Τίτλος:
Strategic customers in a transportation station when is it optimal to wait?
Γλώσσες Τεκμηρίου:
Αγγλικά
Περίληψη:
We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.
Συγγραφείς:
Manou, A.
Economou, A.
Karaesmen, F.
Περιοδικό:
Computers and Operations Research
Λέξεις-κλειδιά:
Game theory, Clearing system; Nash equilibrium strategies; Partial information; Queueing strategic customers; Unobservable, Sales
DOI:
10.1287/opre.2014.1280
