Unit:
Κατεύθυνση Στατιστική και Επιχειρησιακή ΈρευναLibrary of the School of Science
Author:
Λεονάρδος Στέφανος
Supervisors info:
Κωνσταντίνος Μηλολιδάκης Αναπλ. Καθηγ. (Επιβλέπων), Απόστολος Μπουρνέτας Καθηγ., Αντώνης Οικονόμου Αναπλ. Καθηγ.
Original Title:
Γενικεύσεις και Εκλεπτύνσεις του Σημείου ισορροπίας Nash
Translated title:
Coarsenings and refinements of Nash equilibrium
Summary:
Nash equilibrium is the single most theoretic analysis in non-cooperative game
theory. However during the last years it has been criticized due to the
following reasons.
Firstly, in many cases it corresponds to unattractive solutions that are not
choosen by the players. In this directions research focuses in coarsenings of
nash equilibrium.
Secondly, in games with more than one Nash equilibrium we need a tool to
discriminate between them. We examine the method of backward induction and the
concept of sequential equilibrium.
Common in all the theories we examine are the assumptions of common knowledge
and common prior. This field is called Epistemic Game Theory.
Keywords:
Nash equilibrium, Rational expectations, Sequential equilibrium, Backward induction, Common knowledge
