Unit:
Κατεύθυνση Φιλοσοφία των Επιστημών και της ΤεχνολογίαςLibrary of the School of Science
Supervisors info:
Στεφάνου Ιωάννης, Επίκουρος Καθηγητής, Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Φιλοσοφίας της Επιστήμης, ΕΚΠΑ
Μανωλακάκη Ελένη-, Επίκουρη καθηγήτρια, Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Φιλοσοφίας της Επιστήμης, ΕΚΠΑ
Νικολινάκος Δρακούλης, Αναπληρωτής καθηγητής, Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Φιλοσοφίας της Επιστήμης, ΕΚΠΑ
Original Title:
Προτάσεις που αποδίδουν Προτασιακές Στάσεις. Οι απόψεις των Frege και Fodor
Translated title:
Propositional attitude reports. Frege's & Fodor's views
Summary:
Frege’s and Fodor’s views on propositional attitude reports and some difficulties arising from them is the main theme of this dissertation. The core of the essay is Frege’s puzzle about propositional attitude reports. As Frege's puzzle we consider the question why the replacement of terms with the same reference in propositional attitude reports lead to problems when we come to decide whether the proposition is true or false
In the second part is introduced Frege’s solution of the puzzle as well as three main difficulties arising from a logical point of view, in the context of philosophy of language analysis. In addition, in this part is presented the theoretical framework that falls into these opinions. The first difficulty concerns the assumption of infinite references and meanings related to the words and the alternative offered by Dummett and Parsons. The second difficulty discusses the problem about the existence of entities such as thoughts and Carnap's suggestion to deal with this problem. The legalization of the replacement of terms with the same reference in belief attribution sentences is the third difficulty is been analyzed taking under consideration Burge’s objections.
In the third and in the fourth part the analysis concerns Fodor's view and some difficulties arising from this expressed by Berg. In the third part we outline the theoretical framework within Fodor formulated the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) and the solution he proposed on Frege’s puzzle. This discussion takes place in the field of the philosophy of mind. In particular, Fodor’s hypothesis is an attempt to provide a theoretical background for cognitive science. In the fourth part is presented the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) and its basic principles is governed by. We also highlight the central role of propositional attitudes in this. In addition, we present the solution to Frege’s puzzle as derived from the Language of Thought Hypothesis. Then we present Berg’s criticism on Fodor's solution. Berg's argument is focused on whether Fodor responds to the problem raised from Frege’s puzzle .
In the last part the discussion is summarized and conclusions are drawn.
Main subject category:
Science
Keywords:
propositional attitudes, Frege, Fodor, philosopy of mind, philosophy of language, psychology
File:
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ΠΤΥΧΙΑΚΗ_ανέβασμα .pdf
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