Supervisors info:
Ελένη Μανωλακάκη, Επίκουρη καθηγήτρια, Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Φιλοσοφίας των Επιστημών, Σχολή Θετικών Επιστημών, ΕΚΠΑ
Summary:
One of the main courses of this graduate thesis is the notion of proposition as the meaning/content of sentence. The propositional unity problem can be formulated as follows: what is that, that unifies the meaning of a sentence, or else, what differentiates a sentence from a simple list of linguistic terms? This project aims to present various different views of the problem of the unity of the proposition, the first expression of which was made by Plato, when he tried to define the sentence (λόγος). Philosophers were again concerned with this problem at the end of 19th century and this discussion continues to the present. Τhe project begins with the description of the 'birth' of the problem in ancient times. Subsequently, the reference of the most basic approaches to this problem, through both the most fundamental and also some others later theories about propositions in general, is attempted. For every different perspective and its exponent, the most important points and his point of view are included respectively, so that each one can be understood within the context it has been formulated. There are many theorists, who have been concerned with the propositional unity problem and have actively participated in the literature, whose views are not included in this graduate thesis, but this has nothing to do with their theoretical value.
In the first chapter, Plato' s basic views on the subject, as long as the formulation of the problem by himself, are described. After that, two arguments are introduced: the Third Man Argument by Aristotle and the infinite regress argument by Bradley, the latter of which is directly related to the first, but also to the propositional unity problem. The basic views of the central figures of Analytic Philosophy (Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein) on propositions and their unity, follow.
In the second chapter, the views of Carnap, Quine and Davidson on propositions are briefly mentioned, in the context of the new philosophical setting that was formed in the middle of the 20th century by the flourishing of Logical Empiricism. This chapter contains also a brief report of the propositional theories formulated by Kaplan and Cresswell. All the above theories co-shape the field concerning language contexts, propositions and their unity, as it is today.
The third chapter contains some of the 21st century approaches to propositions, which are distinguished on the basis of the different views of their exponents, that concern the nature and the function of propositions, as structured, or not, as long as explainable, or not, entities.
In conclusion, it turns out that the solution that every philosopher tried to give to the propositional unity problem, is directly dependent on how it is viewed and its wording.
Each different theory of propositions gives different characteristics to the problem and therefore different proposals for its solution, if any.
Keywords:
(non) structured proposition, propositional unity, russellian propositions, infinite regress, philosophy of language, semantics, cognitive realism, primitivism
