Unit:
Κατεύθυνση Στατιστική και Επιχειρησιακή ΈρευναLibrary of the School of Science
Author:
Bekios Konstantinos
Supervisors info:
Αντώνιος Οικονόμου, Καθηγητής, Τμήμα Μαθηματικών, ΕΚΠΑ, (Επιβλέπων)
Απόστολος Μπουρνέτας, Καθηγητής, Τμήμα Μαθηματικών, ΕΚΠΑ,
Αθανασία Μάνου, Επίκουρη Καθηγήτρια, Τμήμα Μαθηματικών, ΕΚΠΑ
Original Title:
Συστήματα εξυπηρέτησης με επαναπροσπάθειες και στρατηγικούς πελάτες
Translated title:
Συστήματα εξυπηρέτησης με επαναπροσπάθειες και στρατηγικούς πελάτες
Summary:
In this thesis we will study the area of Queuing Theory with retrials and strategic
customers who will be able to make decisions to enter a queue or not, to leave their
contact details or not, to retry with specific rate, etc. This framework is widely used in
Queueing Theory and there are several models that have been studied. For example, we
can take a service system where if the customers find the server busy they will be able to
decide at what rate they will retry. At the same time, they have entered a virtual waiting
queue, which is called orbit, until they go to the service area. Their goal is to minimize
their total costs (waiting costs and costs per retrial). Here’s a dilemma: high rate means
lots of retrials but little waiting time, while low rate means few retrials but long waiting
time. This will be one of the problems that we will present in this thesis. We will also study
the dilemma of join or balk in a system with a known retrial rate and we will analyze
some useful results. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to present a historical track on
this field and to broadly analyze the optimal strategies that customers can follow under
some models of those that have been studied.
Main subject category:
Science
Keywords:
Service system, usual retrials, constant retrials, strategic behavior, threshold strategy, tagged customer, Nash equilibrium strategy, social welfare, social optimal strategy, administrator's optimization, observable queue, unobservable queue, retrial rate, Nash equilibrium retrial rate, social optimal retrial rate, coordinations mechanisms
