00	
	Fully-compositional semantics		24	12.50	
	False positives		1	0.00	
	Total		62		
COCA	Constructional semantics		51	42.00	
	Fully-compositional semantics		16	8.50	
	False positives		0		
	Total		67		
Kruskal Wallis Test					
		BNC		**COCA**	
Chi-Square		60.000		60.000	
df		2		1	
Asymp. Sig.		.000		.000	

Table 4.13: The K-W test on BELIEVE ME (fully-compositional vs. constructional semantics)

BELIEVE ME BNC vs. COCA Monologual- Monologic (MM) – Monologual-Dialogic (MD) Dialogual- Monologic (DM) – Dialogual-Dialogic (DD)			
Ranks			
F:	**Categories**	**N**	**Mean Rank (MR)**
BNC	Monologual - Monologic (MM)	0	0.00
	Monologual - Dialogic (MD)	7	4.00
	Dialogual - Monologic (DM)	0	0.00
	Dialogual - Dialogic (DD)	30	15.00
	Total	37	

COCA	Monologual - Monologic (MM)	0	0.00
	Monologual - Dialogic (MD)	15	7.50
	Dialogual - Monologic (DM)	0	0.000
	Dialogual - Dialogic (DD)	36	18.00
	Total	51	
Kruskal Wallis Test			
	BNC		**COCA**
Chi-Square	9.000		9.000
df	1		1
Asymp. Sig.	.029		.029

Table 4.14: The K-W test on BELIEVE ME and the MD – MM – DD – DM frequency set

BELIEVE ME BNC vs. COCA **Positional Flexibility**			
Ranks			
F:	**Categories**	**N**	**Mean Rank (MR)**
BNC	Sentence Initial (SI)	12	6.00
	Parenthetical (P)	14	7.00
	Sentence Final (SF)	9	4.50
	Independent Sentential Status (I-S)	2	1.00
	Total	37	
COCA	Sentence Initial (SI)	14	7.00
	Parenthetical (P)	28	14.00
	Sentence Final (SF)	8	4.00
	Independent Sentential Status (IS)	1	0.50
	Total	51	
Kruskal Wallis Test			
	BNC		**COCA**
Chi-Square	36.000		36.000
df	3		3
Asymp. Sig.	.000		.000

Table 4.15: The K-W test on BELIEVE ME and the positional flexibility frequency set

BELIEVE ME Intensifying Features –BNC Intensifying Features –COCA		
Ranks		
F: CATEGORIES BNC Intensifying Features	**N**	**Mean Rank**
Negative Lexical Prosody	37	18.50
Positive Lexical Prosody	24	12.00
Comparatives	18	9.00
Superlatives	10	5.00
Quantifiers	26	13.00
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	4	2.00
Focus Particles	4	2.00
Marked Word Order	1	0.50
Lexical Repetition	7	3.50
Total	136	
Ranks		
F: CATEGORIES COCA Intensifying Features	**N**	**Mean Rank**
Negative Lexical Prosody	49	24.50
Positive Lexical Prosody	27	13.50
Comparatives	22	10.50
Superlatives	16	8.50
Quantifiers	37	17.50
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	2	1.00
Focus Particles	4	2.00
Marked Word Order	5	2.50
Lexical Repetition	14	7.00
Total	176	
Kruskal Wallis Test		
	BNC Intensifying Features	**COCA** Intensifying Features
Chi-Square	92.635	92.635
df	6	6
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 4.16: The K-W test on BELIEVE ME and the intensifying features frequency set

BELIEVE ME BNC vs. COCA **Contextual Features**		
Ranks		
F: CATEGORIES **BNC** Contextual Features	**N**	**Mean Rank**
Preceded by questions	4	2.00
Followed by questions	3	1.50
Preceded by negation	7	3.50
Followed by negation	3	1.50
Collocating with 'and'	5	2.50
Collocating with 'but'	2	1.00
Preceded by a conditional	3	1.50
Followed by a conditional	1	0.50
Total	28	
Ranks		
F: CATEGORIES **COCA** Contextual Features	**N**	**Mean Rank**
Preceded by questions	7	3.50
Followed by questions	2	1.00
Preceded by negation	11	5.50
Followed by negation	15	7.50
Collocating with 'and'	16	6.00
Collocating with 'but'	5	2.50
Preceded by a conditional	7	3.50
Followed by a conditional	3	1.50
Total	66	
Kruskal Wallis Test		
	BNC Contextual Features	**COCA** Contextual Features
Chi-Square	35.00	35.00
df	5	5
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 4.17: The K-W test on BELIEVE ME and the contextual features frequency set

4.7.5 BELIEVE YOU ME: *The statistical significance of the data*

BELIEVE YOU ME BNC vs. COCA Monologual- Monologic (MM) – Monologual-Dialogic (MD) Dialogual- Monologic (DM) – Dialogual-Dialogic (DD)			
Ranks			
F:	**Categories**	**N**	**Mean Rank (MR)**
BNC	Monologual - Monologic (MM)	0	0.00
	Monologual - Dialogic (MD)	61	30.50
	Dialogual - Monologic (DM)	0	0.00
	Dialogual - Dialogic (DD)	6	3.00
	Total	67	
COCA	Monologual - Monologic (MM)	0	0.00
	Monologual - Dialogic (MD)	10	5.50
	Dialogual - Monologic (DM)	0	0.00
	Dialogual - Dialogic (DD)	22	11.00
	Total	32	
Kruskal Wallis Test			
	BNC		**COCA**
Chi-Square	66.000		66.000
df	1		1
Asymp. Sig.	.000		.000

Table 4.18: The K-W test on BELIEVE YOU ME and the MD – MM – DD – DM frequency set

BELIEVE YOU ME Positional Flexibility – BNC Positional Flexibility - COCA			
Ranks			
F:	**Categories**	**N**	**Mean Rank (MR)**
BNC Positional Flexibility	Sentence Initial (SI)	28	24.50
	Parenthetical (P)	31	54.50
	Sentence Final (SF)	8	4.50
	Independent Sentential Status (IS)	0	0
	Total	67	
COCA Positional Flexibility	Sentence Initial (SI)	16	28.00
	Parenthetical (P)	9	15.50
	Sentence Final (SF)	6	4.50
	Independent Sentential Status (IS)	1	1.00
	Total	32	
Kruskal Wallis Test			
	BNC Positional Flexibility		**COCA Positional Flexibility**

Chi-Square	67.000	67.000
df	2	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 4.19: The K-W test on BELIEVE YOU ME and the positional flexibility frequency set

BELIEVE YOU ME BNC vs. COCA **Intensifying Features**		
Ranks		
F: Intensifying Features BNC	**N**	**Mean Rank**
Negative Lexical Prosody	63	31.50
Positive Lexical Prosody	56	28.00
Comparatives	34	17.00
Superlatives	28	14.00
Quantifiers	52	26.00
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	7	3.50
Focus Particles	11	5.50
Marked Word Order	10	5.00
Lexical Repetition	9	4.50
Total	270	
Ranks		
F: Intensifying Features COCA	**N**	**Mean Rank**
Negative Lexical Prosody	31	15.50
Positive Lexical Prosody	19	9.50
Comparatives	13	6.50
Superlatives	6	3.00
Quantifiers	11	10.50
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	3	1.50
Focus Particles	3	1.50
Marked Word Order	4	2.00
Lexical Repetition	9	4.50
Total	99	
Kruskal Wallis Test		
	BNC Intensifying Features	**COCA** Intensifying Features
Chi-Square	124.081	124.081
df	8	8
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 4.20: The K-W test on BELIEVE YOU ME and the intensifying features frequency set

BELIEVE YOU ME BNC vs. COCA **Contextual Features**		
Ranks		
F: Contextual Features BNC	**N**	**Mean Rank**
Preceded by questions	9	4.50
Followed by questions	2	1.00
Preceded by negation	11	5.50
Followed by negation	14	7.00
Collocating with 'and'	19	8.50
Collocating with 'but'	7	3.50
Preceded by a conditional	4	2.00
Followed by a conditional	4	2.00
Total	70	
Ranks		
F: Contextual Features COCA	**N**	**Mean Rank**
Preceded by questions	2	1.00
Followed by questions	5	2.50
Preceded by negation	8	4.00
Followed by negation	5	2.50
Collocating with 'and'	5	2.50
Collocating with 'but'	2	1.00
Preceded by a conditional	5	2.50
Followed by a conditional	3	1.50
Total	35	
Kruskal Wallis Test		
	BNC Contextual Features	**COCA** Contextual Features
Chi-Square	35.00	35.00
df	7	7
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 4.21: The K-W test on BELIEVE YOU ME and the contextual frequency set

4.7.6 BELIEVE IT OR NOT: *The statistical significance of the data*

BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC vs. COCA **Monologual- Monologic (MM) – Monologual-Dialogic (MD)** **Dialogual- Monologic (DM) – Dialogual-Dialogic (DD)**			
Ranks			
F: MM-MD-DM-DD	**Categories**	**N**	**Mean Rank (MR)**
BNC	Monologual - Monologic (MM)	0	0.00
	Monologual - Dialogic (MD)	25	12.50
	Dialogual - Monologic (DM)	0	0.00
	Dialogual - Dialogic (DD)	23	11.50
	Total	48	
COCA	Monologual - Monologic (MM)	0	0.00
	Monologual - Dialogic (MD)	30	15.00
	Dialogual - Monologic (DM)	0	0.000
	Dialogual - Dialogic (DD)	36	18.00
	Total	66	
Kruskal Wallis Test			
		BNC	**COCA**
Chi-Square		65.000	65.000
df		1	1
Asymp. Sig.		.000	.000

Table 4.22: The K-W test on BELIEVE IT OR NOT and the MD-MM-DD-DM frequency set

BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC vs. COCA **Positional Flexibility**			
Ranks			
F: Positional Flexibility	**Categories**	**N**	**Mean Rank (MR)**
BNC	Sentence Initial (SI)	14	7.00
	Parenthetical (P)	24	12.00
	Sentence Final (S-F)	7	3.50
	Independent Sentential Status (I-S)	3	1.50
	Total	48	
COCA	Sentence Initial (SI)	21	10.50
	Parenthetical (P)	37	18.50
	Sentence Final (S-F)	8	4.00

		Independent Sentential Status (I-S)	0	0.00
		Total	66	
Kruskal Wallis Test				
		BNC **Positional Flexibility**		**COCA** **Positional Flexibility**
Chi-Square		65.000		65.000
df		3		2
Asymp. Sig.		.000		.000

Table 4.23: The K-W test on BELIEVE IT OR NOT and the positional flexibility frequency set

BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC vs. COCA **Intensifying Features**		
Ranks		
F: Intensifying Features **BNC**	**N**	**Mean Rank**
Negative Lexical Prosody	45	22.00
Positive Lexical Prosody	34	17.00
Comparatives	19	9.50
Superlatives	10	5.00
Quantifiers	29	14.50
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	6	3.00
Focus Particles	6	3.00
Marked Word Order	9	4.50
Lexical Repetition	6	3.00
Total	163	
		Ranks
F: Intensifying Features **COCA**	N	Mean Rank
Negative Lexical Prosody	54	27.00
Positive Lexical Prosody	47	23.50
Comparatives	24	12.00
Superlatives	24	12.00
Quantifiers	42	22.00
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	6	3.00
Focus Particles	11	5.50
Marked Word Order	7	3.50
Lexical Repetition	11	5.50
Total	226	
Kruskal Wallis Test		
	BNC Intensifying Features	**COCA** Intensifying Features

Chi-Square	119.000	119.000
df	8	8
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 4.24: The K-W test on BELIEVE IT OR NOT and the intensifying features frequency set

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3" align="center">BELIEVE IT OR NOT
BNC vs. COCA
Contextual Features</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3" align="center">Ranks</td></tr>
<tr><td>F: Contextual Features
BNC</td><td align="center">N</td><td align="center">Mean Rank</td></tr>
<tr><td>Preceded by questions</td><td align="center">7</td><td align="center">3.50</td></tr>
<tr><td>Followed by questions</td><td align="center">6</td><td align="center">3.00</td></tr>
<tr><td>Preceded by negation</td><td align="center">5</td><td align="center">2.50</td></tr>
<tr><td>Followed by negation</td><td align="center">8</td><td align="center">4.00</td></tr>
<tr><td>Collocating with 'and'</td><td align="center">3</td><td align="center">1.50</td></tr>
<tr><td>Collocating with 'but'</td><td align="center">1</td><td align="center">0.50</td></tr>
<tr><td>Preceded by a conditional</td><td align="center">0</td><td align="center">0.00</td></tr>
<tr><td>Followed by a conditional</td><td align="center">1</td><td align="center">0.50</td></tr>
<tr><td>Total</td><td align="center">31</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3" align="center">Ranks</td></tr>
<tr><td>F: Contextual Features
COCA</td><td align="center">N</td><td align="center">Mean Rank</td></tr>
<tr><td>Preceded by questions</td><td align="center">4</td><td align="center">2.00</td></tr>
<tr><td>Followed by questions</td><td align="center">5</td><td align="center">2.50</td></tr>
<tr><td>Preceded by negation</td><td align="center">6</td><td align="center">3.00</td></tr>
<tr><td>Followed by negation</td><td align="center">10</td><td align="center">5.00</td></tr>
<tr><td>Collocating with 'and'</td><td align="center">15</td><td align="center">7.50</td></tr>
<tr><td>Collocating with 'but'</td><td align="center">1</td><td align="center">0.50</td></tr>
<tr><td>Preceded by a conditional</td><td align="center">4</td><td align="center">2.00</td></tr>
<tr><td>Followed by a conditional</td><td align="center">10</td><td align="center">5.00</td></tr>
<tr><td>Total</td><td align="center">55</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3" align="center">Kruskal Wallis Test</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="center">BNC
Contextual Features</td><td align="center">COCA
Contextual Features</td></tr>
<tr><td>Chi-Square</td><td align="center">23.521</td><td align="center">23.521</td></tr>
<tr><td>df</td><td align="center">5</td><td align="center">5</td></tr>
<tr><td>Asymp. Sig.</td><td align="center">.000</td><td align="center">.000</td></tr>
</table>

Table 4.25: The K-W test on BELIEVE IT OR NOT and the contextual features frequency set

4.7.7 The internal reliability of the data

4.7.7.1 The internal reliability of the data: Phase 1

Reliability Statistics		
Cronbach's alpha (α)		
F: BELIEVE ME BNC		
Cronbach's alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of items
0.715	0.786	7
F: BELIEVE ME COCA		
Cronbach's alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of items
0.890	0.910	7
F: BELIEVE YOU ME BNC		
Cronbach's alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of items
0.850	0.890	7
F: BELIEVE YOU ME COCA		
Cronbach's alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of items
0.788	0.840	7
F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT BNC		
Cronbach's alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of items
0.912	0.945	7
F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT COCA		
Cronbach's alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of items
0.812	0.890	7

Table 4.26: Cronbach's (α) results for the BELIEVE-family in both corpora

4.7.7.2 The internal reliability of the data: Phase 2

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's alpha (α)

F: BELIEVE ME (BNC & COCA)		
Contextual features / Intensifying features		
Cronbach's alpha (α)	**Cronbach's alpha (α)**	**Cronbach's alpha (α)**
0.850	0.850	0.850
F: BELIEVE YOU ME (BNC & COCA)		
Contextual features / Intensifying features		
Cronbach's alpha (α)	**Cronbach's alpha (α)**	**Cronbach's alpha (α)**
0.880	0.880	0.880
F: BELIEVE IT OR NOT (BNC & COCA)		
Contextual features / Intensifying features		
Cronbach's alpha (α)	**Cronbach's alpha (α)**	**Cronbach's alpha (α)**
0.754	0.754	0.754

Table 4.27: Cronbach's (α) for the contextual and intensifying features in the BELIEVE-family

4.7.7.3 The internal reliability of the data: Phase 3

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's alpha (α)

F: BELIEVE YOU ME / BELIEVE IT OR NOT / BELIEVE ME [BNC & COCA]		
Cronbach's alpha (α)	**Cronbach's alpha (α)**	**Cronbach's alpha (α)**
0.680	0.680	0.680

Table 4.28: Cronbach's (α) for the aggregate frequency set of the BELIEVE-family

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY 2: THINK AGAIN

5.2 The semantics of the constituent parts of THINK AGAIN

5.2.1 The semantics of the verb 'think'

	Oxford English Dictionary (OED)	Cambridge English Dictionary (CED)	Collins English Dictionary (ColED)
think	**think** *with clause* **1. Have a particular belief or idea.** *'She thought that nothing would be the same again.'* *with infinitive* *'Up to 300 people were thought to have died.'* **think of** *(no object)* **1. 1. Have a specified opinion of** *'She did not think highly of modern art.'/'I think of him as a friend.'* **1.2. Used in questions to express anger or surprise.** *'What do you think you're doing?'* **1.3. I think** **Used in speech to reduce the force of a statement, or to politely suggest or refuse something.** *'I thought we could go out for a meal.'* **Think** *no object* **2. Direct one's mind towards someone or something; use one's mind actively to form connected ideas.** *'He was thinking about Colin' / 'Jack thought for a moment'* *with object* **2.1. Have a particular mental attitude or approach**. *'He thought like a general.'* *with complement* *'One should always think positive.'*	[I or T] to believe something or have an opinion or idea: **[+ (that)]** *I think (that) I've met you before.* *I don't think Emma will get the job.* **[+ to infinitive]** *He was thought to have boarded the plane in New York.* **[I] to consider a** **person's needs or wishes:** *She's always thinking of others.* **think verb (DECIDE)** **to use the brain to decide to do something:** **[+ of+ -ing verb]** *I'm thinking of taking up running.* **[+ (that)]** *I think (that) I'll go swimming after lunch.* *I'm thinking about buying a new car.* **think verb (REASON)** **[I] to use the brain to plan something, solve a problem, understand a situation, etc.:** *What are you thinking, Peter?* *You think too much - that's your problem.* **think verb (REMEMBER)** **[I usually + adv/prep] to remember or imagine:** *I was just thinking about you when you called.*	**1. verb [no cont] If you think that something is the case, you have the opinion that it is the case**. *I certainly think there should be a ban on tobacco advertising.* [VERB that] *Tell me, what do you think of my theory?* [V + of/about] **2.verb [no cont]** **If you say that you think that something is true or will happen, you mean that you have the impression that it is true or will happen, although you are not certain of the facts.** *Nora thought he was seventeen years old.* [VERB that] **3. verb [no cont, no passive]** **If you think in a particular way, you have those general opinions or attitudes.** *You were probably brought up to think like that.* [V + like] **4. verb** **When you think about ideas or problems, you make a mental effort to consider them.** *She closed her eyes for a moment, trying to think.* [VERB] *I have often thought about this problem.*

	2.2. think of/about **Take into account or consideration when deciding on a possible action**. *'You can live how you like, but there's the children to think about.'* **2.3. think of** **Call to mind.** *'Lemon thyme is a natural pair with any chicken dish you can think of.'* **2.4. think of/about** **Consider the possibility or advantages of (a course of action).** *'He was thinking of becoming a zoologist.'* **2.5. think to do something** **Have sufficient foresight or awareness to do something.** *'I hadn't thought to warn Rachel about him.'* **2.6. Imagine or expect (an actual or possible situation).** *'Think of being paid a salary to hunt big game!'* **2.7. think oneself into** **Imagine what it would be like to be in (a position or role).** *'She tried to think herself into the part of Peter's fiancée'*	*She was so busy she didn't think to tell me about it.*	*[VERB + about]* **5. verb [no passive]** **If you think in a particular way, you consider things, solve problems, or make decisions in this way, for example because of your job or your background.** *To make the computer work at full capacity, the programmer has to think like the machine.* *[VERB preposition]* **6. verb [no cont]** **If you think of something, it comes into your mind or you remember it.** *I can't think of any reason why he should do that.* *[VERB of noun]* **7. verb** **If you think of an idea, you make a mental effort and use your imagination and intelligence to create it or develop it.** *He thought of another way of getting out of the marriage.* *[VERB + of]* **8. verb [no cont]** **If you think of someone or something as having a particular quality or purpose, you regard them as having this quality or purpose.** *We all thought of him as a father.* *[VERB + of]* *He thinks of it as his home.* **9. verb** **If you think of someone, you show consideration for them and pay attention to their needs.** *I'm only thinking of you.* *[VERB + of]*
think again	**think again (listed as a phrase)** **Reconsider something.** *'The advisory committee must think again about its approach.'*	**think again (listed as an idiom)** to form a new opinion about something or decide to change your decision on it, often after learning more about it: *When the children are misbehaving, it makes me think again about having a large family.*	**think again (listed as a phrase)** **If you think again about an action or decision, you consider it very carefully, often with the result that you change your mind and decide to do things differently.** *It has forced politicians to think again about the wisdom of trying to evacuate refugees.* *[+ about]*

Table 5.1: A lexicographic summary of *'think'* and *'think again'* in OED, CED and ColED

5.2.2 The semantics of the adverb 'again'

	Oxford English Dictionary (OED)	*Cambridge English Dictionary* (CED)	*Collins English Dictionary* (ColED)
again	**1. Another time; once more (adverb)** *'It was great to meet old friends again'.* **2. Returning to a previous position or condition.** *'He rose, tidied the bed, and sat down again'.* **3. In addition to what has already been mentioned.** *'The wages were low but they made half as much again in tips'.* **4. (sentence adverb)** **Used to introduce a further point for consideration, supporting or contrasting with what has just been said.** *'I never saw any signs, but then again, maybe I wasn't looking'* **5. Used to ask someone to repeat something.** *'What was your name again?'*	**1. (adverb) One more time:** *Could you spell your name again, please?* **2. back to the original place or condition:** *We went to Edinburgh and back again all in one day.* **3. again adverb (IN ADDITION)** **In addition to the amount we know about or have mentioned already:** *They are paid half as much again as we are.*	**1. adverb [ADVERB with verb]** **You use *again* to indicate that something happens a second time, or after it has already happened before.** *He kissed her again.* **2. adverb [ADVERB after verb]** **You use *again* to indicate that something is now in a particular state or place that it used to be in.** *I started to feel good about myself again.* **3. adverb** **You can use *again* when you want to point out that there is a similarity between the subject that you are talking about now and a previous subject.** *Again the pregnancy was very similar to my previous two.* **4. adverb** **You use *again* in expressions such as *but again*, *then again*, and *there again* when you want to introduce a remark which *contrasts* with or *weakens* something that you have just said.** *It's easier to take a taxi. But then again you can't always get one.* **5. adverb** **You can add *again* to the end of your question when you are asking someone to tell you something that you have forgotten or that they have already told you.** [spoken] *Sorry, what's your name again?*

Table 5.2: A lexicographic summary of the semantics of *'again'* in OED, CED and ColED

5.6.2 Frequency Counts

5.6.2.1 Distribution of the fully-compositional and constructional instances

Classification of Data	*Fully-Compositional*		*Constructional*	
THINK AGAIN	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA
BNC total sample: 54	12	15	42	48
COCA total sample: 63	22.2%	23.8%	77.8%	76.2%

Table 5.3: An overview of the frequencies of the fully-compositional and constructional instances

5.6.2.2 Distribution of the dialogicity-monologicity and dialoguality-monologuality

Classification of Data	Monologual-Dialogic (MD)		Monologual-Monologic (MM)		Dialogual-Dialogic (DD)		Dialogual-Monologic (DM)	
THINK AGAIN	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA	BNC	COCA
BNC total sample: 54	30	35	0	0	12	13	0	0
(42 constructional)	71.4%	72,9%	---	---	28.6%	27,1%	---	--
COCA total sample: 63								
(48 constructional)								

Table 5.4: An overview of the frequencies of the MD – MM – DD– DM

5.6.2.3 Distribution of intensifying features

	Intensifying Features THINK AGAIN	
Frequency Sets	THINK AGAIN BNC	THINK AGAIN COCA
Constructional Semantics	42/54	48/63
Negative Lexical Prosody	37	40
	88.1%	83.3%
Positive Lexical Prosody	32	38
	76.2%	79.2%
Comparatives	18	28
	42.9%	58.3%
Superlatives	8	21
	19.05%	43.8%
Quantifiers	33	30
	78.6%	62.5%
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	5	8
	11.9%	16.7%
Focus Particles	8	10
	19.05%	20.8%
Marked Word Order	6	2
	14.3%	4.2%
Lexical Repetition	5	9
	11.9%	18.8%

Table 5.5: An overview of the frequencies of the intensifying features

5.6.2.4 Distribution of morphosyntactic and contextual features

Morphosyntactic and Contextual Features THINK AGAIN			
Collocating with Connectors		**Collocating with Conditionals**	
BNC (42)	COCA (48)	BNC (42)	COCA (48)
And / But	And / But	Embedded in the apodosis of a conditional sentence	Embedded in the apodosis of a conditional sentence
4 / 0	8 / 3	19	26
9.5% / ---	16.7% / 6.3%	45.2%	54.2%

Collocating with Questions				**Collocating with Negation**			
Preceded by Questions		Followed by Questions		Preceded by Negation BNC		Followed by Negation COCA	
BNC (42)	COCA (48)	BNC (42)	COCA (48)	BNC (42)	COCA (48)	BNC (42)	COCA (48)
7	9	6	3	8	14	10	6
16.7%	18.8%	14.3%	6.3%	19%	29,2%	23.8%	12.5%
Contextual presence of the verb *'think'*		**Contextual presence of directive performatives**		**Imperative**		**Infinitival Form**	
BNC (42)	COCA (48)	BNC (42)	COCA (48)	BNC (42)	COCA* (48)	BNC* (42)	COCA (48)
18	26	23	19	17	30	24	17
42.3%	54.2%	54.8%	39.6%	40.5%	62.5%	57.1%	35.4%

Table 5.6: An overview of the frequencies of the morphosyntactic and contextual features

* BNC and COCA also feature an instance of the Subjunctive, amounting for 2.4% of the BNC data and 2.1% of the COCA data, respectively.

5.6.2.5 Distribution of positional flexibility

Positional Flexibility THINK AGAIN		
Frequency Sets	THINK AGAIN **BNC** (42)	THINK AGAIN **COCA** (48)
Sentence Initial (SI)	0	0
	---	---
Parenthetical (P)	0	0
	---	---
Sentence-Final (SF)* *5 clause-final included	37	38
	88,1%	79.2%
Independent Sentence (IS)	5	10
	11,9%	20.8%

Table 5.7: An overview of the frequencies of positional flexibility

5.6.3 Reliability and validity statistics

THINK AGAIN COCA – Frequency Set Examined			
Variable Examined Frequency (F)	Mean (M)	Standard Deviation (StD)	Range (R)
Fully-compositional vs. Constructional instances (Fully-comp vs. constr.)	31.50	23.335	15-48
Dialogual- Dialogic (DD) Dialogual- Monologic (DM) Monologual-Dialogic (MD) Monologual-Monologic (MM)	23.33	20.207	0-35
Intensifying Elements (IE)	20.555	7.088	2-40
Morphosyntactic and Contextual Features (MCFs)	8.88	7.972	2-26
Positional Flexibility (PF)	24.00	9.122	10-38
THINK AGAIN BNC – Frequency Set Examined			
Variable Examined Frequency (F)	Mean (M)	Standard Deviation (StD)	Range (R)
Fully-compositional vs. Constructional instances (Fully-comp vs. constr.)	27.00	21.213	12-42
Dialogual- Dialogic (DD) Dialogual- Monologic (DM) Monologual-Dialogic (MD) Monologual-Monologic (MM)	20.00	17.320	12-30
Intensifying Elements (IE)	216.667	12.190	5-37
Morphosyntactic and Contextual Features (MCFs)	8.29	5.187	0-19
Positional Flexibility (PF)	21.00	8.456	0-37

Table 5.8: Calculation of the Mean (M), Standard Deviation (StD) and Range (R) for THINK AGAIN

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test THINK AGAIN BNC: Overall Frequency Set					
F: THINK AGAIN BNC		F: THINK AGAIN BNC Constructional Semantics	F: THINK AGAIN BNC DD / MD/ MM / DM	F: THINK AGAIN BNC Intensifying Features	F: THINK AGAIN BNC Positional Flexibility	F: THINK AGAIN BNC Contextual Features
N Normal Parameters	Mean	63	30	150	43	101
		32.33	10.40	216.666	14.33	17.53
	StD	18.475	13.142	12.190	12.503	9.223
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	.260	.258	.373	.260	.302
	Positive	.260	.258	.373	.260	.302
	Negative	-.260	-.146	-.270	-.260	-.225
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		.368	.729	.645	.368	.603
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.945	.663	.745	.987	.878

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test THINK AGAIN COCA: Overall Frequency Set					
F: THINK AGAIN COCA		F: THINK AGAIN COCA Constructional Semantics	F: THINK AGAIN COCA DD / MD/ MM / DM	F: THINK AGAIN COCA Intensifying Features	F: THINK AGAIN COCA Positional Flexibility	F: THINK AGAIN COCA Contextual Features
N Normal Parameters	Mean	54	35	186	48	121
		37	12.40	20.555	16	17.92
	StD	19.053	13.159	7.088	17.776	5.096
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	.260	.258	.373	.260	.302
	Positive	.260	.258	.373	.260	.302
	Negative	-.260	-.146	-.270	-.260	-.225
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		.368	.729	.645	.368	.603
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.999	.663	.799	.999	.860

Table 5.9: The K-S test for THINK AGAIN (BNC & COCA)

5.6.4 THINK AGAIN: *The statistical significance of the data*

THINK AGAIN Fully-Compositional vs. Constructional Instances					
F:	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
(Fully-comp vs. constr.) _COCA	63	37.00	19.053	15	48
(Fully-comp vs. constr.) _BNC	54	32.33	18.475	12	42
Ranks					
	Categories	N	Mean Rank (MR)	Sum of Ranks	
(Fully-comp vs. constr.) _BNC	Fully-Compositional	12	6.00	66.00	
	Constructional	42	21.00	1410.00	
	Total	54			

(Fully-comp vs. constr.) _COCA	Fully-Compositional	15	8.00	120.00
	Constructional	48	39.50	1896.00
	Total	63		

Mann-Whitney U		
	(Fully-comp vs. constr.) _ COCA	*(Fully-comp vs. constr.) _ BNC*
Mann-Whitney U	.000	.000
Wilcoxon W	1.000	1.000
Z	-1.411	-1.411
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)]	.667[b]	.667[b]

Table 5.10: The K-W test on THINK AGAIN (fully-compositional vs. constructional semantics)

THINK AGAIN **Dialogual- Dialogic (DD) - Dialogual- Monologic (DM)** **Monologual-Dialogic (MD) - Monologual-Monologic (MM)**					
F:	**N**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
COCA *Dialogual- Dialogic (DD)* *Dialogual- Monologic (DM)* *Monologual-Dialogic (MD)* *Monologual-Monologic (MM)*	48	12.20	13.489	13	35
BNC *Dialogual- Dialogic (DD)* *Dialogual- Monologic (DM)* *Monologual-Dialogic (MD)* *Monologual-Monologic (MM)*	42	10.80	11.593	12	30
Ranks					

	Categories	**N**	**Mean Rank (MR)**
COCA *Dial vs. Monol.*	*Dialogual- Dialogic (DD)*	13	6.50
	Dialogual- Monologic (DM)	0	0
	Monologual-Dialogic (MD)	35	32.50
	Monologual-Monologic (MM)	0	0
	Total	48	
BNC	*Dialogual- Dialogic (DD)*	12	6.00

Dial vs. Monol.	*Dialogual- Monologic (DM)*	0	0
	Monologual-Dialogic (MD)	30	15.00
	Monologual-Monologic (MM)	0	0
	Total	42	

Kruskal Wallis Test		
	COCA *Dial vs. Monol.*	*BNC* *Dial vs. Monol.*
Chi-Square	9.000	9.000
df	3	3
Asymp. Sig.	.015	.015

Table 5.11: The K-W test on THINK AGAIN and the MD – MM – DD – DM frequency set

THINK AGAIN **Positional Flexibility**					
F:	**N**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
COCA Positional Flexibility	48	24.00	9.122	10	38
Ranks					
CATEGORIES *COCA* *Positional Flexibility*	**N**			**Mean Rank**	
Sentence-final position (SF)	38			19.00	
Independent sentential status (ISS)	10			5.00	
Total	48				
F:	**N**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
BNC *Positional Flexibility*	42	21.00	8.456	5	37
Ranks					
CATEGORIES *BNC* *Positional Flexibility*	**N**			**Mean Rank**	
Sentence-final position (SF)	37			18.50	
Independent sentential status (ISS)	5			2.50	
Total	42				
Mann-Whitney U					
	COCA *Positional Flexibility*			*BNC* *Positional Flexibility*	
Mann-Whitney U	.000			.000	
Wilcoxon W	1.000			1.000	

Z	-0.987	-0.987
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)]	.456[b]	.456[b]

Table 5.12: The M-W test on THINK AGAIN and the positional flexibility frequency set

THINK AGAIN **Intensifying Features**					
F:	**N**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
COCA *Intensifying Features*	186	20.555	7.088	2	40
Ranks					

CATEGORIES *COCA* *Intensifying Elements*	**N**	**Mean Rank**
Negative Lexical Prosody	40	20.00
Positive Lexical Prosody	38	19.00
Comparatives	28	24.00
Superlatives	21	10.50
Quantifiers	30	15.00
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	8	4.00
Focus Particles	10	5.00
Marked Word Order	2	1.00
Lexical Repetition	9	4.50
Total	186	

F:	**N**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
BNC *Intensifying Features*	152	216.667	12.190	5	37
Ranks					

CATEGORIES *BNC* *Intensifying Features*	**N**	**Mean Rank**
Negative Lexical Prosody	37	18.50
Positive Lexical Prosody	32	16.00
Comparatives	18	9.00
Superlatives	8	4.00
Quantifiers	33	16.50
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	5	2.50
Focus Particles	8	4.00
Marked Word Order	6	3.00
Lexical Repetition	5	2.50
Total	152	
Kruskal Wallis Test		
	COCA	*BNC*

	Intensifying Features	*Intensifying Features*
Chi-Square	44.00	44.00
df	8	8
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 5.13: The K-W test on THINK AGAIN and the intensifying features frequency set

THINK AGAIN Contextual Features					
F:	**N**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
COCA *Morphosyntactic & Contextual Features*	161	12.977	8.29	3	30
Ranks					
CATEGORIES **COCA** *Morphosyntactic & Contextual Features*		**N**		**Mean Rank**	
Apodosis of a conditional sentence		26		13.00	
Imperative		30		15.00	
Infinitive		17		8.50	
Directive Performatives		19		9.50	
Contextual presence of the verb *'think'*		26		13.00	
Preceded by questions		9		4.50	
Followed by questions		3		1.50	
Preceded by negation		14		7.00	
Followed by negation		6		3.00	
Collocating with connector *'and'*		8		4.00	
Collocating with connector *'but'*		3		1.50	
Total		161			
F:	**N**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
BNC *Morphosyntactic & Contextual Features*	136	12.11	6.32	0	24
Ranks					
CATEGORIES **BNC** *Contextual Features*		**N**		**Mean Rank**	
Apodosis of a conditional sentence		19		9.50	
Imperative		17		8.50	
Infinitive		24		12.00	
Directive Performatives		23		11.50	
Contextual presence of the verb *'think'*		18		9.00	
Preceded by questions		7		6.50	

Followed by questions	6	3.00
Preceded by negation	8	4.00
Followed by negation	10	5.00
Collocating with connector *'and'*	4	2.00
Collocating with connector *'but'*	0	0.00
Total	136	
Kruskal Wallis Test		
	COCA *Contextual Features*	*BNC* *Contextual Features*
Chi-Square	44.00	44.00
df	10	10
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 5.14: The K-W test on THINK AGAIN and the contextual features frequency set

5.6.5 The internal reliability of the data

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's alpha (α)

F: Fully-Compositional vs. Constructional

Cronbach's alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of items
0.998	1.000	2

F: Dialogual/ic vs. Monologual/ic

Cronbach's alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of items
0.992	0.991	2

F: Intensifying Features

Cronbach's alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of items
0.956	0.972	2

F: Positional Flexibility

Cronbach's alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of items
0.938	0.910	2

F: Contextual Features

Cronbach's alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of items
0.828	0.846	2

Table 5.15: Cronbach's (α) for the aggregate frequency set of THINK AGAIN

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER 6

CASE STUDY 3: MIND YOU

6.2 MIND YOU

6.2.1 The semantics of the verb 'mind'

	Oxford English Dictionary (OED)	*Cambridge English Dictionary* (CED)	*Collins English Dictionary* (ColED)
mind	**1. often with negative** **be distressed, annoyed, or worried by.** *'I don't mind the rain'* **1.1 object to.** *'What does that mean, if you don't mind my asking?'* **1.2 mind doing something (with negative) or (in questions) be reluctant to do something.** *'I don't mind admitting I was worried'* **1.3 would not mind something informal** **(Used to express one's strong enthusiasm for something)** *'I wouldn't mind some coaching from him!'* **2 (often with negative) regard as important; feel concern about.** *'Never mind the opinion polls'* **3 with clause, in imperative** **Used to urge someone to remember or take care to do something.** *'Mind you look after the children'* **3.1 in imperative** **Used to warn someone to avoid injury or an accident.**	**1. mind verb (BE ANNOYED)** **[I or T] (used in questions and negatives) to be annoyed or worried by something:** *Do you think he'd mind if I borrowed his book?* **[+ -ing verb]** *I don't mind having a dog in the house so long as it's clean.* **[informal]** *I wouldn't mind (= I would like) something to eat, if that's OK.* **[+ obj + -ing verb]** *Do you mind me smoking?* **said to someone when you feel annoyed with that person for what they have just done or said:** *Do you mind? That's my seat you're sitting on!* **2. mind verb (BE CAREFUL)** **mainly UK: to be careful of, or give attention to something:** *[+ (that)] Mind that box - the bottom isn't very strong.* *Mind (that) you don't bang your head on the shelf when you stand up.* *Mind (= make certain that) you take enough money with you.* **old-fashioned** *Mind your language (= don't use swear words), young lady!* **3. mind (out)! mainly UK**	**1. verb** **If you do not mind something, you are not annoyed or bothered by it.** *I don't mind the noise during the day. [VERB noun/verb-ing]* *Do you mind being alone? [VERB noun/verb-ing]* *I hope you don't mind me calling in like this, without an appointment. [VERB noun verb-ing]* *Synonyms: take offence at, dislike, care about, object to* **2. verb** **You use mind in the expressions 'do you mind?' and 'would you mind?' as a polite way of asking permission or asking someone to do something.** **[*politeness*]** *Do you mind if I ask you one more thing? [V if]* *You don't mind if they take a look round, do you? [V if]* *Would you mind waiting outside for a moment? [VERB verb-ing]* **3. verb** **If someone does not mind what happens or what something is like, they do not have a strong**

'Mind your head on that cupboard!' *(no object)* *'Mind out—there's a step missing'* **3.2 informal no object, in imperative Used to emphasize a command.** *'Be early to bed tonight, mind'* **3.3 in imperative Be careful about the quality or nature of** *'Mind your manners!'* **3.4 Also mind you no object, in imperative used to introduce a qualification to a previous statement.** *'We've got some decorations up—not a lot, mind you'* **3.5 (Irish, North American) [with object] pay attention to; obey.** *'You think about how much Cal does for you, and you mind her, you hear?'* **3.6 (Scottish) remember** *'I mind the time when he lost his false teeth'* **4 Take care of temporarily** *'We left our husbands to mind the children while we went out'*	**used to tell someone to move or be careful, or to warn someone of danger:** *Mind out! We're coming through with the stretcher.* *Mind out for falling rocks on this part of the trail.* **4. mind how you go mainly UK informal** *said when you say goodbye to someone, meaning "take care"* **mind verb (TAKE CARE OF)** **[T] UK or old-fashioned us to take care of someone or something:** *Could you mind my bag for a moment while I go to the toilet?* **5. mind verb (OBEY)** **[I or T] us to listen to and obey someone:** *Mind your grandma!*	**preference for any particular thing.** *I don't mind what we play, really.* *[VERB wh]* **4. verb [usually imper]** **If you tell someone to mind something, you are warning them to be careful not to hurt themselves or other people, or damage something.** *[British]* *Mind that bike! [VERB noun]* ***REGIONAL NOTE:*** ***In AM, usually use 'Watch'*** **5. verb** **You use mind when you are reminding someone to do something or telling them to be careful not to do something.** *[British]* *Mind you don't burn those sausages. [VERB that]* ***REGIONAL NOTE:*** ***In AM, usually use 'make sure', 'take care'*** *Synonyms: be careful, watch, take care, be wary* **6. verb** *If you mind a child or something such as a shop or luggage, you look after it, usually while the person who owns it or is usually responsible for it is somewhere else.* *[British]* *Jim Coulters will mind the store while I'm away. [VERB noun]* ***REGIONAL NOTE:*** ***In AM, usually use 'take care of', 'watch'***
mind **(you)**	Not listed separately as an idiom, see case 3.4.	**mind (you)**	**mind (you)** **phrase**

UK used when you want to make what you have just said sound less strong: *He's very untidy about the house; mind you, I'm not much better.* *I know I'm lazy - I did go swimming yesterday, mind.*	**You use mind you to emphasize a piece of information that you are adding, especially when the new information explains what you have said or contrasts with it. Some people use mind in a similar way.** *[emphasis]* *They pay full rates. Mind you, they can afford it.* *I got substantial damages. It took two years, mind you.* *You need a bit of cold water. Not too cold, mind.*

Table 6.1: A lexicographic summary of *'mind'* and *'mind you'* in OED, CED and ColED

6.5 MIND YOU: Frequency counts, reliability, and validity statistics

6.5.2 Frequency counts

6.5.2.1 Distribution of the constructional semantics, the injunctive pattern, and the false positives

MIND YOU			
MIND YOU BNC (65)		**MIND YOU COCA (64)**	
Constructional Semantics	58	Constructional Semantics	54
	89.2%		84.4%
False Positives	6	False Positives	6
	9.2%		9.4%
Injunctive Construction	1	Injunctive Construction	4
	1.6%		6.2%

Table 6.2: An overview of the frequencies of constructional semantics, false positives, and the injunctive pattern

6.5.2.2 Distribution of dialogicity-monologicity and dialoguality-monologuality

MIND YOU			
MIND YOU BNC (58)		MIND YOU COCA (54)	
Monologual-Monologic (MM)	--- (0)	Monologual-Monologic (MM)	--- (0)
Monologual-Dialogic (MD)	25.9% (15)	Monologual-Dialogic (MD)	55.6% (30)
Dialogual-Monologic (DM)	--- (0)	Dialogual-Monologic (DM)	--- (0)
Dialogual – Dialogic (DD)	74.1% (43)	Dialogual – Dialogic (DD)	44.4% (24)

Table 6.3: An overview of the frequencies of the MD – MM – DD– DM

6.5.2.3 Distribution of positional flexibility

MIND YOU			
MIND YOU BNC (58)		MIND YOU COCA (54)	
Sentence-Initial (SI)	82.8% (48)	Sentence-Initial (SI)	22.2% (12)
Sentence-Final (SF)	5.2% (3)	Sentence-Final (SF)	25.9% (14)
Parenthetical (P)	12% (7)	Parenthetical (P)	51.9% (28)

Table 6.4: An overview of the frequencies of positional flexibility

411

6.5.2.4 Distribution of contextual features

MIND YOU			
MIND YOU BNC (58)		MIND YOU COCA (54)	
Collocating with Connectors – 'And'	--- (0)	Collocating with Connectors – 'And'	3.7% (2)
Collocating with Connectors – 'But'	6,9% (4)	Collocating with Connectors – 'But'	27.8% (15)
Preceded by Conditionals	8.6% (5)	Preceded by Conditionals	3.7% (2)
Followed by Conditionals	13.8% (8)	Followed by Conditionals	3.7% (2)
Preceded by Questions	10.3% (6)	Preceded by Questions	7.4% (4)
Followed by Questions	20.7% (12)	Followed by Questions	11.1% (6)
Preceded by Negation	13.8% (8)	Preceded by Negation	44.4% (24)
Followed by Negation	55.2% (32)	Followed by Negation	31.5% (17)

Table 6.5: An overview of the frequencies of the contextual features

6.5.2.5 Distribution of the intensifying features

MIND YOU			
MIND YOU BNC (58)		MIND YOU COCA (54)	
Negative Lexical Prosody	51	Negative Lexical Prosody	52
	87.9%		96.3%
Positive Lexical Prosody	42	Positive Lexical Prosody	44
	72.4%		81.5%
Comparatives	23	Comparatives	15
	39.7%		27.8%

Superlatives	6	Superlatives	14
	10.3%		25.9%
Quantifiers	43	Quantifiers	31
	74.1%		57.4%
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	9	Epistemic Modal Particles	5
	15.5%		9.3%
Focus Particles	13	Focus Particles	15
	22.4%		27.8%
Marked Word Order	8	Marked Word Order	5
	13.8%		9.3%
Lexical Repetition	14	Lexical Repetition	22
	24.1%		40.7%

Table 6.6: An overview of the frequencies of the intensifying features

6.5.3 Reliability and validity statistics

6.5.3.1 The statistical significance of the data

	MIND YOU COCA- Frequency Sets Examined			MIND YOU BNC- Frequency Sets Examined		
Variable Examined Frequency (F)	Mean (M)	Standard Deviation (StD)	Range (R)	Mean (M)	Standard Deviation (StD)	Range (R)
F: Constructional Semantics False Positives Injunctive pattern	21.33	28.308	4-54	21.67	31.565	1-58
F: Monologual - Dialogic (MD) Monologual - Monologic (MM)	12.50	14.456	0-30	13.25	22.255	0-43

Dialogual - Monologic (DM)						
Dialogual - Dialogic (DD)						
F: CONTEXTUAL FEATURES	11.277	8.52	2-24	13.02	10.60	0-32
Collocating with Connectors *'And'*						
Collocating with Connectors *'But'*						
Preceded by Conditionals						
Followed by Conditionals						
Preceded by Questions						
Followed by Questions						
Preceded by Negation						
Followed by Negation						
F: POSITIONAL FLEXIBILITY	20.14	9.45	12-28	24.12	25.68	3-48
Sentence-Initial (S-I)						
Parenthetical (P)						
Sentence-Final (S-F)						
F: INTENSIFYING FEATURES	17.088	11.65	5-52	17.28	13.14	6-51
Negative lexical prosody						
Positive lexical prosody						
Comparatives						
Superlatives						
Quantifiers						
Epistemic Modal						
Adverbials						
Focus Particles						
Marked Word Order						
Lexical Repetition						

Table 6.7: Calculation of the Mean (M), Standard Deviation (StD) and Range (R) for MIND YOU

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test MIND YOU BNC: Overall Frequency Set					
F: MIND YOU BNC		F: MIND YOU BNC Constructional Semantics	F: MIND YOU BNC DD / MD/ MM / DM	F: MIND YOU BNC Intensifying Features	F: MIND YOU BNC Positional Flexibility	F: MIND YOU BNC Contextual Features

		Constructional Semantics	DD / MD/ MM / DM	Intensifying Features	Positional Flexibility	Contextual Features
N		65	58	209	58	75
Normal Parameters	Mean	.8333	9.6667	24.0000	25.6667	18.6667
	StD	2.04124	6.12100	29.44486	4.61880	14.17980
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	.492	.308	.385	.385	.274
	Positive	.492	.225	.385	.385	.274
	Negative	-.342	-.308	-.282	-.282	-.226
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		1.205	.755	.667	.667	.671
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.110	.619	.766	.766	.758

One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test MIND YOU COCA: Overall Frequency Set					
F: MIND YOU COCA		F: MIND YOU COCA Constructional Semantics	F: MIND YOU COCA DD / MD/ MM / DM	F: MIND YOU COCA Intensifying Features	F: MIND YOU COCA Positional Flexibility	F: MIND YOU COCA Contextual Features

		Constructional Semantics	COCA DD / MD/ MM / DM	Intensifying Features	Positional Flexibility	Contextual Features
N		64	54	203	54	72
Normal Parameters	Mean	16.65	12.4898	37.50	19.8163	16.2963
	StD	12.632	4.97545	22.000	15.31839	6.43796
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	.345	.257	.398	.391	.417
	Positive	.253	.235	.269	.391	.417
	Negative	-.345	-.257	-.398	-.201	-.252
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		2.418	1.797	1.593	2.737	2.167
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		.875	.873	.112	.956	.985

Table 6.8: The K-S test results for MIND YOU (BNC & COCA)

MIND YOU COCA Vs BNC Classification of data - Frequency Set					
F:	**N**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
COCA Constructional Semantics False Positives Injunctive pattern	64	21.33	28.308	4	54
BNC Constructional Semantics False Positives Injunctive pattern	65	21.67	31.565	1	58

Ranks			
	Categories	**N**	**Mean Rank (MR)**
COCA MIND YOU	Constructional Semantics	54	37.50
	False Positives	6	7.5
	Injunctive pattern	4	2.5
	Total	64	
BNC MIND YOU	Constructional Semantics	58	36.5
	False Positives	6	4.5
	Injunctive pattern	1	1.00
	Total	65	

Kruskal Wallis Test		
	COCA MIND YOU	**BNC** MIND YOU
Chi-Square	64.000	64.000
df	2	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 6.9: The K-W test on MIND YOU (compositional semantics-false positives-injunctive pattern)

MIND YOU					
(Constructional Semantics)					
Dialogicity-Monologicity & Dialoguality-Monologuality – Frequency Set					
F:	**N**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
COCA Monologual - Dialogic (MD) Monologual - Monologic (MM) Dialogual - Dialogic (DD) Dialogual - Monologic (DM)	54	13.50	15.927	0	30
BNC Monologual - Dialogic (MD) Monologual - Monologic (MM) Dialogual - Dialogic (DD) Dialogual - Monologic (DM)	58	14.50	25.755	0	53

Ranks				
		Categories	**N**	**Mean Rank (MR)**
COCA **MIND YOU** Dialogicity-Monologicity & Dialoguality-Monologuality		Monologual - Dialogic (MD)	30	15.00
		Monologual - Monologic (MM)	0	0
		Dialogual - Dialogic (DD)	24	12.00
		Dialogual - Monologic (DM)	0	0
		Total	54	
BNC **MIND YOU** Dialogicity-Monologicity & Dialoguality-Monologuality		Monologual - Dialogic (MD)	15	7.30
		Monologual - Monologic (MM)	0	0
		Dialogual - Dialogic (DD)	43	21.50
		Dialogual - Monologic (DM)	0	0
		Total	58	

Kruskal Wallis Test		
	COCA **MIND YOU** Dialogicity-Monologicity & Dialoguality-Monologuality	**BNC** **MIND YOU** Dialogicity-Monologicity & Dialoguality-Monologuality
Chi-Square	52.000	52.000
df	2	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 6.10: The K-W test on MIND YOU and the MD – MM – DD – DM frequency set

MIND YOU					
Contextual Features- Frequency Set					
	N	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
COCA **F: Contextual Features** (categories as presented below)	72	11.277	8.52	2	24
COCA Ranks					
F:		**N**		**Mean Rank (MR)**	
Collocating with Connectors – *'And'*		2		1.00	
Collocating with Connectors – *'But'*		15		7.50	
Preceded by Conditionals		2		1.00	
Followed by Conditionals		2		1.00	
Preceded by Questions		4		2.00	
Followed by Questions		6		3.00	
Preceded by Negation		24		12.00	
Followed by Negation		17		8.50	
BNC **F: Contextual Features** (categories as presented below)	**N**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Minimum**	**Maximum**
	75	13.02	10.60	0	32
BNC Ranks					
F:		**N**		**Mean Rank (MR)**	
Collocating with Connectors – *'And'*		0		0	
Collocating with Connectors – *'But'*		4		2.00	
Preceded by Conditionals		5		2.50	
Followed by Conditionals		8		4.00	
Preceded by Questions		6		3.00	
Followed by Questions		12		6.00	
Preceded by Negation		8		4.00	
Followed by Negation		32		16.00	
Kruskal Wallis Test					
		COCA MIND YOU - Contextual features		BNC MIND YOU - Contextual features	
Chi-Square		35.000		35.000	
df		7		7	
Asymp. Sig.		.000		.000	

Table 6.11: The K-W test on MIND YOU and the contextual features frequency set

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
MIND YOU					
Positional Flexibility - Frequency Set					

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
COCA **F: Positional Flexibility**	54	18.00	8.71	12	28

COCA Ranks		

COCA **F: Positional Flexibility**	N	Mean Rank (MR)
Sentence-Initial (SI)	12	47.50
Parenthetical (P)	28	26.5
Sentence Final (S-F)	14	6.5
Total	54	

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
BNC **F: Positional Flexibility**	58	19.33	24.21	3	48

BNC Ranks		

F:	N	Mean Rank (MR)
Sentence-Initial (SI)	48	24.00
Parenthetical (P)	7	3.50
Sentence Final (S-F)	3	1.50
Total	58	

Kruskal Wallis Test		
	COCA MIND YOU - Syntactic Position	BNC MIND YOU - Syntactic Position
Chi-Square	48.000	48.000
df	2	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 6.12: The K-W test on MIND YOU and the positional flexibility frequency set

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
MIND YOU					
Intensifying Features - Frequency Set					

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
COCA **F: Intensifying Features** (categories as presented below)	203	17.088	11.65	5	52

COCA Ranks		

COCA F: Intensifying Features	N	Mean Rank (MR)
Negative Lexical Prosody	52	26.00
Positive Lexical Prosody	44	22.00
Comparatives	15	7.50
Superlatives	14	7.00
Quantifiers	31	15.50
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	5	2.50
Focus Particles	15	7.50
Marked Word Order	5	2.50
Lexical Repetition	22	11.00
Total	203	

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
BNC F: Intensifying Features (categories as presented below)	209	17.28	13.14	6	51

BNC Ranks		
F: Intensifying Features	N	Mean Rank (MR)
Negative Lexical Prosody	51	25.50
Positive Lexical Prosody	42	21.00
Comparatives	23	11.50
Superlatives	6	2.50
Quantifiers	8	3.50
Epistemic Modal Adverbials	43	20.00
Focus Particles	9	4.00
Marked Word Order	13	6.50
Lexical Repetition	14	7.00
Total	209	

Kruskal Wallis Test		
	COCA MIND YOU - Intensifying Elements	BNC MIND YOU - Intensifying Elements
Chi-Square	142.000	142.000
df	8	9
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000

Table 6.13: The K-W test on MIND YOU and the intensifying features frequency set

6.5.3.2 The internal reliability of the data

MIND YOU		
Cronbach's alpha (α)		
Scale Statistics		
F: Overall Frequency Set (BNC & COCA)		
Cronbach's Alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha based on Standardised Items	N of Items
0.954	0.987	2
F: Intensifying Features (BNC & COCA)		
Cronbach's Alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha based on Standardised Items	N. of Items
0.948	0.988	2
F: Contextual Features (BNC & COCA)		
Cronbach's Alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha based on Standardised Items	N. of Items
0.753	0.784	2
F: Positional Flexibility (BNC & COCA)		
Cronbach's Alpha (α)	Cronbach's Alpha based on Standardised Items	N. of Items
0.923	0.923	2

Table 6.14: Cronbach's (α) for the aggregate frequency set of MIND YOU