Summary:
The Greek and Greek Cypriot forces operating in Cyprus in the 1963-1966 period, and expressly, the control and influence exerted over them, became the breeding ground for, the initially contained and consequently open, confrontation between successive Greek administrations and President Makarios. The constant effort made by Nicosia to take under its wing, not only administratively, but essentially operationally, the National Guard, primarily, but, in certain instances, also the Greek Division, came as a "response" to the largely justified suspicions maintained by Makarios, that Athens was not only attempting to control through these bodies the political and diplomatic actions of Nicosia, but also that it could even impose by force of arms, choices that went against the will of the Greek Cypriot people.
Undoubtedly, the government of George Papandreou, having established Makarios' s intentions to follow a course outside the Western framework, sought, both on a political and military level, to control Cyprus. This objective was met by the implementation of “National Center” policies, which had the "militarization" of the island at their core. The decision, however, signalled the inclusion of both the military establishment, with which Papandreou had often collided in the past, as well as the uncontrollable Georgios Grivas, in Greek foreign policy. This development, combined with ideological formation, the persistence with the "Enosis", and the general culture of Greek officers who served in Cyprus at the time, turned the Greek army on the island into a permanent turmoil triggering factor. Whilst, therefore, the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces were intended to contribute to the stability of the Republic of Cyprus, they eventually became one of the key elements of destabilization and perpetuation of the split between the Greek governments and Makarios. The divergence between the Greek officers, on one side, and Makarios on the other, regarding the characteristics of the Enosis and the way it can be delivered, as well as the diplomatic turn of the Archbishop to the East, finally led to the chaotic rift between the former and the majority of the Greek Cypriot people, who, throughout the period discussed, had sided with the Archbishop. The two "sister states" and their officials had, in just a few years, turned into "enemies within the walls".
Albeit the decisions made by Makarios on military matters contributed to the creation of conditions of rupture. The Archbishop, from the first years of Cypriot independence, was acting methodically, on one hand to overturn the Zurich-London agreements and, on the other, to strengthen his position. So, he gradually formed what is named in the present study "a docile mass of armed supporters". It was these masses that would support him throughout the course of the next years in the implementation of his plans.
Τhe actions of Greek officers and their confrontation with Makarios leads to the conclusion that the Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, was for the Greek army a latent form of the Great Idea. Lastly, the presence of the Greek military forces on Cyprus was yet more proof of the tendency towards autonomization that was displayed over time - up to the Regime change- by the army against political power and especially during periods when multifaceted crises were playing out.
Keywords:
Cyprus, Makarios, Grivas, army, ELDYK, Greek Division, National Guard, Papandreou, Military Issue, TOYRDYK, Georkatzis, Karagiannis, United States, Soviet Union
