Κατεύθυνση Βυζαντινή Ιστορία
Library of the School of Philosophy

2021-09-15

2021

Tsakardanos Panagiotis-Christos

Τριανταφυλλίτσα Μανιάτη-Κοκκίνη, Επίκουρη Καθηγήτρια Βυζαντινής Ιστορίας, Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Αρχαιολογίας, Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών

Αντωνία Κιουσοπούλου, Καθηγήτρια Βυζαντινής Ιστορίας, Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Αρχαιολογίας, Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών

Σοφία Μεργιαλή-Σαχά, Αναπληρώτρια Καθηγήτρια Βυζαντινής Ιστορίας, Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Αρχαιολογίας, Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών

Διαχείριση της οθωμανικής απειλής από τη βυζαντινή πολιτική ηγεσία: Από τη σύγκρουση στον Πελεκάνο μέχρι την εισβολή του Σουλεϊμάν στην Ευρώπη (1329-1354)

Greek

Management of the Ottoman threat by the Byzantine political leadership: From the battle of Pelekanon to Suleyman's invasion in Europe (1329-1354)

In a study of the collective work “The Fourth Crusade and the Greek World“ (ΝΗRF/IBR 2008), Professor Taxiarchis Kolias deals with the management of the crusading movement from Byzantium. Aiming to understand the way that the term “management” is approached and applied to –term, which is extremely rare to find in titles of publications of our subject– we understand that the study seeks to promote the debate on the issue of crises or serious “problems’” management on behalf of the Byzantine political leadership. In this case –as in that of the present study– the way of dealing with a "problem", and in particular, an external threat, is analyzed. Therefore, in this study, the way in which Byzantium managed the Ottoman threat during the time when Andronicus III ascended to the throne until the resignation of John VI Cantacuzene (1328-1354) is examined. The choice of period is explained in the light of the fact that, while in 1328 –with the exception of the case of Bursa– the Ottoman activity was still limited to the parts of the mainland of the Bithynian countryside, in less than three decades, their Emirate acquired territory in Europe. Consequently, the question arises as to whether and how the management of the Ottoman threat by the Byzantine leadership contributed to this development.
The structure of this study is as follows: firstly –briefly and with emphasis on the Byzantine-Turkish relations– we describe the historical context of the period 1261-1354 (that is, from the restoration of the Byzantine power to the Ottoman conquest of Thrace), secondly, we attempt to outline fields that are later used as research constants (the political ideology of the Empire and its established practices abroad, the nature of the adversary, the managerial skills of the Empire before the Ottoman invasion of Bithynia and the way in which the leadership of the Palaiologos dynasty had faced the Turkish threat until 1328). The central question is examined in the third and final chapter of this study, in both sections of which (one concerning the period of Andronicus III, and one about the period that followed), the methodology followed was: analysis of their bilateral contacts → study of the conditions both were facing during the same period internally → identification of the way in which the Byzantine Empire handled the Ottoman threat in relation to the policy adopted on the other fronts abroad.

History

Byzantine Empire, Ottoman Turks, Palaiologos dynasty, management, strategy, Byzantine foreign policy, war, diplomacy, geopolitics, geostrategy

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https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/object/2960006