The political economy of european banking union

Doctoral Dissertation uoadl:2963315 86 Read counter

Unit:
Deparment of Political Science & Public Administration
Library of the Faculties of Political Science and Public Administration, Communication and Mass Media Studies, Turkish and Modern Asian Studies, Sociology
Deposit date:
2021-10-22
Year:
2021
Author:
Kazantzis Konstantinos
Dissertation committee:
Ναπολέων Μαραβέγιας, Καθηγητής (Επιβλέπων), Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Δημόσιας Διοίκησης, ΕΚΠΑ.

Λουκάς Τσούκαλης, Ομότιμος Καθηγητής (μέλος τριμελούς), Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Δημόσιας Διοίκησης, ΕΚΠΑ.

Δημήτριος Κατσίκας, Επίκουρος Καθηγητής (μέλος τριμελούς), Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Δημόσιας Διοίκησης, ΕΚΠΑ.

Νικόλαος Κουτσιαράς, Αναπληρωτής Καθηγητής, Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Δημόσιας Διοίκησης, ΕΚΠΑ.

Παναγιώτης Λιαργκόβας, Καθηγητής, Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημών, Πανεπιστήμιο Πελοποννήσου

Γιώργος Παγουλάτος, Καθηγητής, Τμήμα Διεθνών και Ευρωπαϊκών Οικονομικών Σπουδών, Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών

Χρήστος Παπάζογλου, Καθηγητής, Τμήμα Διεθνών, Ευρωπαϊκών και Περιφερειακών Σπουδών, Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο
Original Title:
Η πολιτική οικονομία της ευρωπαϊκής τραπεζικής ένωσης
Languages:
Greek
Translated title:
The political economy of european banking union
Summary:
The decision to establish a banking union was the Eurozone's fundamental response to the Euro area sovereign debt crisis, with a view to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns in the Euro Periphery. But its institutional regime was quite different compared to the initial vision presented in the so-called 'Four EU Presidents Report'. The objective of this thesis is to shed light on the institutional choices that have been made in the context of banking union. Thus, it initially attempts to give prominence to the national interests that influenced the national preferences formation of the main Member States (Germany, France, Spain, Italy) regarding the degree of supranational governance and the degree of risk sharing in the three pillars of the banking union (Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)). Next, it examines the impact of asymmetric interdependence in the banking union negotiations to explain its institutional form. The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is the theoretical framework within which empirical data is analyzed with a view to provide general conclusions.
Main subject category:
Social, Political and Economic sciences
Keywords:
Incomplete banking union, banking policy, EMU, Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single Resolution Mechanism, European Deposit Insurance Scheme
Index:
No
Number of index pages:
0
Contains images:
Yes
Number of references:
471
Number of pages:
277
File:
File access is restricted until 2024-12-13.

Διδακτορική Διατριβή Κωνσταντίνος Καζαντζής.pdf
2 MB
File access is restricted until 2024-12-13.