Τίτλος:
The value of reneging for strategic customers in queueing systems with server vacations/failures
Γλώσσες Τεκμηρίου:
Αγγλικά
Περίληψη:
Customer strategic behavior regarding the join-or-balk dilemma in queueing systems with server vacations/failures has been studied intensively in the recent literature. The standard assumption in these studies is that joining customers are not allowed to renege later. In the present paper we relax this assumption and quantify the value of reneging for strategic customers who face a queueing system with server vacations/failures. To focus on the reneging feature, we study the customer strategic behavior in the simplest such system, that is in the M/M/1 queue with a server alternating between on and off periods. We show that the possibility of reneging has substantial effect on the equilibrium social welfare and throughput. In particular, as the reward from service varies in a given system, it becomes beneficial to activate or deactivate the option of reneging to ensure a higher welfare. Moreover, we show that the effect of the reneging option is particularly significant in the case where the original system with non-strategic customers is unstable. © 2022 Elsevier B.V.
Συγγραφείς:
Economou, A.
Logothetis, D.
Manou, A.
Περιοδικό:
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
Λέξεις-κλειδιά:
Queueing networks; Queueing theory, Balking; Original systems; Queueing system; Reneging; Server vacations; Simple++; Social welfare; Standard assumptions; Strategic Behavior; Strategic customer, Sales
DOI:
10.1016/j.ejor.2022.01.010
