Summary:
Non-human animals as food sources, test subjects, workers and companions have long been
the subject of moral quandaries. The group of organisms raising questions regarding their
moral treatment is however increasingly subscribing new members over the recent years.
Organisms engineered and produced by humans are joining non-human ranks of the morally
eligible. Organoids, hybrids, bioelectronic systems and the recently emerged artificial
intelligence Large Language Networks are entering the scene, a scene once set only for the
filming of science fiction.
Classic approaches on the matter in philosophy have mostly taken either the road of
attributing individual moral rights on the basis of intellectual capacities or the utilitarian way,
of deciding moral considerability by weighing its impact on total satisfaction of interests or
the minimization of pain. The problems these approaches face are well known.
Considering problems less discussed, as deserving to take center stage, they are presented and
then exemplified drawing from two monumental points in science fiction filmic history:
1968's 2001: A Space Odyssey by Stanley Kubrick and 1982's Blade Runner by Ridley Scott.
Departing from the refocused problematic on the subject, we set off to explore an alternative
approach, based on Barandiaran's notion of minimal agency and goals, and Levin's view on
biologic group membership. The continuation of one' s existence is made the central, highest
order goal of all and any organisms or groups, our moral consideration of them is contextual,
based on comparison of the order of goals of those involved, and moral decision making can
be accommodated by statistical scientific methods.
Keywords:
moral status, moral considerability, non-human animals, sentience, agency, interests, rights, science fiction, Blade Runner, 2001: A Space Odyssey
