Dissertation committee:
Βάσω Κιντή (επιβλέπουσα) - Καθηγήτρια, Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Φιλοσοφίας της Επιστήμης, Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών.
Στέλιος Βιρβιδάκης (μέλος τριμελούς) - Ομότιμος Καθηγητής, Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Φιλοσοφίας της Επιστήμης, Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών.
Φαίη Ζήκα (μέλος τριμελούς) - Αναπληρώτρια Καθηγήτρια, Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Θεωρίας της Τέχνης, Ανωτάτη Σχολή Καλών Τεχνών.
Αντώνης Χατζημωϋσής - Καθηγητής, Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Φιλοσοφίας της Επιστήμης, Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών.
Μαρία Βενιέρη - Αναπληρώτρια Καθηγήτρια, Τμήμα Φιλοσοφικών και Κοινωνικών Σπουδών, Πανεπιστήμιο Κρήτης.
Κώστας Παγωνδιώτης - Επίκουρος Καθηγητής, Τμήμα Φιλοσοφίας, Πανεπιστήμιο Πατρών.
Διονύσης Χρηστιάς - Ερευνητής Β', Κέντρον Ερεύνης της Ελληνικής Φιλοσοφίας, Ακαδημία Αθηνών.
Summary:
It is commonly accepted that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Tractatus) is a logical and philosophical treatise that deals chiefly with the problem of the essence of language. The book is composed out of seven main propositions where the first five of them can be seen as the steps of a process that reaches its climax in proposition 6. Proposition 6, the nucleus of the whole book, provides an exact determination of the essence of language through the notion of the general propositional form – the common form shared by every possible proposition. In general terms, the first five propositions articulate a logical notation and the basic principles that guide it, a notation that accurately portrays the logic of the world and of language. Thus, the first five propositions of the book are like five branches (each containing further branches etc) that all lead to proposition 6, the proposition that states the essence of language (the general propositional form). That is, all the propositions up to 6 can be seen as the trunk of a tree that has five branches attached to it: propositions 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. These five branches (each with its own sub-branches) bear the fruits of the tree as it were. Each of these five branches concerns the application of the notion of the general propositional form to specific kinds of propositions: to logical propositions (6.1’s), to mathematical propositions (6.2’s), to the propositions expressing the most general laws/principles of nature (6.3’s), to the propositions of ethics (6.4’s), to the propositions that deal with the meaning of life and to the propositions of the book themselves (6.5’s) .
Hence, the Tractatus can be seen as presenting a single argument (about the nature of the proposition) which it then applies to particular kinds of propositions, drawing conclusions about their status. Finally, proposition 7 is like the common point at which those five branches intersect, their common conclusion: that all the propositions that the branches treat, turn out to be not cases of propositions proper since they do not partake of the essence of proposition. In a general sense, they all concern things that show themselves.
From those five branches arising out of proposition 6, the first three (the 6.1’s, the 6.2’s, the 6.3’s) are the minor branches since they concern matters that are, as it were insignificant, i.e., they concern the philosophical problems in the (strictly academic) sense of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. These three branches, together with the notion of the general propositional form, provide, according to Wittgenstein, the final and ultimate solution to the aforementioned problems; nevertheless Wittgenstein does not consider such problems (and the solutions he has provided) as significant; this is evident by the way he concludes the book’s Preface : “the value of this work secondly consists in the fact that it shows how little has been done when these problems have been solved.”
On the other hand, the last two branches (the 6.4’s and the 6.5’s) are the major branches of the Tractatus tree, they concern the ethical purpose of the book, a purpose that is of interest to everyone as it were, whether he is a philosopher or a common man. They concern the existence of ethical (absolute) value, the metaphysical/ethical subject (ethical will) as the limit of the world, the good or bad exercise of the will (attributable to the ethical subject) and the notions of moral reward and punishment. In general, the last two branches of the tree pertain to ethical notions and highlight their importance in relation to the dissolution of the Riddle of the world, the Riddle as to the meaning of life. The last branch of the tree (the 6.5’s) also concerns the right method in philosophy and the final recognition of the propositions of the book as nonsense - the recognition that they cannot be contained in the general propositional form.
This dissertation is composed of two main parts: Part A (Sense) concerns the trunk of the tree together with the minor branches and Part B (Value) concerns the major branches and more generally the notion of (absolute) value. In part A I will present an overview of my take on Wittgenstein’s conception of language and logic, a conception that culminates in the notion of the general propositional form. I will provide an analysis of this notion as also of the main tenets and presuppositions that lead Wittgenstein to it. Part A will thus deal with the realm of sense and the way Wittgenstein expressly delimits it. For all that, Part A is in a sense preparatory for Part B. The reason for this is that I see the parts of the Tractatus that succeed proposition 6 as being just applications of the notion of the general propositional form to different kinds of propositions; so acquaintance with this notion is a prerequisite for understanding the parts of the book that come right after it.
Part A will deal with the problem as to the nature of language- that the Tractatus sets out to solve-, and the main notions appearing in it: Wittgenstein’s proposed logical notation (in contrast to the notations of Frege and Russell), the notion of the general propositional form as the essence of language and as the only primitive sign in Wittgenstein’s notation, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy and philosophical activity and, finally, the minor branches of the tree: the applications of the notion of the general propositional form to numbers (6.0’s), to mathematical propositions (6.1’s), to logical propositions (6.2’s) and to the propositions expressing the most general principles of physics (6.3’s).
In Part B I will present the two major branches of the tree (6.4’s and 6.5’s) that deal with value. The following topics will be examined: the ethical notions that appear in the Tractatus (the ethical subject, the good or bad exercise of the will, moral reward/punishment, etc), what I consider to be the ethical prototype -the prototype for the notion of the good-, implicit in the Tractatus through a discussion of Pico della Mirandola , Arthur Schopenhauer, Otto Weininger and Leo Tolstoy, the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, the problem of solipsism, the relationship between the mystical and the scientific tendencies inherent in the Tractatus and the status of Wittgenstein’s own sentences. Finally, I will offer an analysis of Wittgenstein’s “Lecture on Ethics”, which I consider as sharing the same conception of sense and value as the Tractatus, and I will conclude with a discussion of the relationship between early Wittgenstein and Immanuel Kant as far as the ethical and its expression in language is concerned. This comparison can illuminate the notion of value and of the ethical inherent in the Tractatus as well as its relationship to the notion of sense.
Keywords:
Wittgenstein, Sense, Value, Logic, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ethics, Transcendental, Idealism, Nonsense, Science, Mysticism, Kant
