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THE MANIOT POLITY:
AN INQUIRY INTO ITS STATEHOOD AND INDEPENDENCE

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INTRODUCTION:

Among the most obscure and understudied periods of the multimillennial history of the Greek Nation is the Ottoman Period, and even more the history of Mani during that era. While though Mani is mostly forgotten as a place by Modern Greeks, and its unique distinct historical course during the Ottoman rule in Greece is completely unknown, there is sometimes a persistent popular rumour of an "independent and free Mani", which had "never submitted to the Turks". This claim is usually a simple statement, without further investigation into its credibility, though it is sometimes regarded as yet another revisionist historical myth, among the many that have managed to become popular in Modern Greece.

But how much truth is there in that statement, that Mani was "independent and free"? It appears that beyond regional historiography, or the various local historical studies, there has never been an academic inquiry that specifically investigates how that question should be understood, and then, using the existing theoretical tools, to explore whether or not Maniots really enjoyed such a level of self-governance and self-determination. Accordingly, in order to inspect the veracity of this assertion, it is necessary to confirm whether the Maniot Polity really was a separate sovereign independent free statehood, with complete absence of foreign rule over its territory, and whether it fulfilled all the scientific criteria of being a full statehood.

The historical framework of this inquiry is through the Ottoman Period of Greece, focusing from the 16th century until the early 19th century, almost up to the Greek War of Independence, while its territorial setting is the Mani Peninsula in the Southern Peloponnese, the Southernmost mainland of Southeast Europe, situated between the Laconian and the Messenian Gulf. It is in this time and place that the stage for the separate history of the allegedly indomitable Maniot Greeks is set.

In the first chapter of this dissertation, there is a presentation of all the necessary prerequisites for the existence of independent sovereign statehoods, and an examination of the international recognition of states, often today considered as the absolute determinant of statehood, contemplating on its relevance in older times, while also a study of the obligations of Ottoman vassals. In the second chapter there is a thorough analysis of the internal organization and political administration of the Maniot Polity, while in the third chapter there is a concise narrative of the international relations of the Maniots. The fourth chapter focuses on the confutation of the notion that the Maniot Beylik constituted a vassalage of the entire Maniot Polity, examining state authority in the Mani Peninsula, while the fifth chapter refutes the viewpoint that the Maniot Beylik's tribute resulted in total vassalage to the Ottoman Turks.

CHAPTER 1: THEORY & METHODOLOGY OF STATEHOOD SOVEREIGNTY

In order to determine whether a polity is actually a free, sovereign and independent entity, or instead consider it as a lower type of polity (such as client-states, vassal-states, sub-states, proto-states, autonomies, provinces with limited self-representation or even full provinces of a state), one should examine and consult the existing tools defining such a type of polity, sometimes described as "full statehood" [Finck,2016:23-26][Coggins,2014:22]. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the various theoretical criteria that have been established to determine whether a polity is a statehood or not, either through the recent centuries or the modern ones, and see if the Maniot Polity abides to them. If it does, then we could ultimately make a case for a Maniot statehood, existing in the Southern Peloponnese through the period of Ottoman domination across Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean. Commencing this inquiry, it is imperative to discern the factors of statehood, and then, using existing bibliography on Maniot history, to detect relevant historical realities that verify these criteria, acknowledging that Maniots of this period were free and independent, organized in their very own statehood. The criteria of sovereignty must also be investigated, to demonstrate that Mani was outside of control of the Ottomans, negating notions that it was conquered or vassalized. Hence, it is important to describe the political frameworks of Ottoman political worldview and tributary vassal states.

1.1: Montevideo Convention Criteria of Statehood

One prominent tool that allows us to scrutinize whether a specific polity is a statehood or not is the "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States" of 1933, an Inter-American treaty signed for the purpose of defining what makes a state, during the flux Interwar Period that saw the emergence of many new countries in the aftermath of the First World War, following the dissolution of multinational states across Europe, usually forming nation-states. Laying the foundation of the modern understanding of statehood, today it is widely used across the world as a standard for deciding the existence of a state [Zadeh:18-20]. The fundamental tests a statehood should adhere to are "(a) permanent population, (b) defined territory, (c) government, and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states" [Crawford,1976:111-122].

(A) Permanent Population:

Permanent population is determined by the existence of a specific group of people that inhabit the state in question, whose size of number is irrelevant to sovereignty. The mode of living of the population is not a requirement, for they could be nomadic or urbanized, homogenous or diverse in ethnicity, language, religion or ideology [Zadeh:22]. The ethnicity of the population is irrelevant for statehood, only their nationality, which is granted by the state itself to the people considered as its own [Crawford,1976:115]. This population should be permanent within a specific area [Syrigos,2017:108-126] and should be united, living together as a community, whose majority should have a common consciousness and identity, considering themselves as connected to the territory and polity of the state [Shen,2000:1126], and those outside of it as foreigners, with a separate political identity, even if they belong to the same ethnicity. The people can be considered as the sum of individuals that are beneath the state authority of a polity, defined by the jurisdiction of the state, a two-way relationship between subjects and state that includes issues of ownership, citizenship, nationality, rights and responsibilities [Perrakis&Marouda,2016:114-122].

(B) Defined Territory:

Statehoods exist in specific territories, that they effectively control and exercise their authority within. This should be a defined territory, but it does not require the existence of precisely defined boundaries, which can fluctuate through time. Generally, before modernity the main condition was to have a continuously existing territorial area that was undisputably under the sole control of the state's government [Syrigos,2017:108-126]. This specific territory was necessary not to have been acquired through conquest in the recent past, so that accepted effective control is imposed onto it [Hill,2017:76-78]. There are no constraints on the territory depending on size or cohesion of area, only of a long-term control over it, without being contested by foreign states through constant warfare [Crawford,2006:46-48].

(C) Government:

It is the necessary self-establishing and self-imposing political authority, indispensable requirement for the existence of statehood. It functions as the political governance of the territory, and the legal form of the political power it exercises. There are no requirements for the form of government in a strictly specific manner, only the existence of effective and efficient control of the territory within its borders, which should be exclusive, independent, and completely separate from governments of other statehoods [Syrigos,2017:108-126] [Perrakis&Marouda,2016:114-122]. There should be a certain accepted degree of authority, from which government derives effectiveness, that must also be legitimate enough for the government to function as the legal face of the state. Authority has to be actually exercised and derived from a stable central political organization that controls public life over both defined territory and specified population [Shen,2000:1130-1132].

(D) Capacity for Foreign Relations:

A statehood's government should express the capability to engage into foreign relations with other countries, meaning the legal competence to participate in public international relations, and as such to exercise its legal rights and legal obligations as a state [Shen,2000:1130-1134]. It serves as the legal representation of the government on an international level, either vis-à-vis with singular foreign state entities, or with multiple of them through international treaties or alliances [Zadeh:32-33].

1.2: Other Modern Criteria of Statehood

One might postulate that apart from the aforementioned modern criteria, there are other characteristics that a state typically includes in order to be considered a full statehood: (1) sovereignty, (2) independence and (3) international recognition. Often, they have even been proposed as the only necessary features for a polity to be considered as state, irrespectively of permanent population, defined territory, government, and foreign relations [Hill,2017:76-78].

(A) Sovereignty:

It is usually connected to effectiveness, the notion that a government of a state should effectively control and rule over the territory and people claimed to belong to the state. This is demonstrated by the government's ability to enforce their state activities, including the legal right to do that exclusively and independently from the will of others within or outside their territory [Zadeh:23-26]. While there is territorial sovereignty (or internal sovereignty), there is also international sovereignty (or external sovereignty), in which the state is above all other

authority apart from international law (only bound by inter-state treaties and agreements) [Crawford,1976:122]. For internal sovereignty, it is often only necessary to have a lack of civil unrest and the establishment of a supreme governmental authority throughout its territorial limits [Lansing,1914:67-68], thus lack of dispute from within it and exercise of internal legitimacy [Hill,2017:76-78], resulting in domestic authority exerting complete internal control. Accordingly, external sovereignty is the condition of the state being acknowledged as the legal representative of the territory and people within it, on an international level by other existing states, as an equal towards them [Coggins,2014:20-21]. According to some analysts, sovereignty is not a necessary element for statehood, but rather a major characteristic that derives from it – though it is often deemed to define the polity's statehood as unquestionable. Yet the amount of power exercised by the statehood may not be absolute but constrained by its international obligations [Crawford,2006:33].

(B) Independence:

For many, sovereignty and independence are tautological terms, yet in practice, while independence derives from sovereignty, it is required for sovereignty. It exists when a state holds autonomy and exclusiveness in its jurisdiction, without being subservient to orders from external powers, while maintaining the sole exclusiveness of responsibility for state, a monopoly over its territory in terms of law, jurisdiction, and effectively enforcing it [Perrakis&Marouda,2016:114-122]. For some, independence is eligible as a determinant of statehood, needing a functional government vested with the authority to define internal and external affairs, constituting the highest legal order within the country, and imposing this legal order it creates, described as "constitutional independence" [Zadeh:28]. Requirements for independence are formality and functionality; "formal independence" is the exclusive bestowing of power of the government of a polity, both for internal and external affairs, while "functional / actual independence" is found when a specific minimum of power is displayed by the governmental authorities of that territory [Crawford,1976:125-127].

Ultimately, it is the sole control of a part of the planet's land area, with all the functions of the state imposed on it, derived by the state's government, with the exclusion of any interference by any other statehood. The government itself should be independent, without being controlled by any other state, otherwise it would be a "puppet-state", functionally or legally nullifying its independence and sovereignty, as now it is not absolute but deriving authority from another state. Throughout history, especially in pre-modern times and even recent, there have been various of political entities that are dependent on other states. A vassal state is not a sovereign state, it is a political construct that is in a dependent relationship with

the suzerain state. Especially in previous centuries, subjects of a vassal state were not foreigners for the suzerain state. The level of dependency was varied, and it was often usual for a vassal state to pay tributary taxes, while in other cases it was only forced to issue declarations of vassalhood and bear the suzerain's standards. The suzerain represented the vassal state, as the latter's government functionally did not possess the prerogative to determine its own external diplomacy [Syrigos,2017:108-126]

(C) International Recognition:

Through the last centuries the practice of international recognition of states by other statehoods has become more prevalent, acknowledging their existence as full states and equal peers that exist under no other authority in existence except international law. There are two major approaches: the compositive theory and the declaratory theory. The former considers state recognition as a fundamental and foundational necessity for the existence of a statehood, while the latter places lesser importance on it, considering it a mere acknowledgment of other states that the statehood in question exists – that it already fulfils the existing criteria for statehood, and that recognition is a verification of this condition [Aroni,2017:151-156]. Recognition of statehood (de jure recognition) and recognition of governments (de facto recognition) are actually different concepts, even if they are often grouped in a single recognition – thus a state can recognize another's statehood but consider its current government as illegitimate [Zadeh:39].

There are various questions emerging from the condition of international recognition. For many, it is the paramount requirement for full statehood, while for others it is the last. Another important parameter is that recognition also extends to territorial recognition, concerning the territory over which the recognized state or government holds sovereign rights, hence it is acknowledged that another state entity does not legitimately control it instead. This aspect of territoriality is necessary for state recognition, as a state cannot exist without it. It is commonly understood that state recognition hails only as far back to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which after the long and disastrous Thirty Years' War established a widely accepted precedent of sole authority of the state in domestic affairs and a doctrine of non-interference from one state in another's territorial jurisdiction, hence demanding the recognition of a state's authority, existence, and territory by the others. For this reason, it is considered profoundly significant by international relations scholars, some considering it the moment statehood as a concept was established [Coggins,2014:20-21].

1.3: State Recognition in Pre-Modern Times

While this was the dominant mindset in political science through the 20th century, currently it is increasingly accepted that states pre-existed the Westphalian system. Among the various schools of thought is the "presentist" approach, which defines sovereignty as the "supreme authority within a territory" that is recognized by others, whether that is an absolute monarchy or another form of government [Costa-Lopez et al,2018:495-496]. Yet there was no established legal practice of mutual state recognition, that was usually determined by the states bilaterally through their inter-state relations. The principal difference to the Westphalian system is the acceptance of polities with lesser legitimacy as claimants of sovereignty, such as principalities, communes, and leagues, while the kingdom they were contained in withheld higher levels of sovereignty [Latham,2012:77-78]. This was not the case in every state; in the French Kingdom, territory non-directly governed by the King of France was recognized as part of their sovereign rights, while in the Holy Roman Empire, with semi-independent entities, such as the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Kingdom of Burgundy or the Kingdom of Italy, local rulers had stronger levels of independence, which were recognized by the Holy Roman Emperor. Ultimately, the question of recognition did not relate to the existence of the state held by the ruler, but to the extent of his authority, especially when others claimed parts of his territory, and to the amount of power he imposed there [Latham,2012:104], being the degree of his rights, rather than to the modern notion of monopoly of rights over the territory [Latham,2012:134-135]. In modern understanding, these territories where there was limited self-rule would be defined as vassal states, with other states recognizing their suzerain's rights over them and their own limited sovereignty, and not as sovereign full statehoods. Nonetheless, it is understood that the notion of recognizing other governments or statehoods did not yet exist, with de jure and de facto recognition being treated as one and the same. Because state systems were irregular and most importantly non-institutionalized [Holsti,2004], if there was diplomatic recognition, there was also bilateral recognition between existing political entities engaging in diplomatic communication. Generally, the system of sovereignty recognition had not been created at all before the 16th century [Lind,2006], with some even claiming it only was established in the early 19th century, while before this point recognition was only about territorial possession rather than state recognition, which is observed in primary sources since the 11th century, at the latest [Grzymala-Busse,2020:21-23].

Based on this reality, where official declarations of state recognition were not a general practice before the 19th century, when the Maniot Polity existed, as permanent diplomatic

missions only appeared much later in history, since the 16th-17th centuries, which were not common through Europe until the 19th century [Lind,2006], a practice that today is seen as the absolute form of statehood recognition, perhaps it would be prudent not to be constrained with the criterion of state recognition, instead considering the mere existence of diplomatic communication between the Maniot Polity and other political entities as the former's official recognition as a sovereign entity by the latter. Therefore, historical examples where Maniots are seen to engage in diplomatic exchanges, trading and military alliances, are sufficient instances of de jure state recognition, instead of demanding official declarations of statehood at a time when this concept did not exist as a legal practice in international relations.

1.4: Ottoman Vassalhood Framework

Considering how the thesis of this dissertation is demonstrating that the Maniot Polity was not attached to or dependent on the Ottomans as suzerain, it stands to reason to present the political ideology of the Ottoman Empire, especially regarding the way they contextualized their vassal territories as an extended part of their own statehood and sovereignty. This theoretic basis should allow us to make it clear later on in this paper how Mani existed outside of that framework, being its own separate full statehood.

The structure of the Ottoman Empire's political entity was based on the general principles of Islam, which defined their political thought, administrative organization and legal foundations. This extended to their international relations, where their religious mindset defined the world in three categories: (1) the "Dar al-Islam" (Abode of Islam), Islamic territories following Islamic Law, where Dhimmis (Non-Muslim subjects) were obliged to pay the Jizya tax for being allowed to practice their religion unharmed, (2) the "Dar al-Harb" (Abode of War), non-Islamic territories and thus outside Muslim rule, candidates for Jihad expansionistic military aggression, and (3) the "Dar al-Sulh" (Abode of Truce), territories also beyond Muslim direct control, but under treaty agreements permitting local administration and not being targeted for invasion, for the exchange of Jizya tax as tribute [Arı,2003:40-41]. It is clear that the question here is whether Mani was a Muslim territory or a Muslim vassal, and whether Maniots adhered to the obligations the Ottomans imposed on their client-states. In brief, these commitments were regularly paying heavy tributary taxes, recognizing the local rulers appointed by the Ottoman government, providing soldiers and resources for the Ottoman military, total support and alignment to the Ottoman's external and foreign policies, procuring official recognitions of submission, having to supply food and other products for the needs of the Ottoman Empire, allowing the Ottomans to use their territory for military campaigns, participating in Ottoman military campaigns and supporting them with resources

[Mayuzumi,2019:26-28], as well as having to gather information across their peripheries, serving as foreign intelligence for the Ottoman government (an obligation of the princes of Wallachia, Moldova and Ragusa) and having an Ottoman agent to conduct all their bureaucratic affairs, under strict surveillance by their overlord [Arı,2003:45-47]. Other responsibilities of Ottoman vassals were representing them in treaties with Christian countries, supporting the Ottoman elites forming in their lands, addressing the Ottoman Sultan as arbitrator for local disagreements and being attached to the Ottoman legal jurisdiction, even if limitedly [Kármán,2020:1-6], while the subjects of these lands were considered tax-payers, not just to their ruler but also their suzerain, with Ottoman tax-collectors entering their territory [Panaite,2020:7-23].

Should a polity adjacent to the Ottoman Empire not demonstrate existence of such mandatory behaviours, but their opposite, then their sovereignty and independence should not be considered infringed by the Ottomans, but as separate and free of their rule. Consistently, in order to determine whether the Maniot Polity was its own free, independent and sovereign full statehood, it should not just be presented to meet the theoretical criteria of statehood (territory, people, government, international diplomacy) but also independence and sovereignty, separate from the Ottoman statehood, which claimed Mani beneath their own direct authority.

CHAPTER 2: GOVERNMENT OF MANI

A major prerequisite to determine whether a political entity is a full statehood or not, is the existence of government, exerting political authority through the territory and people that it holds beneath its jurisdiction and authority. It should be made clear that not only did Maniots enjoy self-determination, but also a governmental regime which was drastically different from anything else in Ottoman Greece. The form of government established in Mani through the period examined, the 16th century - early 19th century, is unique in its composition and order, perhaps not just for the region of Southeast Europe, but even through global history.

2.1: The Foundations of Maniot Political Organization

Like in so many societies through human history, the form of government at the pinnacle of the political and social pyramid was modelled after the most basic structure, the smallest unit of organization, here being family. In Mani, with the unforgiving political conditions and unfertile landscape, overpopulated and crammed with settlements and farmlands, family was the basis of societal organization, functioning also as a political

institution [Kapetanakis,1996:88]. Each household lived separately from other families, without interfering to the affairs of others, governed by their "Gerontas" (Elder), effectively a "Pater Familias", usually the eldest member of the family [Maurer,1997:128]. Larger families were organized into "Genoi" (Clans), also organized under a "Gerontas" as their elected chief, with some such "Genoi" even forming extended families of 200-500 members, with their own family branches, their own castle-tower, their own church and cemetery, their own territory that their members cultivated [Alexakis,1993:42-43].

These extensive patrilinear families were politically organized under the "Gerontiki" (Senate) [Liolios,2013:100-101], meeting in open public spaces called "Rhouga" (Town Square) or in the clan's church. They decided by vote the affairs of the clan, possessing judiciary, legislative and executive powers, comprised by the "Gerontes" (Elders) of the "Genoi", serving as Senators and representing their clans, usually not old people, as the name might suggest, but roughly 40-50 years old, and were presided by the "Opsimogerontas" (Eldest Elder) or "Protogeros" (First Elder), a Chief Senator with "consulting" role [Alexakis,1980:121-122]. Despite being the oldest and most powerful clan chief, having the most warriors under their command, and determined as the wisest, they did not have absolute power, as they were checked by the other "Gerontes", while in important affairs every member of a clan (martial-able men) was invited to councils to determine decisions through elections [Dimitrakos-Mesisklis,1949:76]. For military affairs, they appointed a "Captain", often called "Head of the Clan", being the most capable person, decided through election, and the duration of their office had varying limits [Andromedas,1962:75]. All had to agree that they were indeed the most suitable individual, and in some clans the "Captain" even possessed political powers, with a term-duration of a single year, and all their decisions had to be approved by the council, having really only military power rather than administrative or political [Alexakis,1980:120-122].

2.2: Local Maniot Political Organization

The largest "Genoi" had a general chief for each clan, though this was mostly observed in Northern Mani, while in Southern Mani each clan ruled itself separately of others [Alexakis,1980:123-124]. In general, while in Northern Mani the political organization of society evolved into becoming more centralized, forming larger and larger political unions, Southern Mani remained quite decentralized, with the largest political organizations beyond clans or local village clusters being clan-alliances, named "Syntrofies" (Comradeships). These were essentially leagues between clans, often against other clans, instituted by legally binding agreements and oaths between the partaking clans [Andromedas,1962:77-78]. These leagues

sometimes determined the defence of a province of Mani when invaded by external enemies, even for the common protection of clans that had been warring with each other, or decided a region's external policy towards foreign powers and formed alliances with polities beyond Mani [Kapetanakis,2011:40]. Generally, though, in Southern Mani the regions were far more loosely defined, and not actual political districts as in the Northern Mani, forming mere alliances or leagues [Alexakis,1980:103].

Except the relative state of "anarchy" existing in Southern Mani, divided in multitudes of local clans, in Middle and Northern Mani the political organization was more centralized. There, villages and towns had their own "Kapetanios" (Captain), organized in larger groups of clans and communities, forming a "Kapetania" (Captaincy), with the larger of them organized in "Megales Kapetanies" (Great Captaincies), led by many Captains, all beneath the region's "Archikapetanios" (Chief Captain), who was presiding over a council [Mazarakis-Ainian,1983:18]. The Captains were independent from one another, though they were not all equal in power and importance, obliged to express some small level of submission to the Chief Captain of their region [Moschovakis,1882:107]. The political institution of the Captaincy in Northern and Central Mani was originally a military office subservient to the political authorities, as it was only after the 17th century, during the Second Ottoman Period of the Morea (1715-1821), when these regions became so militarized that the military offices wielded political power [Kapetanakis,1996:91-97]. In some exceptional cases, in North-East Mani some of these Captaincies and Sub-Captaincies even became hereditary offices, with the first son of the deceased Captain or Sub-Captain replacing them [Alexakis,1980:77].

2.3: Sovereignty of Maniot Regional Districts

The Northern Captaincies were composed out of a stratified militarized society, where minor families had little influence, greater ones more and the clans of the Captains oppressed other Maniots through a complex network of paternalistic and clientelist connections, with the power and prestige accumulated through their economic and military domination [Alexakis,1980:125]. In some cases, a Captaincy was shared by more than one Captain, often among 2-3 Captains with a different territory and administrative seat for each [Komis,1995:17], ruling over Sub-Captaincies within the Captaincy. Often, the Captaincy was divided between local Chief Captains governing the region, and Minor Captains controlling clusters of neighbouring villages [Kapetanakis,2011:51]. The responsibilities of the Captains were administrative and military, as well as collecting taxes for the use of the Captaincy's needs [Mexis,1997:357], preserving the peace and harmony of the region and participating in its council when it converged. They were chiefs of the armed forces, not only those quickly

composed in times of need, but also the standing army of their Captaincy [Daskalakis,1923:240-244], and even directed fleets of military ships of their Captaincy in piratical expeditions beyond Mani [Alexakis,1996:170-172], which raiding and plundering activities for the Maniots were official acts of warfare [Simopoulos,2003b:601].

Functionally, each Captaincy was its own separate small statelet, with their own official secretaries, mercenaries, soldiers and attendants [Karakatsianis,2010:124]. Such a notion would not be a hyperbole, as Captaincies themselves adhered to the criteria of statehood: distinct territory, population, government, international relations, sovereignty, independence and separation from other statehoods, with even recognition by other Captaincies or even from countries beyond Mani. The Captaincies had defined boundaries, which, if disrespected by other Maniots, an official state of war would commence [Loukos,1974:6], while they had their own population that self-identified with their own province and often had hostile relations with neighbouring Maniots, sometimes even expressing different cultural traits (e.g. contrast between inland Maniots and coastal Maniots in Southern Mani, or lowland Maniots and highlanders in Northern Mani).

As described above, Cantons had their own government in the form of a council of Captains and minor Protogeroi of each local clan and settlement, ordaining the administration, law and policing of the territory, as well as organizing its military affairs. Curiously, they even had their own external politics as well, separate from that of other Captaincies, or the Maniot Polity as a whole: they developed separate international relations, and even declared war while not involving the other Captaincies. An example for international relations of a Captaincy separate from others, would be how in 1806 the Pro-British Maniot Bey had subdued and ousted the Pro-French Captain Mourtzinos of the Captaincy of Kardamyli in North-West Mani, capturing his territory, because of the latter's diplomatic communication with the French Empire [Giannakopoulou,1996:258]. An instance where a Captaincy fought a conflict with another statehood, while other Captaincies did not, was in 1692, a time that most of the Peloponnese was under rule of the Venetians, with whom the Maniots mostly were in close alliance. Despite that, because a customs tax on the sale of pork to Kalamata was deemed as unfair, the Captain of Zarnata in North-West Mani declared war against the neighbouring Kalamatians, raiding the city and capturing town-officials as hostages for ransom and reparations, ceasing hostilities only when the Governor-General of the Morea conceded to his terms [Komis,1998:15-20]. This was a case when the Republic of Venice dealt specifically with the Captaincy of Zarnata, while the rest of Mani was indifferent and disconnected to these diplomatic procedures. Even in Southern Mani, that was less centralized, there were

regional councils where external policy was determined by vote, like in 1571 when in the area of Nomia there was a “Gerontiki” (Regional Senate) to determine if they would support the Venetians in the Battle of Lepanto, which resolved positively and appointed three Captains to lead the military expedition [Kapetanakis,2011:40].

2.4: Historical Political Evolution and Maniot Beylik

Overall, the Maniot Polity should be understood as a federal stratocratic democracy. The whole society’s hierarchy was organized based on military might through the number of warriors loyal to a faction. In Captaincies, the Captain was elected by the people by merit of martial strength [Daskalakis,1923:37]. Earlier in history (16th-17th centuries), when it functionally formed a full federal republic, the country was governed by a “Gerontiki” (Senate) of Oitylo, then capital of Mani, through a congress of “Gerontes” (Senators) and the presiding “Protogeros” (First Senator), which wielded political power and decided on the common affairs of Mani, while each was the chieftain of their own province [Comnéne,1807:55-60]. As seen in diplomatic documents, the signatories represented their “Genoi” and whole regions, in assembly with all the others. This “High Senate” was essentially modelled after the “Lower Senates”, also called “Gerontiki”, either for the provinces, or smaller ones for towns or clans, and the “Gerontes” (Senators) were the “Protogeroi” of their own districts [Alexakis,1980:145]. Yet through the increased militarization of Maniot society during the hardships of the 17th century, in North Mani the role of the civilian governors was diminished, with that of the military leaders rising, resulting in the fragmentation of Mani, with the Senate of Oitylo losing its position as the common governmental body of the Maniot Republic.

On a more macroscopic scale, after the mid-17th century, for the political affairs concerning the entirety of Mani, both common internal issues and external policies, the Captains converged in a High Council, presided by the highest office in the Maniot Polity, a Captain elected by the majority of the assembling Captains and holding the title of “Archikapetanios” (Chief Captain) [Dimitrakos-Mesisklis,1949:77]. Also called “Hegemon” of Mani (High Chief or Prince) [Kougeas,1963:7-18], they were usually appointed by vote of the elected representatives of the Maniots, the Captains, and they were never a hereditary office [Patsourakos,1910:19]. Their position as centre of authority through Mani was functionally for life [Moschovakis,1882:110], mostly due to the lack of a specific term-limit, so effectively they were removed from the position at the will of the Council of Captains, resulting in these Chief Captains actually remaining on their position for very few years, especially as the Captains wrestled each other for that position. While having their own

Captaincy they directly ruled, the Chief Captain effectively held sovereign rights through much of Mani [Mazarakis-Ainian,1983:18], even organizing policing and armed forces, or being responsible for certain monopolies of trade with the outside world (specifically oil, silks and oak acorns) [Moschovakis,1882:111]. Yet, they mostly had significant authority in Northern Mani, while in Southern Mani the clans were completely free of their command [Dimitrakos-Mesisklis,1949:77]. While the Chief Captain practically held significant jurisdiction in the Northern Mani, nonetheless they were mostly a presiding figure, mainly responsible for Mani's external affairs, but only nominally for the internal affairs of the Captaincies [Patsourakos,1910:20].

This political institution of the Chief Captain was mostly legally established in the late 18th century, with the institution of the "Maniot Beylik". Following the Greek defeat in the Greek Revolution of 1770-1771, Mani was continuously, heavily and repeatedly invaded by the Turks and Albanians of the Morea, with various battles in the fringes of Northern Mani and especially in the North-East region of Marathonisi, to no avail [Kapetanakis,2011:151]. Despite the Ottomans exerting strong military and political pressure through the constant besieging of the entire Mani Peninsula, they had also exhausted the Ottoman armies in the Morea, so Ottoman authorities partly accepted the sovereignty of the Maniot Polity, by officially recognizing the Maniot Hegemon as a "Bey" of the Ottoman Empire, and officially considering Mani not part of the Morea Vilayet, but under the jurisdiction of the Kapudan Pasha (Grand Admiral) [Unknown,2003:1-6]. Under this new arrangement, the Maniot Chief Captain was "appointed" by the Ottoman Sultan, which ordainment however was a mere official recognition, as almost always they would be chosen as Chief Captain by the Maniots through election and would not accept as leader anyone else [Dimitrakos-Mesisklis,1949:78]. The chief electors truly elevating the Hegemon were the Captains of North Mani, the Protogeroi (Senators) of South Mani and the Bishops, while appointment by the Ottoman government, specifically the Ottoman Sultan and the Kapudan Pasha, was merely a recognition [Alexakis,1980:130-135]. For the Ottomans, the Hegemon was named "Bas Bogu" (Highest Naval Officer), while also referred to as "Bas Capitan" (Highest Captain), who was sometimes the Maniot Bey's second-in-command instead [Kapetanakis,2011:139].

CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MANI

As it has been expressed in the description of what makes a statehood exist in a political entity, the ability of a polity's government to establish relations with governments of foreign full states demonstrates that the polity in question can engage in international relations, and thus legally partake in dealings with these other polities and their citizens, as well as expect them to recognize their own sovereign rights. Since we are referring to a time set in a pre-modern period for international law, before the late 18th century - early 19th century, after which the practice of the legal recognition of a statehood by other states is done through a specific decree that they indeed recognize their existence as an equal full sovereign and independent statehood, such foreign diplomatic relations expressed both a de facto and de jure mutual recognition. Consequently, in order to justify the notion that the Maniot Polity was a full statehood, it should be demonstrated that they did have full relations with foreign countries of their time, either just through mere diplomatic communication, or through deeper relationships such as cooperation, trade and military alliances.

3.1: Main Historical Maniot Alliances

(A) Venice:

The Republic of Venice is the country with which the Maniots had the strongest relations. After the fall of the Despotate of Morea in 1460, the Deme of Maniots [Lampros,1915:269] sought protection from the Venetians, ceding them Vardounia and Zygos in North Mani, aiming to create a defensive buffer zone territory with the Ottoman Turks [Daskalakis,1923:19-20]. Nonetheless, Venetians "surrendered" the entire Mani Peninsula to the Ottomans through a peace-treaty, despite not owning it [Wright&MacKay,2008:261-276], condemning the Maniots to Turkish invasions through the 1480s [Wright,2013:157-182]. When these had failed by the 1490s [Daskalakis,1923:32-33], Venetians re-approached the Maniots [Korre,2017:209], with the latter even anew ceding them borderland territory in North Mani in 1503 [Korre,2017:441-442].

Maniot-Venetian relations would be characterized by strong cooperation and friendship through the ensuing three centuries. In 1570, Maniot envoys asked Venetian assistance to destroy the fortress of Porto Kayo, constructed by the Ottomans in 1569, after a sudden landing operation, to contain Maniot and Venetian piracy in the region [Tsiknakis,2012a:447-449]. A Venetian fleet of 25 ships bombarded the naval fortress from the sea, already being besieged by the Maniots from land, resulting in its capture [Tsiknakis,2012a:450-451]. The Venetian Senate sent official gratitude for this synergy

[Tsiknakis,2012a:460], while Maniots requested an armada to liberate the Peloponnese [Tsiknakis,2012a:452]. After the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, Venetians made it a policy to cooperate even closer with Maniots [Tsiknakis,2012b:231], proposing mutual assistance in military activities [Tsiknakis,2006:400-405], even sending them reinforcements in 1571-1572 [Karantonelli,2015:278-279].

The alliance continued in the 17th century, when Maniots requested assistance in organizing their armies, asking from the Venetians for experienced, outsider and thus impartial, military commanders [Alexakis,1980:131]. Due to increased threats of Turkish invasion, in 1642 many were seeking to emigrate, negotiating with Venetians [Pardos,1993:206-207]. In 1644 Venetians did accept Maniots to settle in Corfu, yet Venetians wanted to discourage Maniot emigration in order to maintain Maniot ports as ship-havens [Kapetanakis,2011:104-105]. With the outbreak of the Fifth Ottoman-Venetian War (1645-1669), Venetians supported the piracy of the Maniots in the Aegean Sea as they harmed the Ottoman Turks and attacked their supply lines to the besiegers of Candia [Karantonelli,2015:288], even providing supplies to the Venetian defenders there [Kapetanakis,2011:163]. Eventually, Venetian-Maniot cooperation led to Maniot fleets sailing to Crete in 1667, setting on fire the Ottoman fleet that was besieging Candia [Daskalakis,1923:83-84].

After the fall of Crete, and the outbreak of the Sixth Ottoman-Venetian War (1684-1699), the Maniots sent a letter to the Doge of Venice, requesting military assistance against invasion, which the Venetians accepted, so in 1685 a joint armada of Venetian, Papal, Maltese and Florentines, with a fleet of 75 ships, approached Messenia [Daskalakis,1923:90-96], and after the Venetian Doge landed in Oitylo with 23 ships [Pinzelli,2003:75], he signed an alliance with the Maniots, who offered 10,000 men [Pinzelli,2003:96]. Later on, the Venetians captured the Peloponnese and established the “Kingdom of Morea”, in which Mani was not incorporated, as Maniots did not pay them taxes, except some tiny fees [Kapetanakis,2011:52], which were never paid [Daskalakis,1923:150], they were not included in Venetian taxation censuses [Seifried,2020:3], while they were not subjected to forced labour, like their Morean Greek kinsmen [Dokos,2000:270-277]. Venetians considered the Maniots as equal partners, using them to cover their weak position in the Peloponnese [Daskalakis,1923:150], often employing them as irregular policing rangers [Kapetanakis,2011:56-58], and in exchange Venetians provided military governors and advisors [Kapetanakis,2011:49-52]. Maniot-Venetian relations were soured after the fall of the Venetian Morea to the Turks in the Seventh Ottoman-Venetian War (1714-1718), yet

nonetheless they maintained good relations and Maniots continued to accept Venetian ships through the 18th century. Even as late as the 1790s there were local Captains who were Pro-Venetian, such as Tzanetos Koutoufaris. Particularly in his case, he had managed to return to his Captaincy using arms and money that had been provided by the Venetian Senate [Kapetanakis,2011:281-282].

(B) Malta:

Maniots had close ties with the Maltese since early in their separate history. After Turkish invasion in Mani, in 1582 the Maniots called for aid from the Knights Hospitallers in Malta [Dokos,1979:285]. This was reciprocated, as in 1601 the Knights of Malta sent four galleys, which occupied and destroyed the fort of Passavas in North-West Mani, ousting Turkish control from the area [Karantonelli,2015:285]. In 1605, a fleet including the Knights of Malta intervened in Mani, ousting the Turkish fleet that was besieging the peninsula [Anderson,1952:70], while 1622 a Christian fleet including Maltese ships stationed in Oitylo to refuel the Maniots with ammunition [Mertzios,1979:117-118]. Through the 1630s-1650s Maniots maintained good relations with the Maltese, and would resupply their military corsair ships, that were raiding the Ottoman seas [Karantonelli,2015:116-119], demonstrating a common alliance and mutual assistance, while in the 1660s Maltese-hired pirate Hugues Crevilliers raided the entire Aegean Sea and extracted tax from the Cyclades, in close cooperation with the Maniots [Karantonelli,2015:121]. This collaboration lasted well into the 18th century, with the Maltese still often using Mani as a safe haven when raiding the Turks.

(C) Spain:

Maniots also established diplomatic relations with the Spanish Kingdom, major global colonial power of the 16th-17th centuries, and main rival of the Ottomans. In 1605, the Spanish Viceroy of Naples sent ships aiding the Maniots against the Turks, whose navy was ready to attack from the sea [Karantonelli,2015:110], while in 1605-1606 Spain funded the construction of defensive fortifications in Mani [Mertzios,1979:96-97]. Through 1613-1614, the Duke of Osuna, son of the Viceroy of Naples and Sicily, ventured to Mani with a Spanish fleet and prevented a Turkish invasion, leaving behind weapons, ammunition and provisions [Mertzios,1979:101-103]. In 1619, a Spanish fleet of 46 ships raiding the Aegean Sea was stationed in Mani, leaving again weapons and ammunition [Anderson,1952:108], repeated in 1622 by Napolitan Spanish ships [Anderson,1952:109-110]. During the 17th century, because of growing Turkish aggression, rampant overpopulation and civil wars, Maniots sent envoys to the Spanish authorities, requesting permission to settle their territories. The Spanish were

generally quite welcoming, especially in the Kingdom of Naples, desiring cheap labour [Karantonelli,2015:286]. After 1640-1644, when Maniot delegates to the Spanish Viceroy of Naples conducted negotiations over transportation, taxation and permission of exercising Orthodox Christianity, many Maniots settled in Southern Italy [Pardos,1993:191-240]. Contemporarily, some Maniots repeated their proposition to the Spanish for conquering the Morea, saying that they had 12,000 armed men ready for battle [Pardos,1993:212]. It was ignored, and envoys asking for allowance to migrate to Spanish territory reoccurred in 1648 and 1658, but negotiations failed and were rejected, only accepted in 1678, when after the fall of Venetian Crete Mani's geopolitical position became terrible, and Maniot immigrants accepted the Papacy [Stavrousi,2008:19-24].

3.2: Various Italian States

(A) Florence:

In 1582, Maniots sent diplomatic embassies to Christian nations requesting military assistance against the Ottoman Turks, including the Republic of Florence [Karantonelli,2015:285]. In 1605, in a joint Christian alliance led by Malta, the Grand Duke of Tuscany sent ships to relieve Mani from a Turkish invasion [Anderson,1952:70], while in 1614, along with the Spanish, the Florentines also provided arms and ammunition to the Maniots, seeking to wear down Turkish naval power [Stavrousi,2008:21]. In 1664, Maniots requested the transportation of 300 Maniot families [Mertzios,1979:143], while in 1669, the Grand Duke of Tuscany agreed to permit 1,500 Maniot immigrants to settle his territory [Stavrousi,2008:23]. Later, in 1670, Maniots negotiated with Cosimo III de' Medici [Hasiotis,1969:136], accepting to forsake Orthodoxy in order to settle in Tuscany, resulting in about 1,500 Maniots settling there [Kapetanakis,2011:37], repeated in 1674 with 570 Maniots [Karantonelli,2015:292].

(B) Papal States:

Among the various Christian nations that the Maniots sent envoys in 1582, seeking to form an alliance against the Turks, were the Papal States under Pope Gregory XIII [Kapetanakis,2011:33], requesting him to convince the Spanish King to support them, reassuring the Pope that together they could liberate the Morea [Daskalakis,1923:40-45], having raised an army of 6,000 troops [Simopoulos,2003a:452]. In 1603, Maniots once more sent envoy, now to Pope Clement VIII, again with a similar petition, seeking aid from the Papal States and help in coordinating an alliance [Laskaris,1956:295]. In 1612, through their communication with the Duke Nevers, after previous agreement, Maniots would communicate

through him with the Pope, seeking to forge a coalition and direct a campaign against the Ottoman Turks [Daskalakis,1923:54-55].

(C) Genoa:

In 1602, Maniots had indirect communication with the Genovese through plans spread to Christian rulers over the objective of liberating Greece [Daskalakis,1923:50], while in diplomatic talks of 1612, Genoa promised that they would contribute with 6 galleys and 1,200 Men [Daskalakis,1923:60], a plan that never materialized. In 1622, along with Maltese and Spanish Sicilian ships, vessels of Genoa are recorded to have stopped in Oitylo in order to provide Maniots with ammunition [Karantonelli,2015:216]. In 1663, the Genovese engaged in negotiations with Maniot envoys requesting land to settle [Nicholas,2005:37], which they eventually endorsed, by allowing them to establish in Corsica from 1675 and onwards [Daskalakis,1923:125-130], which they had accepted out of desire to subdue the unruly Corsicans [Stavrousi,2008:31].

(D) Mantua-Montferrat:

A significant instance of Maniot diplomacy was their extensive discourse with Charles I Gongaza, a powerful Italian ruler, that ruled the Duchy of Mantua and the Duchy of Montferrat in Northern Italy, as well as the County of Nevers and the County of Rethel in France. Starting from 1603, he cooperated with the Maniots, aiming to form a great alliance in order to liberate the Peloponnese [Kapetanakis,2011:34]. Having extensive holds in both France and Italy, he was a powerful man, and as a descendant of the House Palaeologos he sought to use his influence to rally the Western European leaders into a crusade against the Ottoman Empire [Miller,1904:646-668]. Thus, he transmitted messages to Mani, declaring how as “Duke Palaeologos” he wanted to liberate Greece [Daskalakis,1923:50-51]. By 1615, Maniots had signed certain written agreements with Charles’ agents, which the latter presented to the King of France in order to encourage him to send armies to the Peloponnese [Daskalakis,1923:60-63]. In 1618, Maniots sent him a representative, with a letter signed by all Maniot Chiefs, urging the arrival of reinforcements [Kapetanakis,2011:34], promising him 10,000 soldiers [Papadopoulos,1966:38]. Eventually all this planning proved vain, as in 1625 the fleet of the Duke of Mantua was burned, which event cancelled his plans indefinitely [Kapetanakis,2011:34].

3.3: Other European Countries

(A) France:

Maniot-French relations first begin when in 1612 a Maniot embassy was sent to the King of France, in cooperation with the Venetian authorities [Ploumidis,1991:164], while in 1618, after invitation of the Maniots, the French King sent a diplomatic mission to Mani, seeking to organize an alliance against the Turks, as France sought to prevent the spread of Spanish influence in Mani, convincing them that only the French could help them deal with the Ottomans [Daskalakis,1923:67-75]. Despite this, the French-Ottoman alliance deterred the French from engaging with the Maniots again, until much later in history, mostly in the late 18th century and onwards.

During the Morean Revolt of 1770, incited by the Russians, Maniot authorities contacted with French diplomats in the Peloponnese and offered to allow French citizens to seek refuge in Mani [Kapetanakis,2011:231-232]. Later in 1776, Maniots captured a French ship in Koroni, refusing to release it despite requests from the French authorities directly to the Maniot Bey [Kapetanakis,2011:290]. In 1790, the French consul of Koroni cooperated with Captain Petros Mavromichalis over their mutual aim to battle piracy in the region [Kapetanakis,2011:309], while around this time the Mavromichalis Clan established closer relations with the French and negotiated over their support for them to obtain the Maniot Beylik [Kapetanakis,2011:440-445].

Following the conquests of the French Republic across the Italian Peninsula, Maniot Bey Tzanetos Grigorakis consigned a letter to Napoleon Bonaparte, requesting cooperation between France and Mani, declaring that French ships could use Maniot ports for their needs. After receiving it, Napoleon sent Demos Stephanopoulos, a French Citizen and Corsican Maniot, as official envoy and messenger to Mani, carrying a letter where he declared willingness for an alliance against the Turks [Daskalakis,1923:204-208], which however never materialized. Nonetheless, in letters to Tzanetos Grigorakis, the French Emperor practically officially declares the Maniot Polity as a statehood, stating that Maniots had "managed to preserve their independence", recognizing complete absence of foreign rule [Giannakopoulou,1996:232-233].

On the eve of the 19th century, the French would even supply Pro-French Maniot Captains, seeking to promote their power and influence and thus to render the whole of Mani into becoming Pro-French [Giannakopoulou,1996:233], while the French consul in the

Peloponnese, who was in close relations with Tzanetos Grigorakis, sought to promote French interests in the region, resulting in Pro-French Maniots receiving crates with gunpowder from the French [Kapetanakis,2011:375-378]. By 1809, Maniots were requesting more firearms from the French, and repeated their call to Napoleon Bonaparte to campaign in their region. The French tried to appease the Maniots with promises, in order to use them as agents supporting their own interests, and to cancel British interests in the Peloponnese [Kapetanakis,2011:402]. In the same year, Petros Mavromichalis, the later Maniot Bey, travelled to meet with the French General and Governor of the Ionian Islands in Corfu, discussing the possibility of liberating the Morea, however the plan was rejected as France did not dominate the sea in the region [Kapetanakis,2011:414-415]. He claimed to have brought signatures from the Bishops, Chief Captains, Captains and all inhabitants of Mani, all supporting him in this venture [Kapetanakis,2011:445]. Later in 1812, Petros Mavromichalis requested a loan of 20,000 kuruş from the French to buy the rights of the Beylik from the Turks, and thus become accepted as the trade and diplomatic representative of the Maniots, promising in return that all French ships would have asylum in Maniot ports, that he would ensure British influence to remain out of Mani, and provide intelligence of the local affairs to the French government [Kapetanakis,2011:449].

(B) Great Britain:

Maniot-British relations were only established in the late 18th century, when the British decided to expand their influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially the Ottoman Empire, and to deter other colonial hegemonies from doing the same. Around this time, the British had convinced many Captains to become Pro-English, preventing French influence, leading to civil war between many Maniot Captaincies [Giannakopoulou,1996:242-244], while diplomatic communication increased following the surrender of the Ionian Islands to the British by the French in 1815, after which time the British sought to erase French influence across Greece.

In 1803, the Maniot Bey Antonis Grigorakis sent letter to the British consul of Kythera discussing the various hardships inflicted onto the Maniots through foreign piracy [Kapetanakis,2011:347], while in 1804, former Maniot Bey Tzanetos Koutoufaris proposed to the British consul of the Ionian Islands the establishment of a vice-consulate of the British government somewhere in Mani, which would promote the Pro-British Maniot faction [Giannakopoulou,1996:255-256]. In the same year, the British consul of Patras funded Antonis Grigorakis with 1,500 kuruş, so that the latter could fund his defence against Pro-French Captain Mourtzinos, as he needed money and ammunition [Kapetanakis,2011:365],

while in 1806, the British consul of Patras provided him with even more funds, seeking to spread British propaganda across Mani [Giannakopoulou,1996:246-247]. Later in 1810, in a treaty organized by the High Commissioner and the General of the Ionian Islands with Morean Greek rebels, also signed by envoys representing most Maniots, agreed that in case of French intervention, the British would dispatch an army of 12,000 soldiers to capture the Morea, aided by Maniots and Moreans [Kapetanakis,2011:423]. In 1812, Maniot Bey Theodoros Grigorakis had a letter delivered to the British consul in Kythera, explaining his efforts to suppress piracy in the region [Kougeas,1962:88].

(C) Russia:

Like the British, the Russians only began contact with Maniots in the late 18th century, after they had conquered much of the north coast of the Black Sea, allowing them to approach the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans, presenting themselves as champions and protectors of Orthodoxy across Southeast Europe. In 1767, a Greek agent of Russia was sent to the Peloponnese, seeking to incite rebellion on the behalf of the Russians, with promises of military aid. While visiting Mani he reassured that Catherine II desired the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the Liberation of Greece, not believed by the Mavromichalis Clan [Kapetanakis,2011:170-173]. In 1763, Gregory Orlov, General-in-Chief of Russia, sent letters to approach the Maniots, declaring them as the "Spartan nation" that had "never been subdued to the Turks", officially recognizing them as an independent polity [Kapetanakis,2011:172], while in 1769, Prime Minister of Russia Nikita Panin sent a letter to Mani, verifying their desire to liberate Greece [Kougeas,1956:52-53].

In February 1770, military-man and diplomat Theodore Orlov landed with the Russian fleet in Oitylo of Mani, and there he officially addressed Maniot Captains for alliance [Kontogiannis,1989:65]. Despite many disagreeing, principally the powerful Mavromichalis Clan, the Russians managed to convince many to follow them, establishing their alliance and creating the Western and Eastern Maniot Legion, that campaigned in Messenia and Laconia against the Ottomans [Kapetanakis,2011:185]. The Greek Revolt of 1770-1771, also known as the "Orlov Revolt", initially marked victories, but ultimately proved a disaster for both Moreans and Maniots, because of the limited forces the Russians had dispatched, and their retreat from Mainland Greece, with the Ottomans inflicting indiscriminate damage across the Peloponnese and again besieging Mani for many years, even going as far as invading repeatedly [Daskalakis,1923:175-185]. Following this blunder, that was seen as a betrayal by Maniots, their relations with the Russians would be soured for many years. Yet in 1788, the French consul in Koroni attests that Mani was divided in parties, loyal either to Venetians or

Russians, which resulted into them constantly infighting over which faction would dominate [Kapetanakis,2011:302]. During the Russian Administration of the Septinsular Republic in the Ionian Islands in 1800-1807, Russians re-approached the Maniots, sending declarations to Maniot Captains, trying to incite them once more into attacking the Ottoman Empire [Daskalakis,1923:218-220].

3.4: Conclusions

From this brief study into the international relations of the Maniots during their separate history, through the 16th century - early 19th century, it is apparent that despite being isolated from Ottoman Greece, they were not secluded from the rest of Europe. In line with the fundamental criterion of full statehood, the capacity of a political entity to engage in foreign relations with other sovereign entities, which as explained in this historical period also demonstrates both a de facto and de jure diplomatic recognition of statehood, Maniots would develop extensive diplomatic relations everywhere that was possible for them, despite being almost surrounded by hostile territory and hostile waters of the Ottoman Empire.

From the information presented above, it is evident that up to the mid-17th century, the Maniot Polity had formed international relations with nearly all of Continental Western Europe, except for the Holy Roman Empire. Through the Republic of Venice, the Knights of Malta, the Papal States, the Republic of Florence, the Republic of Genoa, Duke Nevers ruling much of Northern Italy, and the Spanish holds in Italy (Sicily, Naples, Milan), Maniots enjoyed recognition by the entire Italian Peninsula, while through their communication with the Iberian Union, the same applied for all of the Iberian Peninsula, and perhaps its vassals in Burgundy and the Netherlands. With France, Great Britain and Russia joining in the late 18th century, almost all of Western Europe had at one point recognized them, except for the Holy Roman Empire and the Archduchy of Austria. Possibly one could even speak of an “indirect recognition”, through members of the Holy Roman Empire engaging in diplomacy with the Maniots (e.g. Florence, Genoa, Mantua), or through trade (such as the Maniot Bey’s trade with Trieste of Austria [Kapetanakis,2011:85], selling most of Mani’s olive oil exports, his main source of income [Wagstaff,1965:300]). In that case, one might suggest all of Europe somewhat recognized the Maniot Polity, directly or indirectly, apart from the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, owing to great geographic distance, and of course the Ottoman Empire.

CHAPTER 4: MANIOT SOVEREIGNTY & INDEPENDENCE

It is commonly assumed that while the Mani Peninsula was not completely subjugated by the Ottomans, that Maniots nonetheless were not enjoying full sovereignty, but instead that their independence was in fact limited, either considering the Maniot Polity to have been a mere autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire, or a semi-independent vassal statehood. The main disagreements raised against the concept of the existence of a fully independent Maniot Polity are the notion that this proposition is negated by the existence of the Maniot Beylik, rendering all the Maniot Polity into an Ottoman dependency.

The counterargument of the Maniot Beylik as part of the Ottoman government is particularly evoked, as it was an existing legal institution, which has been extensively studied, unlike other weaker rebuttals, such as claiming that Mani had been fully occupied by the Turks in various points in history, which appears baseless, especially as Maniot international relations never seem to have ever been interrupted (this essay does not investigate the history of the Maniot-Ottoman Wars, as it is focused on the political aspects of Maniot sovereignty). In extend to the Maniot Beylik, focusing on the period of 1776-1821, it is also argued that during this time the Ottomans were compromising the internal sovereignty of the Maniots through military presence in Mani, while that Maniots did not have the means to prevent the imposition of any form of Ottoman domination. Therefore, these main three counterarguments should be scrutinized and refuted, in order to confirm that even in this controversial period, the Maniot Polity was a full statehood.

4.1: The Maniot Beylik

(A) Maniot Beylik as Full Vassalage?

The responsibilities the Ottoman Empire bestowed on the Maniot Bey were principally four: (a) to demonstrate absolute submission and loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, (b) to persecute any land-robber or pirate that entered Maniot territory, either captured and surrendered to Ottoman authorities or executed, (c) to never assist or protect declared enemies of the Ottoman authorities and (d) to minimize internal conflict, with the Maniot Bey functioning as arbitrator of peace [Unknown,2003:42-44]. These were repeated in common declarations, signed by all Captains, Chiefs and Bishops across Mani, also promising (e) that Maniots would obey the Maniot Bey, (f) that criminals would be delivered to the Maniot Bey, and (g) that taxes would be paid to the Maniot Bey [Kapetanakis,2011:232&380-381].

It even appears that the Maniot Bey was often instructed to send criminals and wanted men by the Ottoman authorities to be judged under their judicial system, rather than being dealt within the Maniot Polity [Kapetanakis,2011:136]. In the meantime, the Maniot Bey was expected to act as policing administrator of the Mani Peninsula, not permitting Maniots to engage in piracy and land-raids, and to execute violators or imprison them and send them to Constantinople [Kougeas,1962:70-80]. Furthermore, civil war between Maniot Captaincies was prohibited and the Maniot Bey had to resolve the conflict by acting as intermediator judge [Kapetanakis,2011:264]. As an extension of the Maniot Bey being the intermediate of Ottoman-Maniot affairs, he was also responsible for not permitting the entry of Maniots into Ottoman territory without a written permission signed by him [Kapetanaki,2007:266], functioning as a passport. If Maniot merchants were found without their passports, they were arrested and delivered to the Maniot Bey [Kapetanakis,2011:138]. This was significant, as Maniots were dependent on food imports from the Peloponnese, principally wheat and maize, and needed to sell their own products there for revenue [Wagstaff,1996:283].

The Maniot Bey also had personal obligations to the Ottoman Empire. He was required to issue frequent statements of submission to the Ottoman Sultan, often ratified by the Ecumenical Patriarch [Kapetanakis,1996:100]. He had to send military forces to assist the Ottomans if requested [Belia,1975:290], or sometimes just specialized personnel such as sailors (about 100 Maniots each year were sent to work in Constantinople for 6 months) [Kougeas,1962:70-76]. Likewise, the Maniot Bey was required to send hostages, usually some of his own children, as a means of the Ottomans to prevent opposition, with the threat of harming them [Kapetanakis,2011:265-266], while he had to deliver a report to the Ottoman Grand Admiral every 15 days, informing him of Maniot affairs and news they received from abroad [Kougeas,1962:70-76]. For better coordination, the Ottoman authorities also appointed 4 Minor Captains to maintain order on behalf of the Maniot Bey [Kapetanakis,2011:270]. A very important function of the Maniot Bey, derived but not exclusive to restricting land-raids and piracy, was generally to protect free trade between the Maniot Polity and the Ottoman Empire, and safeguard free ship navigation in the seas around the Mani Peninsula [Alexakis,1980:133].

(B) Rejection of Maniot Beylik as Full Vassalage:

The main counterargument against the Maniot Beylik rendering all of the Maniot Polity as an Ottoman vassal state is that the Maniot Bey did not have effective control across the Mani Peninsula. All Maniot Beys originated from dominant families established in Northern Mani, while only the Mavromichalis Clan was in Middle Mani, so they did not have

Southern Mani under their direct control. Moreover, the Maniot Bey ruled as a Chief Captain, directly over his own vassals and territory, which did not include other Chief Captains or Districts he had no influence over. This was the case even when the office was moved from one family to another; the newer Maniot Bey did not control the territory of the former ones, hence they only functionally administrated over a small part of the Mani Peninsula. This means the Maniot Bey often intervened in hostile Captaincies like a foreign government, having no direct control over them, and often not being able to impose the orders of the Ottoman government, or even their own political agenda [Alexakis,1980:136].

The best evidence for this is the Kitries Agreement of 1819, between the Grigorakis, Troupakis and Mavromichalis Clans, where the three most powerful families and Chief Captains of Northern Mani agreed that the current Maniot Bey, Petros Mavromichalis, was to be recognized as "Hegemon" of all Mani by the other two major clans, swearing obedience and cooperation, even promising to prevent all attempts to usurp that position [Tzortzakis,1981:42-45]. Effectively, this demonstrates that the Maniot Bey essentially only ruled over 1/3rd of Northern-Middle Mani (thus about 2/5ths of the whole Peninsula), and that now this treaty rendered him as "Dictator" of all Mani (like the old Roman institution), for the sake of Maniot coordination during the Greek War of Independence, which was being prepared. This lack of control over the Maniots by the Maniot Bey is underlined in the reality that while he was supposed to restrict robbery raids and piracy in Mani, he could not enforce it. This is best observed in a Russian diplomatic mission to Mani in 1815, meeting with 150 representatives of the Maniots (probably 10 from each of the roughly 15 Cantons [Kapetanakis,2011:259]), seeking to convince them to stop piracy, only persuading just 50 of them [Kapetanakis,2011:431]. It appears that this 1/3rd of the Maniots agreeing to avoid piracy was mainly those influenced by the Maniot Bey, thus he could not impose his will on the remaining 2/3rds of the Maniots. This lack of control appears to have been most prevalent in Southern Mani: for example, in 1792, the renegade Russian colonel Lambros Katsonis, public enemy of the Ottomans as he had been raiding the Aegean Sea for years, had retreated to Porto Kayo after defeats by the Ottoman fleet, supported by a great part of the Maniot population, with 3,000 warriors joining him [Kapetanakis,2011:316].

Since 2/3rds of the Maniots did not obey the Maniot Bey, whose direct rule was even smaller than that (roughly 2/5ths only), he could not enforce his obligations taken on behalf of the Ottomans. He was unable to suppress piracy and raiding, he could not check internal conflict between Maniot Cantons, he could not prevent Maniots assisting public enemies of the Ottoman Empire, he could not forbid the entry of anti-Ottoman armed forces in Mani. This

can only mean that even when the Maniot Bey desired to fully submit to the demands of the Ottomans, that only concerned his own territory and those loyal to him, and not the rest of the Maniot Polity. Therefore, the Maniot Beylik was only a part of the Maniot Polity, not encompassing its entirety, thus, if it is considered an Ottoman vassal, that only concerns that part and not the whole. Overall, Maniots did not even adhere to their promises to the Ottomans, that they would obey the Maniot Bey, abstain from anti-Ottoman military actions and surrender dissidents. For this reason, any commonly signed statement of submission from Maniots to the Ottoman government should be regarded as a mere means of temporary appeasement, empty promises that do not represent the existing reality. Regarding the personal obligations of the Maniot Bey, often resembling that of vassals, with responsibilities like intelligence gathering and providing military personnel, that still only concerned the Maniot Bey and his domain alone, not the Mani Peninsula beyond his control.

Accordingly, the Maniot Beylik could be viewed at most as a vassal political entity to the Ottoman Empire, forming only a part of the Maniot Polity, hence should best be compared to earlier instances in Maniot history, during the 16th-18th centuries, where the Ottomans had occupied or vassalized parts of the Mani Peninsula, principally in Northern Mani, while not holding Middle and Southern Mani (which were also known as Inner and Lower Mani [Seifried,2014:46-47]). While there had been times before the Maniot Beylik, when Northern Cantons of Mani and some coastal areas had been completely subdued by the Ottomans, or when they had been forced to pay heavy tribute to the Ottoman authorities in Mystras, often as far as Oitylo [Mertzios,1979:114-120], yet that did not include the entirety of the Mani Peninsula, where the Middle and Southern Mani remained sovereign and independent, in constant conflict with the Ottomans, who even went on to construct the military forts of Passavas and Kelephas to contain them [Kapetanakis,2011:32], so the boundaries of the Maniot Polity's sovereignty and independence had merely been pushed further South [Daskalakis,1923:80].

4.2: Sovereignty over Maniot Territory

(A) Absence of Ottoman Sovereignty in Mani:

An argument of how the Ottomans held no degree of control within the Mani Peninsula, lacking any domination there, is the containment measures they had taken to prevent the Maniot Greeks from exiting this territory and entering areas directly controlled by the Ottoman Empire. Since the Ottomans would restrict the Mani Peninsula as if it was a foreign hostile territory with a constant state of warfare between them, it could be stated that this attitude reflected the existing reality.

For instance, the Serasker of the Morea, as Ottoman Commander of the Peloponnese, ordering the region's Ottoman military forces, was bestowed with the responsibility to supervise over the boundaries of the Maniot Polity, being responsible to maintain civil order and contain any attack on Ottoman territory by Maniots [Kyrkini-Koutoula,1996:86-87]. Specifically, in the late 18th century - early 19th century, the Ottomans maintained a standing army guarding the Ottoman-Maniot borders, such as a force of 100 soldiers stationed in Kalamata, preventing the exit of Maniots with no permit to enter Ottoman territory [Chrysanthopoulos,1888:247], while also in the mountainous region of Vardounia, separating the Mani Peninsula from the rest of Laconia, where the Turks had permanently settled Muslim Albanians, with a force of 1,000 soldiers [Kapetanakis,2011:203], or roughly 1,500-3,000 fighters, composed out of a population of 4,500-6,000 settlers, spread across 38 settlements and 48-80 forts [Saitas,1996:37]. Therefore, the existence of a force of maximum 3,100 warriors, perpetually garrisoned to specifically contain the Mani Peninsula, demonstrates the lack of any effective control of the Ottomans there. Aside of these armies focused on Mani, there were roughly 10,000 Turkish soldiers spread across the Peloponnese, ready to be assembled in case of conflict with the Maniots [Kapetanakis,2011:306]. The Ottomans sometimes even imposed naval blockades on the Mani Peninsula, even during the time of the Maniot Beylik, led by the Kapudan Pasha, Ottoman Grand Admiral. They were usually enforced either for prevention of Maniot piracy in Ottoman waters, or as punishment for not complying to demands [Kapetanaki,2007:289].

From the above information it is quite apparent that Maniots were not Ottoman subjects in any form, as they were not only forbidden to enter Ottoman territory, being arrested and delivered to the Maniot Bey if they did, but also the Ottomans would restrict access to the mainland for the entire Mani Peninsula, seeking to contain Maniot external sovereignty as much as possible.

(B) Effective Internal Sovereignty of Mani:

Against the external threat of the Ottomans, the Maniots had amassed large armies to defend themselves and their land. They frequently presented numbers of large military manpower to their potential allies, hoping that this would prompt them into an alliance. For example, in 1612-1613, when the Chief Bishop of Mani Neophytos addressed the Spanish King Philip II in a letter, asking him to send armies to liberate the Greeks, he reassured him that in the Mani Peninsula there were 17,000 armed men, unconquered by the Turks [Laskaris,1956:293-311]. There were many such proposals, though this in particular stands out due to the considerably large number of forces Maniots claimed to possess. Elsewhere,

they presented varying figures, from 6,000 soldiers to Pope Gregory XIII in 1582 [Simopoulos,2003a:452], to 10,000 fighters to Duke Charles I Gongaza in 1618 [Papadopoulos,1966:38], to 12,000 warriors to the Spanish in the 1640s [Pardos,1993:212] and to 10,000 men to the Venetians in 1685 [Pinzelli,2003:96].

That was even true for the time of the Maniot Beylik, where all the Cantons of Mani maintained their own standing army, used for the maintenance of their external and internal security. Specifically, before the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence (1821-1829), the Filiki Eteria, that was organizing the preparations for the upcoming conflict, had sent two different representatives to record the number of fighters in the Mani Peninsula. One presented a figure of 6,000 full-time soldiers, while the other 7,750, only counting those professionally in the military under the direct rule of the Captains [Daskalakis,1923:240-244]. It is difficult to evaluate the population of Mani during the time of the Maniot Beylik, as there are conflicting testimonies in the primary sources, but according to the French consul of Patras, Joseph Jean-Baptiste Roussel, in a report of 1813, the Mani Peninsula was inhabited by roughly 57,000 people [Seifried,2014:46-75].

This means that the full-time soldiers amounted to 10.5%-13.6% of the total population, hence, when only considering the proportion of the professional army in the Maniot Polity against its entire population, it is evident that Maniots were even more militarized than the most militarized country in Western Europe, the Kingdom of Prussia, which in the mid-18th century maintained an army the size of 7.2% of the population during war-time [Dwyer,2000:14], while in peace-time around 5% [Tallet,2013:146]. In more extreme estimations of the Maniot population, such as in the "Geographia Neoteriki" (Modern Geography) by the Thessalian Greek Daniel Philippidis and Grigorios Konstantas, published in 1791, the probably exaggerated estimation of 120,000 people living in Mani is presented [Philippidis&Konstantas,2006:152], which however drops the professionally militarized percentage to 5%-6.5%, closer to that of the Kingdom of Prussia. Either way, this comparison proves that the Maniots were probably the most militarized society across Europe, which resulted in absolute internal and external sovereignty, being fully capable to defend their territory, even from massive invasions, as they were a population that was heavily armed and thus extremely difficult to subdue. And this does not even consider the military capabilities of the civilian Maniot population, which in times of dire need mustered thousands of armed citizens, not just men but also women, such as in the Battle of Vromopigada in 1770, when 2,000 women fought along with 3,000 men [Daskalakis,1923:182-184].

4.3: Conclusions

Based on the above analysis, it is evident that Maniots enjoyed considerable sovereignty, to the point of independence. Even if the Maniot Beylik is considered a vassalhood, that only represents a fraction of the Maniot Polity, despite rotating around the chief clans of Northern Mani. Therefore, the entirety of the Maniot Polity was not a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, because those conditions of submission did not exist in Mani beyond the control of the Maniot Bey. Simultaneously, the Ottomans held no direct control inside Mani, only being able to limit its external sovereignty instead through constant land and naval blockades. Contrary to this, Maniots maintained a permanent standing army, large enough to effectively fully defend the Mani Peninsula, denying the Ottomans any sovereign rights there (apart from the aforementioned Maniot Beylik), and imposing only the legislative, judicial and executive rule of the local Maniot authorities.

Evidently, apart from the well recorded tribute, that the Ottomans were extracting from the Maniot Beylik, the Maniot Polity did not adhere to the various obligations of Ottoman vassal states. Unlike the usual expectations by the Ottomans regarding their vassals, the Maniots did not recognize Ottoman rulers in their territory, and constantly contested Ottoman rule over the Peloponnese, they did not supply them with resources, food and other products for their needs (except for Maniot trade with Ottoman Morea, not under obligation, but due to their dependency on trade for their nourishment [Wagstaff,1996:283]). Likewise, they did not align with Ottoman external politics, the recognitions of submission were very few, and were just written declarations that never materialized beyond empty promises, they did not allow Ottomans use their territory for military purposes and did not have an Ottoman agent overseeing their bureaucratic affairs, nor did they ever represent the Ottoman Empire in treaties with foreign countries. Typically, with the exception of the Maniot Beylik, which, again, represented only a part of Mani, they did not provide soldiers to the Ottoman army, they did not deliver information of the affairs of Mani and its general periphery, and Ottoman authorities did not have any real judicial jurisdiction.

CHAPTER 5: REFUTING MANIOT POLITY AS A TRIBUTARY VASSAL STATE

One of the principal criticisms that have been presented in the past against the notion of an independent and sovereign Maniot Statehood is the fact that in certain times in history we have evidence in the primary sources over Maniot authorities delivering "tribute" to the Ottoman government. This rebuttal usually mostly concerns the period of the Maniot Beylik, where the most powerful Captain in Mani was required to deliver a specific sum of money to the Ottoman authorities of the Morea Eyalet. Yet, it could be argued against this claim that this was no different than the various payments that had been given by warring entities, for the sake of buying brief cessation of hostilities or establishing non-aggression, or brief peace, or long-lasting peace or even good relations.

5.1: Describing the Maniot Tribute

Accordingly, in defending Mani's sovereignty, it could be argued that Maniots were not paying taxes to the Ottoman Turks, which would make them part of the Ottoman Empire's administration and legal framework, but were rather just paying a sum of money to their enemy for the sake of avoiding escalation of conflict, especially yet another full-scale invasion, which would be much costlier in money and blood to deal with, having to dispend resources in organizing a defensive campaign, paying for the soldiers, their supply in weapons, ammunition and provisions, accounting for the loss of life, and the large expenditure in restoring the damaged areas. There are various instances in history with these types of agreements, when a political entity agrees to deliver tribute to another for the sake of peace, even if they are not a vassal state of the tribute's receiver. The best way to discern whether we have a case of a tributary entity also being a vassal state, is to look into the proportion of the tribute against the country's revenue.

The Maniot tribute's amount fluctuated through time, but by the time of the Maniot Beylik (1776-1821), it is generally accepted to have amounted to 17,500 kuruş (15,000 kuruş for the Ottoman Sultan and 2,500 kuruş for the Kapudan Pasha, Grand Admiral of the Ottoman Empire) [Kougeas,1962:84-90]. Instances of earlier forms of tribute are either singular cases after some defeat, or just local Captaincies giving tribute, usually in Northern Mani, rather than all the Maniots. In one primary source, we are given the information from the French consul in Koroni, who was trading in the area, that in the 1770s the Maniot Bey had the annual income of 150,000 kuruş [Belia,1975:270-301], which means that the tribute amounted to 11.66% of the total. In another case, in a letter of Petros Mavromichalis, the last Maniot Bey (1815-1821), he stated that he was "independent ruler in all of Sparta (Mani), from Trinisa to Agiasos (Agia Sion in Upper Verga, Mani's border with Kalamata), with 500,000 kuruş

revenue annually" [Loukos,1991:138], placing the percentage of the tribute much lower, at 3.5% of the total.

5.2: Comparing Non-Vassal with Vassal Tributes

The practice of proper statehoods delivering tribute to avoid war was commonplace in the period examined in this paper, the 16th century - early 19th century. We do know that the Principality of Transylvania and the Habsburg Kingdom of Hungary would pay large sums as tribute to the Ottoman Empire [Fazakas,2020:265], and so did the Habsburg Archduchy of Austria [Yilmaz,2015:153], while both the Russian Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would give annual tribute to the Crimean Khanate, in order to prevent being harassed by invasion [Panaite,2019:88-89][Özer,2008:7][Brisku,2019]. A good example is the Venetian Republic giving tribute to the Ottomans [Topping,1979:163]; when the Turks captured Cyprus in 1571, they forced the Venetians to pay 300,000 ducats for peace [Oral,2022:146-147], when in 1569-1579 the Venetian Republic's revenue is estimated at roughly 1,900,000 ducats [Pezzolo,2006:24], hence the tribute amounted to 15.78%, higher than both percentages of the Maniot Bey's tribute (3.5% or 11.66%). There were various justifications by these vast and powerful countries on their deliverance of tribute; from buying peace, to buying recognition by the Ottomans over lands they held in territory adjacent to theirs, to buying good relations or even trade rights [Panaite,2019:172-174][Arı,2003:36-45]. Some, like the Austrian Archduchy, pretended these tributes were "diplomatic gifts" aiming good relations [Göçek,1987:105]. It is clear that the mere action of paying a tribute did not make the delivering party a vassal state of the receiving party, and that it was considered as a means to achieve certain aims perhaps unattainable through diplomacy or coercion.

It could even be asserted that the figures of 3.5% or 11.66% of state budget are not even enough for a proper condition of vassalhood, nor the standard of the Ottoman Empire over their vassal states. This is because the proportion of tribute to the revenue of officially recognized and internationally acknowledged Ottoman vassal states appears to have been much higher, with the dependency relationship being far more exploitative and brutal for the vassal state's economy. In the case of the Republic of Ragusa, a well-known vassal and principality of the Ottoman Empire, despite having a great deal of self-determination, it has been determined from primary sources that despite a 10% surplus in their overall budget, about 32% of state expenditure was committed for "tributes and 'good relations' expenses" [Havrylyshyn&Srzentić, 2014:40]. These primary sources refer to the late 18th century, before the French conquest of the Republic of Ragusa in 1806 [Kunčević,2013:90-92], therefore the tribute and 'good relations' expenses could only refer to payments done to the Ottomans and

their agents (with the ‘good relations’ expenses most likely referring to obligatory customary gifts and bribes to Ottoman officials). A similar status is found in the Danubian Principalities: the Principality of Wallachia and the Principality of Moldova. For Wallachia specifically, we know that in 1819 state revenue amounted to 5,910,000 thalers (German and Austrian coins), of which 2,083,000 thalers were delivered to the Ottoman Sultan in Constantinople, so tribute was 35.24% of the revenue [Ene-Dinu,2021:412-413], while in 1821, in both Wallachia and Moldavia the state expenditure given to the Turks as tribute amounted to about 35% of the total [Hitchins,1996:32-33]. Consequently, since at least three individual tributary vassal states of the Ottomans are observed delivering 32-35% of their state budget, that seems to have been the standard demand from Ottoman vassals, so the amounts paid by the Maniot Bey do not justify the status of a tributary vassal state leader.

5.3: The Maniot Tribute as a Trade Tariff

Overall, the income of the Maniot Bey did not represent the entire revenue of Maniots or their authorities. He did not directly control the entirety of Mani, serving as representative figure of the Maniots for their external affairs, principally with the Ottoman Empire, and while he held monopolies over the most profitable commercial goods, he did not control all of them. Specifically, he controlled the entirety of Mani’s exports in oil and acorn production, deemed as the most profitable trade commodity of Mani, transported through the Ottoman seas to the Black Sea, to Italy and the Adriatic Sea [Wagstaff,1965:300]. Yet Maniots produced and traded sheep, goat, cattle and pigs, and their products, as well as plants like corn, barley, beans, chick peans, honey and wax [Wagstaff,1965:296-302]. Primary sources speak of exports of 2,800 tons of wheat, as well as major silk and cotton production, and a ranging income of 250,000-980,000 kuruş, perhaps depending on the year’s harvest and trade availability, given the political situation in the region [Kapetanakis,2011:83-86]. It should be noted that the 980,000 kuruş for 1805, accounted for the more “abundant years” [Wagstaff,1996:284], which renders the tribute a mere 1.78% of Maniot exports, a minuscule amount. Meanwhile, focusing only on exports ignores income from internal economy, and from other means of profit, such as piracy and slavery, from which the local governments amassed much of their revenue, without sharing with the Maniot Bey, who only directly ruled part of North-Central Mani and not the entire Mani Peninsula. Therefore, the revenue of the Maniot Bey was through monopolies, principally that of olive oil (60% of Maniot exports’ value in 1804 [Wagstaff,1996:282-283]), and controlling the main land routes, with the rest of Mani depending on incoming merchants from the Peloponnese or other trading partners, not having a large merchant fleet, mostly due to dedicating their own fleets for piracy and war

[Wagstaff,1965:301-302]. After all, the Maniot Bey's income was also gathered through his right to issue selling permits and to operate the Maniot ports, imposing an imports fee – this utilization of his customs rights was the main source of his income, paying the tribute through this form of indirect taxation [Daskalakis,1923:195-196].

The function of the tribute as a means not only for buying peace, but also for the freeing of secure trade beyond Mani is underlined by the consequences of not paying this tribute. Beyond the threat of invasion, the Ottomans used trade blockades, by having the fleet of the Kapudan Pasha patrol in the seas surrounding Mani and forbidding Maniots to enter the Peloponnese and sell their products in the markets of cities in Ottoman territory [Kapetanaki,2007:289]. With this outlook, the tribute of the Maniots should be mostly understood as a form of protectionist sanction taxation from a foreign hostile country, and also as an import fee for the Maniot Bey, recognized representative of the Maniot Polity, effectively buying the right to trade with the Ottomans, on both a personal and a communal level. The great profits the Maniot Bey earned through his trade monopoly were large for an individual leader of a powerful clan, and for Maniots overall trade factored a substantial income; the figure of 250,000-980,000 kuruş noted above as annual revenue of Mani through trade only is very close to how in 1794 the exports revenue of the Ottoman city of Kalamata amounted to 220,000 kuruş, while for 1809 it is estimated at 935,000 kuruş [Kremmydas,1980:84]. The 500,000 kuruş income of the Maniot Bey was not an insignificant sum, amounting to 2.5% of the revenue of the Ottoman Empire in the 1780s-1790s, around 20,000,000 kuruş, or 1.6% of the revenue of the Ottoman Empire in the 1800s, around 30,000,000 kuruş [Levy,1982:238-239]. This was in an Ottoman Empire of 3 million square kilometres in territory with roughly 25–32 million people [Khoury,2007], so this amount of money was a lot for such a small region with such a small population in comparison.

5.4: The Maniot Tribute as a Negligible Fee

It should be clarified that the figure of 17,500 kuruş had been a recent tribute, created in 1776 with the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774, and after the failed attempts of the Turks to take over Mani. Before that point, Maniots only had to pay a sum of 4,000 kuruş from 1715 to 1776 [Daskalakis,1923:151-152][Kapetanakis,2011:64], while in previous periods tribute had fluctuated around that figure (4,000 kuruş from the 16th century to the mid-17th century, then increased to 5,000 kuruş during the late 17th century), which was rarely actually paid to the Ottomans [Menenakou,1998:12-13b][Komis,1995:40-45] [Komis,1992:23-40][Bantenkas,2015:386]. Therefore, we could perhaps say that the 4,000 kuruş were the pay for the non-aggression deal, while the extra 13,500 kuruş represented the

trade and entry fees (allowing Maniots to enter Ottoman territory and export products or work there), as a direct result of the new freedom of trade for the Greeks with the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774.

These fees should not be considered large by any means. In the 1770s-1790s, the 4,000 kuruş fee was basically half of the salary of the British ambassador in the Ottoman Empire, at 8,000 kuruş, or merely the price of a single British "berat" (tax exemption license) at 4,000 kuruş [Artunç,2015:730], or just the annual income of 28 unskilled workers (about 142 kuruş/year each [Artunç,2015:730]). For the very same period, the total 17,500 kuruş was equivalent to only 123 unskilled workers' annual income, or just a little more than the annual rent income for the Büyük Yeni Han from 1770 to 1816 (a major traveller inn right next to the Grand Bazaar of Constantinople) of about 13,000-14,000 kuruş [Yaşar,2016:124]. For the Maniot economy in 1804, the 17,500 kuruş amounted to just a bit less than their exports in silk only (19,500 kuruş), which was dwarfed by their total exports (250,000 kuruş) [Wagstaff,1996:282-283]. It should be noted that at least for the period from the 1600s-1610s until the 1760s-1770s, despite the various wars, the coin value and consumer prices within the Ottoman Empire generally remained very fixed [Pamuk,2004:454-458], so the existing tribute of 4,000 kuruş did not change much in value with the passage of time. From these figures, presented in comparison to the tribute delivered by the Maniot Bey to the Ottoman Empire, I believe it should be understood that the "tribute tax" was by no means a significant one, in lieu of it being miniscule, hence it should not be considered as enough to render the Maniot Polity a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire.

CONCLUSION:

The Maniot Polity is very little remembered today, both among laymen and pundits; both Greek and foreign historiography have completely overlooked its existence, and when they happen not to, they usually view it as no more than a mere unruly autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, or worse, an unorganized assembly of outlaws. Only some regional studies have been conducted, principally by local scholars, which are however usually focused on specific aspects, or are just generalized narratives of the region's whole history, without a specific investigation of the Maniot Polity as its own distinct Greek statehood during the Ottoman Period of Greece.

It should be apparent from the argumentation of this dissertation that the Maniot Polity did fulfil the main theoretical criteria for full statehood. It was a separate territory with a distinct population, composing a separate sovereign government, organized as a stratified federalized state, with local, regional and common republican institutions, albeit in the form of a stratocratic direct democracy, a political regime alien to the ones existing in Ottoman Greece. Maniots would undeniably engage in diplomatic relations with other countries, in which their external and internal authority was recognized. Certainly, the Mani Peninsula was not part of the Ottoman "Dar al-Sulh" (Abode of Truce), as a vassal state, because the tribute of the Maniot Beylik was miniscule in comparison to the expected proportion of an Ottoman dependency's state budget, the Maniot Beys only controlled a small part of Mani, not even being able to comply to their obligations to the Ottoman government, while declarations of homage from all Maniots together were empty promises. Arguably, the Maniot Polity should be considered to have existed for the Ottomans under the description of "Dar al-Harb" (Abode of War), given the size of military forces they had placed on their common borders, in order to contain the Maniots, and the frequent state of conflict existing between them.

In conclusion, Maniot governments, either regional or federal, enjoyed territorial sovereignty with effective rule through internal sovereignty, and exercised their external sovereignty, enjoying internal legitimacy in their territories, and establishing constitutional and functional independence, through their sole and effective rule. Therefore, through this monopoly of state responsibilities, the Maniot Polity was a constitutional formal independence. Evidently, popular claims regarding the independence of Maniots during the Ottoman Period are not baseless ultranationalist or localistic narratives, but instead correspond to historical reality.

It is hope of the author of this dissertation that this work will serve as the stimulus for a more structured and systematic study of Maniot History, through a new light of political studies, placing the Maniot Polity on the map for Greek and international historiography, both figuratively and literally, where one could be able to speak of a "Maniot Republic", which existed through three and a half centuries, from the fall of the Despotate of Morea up until the formation of the modern Hellenic State.

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