



HELLENIC REPUBLIC  
National and Kapodistrian  
University of Athens



UNIVERSITY OF THE  
AEGEAN

SCHOOL: ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT: COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA STUDIES

## **MSC IN MEDIA AND REFUGEE/MIGRATION FLOWS**

**The place and coverage of migrants and refugees in  
France's mainstream media during the 2022 presidential  
elections.**

*by Clara Galotta*

I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Georges Pleios who helped me throughout the construction of the thesis but also allowed me to change subjects afterwards. Thank you also to professors Nikos Papanastasiou and Ekaterini Stavrianea who participated in the defence of the thesis and commented on my work. Lastly, I would like to thank my former professors: Dr. Jesús A. Guillamón Ayala, professor in the department of sociology and social work at the university of Murcia and Ms. Helene André-Bigot, professor of sociology and anthropology in the university of Grenoble who taught me a lot, both on an academic and human level and eventually helped me find my path.

This thesis would not have been possible without the physical and emotional support of my friends and colleagues Elisa and Anastasia who took care of me during tough times and helped me keep it together through the pandemic but also my little sister who, even from a distance, always kept me centred.

Finally, I will also thank my family, without which I would not be here today. Even in difficult times, they always gave me the opportunity and means to study and to learn and, for that, I will always be grateful to them.

## **Contents.**

<b>Abstract.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Research Methodology .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Media, migration and far-right movements .....</b>	<b>16</b>
1. <i>The impact of the media and its multiple forms in the public discourse.</i>	
2. <i>The place of migration in the media and public discourse</i>	
3. <i>The rise of political extreme parties representation in the media</i>	
<b>The place and coverage of migrants and refugees in the mainstream media during the 2022 presidential elections .....</b>	<b>41</b>
4. <i>The overrepresentation of the theme of migration in the media space</i>	
5. <i>Entertaining politics: the reign of the all-opinion</i>	
6. <i>The role of the media in the democratisation and normalisation of far right's discourses about migrants and refugees</i>	
<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>References.....</b>	<b>57</b>

## **ABSTRACT**

Migration, as a theme, has been, is and will always be a core theme in the media sphere, especially during election times. These periods trigger more concern in the population and the voters who want coverage, but also become an opportunity for politicians and parties to spread their discourses and deliver speeches that are often personified, individual and stigmatising. Coupled with new platforms and tools of communication -such as social medias or the rise of television shows about politics and social issues, but also with a new way of making the news and delivering it, the medias were able to provide more diversified debates on social but also helped the propagation of extreme discourses on both sides of the political spectrum, undermining the traditional parties and political correctness. The rise of this infotainment allowed, under the guise of societal debate and political confrontation to attract listeners and viewers by offering entertainment and provocation. The debate is more accessible, probably funnier to watch and speaks to a population usually reluctant to take an interest in politics but ends up giving the floor to extreme and controversial speeches and shortcuts that confuses voters to the advantage of the far-right parties.

## **KEYWORDS**

Migration, Politics, Media, Social media, France, Infotainment, Narrative, Influence.

## INTRODUCTION

*“Fandom, after all, is born of a balance between fascination and frustration: if media content didn't fascinate us, there would be no desire to engage with it; but if it didn't frustrate us on some level, there would be no drive to rewrite or remake it.”<sup>1</sup>*

Pierre Bourdieu once said about media: *“television enjoys a de facto monopoly on what goes into the heads of a significant part of the population and what they think”<sup>2</sup>*. Nowadays, it is almost impossible to talk about politics, democracy or any social phenomena without talking about newspapers, radio, internet or television. Media represents the connection between us and the rest of the world, between the inside and the outside. It represents access and knowledge, and, for leaders and politicians, the best means to communicate with people.

At the base of exchanges between citizens and governments, media is also used to send a message and channel ideas and concerns, preoccupations, public interests. In a democratic country, the freedom of the media is seen as a guarantee of expression for the citizens of that state: written or audiovisual, they are both means that allow the population to talk about their daily social lives but also the social and political climate of the country, bringing their demands to the ears of those who govern. In 1996, Bourdieu had already begun to sense the spread of television's domination in the world of accessible journalism and the way it was beginning to alter the functioning of universes as different as those of culture, literature, science, philosophy, politics, and even justice and social phenomenon -like migration.

In our multicultural and globalised societies, migration seems to be present in every political speech, at the centre of media debates or among the field of main interest in polls. Indeed, according to a research on the expectations and priorities of the French population on major issues to take into account before the presidential elections and discussion during the presidential election campaign, economic issues (unemployment and energy prices), environment (climate change, pollution and protection of biodiversity) and the pandemic of Covid-19 are at the top three in their list of concerns. Migration issues (migrants and

---

<sup>1</sup>Jenkins, H. (2006). *Convergence Culture : Where Old and New Media Collide*. NYU Press.

<sup>2</sup>Bourdieu, P. (1996). *Sur la télévision*. Raisons d'agir.

refugees arriving in Europe) comes just after for the average French person, with 26%.<sup>3</sup> Unsurprisingly, concern for these issues varies according to the declared political orientation of the respondents. On some issues, such as migration it is in fact a determining factor in the choice of priorities. Thus, 84% of E. Zemmour's voters consider the issue of migrants and refugees arriving in Europe to be a priority, i.e. 48 percentage points more than the average French person.

We know migration is not a recent phenomenon. Beginning when the first humans moved from Africa more than 1.8 million years ago, continuing through ancient times and the Middle Ages until today's very modern societies, its visibility has however tripled these last few years, especially in Europe. As a continent, Europe has always been at the centre of global migration movements. Until the end of the Second World War and the 1950s, the continent was more considered a sending area, migration happening mainly within and outside of Europe. In no less than one century, between 1820 and 1920, 55 million Europeans left the continent and after 1945, 15 million. Europeans were, in those times, more likely to emigrate as almost two thirds (33 million) went to the United States, 4.5 million to Canada and the rest to Latin America, Oceania and Africa. Since the mid-20th century however, Europe has become a receiving area, with different consecutive waves of immigration. Southern European nationals and many Jews continued to emigrate until the early 1950s but emigration slowly started to fade into the background of the stage of human mobility. Thus, between the 1950s and the 1990s, Europe became the place of intra-regional movement of refugees and displaced people as a consequence of the Second World War, but also faced the immigration of low skilled workers from North Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe generated by demand in service and domestic sectors as well as waves of people from outside Europe following the decolonization process and asylum seekers from Eastern Europe.

This past decade, the consolidation and expansion of the European Union and its policy and regime of free movement facilitated the mobility of high and low skilled workers, generating flows of people coming from Central and Eastern Europe to Western and Southern Europe as well as new waves of immigration from Central and North Africa, South America or Asia. In addition, the geopolitical situation of certain countries of the Middle East and North Africa or more recently in Ukraine prompted a surge in the numbers of arrivals in Southern Europe of

---

<sup>3</sup> According to a survey conducted by the "YouGov Institute" from January 13 to 21, 2022 among a sample of 2,107 people representative of the French adult population:

<https://focus2030.org/Les-preoccupations-des-Francais-es-en-amont-de-l-election-presidentielle-2022>

asylum seekers trying to reach Northern European destinations. The UN refugee agency, UNHCR, estimates 100 million people who have been forced to flee their homes globally, highlighting as the leading causes of this displacement of people worldwide food insecurity, the climate crisis, war in Ukraine and other emergencies from Africa to Afghanistan.

This shift in migration in Europe became all the more visible in the media as the migratory movements became significant. Since 2015, Europe has had to deal with increasing numbers of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers. According to the EU statistics agency, 2.4 million refugees and people in refugee-like situations and 860 thousand asylum-seekers (pending cases) were hosted in EU-27 Member States at the end of 2018<sup>4</sup> with a number of people applying for asylum in the European Union reaching a record in 2015, with 1.26 million<sup>5</sup>.

In 2020, 1.9 million immigrants entered the EU from non-EU countries, a decrease of almost 30% guided by the spread of the global pandemic of the Covid-19 virus and the travel restrictions<sup>6</sup>. On January 2021, the European Union estimates the percentage of people representing non EU citizen to 5,3% of EU's total population and 8,3% the people born outside of it<sup>7</sup>.

The rise of the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and more particularly in the countries of the European Union triggered a parallel rise of the visibility of migration movements in the media. As seen in polls, concerns and preoccupation about migrants and refugees also grew bigger in the public opinion also because of the interest the media have taken on the subject and the way they highlight it. From 2015, newspapers and other news channels have been referring to a “migration crisis”<sup>8</sup> labelling an identified peak in movement of people migrating towards Europe and its border and thus democratising an expression which will be often used in the future as political leverage. Several articles in the French newspaper *Le Monde* dating from 2015 for example, press the issue of a crisis that would cause tension and concern among European governments.<sup>9</sup> The migration issue has become a

---

<sup>4</sup> UNHCR Global Report 2018: <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unherstats/5d08d7ee7/unhcr-global-trends-2018.html>

<sup>5</sup> According to the Eurostat report: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/>

<sup>6</sup> According to the Eurostat database:

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration\\_and\\_migrant\\_population\\_statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics)

<sup>7</sup> According to Eurostat:

[https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en)

<sup>8</sup> In April 27, 2015 an article in the popular French newspaper "Le Monde" entitled "Crise des migrants: à chacun sa solution" already uses the expression and presents immigration as a “problem to be solved”.

<sup>9</sup> Articles from *Le Monde*:

“La crise migratoire en discussion au sommet des pays des Balkans”

[https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/08/27/la-crise-migratoire-s-invite-au-sommet-des-pays-des-balkans\\_4737732\\_3214.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/08/27/la-crise-migratoire-s-invite-au-sommet-des-pays-des-balkans_4737732_3214.html)

central one in political speeches through Europe, the media's binary coverage of migrants and refugees, taken as "faceless victims" or "security threats"<sup>10</sup> has played an important role in this increasing tendency, often supported by the European Union policies and angle on the matter who despite its attempt to settle a common asylum policy tends to sometimes freeze the debates and crystallise tensions and disagreement which eventually benefits the rise of extreme political parties and their visibility in the media<sup>11</sup>. The European Journalism Observatory analysed the media treatment of the European migration crisis in 17 countries, based on 2,417 press articles published between 2015 and 2018. The results show that the way the media report on this topic changes mainly depending on the country and the way migration is perceived there. Generally, coverage is dominated by political debates and actors and leaves little room for the voice of migrants.<sup>12</sup>

Since 2015, the "migration crisis" has regularly entered the public debate in France and Europe, relayed by politicians, the media and social networks and several events constitute this thread. Among them are the shipwrecks of migrant boats in the Mediterranean migrants, starting with the shipwreck off Lampedusa in Italy in 2013<sup>13</sup>, which resulted in the death of 366 migrants. The repetition of these accidents at sea has come to make the central Mediterranean "the deadliest migration route in the world" according to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)<sup>14</sup>. Migration by land has also claimed many victims, such

---

“Si tu viens en Hongrie, tu dois respecter nos lois”

[https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/07/02/crise-migratoire-si-tu-viens-en-hongrie-tu-dois-respecter-nos-lois\\_4667716\\_3214.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/07/02/crise-migratoire-si-tu-viens-en-hongrie-tu-dois-respecter-nos-lois_4667716_3214.html)

“Les migrants de Calais mettent Français et Britanniques au bord de la crise diplomatique”

[https://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2015/07/29/les-migrants-de-calais-mettent-francais-et-britanniques-au-bord-de-la-crise-diplomatique\\_4703403\\_1654200.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2015/07/29/les-migrants-de-calais-mettent-francais-et-britanniques-au-bord-de-la-crise-diplomatique_4703403_1654200.html)

“Crise des migrants : Les Etats doivent arrêter ce jeu stupide consistant à rejeter la faute sur les autres “

[https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/08/25/immigration-les-etats-doivent-arreter-ce-jeu-stupide-consistant-a-rejeter-la-faute-sur-les-autres\\_4736018\\_3214.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/08/25/immigration-les-etats-doivent-arreter-ce-jeu-stupide-consistant-a-rejeter-la-faute-sur-les-autres_4736018_3214.html)

“Rupture entre l'est et l'ouest de l'Europe sur l'accueil des migrants”

[https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/06/29/rupture-entre-l-est-et-l-ouest-de-l-europe-sur-l-accueil-des-migrants\\_4663708\\_3214.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/06/29/rupture-entre-l-est-et-l-ouest-de-l-europe-sur-l-accueil-des-migrants_4663708_3214.html)

<sup>10</sup> Chouliaraki, Lilie and Stolic, Tijana (2017). *Rethinking media responsibility in the refugee 'crisis': a visual typology of European news*

<sup>11</sup> “Les quotas migratoires proposés par l'UE”

[https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/09/07/les-quotas-migratoires-proposes-par-l-ue\\_4747857\\_4355770.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/09/07/les-quotas-migratoires-proposes-par-l-ue_4747857_4355770.html)

“Autriche, Pologne, Hongrie... que faire face à la « banalisation » de l'extrême droite en Europe ?”

[https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/12/19/il-y-a-une-sortie-d-acceptation-des-principaux-pays-europeens-face-a-la-montee-de-l-extreme-droite\\_5231973\\_3210.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/12/19/il-y-a-une-sortie-d-acceptation-des-principaux-pays-europeens-face-a-la-montee-de-l-extreme-droite_5231973_3210.html)

<sup>12</sup>Susanne Fengler, Marcus Kreutler (2018). Migration coverage in Europe's media: a comparative analysis of seventeen countries:

[https://www.otto-brenner-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user\\_data/stiftung/02\\_Wissenschaftsportal/03\\_Publikationen/AP39\\_Migration\\_EN.pdf](https://www.otto-brenner-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_data/stiftung/02_Wissenschaftsportal/03_Publikationen/AP39_Migration_EN.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> *La Repubblica* “Lampedusa, strage di migranti. Barcone a picco, centinaia di morti”

[https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2013/10/03/news/lampedusa\\_brucia\\_un\\_barcone\\_strage\\_di\\_migranti-67817611/](https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2013/10/03/news/lampedusa_brucia_un_barcone_strage_di_migranti-67817611/)

<sup>14</sup>According to the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Missing Migrants Project, More than 45,400 deaths have been recorded since 2014: <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/>



as the tragic episode of the 71 people found asphyxiated in a truck in Austria on 27 August 2015<sup>15</sup>. The announcement of these shipwrecks and more generally of these migratory "accidents" causing numerous victims has made the great media moments of the migratory crisis. It finds many echoes also because of the emotional aspect emphasised by the press and the photographs. In September 2015, the broadcasting of the photo of Aylan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian boy found dead on a beach in Turkey among 11 other Syrian refugees as they were trying to cross the Mediterranean on two boats bound for the Greek island of Kos, provoked a media shock on a European scale and a real stir in public opinion. The shock of the photo seems to act as a reminder that refugees have a face. This photo has brought more weight from a media point of view than the figures of the victims regularly quoted in the media. On September 3rd 2015, both French and English newspapers *Le Monde* and *The Independent* respectively entitled their article: "Réfugiés : une photo pour ouvrir les yeux"<sup>16</sup> and "If these extraordinarily powerful images of a dead Syrian child washed up on a beach don't change Europe's attitude to refugees, what will?" underlying here the horror of the situation, the need to talk about it and appealing to the sensitivity and emotion of the population in order to try to awaken the conscience. This was besides clearly stated by the *Independent* in their own article, right under the picture of the little boy: "*The Independent has taken the decision to publish these images because, among the often glib words about the "ongoing migrant crisis", it is all too easy to forget the reality of the desperate situation facing many refugees*".<sup>17</sup> When these tragic events take place, the attention of the media, and national public opinion, is focused on the migration phenomenon.

The same seems to happen in periods of political elections where the theme of migration always takes a lot of space, sometimes totally monopolising the media and political discourse, overshadowing all other subjects to summarise the unfolding of an entire election. In France, the publication of immigration figures for 2021 by the Minister of the Interior<sup>18</sup> confirmed the expected rebound after a year 2020 made atypical by the health crisis. Slightly down from 2019 at 272,000 residence permits issued, legal immigration has reached a new

---

<sup>15</sup> *The Guardian* "Hungarian police arrest driver of lorry that had 71 dead migrants inside"

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/28/more-than-70-dead-austria-migrant-truck-tragedy>

<sup>16</sup> "Refugees: an eye-opening photo":

[https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/09/04/refugies-une-photo-pour-ouvrir-les-yeux\\_4744650\\_3214.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/09/04/refugies-une-photo-pour-ouvrir-les-yeux_4744650_3214.html)

<sup>17</sup> *The Independent*:

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/if-these-extraordinarily-powerful-images-of-a-dead-syrian-child-washed-up-on-a-beach-don-t-change-europe-s-attitude-to-refugees-what-will-10482757.html>

<sup>18</sup><https://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/Info-ressources/Etudes-et-statistiques/Chiffres-cles-sejour-visas-eloignements-asile-acces-a-la-nationalite/Archives/Les-chiffres-2021-publication-annuelle-parue-le-20-janvier-2022>

high point. Asylum applications are also on the rise again, with just over 100,000 applications but without reaching the levels experienced since the 2015 migration crisis. Between the anxiety-provoking speeches by the extreme right and part of the right, the theory of the “great replacement” spread by a new reactionary candidate who suddenly gain a lot of attention in the media -and therefore, in the public space and opinion, and the mixture of indifference and candour of a part of the left, the debates revolved more around identity issues than social issues. The themes of immigration and insecurity have taken precedence over the climate emergency, health, education and purchasing power in the candidates' speeches and, therefore in the media space. Political events, just like tragic ones, draw the attention of the media, and the public on the migrants and refugees and the theme of immigration in general.

The continuous discourse around migration and refugee flows in the public space -and all its ramification concerning identity, culture, religion, has been a stepping stone in the rise of the extreme parties; especially the extreme right and “Le Rassemblement National”. Cases of sexual violence suffered by migrant and refugee women or visible gender identifications are also usually framed and portrayed in stereotypical ways, summarizing opposition and prejudices between the West and Global North, seen as “progressive and civilized,” and the rest of the East and Global South “backward and threatening.” As women’s figures and bodies become more visible and on the move across borders but also in the public space on social media for example, discussion about the representation of female experiences in the migration process still remains invisible and their voices still muter than men’s stories. Indeed, there seems to be an underrepresentation of female refugees and migrants in the photographs and news articles in European media and women tend to be represented more as victims compared to men who tend to be more frequently depicted as active characters in their story. In addition to being less represented in European media, women are being associated with a passive and secondary role. European media are contributing to reinforce the “symbolic annihilation” of women by condescendingly showing female migrants as an inoffensive, vulnerable, and submissive subject. Gendered constructions play a big role in the way media frame migrants and refugees and contribute to massively shaping the public opinion and perpetuating stereotypes which lead to more social and gender inequalities.

## **Research Methodology - Content Analysis**

The outcomes of this analysis would be, considering the intense and new political context, to identify the way public discourses and media speeches in their most popular forms -newspapers and television, shift on migration and focus on migrants and refugees in France, underlining the condition of women and how they are portrayed. The presidential elections have always been an opportunity and a springboard in the media landscape: news is more widely followed, articles are relayed en masse and politics becomes media (and vice versa), intruding into most popular conversations and debates. The purpose would be to identify how the media speech changes during elections and point the way it left more space to the migration theme during the electoral campaign, thus influencing public opinion and vice-versa. Is it because the public opinion is so focused on migration these past decades that the media seems to talk about it?

Recent studies and important reports on ecology such as the second part of the IPCC's sixth assessment report, published on February 28, 2022 -just before the electoral campaign, were meant to be one of the main themes and objects of debates for politicians and journalists. Indeed, the first part, dated August 2021, concluded that climate change was occurring faster than expected. The latest work focused on the impacts, vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacities of the climate crisis. A situation of global emergency, highlighted by scientists which deserved its full place in the media and public debate. However, climate change and the environment seemed to be rather invisible during the campaign, in the inter-round debate for example and the discussion stayed on the topic of security, immigration and purchasing power for the longest part of the evening. As a result, we could say that the political and emotional events like terrorist attack and elections are always bringing the focus on migration.

Migration is talked about more but always in some certain way. The main portrait and discourse on migrants and refugees is always the same: victim or threat; passive and never active. Under the election period, the emphasis seems to be more on the "safety"; somehow correlating migration and insecurity, or even crime: during debates, it is almost always put under the theme "security". Women also seem to have a very specific representation in the media, more inclined to victimisation or underlying motherhood. It has its particularities to be a migrant or refugee and a woman in a phenomena relatively "dominated" by men -generally

more represented in the media . Gender division doesn't seem to have missed that thematic either. The case of muslim women is a probant example of this gender division in the representation of migrants and refugees, as well as the politicization of the thematic and its recuperation by the extreme political parties in France. On the second round of elections -but it is the case in every presidential election of these past twenty years, the veil for muslim women in the public place (and, in the same spirit, the use of the "burkini" in public swimming pool) were a subject particularly targeted by the media and used by the far right party Rassemblement National's candidate Marine Le Pen to improve her image of feminist. Her discourse and that of Eric Zemmour -practically unknown before the presidential elections, have been picked up by the media, monopolising public attention.

New ways of "reporting" also have their fair share when analysing the narrative on migrations and thus its impact on public discourses and public opinion. The weight of the infotainment on the migration theme -and more generally on political thematics, is becoming increasingly important, completely bending and influencing the public opinion as well as increasing its political recuperation, not only in political speeches but also on television news channels which developed new shows at peak viewing times, mixing information and entertainment in order to attract viewers. The most scandalous wins the prize.

With their new coverage and persistent narratives on social issues, not to mention the emergence of an entertaining reporting that seems to become the most accessible channel for information and the politically charged context caused by the presidential elections, the media have reinvented the way in which they present and *represent* the migration issue in the public space.

How and how much is this theme portrayed in the French media during the presidential election and among all the other ones considered of political relevance and public preoccupation like environment or the pandemic? Does the media and more specifically the mass media have become a public floor for far-right and extremist discourse about migration and refugee flows and are the new ways of reporting mixing information and entertainment have had an impact on migration's coverage? Finally, considering the weight of gender division in the narrative about migrants and refugees, does gender impact their representation in the media? Are women's portraits used to amplify the discourse on migration and

exemplify some arguments held by the far-right politicians like for example the discourse about the wearing of the veil in the public space used by the Rassemblement National ?

During the special political context that is a presidential election campaign, in France, the media are putting more emphasis on the question of migration and refugee flows than usual, claiming it is one of the main concerns (if not the main concern) of the French population. In fact, we could argue that the coverage of immigration in periods of political change is as present and visible as it is in periods that follow terrorist attacks - like for example, after the attacks of Paris in 2015, as if migration and terrorism were correlated. During political campaigns, migration is treated as an “issue” or “concern” by the media -this denomination being indifferent of their known political stance. In addition, it is always categorised in debates, articles or speeches under the label of “security”, as if migration and refugee flows were a matter of public safety.

In France, the theme of migration has been the most talked about during the presidential campaign, tied with the issue of purchasing power. Those themes are among the favourites of the french extreme political parties as *Le Rassemblement National*, *Reconquête* or *La Franche Insoumise* -respectively carried and represented by Marine Le Pen, Eric Zemmour and Jean Luc Mélenchon in the elections. It has thus offered a significant amount of place and time for them to develop arguments about the subject, sometimes at the expense of other urgent themes such as climate change, violence against women or the question of the national educational system that were placed far behind in the public discourse and, eventually, in the public sphere in general. This was particularly the case during the Macron-Le Pen debate between the two rounds of the election, broadcasted live on TV by five different channels, both private and public and followed by 15.6 million viewers. Those arguments, as it is always the case during elections are relayed, analysed, spread by the press which increase the amount of articles, shows, journalistic debates and, in the end, draw the attention of the public opinion.

The media have left more space to the immigration topic carried by the extremes and, inevitably, allowed negative and xenophobic discourses to emerge in the public space. Migration is seen as a security problem and sometimes a threat to French culture and the national integrity of the country. The question of migration policies, has become an “imposed theme” in the campaign and has taken a prominent place, pushed by the candidate Eric Zemmour, for whom the "great replacement" is at the centre of France’s deepest problems

regarding immigration and purchasing power. The subject is also underlined by the traditional right (Les Républicains) with candidate Valérie Pécresse and Marine Le Pen, leading to long debates about the necessity to strengthen migration policies proposing referendum on the subject -involving the public opinion and implying that it is in fact a main preoccupation for french people, to abolish the right to land, to exclude any regularisation of foreigners who have entered illegally, to limit or abolish family reunification, to cut off certain social rights of foreigners living in France or to impose that asylum applications be filed outside the territory, in embassies or at the border.

With the economic crisis and rise of poverty among the working and middle classes are also often linked by far right parties, pushed then in the media which eventually further fuels the circle and the monopolisation of the debate by predominant and negative discourse about migrants and refugees.

With the increase of the presence of immigration in political and media discourses during the 2022 campaign emerged a variety of new political, societal and cultural programs on television but also through social media that have become a source of information for many French people, more accessible or entertaining in a context of political, economical, societal and sanitary crisis. The context given by what has always been a popular election -because highly visible and publicised, leads the media to leave room for an *infotainment* which also impacts the way migrants and refugees are portrayed, sometimes focusing more on the form and less the content. The multiplicity of popular shows and mass media has normalised some discourses about migration, refugees and migrants in general because of their purpose in gaining viewers.

Our hypothesis would suggest that in times of political elections, migration and refugee flows are suddenly among the top subjects in newspapers but also in TV news, political shows and social media. One outcome of this study will also be the possibility to compare and underline the change in the media discourse concerning migrants and refugees on the eve of an important -but mostly popular, election in France. The media seem to help political figures with a provocative and sometimes xenophobic discourse emerge in the public space and, therefore, seem to put emphasis on the migration-security pole *-and therefore, by association as if migration would equal insecurity*, which eventually influence and shape public opinion. It would be interesting to understand how certain provocative and discriminatory statements manage to monopolize the debate and the floor in the public space. Does the media play a

role in this? As seen in the news, Eric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen, both strong far right candidates that put emphasis on migration and refugees and the danger they represent were constantly moving up or down in the polls in voting intentions and this, always according to a media “trend”. The more they are talked about, the more they influence the public debate. Are we talking about them because the French population is concerned about migration and refugees flow or is it because their comments on immigration -and women, are so visible in the public space and present in the media and in speeches during election periods or after events such as terrorist attacks that migrants and refugees became a major concern in recent years?

In today’s political landscape, but also in the media, migration and refugee flows are almost always talked about under the label of “security”, implying it is a matter of public and national safety.

The status of women when we talk about migration, can also be a “fuel” to feed more debates and more coverage. Gender being a socially constructed category in a patriarchal society, women and more widely gendered people, have been dominated by the male gaze and the cis-heteronormative conception of gender and sexuality. Studies have shown that social “status” which identifies a person and their place in society can be crossed between each other, meaning that the more a person fit into different categories at the bottom of the social scale, the more are the chances for them to experience discrimination. The migrant/refugee category already has a certain social label in the media (and indirectly in the society), and the examples of the media coverage of women -especially muslim women in France, who combine both social markers helps spreading stereotyped representation until sometimes helping and legitimising the far-right discourse.

## **Media, migration and far-right movements**

*The impact of the media and its multiple forms in the public discourse.*

In this context of migration, the media plays a crucial role in providing verified information, informed opinions, and balanced and inclusive narratives. How the media covers migration will affect the diversity and quality of information received by the public, especially refugees and migrants, as well as how societies perceive and respond to the issue. Thus, it is mainly through the media that citizens today receive information about the "migration crisis" in Europe. The media have, therefore, a capital importance in the formation of representations and discourses around migrants since they participate in the creation of several national public opinions. The word "media" refers to the configuration of a distance, with no major possibility of interaction between the receiver and the transmitter. Today, this definition covers different realities. Indeed, the media is described as much as a support as a technique of communication. The passive dimension of the receiver of the news tends to decrease, in particular through the examples of the social networks by the means of which each one can become a vector of information. The news is not only received but also participative and interactive which allows new actors to intervene in the process of creating information. This new dynamic around the propagation of information and the role of the media in general is well demonstrated by the notion of transmedia<sup>19</sup> which challenges the idea of the receiver being only passive towards the media and, on the contrary, tries to emphasise his role in the search for information. The transmedia involves a specific narrative discussed on different supports such as television, Internet, radio, publishing etc. which bring, thanks to their specificity of use and their technological capacity, a complementary glance on the treated subject. Thus, the receiver, who follows a program on a television channel for example, is invited to continue his journey on the social network account of this television channel and to react live to what is posted there.

Media, under all its forms, have always had an important role in the way migration and refugee flows have been portrayed and carried in the public discourse and, by extension, the public opinion. The role played by the media in everyday life and in socialisation as much as

---

<sup>19</sup> first used, by Henry Jenkins (2003) to describe "a process in which the elements of a fiction are dispersed across various media platforms in order to create a coordinated and unified entertainment experience. Ideally, each medium makes its own contribution to the development of the story" in *Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide*



relationships and personal opinions is nowadays obvious. Often qualified as a fourth power,<sup>20</sup> the media plays, in our society, an undeniable political role, as well as a strong presence and a counter power to those institutional -executive, legislative and judicial, able to pressure, influence and even forge minds and opinions. One can imagine that during a tense political period and on the brink of important elections for the country, the media in France would be further strengthened in their role as a public forum -a platform, for the people. As stated by Henry Jenkins, "*fandom, after all, is born of a balance between fascination and frustration: if media content didn't fascinate us, there would be no desire to engage with it; but if it didn't frustrate us on some level, there would be no drive to rewrite or remake it*"<sup>21</sup>. In France, elections, especially presidential ones, have always brought out the interest for public debate bringing out a fixation on the major issues of society. Articles are becoming more frequent, more people are invited to the debates on TV channels and we are witnessing a multiplicity of polls on all themes and subjects: on the voting intentions of the citizen but also on popular societal issues like immigration or purchasing power for example.

The television, as reminded by Bourdieu's analysis<sup>22</sup>, now followed by a part of the press, suffers from a constraint: the search for the largest audience and an unconcealed competition for the ratings. Mass media represents the modern culture, which carries in itself a promise of emancipation, but eventually becomes the base of commercial and industrial exchanges<sup>23</sup>. For commercial purposes, they pretend to realise a cultural project that they contribute to, eventually, undermine. Television shows presenting itself as informative are today overrepresented and, as Adorno and Horkheimer from the Frankfurt School already underlined in their time, this rise of the media and mass culture - the appearance of magazines, the emergence of cinema and television, reaches the culture not on the surface but in its very content. Their observations on the media and culture of their time, as much as on the political processes, join those one can have on today's society where, on one hand, media are seen as tools and contribute to giving voice and being a platform of direct democracy but *can also become an instrument of symbolic oppression*.

Mass media are capable of rapidly transmitting the same message -the same narrative, to a very large audience. With the democratisation and the multiplicity of new instruments of

---

<sup>20</sup> Edmund Burke first used the expression "fourth power" to condemn the French Revolution in 1790, and in 1840 Balzac used it again in an article in *La Revue Parisienne*: "If the press did not exist, it should not be invented"

<sup>21</sup> Henry Jenkins (2003), *Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide*.

<sup>22</sup> *Sur la télévision*, P. Bourdieu

<sup>23</sup> T. Adorno, *Le fétichisme en musique et la régression de l'écoute*, Allia, Paris, 2008 (1938).

communication, the media discourse sometimes turns to advertising, with new popular support like entertainment shows about serious subjects like politics. This was notably the case with the entertaining program “*Face à Baba*”<sup>24</sup> in France broadcast on a popular channel where the presenter had made several popular political personalities meet<sup>25</sup> during the first round of the presidential elections to face each other and initiate the discussion. The television format on a channel known to be favoured by young people or the working class was intended to democratise the debate and make it accessible, popular, and worthwhile. It was triggered by the desire to address audiences who are particularly reluctant to take an interest in political debate. However, the program, initially qualified as political, quickly turned into a show that used brutal codes and lacked restraint, seeking the propensity to provoke or scandalise to gain more views, gnawing at the framework of an already unhealthy public debate<sup>26</sup>.

This type of program sums up what "infotainment" is all about, i.e. a tendency to treat all programs and information with the processes of entertainment in order to serve a variety of content through traditional media. According to Demers' (2005) definition, infotainment is more specifically a program or media content based on information that includes elements of entertainment with the objective of becoming popular with the public and consumers, and thus gaining an audience<sup>27</sup>. The aim of this method is to make information more easily accessible to a larger number of people and thus to make the media concerned more visible, more sold, more seen. It is a question of playing on two levels: to entertain and to inform. At a time when the media are forced to adapt to cultural changes -new ways of consuming information with the advent of social networks, economic changes -the crisis of traditional media, and technological changes -the emergence of social networks, we can ask ourselves how infotainment emerged and imposed itself by reconciling two themes, two worlds that seem to be at odds. In order to capture an attention that is scattered as the points of contact with the multiplicity of media, information would need to be entertaining in order to attract the greatest number of people. Except that infotainment is not just that. Behind this catch-all

---

<sup>24</sup> Entertainment show entitled “Face à Baba”, broadcast on a national french channel called C8

<sup>25</sup> Marine Le Pen, Jean-Luc Mélenchon or even Eric Zemmour

<sup>26</sup> *Le Monde* “Magali Berdah et Cyril Hanouna, ces incontournables de la campagne présidentielle « pour que la politique devienne sexy”

[https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2022/03/13/on-fait-ce-qui-manquait-pour-que-la-politique-devienne-sexy-magali-berdah-et-cyril-hanouna-ces-incontournables-de-la-campagne-presidentielle\\_6117293\\_4500055.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2022/03/13/on-fait-ce-qui-manquait-pour-que-la-politique-devienne-sexy-magali-berdah-et-cyril-hanouna-ces-incontournables-de-la-campagne-presidentielle_6117293_4500055.html)

<sup>27</sup> Demers, D (2005). Dictionary of Mass Communication & Media Research: A Guide for Students, Scholars and Professionals

term lies a very specific ideology, anything but neutral. According to Acrimed<sup>28</sup>, "infotainment is (...) very low information content, always federating opinions, and general public in its journalistic treatment"<sup>29</sup>. This type of media remains mostly in digital form - online articles, but in recent years it has also been available into television programs and presents industrial quantities of content with little informational added value. While the "classic" work of a journalist requires him to devote a considerable amount of time to researching reliable sources, comparing them, and bringing a critical eye to them, infotainment sites have become specialists in another way of producing content, one that is more economical in time: selection. Infotainment is a new way of choosing who can discuss a subject. It is no longer necessary to be well informed or to know how to reason. It is enough to be provocative, to speak to shock, "to go viral". The debate goes from academic to telegenic and the content no longer stems from a reflection but from a desire to create the event. One of the representatives of this new type, Éric Zemmour, polemicist and columnist on a famous French channel, illustrates this phenomenon in practice, passing himself from polemicist to politician as well. Information and polemics meet. We are witnessing the continuation of a long-term trend, which has seen the content lose its importance to the benefit of the container, the form imposing itself on the substance. Whether it is a question of being polemical, loud or just being viral, the infotainment media are defined more by a way of saying than by a real will to say: form prevails over content.

The ways in which information is selected are changing. Journalism is endowed with a social function: to clarify current events, to train the public's critical mind, to provide the information necessary to construct one's point of view and to position oneself on social issues. This social function appears less and less as a shared ideal in the media sphere. Infotainment creates a change of perspective. The social value of information and of the treatment it receives is totally evacuated, in favour of taking into account its economic value, which consists in focusing on the potential virality of a content to determine whether it will be published. Readers become consumers and information becomes the product. In the relationship between information and entertainment, the former must serve the latter. The news becomes a pretext for the spectacle - in the "usual" sense, but also in the sense in which

---

<sup>28</sup> *Action critique Médias*: French association of 1901 which aims to give a critical account of the position of the media in France as well as to inform in an independent way on information (on its contents and on the conditions of its production), on the media, on journalism and journalists.

<sup>29</sup> Acrimed, *Informations à la solde du divertissement*:

<https://www.acrimed.org/Informations-a-la-solde-du-divertissement?recherche=infotainment>

Guy Debord, the French philosopher and writer to whom we owe the socio-political notion of "spectacle". For him, the media reinforce the effects of the *spectacular* by making the debates based only on entertainment all futile. Subjected to the power, the media constitute the best propagandists of the society of the spectacle, maintaining, via the practice of the rumour and the disinformation, the individuals in the ignorance.<sup>30</sup> Whereas the revolt of 1968 did not take place yet, that the technologies of information and the mass entertainment are in their stammering and not yet completely globalised, Guy Debord sees coming the generalised commodification of the living and of the territory, the mechanisms of diffuse control of the population, the instrumentalization of the fears and the cult of the media status: "*the alienation of the spectator in favour of the contemplated object (which is the result of his own unconscious activity) is expressed in this way: the more he contemplates, the less he lives; the more he accepts to recognize himself in the dominant images of the need, the less he understands his own existence and his own desire*".<sup>31</sup>

The crisis that traditional media are going through is generating changes. New formats, new ideas, new ways of producing information are being tested, supported and facilitated by new technologies such as social media.

The media of the 21st century undoubtedly marks the junction between entertainment and more serious subjects -or what is considered serious subjects, especially politics. The history of journalism is indeed closely linked to that of political issues. Until the 1990s, journalism was organised around press groups identifiable by their legal status, but also and above all by their editorial line, which shaped their identity, sometimes political. This is the case in France for newspapers such as *Le Canard enchaîné*, labelled as far left, *Le Figaro*, known to be more linked to the conservative right, or *Valeurs Actuelles*, rather following the far right in its ideas, values and personalities.

The opening of Arpanet<sup>32</sup> -before internet, in the public space in 1969 coincides with a political awareness and therefore an expansion of the ways and methods of expression, changing the way to inform and communicate. Like the figure of the charismatic leader theorised by Max Weber<sup>33</sup> which draws its power from its art of communicating and

<sup>30</sup> Guy Debord, *La Société du Spectacle*, 3e édition (1992)

<sup>31</sup> Guy Debord, *La Société du Spectacle, I. la séparation achevée*, 30, 1967

<sup>32</sup> *Advanced Research Projects Agency Network*: name of the information network, between federal services (intelligence and government) and university researchers that will later give rise to the Internet.

<sup>33</sup>Weber, M (1995). *Le savant et le politique*, Plon.

transmitting through symbols, of being a source of information, the media and the new forms of media today convey ideas and are based on common values, known by all, taken up by all. Indeed to be on the same wavelength, is it not to communicate? This interactivity used to be through radio, which has now been transformed into social media. The liberalisation and access to technological tools also brings a proliferation of information sources that reduce the public space and that penetrate our intimacy sometimes proving to be overwhelming. The media environment is saturated and, although this infotainment is not totally unfounded, there is nevertheless the permanent risk of a drift that information and politics become the supports of a marketing of a new kind. This competitive commercialization of the radio and television programs would be the cause of a very clear decline of the political information but also of a crisis within the political communication, a crisis all the more marked by the fact that the media of the television information no longer trust the “pure information”, preferring from now on the infotainment to it<sup>34</sup>.

The need for entertainment is in human nature. For the philosopher Blaise Pascal, it is even essential to humans since it allows them to forget their misfortunes, but especially their condition as mortal beings.<sup>35</sup> Many philosophers and sociologists have hypothesised over the centuries that entertainment is vital to an individual's happiness. Today, in our society, it is commonly accepted that everyone needs entertainment for their health and well-being. Labour legislation has even adapted to this need with, in France for example, the leisure time largely evolving, with the work week gradually going from 70 hours in 1860 to 35 hours in 2000, or the number of paid vacations that have increased over the years -originally 15 days, now five weeks since 1982. Thus, a more and more important place for leisure and entertainment is made in the life of the French. This entertainment is subjective because it is specific to each individual. Thus, watching television can already be perceived as entertainment, regardless of the program watched. This activity is performed by a very large majority of French people. In a press release dated January 19, 2022,<sup>36</sup> *Médiamétrie*<sup>37</sup> announced that in 2021, the average consumption of television in France was 3h41 per day, one minute more than in 2019, the reference year because it was not marked by the health

---

<sup>34</sup> Brants, K. (2003). De l'art de rendre la politique populaire. . . *Réseaux*, 118(2), 135. <https://doi.org/10.3917/res.118.0135>

<sup>35</sup> Pascal, B (1976). *Pensées*, opuscules et lettres, Ed. Classiques Garnier.

<sup>36</sup> *Médiamétrie*, *L'année TV 2021*, Communiqué de presse du 19 janvier 2022.

<sup>37</sup> created in 1985, is a public limited company specialised in audience measurement and the study of audiovisual and digital media usage in France.

crisis. The 6:30 pm / 9 pm and 9 pm / 11 pm time slots capture almost half of the daily audience with 46% in 2021. These times generally correspond to prime time news or entertainment programs as mentioned above.

However, despite its popularity, television is often decried. The concept of entertainment is opposed, for some intellectuals, to that of culture. For the sociologist Edgar Morin, entertainment and leisure are indeed perceived by intellectuals as dangers for culture: leisure refers to activities that prevent the cultural development of individuals. Still according to Morin, the problem would come from the passive state of the individual that entertainment causes contrary to culture which stimulates it<sup>38</sup>. He designates the television and the other media, as the "culture of mass" or "the cultural industry". A culture which could appear only within an industrialised capitalist society, according to Bremond (1963): "It is at the same time industrial culture and cultural industry. [...] It was necessary first of all to have technical inventions (cinematograph, wireless telephony), and it was necessary then that these inventions, diverted from the nobly utilitarian ends for which they had been conceived, were transformed into machines to promise happiness."<sup>39</sup> The idea of happiness is essential in this entertainment industry that the ICT<sup>40</sup> would have created. Indeed, according to Morin, since this massive entertainment product is made to be consumed, it must "please". The objective of entertainment is to please in order to distract the person it distracts from his worries. Thus, on television, it seems to us that most programs that have no other claim than to please in order to entertain and amuse the viewer are classified as "entertainment". The entertainment does not pose as a condition to inform or to educate but only to entertain and to please.

It has always been accepted that a journalistic program can entertain its audience and make them feel amused or happy. Thus, to classify this program as infotainment because the information is delivered in a pleasant style seems to us to be a distortion of journalism. Even if during their training, journalists learn to inform quickly and clearly, they are encouraged to do so in a way that captivates and interests their audience. The journalist can therefore be pleasant without being infotainment.

The information-based program or media content in question must always contain elements of entertainment. For example, a television program such as the newscast of a 24-hour news channel cannot be considered infotainment if it occasionally gives a lighter treatment to

---

<sup>38</sup>Morin, E. (1962). *L'esprit du temps : Essai sur la culture de masse* (La Galerie) (French Edition) (0 éd.). Grasset.

<sup>39</sup>Bremond, C. (1963). Un plaidoyer. *Communications*, 2(1), 178-184. <https://doi.org/10.3406/comm.1963.962>

<sup>40</sup>*Information and communication technologies*

information. Similarly, an entertainment program cannot be considered infotainment if it is not based on information, even if the latter sometimes includes informative elements in its content. It seems essential to specify that an infotainment program has an objective not only to inform or to entertain, but to inform and entertain at the same time. For Brants (2003), the journalistic style of infotainment has certain characteristics that bring it closer to our definition: *"more relaxed, generally personal and open. It would seek to entertain more than to mark independence and criticism. The format would be entertaining, which can mean both sensational and rather emotional."*<sup>41</sup>

With the web, the public is witnessing a new event in the media: the race for information. Indeed, the Internet offers the possibility to publish information faster than other media, without having to worry about the form or the presentation of the information. It is not uncommon, for example, to see a news site publish a short piece of information before having more information on it, in the manner of the "breaking news" that usually scrolls at the bottom of the continuous news channels, before the channel has been able to process the subject. This race for information has always existed but has accelerated in recent years with new technologies. A race that Bounoux already mentioned in 1995 between the three historical media, estimating that the freshness of a piece of information made its "market value". In this perspective, the fastest media has a considerable advantage. However, this sometimes leads to the publication of erroneous information, especially on the Internet. Because the public does not only "suffer" the publication of the information, it participates in it itself (it is the Web 2.0). Thus, everyone is free to publish and broadcast on the Internet, sometimes creating ethical concerns and verification of sources that we do not find as frequently in traditional media, which are more regulated deontologically speaking. There are thus multiple ways to get information on the Internet, and the user does not always choose the way he will be informed. For example, an Internet user can discuss or entertain himself on a social network and be interested in a piece of information spread by one of his contacts without having made the choice to connect to get information. He will then be able to spread this information on a network or on his own website, thus meeting a need for communication or sharing.<sup>42</sup> This is certainly the main attraction of social networks. Technologically, the Internet is undoubtedly dominating this new four-way information race (even if its success in terms of quality remains debatable). A fact that traditional media are probably aware of,

---

<sup>41</sup>Brants, K. (2003). De l'art de rendre la politique populaire. . . Réseaux, 118(2), 135. <https://doi.org/10.3917/res.118.0135>

<sup>42</sup>Loquay, P. (1995). La communication contre l'information. Daniel Bounoux, Hachette, coll. Questions de Société, Paris 1995, 144 p. Communication et organisation, 8. <https://doi.org/10.4000/communicationorganisation.1830>

which would push them to focus on a completely different treatment of the news. In short, to evolve towards new treatments of information to distinguish themselves and keep a particular attraction for their users. Because can the television be satisfied to simply diffuse the information without particular treatment? If the market value of information is indeed its freshness, it seems difficult for the small screen to compete with cyberspace. Of course, a continuous news channel will be able to broadcast a piece of information in the minutes following its reception; still, the viewer has to be present in front of his screen... This is where the main advantage of the Web lies. As previously stated, the Internet has an advantage: a piece of information can be received by a user, without the latter having to seek information. It is the information that fetches the Internet user. Moreover, contrary to other media, the Internet is accessible from any place with a multitude of receivers (computer, cell phone, tablet and even video game consoles). This gives it a new advantage over other media. For all that, one cannot speak about "media struggle": there is not strictly speaking a race between the Internet and the other media. Nevertheless, it is important to understand how, for an individual, the presence of the Internet can change his habits of consumption of information and his expectations. The arrival of the Internet and all its advantages and disadvantages force the other media to distinguish themselves to continue to exist with the young people, television being no exception.

### *The place of migration in the media and public discourse*

As previously reported, according to polls<sup>43</sup>, immigration is only a concern for 29% of French people, far behind purchasing power (51%), the health system (32%) and the environment (30%). However, immigration is the second most important issue for the candidates of the 2022 presidential elections, after the Covid-19 epidemic, and it is the subject of a lot of fake news. As we have seen, the media contribute greatly to influencing public opinion, that is, the majority state of mind of the population, and therefore, indirectly, the vote of citizens. The quality of media treatment of a societal subject as central as migration is an essential issue for democracy: without informed public debate, based on established facts and reliable information, there is a lack of realistic and relevant political proposals, but also a lack of trust and informed choices on the part of citizens. The gap

---

<sup>43</sup> France Inter and Ipsos Sopra-Steria poll of 23 January 2022.



between the real concerns of the population and the coverage of migration issues in the media is glaring.

First, the amount of airtime and media treatment devoted to immigration on television has a clear impact on public attitudes toward immigration. Increased visibility of immigration in the media leads to polarised attitudes toward immigration. Indeed, more airtime devoted to immigration on French channels exacerbates public opinion toward immigration and draws viewers toward extreme attitudes. Thus, individuals who are moderately favourable to immigration become very favourable to it, while individuals who are not very favourable to immigration become strongly opposed to it. These results are not limited to opinions toward immigration but also extend to voting choices, as an increase in the prevalence of immigration on television programs pulls some centre-right voters toward the far right while centre-left voters increase their likelihood of voting for the traditional left and green parties. The increase in airtime devoted to immigration would therefore benefit the far right and confirm the strategic interest of some candidates in imposing the subject of migration at the heart of the current campaign. According to a study by economists Jérôme Valette and Sarah Schneider-Strawczynski,<sup>44</sup> not all topics related to immigration in general are equal in content. Their data reveal that channels such as TF1<sup>45</sup>, for example, watched by people who are rather unfavorable to immigration, associate immigration with its cost in 20% of cases, and terrorism in 12% of cases. On the other hand, channels watched by individuals who are relatively more favourable to immigration, such as Arte, devote only 9% and 5% respectively to these subjects and prefer to focus on the Syrian conflict or the crisis in the Mediterranean. This polarisation of attitudes is therefore driven by specific topics such as the cost of immigration and its impact on the country's economy on the one hand, and the reception and integration of immigrants in France on the other. This is not the case in other host countries such as Germany or the United States, where information about immigration increases the empathy of the entire television audience and leads individuals to adopt more favourable attitudes towards immigration. In France, it appears that viewers may "become" pro-immigration depending on the media framing, but that the question of the potential costs associated with immigration to the national territory is a major source of division. Finally, the journalistic framing of immigration in the media, and in particular the tone adopted, also appears to be crucial. Here again, an in-depth textual analysis, known as "sentiment analysis",

---

<sup>44</sup> Schneider-Strawczynski, S. & Valette, J. (2021). « Media Coverage of Immigration and the Polarization of Attitudes », PSE Working Paper, n° 202146. URL : <https://halens.archives-ouvertes.fr/PJSE-WP/halshs-03322229v1>

<sup>45</sup> the first and oldest national general-interest television channel in France. It was created on January 6, 1975, and was privatised on April 16, 1987.

shows that the different channels, among themselves, but also over time, adopt a more or less positive or negative discourse when dealing with immigration. The adoption of a positive discourse, with the same amount of airtime, has little influence on attitudes and, on the contrary, a negative discourse plays more significantly on attitudes towards immigration and pulls the whole population towards anti-immigration positions. Talking about immigration matters, but the way in which we talk about it also matters.

When it comes to opinion on migration issues, the interaction between the media and the audience is difficult to grasp. This is where the role of social networks comes into play, as they are platforms directly linked to the consumer of the information and therefore allow the reactions to certain articles to be reflected almost instantaneously. A study by the sociologist Katharina Tittel, for example, shows how on social networks the mention of nationality in press articles on immigration provokes the most reactions from Facebook users. The media audience also plays an active role, contrary to what one might think, in promoting certain narratives about immigration. Social networks and their metrics provide a way to make this role visible and measure audience reactions. In his study, Tittel examines audience engagement with different Facebook posts containing news articles on immigration and published on the Facebook pages of relevant newspapers in France, Germany, and the UK. The analysis variable is the nationality, assumed or real, mentioned in the article. The analysis takes into account the subject matter of the article (such as crime or the economy) to ensure that measures of over- or under-engagement depend solely on the nationality mentioned. For all three countries, we thus observe that posts containing hyperlinks to articles that mention nationalities from North Africa and the Middle East are more likely to "outperform." In contrast, posts containing hyperlinks to articles mentioning nationalities from Central and South America, and East and Southeast Asia tend to "underperform." The analysis shows that audience engagement on Facebook with news articles about immigration varies depending on whether or not the nationality of the people involved is mentioned and, if so, which nationality it is<sup>46</sup>. In a context where editorial choices may be guided by commercial concerns, one may wonder whether this higher engagement with posts mentioning African and Middle Eastern nationalities does not encourage newspapers to talk more about these groups. This is a particularly sensitive issue as the way the media covers

---

<sup>46</sup> Katharina Tittel, « Articles sur l'immigration diffusés sur Facebook : la mention de la nationalité influe sur le nombre de réactions », in : Barbara Joannon, Audrey Lenoël, Hélène Thiollet & Perin Emel Yavuz (dir.), Dossier « Les migrations dans l'œil des médias : infox, influence et opinion », *De facto* [En ligne], 30 | Janvier 2022, mis en ligne le 31 janvier 2022. URL : <https://www.icmigrations.cnrs.fr/2022/01/07/defacto-030-04/>

migration issues has an impact on the representation of the phenomenon in public opinion, and perceptions about the demographics of immigrants are linked to individuals' political preferences.

The role of political and media actors reverts to that of producers of migration narratives; absorbed by consumers of information.

Often labelled as a topical issue, migration is a recurrent media theme, both because of the media pressure it receives and because of the constant political instrumentalization to which it is subjected. Media information about the role of migration in the development of a country, for example, often comes into play. It is a question of finding "positive points" in immigration, as if to relieve or counterbalance the arrival of migrants and refugees with something beneficial for society. This role of immigration is extremely contrasted. Overall, in all countries, three forms of representation can be distinguished. First, the migrant or refugee is seen as a threat: in this case, immigration is perceived either as a mistake (*"A blunder for which we'll all pay the price"* from the Daily Mail, on the 11/21/06<sup>47</sup>), or as a burden on public resources and employment: *"There is growing evidence of British workers being replaced by East Europeans. And since East Europeans accept lower wages, British workers - from construction workers to truck drivers to flower arrangers - are suffering pay cuts"*<sup>48</sup>, or as related to the terrorist threat (*"La situation sécuritaire de la France se dégrade. Et le lien entre terrorisme et immigration n'a jamais été aussi clair"*<sup>49</sup>). As a second narrative, the migrant or refugee is seen as the victim (*"Drowned, restrained, shot: how these migrants died for a better life"*<sup>50</sup>). Here again, asylum and labour immigration, migrants and refugees can be mixed up. Migrants are often perceived as people fleeing war and poverty. Finally, although more rarely, the migrant or refugee is sometimes perceived and presented in the media discourse as an actor: the media coverage highlights the benefits that the host economies derive from migration, either for reasons of labour supply and skills, or because of

---

<sup>47</sup> Daily Mail. (2006, 22 novembre). A blunder for which we'll all pay the price. Mail Online. <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-417883/A-blunder-pay-price.htm>

<sup>48</sup> Daily Mail. (2006, 22 novembre). A blunder for which we'll all pay the price. Mail Online. <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-417883/A-blunder-pay-price.html>

<sup>49</sup> "The security situation in France is deteriorating. And the link between terrorism and immigration has never been so clear" in Valeurs Actuelles (2021, 25 avril). *"La France n'a pas repris la souveraineté sur ses flux migratoires"*, selon Rachida Dati. Valeurs actuelles.

<https://www.valeursactuelles.com/politique/la-france-na-pas-repris-la-souverainete-sur-ses-flux-migratoires-selon-rachida-dati>

<sup>50</sup> Watt, H., Rice-Oxley, M., & Taylor, D. (2020, 16 avril). *Drowned, restrained, shot : how these migrants died for a better life*. The Guardian.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/drowned-restrained-shot-life-stories-migrants-case-studies>

the migrants' entrepreneurial spirit (*“Pour un recours accru à l’immigration face aux pénuries de main-d’œuvre”*).<sup>51</sup> The issue of declining demographics has also been a recurring theme (*“L’immigration, arme de rajeunissement démographique ?”*<sup>52</sup>) for many years. The reports, in general, point to the overall confused and negative image that migrants carry.

Immigrants are thus perceived as a burden on public resources and not as producers of economic wealth. On the other hand, they are perceived as victims of a situation of distress from which they must flee. The two aspects are very often linked and in both cases, migrants are perceived as separate from the population of the host country, as outsiders, isolated. They are not treated on an equal footing; as if they were necessarily "other", as if they were necessarily "against". This results in a distancing but also a certain tension based on a false perception of reality. From then on, this type of discourse leaves the door open to all kinds of discourse, later recuperated and instrumentalized by politicians: the myth of invasion, the dissolution of national values, etc. The discrepancy between the facts presented by the media and the statistical realities is repeatedly noted. In Italy, for example, two thirds of the media productions identified address migration as a problem (integration difficulties, illegal immigration, racism or discrimination)<sup>53</sup>. Journalists favour the treatment of individual stories, which are easier to collect and present, over longer-term migration systems and processes. This bias further reinforces the sensational and temporary aspects of migration. Moreover, there is little room for multicultural and ethnic media in the media space, which prevents them from producing a counter-discourse to the mainstream media, which is necessary to inform the population and to encourage critical thinking, openness and diversification. As a result, immigrant associations and groups are more objects than subjects of the media sphere.

A study by the European Journalism Observatory (EJO)<sup>54</sup>, co-funded by the Otto Brenner Stiftung, sheds light on the role of the media in the migration debate: according to

<sup>51</sup>“ For an increased recourse to immigration in the face of labour shortage” in Auriol, E. (2021, 29 octobre). « Pour un recours accru à l’immigration face aux pénuries de main-d’œuvre ». Le Monde.fr. [https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2021/10/29/pour-un-recours-accru-a-l-immigration-face-aux-penuries-de-main-d-uvre\\_6100345\\_3232.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2021/10/29/pour-un-recours-accru-a-l-immigration-face-aux-penuries-de-main-d-uvre_6100345_3232.html)

<sup>52</sup> “Immigration as a weapon of demographic rejuvenation?” in Bernard, P. (1998, 18 septembre). *L’immigration, arme de rajeunissement démographique ?* Le Monde.fr. [https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1998/09/18/l-immigration-arme-de-rajeunissement-demographique\\_3668924\\_1819218.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1998/09/18/l-immigration-arme-de-rajeunissement-demographique_3668924_1819218.html)

<sup>53</sup> These conclusions are part of the large study called the IDEM program (*Informer sur le Développement et les Migrations*). The research was conducted by five NGO of five European countries: CEIPAZ in Spain, COSPE in Italy, CIDAC in Portugal Portugal, Connection for Development in the United Kingdom and Forim in France.

<sup>54</sup> Berry, M., Garcia-Blanco, I., & Moore, K. (2016). Press coverage of the refugee and migrant crisis in the EU: A content analysis of five European countries.

the EJO's comparative analysis, the media's treatment of migration and asylum varies from country to country. It analyses the media treatment of the European migration crisis in 17 countries, based on 2,417 press articles published between 2015 and 2018. Clear differences in quantity and quality are visible not only between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe, but also within Western Europe itself. The study also reveals many *blind spots* in the coverage of this phenomenon. The way the media report on the topic changes mainly depending on the country and the way migration is perceived there. Generally, coverage is dominated by political debates and actors -which would then explain its overrepresentation during political elections periods, and leaves little room for the voice of migrants.

With 1.1 million refugees (according to UNHCR data for 2019, before the pandemic<sup>55</sup>), Germany has emerged from the "European migration crisis" as one of the top five refugee-hosting countries in the world, along with Uganda, Pakistan, Turkey and Sudan. This position has given rise to a "German-specific perspective" on the issue: in this country, media coverage of migration far exceeds that of all other states analysed - and is matched only by Hungary, whose Prime Minister Viktor Orban has positioned himself as an opponent of German Chancellor Angela Merkel on migration policy.

The study shows fundamentally different coverage patterns between Germany, Italy and Greece on the one hand, and all other EU countries in our sample on the other. In Germany, Italy and Greece, migration and asylum are presented as a domestic issue, reflecting the fact that these countries are the main targets of migration movements. However, the media in the other EU countries that the EJO analysed treat the topic primarily as a foreign affairs issue, one that arises outside the home country, beyond national borders. Media in France, the United Kingdom, and Hungary, on the other hand, emphasise the prominent role of their leaders in international policymaking. The tone of coverage also varies greatly from country to country. In general, the media in Central and Eastern Europe focus more on the problems associated with migrants and the protests they provoke. Western European media, on the other hand, focus on their situation and the help they receive. They also quote many more (non-migrant) stakeholders with positive attitudes towards migration and asylum than their Central and Eastern European counterparts.

---

<sup>55</sup><https://www.unhcr.org/globalreport2019/#:~:text=The%20number%20of%20people%20of.million%20people%20to%2043.5%20million.>

The geographical perception of migration, which can be seen as taking place at home or abroad, has further implications and countries with a predominantly domestic perspective emphasise the positive. An example is provided by the German newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, in which 35% of the main actors quoted are German citizens and institutions providing assistance to migrants and refugees. A trend also emerges when we compare data from centre-left media and media with a more conservative profile: the former tends to report more actors with a positive attitude and talk much more often about the situation of migrants and the help given to them.

Another particular point has been highlighted in the study: coverage is also dominated by political debates and actors (45%), leaving almost no space (4% of articles) for economic, cultural, historical and contextual information and most articles confuse migrants and refugees or remain unclear about the status of the people involved. Only one-third of the articles (33%) clearly distinguish between refugees, who have a protected legal status, and migrants, who leave their home countries for economic, social, educational, or other reasons. Most articles (60%) confuse migrants and refugees or remain unclear about the status of the persons concerned, perhaps, out of ignorance or to be in line with politicians and their use of ambiguous language or in order to not confuse the audience the result is the same: it has a deep impact on the way migration and its different forms are perceived and lead the way to easy amalgams. Amalgams that are then at the centre of far right parties political discourses who use it to speak to the people and find a voice and can provoke raises in hate speech about migration in the public space.

More often than not, migrants are the silent spectators of migration coverage. According to the EJO's study, of the 26.6 percent of articles actually featuring migrants and refugees, 18 percent cover them only as large, anonymous groups. Only 8% of articles feature them as individuals or families - while citizens and civil society actors in destination countries appear in 18% of articles. And very few of the migrants and refugees featured in the articles are named. While the caregivers are individualised, the people who receive help are not.

Migration is worth talking about for the media, but only in a certain way. One that is often linked to the political agenda. The segmented media landscape between mainstream media and popular press is at the root of this contrast. The editorial pressure of an anti-immigration press contributes to a discourse that focuses on migration as a threat to jobs and social

security and the space given to journalists to deal with the issue is often too limited to provide the nuance necessary for quality analysis. However, this editorial pressure is not enough to explain the often clear-cut tone of the media. The construction of the news is itself a factor in distorting the reality of migration. The media news is constructed by imitation and training effects, with the media being pushed to deal with the dominant themes of the news or risk being punished by a drop in ratings. This mode of construction tends to privilege significant events such as shipwrecks, mass arrivals or security aspects. The impact on development is not likely to generate such sensational news. In fact, the place of interactions between migration and development in the media discourse in a positive mode, remains extremely marginal. This marginality contrasts sharply with the liveliness of practices, analyses and discourses in other spheres of society. In France, most audiovisual productions on immigration are made in the form of documentaries or reports. They tend to trace the individual experiences of migrants in the host society. This type of production therefore takes the point of view of the migrant as an actor. They therefore follow the evolution of the conditions of the immigrant over time, from the massive arrivals of labour immigration in the 1970s to clandestine immigration in the 1990s and 2000. It differs from other countries such as Spain *Le bilan des connaissances espagnol* which give greater prominence to immigrant community media. These media participate in the constitution of a collective identity in migration by creating a representation of the immigrant community as a counterpoint to that conveyed by the national media. These media also constitute a space for political expression where the demands of migrant actors are formulated. The transnational dimension of the migratory experience is also an essential characteristic of this media space. Information concerning the country of origin or communities settled in other third countries plays a major role. Development and co-development practices therefore occupy an important place. The development of community media accompanies that of the economic activities of the immigrant populations: the growth of the offer of ethnic products, the opening of restaurants, the setting up of artistic shows, discounts, the sale of household appliances, banks, postal services, telephone services, etc. require an extension of the "media spaces".

The treatment of migration is also strongly influenced by events and sensationalism, which contributes to the presentation of the migration phenomenon as social pathos. Highlighting discourses and narratives about migration which focus on the emotional sometimes allow the media to speak about it as a "news item", cross-cutting to all categories, -economy, society, politics, international, national... etc. Coupled with a new directive line

of reporting to “go viral” migration has become a perfect stage for political discourses, especially extreme ones.

### *The rise of political extreme parties representation in the media*

Themes of immigration or identity have already been used by politicians in the political game (with the Dreyfus affair and anti-Semitism at the end of the 19th century, in the 1930s against immigrants from Eastern Europe). It is not a total novelty to use migration to get elected, even more nowadays as they are at the heart of the concerns of a part of the French population. On insecurity, immigration has been associated with delinquency and therefore, immigration would "bring" insecurity. There is a culprit constructed and designated by politicians and by certain media. On television, we see embedded reports with police or firemen that give the feeling that rules are not respected, that we are dominated by "criminals". All this has also been reinforced by terrorist attacks committed by people who were sometimes born in France, sometimes not.

Since the 1980s, cultural concerns have gained voters from all sorts of different social categories. Articles, debates and other political instruments are tainted by emotional discourses, playing with fear and insecurities: there is a feeling that home is no longer home, that society is changing, that the French -as a population but also a culture, will be uprooted. It is the idea and the fantasy of the *great replacement*, created by anxiety and frustration. At this point in history, the world has become more and more globalised and this globalisation sometimes brings a social downgrading with relocated factories, and the feeling that one no longer controls one's own life which is decided elsewhere, by invisible people. We are no longer assured of progress for ourselves and our own children. On the contrary, we are heading towards a possible decline. It is a disenchantment after the Glorious Thirty and then the acceleration of the changes linked to digital technology since the 2000s. The issues surrounding the national narrative come into play in this context. A narrative of comfort and fortification is built. On the one hand, there is comfort, because a safe imaginary is one policed and clean, which narrative turns around heroes and a community presented as unified, homogeneous, coherent, as if there were a unity that had broken into pieces today. A history that has a comforting side is being mystified. The fortification comes next because an inner fortress is built, separated from the others. The others are the refugees, the migrants, and -as often when we talk about migration in France, the Muslims. There is a rampart created with a



history from before to which these people would not belong. This discourse is “reassuring” and feeds on a feeling of vulnerability, of fragility. It creates figures who would represent the enemy and who would put us in danger. It was, in fact, the whole directive line of the *Front National* with Jean Marie Le Pen, in the 1980s, who talked about the loss of jobs: “*They're going to take our jobs.*”<sup>56</sup> Nowadays, the focus is more on culture and symbolism. Migrants and refugees -which are not differentiated anyway, are seen as a threat because they will take away our *civilization*, it is presented as an almost existential danger. This idea is very present in the current discourse of Éric Zemmour who plays on the threat of disappearance of the entire French culture with his theory of “great replacement”. Again, the emphasis is put on an emotional aspect in order to attract the attention of listeners already on edge in a context of global crisis -political, economical and health. His theory may not be scientifically supported, but it can affect people who already feel vulnerable to then transform this fragility and look for a scapegoat in the figure of the immigrant or the Muslim.

Media visibility is a crucial resource in politics, especially for influencing debate and public policy through non-institutional and rather popular means. Far-right social movements have been able to increase their exposure by choosing politically relevant actions and themes, and by creating public controversies. Not all facts become news: the media have a role as gatekeepers to the public space<sup>57</sup> by acting as a filter that turns political events into public, newsworthy events. Events must therefore meet specific expectations in order to attract ratings and capture the attention of journalists. To make the news, a story must be considered important, i.e to have media value<sup>58</sup> and this media value is higher according to some facts.

Media attention is more easily captured by actions that make it easier for journalists to identify protagonists and targets: the possibility of building dramatic, personalised and confrontational stories around these events, involving elites, as well as the emergence of counter-mobilisations, can shape media interest<sup>59</sup>. The media visibility of far-right movements follows the same pattern as the media coverage of social events or protest

---

<sup>56</sup> Damgé, M. (2016, 11 octobre). *Idée reçue sur les migrants (4/6) : « Ils veulent le travail des Français »*. Le Monde.fr. [https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/10/10/idee-recue-sur-les-migrants-4-6-ils-voient-le-travail-des-francais\\_5011081\\_4355770.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/10/10/idee-recue-sur-les-migrants-4-6-ils-voient-le-travail-des-francais_5011081_4355770.html)

<sup>57</sup> Johan Galtung, Mari Holmboe Ruge, « The Structure of Foreign News : The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers », *Journal of Peace Research*, 2 (1), mars 1965, p. 64-90.

<sup>58</sup> William Gamson, William Croteau, Theodore Sasson, « Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality », *Annual Review of Sociology*, 18, 1992, p. 373-393.

<sup>59</sup> Todd Gitlin, *The Whole World Is Watching. Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003 ; Michel Offerlé, « Descendre dans la rue : de la “journée” à la “manif” », dans Pierre Favre (dir.), *La manifestation*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1990, p. 91-127.

movements that capture the attention of the media sphere on a continuous basis, such as the Yellow Vests movement. Far-right and populist right parties have often had the status of outsiders in contemporary democracies. However, their access to the media has become a crucial step in their electoral breakthrough<sup>60</sup>. Media visibility can lead to increased electoral support, and legitimises the rise of these parties by granting access to electoral competition, making their appearances alongside more traditional actors commonplace. Thus, while rivalry between mainstream political parties structures the opportunities available to these outsiders, access to the media provides them with the resources to capitalise electorally on these opportunities.

The visibility of right-wing populist and extreme right-wing parties would therefore be a consequence of a new way of doing politics but also of information with the democratisation of the style and content of extreme right-wing discourse, and the personalisation of leadership<sup>61</sup>. The 'media logics' of news production would favour the multiplication of content closer to the tastes of the public, which is more interested in news with negative and confrontational approaches, attentive to personality rather than political line, and encouraging the simplification of complex political affairs. The importance of personalising leadership with a figure who is present throughout the media sphere, who speaks in simplified and accessible political language, and who emphasises conflictual and tense issues, is also important in mobilising a public - and therefore an electorate - that is increasingly domestic and less invested in politics. This population is generally the one that generates audiences and therefore the one that certain media pillars are looking for, such as the major news channels -*TF1* in France, for example, or the 24-hour news channels -*BFM TV*, *LCI*, or even the popular paper press in the various regions (*Ouest-France*, *Le Dauphiné Libéré* or *La Provence*).<sup>62</sup> This regional press, often seen as a form of permanence of an old and almost obsolete press model in the age of globalisation and based on local information aimed at the widest possible audience, constitutes an enormous springboard for populist and extreme discourse because it benefits from a proximity, both physical and symbolic, with its readers by giving them access to the most directly comprehensible world - that of daily lives and

---

<sup>60</sup> Bos, L., Lefevere, J. M., Thijssen, R., & Sheets, P. (2017). The impact of mediated party issue strategies on electoral support. *Party Politics*, 23(6), 760–771. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068815626603>

<sup>61</sup> Gianpietro Mazzoleni, « Populism and the Media », dans D. Albertazzi, D. McDonnell (eds), *Twenty-First Century Populism*, *op. cit.*, p. 49-64, p. 52.

<sup>62</sup> Journaux populaires en France à diffusion régionales pour respectivement Le Grand Ouest, Auvergne-Rhône Alpes et Provence-Alpes Côte d'Azur

routines.<sup>63</sup> With a dominant position on a territory, it acts as a mediator in the public space, diverting the gaze from the depth and diversity of society to an oversimplified construction of social and political relations.

In this respect, the regional press is in line with the evolution of media communication towards information content that responds more directly to public demands, providing more entertainment and sensationalism. The attention given to law and order issues in the discourse of the far-right parties would respond to the media's tendency to prefer dramatic and emotional news<sup>64</sup> and the interpretations of migration flows and integration often capture the media attention for the simplification of information and the adoption of conflict frames<sup>65</sup>. The media are often willing to cover the outbursts of extreme right-wing parties against the government, and especially personal attacks on political opponents, from which they hope for a scandal worthy of public attention. The visibility of the extremes is thus explained, on the one hand, by the content of their discourse and, in particular, the fact that they politicise widespread feelings of national identification and insecurity; on the other hand, their political style, which simplifies complex facts.

In the case of far-right parties, the visibility of their political actors has increased, in particular thanks to the emergence of new political themes in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s<sup>66</sup> such as immigration, a subject long marginalised by mainstream parties and associated with the far right. Far-right protest actions are of more interest to journalists when they focus on issues that are considered 'owned' by the far right. These include issues related to immigration and integration, as it is on these subjects that the public recognises the far right as having some credibility. Thus, media visibility is more likely when mobilisations are on issues that the far right owns, such as immigration and integration. Moreover, the tendency of the mass media to favour spectacular events that allow for an emotional and dramatising treatment of social reality<sup>67</sup> is in line with certain characteristics of the discourse of the

---

<sup>63</sup> Ballarini, L. (2008). Presse locale, un média de diversion. *Réseaux*, 148-149, 405-426.

<https://www.cairn.info/revue--2008-2-page-405.htm>.

<sup>64</sup> Tjitske Akkerman, « Friend or Foe ? Right-Wing Populism and the Popular Press in Britain and the Netherlands », *Journalism*, 12 (8), 2011, p. 931-945

<sup>65</sup> Holli A. Semetko, Patti M. Valkenburg, "Framing European Politics : A Content Analysis of Press and Television News", *Journal of Communication*, 50 (2), 2000, p. 93-109.

<sup>66</sup> Cas Mudde, « The Single Issue Party Thesis : Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue », *West European Politics*, 22 (3), 1999, p. 182-197.

<sup>67</sup> Stuart N. Soroka, « Issue Attributes and Agenda Setting by Media, the Public, and Policymakers in Canada », *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 14 (3), 2002, p. 264-285.

extreme right, such as the reference to violent crimes, terrorist attacks or the dramatisation of political conflicts. It then becomes in the media's interest to associate securitisation and dramatisation with the extreme right, as events focusing on crime and insecurity are more likely to attract their attention and, by extension, their ratings. Media visibility is more likely when far-right mobilisations focus on public order issues, such as violent crime and threats to physical safety, which are often linked to immigration by these far-right parties and correspond to the media's predilection for dramatising events.

The media - although they are a reflection of it and a springboard for it - are not the only ones responsible for the entrenchment of the extreme right in France, which is primarily the product of various crises (political, economic, social) but also of a particular political configuration.

The media's staging of political issues - exacerbated in times of elections to the detriment, too often, of information on substantive debates - is a model that benefits the far right: it contributes to turning large sections of the population - particularly in the working and middle classes - away from politics while giving a lot of airtime to the far right's anti-system discourses. It is with this same perspective that mainstream journalism has depoliticised and trivialised the Rassemblement National, especially since Marine Le Pen took over the party. A "de-demonisation" largely relayed by the mainstream media with the support of polling institutes.<sup>68</sup> This depoliticisation of politics and the extreme right goes so far as to create a reinvented party, as if to copy the revival proclaimed by its leaders. The Rassemblement National has thus become banal, anchored in the common sense of everyday life but also of media life, and its visibility in the polls has been confirmed, which are at the centre of its media treatment, contributing *"to the construction of a partly unreal reality of the party, by presenting it as a renewed organisation, by almost systematically overestimating its electoral potential or by accentuating its normality at the cost of a biased interpretation of the results of the surveys"*<sup>69</sup>.

Since September 2021 - even before the official announcement of his candidacy - these same media extrapolations have benefited the media treatment of candidate Éric Zemmour. The

---

<sup>68</sup> Alidières, B. (2018). Confirmation du recul ou nouvel essor du vote Front national-Rassemblement national dans la France, demain ? *Hérodote*, N° 170(3), 77-108. <https://doi.org/10.3917/her.170.0077>

<sup>69</sup> Dézé, A. (2022). La construction sondagière du Rassemblement national. *Politika*. <https://www.politika.io/fr/article/construction-sondagiere-du-rassemblement-national>

media's infatuation with this new extreme right-wing actor was such that he did not need to make any official announcement of his candidacy before 30 November in order to be perceived as a serious candidate and therefore worthy of media coverage. This depoliticisation also allows the mainstream news media to take on more superficial and intimate angles and subjects that would normally be found in the celebrity press, such as more relaxed interviews about the daily lives of politicians<sup>70</sup> : Marine Le Pen's famous cats "*The president of the Rassemblement National (RN, ex-Front National), who likes to call herself a "cat lady", has a consuming passion for her felines*"<sup>71</sup> are one example. Normalised, this routine and continuity explains the explosion of the visibility of the extremes in the media landscape; even more so during the 2022 presidential election.

The promotion of the far right's favourite themes in the media agenda reinforces this trivialisation. Immigration, almost always coupled with insecurity in the discourse, is often more likely to make the headlines and to be relayed on social networks. These two themes are also often treated in a single sense, which delimits the perimeter within which it is possible to think about the different issues related to these themes. Thus the narrative revolves mostly around toughening the repression of delinquency in working-class neighbourhoods, the threat posed by immigration - which is always illegal - and Islam as an internal enemy to be fought because it is associated with terrorism<sup>72</sup>. The media no longer question the rhetoric of the far right but take it for granted. As a result, discourse is becoming more liberal and debates are increasingly moving to the right of the political spectrum. The reconfiguration of the media field, which has aligned itself with a race for listeners and advertising revenues and with a mode of information processing that is more like a show with the advent of television, is partly responsible for the visibility of these new old discourses on immigration in the public space<sup>73</sup>.

The reporting of information then goes through a target construction and plays on emotions such as frustration and fear. The word is mostly captured by elected officials and institutions

---

<sup>70</sup> Friot, M. (2020, août 13). Quand Paris Match roule pour le RN. *Acrimed | Action Critique Médias*.

<https://www.acrimed.org/Quand-Paris-Match-roule-pour-le-RN>

<sup>71</sup> Hacot, O. B. E. V. (2020, 22 avril). Les animaux des politiques : Marine Le Pen, la « mère à chats ». *leparisien.fr*.

<https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/les-animaux-des-politiques-marine-le-pen-la-mere-a-chats-18-08-2018-7856454.php>

<sup>72</sup> Laurent Bonelli, *La France a peur. Une histoire sociale de "l'insécurité"*, *Lectures* [En ligne], Les comptes rendus, mis en ligne le 10 juin 2008, consulté le 22 juillet 2022. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/lectures/611> ; DOI :

<https://doi.org/10.4000/lectures.611>

<sup>73</sup> Jacques Terral, *L'insécurité au journal télévisé. La campagne présidentielle de 2002*, L'Harmattan, 2004.

of authority such as the police or the judiciary, which further supports the angle of fear and criminality given to subjects such as immigration and insecurity, and new forms of media such as "Enquêtes Exclusives" or "90' Enquêtes" continuously take up the same subjects, -suburbs, crime, immigration, sometimes all treated under the same theme, reproducing the stereotypes and amalgams<sup>74</sup>. This tendency to shape the imagination by continuously broadcasting news related to the 'fetish' themes of the ultra-conservative right and the extreme right is all the more strong just before and during election periods: In the four months preceding the second round of the 2002 presidential election - which pitted the traditional right-wing candidate Jacques Chirac against the extreme right-wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen, for the first time in the second round of the presidential election, the television news devoted "18,766 items to crimes, sexual assaults, robberies, or interventions by the police and gendarmerie forces, i.e. 987 per week. The written press contributed 25.6%"<sup>75</sup>. The years have passed but the trend has not changed and these media frenzies end up marginalising the social crisis, the insecurity of workers, the increase in poverty and inequality on the agenda by taking all its attention on certain favourite far-right subjects such as migration; sometimes relaying their discourses and creating associations, especially in regards to migrants and refugees.

The correlation made by some extreme political parties between immigration and criminality for example, has only increased in recent years in France, particularly in the fractured political context and with recent events like terrorist attacks in the country<sup>76</sup> but also across Europe<sup>77</sup>: "*for several days now, terrorism and immigration, the two words have been mixed up in political speeches*"<sup>78</sup>. This observation is neither new nor specific to France. Indeed, the association of migration with terrorism is a classic figure in the rhetoric of far-right parties and populist movements. In November 2015, in an interview with the American media Politico, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, declared: "*Of course it's not accepted, but the factual point is that all the terrorists are basically migrants. The question is when they migrated to the European Union.*"<sup>79</sup> This type of statement is part of a long drift towards security and identity of the Hungarian government, which plays on the

<sup>74</sup> Jérôme Berthaut, *La banlieue du « 20 heures ». Ethnographie de la production d'un lieu commun journalistique*, Agone, 2013.

<sup>75</sup> Jacques Terral, *L'insécurité au journal télévisé. La campagne présidentielle de 2002*, L'Harmattan, 2004.

<sup>76</sup> FANSTEN, Emmanuel ; FRÉNOIS, Mathilde ; LÉBOUCQ, Fabien, "Nice : trois morts dans l'attaque terroriste contre la basilique Notre-Dame", *Libération*, 29 octobre 2020.

<sup>77</sup> "Autriche : au moins quatre morts dans une 'attaque terroriste' à Vienne", *Le Monde*, 2 novembre 2020.

<sup>78</sup> PASCUAL, Julia, "Le lien entre terrorisme et immigration à l'épreuve des faits", *Le Monde*, 13 novembre 2020.

<sup>79</sup> Kaminski, M. (2015, 2 décembre). *'All the terrorists are migrants'*. POLITICO.

<https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-interview-terrorists-migrants-eu-russia-putin-borders-schengen/amp/>

anti-immigrant and xenophobic registers to make voters forget the economic and social crises. In Hungary, the rhetorical association between terrorism and immigration is therefore part of a policy of criminalising all figures of otherness deemed different.

In France, since the beginning of the 2000s, local and national leaders of the Front National - now Rassemblement National (RN), since 2018 - have frequently established a causality between the presence of migrants and descendants of immigrants on French territory and terrorism. Thus, already in 2012, in the midst of the presidential election campaign, Marine Le Pen made a direct link between the terrorist acts committed in Toulouse by Mohamed Merah and the "immigration problem" in general: "*How many Mohamed Merahs are there in the boats and planes that arrive in France every day filled with immigrants? How many Mohamed Merahs among the children of these non-assimilated immigrants? [...] Mohamed Merah is perhaps only the tip of the iceberg*".<sup>80</sup> The recurrent use of this amalgam to mobilise certain vulnerable fringes of the French electorate, more affected by the economic, political and health crises, is a common technique of the far-right parties and is becoming more and more visible in the media. The subject of migration is politically recuperated to put pressure on the elections and in order to get votes, and extremes are the one who use it because they made it their pre-selection topic long ago. Because it appeals to emotions -playing with the fear of insecurity and the so-called disappearance of French culture, it is more interesting and appealing for a large part of the French population, especially those who do not have the time or energy to look for different sources of information because of work, housework, children... etc.

Since the acceleration of communication, the instantaneousness of access to information and globalisation in general, almost the entire media spectrum, whether television, paper or radio, is owned by large groups, which has resulted in a fundamental change in the news treated on the most watched television news programmes, with a weakening of the different political options proposed and an alignment with the major capitalist themes<sup>81</sup>. The effects of globalisation on the media sphere are felt most in peri-urban and rural areas, where the French population is still in the majority, as it creates a distrust of the mainstream media by citizens in difficulty. The latter have become the

---

<sup>80</sup> AFP, "Marine Le Pen fait l'amalgame entre immigration et terrorisme" [En ligne], *Libération*, 25 mars 2012, [https://www.liberation.fr/france/2012/03/25/marine-le-pen-fait-l-amalgame-entre-immigration-et-terrorisme\\_805592](https://www.liberation.fr/france/2012/03/25/marine-le-pen-fait-l-amalgame-entre-immigration-et-terrorisme_805592).

<sup>81</sup> Documentaire de Yannick Kergoat et Gilles Balbastre de 2011 intitulé *Les Nouveaux chiens de garde*

guardians of the system, which leads to a rejection on the part of certain listeners, even among the faithful, who turn to figures who are known enemies of the media, and therefore, by extension, of the system. Newspapers, television programmes and radio stations saw a confrontation between the progressive left and right-wing extremism, with each camp demonising the other: "*The antilepénistes*<sup>82</sup> *had not foreseen that their main target could gloriously present himself as an unjustly accused victim and as a hero, a 'Resistance fighter', or even as an heir of the 'Resistance', in the face of the new supposed enemies of France. Without its "Luciferian" dimension, the FN would not be able to exert the slightest seduction*"<sup>83</sup>.

The migration theme is a probing example of the appropriation of the far right of a subject they always used to gain voters but redesigned to appear less extreme and, in fact, more revolutionary against a system that supports violence and inequalities. Coupled by the long repeated association between migration and insecurity and the media's frenzy with negative news to gain more audience, extreme right's ideas about migration have become common ground on debates and gained more visibility. By shifting the terrain of the fight against the extreme right to the emotional side, voting no longer necessarily becomes rational but emotional, which pushes undecided voters - those not necessarily attached to a traditional party, increasingly numerous with the new generation, and often vulnerable populations to choose a third way in a charismatic figure to get out of the system, such as Eric Zemmour in France or Donald Trump in the U.S., who are the "enemies" of the media, but who are still visible there.

---

<sup>82</sup> those "against Le Pen"

<sup>83</sup> Foussier, P. (2015). Du diable en politique. Réflexions sur l'antilepénisme ordinaire. *Humanisme*, N° 306(1), 121-122. <https://doi.org/10.3917/huma.306.0121><https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2014/05/23/31001-20140523ARTFIG00343-pierre-andre-taguieff-la-propagande-antilepeniste-puissant-facteur-de-la-montee-du-fn-12.php>



## **The place and coverage of migrants and refugees in the mainstream media during the 2022 presidential elections**

Migration is nowadays one of the major themes presented in the media, but especially during election times as it became one of the key topics of the presidential campaign this past decade. Therefore, in 2022, the space given to it in the media seems to have never been so important.

The French presidential election of 2022 takes place on 10 and 24 April 2022. Two rounds are required to elect the candidate for a five-year term. This is the twelfth presidential election of the Fifth Republic. Coming first in the first round, the outgoing president Emmanuel Macron (27.85%) faces Marine Le Pen (23.15%), as in 2017. In third place with 21.95% of the vote, Jean-Luc Mélenchon achieves the highest score of his three candidacies and comes well ahead of the left, but fails to reach the second round. Once again, the traditional political parties were absent from the second round, in even greater proportions than in the previous election. The *Le Parti Socialiste* and *Les Républicains*, represented respectively by Anne Hidalgo and Valérie Pécresse, collapsed with historically low scores and did not even reach the 5% threshold. For the first time, candidates classified as far right exceeded the threshold of 30% of the votes cast in the first round, with opinion polls suggesting a close duel with the outgoing president, and the radical left exceeded the threshold of 20% of the votes cast in the first round. Note also the result of the candidate Eric Zemmour of the *Reconquête* party who comes out of the first round in fourth place with a score of 7.07%, again well ahead of Valérie Pécresse's 4.78% and Anne Hidalgo's 1.75%. The second round finally saw Emmanuel Macron win by 58.55% of the votes cast<sup>84</sup>.

The election campaign officially started on 28 March, two weeks before the first round, thus launching the equal media time period<sup>85</sup> but the proclamation of the list of candidates, drawn up by the Constitutional Council, "no later than the fourth Friday before the first round of voting" (Act of 29 March 2021) was published on 7 March 2022 and the media have been

---

<sup>84</sup> *Élection Présidentielle 2022 : candidats, dates, sondages et résultats*. (2022). Libération. <https://www.liberation.fr/dossier/election-presidentielle-2022/>

<sup>85</sup> Le Monde. (2022, 28 mars). Début de la campagne présidentielle officielle : stricte égalité du temps de parole entre candidats, diffusion de la propagande électorale. . . . *Le Monde.fr*. [https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/03/28/presidentielle-2022-strict-equalite-du-temps-de-parole-entre-candidats-diffusion-de-la-propagande-electorale-debut-de-la-campagne-officielle\\_6119407\\_6059010.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/03/28/presidentielle-2022-strict-equalite-du-temps-de-parole-entre-candidats-diffusion-de-la-propagande-electorale-debut-de-la-campagne-officielle_6119407_6059010.html)

preparing this election long before, when the candidates officially proclaimed they were engaging in the campaign so the content analysis of the coverage in mainstream media of migration in its whole during the presidential elections can be considered relevant for assessment from October 2021 until April 24th 2022 -official end of the electoral campaign.

### *The overrepresentation of the theme of migration in the media space*

The political marketing techniques used by candidates in France to convince their electorate have always existed, particularly through television. Television has become a privileged means of communication to persuade citizens, to launch debates and the elections then take on the form of a war of conquest. Like newspapers, but more popular, television allows candidates to address the greatest number of people, but also to communicate by playing with sounds and images, so as to arouse emotions in viewers. This medium has become the primary source of information for the French, particularly during election periods, and this success has continued to grow with the arrival of private channels and continuous news channels. With TV, the importance of audience figures and the monetary gain linked to them also emerges, pushing producers to focus on 'selling' themes such as immigration to attract viewers. Moreover, the theme of immigration was widely represented in the presidential campaign due to the geopolitical context with the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine<sup>86</sup>.

This context of war has made it possible to bring up the subject of European immigration and the reception of European refugees, which is in opposition to the international immigration experienced by Europe over the last ten years: *"Even Marine Le Pen, who has always made the migration issue her trademark, now considers it "natural" to receive European refugees. While 79% of French people would be in favour of their reception according to a Harris Interactive poll, the candidate of the Rassemblement National scored a few points allowing her to consolidate her place in the second round of the presidential election"*<sup>87</sup>. A geopolitical turn of events which, with the support of the media underlined in the previous paragraphs, allows the 'banal' extreme right of Marine Le Pen to publicly oppose what the

---

<sup>86</sup> Quentin, A., & Boiteau, V. (2022, 3 mars). Guerre en Ukraine : quel impact électoral pour les candidats à la présidentielle en France ? *Libération*.

[https://www.liberation.fr/politique/elections/guerre-en-ukraine-quel-impact-electoral-pour-les-candidats-a-la-presidentielle-en-france-20220303\\_OV43V3UQYZGENLHXNVLRXI3VMQ/](https://www.liberation.fr/politique/elections/guerre-en-ukraine-quel-impact-electoral-pour-les-candidats-a-la-presidentielle-en-france-20220303_OV43V3UQYZGENLHXNVLRXI3VMQ/)

<sup>87</sup> Quentin, A., & Boiteau, V. (2022, 3 mars). Guerre en Ukraine : quel impact électoral pour les candidats à la présidentielle en France ? *Libération*.

[https://www.liberation.fr/politique/elections/guerre-en-ukraine-quel-impact-electoral-pour-les-candidats-a-la-presidentielle-en-france-20220303\\_OV43V3UQYZGENLHXNVLRXI3VMQ/](https://www.liberation.fr/politique/elections/guerre-en-ukraine-quel-impact-electoral-pour-les-candidats-a-la-presidentielle-en-france-20220303_OV43V3UQYZGENLHXNVLRXI3VMQ/)

Rassemblement National considers to be the more extreme right of polemicist candidate Eric Zemmour<sup>88</sup>. Here again, the treatment of the Ukrainian immigration issue by the French mainstream media, and especially the news channels, differs widely.

The media coverage of Ukrainian immigration not only saturated the media landscape and the election campaign with the theme of refugees, but also highlighted the orientalist and racist coverage of some mainstream media: *"We are not talking about Syrians fleeing the regime's bombing (...). We are talking about Europeans who are leaving in their cars that look like our cars, and who are just trying to save their lives"*<sup>89</sup>. As this statement made on a popular 24-hour news channel - the most watched in France, in prime time - political or media comparisons between the fate of Ukrainian refugees and those from other parts of the world, particularly the Middle East, have been debated, highlighting the hypocrisy of European policies, implying in some ways that some refugees are more worth it than others; as if there was some kind of hierarchy in the different profiles of migrants and refugees. For example, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the French National Assembly said he was "moved" to see *"high-quality immigration, which we can take advantage of"*<sup>90</sup> and Jean-Christophe Barbier, editorialist on BFM-TV, speaks of *"cultural Europeans"* when referring to the Ukrainian refugees who should be welcomed in the countries of the European Union and who are not *"migrants who are going to pass through in an migration logic"*<sup>91</sup>. To understand: Ukrainians, because they are Europeans, are not migrants but refugees.

Obviously this binarity in the discourse on refugees depending on whether they come from Europe or elsewhere - especially Africa or the Middle East - is not specific to France: *"This is not a place, with all due respect, like Iraq or Afghanistan... Where the conflict has been raging for decades... This is a relatively civilised country... A relatively European country... I choose my words carefully"*<sup>92</sup>. This vocabulary decontextualizes conflicts and misleads viewers. The use of the terms 'refugee' and 'migrant' also raises questions. The media's

---

<sup>88</sup> Woessner, G. (2021, 14 novembre). Face à Zemmour, Marine Le Pen à l'offensive. *Le Point*.

[https://www.lepoint.fr/presidentielle/face-a-zemmour-marine-le-pen-a-l-offensive-14-11-2021-2451866\\_3121.php](https://www.lepoint.fr/presidentielle/face-a-zemmour-marine-le-pen-a-l-offensive-14-11-2021-2451866_3121.php)

<sup>89</sup>In French: *"On ne parle pas là de Syriens qui fuient les bombardements du régime (...). On parle d'Européens qui partent dans leurs voitures qui ressemblent à nos voitures, et qui essayent juste de sauver leur vie"*, from the journalist Philippe Corbé on BFMTV, France's leading news channel

<sup>90</sup> In French: *"Immigration de grande qualité, dont on pourra tirer profit"* from Jean-Louis Bourlanges in the programme "Europe Matin" on Europe 1 on 25 February 2022:

<https://www.europe1.fr/politique/guerre-en-ukraine-on-aura-une-immigration-de-grande-qualite-dont-on-pourra-tirer-profit-4095961>

<sup>91</sup> Kerlouan, P. (2022, 1 mars). *Guerre en Ukraine : il y a donc réfugiés et réfugiés, reconnaît Christophe Barbier*. Boulevard Voltaire. <https://www.bvotaire.fr/guerre-en-ukraine-il-y-a-donc-refugies-et-refugies-reconnait-christophe-barbier/>

<sup>92</sup> Charlie D'Agata, foreign correspondent for CBS

treatment of Ukrainian immigration compared to Afghan immigration in August/September 2021 when the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan supports this contrast between migrant and refugee. At the time, Afghans were referred to as "migrants" in much of the French press, while Ukrainians are now identified as "refugees". According to the Geneva Convention, the term refugee refers to individuals fleeing armed conflict or persecution. As in Ukraine, but also in Afghanistan. This confusion stems from political discourses that have made a clear distinction between these populations. This difference in treatment was also observed at the EU's borders during the crisis with Belarus last summer. Faced with an unprecedented influx of people mainly from the Middle East, Poland locked its border by building a wall and illegally turning back hundreds of exiles on the Belarusian side, in defiance of international law. These practices are still going on in the region, while a little further south, Ukrainians are welcomed with open arms by the Polish authorities.

There is a difference between Afghan refugees or, more generally, refugees from a Muslim culture and Ukrainian refugees, which is well highlighted in the media. Ukraine is a predominantly Christian country with an Orthodox tradition, far removed from Islam. It is close to us in terms of civilization and culture. Everything, from the attitude, the visibility in the media and the words used to talk about it leads the consumer of news -us, to believe that today's Ukrainian refugees, like those of yesterday, unlike some of the *migrants* from Islamic countries, will not bring a culture that is foreign, or even hostile to ours, and will not pose any problem of integration or assimilation as feared by representatives of the extreme right, and in particular Eric Zemmour with his theory of the great replacement. Biassed media coverage helps to feed a similar political discourse and the way journalists cover a subject like this also influences public opinion, and then politicians, and the proportion of refugees they are willing or not to welcome. Thus the language is important: no more talk of "*protection against irregular migration flows*"<sup>93</sup>, as Emmanuel Macron declared and an almost unanimous use of the term refugees, compared to the usual "migration crisis", is also symbolic. This hierarchisation of refugees in certain media and political discourses could feed security and identity politics, further excluding non-Europeans.

---

<sup>93</sup> Laurent, P. A. (2022, 22 juillet). « *Nous protéger contre des flux migratoires irréguliers* » : les arrières-pensées de Macron. L'Express.fr. [https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/nous-proteger-contre-des-flux-migratoires-irreguliers-les-arriere-pensees-de-macron\\_2156723.html](https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/nous-proteger-contre-des-flux-migratoires-irreguliers-les-arriere-pensees-de-macron_2156723.html)

Under the election period, the emphasis is always put on the importance of safety and security, as well as the importance of the police in the society. It is a thematic favoured by Eric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen, both strong far right candidates who underline the role migration and refugees and the danger they represent. The subject is often put in parallel with events such as the terrorist attacks as an example of its danger. On the far right, Marine Le Pen wants to create 20,000 prison places over five or six years and promises the deportation of foreign prisoners and the end of the adjustment of certain sentences. Éric Zemmour said that the police were facing a "conflict of civilisation" in the suburbs and that they should become "hunters" again even going so far as to want to introduce an "excusable defence" criterion for police officers and citizens<sup>94</sup>.

The more they are talked about, the more they influence the public debate - as it is implied by the way they move up or down in the polls, and the more migration and refugee flows are visible and associated with security and criminality in the public debate. This democratisation is complete as it is not only the case with the extreme: Valérie Pécresse from the traditional right wing, who promises "zero impunity", has announced in her program a 50% increase in the budget for the police over five years, one-year prison sentences for any attack on a policeman or gendarme, and an end to the "culture of excuse". Like the far-right candidates, she made the link between migration and terrorism, insecurity. As understood previously, the media keeps talking about insecurity and migration because it is relevant to the French population and make them gain viewers or listeners but their comments on migration are so visible in the public space and present in the media and in speeches during election periods or after events such as terrorist attacks that migrants and refugees became a major concern in recent years. The two processes feed into each other.

All the polls showed that, especially in the period between rounds of the elections, purchasing power was at the top of the list of concerns for French voters, but immigration is never far away. All the more so as it is often coupled with another subject of considerable importance for voters - and therefore listeners: security. In an OpinionWay poll for *Les Echos* published at the end of September, the subject came fourth with 37% of people

---

<sup>94</sup>Presented by the candidate as an "excusable right of defense" so that people who have been attacked can "finally have the right to fight back against thugs": Yakin, J. (2022, 27 janvier). *Eric Zemmour et droit de « défense excusable » : à quoi ressemble la légitime défense déjà prévue par le code pénal*. Franceinfo. [https://www.francetvinfo.fr/replay-radio/le-vrai-du-faux/eric-zemmour-et-droit-de-defense-excusable-a-quoi-ressemble-la-legitime-defense-deja-prevue-par-le-code-penal\\_4914769.html](https://www.francetvinfo.fr/replay-radio/le-vrai-du-faux/eric-zemmour-et-droit-de-defense-excusable-a-quoi-ressemble-la-legitime-defense-deja-prevue-par-le-code-penal_4914769.html)

considering it an important issue, behind purchasing power (48%), security (46%) and social protection (43%) but ahead of the environment (36%).<sup>95</sup> More generally, several surveys published in recent years show that a majority of French people want to regulate the flow of immigrants more. "Immigration is not an opportunity for France", according to 63% of those questioned by Ifop in January 2020<sup>96</sup>. International events, such as the Afghan and Ukrainian crisis have also put the issue back at the heart of the debate. Given the media's propensity to associate the theme of security, which is widely visible in the media space, with that of immigration by associating them in the way they cover the news, these often linked themes are the most relayed and therefore the most visualised, which in turn makes them subjects of interest and the circle becomes endless.

The topic of climate change and more generally of the environment seemed to be rather invisible during the campaign despite the growing interest of the media and the population in this subject in the past few years. In the inter-round debate for example, over three hours of debate, the environment took up 18 minutes<sup>97</sup>, according to the *Pour un réveil écologique collective*, i.e. 10% of speaking time. On the subject, the debate between the two parties did much better than the previous political broadcasts of the campaign but still insufficient in the face of the other subjects covered during the debate which were addressed as a fundamental, cross-cutting theme that must underpin political and societal choices in all areas in contrast to the environmental issue. These issues have not been central to the presidential campaign, quite the contrary. According to data from *Affaire du siècle*<sup>98</sup>, the environment has occupied an average of only 3.6% of media time over the past two months.

The appearance of Eric Zemmour in the campaign has also put the issue at the centre of the debate, multiplying radical statements on the subject, taking up the thesis of the "great replacement" and dragging behind him candidates from the traditional right, who are multiplying their proposals: going back on the right of the soil<sup>99</sup> or built a constitutional bill

---

<sup>95</sup> Mazuir, V. (2022, 22 avril). Sondage présidentielle 2022 : tous les résultats de notre baromètre quotidien. *Les Echos*. <https://www.lesechos.fr/elections/sondages/sondage-presidentielle-2022-les-resultats-de-presitrack-1357211>

<sup>96</sup> The survey was conducted among a sample of 1,008 people, representative of the French population aged 18 and over. The representativeness of the sample was ensured by the quota method (gender, age, profession of the respondent) after stratification by region and urban area. The interviews were conducted by self-administered online questionnaire from 22 to 23 January 2020: <https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/117088-Rapport-LF.pdf>

<sup>97</sup> According to "Pour un réveil écologique", Collective of students and young graduates mobilised in the face of ecological crises on social media.

<sup>98</sup> <https://laffairedu siecle.net/laffaire/>

<sup>99</sup> *Eric Ciotti veut revenir sur le droit du sol pour tous*. Nice-Matin.

<https://www.nicematin.com/index.php/politique/eric-ciotti-veut-revenir-sur-le-droit-du-sol-pour-tous-349387>

to fight "uncontrolled immigration"<sup>100</sup>. Beyond the proposals - the promises, the discourse has also hardened towards immigration, mainly because of the omnipresence of Eric Zemmour in the media and the debate between journalists, specialists or candidates. His media popularity is pushing him up in the polls and leading to an even greater interest in his favourite subjects, while the traditional left, which does not put immigration at the heart of their concerns - or at least not in the provocative way of Zemmour or Le Pen - is lagging in the polls and struggling to impose their own themes.

### *Entertaining politics: the reign of the all-opinion*

While the major events of presidential campaigns always take place on TV, radio or in the regional press, new formats have appeared. The 2022 presidential election, placed under the spectre of the Covid-19 health crisis which redistributed the cards, has seen the appearance of new broadcasting channels, most often carried by influencers. A great first. The candidates played the game and responded to totally innovative invitations: the programme "Face à Baba" on the popular channel C8, quick interviews in the form of "speed dating" on the Instagram account of Hugo Travers (@hugodecrypte), participation in podcasts, notably on Spotify, or in the "Great Debate" on Twitch... This was an opportunity for politicians to reach a younger target and to show themselves in a new light. Moreover, the traditional media have become aware of the issues at stake and new television formats have also appeared, such as "Ambition intime", presented by Karine Le Marchand, a political programme that invites the viewer to discover the intimacy of political figures.

In the era of buzz and controversy, the place taken by television in revising and broadcasting the media 'debate' offers an even stronger and more intense resonance on controversial subjects such as migration. Debates are structured by polemics, scandal and sometimes even clashes between candidates or guests on stage. They talk about immigration without mentioning the figures or about insecurity based on testimonies alone. It is more a question of telling a chaotic "telegenic" story that will attract viewers or of oversimplifying the story so as not to risk the channel being changed. It is on this type of content that far-right speakers thrive, having always made scandal and provocation a political strategy. As a consequence, the multiplication of racist and reactionary statements that punctuate public

---

<sup>100</sup> *Péresse présente un projet constitutionnel pour « stopper l'immigration incontrôlée »*. Le Point.  
[https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/peresse-presente-un-projet-constitutionnel-pour-stopper-l-immigration-incontrolee-05-10-2021-2446322\\_20.php](https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/peresse-presente-un-projet-constitutionnel-pour-stopper-l-immigration-incontrolee-05-10-2021-2446322_20.php)

debate, most of the time without contradiction from the media which plays more the role of a passive broadcasting platform than an opportunity for critical reflection.

The overexposure of *Éric Zemmour* is a symptom in itself of the tendency of the media to move towards a mode of dissemination and access to information that is closer to entertainment and the fact that he became in only a couple of months such an unquestionable present figure whose discourses are not only recognized but also normal is only accelerating the process of this new form of information. The candidate is never mentioned as a “racist” and without mentioning his convictions for provocation to hatred, speaking instead of 'controversial remarks' and 'polemics'.<sup>101</sup>. The presenters and editorialists set up the far-right candidate as enemy number one, continuing throughout the campaign to submit Zemmour's racism to the opinion of elected officials: "Is *Éric Zemmour* a racist? B. Boursier to C. Jacob, BFM-TV, 26 September); "When you provoke racial hatred, are you a racist? ) and even put the question of the 'great replacement' on the agenda of one of the biggest television programmes of the presidential campaign, 'Élysée 2022', on the national channel France 2 (France 2, 'Élysée 2022', 23 September), thereby legitimising a deeply xenophobic theory as a valid alternative, during prime time, on a popular channel.

The grip of commercial and market logic in the journalistic field is inexorably accelerating the trend. They are the cause of the deterioration of the conditions of journalistic work, and are hitting the audiovisual sector hard - also in the written press. The culture of entertainment and the reign of the all-opinion are making low-cost models that impoverish information sacred: micro-subjects, instantaneity, mimicry, increased dependence on institutional sources... In the journalistic circuit, everything contributes to the marginalisation of the long term, of investigation and reporting, from which the extreme right benefits greatly. With a the kind of reporting based on shortcuts and pastime the media amplify - without much contradiction, the reactionary discourse conveyed by the political field around immigration, Islam or "insecurity".

The new forms of media that appeared during this presidential campaign were also intended to include voters, to move back to active rather than passive information, as with social networks. "Élysée 2022", France 2's political programme, hosted a presidential

---

<sup>101</sup> « *Éric Zemmour*, du journaliste au polémiste », « Retour vers l'info », France Info et INA, 16 sept. 2021: [https://www.ina.fr/ina-eclairage-actu/video/s1104154\\_001/eric-zemmour-du-journaliste-au-polemiste](https://www.ina.fr/ina-eclairage-actu/video/s1104154_001/eric-zemmour-du-journaliste-au-polemiste)



candidate each week in a new configuration, where the candidate was interviewed in the first part by several of the group's journalists (one on international affairs, on purchasing power, on ecology and on culture), and a few French people drawn from a panel of 150 citizens. The news channel LCI goes even further with "*Mission convaincre*<sup>102</sup>", where candidates are challenged to convince a panel of six abstentionist citizens. At the end of January, the evening news on France 2 was also organising major political interviews. This new programme, called "20 h 22", was coupled with a 90-minute live broadcast on the Twitch platform. In the same spirit, the political programme "Face à BFM", where a candidate answers questions from BFM and BFM Business journalists, is streamed on BFMTV's Twitch channel.

These new forms of information dissemination adapted to the presidential elections were able to provide more diversified debates on the complex issues at the heart of the presidential debate, but also to propagate extreme discourses on both sides of the political spectrum, further undermining the traditional two-party system and right-left opposition in politics and in the media. Through aggressive antagonisms and informational confusion due to the immediacy of information, social networks can benefit the extreme right. Cyril Hanouna's aforementioned shows<sup>103</sup>, which are based on invective, and where the humiliation of the other is used as conversation, entertainment and sometimes even qualified as debate. Politicians invited to this kind of show to talk about societal issues, trying to attract a certain young audience disinterested in politics, validates this kind of conversation and debate in society.

The results of the last presidential and, more recently, legislative elections will result in an increase in the amount of time the far right and the Rassemblement National have to speak in the media and, with it, the space given to tricky debates. Debates and provocative front pages on wokism or the burkini, to which the news channels often devote a good part of their morning shows, *Valeurs actuelles* has become an almost reference media.

*The role of the media in the democratisation and normalisation of far right's discourses about migrants and refugees*

---

<sup>102</sup> Mission to convince

<sup>103</sup> Face à Baba or Touche pas à mon poste, both broadcast on the channel C8

With three months of scoop, controversy and scandal, of focusing on his place in the polls, of speculating on his candidacy, his place in relation to the Rassemblement National or his voting intentions, the media created the "Zemmour event" and placed this non-candidate, unknown to many before the presidential elections, at the centre of gravity of public debate. By creating an artificial existence for him in the media sphere, well before his candidacy, newspapers and other political programmes helped to influence the timing of the presidential campaign, by putting pressure on the strategies and representative processes of other parties, or by questioning left-wing voters, more than seven months before the elections, about their willingness to "block" the extreme right, when the prescription of the "useful vote" is not already in place. All this without the slightest public reaction from journalists' associations. An omnipresence that has allowed a democratisation of the traditional figures of the extreme right. Indeed, Marine Le Pen has appeared, not only in the media but also politically among voters, as the alternative to the hurricane Zemmour.

The far right has good spokespersons in the mainstream media, in addition to their own titles and channels on the web. The complacency of the media management towards Zemmour is accompanied by the overexposure of reactionary and far-right journalists, intellectuals and racist media philosophers who truly believe a "one-can say anything", not to mention the role of activists from the "extreme centre", who share and feed some of the obsessions of the far right. The media platforms favour these reactionary movements, increasingly marginalising personalities on the opposite side of the political spectrum: journalists (particularly independent), actors from the political, associative or intellectual sphere who are able to provide a substantiated contradiction to the security and xenophobic theses, anti-fascist and anti-racist activists, or simply people who are regularly targeted by Islamophobic and racist bludgeoning. For example, in 2019, when a representative of the Rassemblement National verbally assaulted a mother wearing a headscarf in the middle of a regional council, the news channels devoted 85 debates to this subject: 286 speakers, no women wearing the headscarf<sup>104</sup>.

Election periods are times of security hysteria, when the mainstream media is all about order, security and immigration. Debates are struck by a binary division ('pro' versus 'anti'), which has benefited the far right for decades, even more so when journalistic categorisations are

---

<sup>104</sup> *La mère voilée agressée par Julien Odoul porte plainte*. Libération.  
[https://www.liberation.fr/france/2019/10/17/la-mere-voilee-agressee-par-julien-odoul-porte-plainte\\_1758090/](https://www.liberation.fr/france/2019/10/17/la-mere-voilee-agressee-par-julien-odoul-porte-plainte_1758090/)

biased, as when it lumps immigration and security or order together for example. The far right can present itself as an alternative to the single-mindedness conveyed by both the right and the governing left. During the campaign, the lack of visibility of left-wing and socialist discourse in the media, the mainstream media succeeded in politically shifting their positions to the far right. By repeating, for example, the liberal discourse of the government of the system against "the populisms" in one word, that is to say *La France Insoumise* of Jean Luc Mélenchon and the *Rassemblement National* of Marine Le Pen, which are thus put in the same basket, historical struggles of the socialist left become proposals of the RN<sup>105</sup>. For example, this exchange between a France Info journalist and Sandrine Rousseau (candidate in the EELV primary): "Are you for retirement at 60? [Yes]. Like Marine Le Pen. It's an observation, it's a fact"<sup>106</sup>. The subjects are simplified to the simplest form: for or against the euro, for or against forms of protectionism, for or against retirement at 60. The choices presented are always in opposition to the system on the one hand - and therefore indirectly to the current power and the revolutionaries on the other, who are anti-system and who are all allies of the *Rassemblement National*. In the public sphere and, by extension, in the popular imagination, representatives of the extreme right can therefore be likened to left-wing elected representatives with ecological and socialist proposals. Omnipresent in news commentary, overwhelming in election periods, the media construction of the "convergence of extremes", as much as that of a "second round" Macron-Le Pen, replayed *ad infinitum* since 2017, are so many stagings from which the radical and critical left systematically emerges less visible or discredited<sup>107</sup>. The capitalist predation on information aggravates all these processes. The media are becoming more and more general and private, sometimes giving way to channels of hatred, such as the CNews channel, where the editorial line clearly displays its support for Zemmour, who was a columnist on the channel's programmes until just before his official candidacy. This is the result of a specific configuration of the media field that has yielded to capitalist constraints and commercial competition. It is not new but the media have left more space to the immigration topic carried by the extremes and, inevitably, allowed negative and xenophobic discourses to emerge in the public space. They are present every time the subject is mentioned which made them considered more expert, reliable and trustworthy on the theme of migration<sup>108</sup>.

---

<sup>105</sup> Rassemblement National

<sup>106</sup>From France Info broadcast "Le Grand Oral" on 21 September 2021

<sup>107</sup>Reymond, M. (2012, 10 avril). *Les éditocrates contre Jean-Luc Mélenchon*. Acrimed | Action Critique Médias. <https://www.acrimed.org/Les-editocrates-contre-Jean-Luc-Melenchon>

<sup>108</sup> Martin, C. (2021, 22 septembre). SONDAGE BFMTV - Présidentielle : Zemmour jugé parmi les plus crédibles sur l' ; immigration, nettement moins. . . *BFMTV*.

As a result of this overexposure, certain rhetorical theses of the extreme right have been popularised among viewers of channels that are well established in the French media landscape and have a very diverse audience, such as CNews, BFM-TV, France Télévisions, or the radio stations Europe 1, France Inter, RTL, Radio Classique. Social networks also have their share of responsibility: by allowing the more provocative debates to flourish with little or no limit, they have contributed to lifting certain taboos and overshadowing or influencing certain traditional media. The programme *Touche pas à mon poste* presented by a famous French host Cyril Hanouna on C8, has also largely contributed to trivialising far-right speech in general, and that of Eric Zemmour in particular. Under the guise of pluralism, the guests are the most controversial figures in the political, cinematographic or literary landscape, such as Thaïs d'Escufon, the former spokesperson for the group *Génération identitaire*<sup>109</sup> and it was also on this programme that we saw several columnists or personalities declare their support for Marine Le Pen publicly, such as the former Miss France Delphine Wespiser, further contributing to the trivialisation. In the 2000s, reactionary speech rarely appeared in the media and the far right was confined to marginal publications.

Women also seem to have a very specific representation in the media. The case of muslim women is a prime example of a gender division in the representation of migrants and refugees, which has been recuperated by certain far-right discourses. The politicisation of the refugee or migrant woman (represented by the veil) also benefits the visibility of Marine Le Pen or other extremes who use a religious symbol as a gateway to immigration - even though the veil is not necessarily synonymous with immigration. Marine Le Pen is keen that nothing should detract from her discourse on identity: the candidate of the *Rassemblement National* does not target Islam or Muslims, she says, but Islamism. Similarly, she does not target migrants, but migration. This rhetorical distinction hardly stands up to a detailed analysis of her programme and comes up against an incoherence, that of the Islamic veil. "It's funny that this affair of the veil comes back on all the platforms, like that, brutally", reacted Marine Le Pen, questioned on Franceinfo, Friday 8 April. It is an Islamic uniform," she reiterated. It is

---

[https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/elections/presidentielle/sondage-bfmtv-presidentielle-zemmour-juge-parmi-les-plus-credibles-sur-l-immigration-nettement-moins-sur-l-economie-ou-l-environnement\\_AN-202109220323.html](https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/elections/presidentielle/sondage-bfmtv-presidentielle-zemmour-juge-parmi-les-plus-credibles-sur-l-immigration-nettement-moins-sur-l-economie-ou-l-environnement_AN-202109220323.html)

<sup>109</sup> a former French far-right identitarian political movement created in September 2012 and dissolved in March 2021, having been active mainly in France. The movement is white nationalist and Islamophobic, although it has never defined itself as such.

under the Islamic uniform that I will ban the veil in public space. Her project mentions all "public places", i.e. the street, public services, restaurants, cinemas or shops<sup>110</sup>.

By taking the veil as an Islamist symbol, she is putting the debate back on a theme that she can be seen as more legitimate to defend: not the prohibition of the manifestation of a religious affiliation, but the prohibition of a sexist sign, which would call into question the equality of rights between women and men. By displacing the problem without really announcing it and by associating the wearing of the veil with immigration and the repression of women, Marine Le Pen finds a platform in the media sphere that frames the image of the Muslim woman as a woman subjected to her husband's culture - and not an actress of her own culture, to the point of justifying certain remarks and measures of far-right candidates.

*Le Figaro*, for example, points out in an article dated 28 March 2022 that "*Behind the question of the veil, it is indeed equal rights and a certain idea of democracy that is directly attacked*"<sup>111</sup>. The ban becomes defensible, the common and even democratic discourse. The legitimization of xenophobic discourse is made through a feminisim-washing; opposing two minorities that are not at all incompatible.

---

<sup>110</sup> *La charge de Marine Le Pen contre le voile, « un uniforme islamiste »*. (2022, 12 avril). L'Obs. <https://www.nouvelobs.com/election-presidentielle-2022/20220412.OBS57017/marine-le-pen-charge-le-voile-un-uniforme-islamiste.html>

<sup>111</sup> Pina, C. (2022, 28 mars). *Céline Pina : « Pourquoi 61 % des Français sont pour l'interdiction du port du voile dans l'espace public »*. LEFIGARO. <https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/societe/celine-pina-pourquoi-61-des-francais-sont-pour-l-interdiction-du-port-du-voile-dans-l-espace-public-20220328>

## CONCLUSION

The theme of migration has been overrepresented in the public discourse during presidential elections: it has been increasing over the years and is more talked about since *Rassemblement National* has gained so much more votes in the second round of elections.<sup>112</sup> The discourse tends to be negative and the debate superficial, gravitating towards Zemmour's theory of great replacement in the first round and the wearing of the veil in the public space in the second.

Migration has been, is and will always be a core theme in the media sphere, especially during election times. It is in these periods that social issues are most discussed in the media, because of the concern they trigger in the population and the voters, but also because it is an opportunity for politicians and parties to deliver speeches that are often personified, individual and stigmatising. The coverage on migrants and refugees doesn't differ in its content that much more than in non election periods: victims or threats -depending on the political affiliation, talked about but never really heard. Under the election period however, the topic of migration seems to merge with that of safety, implying a correlation between refugees and migrants and insecurity, or even crime. In this particular election however, the geopolitical context with the war in Ukraine and the arrival of Ukrainian refugees at the gates of the European Union has accelerated the debate on immigration; highlighting a Western ethnocentrism in a stark contrast in the way different refugees are treated depending on their country of origin. Ukrainians are "refugees" while Afghans are migrants, or Ukrainians are not in an "immigration logic" while Afghans represent "an uncontrollable migratory flow". The hierarchisation of these different migrations - and by extension of the people who migrate, according to their country of origin or their religion - reveals the profoundly xenophobic character of some of the dominant discourses on immigration in the mainstream media; especially on television and on the 24-hour news channels.

The coverage of migration is also associated with that of security and safety, This reveals an almost unconscious association made by the media and politicians between crime - or even terrorism - and immigration. For example, during the debate between the two rounds of the presidential election, broadcast on two major private and national channels (*TF1 and France*

---

<sup>112</sup> in the second round of the 2022 presidential election, Marine Le Pen obtained a score of 41.45%, compared with 33.9% in 2017, and in the legislative elections held immediately afterwards, the "Rassemblement National" obtained 89 seats in the National Assembly, whereas it had only 8 in 2017

2), the journalists who prepared the various major themes to propose to the candidates , linked the theme of immigration to that of security. The two are confused in the public debate, which helps to legitimise certain far-right discourses on the “dangers” of “uncontrolled immigration”. Indeed, it is also noticeable that during election periods the immigration addressed by the media and politicians is that which is clandestine, uncontrollable and illegal.

The media seem to help political figures with the exposure of a provocative and sometimes xenophobic in the public space that became almost habitual. The pressure put on the migration-security pole and the continuous debates on discriminatory theories or racist political figures influence and shape public opinion. Monopolising the debate and the floor in the public space, the case of *Éric Zemmour* has been a strong one during the first round of elections. His overexposure of *Éric Zemmour* is a symptom in itself of the tendency of the media to move towards a mode of dissemination and access to information that is closer to entertainment. He became in only a couple of months an unquestionable present figure whose discourses are not only known by everybody but also legitimise as he is invited everywhere to discuss his xenophobic and homophobic ideas.

Women also seem to have a very specific role in the media’s representation of migration and the way the far-right assert their discourses. The politicisation of the refugee or migrant woman (represented by the veil) also benefits the visibility of extremes who use the religious symbol as a gateway to migration or a symbol of oppression to then legitimise their comments on the dangers of migration and terrorism. By taking muslim women as a symbol , migration is once again at the centre of the debate, strongly implied behind a more legitimate cause: not the rejection of a different culture and religion but the rejection of a sexism and male domination. The media becomes a platform to justify some controversial and xenophobic propositions -notably concerning the wearing of the veil in the public space but also the wearing of the burkini in municipal swimming pools, because it focuses on women’s bodies and how Muslim women are subjected to their husband's culture - and not an actress of their own culture. We find here the continuity of the coverage of refugees and migrant women as only passive victims, always talked about under the prism of the male. The media coverage of women -especially muslim women in France helps spreading stereotyped representation until sometimes helping and legitimising the far-right discourse.

New platforms and tools of communication were of course able to provide more diversified debates on the complex issues at the heart of the presidential debate, but simplified the propagation of extreme discourses on both sides of the political spectrum, undermining the traditional parties and political correctness. Through aggressive antagonisms and informational confusion due to the immediacy of information, social networks can benefit the extreme right but it is also the case of infotainment shows which under the guise of societal debate and political confrontation seeks to attract listeners and viewers by offering entertainment and provocation. Those new forms of spreading information with the strength of the television format were probably intended to democratise the debate and make it more accessible as well as address a population particularly reluctant to take an interest in political debate and elections but ended up giving the floor to extreme and controversial speeches and a simplification and shortcuts that confuses voters. The polls in voting intentions was a prime example of this confusion as candidates moved up and down always according to their place and visibility in the media -more specifically, television media. These past decade, the subject of migration has been a concern for the French population due to the strong movement of people across Europe but its overrepresentation in the media -under all forms, and the public sphere have fueled discussions with increasingly controversial and discriminatory speeches that would not have been accepted in prime time or on popular channels even twenty years ago. Moreover, the appearance of new journalists, editorialists, intellectuals or political figures and their recurrence on television or in newspaper columns has amplified the trivialisation of a discourse that was previously reserved for the extreme right, which has been de-demonised. Given the media's propensity to associate migration with security and terrorism already widely visible in the media space in terms of time, space and diversity of platforms, these themes are the most relayed and therefore the most visualized, which in turn makes them subjects of interest for the population and so the politics and so the media. The circle becomes endless.



## REFERENCES.

1. Alidières, B. (2018). Confirmation du recul ou nouvel essor du vote Front national-Rassemblement national dans la France, demain ? *Hérodote*, N° 170(3), 77-108. <https://doi.org/10.3917/her.170.0077>
2. Akkerman, T. (2011). Friend or foe? Right-wing populism and the popular press in Britain and the Netherlands. *Journalism*, 12(8), 931–945. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884911415972>
3. *ARPANET : Internet à ses débuts*. (2018, 6 novembre). IONOS Digitalguide. <https://www.ionos.fr/digitalguide/sites-internet/developpement-web/arpamet/>
4. Auriol, E. (2021, 29 octobre). « *Pour un recours accru à l'immigration face aux pénuries de main-d'œuvre* ». Le Monde.fr. [https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2021/10/29/pour-un-recours-accru-a-l-immigration-face-aux-penuries-de-main-d-uvre\\_6100345\\_3232.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2021/10/29/pour-un-recours-accru-a-l-immigration-face-aux-penuries-de-main-d-uvre_6100345_3232.html)
5. Asif Hasan, Tripti Sharma, Azizuddin Khan, Mohammed Hasan Ali Al-Abyadh, "Analyzing Hate Speech against Migrants and Women through Tweets Using Ensembled Deep Learning Model", *Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience*, vol. 2022, Article ID 8153791, 8 pages, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/8153791>
6. Askanius, T., Mylonas, Y. (2015) Extreme-right responses to the European economic crisis in Denmark and Sweden: The discursive construction of scapegoats and lodestars. *Javnost - The Public*, 22(1), 55-72.
7. Azihari, F. (2019, 24 septembre). *Immigration : à qui appartient la France ? Valeurs actuelles*. <https://www.valeursactuelles.com/societe/immigration-a-qui-appartient-la-france/>

8. Azzouzi, R. E., & Zerouala, F. (2022, 20 mai). *Présidentielle : « Voilées ou non voilées, les femmes musulmanes ont toutes peur »*. Mediapart.  
[https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/180422/presidentielle-voilees-ou-non-voilees-les-femmes-musulmanes-ont-toutes-peur#at\\_medium=custom7&at\\_campaign=1048](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/180422/presidentielle-voilees-ou-non-voilees-les-femmes-musulmanes-ont-toutes-peur#at_medium=custom7&at_campaign=1048)
9. Barroux, R. (2014, 29 mai). *230 millions de migrants dans le monde, des flux qui ne cessent d'augmenter*. Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2014/05/29/230-millions-de-migrants-dans-le-monde-des-flux-qui-ne-cessent-d-augmenter\\_4428870\\_3244.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2014/05/29/230-millions-de-migrants-dans-le-monde-des-flux-qui-ne-cessent-d-augmenter_4428870_3244.html)
10. Bassoni, M. "Infotainment [info-divertissement] : vers une reconfiguration de l'espace médiatique ?", Hyper Article en Ligne - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société, ID : 10670/1.t838h9
11. Bassoni, M., Joux, A. (2014). Introduction à l'économie des médias. Armand Colin.
12. Bassoni, M. & Weygand, F. (2011). Les enjeux économiques de la géolocalisation pour les réseaux sociaux numériques. *Hermès, La Revue*, 59, 137-142.  
<https://doi.org/10.3917/herm.059.0137>
13. Beaud, P. (2000). Brève histoire de la sociologie française des médias. *Réseaux*, 100, 457-485. <https://www.cairn.info/revue--2000-2-page-457.htm>.
14. Bernard, P. (1998, 18 septembre). *L'immigration, arme de rajeunissement démographique ?* Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1998/09/18/l-immigration-arme-de-rajeunissement-demographique\\_3668924\\_1819218.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1998/09/18/l-immigration-arme-de-rajeunissement-demographique_3668924_1819218.html)
15. Bernard, P. (2015, 29 juillet). *Les migrants de Calais mettent Français et Britanniques au bord de la crise diplomatique*. Le Monde.fr.  
<https://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2015/07/29/les-migrants-de-c>

alais-mettent-francais-et-britanniques-au-bord-de-la-crise-diplomatique\_4703403\_1654200.html

16. Berry, M., Garcia-Blanco, I., & Moore, K. (2016). Press coverage of the refugee and migrant crisis in the EU: A content analysis of five European countries.  
<https://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.pdf>
17. Blinder, S., 2015. « Imagined Immigration : The Impact of Different Meanings of “Immigrants” Public Opinion and Policy Debates in Britain », *Political Studies*, vol. 63, n° 1, p. 80–100. DOI : 10.1111/1467-9248.12053 ; Herda, D., 2015. « Beyond innumeracy : heuristic decision-making and qualitative misperceptions about immigrants in Finland », *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 38, n° 9,, p. 1627–1645. DOI : 10.1080/01419870.2015.1005643.
18. Bonnafous, S., & Rugraff, P. (2002). Marlène Coulomb-Gully, La démocratie mise en scènes. Télévision et élections. *Mots*, 69, 160-162. <https://doi.org/10.4000/mots.10763>
19. Bos, L., Lefevre, J. M., Thijssen, R., & Sheets, P. (2017). The impact of mediated party issue strategies on electoral support. *Party Politics*, 23(6), 760–771.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068815626603>
20. Bouanchaud, C. (2017, 20 décembre). *Autriche, Pologne, Hongrie. . . que faire face à la « banalisation » de l’extrême droite en Europe ?* Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/12/19/il-y-a-une-sort-e-d-acceptation-des-principaux-pays-europeens-face-a-la-montee-de-l-extreme-droite\\_5231973\\_3210.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/12/19/il-y-a-une-sort-e-d-acceptation-des-principaux-pays-europeens-face-a-la-montee-de-l-extreme-droite_5231973_3210.html)
21. Bourdieu, P. (1996). *Sur la télévision*. RAISONS D AGIR.
22. Bourgne, P. (2017). Niklas Luhmann, *La Réalité des médias de masse*: Trad. de l’allemand par Flavien Le Bouter, Paris, Éd. Diaphanes, coll. Transpositions, 2012,

- 197 pages. *Questions de communication*, 31, 496-498.  
<https://doi.org/10.4000/questionsdecommunication.11293>
23. Brants, K. (2003). De l'art de rendre la politique populaire. . . *Réseaux*, 118(2), 135.  
<https://doi.org/10.3917/res.118.0135>
24. Bremond, C. (1963). Un plaidoyer. *Communications*, 2(1), 178-184.  
<https://doi.org/10.3406/comm.1963.962>
25. Cassely, J., & Fourquet, J. (2021). *La France sous nos yeux. . Economie, paysages, nouveaux modes de vie*. SEUIL.
26. Cassini, S., & Dassonville, A. (2022, 20 avril). *Débat Macron - Le Pen : le feuilleton télévisé de la campagne électorale a dérapé*. Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/actualite-medias/article/2022/04/19/le-feuilleton-televisé-de-la-campagne-electorale-pour-la-presidentielle-2022-a-derape\\_6122808\\_3236.html#xtor=AL-32280270-%5Bdefault%5D-%5Bios%5D](https://www.lemonde.fr/actualite-medias/article/2022/04/19/le-feuilleton-televisé-de-la-campagne-electorale-pour-la-presidentielle-2022-a-derape_6122808_3236.html#xtor=AL-32280270-%5Bdefault%5D-%5Bios%5D)
27. Castelli Gattinara, P. & Froio, C. (2018). Quand les identitaires font la une: Stratégies de mobilisation et visibilité médiatique du bloc identitaire. *Revue française de science politique*, 68, 103-119. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rfsp.681.0103>
28. *La charge de Marine Le Pen contre le voile, « un uniforme islamiste »*. (2022, 12 avril). L'Obs.  
<https://www.nouvelobs.com/election-presidentielle-2022/20220412.OBS57017/marine-le-pen-charge-le-voile-un-uniforme-islamiste.html>
29. Chadwick, A., 2013. *The Hybrid Media System : Politics and Power*. Oxford University Press. DOI : 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759477.001.0001.
30. Chouliaraki, Lilie and Stolic, Tijana (2017). Rethinking media responsibility in the refugee 'crisis': a visual typology of European news. *Media, Culture and Society*. 39, (8) pp.1162-1177

31. Clair, F. S. (2022, 26 avril). *[Saint Clair] Emmanuel Macron réélu : le bloc national dans l'impasse*. Valeurs actuelles.  
<https://www.valeursactuelles.com/clubvaleurs/politique/saint-clair-emmanuel-macron-reelu-le-bloc-national-dans-limpasse>
32. Connor, P., & Krogstad, J. M. (2020a, mai 31). *Many worldwide oppose more migration – both into and out of their countries*. Pew Research Center.  
<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/many-worldwide-oppose-more-migration-both-into-and-out-of-their-countries/>
33. Conzo, P., Fuochi, G., Anfossi, L. et al. Negative media portrayals of immigrants increase ingroup favoritism and hostile physiological and emotional reactions. *Sci Rep* 11, 16407 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-95800-2>
34. Daily Mail. (2006, 22 novembre). *A blunder for which we'll all pay the price*. Mail Online. <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-417883/A-blunder-pay-price.html>
35. D'Allonnes, D. R., Lemarié, A., Fressoz, F., & Desmoulières, R. B. (2015, août 27). *Migrants : le silence gêné des politiques*. Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/08/26/migrants-le-silence-gene-des-politiques\\_4737094\\_823448.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/08/26/migrants-le-silence-gene-des-politiques_4737094_823448.html)
36. Damgé, M. (2016, 11 octobre). *Idée reçue sur les migrants (4/6) : « Ils volent le travail des Français »*. Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/10/10/idee-recue-sur-les-migrants-4-6-ils-volent-le-travail-des-francais\\_5011081\\_4355770.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/10/10/idee-recue-sur-les-migrants-4-6-ils-volent-le-travail-des-francais_5011081_4355770.html)
37. Debord, G. (1996). *La Société du Spectacle*. Folio.
38. Décodeurs, L., Chastand, J., & Stroobants, J. (2015, 13 novembre). *Les quotas migratoires proposés par l'UE*. Le Monde.fr.

- [https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/09/07/les-quotas-migratoires-proposes-par-l-ue\\_4747857\\_4355770.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/09/07/les-quotas-migratoires-proposes-par-l-ue_4747857_4355770.html)
39. Delomez, G. (2022, 25 février). *Guerre en Ukraine : « On aura une immigration de grande qualité dont on pourra tirer profit »*. Europe 1.  
<https://www.europe1.fr/politique/guerre-en-ukraine-on-aura-une-immigration-de-grande-qualite-dont-on-pourra-tirer-profit-4095961>
40. Dézé, A. (2022). La construction sondagière du Rassemblement national. *Politika*.  
<https://www.politika.io/fr/article/construction-sondagiere-du-rassemblement-national>
41. Dictionary of mass communication & ; media research : a guide for students, scholars and professionals. (2006). *Choice Reviews Online*, 43(06), 43-3124.  
<https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.43-3124>
42. Devresse, J. (2010). *Le Pen sous presse: la réception paradoxale d'un discours dénonciateur*. France: L'Harmattan.
43. Dufour, L. (2005). Julien Terral, L'insécurité au Journal Télévisé. La campagne présidentielle de 2002. *Questions de communication*, 8, 493-495.  
<https://doi.org/10.4000/questionsdecommunication.5862>
44. *Élection présidentielle 2022 : candidats, dates, sondages et résultats*. (2022). Libération. <https://www.liberation.fr/dossier/election-presidentielle-2022/>
45. European Commission. (2019). *Eurobarometer*. Standard Eurobarometer.  
<https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2253>
46. Facchini, G., Mayda, A. M., & Puglisi, R. (2009). Illegal Immigration and Media Exposure : Evidence on Individual Attitudes. *SSRN Electronic Journal*.  
<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1513176>

47. Fandrich, C. M. (2013). A Comparative Study on the Asylum Landscapes within the EU for Iraqis after the 2003 Iraq War and Syrians after the 2011 Syrian Civil War. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2376221>
48. Fansten, E., Frénois, M., & Leboucq, F. (2020, 29 octobre). *Nice : trois morts dans l'attaque terroriste contre la basilique Notre-Dame*. Libération. [https://www.liberation.fr/france/2020/10/29/attaque-au-couteau-dans-une-eglise-de-nice-au-moins-un-mort\\_1803824/](https://www.liberation.fr/france/2020/10/29/attaque-au-couteau-dans-une-eglise-de-nice-au-moins-un-mort_1803824/)
49. Fenoglio, J. (2015, 4 septembre). *Réfugiés : une photo pour ouvrir les yeux*. Le Monde.fr. [https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/09/04/refugies-une-photo-pour-ouvrir-les-yeux\\_4744650\\_3214.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/09/04/refugies-une-photo-pour-ouvrir-les-yeux_4744650_3214.html)
50. Florina Nedelcu, M. (2002). L'utilisation d'un espace virtuel par une communauté de professionnels immigrés : vers une nouvelle forme d'organisation diasporique ? *Autrepart*, n° 22(2), 147-165. <https://doi.org/10.3917/autr.022.0147>
51. Foussier, P. (2015). Du diable en politique. Réflexions sur l'antilepénisme ordinaire. *Humanisme*, N° 306(1), 121-122. <https://doi.org/10.3917/huma.306.0121>
52. Friot, M. (2020, août 13). Quand Paris Match roule pour le RN. *Acrimed | Action Critique Médias*. <https://www.acrimed.org/Quand-Paris-Match-roule-pour-le-RN>
53. Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. H. (1965). The Structure of Foreign News: The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers. *Journal of Peace Research*, 2(1), 64–90. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336500200104>
54. Gamson, W. A., Croteau, D., Hoynes, W., & Sasson, T. (1992). Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 18(1), 373-393. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.18.080192.002105>

55. Geisser, V. (2020). Immigration et terrorisme : « corrélation magique » et instrumentalisation politique. *Migrations Société*, 182, 3-13.  
<https://doi.org/10.3917/migra.182.0003>
56. Gitlin, T. (2003). *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left*. United Kingdom: University of California Press.
57. Goffman, E. (1977). La ritualisation de la féminité. *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 14(1), 34-50. <https://doi.org/10.3406/arss.1977.2553>
58. Hacot, O. B. E. V. (2020, 22 avril). Les animaux des politiques : Marine Le Pen, la « mère à chats ». *leparisien.fr*.  
<https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/les-animaux-des-politiques-marine-le-pen-la-mere-a-chats-18-08-2018-7856454.php>
59. Hansen, R. (2003a). Migration to Europe since 1945 : Its History and its Lessons. *The Political Quarterly*, 74(s1), 25-38. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923x.2003.00579.x>
60. Ifop pour Le Figaro. (2020, janvier). *Les Français et l'Immigration*.  
<https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/117088-Rapport-LF.pdf>
61. *Informations à la solde du divertissement*. (2005, 17 février). Acrimed | Action Critique Médias.  
<https://www.acrimed.org/Informations-a-la-solde-du-divertissement?recherche=infotainment>
62. Ireton, C., & Posetti, J. (2018). *Journalism, fake news & disinformation: handbook for journalism education and training*. Unesco Publishing.  
<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000265552>
63. Jamet, D. (2022, 11 avril). *[Jamet] Macron sur une voie de barrage*. Valeurs actuelles.



- <https://www.valeursactuelles.com/clubvaleurs/politique/jamet-macron-sur-une-voie-d-e-barrage>
64. Jenkins, H. (2006). *Convergence Culture : Where Old and New Media Collide*. NYU Press.
65. Kaminski, M. (2015, 2 décembre). 'All the terrorists are migrants'. POLITICO.  
<https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-interview-terrorists-migrants-eu-russia-putin-borders-schengen/amp/>
66. Keles, A. (2016). La réponse de l'Union européenne à la crise migratoire des réfugiés. *Revue des droits de l'homme*. <https://doi.org/10.4000/revdh.1961>
67. Kerlouan, P. (2022, 1 mars). *Guerre en Ukraine : il y a donc réfugiés et réfugiés, reconnaît Christophe Barbier*. Boulevard Voltaire.  
<https://www.bvoltaire.fr/guerre-en-ukraine-il-y-a-donc-refugies-et-refugies-reconnait-christophe-barbier/>
68. Kessler, D. (2012). Les médias sont-ils un pouvoir ? *Pouvoirs*, 143(4), 105.  
<https://doi.org/10.3917/pouv.143.0105>
69. Koulberg, A. (2018). *Le FN et la société française: L'extrême droite banalisée*. Belgium: Les Éditions Utopia.  
[https://www.google.fr/books/edition/Le\\_FN\\_et\\_la\\_soci%C3%A9t%C3%A9\\_fran%C3%A7aise/mC5NDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0](https://www.google.fr/books/edition/Le_FN_et_la_soci%C3%A9t%C3%A9_fran%C3%A7aise/mC5NDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0)
70. Krzyżanowski, M., Triandafyllidou, A., & Wodak, R. (2018). The Mediatization and the Politicization of the “Refugee Crisis” in Europe. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 16(1-2), 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2017.1353189>
71. Kunert, S. (2012). Médias et élections. La campagne présidentielle de 2007 et sa réception: VEYRAT-MASSON, Isabelle (Dir.), 2011, L'Harmattan – Ina Éditions,

Paris, 252 p.. Communication & langages, 171, 113-114.

<https://doi.org/10.4074/S0336150012011118>

72. Lamizet, B. (2004). Jacques GONNET (2003), Les médias et la curiosité du monde. *Communication, Vol. 23/1*, 176-179. <https://doi.org/10.4000/communication.3954>
73. Laurent, P. A. (2022, 22 juillet). « *Nous protéger contre des flux migratoires irréguliers* » : les arrières-pensées de Macron. LExpress.fr. [https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/nous-proteger-contre-des-flux-migratoires-irréguliers-les-arriere-pensees-de-macron\\_2156723.html](https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/nous-proteger-contre-des-flux-migratoires-irréguliers-les-arriere-pensees-de-macron_2156723.html)
74. Le Monde. (2015a, avril 27). *Crise des migrants : à chacun sa solution*. Le Monde.fr. [https://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2015/04/27/crise-des-migrants-a-chacun-sa-solution\\_4623227\\_1654200.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2015/04/27/crise-des-migrants-a-chacun-sa-solution_4623227_1654200.html)
75. Le Monde. (2015b, août 25). *Crise des migrants : « Les Etats doivent arrêter ce jeu stupide consistant à rejeter la faute sur les autres »*. Le Monde.fr. [https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/08/25/immigration-les-etats-doivent-arreter-ce-jeu-stupide-consistant-a-rejeter-la-faute-sur-les-autres\\_4736018\\_3214.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/08/25/immigration-les-etats-doivent-arreter-ce-jeu-stupide-consistant-a-rejeter-la-faute-sur-les-autres_4736018_3214.html)
76. Le Monde. (2020, 3 novembre). *Autriche : au moins quatre morts dans une « attaque terroriste » à Vienne*. Le Monde.fr. [https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/11/02/fusillade-a-vienne-pres-d-une-synagogue\\_6058255\\_3210.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/11/02/fusillade-a-vienne-pres-d-une-synagogue_6058255_3210.html)
77. Le Monde. (2022, 28 mars). Début de la campagne présidentielle officielle : stricte égalité du temps de parole entre candidats, diffusion de la propagande électorale. . . . *Le Monde.fr*. [https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/03/28/presidentielle-2022-strict-egalite-du-temps-de-parole-entre-candidats-diffusion-de-la-propagande-lectorale-debut-de-la-campagne-officielle\\_6119407\\_6059010.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/03/28/presidentielle-2022-strict-egalite-du-temps-de-parole-entre-candidats-diffusion-de-la-propagande-lectorale-debut-de-la-campagne-officielle_6119407_6059010.html)

78. Le Monde avec AFP. (2015, août 27). *La crise migratoire en discussion au sommet des pays des Balkans*. Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/08/27/la-crise-migratoire-s-invite-au-sommet-des-pays-des-balkans\\_4737732\\_3214.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/08/27/la-crise-migratoire-s-invite-au-sommet-des-pays-des-balkans_4737732_3214.html)
79. Le Point.fr. (2021, 5 octobre). *Pécresse présente un projet constitutionnel pour « stopper l'immigration incontrôlée »*. Le Point.  
[https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/pecresse-presente-un-projet-constitutionnel-pour-stopper-l-immigration-incontrolee-05-10-2021-2446322\\_20.php](https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/pecresse-presente-un-projet-constitutionnel-pour-stopper-l-immigration-incontrolee-05-10-2021-2446322_20.php)
80. Lejeune, B. (2021, 9 décembre). *2022 au défi de la crise migratoire*. Valeurs actuelles.  
<https://www.valeursactuelles.com/clubvaleurs/societe/2022-au-defi-de-la-crise-migratoire/>
81. Levendusky, M., & Malhotra, N. (2015). Does Media Coverage of Partisan Polarization Affect Political Attitudes ? *Political Communication*, 33(2), 283-301.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2015.1038455>
82. Loquay, P. (1995). La communication contre l'information. Daniel Bounoux, Hachette, coll. Questions de Société, Paris 1995, 144 p. *Communication et organisation*, 8. <https://doi.org/10.4000/communicationorganisation.1830>
83. Marteau, S. (2022, 14 mars). *Magali Berdah et Cyril Hanouna, ces incontournables de la campagne présidentielle « pour que la politique devienne sexy »*. Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2022/03/13/on-fait-ce-qui-manquait-pour-que-la-politique-devienne-sexy-magali-berdah-et-cyril-hanouna-ces-incontournables-de-la-campagne-presidentielle\\_6117293\\_4500055.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2022/03/13/on-fait-ce-qui-manquait-pour-que-la-politique-devienne-sexy-magali-berdah-et-cyril-hanouna-ces-incontournables-de-la-campagne-presidentielle_6117293_4500055.html)
84. Martinache, I. (2008). Laurent Bonelli, La France a peur. Une histoire sociale de l'"insécurité". *Lectures*. <https://doi.org/10.4000/lectures.611>

85. Matarasso, Michel., Morin E, *L'esprit du temps. Essai sur la culture de masse..* In: Revue française de sociologie, 1963, 4-1. pp. 80-83;  
[https://www.persee.fr/doc/rfsoc\\_0035-2969\\_1963\\_num\\_4\\_1\\_7129](https://www.persee.fr/doc/rfsoc_0035-2969_1963_num_4_1_7129)
86. Martin, C. (2021, 22 septembre). *SONDAGE BFMTV - Présidentielle : Zemmour jugé parmi les plus crédibles sur l' ; immigration, nettement moins. . . BFMTV.*  
[https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/elections/presidentielle/sondage-bfmtv-presidentielle-zemmour-juge-parmi-les-plus-credibles-sur-l-immigration-nettement-moins-sur-l-economie-ou-l-environnement\\_AN-202109220323.html](https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/elections/presidentielle/sondage-bfmtv-presidentielle-zemmour-juge-parmi-les-plus-credibles-sur-l-immigration-nettement-moins-sur-l-economie-ou-l-environnement_AN-202109220323.html)
87. Mazuir, V. (2022, 22 avril). *Sondage présidentielle 2022 : tous les résultats de notre baromètre quotidien. Les Echos.*  
<https://www.lesechos.fr/elections/sondages/sondage-presidentielle-2022-les-resultats-de-presitrack-1357211>
88. McGregor, S. C., 2019. « Social media as public opinion : How journalists use social media to represent public opinion », *Journalism*, vol. 20, n° 8, p. 1070–1086. DOI : 10.1177/1464884919845458.
89. *Migration data in Europe.* (2021, 14 juin). Migration Data Portal.  
<https://www.migrationdataportal.org/regional-data-overview/europe>
90. Ministère De L'Intérieur. (2022). *Les chiffres 2021 (publication annuelle parue le 20 janvier 2022).*  
<https://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/Info-ressources/Etudes-et-statistiques/Chiffres-cles-sejour-visas-eloignements-asile-acces-a-la-nationalite/Archives/Les-chiffres-2021-publication-annuelle-parue-le-20-janvier-2022>.
91. *Marine Le Pen fait l'amalgame entre immigration et terrorisme.* (2012, 26 mars). Libération.

[https://www.liberation.fr/france/2012/03/25/marine-le-pen-fait-l-amalgame-entre-immigration-et-terrorisme\\_805592/](https://www.liberation.fr/france/2012/03/25/marine-le-pen-fait-l-amalgame-entre-immigration-et-terrorisme_805592/)

92. *More than 100 million now forcibly displaced : UNHCR report.* (2022, 17 juin). UN News. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1120542>
93. Morin, E. (1962). *L'esprit du temps ; : Essai sur la culture de masse (La Galerie) (French Edition)* (0 éd.). Grasset.
94. Mudde, C. (1999). The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue. *West European Politics*, 22, 182-197.
95. Nice-Matin, La Rédaction. (2015, 14 mai). *Eric Ciotti veut revenir sur le droit du sol pour tous.* Nice-Matin.  
<https://www.nicematin.com/index.php/politique/eric-ciotti-veut-revenir-sur-le-droit-du-sol-pour-tous-349387>
96. Nicolas, B. (2022, 8 juin). *Mélenchon, le candidat du vote musulman.* Valeurs actuelles.  
<https://www.valeursactuelles.com/clubvaleurs/politique/melenchon-le-candidat-du-vote-musulman>
97. Pascual, J., & Trippenbach, I. (2022, 28 mars). *Présidentielle 2022 : la politique migratoire, un thème imposé dans la campagne électorale.* Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2022/03/28/presidentielle-2022-la-politique-migratoire-un-theme-impose-dans-la-campagne-electorale\\_6119424\\_823448.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2022/03/28/presidentielle-2022-la-politique-migratoire-un-theme-impose-dans-la-campagne-electorale_6119424_823448.html)
98. Pascual, J. (2020, 12 novembre). *Le lien entre terrorisme et immigration à l'épreuve des faits.* Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/11/12/le-lien-entre-terrorisme-et-immigration-a-l-epreuve-des-faits\\_6059461\\_3224.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/11/12/le-lien-entre-terrorisme-et-immigration-a-l-epreuve-des-faits_6059461_3224.html)

99. Pina, C. (2022, 28 mars). *Céline Pina : « Pourquoi 61 % des Français sont pour l'interdiction du port du voile dans l'espace public »*. LEFIGARO.  
<https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/societe/celine-pina-pourquoi-61-des-francais-sont-pour-l-interdiction-du-port-du-voile-dans-l-espace-public-20220328>
100. *Les préoccupations des Français-es en amont de l'élection présidentielle 2022*. (2022). Focus 2030.  
<https://focus2030.org/Les-preoccupations-des-Francais-es-en-amont-de-l-election-presidentielle-2022>
101. Quentin, A., & Boiteau, V. (2022, 3 mars). Guerre en Ukraine : quel impact électoral pour les candidats à la présidentielle en France ? *Libération*.  
[https://www.liberation.fr/politique/elections/guerre-en-ukraine-quel-impact-electoral-pour-les-candidats-a-la-presidentielle-en-france-20220303\\_OV43V3UQYZGENLHXNVLRXI3VMQ/](https://www.liberation.fr/politique/elections/guerre-en-ukraine-quel-impact-electoral-pour-les-candidats-a-la-presidentielle-en-france-20220303_OV43V3UQYZGENLHXNVLRXI3VMQ/)
102. Reymond, M. (2012, 10 avril). *Les éditocrates contre Jean-Luc Mélenchon*. Acrimed | Action Critique Médias.  
<https://www.acrimed.org/Les-editocrates-contre-Jean-Luc-Melenchon>
103. Rigoni, I. (2010). Éditorial. Les médias des minorités ethniques. Représenter l'identité collective sur la scène publique. *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, 26(1), 7-16. <https://doi.org/10.4000/remi.5027>
104. Rising Migrant Deaths Top 4,400 This Year : IOM Records More Than 45,000 Since 2014. (2021). International Organization for Migration.  
<https://www.iom.int/news/rising-migrant-deaths-top-4400-year-iom-records-more-45000-2014>
105. Rubino, M. (2013). Lampedusa, strage di migranti. Barcone a picco, centinaia di morti. *La Repubblica*.

- [https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2013/10/03/news/lampedusa\\_brucia\\_un\\_barcone\\_strage\\_di\\_migranti-67817611/](https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2013/10/03/news/lampedusa_brucia_un_barcone_strage_di_migranti-67817611/)
106. Saunier, V. (2019). Droite extrême vs extrême droite : échiquier politique et position de l'adjectif. *Mots*, 119, 129-149. <https://doi.org/10.4000/mots.24538>
107. Schmitt, L. (2015). Le « transmédia », un « label » promotionnel des industries culturelles toujours en cours d'expérimentation. *Les Enjeux de l'information et de la communication*, 16(1), 5-17. <https://doi.org/10.3917/enic.018.0005>
108. Schneider-Strawczynski, S. & Valette, J. (2021). "Media Coverage of Immigration and the Polarization of Attitudes", PSE Working Paper, n° 202146. URL : <https://halens.archives-ouvertes.fr/PJSE-WP/halshs-03322229v1>
109. Semetko, H.A., & Valkenburg, P.M. (2000). Framing European politics: a content analysis of press and television news. *Journal of Communication*, 50, 93-109.
110. Sensio, E. (2021). *L'Année TV 2021*. Médiatrie : L'année TV 2021. <https://www.mediametrie.fr/fr/annee-tv-2021>
111. Soroka, S. (2002). Issue Attributes and Agenda-Setting by Media, the Public, and Policymakers in Canada. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 14(3), 264-285.
112. *Statistics on migration to Europe*. (2020, février 7). European Commission - European Commission. [https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-of-life/statistics-migration-europe\\_en#developmentsin20192018](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-of-life/statistics-migration-europe_en#developmentsin20192018)
113. Stolz, J. (2015, 2 juillet). *Crise migratoire : « Si tu viens en Hongrie, tu dois respecter nos lois »*. Le Monde.fr. [https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/07/02/crise-migratoire-si-tu-viens-en-hongrie-tu-dois-respecter-nos-lois\\_4667716\\_3214.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/07/02/crise-migratoire-si-tu-viens-en-hongrie-tu-dois-respecter-nos-lois_4667716_3214.html)

114. Stroobants, J. (2015a, juin 16). *Malgré les tensions, France, Italie et Allemagne tentent de taire leurs divergences migratoires*. Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/06/16/malgre-les-tensions-france-italie-et-allemande-tendent-de-taire-leurs-divergences-migratoires\\_4655545\\_3214.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/06/16/malgre-les-tensions-france-italie-et-allemande-tendent-de-taire-leurs-divergences-migratoires_4655545_3214.html)
115. Stroobants, J. (2015b, juin 29). *Rupture entre l'est et l'ouest de l'Europe sur l'accueil des migrants*. Le Monde.fr.  
[https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/06/29/rupture-entre-l-est-et-l-ouest-de-l-europe-sur-l-accueil-des-migrants\\_4663708\\_3214.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/06/29/rupture-entre-l-est-et-l-ouest-de-l-europe-sur-l-accueil-des-migrants_4663708_3214.html)
116. Trémel, L. (2003). *Sociologie de la communication et des médias*: de Eric Maigret, 2003, Paris, Armand Colin, 288 pages. *Éducation et sociétés*, no<(sup> 12), 169-171. <https://doi.org/10.3917/es.012.0169>
117. Tittel, K. (2022). “Articles sur l’immigration diffusés sur Facebook : la mention de la nationalité influe sur le nombre de réactions”, in : Barbara Joannon, Audrey Lenoël, Hélène Thiollet & Perin Emel Yavuz (dir.), Dossier “Les migrations dans l’œil des médias : infox, influence et opinion” :  
<https://www.icmigrations.cnrs.fr/2022/01/07/defacto-030-04/>
118. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). *International Migration 2019 : Report (ST/ESA/SER.A/438)*. (s. d.).
119. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2016a). *UNHCR viewpoint : « Refugee » or « migrant » – Which is right?* UNHCR.  
<https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html>
120. Valence, A., & Roussiau, N. (2009). “L’immigration et les droits de l’Homme dans les médias : une analyse représentationnelle en réseau”. *Les Cahiers*



*Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale, Numéro 81(1), 41-63.*

<https://doi.org/10.3917/cips.081.0041>

121. Valeurs Actuelles (2021, 25 avril). *“La France n’a pas repris la souveraineté sur ses flux migratoires”*, selon Rachida Dati. Valeurs actuelles.  
<https://www.valeursactuelles.com/politique/la-france-na-pas-repris-la-souverainete-sur-ses-flux-migratoires-selon-rachida-dati>
122. Voirol, O. (2010). La Théorie critique des médias de l'École de Francfort : une relecture. *Mouvements*, 61, 23-32. <https://doi.org/10.3917/mouv.061.0023>
123. Vovou, I. (2015). Henry Jenkins, *La Culture de la convergence. Des médias au transmédia*: trad. de l'anglais par C. Jaquet, Paris, A. Colin/Ina Éd., coll. Médiacultures, 2013 [2006], 336 pages. *Questions de communication*, 28, 363-364.  
<https://doi.org/10.4000/questionsdecommunication.10262>
124. Watt, H., Rice-Oxley, M., & Taylor, D. (2020, 16 avril). *Drowned, restrained, shot : how these migrants died for a better life*. The Guardian.  
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/drowned-restrained-shot-life-stories-migrants-case-studies>
125. Weber M., *Le savant et le politique*, Plon, 1995.
126. Withnall, A. (2015, 3 septembre). *Will pictures of a dead child change Europe's attitude to refugees?* The Independent.  
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/if-these-extraordinarily-powerful-images-of-a-dead-syrian-child-washed-up-on-a-beach-don-t-change-europe-s-attitude-to-refugees-what-will-10482757.html>
127. Woessner, G. (2021, 14 novembre). Face à Zemmour, Marine Le Pen à l'offensive. *Le Point*.

[https://www.lepoint.fr/presidentielle/face-a-zemmour-marine-le-pen-a-l-offensive-14-11-2021-2451866\\_3121.php](https://www.lepoint.fr/presidentielle/face-a-zemmour-marine-le-pen-a-l-offensive-14-11-2021-2451866_3121.php)

128. Yakin, J. (2022, 27 janvier). *Eric Zemmour et droit de « défense excusable » : à quoi ressemble la légitime défense déjà prévue par le code pé.* Franceinfo.  
[https://www.francetvinfo.fr/replay-radio/le-vrai-du-faux/eric-zemmour-et-droit-de-defense-excusable-a-quoi-ressemble-la-legitime-defense-deja-prevue-par-le-code-penal\\_4914769.html](https://www.francetvinfo.fr/replay-radio/le-vrai-du-faux/eric-zemmour-et-droit-de-defense-excusable-a-quoi-ressemble-la-legitime-defense-deja-prevue-par-le-code-penal_4914769.html)
129. Zimdars, M., & Mcleod, K. (2020). *Fake News : Understanding Media and Misinformation in the Digital Age (Information Policy)*. The MIT Press.
130. (2014). Les médias : un quatrième pouvoir ?. Dans : Francis Balle éd., *Les médias* (pp. 94-98). Paris cedex 14: Presses Universitaires de France.