Unit:
Κατεύθυνση Στατιστική και Επιχειρησιακή ΈρευναLibrary of the School of Science
Supervisors info:
Α. Οικονόμου Αναπλ. Καθηγητής
Original Title:
Στρατηγική συμπεριφορά σε συστήματα εξυπηρέτησης υποκείμενα σε βλάβες
Translated title:
Strategic behavior in queueing systems with breakdowns
Summary:
In the queueing literature there is an emerging tendency to study systems from
an economic viewpoint.In the present paper we consider the Markovian
single-server queue with an unreliable server. The customers observe the queue
length and then decide whether to join or balk. We consider separately two
information cases and we identify the (Nash) equilibrium balking
strategies.Finally we analyze the system under the assumption that the
customers may depart without receiving service (reneging).
Keywords:
Queueing systems, Economic viewpoint, Strategies, Symmetric equilibrium strategy , Reneging
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