Semirealism or Neo-Aristotelianism?

Επιστημονική δημοσίευση - Άρθρο Περιοδικού uoadl:2994521 6 Αναγνώσεις

Μονάδα:
Ερευνητικό υλικό ΕΚΠΑ
Τίτλος:
Semirealism or Neo-Aristotelianism?
Γλώσσες Τεκμηρίου:
Αγγλικά
Περίληψη:
Chakravartty claims that science does not imply any specific metaphysical theory of the world. In this sense, science is consistent with both neo-Aristotelianism and neo-Humeanism. But, along with many others, he thinks that a neo-Aristotelian outlook best suits science. In other words, neo-Aristotelianism is supposed to win on the basis of an inference to the best explanation (IBE). I fail to see how IBE can be used to favour neo-Aristotelianism over neo-Humeanism. In this essay, I aim to do two things. Firstly, I explain why this failure is not idiosyncratic: it should be there even by Chakravartty's lights. Secondly, I raise some critical worries about Chakravartty's semirealism, especially in connection with the concept of a 'concrete structure' and the detection/auxiliary distinction. The essay ends with a dilemma: an exclusive disjunction encapsulated in its title. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
Έτος δημοσίευσης:
2013
Συγγραφείς:
Psillos, S.
Περιοδικό:
Erkenntnis
Εκδότης:
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Τόμος:
78
Αριθμός / τεύχος:
1
Σελίδες:
29-38
Επίσημο URL (Εκδότης):
DOI:
10.1007/s10670-012-9418-z
Το ψηφιακό υλικό του τεκμηρίου δεν είναι διαθέσιμο.